lectual and emotional basis for the people's total c()mmitment , to the society under the Communist control. Stalin and Mao

Tse-tung are only infrequently mentioned in the Party docu­ments, presumably because of the divergent Sino-Soviet view­points ()n the tactical lines expounded by these two figures. To the Party leadership, Communist ideology is the all-embracing, ultimate set of values-the standard of truth by which all social, cultural and political activities are justified and judged.

Inseparably related ·also is the p()litical dogma that Party su­premacy should be accepted as a matter of faith. The Party, considering itself the defender of the working class and its proletarian ideology, is defined as the only legitimate organization capable of preserving the "purity" of the Communist doctrine and of interpreting and applying it to the specific needs of revolutionary undertakings throughout both North and South Vietnam.

In the mid-1960's Communist ideology continued to constitute the nucleus of what the government called revolutionary hero­ism-an idealized fighting creed desigued to develop militant attitudes on the part of the people. Acc()roing to Party pronounce­ments, revolutionary heroiSllll contained the following elements: absolute loyalty to Party leadership and adherence to its poli­cies; militant class consciousness; virulent hatred for the United States; and patriotic sentiments.

Party theorists explained that revolutionary heroism under­went two distinct developmental phases. During the so-called resistance days, before mid-1954, the application of this fighting creed was limited mainly to the struggle for national independ­ence from French rule and, to a lesser extent, to eff()rts in sup­port of giving lands to the peasants. After the Geneva settlements of 1954, however, the scope of the creed was enlarged to take into consideration the dual tasks of building a socialist society in North Vietnam and of thwarting the so-called "United States imperialist desigus on Vietnam." Party theorists repeatedly em­phasized that the socialist and anti-United States patriotic themes of revolutionary heroism are interdependent and must be mutually reinforcing. They admitted, however, that although patriotic sentiments could be aroused easily, efforts to stimulate so~ialist or Communist awareness failed to obtain comparable results.

According to Party leaders, an ideal or exemplary citizen is a "socialist man"-a truly revolutionary combatant, dedicated to both socialism and patriotism, who is prepared to brave all suf~ ferings and difficulties in defeating enemies. He is also depicted

249

as a man leading "an indus.trious and simple life, 'sharing hap­piness and hardship with the masses, and worrying first and enjoying later."

In the mid-1960's the Party tended to emphasize the "hate United States" aspect of the fighting creed more than other considerations. This was evident especially after the United States participation in the Vietnam conflict in mid-1965. Party propagandists were attempting to attach qualities of almost supernatural power to this hatred theme. Thus, in June 1966 an article in Quan Doi Nhatn Dan (People's Army), daily organ of the Army, declared:

Hatred is a revolutionary sentiment which is very important in fighting. It is the explosive power of our heart. It is the soul of each bullet and is the bayonet pointing against the enemy. It transforms the steel and iron in our hands into invincible strength. . . . With hatred one is bold. With the flame of hatred burning their hearts, our fighters would not fear difficulties and would not retreat in the face of death.

The Party's political ideology is disseminated through various channels. Cadres assigned to all Party branches, administrative agencies, units of the armed forces, mass organizations and agri­cultural and industrial production units performed key 'roles in explaining the meaning and importance of revolutionary hero­ism (see ch. 11, Political Dynamics; ch. 13, Public Information arid Propaganda).

Another important channel is the school system, the primary function of which is described as creating and forging new socialist men. Ideally, socialist men would be "useless ... with­out ideological and moral training" no matter how much knowl­edge they possessed. On the other hand, Party leaders warned that if a ·scientific education is neglected, "then we will only have virtuous men without knowledge for the building of social­ism and Oommunism." Under the Party policy this ideological training should start from the kindergarten level. Hence, a kindergarten teacher is officially described as the second mother of the child in his development of character, sentiments and intellect (see ch. 8, Education).

Militant ideological training is also undertaken through the so-called emulation campaigns. In the mid_1960's these drives included: the "each one works as two" movement, a campaign designed to exhort the peOple toward building and protecting North Vietnam and toward the supporting of "the revolution for the liberation of South Vietnam"; the "three ready move­ment" for the youth who were to be ready to join the Armed

250

Forces and fight heroically, ready to overcome difficulties, step up production, study under whatever circumstances and go any­where and perform any task designated by the fatherland; and the "three responsibilities movement" for the women who were to perform the work formerly undertaken by men now in mili­tary service, to care for the families and dependents of soldiers on the front and to join the local Militia (see ch. is, Public Information and Propaganda).

Still another important scheme in the mid-1960's was the adulation of President Ho Chi Minh as the national father of the state. The Party prescribed that every action and word of Presi­dent Ho should be emulated. By mid-1966 the government claimed to have produced· nearly 400,000 so-called Uncle Ho's good nephews and nieces, a title given to school-age children judged to be exemplary in their emulation of President Ho (see ch. 8, Education). Indications in the mid-1960's were that Presi­dent Ho was personally popular :nith the vast majority of the people presumably because of his earlier image as nationalist leader in the true Vietnamese tradition. Popular attitude toward him as the Communist leader could not be readily determined in late 1966.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE AUTHORITY

Information from independent sources pertaining to the actual popular perception of such concepts as the state, nation, coun­try or government was scant in late 1966. Nonetheless, occasional reports by non-Communist visitors to North Vietnam, although fragmentary, suggested that most of the people became highly conscious of their Vietnamese identity and that generally they st-emed to sUPl)ort the regime. The same sources also suggested that after the initiation of United States air attacks in 1965 the popular attitude toward the United States steadily "toughened." These sources did not explain, h()wever, whether the people's seeming loyalty toward the authority was because of their under­standing of President Ho's regime as being Communist, their understanding of it. as a purely Vietnamese entity or because of their desire merely to survive .with whatever collective entity; nor was there any clear indication as to the spontaneous popular attitude toward the reunification ·of N o~th and South Vietnam.

Popular attitudes toward authority could be surmised in part from Party l-eaders' frequent statements, which implied that the people's political attitudes, including those of Party members,

251

left much to be desired and that prolonged and arduous efforts would be needed to alter this situatiO'n.

There were other indicationa to suggest that the popular atti­tudes toward the party 'and <tJhJe government continued to be less than satisfactory from the point of view of the authorities. In February 1965, Politburo member Le Duc ThO' conceded that "man's transfO'rmation is not a task which can be fulfilled in a simple, hasty, and rude way; it requires of us nO't O'nly intense affectiO'n, but also meticulous and comprehensive measures."

In November 1966 Le Duc Tho cO'ntinued to voice hi.s dissatis­faction over the popular attitudes toward the Party and with the attitudes 01' many Party members toward the peO'ple. While discussing the "urgent need" for improving the relatiO'nship be­tween the peO'pleand the Party, he pointed out that "many short­comings must be O'vercome." Referring mainly to the Party's cadres and members in many villages and cooperatives, he cited twO' majO'r categO'ries of shortcomings, one stemming from the questiO'nable moral standards of some Party functionaries and the O'ther from their arbitrary and bureaucratic attitude toward the people. He asserted that these problems were largely resPO'n­I!ible fO'r "signs of lack of enthusiasm and unity" among the peO'ple.

Specifically, Le Duc Tho criticized unspecified numbers 01' Party elements for their common indulgence in "bad mO'tivation, dubious financial dealings, cO'rruption, abuse of kindness, failure to' pay debts, drunkenness and debauchery." He also complained about the so-called undemocratic, bureaucratic and superficial manner of attending to the needs of the people on the part of lower-level Party cadres and members. In addition, he held a number of high-level comrades responsible for this undesirable trend-a situation which he said was caused by their propensity for pressing their subordinates for demonstrable results in di­verse Party undertakings.

Le Due Tho also implied that the separation O'f the Party from the masses was more or less inevitable under such imperfect conditions of Party leadership. He complained that many Party cadres and members "tried to hide their shortcomings, to limit democratic practice, to ,show prejndices, and to suppress thO'se who criticized them:." He also criticized a number of comrades for being influential by the prevalence of the so-called exploiting classes' mentality. In the mid-1960's the Party was attempting to remedy the situatiO'n by pursuing the so-called four good chi bo movement, launched initially in June 1962 (see ch. 11, Politi­cal Dynamics).

252

MINORITY GROUPS

Information regarding the political orientation of such groups as the Catholics and ethnic minorities in the highlands was in late 1966 scanty and remained largely conjectural. Occasional Party statements concerning these groups, however, provided some hints as to their political attitudes.

Catholics

By mid-19M there were roughly 1.4 million Roman Catholics in North Vietnam. After the Geneva settlement of the same year, some 700,000 of them fled to the South; it appeared then that those who remained in the North-estimated to be between 500,-000 and 800,000 in late 1966-did so less because of their sym­pathywith the Communist-controlled regime than because o,f their deep attachment to their ancestral land and uncertainty about their future in a part of the country with which they were unfamiliar.

The authorities consistently have spoken of their respect for the right of religious groups to worship as they please, and the Constitution of 1960 specifically provides for freedom of religion. Behind this facade of assurances, however, the regime has sub­jected the Church to a campaign of only slightly disguised harassment, legal restriction and propaganda. Taxation has struck at the Church finances, and with the decline in the num­ber of seminaries the Communists evidently expect that the ranks of the clergy will 'be thinned by attrition. The regime has also acted to reduce or eliminate the contact of the looal Church with the Church a;broad, and this policy is supplemented by an . effort-sometimes implemented with force-to organize Oatho­lies into progovernment groups. Some importance appears to be attached to obtaining support from the Catholic clergy, as well as the laity, as a means of convincing the large Catholic popula­tion in South Vietnam that reunification would not spell the end of Vietnamese Catholicism (see ch. 6, Family, Religion and S0-cial Values).

The Catholic attitude toward the Communist authority, actual or fancied, has been a frequent subject of official attention, especially when Party leaders addressed themselves to the prob­lem of national integration and internal security. For example, in September 1960,Party First Secretary Le Duan implied that the Catholic community was potentially exploitable by the so­c.alled counterrevolutionary elements. operating in religious guise ..

253

Likewise, a Party official asserted in February 19£8 that the

Catholic Church should be btamed for the existence of "many

false shepherds hiding under the cloak of the priests to carry

out intelligence activities, to serve as lackeys for the imperial­

ists .... " The apparently unenthusiastic political posture of the

Catholic adherents seemed to persist. Thus, in February 1966,

Le Duc Tho ordered the Party's propaganda and mobilization

efforts to be especially geared to "those areas where there are

compatriots practicing Catholicism." An article in the August­

September 1966 issue of Tuyen Huan continued to press for "a

struggle against insiders and reactionaries who are utilizing

Christianity" to undermine the government.

Ethnic Minorities

In the mid-1960's the ethnic minority peoples in the highlands

numbered upwards of 600,000 and possibly as many as 2 million.

As in South Vietnam, they have been historically at odds with

the dominant Vietnamese-Sl\leaking people of the lowlands. The

Communist regime has attempted to woo them by giving some

recognition to the cutsoms, J.anguages and cultures O'f the various

minorities and by granting them nominal political autonomy

whileactualJy maintaining close administrative and political con­

trol over them (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Languages).

The ideological, cultural, technical, and scientific standards of

the minorities and of the Party caures and members operating

in the highlands were lower than those of the lowlan.ders. Ac­

cording to an article in the February 1965 issue of Hoc TO![>,

another problem was the persistence of old habits, customs and

way of thinking among the highlanders, interfering not oniy with

the deVelopment of a new proletarian ideology but 'also with the

development of national consciorumess or sense of identification

with the North Vietnamese Govermnent. The same source stated

that stil1 another obstacle in their poUtical and cultural develop­

ment was the existence of friction 'among the minorities them­

selves. The article asserted that lack of unity among the minori­

ties seri()usly hampered the Party's mass movements in the area.

It berated a number of Party members for their arbitrary, bu­

reauCl.'atic practices, corruption, wasteful actions, inactions,

self-complacency and for ignoring the needs of the people.

NATIONAL SYMBOLS AND HOLIDAYS

National symbols indicate a complete break with the past.

254

The flag of the so-called Democratic Republic of Vietnam, a solid red rectangle with a large five-pointed gold star in the center, is akin to the red five-star flag of Communist China. The coat of arms is a circular shield with a five-pointed gold star near the top and a gold cogwheel at the base. The national anthem is "Forward Soldiers" (Tien Quan Cu).

New Year's Day, January 1, is an official holiday but not the traditional Tet (lunar New Year), the observance. of which is frowned upon as "unenlightened." May 1 is an important holi­day, second only to September 2, the anniversary of the found­ing of the so-called Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1945. The anniversaries of heroes and heroines of Vietnamese history are not marked with holidays, but these persons and their achievements are invoked in articles and speeches on patriotic themes. Other commemorative days include February 3, the founding date of the Lao Dong Party in 1930; May 7, the day of the Dien Bien Phu victory in 1954; July 28, war invalids' and martyrs' day; August 19, marking the successful Viet Minh insurrection in Hanoi in 1945; December 19, the day when the anti-French resistance war began in 1946; December 20, the founding date of the so-called National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam in 1960; and December 22, the day when the North Vietnamese Army was founded in 1944.

255

SECTION m. ECONOMIC

CHAPTER 15

CHARACTER AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY

The economy remains largely agricultural despite the govern­ment's preoccupation with industrialiZation. Most of the popu­lation is engaged in farming. Irrigated rice is the principal crop, and food production. in most years is insufficient to feed the people. Industrial production has risen sharply, but it has fallen far short of stated goals; handicrafts still contribute over half of the total annual industrial output. Although some progress has been made; it could not have been achieved without large­scale assistance from other Communist states. Farming and handicrafts are almost entirely collectivized; all industry is state owned. State trading organizations control most of the country's wholesale and retail trade and have a monopoly of external trade, a major portion of which is with Communist countries.

Early in the twentieth century the French colonial adminis­tration·began to introduce various European improvements into the traditional agrarian subsistence economy of Tonkin and northern Annam. Extensive coal, iron and nonferrous meta~ mines were exploited. Some coffee, tea, cotton, and tobacoo plan­tations were established. Modern hydraulics works protecting 440,000 acres of wet-rice fields were constructed in the Red River Delta, and power stations were built at mining installations and in ubran centers.

At Haiphong a sMpbuilding industry and plants for the produc­tion of cement, glass bottles, porcelain and textiles were created. Other small processing industries and railway repair shops were centered in Hanoi; textile factories were located 50 miles south­east. in N am Dim; and papermills, 30 miles northwest at Viet TrL Railroads were constructed to China, northwest from Hai­phong via Lao Cai to Kunming and northeast from Hanoi via Lang Son to Nanning. A third line joined Hanoi with Saigon. Navigation on the delta waterways and the ports of Haiphong were developed. By 1989 over 5,000 miles of roads, of which almost 800 miles were aephalted, connected the major centers.

257

From 1939 to 1954 Vietnam was the scene of international war and civil strife. Roads, railroads, bridges, industrial plants and powerplants, irrigation and drainage works were destroyed or dismantled. Navigable waterways and ports were neglected and silted up. Plantations and farmlands were abandoned, and farm families crowded into the cities, swelling the ranks of the un­employed. Thus, at the time of partition, reconstruction alone presented a formidable and costly burden further exacerbated by a disastrous crop season resulting in widespread famine.

The September 1954 'session of the Politburo of the Lao Dong Party's Central Committee outlined the basic tasks for the reconstruction of the economy. Primary attention was to be devoted to raising farm output and solving the food situation, to rehabilitating industrial enterprises, mines and powerplants, and, according to the Central Committee's report, "to consoli­dating the state sector of the economy while utilizing the private sector in the interest of the construction of socialilSlll." A policy of continuing the land reform program begun in 1945 in the area of Viet Minh control and extending it to the whole country was adopted by the Party at this session.

Late in 1955 a National Planning Board and a Central Statis­tical office were established with the assistance of Chinese and Soviet experts, and shortly afterward a plan for 1955 through 1957 was announced. Thirty-eight percent of capital investment wrus to be spend on industrial reconstruction, 23 petcent for transport and communications, 20 percent for agriculture and irrigation and the remaining 19 percent for education and social services.

At the same time this plan was in foree, following the Chinese model and under the watchful eye of Chinese advisers, land dis­tribution Was carried out. In this part of Indochina, where land­holdings were traditionally smaH and owner operated, virtually the only large landlords were French plantation owners. Their lands were confiscated along with those of other "traitors," the plantations beiug set up as state farms. Regardless of the small size of the remaining farms, "landlords" had to be found in every village, denounced, tried, executed, and their lands divided among the village landless. This resulted in the elimination of more efficlent'farmers and the reduction of farm size to an aver­age of 2 acres. A halt was called to the terror when open rebel­lion broke out among the peasantry in Nghe An Province, south of Hanoi. However, the disruption in the countryside not only had affected food production but had caused a setback in recon­struction and rehabilitation.

258

Nonetheless, at the end of 1957 the authorities announced that the economy was reconstructed; that the value of gross indus­trial product had achieved the 1989 level and that the value of gross farm output was considerably higher than it had been in 1989. Furthermore, it was stated that the "socialist sector" of the economy had begun to play a leading role. By the end of 1957 the share of the socialist sector in gross farm output was only 0.8 percent. It accounted, however, for 25.2 percent of the value of the gross product of industry and handicrafts, 98 per­cent of foreign trade, 52.6 percent of wholesale trade and 81.8 percent of retail trade.

One of the basic tasks of the Three-Year Plan for the Trans­formation and Development of the Economy and Culture (1958-60) was:

. . . to liquidate capitalist ownership of the means of production in industry and' trade, 80 that-after the transformation of agri­culture and of handicrafts-socialist ownership of the means of production can become the base of the economy, liquidating the bourgeois class and capitalist exploitation, reeducating the capital. ists to make them useful members of society.

The Three Year Plan provided for the doubling of state invest­ment in the industrial and agricultural sector with the aim· of raising overall production during the Plan period by 82 percent, an industrial target of 89 percent and an agricultural target of 79 percent. Targets were later reduced to 50 percent overall, 70 percent for industry and 40 percent for agriculture.

The "transformation of private capitalist industry and trade" was begun through the establishment of "joint state-capitalist enterprises." In the creation of these enterprises, mobile capital and real estate were assessed by government authorities, and valuation until the total assessment was liquidated. The state became the sole owner of such enterprises, which thereafter were operated in accordance with the state plan. Craftsmen, arti­sans and small merchants were "transformed," either by being hired in state trading organizations or by being organized into various types of cooperatives, such as handicraft or those for buying and selling. At the same time, the collectivization of agri­culture was also started.

By the end of 1960 almost all (98.9 percent) privately owned industrial and trade enterprises had been converted into com­bined "joint state-capitalist enterprises." The public sector owned nine-tenths of all industry and commerce and four-fifths of all transport. Approximately 75 percent of all petty traders and artisans had been organized into state-controlled cooperatives.

259

In the countryside some 85 .percent of all peasants had felt obliged to join agricultural producer cooperatives.

Industry seems to have performed fairly well under the Three­Year Plan. Ninety-three principal industrial projects were .com­pleted. In 1960 industry accounted for 40.7 percent of the total valueofindustrial·a.nd agricultural production, as compared with 31.4 percent in 1957; the share of what is called "modern in­dustry" rose from 10.5 percent to 19.5 percent in the same period. Textiles were ·recorded at having done better than was originally anticipated; otherwise, the output of industry generally ran below that called for by the Plan, but not excessively so. Pro­duction of raw phosphate greatly exceeded the target. ~ output of electricity in 1960 is given 'as falling WllY a little short of the target of 271 million kiiowatt-hours fixed for that year, the program for the construction of six new power stations with a capacity of 67,000 kilowatts must have been more or less full­filled. Transport facilities within the country and up to the Chi. nese border were greatly improved. The Dong Anh-Thai Nguyen railway, which serves the new steel center north of Hanoi, was reported completed in the second half of 1960.

In agricultur~, however, the Plan proved to be entirely vision­ary. It demanded a production of 7.6 million tons of paddy rice in 1960 as against the 4.5 million tons finally claimed, substan­tially lower thMl in the previous 2 years. Livestock. numbers were also less than in 1959. As a result of decreased food sup­plies, rations had to be cut.

In 1961 the first FivecYear Plan (1961-65) was initiated. Its primary objectives were "to lay down socialist Imiterial and technical foundations, to advan~esocialist industrialization, giv­ing priority to heavy industry, and to complete soc~t reform." Meanwhile, the groundwork was to be laid for "future long­range development." The 1965 value of industrial and handicraft products was to. be 119 percent higher''thaD. that of 1960, or an average annual increase of 17 percent. VaHoils targets estab­lished for 'production in 1965 included: 660 million kilowatt­hours. of electricity, 5 million tons of coal; 85,000 tons of cast iron, 1.4 million tons of raw phosphate and 710,000 tons of cement. The value of agricultural products in 1965 was to be 87 percen!l; over 1966, .or an average annual increase of 6.5 per­cent. By 1965 the volume of foodstuffs, was to. have reached 7.1 million tons, and acreage under industrial crops was to have greatlyexMDded.to provide raw materials .for industry and export..' .

Each.ysar's production theoretically was established in 'accord-

ance with the growth rates ·stipulated in the Five-Year Plan, section by section. Goals, however, were likely to be presented in percentage terms of a revised but unstated base, making it difficult to assess actual performance. In 1963 Party policy shifted from giving priority to heavy industry !'paying greater attention to agriculture and light industry," no doubt a conse­quence of the overriding need to increase food production. In 1963 and 1964 heavy investments were made in the construction and operation of irrigation works. In 1966. the Party again shifted the direction of its economic activities; the new policy called upon the people. "to produce and fight at the same' time."

"Step up the building of the materilll and technical founda­tions of socialism," exhorted Premier Pham Van Dong, "in a way suited to wartime conditions so as to meet both the immediate and long-term requirements and to accelerate the development of agriculture, local industry, communications and transport." In the same speech the Premier announced th'at the goals of the first Five-Year Plan h8.d been fulfilled, that the second Five­Year Plan would be abaJidoned arid that the new policy initiated in 1965 would determine the production plans for 1966 and 1967.

The degree to which the first Five-Year Plan's original tar­gets were met is difficult to determine. In 1964, the latest date for which production figures are available, the. country gener­ated 648.1 million kilowatt-hours of electricity and produced 3.4 million tons of coal, 694,000 tons of cement and 825,600 tons of raw phosphate. The ,rice harvest was 4.,5 million tons. Had it not been for the labor. shortlige res\llting from military require~ ments, the original 1965 goals might have been achieved in min­ing and some industries.

During the period of this Plan most of the industrial enter­prises in the country were constructed or expanded. In 1965 they totaled over 1,000; of these, 200 were described as rela­tively large and modern, including the metallurgical combine at Thai Nguyen, the chemical combine at Viet Tri and the phos­phate plant in Haiphong. Developments' in electric power, ma­chine building, metal processing and chemical production had been substantial. Production capacities of the coal, phosphate, iron and chromite mines had been increased. The' area under controlled irrigation had been extended, bu.t still too much culti­vated land in the Delta was' subject to drought and waterlogging. New industrial crops had been introduced and were being grown on a steadily increasing acreage. The 'critical economic problem

. remained the production of enough rice to feed the population.

261

In 1965 industry and handicrafts contributed the larger share, 53.7 percent, to the value of gross national product, agriculture contrrbuting only 46.3 percent. The aggregate value of industrial production had risen to 2.7 billion dong (for value of the dong, see Glossary) in 1965 from 838.9 million in 1957, and the value of agricultural production h'ad increased to 2.6 biUion dong from 1.8 billion in 1957.

According to the authorities, natural calamities began affect­ing the rice crop in 1960, and by 1966, in spite of the efforts made to expand food production, rice output had shown only minor increases. The area of double-cropped rice had been ex­panded, and a third rice crop, a novelty in North Vietnam, had been introduced, but acreage was limited.

Some expansion had been registered in the production of sweet potatoes, manioc and corn. Industrial crops, such as sugar­cane, fibers and rubber, had been introduced on state farms .

. Attempts had been made to resettle many Vietnamese from the Delta into the highlands and to urge the local minority peoples in the highlands to form cooperatives growing fibers, coffee,tea and peanuts. Farm practices in general had shown little change over the centuries, but diversification of crops, use of fertilizer, consolidation of fields and standardization of field size were gradually becoming acceptable. The family farm had not been eliminated, in spite of the government's stated policy that the peaeants were to be grouped into cooperatives as a transition to ultimate collectivization. Farmers were exhorted by the authori­ties to sell their produce only through buying-and-selling coop­eratives or state-owned stores, but officials frequently complained of peasant hording and b~ack-market sales.

The vast majority of North Vietnamese still earn 'a living from the land. Manual labor is the rule; a few hundred thou­sand are engaged in handicrafts, and fewer than 100,000 are employed in modern factories. A shortage of trained engineers, managerial personnel, and skilled workers has plagued all sec­tors of the economy since partition. On-the-job training has been. stressed, and specialists from Communist countries have played a major role. as instructors. Numerous technical schools have beell established, and trainees have been set to China, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia for lIdvanced instruction.

The financial and monetary system is a monopoly of the gov­ernment and is· centered in the National Bank, which is the Ultimate source of all funds. Government revenues have con-

262

sisted almost entirely of domestic revem:e~ and aid and credit extended by other Communist states. From 1955 through 1963, the last year for which such information is available, domestic revenues assumed an ever greater proportion of the total, rising from 60.5 percent to 79.,5 percent. Of domestic revenues, profits from state-owned enterprises and industries have shown the highest rate of increase, rising from 6.5 percent in 1955 to 56 percent of total domestic revenues in 1963. Taxes, however, still make an important contribution.

Taxes on agricultural producers are payable in kind, are col­lected by district cadres at harvesttime and are deposited in government warehouses in each district. Taxes on business, trade, industry, urban real estate, exports and imports are payable in money. Information is not available on the system of accounting within the government for payments in taxes in either cash or kind. Complaints of tax evasion are registered frequently by the government, but the scale is not divulged.

The North Vietnamese unit of currency, the dong, has no value outside the country and is unsupported by gold or foreign exchange. All foreign exchange in the country must be deposited with the government, whether still with the National Bank as in the past or with the new Foreign Trade Bank is unknown. For­eign exchenge holdings of the government are not published. Interest payments due on loans from the Soviet Union and othe.· European Communist countries and the balance of exports and imports between North Vietnam 'and these states is drawn up annually in rubles. Payment arrangements with Communist China have not been made public. North Vietnam's balance of payments position with free world countries is favorable; whether foreign exchange derived from these transactions has been used to payoff debts to Communist countries is not k,nown (see ch. 21, Financial and Monetary System; ch. 18, Foreign l!]conomic Relations).

A significant amount of economic and technical aid, loans, and credits has been and is being received from Communist countries, especially Communist China and the Soviet Union. By the end of 1964 aid totaling 320 million rubles, of which 94.5 million rubles were gratis, had been delivered by the Soviet Union and Eastern European Communist countries (for value of ruble, see Glossary). Total value of aid furnished by Communist China was unknoWn, although North Vietnamese authorities stated that the amount was greater than that received from the Soviet Union.

263

The Communist countries had restored the mines, constructed powerplants, factories, communications lines, and many medic~l educational institutions. China had reconstructed and equipped the railways and. ,the Haiphong shipyard. The Soviet Union and Romania Were the prime suppliers, of petroleum, oil, and lubri­cants. Aid shJpments which had begun tapering off in the early 1960's were, greatly increa~ed in 19.65 'and 1966, but extent and scope were unknown.

Thai Nguyen, the iron and steel' combine which is the pride of North Vietnam's industrial developm,ent program, has been built on an entirely new site, near iron mines in the mountains some 40 miles north o~ Hanoi. Most ·of the other new plants have been located in towns or cities where workshops or factories were already in operation. The Viet Tri. chemical combine was constructed. nea~ the old French papermills. The textile mills of Nam Dinh have been re,constructed and expanded, and new ones have been built. ·The. former railway repair shops. at. Vinh,,·{)n . the coastal plain 160 miles south of Hanoi, have provided a base for a m~mber of smallplailts. In Haiphong the old French cement plant has been enlarged, and the ship repair yard once used by the French fleet in the Far East is now capable of building ships. A fish cannery has been added to Haiphong's industries.

Hanoi has. been transformed from a commercial to an indus­trial city. At the time of partition, Hanoi had about a dozen enterprises. Some were light industries, such as a brewery and an ice plant; others .were public utilities. A few thousand ~ar­penters, tailors, blacksmiths, and other artisans produced com­mo.dities to meet the immediate needs of the people. Within 10 years Hanoi. became the industrial center of the country. It had 88 industrial. enterprises, 756 advanced cooperatives of artisans and 1,021 handicraft cooperative cells, employing 80,000 work­.ers. The factories, included ,the Hanoi andG;ia Lam Engineering Plants, the Cau Duong plywood factory, t.he March 8 Textile Mill, the Hanoi Cloth and Bag Weaving Mills, and the Thong Nhat match factory. In 1965 Hanoi began resitingworkshops in the' countryside, moving workers along with the ~achines.

, t ' ~ , ' " ' - ,

Indispensable plants, however, ,remained, and at the end of 1966 Hanoi still housed a third of the country's industry~

By the .endof 1966. serious strains had developed in the econ­pmy as a. result. of the Waf conditions. A general slowing down had occurred..il} industrialjlnd agricultural ~ivity as a conse­quence of interruptions. in electric power, . the. destruction of petroleum storage facilities, and manpower shortages. A large

,264

labor force was diverted to repairing roads, railroads, and com­munications lines and to eradicating 'bomb damage. Time spent in constructing air raid shelters and in sky watching was lost from productive activities. Because the United States air attacks had interdicted transportation routes, distribution of raw ma­terials to industry and consumer goods to wholesale and retail outlets had become a very serious problem.

265

CHAPTER 16

AGRICULTURE

North Vietnam is predominantly an agricultural country, and rice is the principal crop. The agricultural sector of the economy accounts for about 50 percent of the national income, provides a livelihood for about 85 percent of the population and employs almost 80 percent of the labor force. Besides furnishing the bulk of the food consumed, agriculture produces most of the raw materials for light industry rund a large portion of exports. Yet agriculture has been and continues to be a key weakness in the economy, the result of a number of factors.

In 1966 the government was concerned with achieving maxi­mum harvests, but pl:anting and harvesting were being affected adversely by bad weather, labor shortage, and aerial bombard­ment. Dangers of working in the fields during air raids had affected transplanting of seedlings in the ricefields, and harvest­ing teams were having to work in scattered units. To replace the drainoff of men for the Vietnam war, officials were urging more women, children, and old people to work on the fanns. Delivery of food from the fanns to the cities, never satisfactory, had become critical as a result of the disruption of the transporta­tion system caused by the United States aerial bombing.

Traditionally a food deficit area, the country's agriculture is barely able to sustain the popUlation at a very low level of sub­sistence, even in good years. In years of drought and floods large imports of food have been required to alleviate famine. In 1966 per capita food supplies appeared to be lower than before World War II.

Characterized by an' extremely high man-land ratio, primitive methods of cultivation and a very limited amount of capital equipment, agricultural production is virtually stagnant. The benefits of tropical climate which allow year-round cultivation are modified by comparatively infertile soils, rugged topography, and unreliable rainfall during parts of the year.

The country's agricultural production is being recast through a series of long-tenn plans aimed at increasing the mUltiple-

267

crop area, ralsmg the level of farming technology, improving tools, developing better seed strains, increasin fertilizer appli­cation, and expanding educational, experimental, and extention services. Utilization of the land is changing with industrial crops, secondary food crops and fodder crops accupyoing an in­creasing area. Higher yields of. rice were expected to compen­sate for shifts in acreage. In actual practice, however, rice yields have shown a downward trend, mainly because of un­favorable weather and a negative attitude toward callectiviza­tion. In order to .increase acreage under crops, close to a million persons. were transferred in the early 1960's from the densely popula~ Delta and resettled in the spar,sely populated highlands, the home of 2 million mountain people who traditionally prac­tice a shifting cultivation. In 1966 about 300,000, mainly Man and Meo, were still doing so.

AgricultUre has undergone massive institutional changes since independence was gained in 1954. Through successive steps of land reform and socialist organization, mare than 85 percent of :all farm families have been incorporated into agriculture's socialist structure .. kbout two-thirds of these families belang to. rudimentary forms of collectives, the remainder to a more de­veloped type. Ownership ,of the land and the means of praduction are vested in these latter organizations but are retained by the members in the more rudimentary type. All farming activities and the dispasition of produce are carried out according to the state plan. SuppJiesand credit for agricultural-producing units are provided by desig1llited state institutions, which, acting as marketing ,outlets for these farmi;ng units, are important cogs in the state's collection and distribution mechanism.

Animal husbandry occupies a subordinate but increasingly im­portant position in agriculture. Livestock is primarily a source of draft power and secondarily a source of food and fertilizer. Governmental attempts to raise hogs collectively have been only partly successful. The major proportion of livestock remains in private hands. Lack of peasant incentive, low level of technology, inadequate feed and a general developmental lag are major de­terrents to the livestock industry.

Fishing ,and forestry are important adjuncts to agriculture. Both ar~ state monopolies administered by the Departments of Sea Products and of Forestry, respectively, in the Ministry of Agriculture. Both industries have a large potential but are char­acterized by a technologioo.l lag and are beset with distribution probleJ):)S.

268

BACKGROUND

The RedJ River Delta, the original homeland of the Vietnam-. ese people, is an. ancient center of wet-rice cultivation. This method of growing rice requires great quantities of water· on the fields in the early period of the production cycle and drain­age of the fields in the latter period. The Red River provided the water and the alluvial soils favorable for rice cultivation.

By the third century B.C. the ancestors of the Vietnamese knew how to grow two rice crops· a year and had' developed techniques for irrigating and draining their fields. Every year the level of the Red River rises rapidly during the summer months, frequently flooding the countryside and endangering men and their crops. To control the river and to hold back the sea, the early Vietnamese built a series of dikes in addition to dams, ditches, and canaLs. When conquered by the Chinese, they already had a network of dikes supplemented by drainage and . irrigation works of greater antiquity. These were improved and extended by the Chinese who instituted the practice of regular inspection by a member of the mandarin's staff. The Chinese also introduced the plow and the water buffalo.

After the Chin~se defeat, .successive Vietnamese imperial dynas­ties, in order to encoU'l~age agriculture ( their main source of wealth), continued to construct dikes and irrigation w()rks and instituted inspection and supervisory departments of govern­ment. Peasants were forced to devote 60 to 1201 days a year to labor on public works to protect the fields. It was, however, not until the thirteenth century that the Deltl\ was provided with a planned and general systems of dikes and waterways.

As a result of the steady accumulation of silt in the bed of the Red River, however, the Tonkinese never succeeded in gain­ing complete protection against flooding, with the result that famines frequently occurred, owing to the destruction of the rice crop. It was only in 1883, under French administration, that the embankments were raised above high-water level of the river. Despite these measures, serious ruptures of the embank­ments continued, . and widespread flooding· occurred on 13 occa­!lions between 1902 and 1926. In 191.:l6 water covered nearly a third of the Delta in one of the worst floods in Ton:kinese history. This caused the French to raise the embankments above the high­est recorded level of the river-to as much as 40 feet neat Hanoi, where the river floods attain their highest level. Subsequently,· the French enlarged the principal dikes to a thickness of 150 feet, whereas.in 188fi none exceeded 45 feet.

269

To improve the control of drainage and irrigation the French, between 1906 and 1938, built several modern hydraulic systems guaranteeing water to over 440,000 acres stretching from Hai­phong and Nam Dinh northwest to Thai Nguyen and Vinh Yen near the upper reaches of the Delta. Each system consisted of a diversion dam and a series of canals which led water into the paddy fields by gravity. At Son Tay, west of the Red River, electrically powered pumps were installed which raised the water of the Red River 15 feet to canals which distributed it to the ricefields.

The French also established agricultural and hydrological re­search stations and introduced the large-scale production of rubber, coffee, and tea. VEcole Veterinaire de Hanoi was created in 1906 as part of the Ecole de Medicin; the Ecole Superieure d' Agriculture et de Sylviculture de Hanoi, and the Ecole Pratique d' Agriculture de Tuyen Quang were created in 1918; and a branch of the French Institut des Recherches Agronomiques was started in 1925. A number of laboratories and experimental stations were founded primarily for the study of rice culture.

During the Indochina War many of the major hydraulic works were destroyed by bombing, thus endangering the planting of rice on over 790,000 acres. More than 345,800 acres were laid fallow, covered with a network of strongholds, barbed wire and minefields, which later had to be reclaimed. Thousands of head of cattle for plowing were killed, and many houses and villages were burned to the ground. Experiment stations and research institutions were abandoned, and most French techpicians left the country when the French Expeditionary Forces withdrew in 1954.

LAND UTILIZATION

Land utilization in North Vietnam, which consists of two major topographical regions-the lowlands along the Gulf of Tonkin and the mountainous hinterland stretching to Laos and Commu­nist China-has been determined largely by physical geogra­phy (see ch. 2, Physical Environment and Population) .. Of the totaJI land area of 39 million acres, about 20 million are covered with forests. Cultivated acreage is confined almost entirely to that one-sixth of the land area located in the Red River Delta and the northern coastal lowlands of what was formerly Annam. Slash-and-burnagriculture is still practiced on the slopes in the mountainous hinterland, much of which is heavily forested.

Only 5 million acres were claimed to be under cultivation in

270

1965, of which 3.7 miHion acres were. stated to be riceftelds.

Thetemaining cultivated acreage produces mainly such crops as

corn, .manioc, sweet potatoes, sugarcane, tea, coffee, vegetables,

hard fibers and fruits. .

As a result of governmental directives, change has been grad­

ually taking place in the utilization of land. A third rice crop

has been introduced, the ·area of the fifth-month rice crop (har­

vested in May and June) has been expanded, and the area

devoted to the production of rice relative to that of the other

crops has been reduced. Most of the current land development

programs are confined to the foothills of the mountains, it being

generaIlyconceded that unused acreage in the Delta is negli­

gible. Despite the great efforts expended on increasing the

amount of new land under cultivation, total cultivated acreage

in 1965 showed an increase of only 300,000 acres over the arable

acreage reported in 1960, a figure considerably less than claims

made in numerous official statements.

Rainfall is heavy throughout the country, but amount and

timing vary from year to year and place to place. Eighty per­

cent falls in the period from March through October and may

be followed by drought from November through March. In the

Red River Delta agriculture is governed by the annual flood of

the river. Draining the high and steep mountains to the north­

west, the river is subject to great fluctuations and may increase

its volume of flow as much as 30 times during the peak of the

flocd period from May to October.

All the cultivated land in the Delta is alluvial and varies in

composition from loam and sand to heavy clay, which is impos­

sible to plow when dry. In the coastal reaches of the Delta, sandy

areas are common. In the northwest, red, gray and yellow loams

predominate. Mthough the soils of the Delta are in general very

fertile, the gradual diking off of the river against destructive

floods and for irrigation has reduced the annual deposit of en­

riching silt on the land. Much of the land is acid, generally

lacking in phosphorus compounds and low in essential organic

material. Mthough soil surveys were underway in 1966, insulfi­

cient work had been done to determine the optimum fertilizer

requirements for all the soils in the Delta.

The hill and mountain country is covered by residual soils,

produced by the decomposition of underlying rock. The soils

are mostly lateritic, comprising mainly alumnia and iron oxides,

and often are not fertile. Laterization is retarded by forest cover,

and when the land is CIleared for cultivation good crops may

be obtained for a few seasons, but the minerals are rapidly

271

leachAlid out of the soil, which soon, becomes uneconomic to work. For this reason, the minority peoples living in the highlands customarily practiced shifting cultivation, in which the land is cropped for a short time and lIhen abandoned. This method of cultivation, however, has destructive effects, f()r in addition, to the loss ()f mineral matter, the clearing of the f()rest lays the S()i11 open to surface erosion, which is particulal'ly active as, a result of the intense rainf8JI1.

WATER CONTROL

Water control is of prime importance to agriculture through­out the country. In the Delta it is as necessary today as in earlier times to control the flooding of the big rivers, to prevent the influx of sea water and to link up the large ri,ver systems. In the Mghlllnds irrigation of dry fields and prevention of ero­sion also require water control.

Dikes, the only efficient defense against river and ocean, con­stitute an extensive network in the Delta. Near Hanoi, where the river floods reach their maximum 'level, dikes flanking the rivers and canals are powerful structures. In the eastern Delta the dikes disappear almost completely, o1lily to reappear as a close-meshed network in the southeast, where tidal 'action threatens salt water penetration. Maintenance, repair, and im­provement of the dikes and embankments are a constant concern of the government.

After flood prevention, proper drainage and irrigation of the paddy fields are essential for cultivation, since rice must be flooded to a depth of 4 to 6 inches, or in certain cases up to 12 inches, from the time of planting to maturity. In the, Delta, which suffers much more from an excess than an insufficiency of water, drainage is more important than irrigation. In many areas both irrigation and drainage systems are needed side by side, and this' network of dikes and canals extends from the coast far up the various river systems. Hanoi claims to have re­constructed the major hydrauliC works and pumping stations destroyed during the Indochina War and to have initiated a num­ber of new irrigation and drainage projects which increased the irrigated area from 2.3 miLlion acres in 1957 to 5 million (or total area under cultivation) in 1963. More reasonable was the claim" made in 1964 that !lutomatic irri<g!ltion was gU!lt!lnteed to some 900,000 acres, double the irrigated !lcre!lge in 1939.

Despite the progress mllJde in ,the introduction of modern methods of water control, primitive irrigation is still widely

272

practiced. River water is directed into the rice paddies through an elaborate system of canals and sluice gates. Gravity flow is employed for fields adjacent to the main waterways. To raise water, bamboo scoops and simp,le machines are used. Although the government has introduced the use of the mechanical pump and exhorted machine shops and engineering plants to produce them, Hanoi reported that only some 1,DOO were put to use on farms in 1965. At the same time, complaints were registered about lack of planning in the use of and wastage of pumps.

In order to improve the water control system and provide a more efficient use of water, the government in 1963 began to organize irrigation teams within the collectives. It was recom­mended that the teams consist of 25 to 35 members, 30 to 50 percent of whom should be youths and that, presumably for control and labor discipline purposes, 40 to 50 percent of the youths should be militiamen. It was recommended also that women and Party members should be included. The regime claimed that, by the end of 1965, 14,265 irrigation teams com­prising 300,000 members had been organized in 12,000 coopera­tives in the Delta, and in the mountains 85 irrigation teams in 500 cooperatives.

LAND TENURE

In line with Communist practice, landownership is in the process of being socialized, that is, changed from a system of private ownership and individual enterprise to a system of pub­lic ownership. Some land, nevertheless, is still privately owned, and some individuals live and work outside coBectives. In 1966 collectivization appeared to be at about the same level as in 1959, when it was alleged' to have been almost complete. The lethargy manifested by the collectivized peasants, combined with the desperate need for increasing food production, militated against the government's taking drastic action to force complete socialization.

The cadastral survey begun by the French in the 1930's was interrupted by World War II and never completed. The land registers kept by the villages and hamlets by order of the Viet­namese emperors beginning in the fourteenth century were stated to be unreliable even, before events of World War II and the Indochina War rendered them even more obsolete. By 1960, however, Hanoi began to reallize that in order to plan agricultural production and assess taxes it needed a cadastral surveyor a substitute for it, and in 1964 it was reported in Noon Dan, the

273

official Party newspaper, that each district government was in possession of data concerning every plot of land in the district.

Traditional Tenure

In the first century A.D. the Viets, the forebears of the Viet­namese people, were already wet-rice fanners as wen as fisher­men. Most of them lived in villages in the Red River Delta, and each village was governed by a council selected by the resi­dent families, a custom honored by the emperors and continued with modifications until the Communist takeover. In principle, the land belonged to the ruler who ordinarily granted the vil­lage or hamlet the right to use the land, for which the residents paid taxes. The wet-rice fields were held in common by all the families in the village, a situation arising presumably from equal participation by all in building and maintaining the dikes which made the paddy ,fields and the irrigation system which watered them. Individual families held usufruct rights to par­ticular plots which were reallocated every few years by the vil­lage council.

Gradually, this custom was modified and only a certain por­tion of the fields was held in common by the village, other fields becoming in practice the property of those who cultivated them and paid taxes on them. Land grants made by the emperors were also considered to be private property. Ownership of these fields could, be transferred by purchase and saie, gift, legacy, or inheritanoo; communal fields were, however, inalienable. When the country came under French administration, the emperor ceded the land to the High Commissioner for Indochina, to be administered according to French law, but as far as village fields were concerned little was changed. .

I

French Concessions

The French were primarily interested in developing the re­sources of their new territories, and the underveloped highlands, avoided by the Vietnamese, presented such an opportunity. Large land grants (called concessions) for the cultivation of tea, coffee, sugarcane, and other plantation crops were IIllI;de to Frenchmen, Chinese, and favored Vietnamese on the condition that they would clear the land and make other improvements.

Until a decree issued in December 1913, concessions were granted under local regulations special to each of the component

,274

territories c.omprlslng FrenCih Ind.ochina. The 1913 decree was the first in a series whereby the French administrati.on s.ought to regularize and clarify the procedures f.or .obtaining grants, the c.onditions to be met by the concessi.onaire and payments to be made f.or different types .of c.oncessi.ons. The theme .of 'all the decrees was land devel.opment. Titles were pr.ovisi.onal and c.ould be withdrawn if the impr.ovements specified in the registrati.on d.ocuments were n.ot carried .out.

Maintenance .of the rights .of the min.ority pe.oples living in the highlands and the reservati.on .of sufficient land to meet their need's were pr.ovided f.or in a 1926 decree and further de­fined in a 1928 decree. The 1926 decree als.o required that an applicant f.or a land grant present pro.of that he had sufficient capital and equipment to devel.op the c.oncessi.on. Under the 1928 decree, if 'a land grant was n.ot devel.oped within 5 years it c.ould be withdrawn.

Agrarian Reform

Bef.ore W.orld War II, .of an estimated 1.5 milli.on rural h.ouse­h.olds in the Delta, nearly 1 mftli.on .owned the land they culti­vated. The largest single land.owner was the Cath.olic Church. Landh.oldings, h.owever, were generally Bmwl and badly frag­mented, a result .of the traditi.onal Vietnamese practice .of divid­ing pr.operty equally am.ong sons. A farm .of 10 acres was c.onsidered large. Many .owners were such in name .only because .of pelllllanent indebtedness t.o m.oneylenders wh.o generally were m.ore interested in keeping the fal1lller in a c.onstant state .of indebtedness than in repayment .of the principaJ. Interest rates up to 300 percent were charged .on loans. C.ommunal land .owned by the viJIlages was leased to landless farmers 'at rents as high as 50 percent .or m.ore .of the cr.op. C.ommunal lands bef.ore the war am.ounted to as much as 20 percent .of the t.otal cr.opland and were the main s.ource .of income f.or many villages.

An agrarian reform pr.ogram was ann.ounced sh.ortly after the Viet Minh regime came to power in August 1945, but little was d.one to carry it .out. During the Indochina War, .official attenti.on f.ocused .on the distributi.on .of aband.oned land. What was called f.or at this time was little m.ore than rec.oguiti.on .of the rights .of peasants t.o c.ontinue cultivati.on .of aband.oned land they had already taken .over. As miilitary successes enlarged the area .of Viet Minh c.ontr.ol, preference was given to Viet Minh s.oldiers and their families in the redistributi.on .of land c.onfiscated from French nati.onals .or absentee supp.orters .of the Ba.o Dai g.overn­ment.

275

In 1953 a more rigorous program, based on the political loyalty of landowners, was formulate,d at a Cabinet meeting. The rurrul population was classified into landless agricultural labor­ers, poor peasants, middle peasants, rich peasants, and land­lords. All land and personal property belonging to "colonialists, traitors, and reactionaries" and communal land belonging to the villruges were expropriated for distribution to the landless and poor peasants. People's Courts were established to classify the rural population, and all local leadership was brought under the control of the Lao Dong Party.

Making promises of free land, Party cadres (see Glossary) organized mass trials before the People's Courts. Peasants were encouraged to denounce their wealthier neighbors. It was enough for a manto be accused by a neighbor for him to be condemned as wealthy, cruel, or reactionary. Once convicted, his land and goods were redistributed, and he might count himself Jucky if he suffered no further penalty. Spectacular trials and emotional attacks quickly got out of control. By the summer of 1956, how­ever, the excesses had brought disillusion and, in some places, outrig1ht rebellion. "Grave errors" were admitted by the Party in October 1956, and a "mistake correction" campaign was launched which was intended to correct the worst abuses and restore rural confidence.

In fact, the Communist government had few "wealthy land­lords" to deal with in this area of small holdings. It did punish and expropriate the lands of the sizable group of moderately prosperous small farmers. In so doing, it liquidated the only experienced rural leadership then capable of challenging the government. Of the then total of 4.5 million acres of arable land" between 1 and 2 miNion acres were redistributed. Approximately 8 million peasants gained some land, but the size of the average holding was not greatly increased.

Collectivization and State Farms

The stated pooicy of Hanoi is to reorganize the peasants into cooperatives as a step toward ultimate collectivization. The first phase of this process was the creation of work-exchange teams composed of peasants who agreed to help each other during peak periods of the rice-growing season. The teams, organized with the assistance of local Party cadres, might include an entire hamlet or only a few families. In the course of time, they were expected to grow in size and scope and become permanent or-

276

ganizations under Party cpntrol, Eventually, the teams were to operate in accordance with a yearly production plan rather than to simply satisfy peak seasonal requirements.

The comparatively slow rate of development of these perma­nent work-exchange teams suggests popular reluctance to par­ticipate. At the end of 1956 the government reported that there were 190,249 teams; by the end of 1958 the number had in­creased to 245,000, comprising nearly 1.8 million families or over 80 percent of all peasant families. Less than a fourth of the teams, however, were on a year-round basis.

The work-exchange teams were used as a springboard for the development of collectives, which by 1960 were of two kinds, rudimentary and advanced. By the end of 1963 there were 30,624 cooperatives with approximately 2.5 million households, or 85.3 percent of all peasant famUies. About a third of the coop­eratives were of the advanced type. Some 300,000 peasant house­holds had yet to join cooperatives. The size of the cooperative, according to one Hanoi publication, is limited by the managerial skill of the local cadre, and the optimum size is said to be 200 families. Cooperatives larger than this apparently encountered serious difficulties in maintaining efficient operation.

Eleven state farms were created in 1955 on land expropriated from French owners without compensation. Three years later there were reported to be 16 state farms with a total of nearly 125,000 acres of agricultural land, most of it in industrial crops, such as sugar, tea, hard fibers, cotion, and coffee. The number of state farms was increased to 49 on January 1, 1961, when 33 army estates were transferred to the newly created Ministry of State Farms. In 1962 the government claimed that it had established 55 state farms, 15 of which were in the Viet Bac Autonomous Region. The area covered by state farms was stated to be close to 500,000 acres, with a working force of ,60,000. In 1966 the number of state farms had risen to 59, but the amount of acreage added and the size of the new labor force were not given.

E'ach year the state farms supply thousands of tons of products, such as coffee, tea, fruit, rubber, black pepper, and tobacco to the government for export and for use as raw. materials in do­mestic industry. In 1966 the area of state farms devoted to the production of ind\lstrial plants and fruits covered 74,100 acres, three-fifths of the acreage planted to these crops. Catile be­longing to the state farms made up 10 percent of the total number in the country and represented an important source of milk and work animals.

277

All labor on these farms is hired. The farms seem to have a fairly high degree of mechanization and, according to Hanoi reports, are well supplied with technicians from the Soviet 'Union and Communist China. The main functions of the farms were stated to be the training of cadres for farm cooperatives and the establishment of qualitative standards and production 'norms which the cooperatives would be expected to equal or surpass. In 1966 the supervision of state farms was transferred from the Ministry of State Farms in Hanoi to local government and Party echelons.

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF COLLECTIVES

Collectives, called agricultural producers' cooperatives in North Vietnam, consist of two types: rudimentary (sometimes trans­lated elementary or lower) and advanced. The rudimentary type is regarded as a transitional form leading to the advanced type which resembles the Soviet kolkhoz (collective farm). In the rudimentary type, members retain ownership of their land, live­stock, and farm machinery for the use of which they are paid rent by the cooperative. Each member also receives part of the gross yield of the cooperative, according to his labor contribution.

In the advanced' type, members retain ownership only of their personal effects and domiciles; all other belongings become the property of the collective, either as part or full payment of the entrance fee. Crop yield and any other income derived from the property are deposited to the account of the cooperative, and members are paid in proportiQlll to their contribution in work­days without regard to the amount of land, draft animals or farm machinery each may have contributed to the cooperative. In all other respects, the organization' and operation of both types of cooperative are the same. .

Membership

AU workers in the countryside from 16 years of age upwards are eligibM to become members of a cooperative if their appli­cations are approved by the congress of the cooperative's mem­bers. Young people under 16 can be accepted to work in the cooperative and are paid, like other members, according to the work done. Cooperatives are urged to admit ex-servicemen, members of the families of sick and wounded servicemen, "war martyrs," and cadres belonging to "working peasants' families" and to absorb disabled people, old folks, orphans, and widows

278

with a suitable working-class background. Rich peasants and former landlords may be admitted to a cooperative only after they have "reeducated themselves through labor." Persons who have "lost their civil rights" cannot be admitted to membership ina cooperative, but members of their families who have not lost their civil rights may be admitted. Ineligible for member­ship are insane persons, "hooligans and those who have com­mitted crimes and incurred the hatred of the people."

Members are required ... to respect the cooperative's regulations, carry out all decisions of the congress of the cooperative's members and of the managing board, abide by the cooperative's labor discipline and do propaganda work for the cooperative to persuade more people to join it.

Members have the right to participate in the work of the coop­erative and to receive fair payment for their work;

... to discuss, put forth criticism and suggestions and ,vote on the work of the cooperative, to elect, and stand for election to, the leading bodies of the cooperative and participate in the control over the activities of the managing board.

They also may engage in "family side-lines," on condition that these activities do not hamper work in the cooperative.

Members may withdraw from the cooperative but only after harvest time and must notify the managingooard in advance. Withdrawing members may take out their own land and animals which they originally contributed, their share in money and any money lent to the cooperative. They cannot, however, 'ask for a share in the cooperative's common funds and other proper­ties. of the cooperative. Any member who "seriously violates the cooperative's re,gulations, commits. repeated and serious errors or transgresses State laws and is deprived of his civil rights" is liable to be expelled from the cooperative under the same condi­tions as in the case of voluntary withdrawal.

Members are expected to give their land to the cooperative for "unilfied use" but, in addition to land for houses, courtyards, stables and haystacks, each family receives a small plot for growing vegetables, flowers, and fruit trees. In the mountain regions the individual plots may be much larger than in the low­lands. Cooperative members of the national minorities may also receive a small amount of Iland reserved for the cultivation of rice destined to be used in religious worship. Lotus ponds, fish­ing ponds, orchardS, gardens or hills planted with bamboo, tim­ber and palm trees, tea, jute, or perennial crops mayor may not be turned over to the cooperative, depending on whether or not its unified management would benefit production ..

279

On admission to a rudimentary type agricultural cooperative, members must buy so-called: production shares to cover produc­tion expenses for the purchase of seeds and fertilizers and the repair of farm implements. As the cooperative advances, mem­bers must also subscribe for collective shares to buy oxen, buffaloes and farm tools. Production shares must be paid up in either cash or kind at the time the member's Jand is turned over to the cooperative. 'Dhe amount must be equal to the production expenses on the land and for one cultivation season, plus the seeds and part of the fertilizer required for the next season (by season is meant the main cultivation season in the locality).

Collective shares must be subscribed for by all members on a per capita basis, and the tobl subscribed must be equal to the sum needed by the cooperative to buy draft animals and farm tools, or to pay for those brought into the cooperative by its members. If this amount is too great for the majority of the memters, the amount of each share may be reduced and the remainder paid from the investment fund which the cooperative is required to maintain. Those among the cooperative's member­ship who can no longer work, or whose working capacity is limited, may either be exempted from paying their part of the collective share or be granted reduced rates if the congress of the cooperative's members rugrees.

In case the oxen, buffaloes, and farm tools of cooperative members are collectivized, their value in money is deductible from the collective shares subscribed by their owners, who pay or are paid the differences. Payment of .differences in favor of the cooperative may be in installments, the interest. rate being equal to that paid by the cooperative to its creditors. Those members who are too poor to pay for their shares and cannot borrow from other people are permitted to borrow from credit cooperatives or from the state bank. When withdrawing from the cooperative, members may withdraw their production shares and their part of the co[,Jective shares. When in need of more capital, the cooperative may borrow money from its members, the interest rate being the same as that paid for money dePosits in credit cooperatives. The member must be repaid in full within 1 to 3 years.

Management

The governing body of the cooperative is the congress' of the cooperative's members. The congress is responsible for examin­ing and ratifying the reports of the managing board and: the control commission, the produetion plans, draft budget, Illibor

280

norms, and norms for calculating payment for each type of work. It examines and decides on the payment of land rent, the transfer of animals, large farm implements and irrigation works to the cooperative, the SUbscription of shares, and the distribution of annual income. It adopts and amends the cooperative's regula­tions. It elects and dismisses the cooperative manager and the members of the managing board, the chairman and members of the control commission. It admits new cooperative members, examines and determines bonuses and penalties and decides on the expulsion of cooperative members.

A decision made by the congress of the cooperative's members is valid only if more than half of the total number of cooperative members are present and if it is approved by more than half those present. The managing board is required to convene the congress at least once every 3 months. In the case of newly founded cooperatives, .the congress should be convened once a month.

The mana.ging board must abide by the cooperative's regu­lations and the decisions of the congress of the cooperative's members. It directs the production work of the cooperative, represents the cooperative in transactions with other bodies and organizations and reports its actions to the cooperative's members. The manager, assistant manager and other members of the managing board share among themselves "the responsi­bility of leadership in agricultural production and other trades, finance, political and ideological work, cultural and social work." Some of them must assume direct responsibility as heads of pro­duction brigades or teams. The mana.ging board appoints 'assist­ants, 'such as bookkeeper and a storehouse man.

The control commission controls the activities of the manag­ing board to see that it and the cooperative members' abide by the cooperative's regulations and the decisions of the cq,ngress. It also controls receipts and expenditures and gives its regular report to the congress. Members of the mana.ging board and its assistants cannot at the same time be members of the control commission.

The cooperative's manager, the chairman of the control com­.mission, and members of the managing board and control com­mission are elected every year and may be reelected. Regulations stipulate that the managing board should consist of from 5 to 15 members and the control commission of from 3 to 5. On the managing board and the control commission women must rep­resent one-third of the membership. In the mountain regions, incase cooperative members come from various nationwl minori-

281

ties, each group must have representatives on the managing board and the control commission. If cooperative membership includes several religious groups, persons from each of these groups must be elected to the cooperative's governing bodies. Qualifications for election to the managing board and the control commission are: "determination in building the cooperative, devotion to the common interests, safeguarding the interests of the collective and capacity for work."

Operations

Each year a rudimentary cooperative is required to set aside 25 to 30 percent of the annual output of the lands that have been brought into the cooperative by its members. This por­tion of the output is used to pay rent to the members for the use of their lands. The annual output is evaluated by the coop­erative at the time when the members concerned are admitted. In places where there is much land and little manpower or where lands are far from the village and of low quality, or need much work and investment, the amount of land rent may be less than 25 percent. When crops are seriously damaged by natural calami­ties rent is reduced, as determined by the congress of the coop­erative's members.

Deducted from the rent paid to any member is the amount of the agricultural tax partially or totally paid by the cooperative on the. member's behalf. Lands may be lent to the cooperative by landowners in the loc!IJlity who leave to work elsewhere. In such instance, the cooperative exploits them for its own benefit, pays the agricultural tax to the state and pays the agreed amount of rent to the owner in cash or kind.

If pagodas or churches want to entrust to the cooperative lands ·left to them, it may accept the duty of cultivating them and pay a portion of the produce to the owners. The rate is determined by the cooperative in Il!greement with the rank and file of the congregation.

Irrigation works (ponds, wells, dikes, ditches) included in lands brought into the cooperative are put under its administra­tion. If the owners have not yet gained a fair return from the irrigation works they have constructed, the cooperative is re­quired to compensate them adequately within a period of 2 to 3 years.

Draft animals mayor may not be turned over to the coopera­tive. The cooperative may hire them, however, and the owner must be compensated if they die or suffer as a result of overwork.

282

If the cooperative is in a good financil!ll position, it may buy members' animals to make them common property, if the mem­bership concurs. Payment may be made over a period of 3 to 5 years. Interest on the sum due must be paid at a rate agreed upon by the two parties concerned, but it must not exceed that paid on deposits in credit cooperatives.

The cooperative may buy cattle other than draft animals, paying the owners in installments, or the cooperative and own­ers may share the returns between them. Prices paid for the purchase or hire of animals must beat current locI!!! rates. In the mountain regions, "in view of local customs and manners, when oxen and buffaloes are collectivized several may be left as private property to those cooperative members who possess many animals." The collectivization of horses, used IllS riding or pack animals, is prohibited.

Cooperatives may rent from members such items as plows, harrows, water wheels, threshers, grinders, carts, and boats. Hiring prices are fixed in I!ICcordance with the item's real value and its period of use. During this period the implement must be kept in good repair or the owner compensated for irreparable damage. Implements for which there is frequent need may be purchased on installments. Handtools, such as sickles and knives, are supplied and repaired by the members.

Late in each autumn both types of cooperatives are required to sum up the experiences of the last production year and to work out a production plan for the next year in I!ICcordance with the state plan. Plans must cover all aspects. of the cooper­ative's activities. Overall production targets and targets for indic vidual products must be established. Plans must be drawn up for the utilization of manpower, draft animals and farm too·ls, for the selling and processing of products and for capital con­struction. Based on the annual production plan, concrete imple­mentation plans must be worked out for el!lCh season or eaoh month. The cooperative managing board is required to permit the members to enter into the discussion of the plans.

Cooperatives made up of 15 or more households may divide themselves into fixed production brigades or teams which are given lands, oxen, buffaloes, and farm tools. The units organize their work according to the common plan of the cooperative and elect their leaders who distribute work to el!lCh member, exer­cise control over the work and register the number of days worked. The cooperative fixes brigade or team targets for each month, season, or year concerning the number of workdays, the expected yield, and production expenses. Cooperatives which reg-

283

Ullarly undertake many types of productive activities may form production teams which specialize in food crops, industrial crops, livestock breeding, tree planting, fish raising, production of lime and bricks and so on.

To ensure the implementation of the cooperative's production plan, members are required to abide by the following regulations: perform the number of assigned workdays, except in cases of illness, childbirth, and participation in activities of general interest to the cooperative; obey the ,leading cadres in the as­signmentand implementation of work. Disciplinary measures against those who do not fulfill their tasks may be taken by the cooperative. Measures include admonition, warning, critici&m, reduction of workdays, dismissal from office in the case of lead­ing cadres and expulsion from the cooperative.

Payments to members are based on the amount of work done. In application of this principle, the cooperative is required to set labor norms for each kind of work and norms for caleulating payment for each type of work. Under average conditions, for the fulfillment of a labor norm, one workday, that is, 10 work points, is a;llotted. Allocations of work points are also made to the managerial staff and to those families who do not have suffi­cient working members to support the family (see ch. 20 Labor).

At the time the annual production plan is drawn up, the cooperative's managing board is required to produce a draft budget for the year. It includes sources of capital, plans for the utilization of capital, the estimated total yearly income from agricultural production and other trades, and plans for the dis­tribution of income. The board must approve expenses enumer­ated in the draft budget except for minor items which need only the manager's approval.

Expenses outside the draft budget must be decided on by the congress of the cooperative's members. All receipts and expenses must be recol1ded in written documents. All account books are open to public inspection at regular intervals. Work records of the cooperative's members must be open to public inspection at the end of every month, every crop season and every year, and financial account books at the end of every month and every year. Documents pertaining to cooperative commoil property must be made public at the end of the fiscal year.

Members whose actions are prejudicial to the cooperative or who are gnilty of embezzlement, theft or sabotage of common property must be disciplined, according to the gravity of their mistakes by "criticism, warning, payment of reparations, Or ex-

284

pulsion from the cooperative." Legal action may also be insti­tuted.

The cooperative is advised, after setting aside sufficient in­come for the payment of common expenses and before the annual official distribution, to make partial payments of the amounts due its members for land rent and work done. At the end of the year the cooperative pays its state taxes and distributes the income derived from agricUiltural production, trade, and other sources. Funds are allocated' to supplement production expenses in the past year if the draft budget allowance has proved in­sufficient for that purpose. Contributions are made to the invest­ment fund and the common welfare fund, and provisions are made to meet administrative expenses whiCh must not exceed 1 percent of total annual income. Land rent is paid, and the remainder is used to make payment for workdays performed by the cooperative members in agriculture and other trades.

The investment fund is spent on the purchase of animals and farm implements and on the construction of storehouses, irri­gation wOl'ks, land reclamation, tree planting, afforestation and digging fishponds. When a cooperative is inaugurated, this fund should receive no more than 5 percent of the net annual income, that is, total annual income minus production expenses. When production has been stepped up, the fund may be increased to 10 percent. The common welfare fund is spent on cultural and socirul activities. At the beginning this fund should be no more than 1 percent of net annual income, but after production has developed it may be increased to 2 or 3 percent. When income d'rops as a result of natural calamities these two funds may be reduced accordingly.

Under the leadership of the Party cell, the cooperative is urged to educate its members constantly, stressing the propa­gation and explanation of Party policies and the development of a "collective spirit." Great importance is attached to cultural and social work. The cooperative isrequf.red to organize its mem­bers in a planned way to "help eliminate Hiiteracy; supplement their education; engage in technical and professional studies; popularize practical science, book and newspaper reading, ar­tistic and physical training and sports,activities." It must assigu suitable work to elderly persons, invalids, pregnant women and young people under 16. It is re.'!>ponsible for the proper care of members who suffer injury in the course of collective work and, in case of death, ensure the livelihood of their families. The cooperative must promote public and family health and sanita­tion, organize babysitting faci.Jities, set up a system of rest for women before and after childbirth, and help at childbirth.

285

THE ROLE OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT

'Ilhe Lao Dong Party Central Committee established the prin­ciples and policies guiding agricultural production and the state plans. It leaves the concrete tasks to government organs. The Central Committee for Rural Affairs assists the Party Central Committee in studying questions regarding agricultural policies, trends in organization and production activities of the agricul­tural producers' cooperatives and state farms. It supervises the implementation of policies, sums up experience gained and closely coordinates all branches of the Party and government which serve agTiculture. It is responsible for the professional training of officials for rural affairs at lower levels. The State Planning Commission assists the Party Central Committee and government. to develop state plans and to follow and supervise the imple­mentation of these plans. It also gives professiona.! guidance to planning committees at lower levels (see ch. 10, The Govern­mental System).

On behalf of the Council of Ministers, the premier directs, con­trols, supervises, and coordinates the various ministries, depart­ments, and committees in their task of carrying out the state plan for agricultural production. In this task, he is assisted by the Agricultural Bureau of his office. Basing itself on the gov­ernment's genera.! state plan, the Ministry of Agriculture directs the implementation of the agricultura.! production plan, carries out scientific and technicwl research in agriculture, trains man­agerial cadres for the cooperatives, agriculturists and high­ranking cadres for forest and marine products branches in coop­eration with the various ministries and branches concerned (see ch. 10, The Governmental System).

'Ilhe Ministry of State Farms directs production on the state farms and the clearing of Virgin land. The Ministry of Water Conservation is responsible for carrying out the state plan re­garding hydraulics and dikes. It trains cadres, supervises the construction of large and complex hydraulic installations and guides irrigation work in the various regions. The Departments of Forestry and Sea Products in the Ministry of Agriculture direct the implementation of the pertinent sections of the state plans and train cadres in forestry and fishing. They are also responsible for the management of state forest and fishing enter­prises. The Department of Sea Products directs the management of the fishermen's cooperatives (see ch. 10, 'Ilhe Governmental System).

At provincial level the bureau of cooperation and production

286

of the provincial administrative committee is entrusted with the task of helping the provincial Party committee for rural affairs and the provincial administrative committee guide the work of collectivization and agricultural production. The specialized agri­cultural offices of the province help the administrative committee direct technical developments in agriculture and also train agri­culturists.

The agricultural office at district level helps the Party commit­tee and the district administrative committee to carry out the work of cooperativization, agricultural production, irrigation, planning and collection of statistics. The district agricultural office also assists the provincial level to keep in close touch with, lead, control and supervise the villages and follow the activities of the cooperatives.

At village level, Party ceBs, organized within each cooperative of from 150 to 200 families, are guided by the village Party committee which is responsible for directing and maintaining vigilance over the cooperatives. The Party cells and Party com­mittee have the duty to lead the people in the organization of agricultural production 'and in implementing the policies enun­ciated by the Party and the government. They are responsible for popularizing and implementing the state laws and keeping order and security. Their most important duty is to carry out "political and ideological work among the peasants."

PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITIES

Farming

Despite the government's objective of complete collectivization of all agricultural activities, farming, even with the country's 80,000 cooperatives, continues to be largely a family affair. In 1968, the last year for which such information is available, over 50 percent of farm family income was derived from the family plot and from sidelines in which family members engaged, such as raising pigs, chickens, and ducks for consumption or sale, producing handicrafts, planting and cultivating fruit trees, and raising fish in small ponds. Some success in developing produc­tion teams has been achieved in irrigation, fiood control, and harvesting but cooperation by all members of the community in such activities has long been traditional in Vietnamese rural society. Collective breeding, care, and use of animals' has been a notable failure, seriously affecting the siZe> of the nation's herds ,and the availability of draft animaJs.

287

Before 1965 official reports stated that 75 percent of the rural labor force were women. In 1965 and 1966, this percentage was reported to have risen to 80 and then 85 percent with women engaging in plowing, harrowing, and the construction and repair of dikes and irrigation works.

Production of rice is insufficient to feed the rapidly increas­ing population, and the farmer makes a bare subsistence living. The per capita production of paddy rice in 1955 was approxi­mately 630 pounds. Mter collectivization per capita production sank to 576 pounds in 1960, rooe to 613 pounds in 1961, but, mainly because of extremely unfavorable weather, sank to a new low of 529 pounds in 1963. As a result of the water conservancy drive in 1964 and 1965, the 1965 harvest was reported by the authorities to have been the best since 1959 despite Hanoi's claims that water conservancy works were deliberately bombed by United States aircraft. Per capita production figures during these years have not been pUiblished.

The farm family 'supplements its food resources with produce from the family gal'den, fish from the canals or ricefields, and small livestock and poultry raised on scraps and gleanings. Al­though farmers are exhorted by Party and government officials to sell all surplus produce to cooperative or state-owned enter­prises, they, in fact, have been unwilling to relinquish more of their food s;upply than has been required by law, preferring to sell on the free market. Officials have frequently complained of evasion of food deliveries and of peasant hoarding. Their com­plaints began tapering off in 1965, and a more satisfactory de­livery situation may have resulted from the burst of patriotism aroused by what Hanoi euphemistically caBs the "new ~ituation," created by United States aerial assaults.

Individual holdings, traditionally small in Tonkin, were fur­ther fragmented by the redistribution carried out in the late 1950's under the land reform program. When it was terminated, farms averaged no more than 2 acres. A number of cooperatives have exchane;ed their scattered fields with individual owners or villages or other cooperatives in order to consolidate their hold­ings. At the beginning of 1966 it was officially stated that the average cooperative in the Delta was made up of 152 peasant households and farmed 193.9 acres. The size of most ricefields was said to be a standard 330 square meters (1 acre equals 4,046.9 square meters). In the highlands cooperatives averaged 34 peasant households, with 66.7 acres of land.

Cultivation methods have shown little change except on the state farms, which have been mechanized with Soviet and Chi-

288

nese assistance, and on a few cooperatives. Most of the work is done by hand with the help of water buffalo for plowing and harrowing. In the lowlands animals are overworked and under­fed. In 1965, 1.7 million draft buffalo were still insufficient to meet requirements, for plowing, harrowing and hauling.

It is noteworthy that the most optimistic plans projected for 1965 called for not more than 15 percent of the cultivable land outside state farms to be farmed with machinery, a goal which was not met. In 1966 the target was established to equip only 1,500 cooperatives with small machines for pumping water, threshing rice, milling rice and processing animal feed. Most tools are locally made and of poor quality. With the increasing dependence on female labor, the authorities were urging local enterprises to produce tools adapted to use by women.

In the highlands, where the government had established au­tonomous regions for the national minorities, attempts were con­tinuing to be made to settle them into cooperative centers for the production of industrial crops, such as hard fiber, coffee, tea and peanuts. Some success has been reported despite resistance to the abandonment of shifting agriculture. Of the national mi­norities, the Man in particular in 1966 were still refusing to migrate from their mountain homes to settle more productive lands at lower altitudes. Livestock breeding had proved to be very successful in the highlands, but transfer of the livestock to the lowlands had encountered difficulties.

Toward the end of 1963, in order to improve agricultural pro­duction and to raise the income level of the peasantry, the gov­ernment designated certain cooperatives which were to engage in the intensive cultivation of rice. The government provided improved seeds, electric power, mechanical equipment, sufficient chemical fertilizer and insecticides for their fields, and techno­logical and scientific guidance from the agricultural experimental stations. In 1964 production increased, and 120,000 farmers were reported to have newly joined the cooperatives. In 1966 the regime reported that these cooperatives had succeeded in further raising rice production beyond the goal of 5 tons per hectare (see Glossary).

Rice Production

Rice production occupies a major position in the economy from the standpoint of the number of persons-about SO percent of the labor force-whose livelihood depends on its cultivation. Most rice is produced under the wet method of cultivation and is centered on the lowlands of the Red River Delta and the other

289

river systems along the coast. Early maturing varieties which d€IVelop within sa few as 120 days are generally grown in this are,a.

The farmer uses the lunar calendar ,and ,refers to his crop by the month in which it is harvested. The schedule of harvesting two crops of rice in the Red River Delta is interesting (see table 3). The tenth-month crop, planted on 3.4 million acres, is the most important, yielding over 2.5 million tons of rice. Over 2 million acres are double cropped, producing 1.5 million tons of rice in the 'Spring. In some areas a third rice crop, harvested in 'June, a novelty in North Vietnam, has been introduced but is grown on no more than 240,000 acres.

During 1964 the government claimed a total output of 4.5 mil­lion metric tons, of rice. This represented a clear gain over the 4.3 million metric tons produced in 1963 but was still far below the bumper crop of 5.2 million metric tons in 1959. The problem was phrased as follows by a government spokesman:

With the present birth rate (estimated close to 3 percent annual increaseL the food needed in 1970 will amount to an equivalent of 7 million metric tons of rice, not including fodder for livestock, rice reserves, and additional food for improved nutrition. This require­ment will be fulfilled only if during the next 5 years average rice production increases by 4.3 percent per year over the 1963 level. ... During the next 5 years we must try hard to boost food production, especially rice production.

Table 8. Double-Cropping, Rice-Harve.ting Schedule in North Vietnam

Operation Summer crop

Sowing in nursery ____ Mid-December to early February.

Transplanting ________ Mid-January to early March.

Harvesting ___________ Early May to mid-June.

Winter crop

End of May to early 1uly.

End of June to early August.

Mid-October to mid­November.

Population growth and construction have resulted in a per ,capita decrease in the cultivaJted area between' 1958 and 1963, leaving the intensification of cultivation and improving c'rop yields as the only means for increasing rice production. Endeav­-ors along this ],ine, however, are. hampered by a shortage of chemica.I fertilizel'lS, electric power for pumping stations, ,pumps, farm machinery and insecticides. With the added factor of low producer incentive under the cooperative farm system, the out­look is not favorable,

290

Other Food Crops

Having found it difficult to produce sufficient rice, special em­phasis has been placed on developing production of supplementary food crops. Area grown to corn, sweet potatoes, taro, manioc, and beans has shown a steady increase from 1 million acres in 1960 to 1.5 million acres in 1963. The )nost important food crop, other than rice, is corn which is grown as a dry-season crop in the ricefields where irrigation is inadequate for a double crop of wet rice. In 1960 government· production figures for corn showed an annual total of 215,000 tons. An increase to 275,000 tons for 1961 and 1962 resulted from newly cleared lands in the upland areas. Sweet potatoes, taro, manioc, and beans are also grown during the dry season. Most farmers grow sweet potatoes and a wide variety of other vegetables for their own use, with, in many cases, a small surplus for sale. Leafy vegetwbles of many varieties are grown in most family gardens and in small truck gardens of half to three-quarters of an acre which commonly surround cities, towns, factories, mines, and worksites.

Industrial Crops

Industrial crops and their processed derivatives, although small in acreage and in tonnage, constitute the bulk of agricultural ex­ports. Production of cotton, which before the war was grown as an additional cash crop on small peasant holdings in Thanh Hoa Province during -the dry season, has been greatly expanded. Most of the cotton is reported as being produced on state farms. In 1955 the total area in cotton was given as 23,000 acres; by 1963 it had been increased to 46,000 acres in Thanh Hoa and Thai Binh Provinces, along the coast south of the Red River. New varieties have been introduced from Egypt and Communist China, and technical assistance has been given by the Chinese. Plans have been reported for the expansion of the cotton-growing area to the highlands. Although by no means self-sufficient in cotton in 1963, government sources predicted that by the end of 1965 self-suffi­ciency nearly would be achieved.

Special efforts have been made to encourage the production of other fiber crops,such as jute and hemp. Jute has increased rapidly -from 1,360 acres and 1,120 tons in 1956 to 27,880 acres and 16,250 tons in 1963. The crop is grown near swamps and water­holes which provide the natural facility for retting. In addition to being a good export item, the fiber is used iIi the manufacture of burlap, rope, fishing nets, bagging material, bedding, tloormats, and sandals. The production of hemp, which has much the same uses, increased from 380 tons in 1960 to 1,032 tons in 1963.

291

Sugarcane was grown in the past exclusively for home consump­tion as molasses or crude sugar. Acreage and production in­creased from 12,355 acres and 100,000 tons of cane in 1955 to about 31,000 acres and 732,000 tons in 1963. Modern refining facilities have been constructed to process a portion of the crop; refined sugar was reported to total 25,000 tons in 1963.

A variety of vegetable oiIseeds are grown, primarily peanuts, soybeans, sesame, cottonseed, and castor 'beans. Grown during the dry season, acreage and production have shown appreciable in­creases. Peanuts and soybeans constitute about 80 percent of the acreage and 90 percent of the production. Peanuts, the most im­porlant of the oilseeds, more than doubled in acreage from 1955 to 105,300 acres in 1963. Production increased from 14,000 tons in 1955 to 34,530 tons in 1963. Soybeans have not been so successful. The crushing and refining capacity has been expanded, producing almost 5,000 tons of oil annually.

Only a small section of the highland area will support the rub­ber tree, and no large plantations were developed there during the colonial period. In order to develop its own supply of rubber, the government introduced the rubber tree after partition in 1954, and extensive plantings have been made on recently cleared land on state farms and in ·the highlands. Acreage totaled 16,122 acres in 1963, but actual production must await the maturation of the trees, which normally takes aJbout 7 years.

Animal Husbandry

Special attention has been given to animal husbandry, which is slowly growing in importance. In 1963 the value of the output of this industry (including fish raising on farms) amounted to al­most 19 percent of the total for agriculture.

Under Communist rule the produetion of livestock has been er­ratic, hindered by social, economic, and cultural factors. Hogs and poultry are commonly bred and raised by the family for home consumption or for sale. Large animals are used for draft except in the highlands where they are raised for slaughter and sale to low­landers. Only since 1963 has the government enforced its direc­tives for the care and feeding of livestock, which included specific provisions allocating 5 percent of a cooperative's land to grow fodder crops. Previously, pigs and poultry were scavengers, and cattle, horses, and buffaloes were grazed along paddy dikes, trails, and in unCUltivated areas of native grass because of the lack of feed.

292

Peasants are encouraged to raise livestock and are paid the going price for any domestic animals they turn over to the state­trading organization. Extra payments are made for overfulfill­ment of goals. Other incentives include a share in the increase from offspring; the right of hog raisers to keep 30 percent of the salwble pork for individual use, and, to those raising hogs as a special enterprise, permission to sell any 'surplus on the free market.

Water buffalo increased at a very slow rate from 1.1 million head in 1955 to 1.5 million head in 1964. The size of the cattle herd fluctuated erratically over the same period; numbers rose from 756,000 in 1955 to 992,000 in 1958, but they slumped to 781,000 in 1961 and rose to 820,000 in 1964. Most buffalo and cat­tle were located in the highlands. Hogs are raised all over the country; numbers doubled from 2.1 million in 1955 to 4.2 million in 1964. The breeding of sheep and goats is being encouraged by the government in order to produce domestic wool and hair for the textile industry. Introduced by the Mongolian People's Republic, sheep increased from 2,300 in 1960 to 10,000 in 1963 and goats from 48,800 in 1960 to 88,700 in 1963. These flocks are also located in the highlands. Numbers of chickens and ducks increased from 47.5 million in 1960 to 57.7 million in 1963.

Forestry

Acbout 20 million acres are forested, with officially estimated reserves of 1.96 billion cubic yards of timber. Located in the high­lands are large reserves of commercially valuable timber, includ­ing teak, ebony, rose wood and various other species commonly used for furniture, boxes and various luxury items. During the Japanese occupation, forest tracts convenient to rivers or esta,b­lished roads were ruinously exploited. An extensive program for building roads or adapting waterways for the transportation of logs to the sawmills is needed to provide !l;Ccess to the good forest which remains. Bamboo, the major building material, grows pro­fusely on the lower hills and plains, and palms and mangrove grow along the shoreline.

Completion of new processing facilities hll!S resulted in a rise in the demand for construction timber, furniture timber and lux­ury woods. Output of timber has increased significantly from 474,000 cubic yards in 1955 to almost 1.3 million cubic yards in 1963. In the past the use of timber for fuel exceeded that for com­mercial uses, but demand for charcoal and firewood remains heavy. Since partition, timber and wood products have become

293

important exports, rising in value from 416,000 new rubles (see Glossary) in 1955 to.4 million new rubles in 1962.

Attempts at reforestation have been meager; they include planting pine seedUngs on eroded hills and the establishment of tree belts along the coast to stl'engthen the sea dikes. From 1960 to 1963 an annual average of 1150 million trees reportedly were planted.

Fishing

Fish of many varieties abound in aU the inlets and river mouths of the coast, and carp is stocked in many inland ponds and flooded rice paddies. According to 1963 official statistics, 78.2 percent of the 500,000 fishermen and their families belong to organizations similar to the agricultural collectives. Many fisherman engage in farming,and .others work at various handicrafts. Various agricul­tural cooperatives are also reported to be engaged in rearing fresh­water fish.

A state-owned fishing fleet of 31 motorized ships is reported to be in operation. In addition to the state-owned fleet, some powerboats are used in offshore fishing, but sails continue to predominate. Entire families sometimes live on the larger ves­sels, which often work fishing grounds 20 or 30 miles from shol'e.

The government has built a number of plants for the processing of marine products, constructed small fishing ports and established state-operated shipbuilding enterprises and repair shops. It has also conducted research projects on fish resources and the marine characteristics of the Gulf of Tonkin.

The annual catch has steadily increased from about 94,000 tons in 1955 to over 220,000 tons in 1961. More than three-fourths of the annual catch-mainly striped tuna, bonito and mackerel-is marketed fresh. A small amount is dried, and the remainder­mostly sardines 6 inches and under-is used to make fish sauce (nuoe mam).

The government's major effort has been concentrated on de­veloping inland fishing because of its large potential. Inland fish­ing areas include almost 2.5 million acres of ponds, lakes, rivers, canals and paddy fields. Fresh-water fish production increased from 1,500 tons in 1955 to about 85,000 tons on 375,000 acres of water area in 1963.

Gathering

The gathering of wild forest products provides an important

294

source of income to families in the highlands. Anise, from which an aromatic oil is produced as well as a spice, is gathered there, and a very fine quality of cinnamon is harvested-reportedly 6,000 tons in 1960. Lacquer, various tannins, and dyes are also im­portant forest products. Numerous edible herbs and fruits which are valuable sources of food, ~specially during poor harvests, are also found in abundance.

DISPOSITION OF PRODUCE

Most produce is delivered to stllite agencies. Although there is still a free market, it handled less than 9 percent of retail trade in 1960 and has continued to be under heavy government attack. All industrial crops are delivered from the fields directly to state-owned processing establishments. In the case of rice and corn, agricultural taxes on land used to produce these crops, ir­rigation fees and tractor rents are payable in kind. Producers of sweet potatoes and dried manioc are also urged to pay the govern­ment in produce. Beginning in 1966 new regulations were issued permitting those cooperatives which produced insufficient food to feed their members to pay taxes and other charges in money. Delivery of taxes to government warehouses in .some dis­tricts is organized by the Transportation and Communications Section of the district government which supplies the transport. The state-operatedwarehouses to which the transportation system is linked in turn supply raw materials to processors and are sales points for unprocessed farm products (see ch. 21, Financial aild Monetary ::lystem).

Producers of rice, corn, sweet potatoes, and manioc are also required to sell to the state a certain percentage of their crop at stated prices. In 1960 the government made an administrative decision to use material profit to stimulate the farmers to increase production and to sell more foodstuffs to the state. Since that time, incentive. prices have been paid the peasants to deliver amounts in excess of their obligations, and various industrial products have been reserved ·to exchange with farmers.

At the end of 1965 more than 4,000 buying--and-selling coop­eratives had been formed for the purposes of buying agricul­tural produce fr9m the peasants and supplying them with tools,seeds and fertilizers. A large proportion of farm products is marketed through this network. These cooperatives constitute a thinly disguised mechanism whereby .the government can regu­late the distribution of food, farm supplies and other manufac­tured products.

295

CHAPTER 17

INDUSTRY

The government is committed to a policy of rapid industrial expansion, which, despite severe food shortages and lack of cap· ital, has shown some success. This can be attributed to the coun· try's raw material resources, its relatively extensive industrial base created under the French, and its large, hard·working labor force from which the authorities have been able to demand con· siderable sacri<fices. An influx of Soviet, Communist Chinese, Czechoslovakian, and East German equipment and technicians, under foreign aid agreements concluded with Communist coun· tries, has made a major contribution to industrialization (see ch. 18, Foreign Economic Relations).

The United States air assaults starting early in 1965 resulted in a slowing down of large·scale construction as cadres and work· ers were diverted to road, railroad, and bridge repair and the building of shelters. Bomb damage to powerplants, causing the cutoff of electrIc power, severely affected industrial production. Deliveries of raw materials to factories, always a problem, be· came even more uncertain. Productivity, already low, declined as a result of work interruptions and the employment of inexperi· enced workers to replace those mobilized.

The intensification of the air attacks in 1966, according to an Agence France Presse (AFP) dispatch, caused the Hanoi govern· ment to undertake a maj or program of economic dispersion to be completed by the end of that year. The program envisaged the movement of factories and industrial plants from concentrated complexes in urban areas to upland regions. Two important excep· tions were the cement works at Haiphong and steel mills at Thai Nguyen, some 40 miles north of Hanoi. Dispersion, while min· imizing the vulnerability of industrial target areas, undoubtedly will impede seriously industrial progress for a considerable period of time.

Under the French colonial administration industry consisted largely of plants processing raw agricultural materials and repair workshops. These and the' few powerplants were severely damaged

297

during the Indochina War, but by 1957 industry has largely been restored to its pre-World War II level. In 1958 the country began a Three-Year Plan which was to give it a nucleus of heavy in­dustry lacking in the past and to lay the foundation for a modern industrial state. A blast furnace, iron and steel plants and ship­yards were under construction by the spring of 1960, and other installations came into operation in 1961.

The Five-Year Plan, inaugurated in 1961, continued to give pri­ority to heavy industry, with emphasis on electric power, iron and steel production, and the manufacture of machinery. Produc­tion of hardware and farm implements was considered of out­standing importance, and a network of machine shops was estab­lished in all provinces and districts. At the same time consumer goods production was increased, with particular emphasis on de­velopment of local industries and handicrafts which were expected to meet domestic requirements. Local industry was di­rected to meet the needs of the local area (province) in agricul­ture, transportation, and consumer goods, relying on the local sources of raw materials, manpower, and capital. It was the aim of the government that each province should become an inde­pendent economic unit. In 1962 the value of local industry pro­duction was stated to represent 55.8 percent of the total volume of industrial production.

According to Le Duan, first secretary of the Lao Dong Party, it is the purpose of the government "to change the entire produc­tion basis of society from the current handicraft labor into a mechanized production foundation." This.is to be achieved through "step-by-step progression from handicrafts ·to semimechanization to modern machinery." To further this purpose, from 1961 to 1965 many factories with relatively modern technology and manufacturing a diversity of products were put into production. These included iron and steel, machinery, textiles, foodstuffs, pa­per, soap, chemicals, batteries and electric bulbs, asphalt, porce­lain, and lumber. In addition, the ministries in charge of indus­trial production established scientific and technological research organizations and schools to train cadres (see Glossary) and technical worlrers. Many of these trainees were sent abroad to Communist countries for advanced training and experience. Despite official statements that labor efficiency has increased every year and that quality has improved, productivity has remained low and quality poor.

Since the country cannot afford the investment to modernize an entire branch of industry, modern factories exist side by side

298

with handicraft production which is gradually being semimech­anized, but at a very slow rate. The handicraf.t and local industry sectors are still very large. They produce many consumer goods, yield a high total value of products annually and employ many times the number of workers in the modern factories.

Hanoi, until 1966, with chemical, match, tire, brick, and ma­chine construction plants, was an industrial center as well as the political and administrative capital. The major industrial plants, however, were said by AFP to have been removed during 1966, in accordance with the government's economic dispersion pro­gram. At Haiphong, in addition to the newly modernized port, there were a cement factory and a fish cannery. Until mid-1966, N am Dinh was still a center of light industries, especially tex­tiles. Some chemical factories (for different types of fertilizer) were located at Viet Tri and at Bac Giang, about 30 miles north­west and northeast, respectively, of Hanoi.

Machine factories, on which North Vietnam depends to equip agriculture as well as industry, were centered in Hanoi and Cam Pha, on the coast 40 miles northeast of Haiphong. Tea,' cigarette and plywood factories were at Phu Tho, 45 miles northwest of Hanoi. The extent of the dispersion program and its effect on these industrial plants were undetermined.

The all-pervasive economic role of government is exercised by a complex apparatus of official bodies. Resolutions of the Polit­buro set up the direction, task and organizatiop. of industry. This organ' also establishes the guiding principles of technical and p~oduction leadership for each branch and department from the centrally operated state enterprises to the regionally operated state ,enterprises, joint state-private enterprises, handicraft co­operatives and small industries.

The Central Statistical Bureau of the State Planning Commis­sion compiles and issues statistics on production and announces planning goals and achievements. The National Scientific Research Commission concer~s itself with technical training and advises the Vietnam Polytechnical College and the Engineering College on re­search and technical training. Control of the salt industry is ex­ercised by the Bureau of the Salt Industry in the Ministry of .!<'inance.

In the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the National Mineral Import­Export Corporation has a monopoly on exporting and importing minerals, and the National Machinery and Technics Import-Export Company has a monopoly on importi,ng and exporting machinery, equipment and technical assistance. The Ministry of Heavy In-

299

dustry and the Ministry of Light Industry control the factories that fall into each of these categories. The Ministry of Heavy In­dustry. for example, manages a number of establishments pro­ducing machinery, construction materials electric power and chemicals. Gold refining and mining also fall within its jurisdic­tion. In 1964 this Ministry reported that it included 100 enter­prises and worksites, 57 schools and had more than 100,000 cadres and workers on its staff.

STRUCTURE AND OWNERSHIP OF INDUSTRY

The regime has largely replaced private with public ownership of industry. Pressure was brought to bear on earlier established French enterprises through exorbitant tax rates and other means which forced them to sell out to the government at extremely low prices. In September 1960, Premier Pham Van Dong reported that 95 percent of the total number of privately owned and operated enterprises, industries and trading businesses had been transformed into pUblic-private joint enterprises with a few becoming cooperatives. He further stated that the cooperative movement was also making progress among the crafts.

Factories, including those which were still priva;tely owned, were administered by Communist cadres and were required to produce according to established production norms with raw materials al­lotted and sold to them by the sta;te. If production fell short, the factory was required to make up the difference. Since private owners were forbidden to sell either pi'ant or equipment, their ulti­mate solution was to present their factories to the government.

In 1955, North Vietnam had 20 state-owned enterprises operated by the central government. In 1961 there were 184 central gov­ernment operated enterprises, 1,000 local (state ownership ex­ercised at district or provincial level) industrial enterprises and public-private jointly owned enterprises. Between 1955 and 1961 the share of state-owned industry in total industrial production rose from 12 percent of 57.6 percent.

POWER

The generation of electric power is largely based on the coun­try's rich coal deposits. The government claims that it increased from 53 million kilowatt-hours in 1955 to 548.1 million in 1964. Capacity is said to have risen from 30,000 kilowatts to 100,000

300

by the end of 1961. At the time of partition, the country had only three power stations which had been built by the French. Located at Hanoi, Haiphong, and Nam Dinh, they were obsolescent and war damaged, but by 1959 they had been rehabilitated and transmission lines had been extended. In 1961 it was reported that the Soviet Union had built seven powerplants, including one each at Vinh and Thanh Hoa, in the mid-coastal region.

By the end of 1965, 63 small hydroelectric power stations had been built in the highlands. Numerous electrical pumping and transformer stations had also been located throughout the Delta, where a unified power network had taken shape. Although the pri­mary purpose of the pumping stations was irrigation, they also supplied electricity to villages and cooperatives. The aim was to produce sufficient electric power, not only to serve industry and the public services, but to expand rural electrification through­out the country (see ch. 16, Agriculture).

MINING

North Vietnam produces coal, zinc, tin, iron ore, uranium and­in much smaller quantities---"1;ungsten, lead, antimony, manga­nese, and gold. A general Geological Department, established in 1962 with Soviet technical assistance, has made a geological !nap of the country, and the Five-Year Plan, which called for increased prospecting for minerals, has transformed this sector of the econ­omy. Although mineral output has greatly increased since 19'00, only a few products are of significance. The country's high qual­ity antracite continues to be in demand in oriental markets. Pro­duction of phosphate ores runs at about 2 percent of the world total, and high-grade metallurgical chromite at about 1 percent of the world supply.

The country's ability to supply its own mineral requirements as well as to meet foreign demands has been greatly improved. J£nough iron ore has been uncovered to meet the needs of a second medium-sized iron and steel center. New deposits of nonferrous metsls have been discovered and developed.

The chemical and fertilizer resource base has proved to be good, and most other nonmetallic raw materials appear adequate to meet foreseeable demand. Raw phosphate mine output capacity has been expanded to above 1 million tons a year, primarily to supply foreign markets. In 1964 about one-third of total mineral output was exported (see ch. 18, Foreign Economic Relations).

Coal, with reserves estimated at 20 milliQn tons, is by far the

301