Truthful Fiction and Spiritual Crisis

by:

Jason Muscant. B.A.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduatc Studies and Research

in partial fultillment o f thc requirements for the degree of

Master of Ans

Department o f Polit ical Science

Carleton University Ottawa. Ontario. Canada

August 1.2000

@copyright. 2000 Jason Muscant

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ABSTRACT

This analysis o f Plato's Rrpublic will attempt to reconcile a quandary found

\b ithin irs tcxt. In Repuhlic. the protagonist Socrates rcprcsents a beauti ticd vision o f the

philosophic way of life. This way o f lire is dedicated to the vigilant pursuit oTtruth. and

the cultivation o f the soul to tàcilitate this pursuit. However. throughout the text.

Socrates consciously tells and prornotes lies as he sees fit. Through this thesis. 1 intend to

dcmonstrate that Socntes' use of fiction is not antithetical to promoting the search For

truth. To accomplish this. I intend to argue that Plato recognizes a di fference between a

lic in speech. and a lie in the soul. Furthemore. while the lie in speech can be used to

rcoricnt others towards the pursuit o f the "Good". the lie in the sou1 prevents this from

wer occurring.

While the approach of this work can be understood as a thematic textual analysis

o f Riythl ic and sevcnl other supporting Platonic dialogues. this thesis wi l l Iollow a strict

methodolo~y oof argumentation. In the "Introduction". I intend to presrnt the argument at

hünd. and situate the assumed contradiction within the body of the Platonic dialogues. 1

\i il1 then introduce the lie in speechAie in the sou1 dichotomy as a hypothetical solution to

the problem. The rest o f the work wi l l be dedicated to justifyiny and defendiny this

h ypothesis.

Because content is inseparable from context within Platogs hermeneutical world.

in the tirst chapter. [ wi l l attempt to analyze the contextual parameters o f the argument.

This chapter v d l be divided into two sections. The first section wi l l examine the actual

location where Socraies' noble fiction comes into being. and explain its significance. [n

the second section. I will introduce the characters involved, and suggest how their unique

personalities affected Socrates' lying.

The second chapter of the thesis wil l build on the first by discussion the notion o f

spiritual crisis. Through this discussion. 1 will elucidate upon Platonic '~holeness". It

rvi l l bc suggcstcd that al1 knowledge is penonal knowledge. and that the condition o f

spiritual crisis occurs when the metaphors used for penonal knowledge faii to

appropriatcly imbue rneaning upon experience.

Chapter Three will "bridge the gapo' between the tirst two chapters by explaining

that the context o f the Rcpiihlic is primarily Athens in spiritual crisis. and because o f this.

all of Socrates' entourage possess lies in their souls. I will argue that Socrates' use o f

tiction \\as an attempt to destroy theses lies. so that the other characters in the dialogue

çan rr-orient thrrnselves into a pursuit o f virtue. To accomplish this. I will divide this

chapter into three sections. The t int section. using Thucydides as a resource. wil l

support the proposition that Plato's (and Socrates') Athens was in a spiritual crisis. In the

second section. I will dernonstrate how Socrates used fiction to combat the lies in his

entourage's souls. 1 will explain the potential for. and consequences of. a

misappropriation o f a microcosmic order on a macrocosmic structure. and use Repuhlic's

Book V as a source to defend the claim that Socrates feared its occurrence. Finalty. in the

third section. [ w i l l bring this issue to modemity by using Hobbes' Leviaihan and Nazi

(;erman> as modem exarnples o f this misappropriation.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Chaptcr 1: The Context o f the Argument

Section 1: Location

Scction I I : Characters and their Perceptions O f the Endeavour

C haptrr I 1: k i t Knowing. Techne and Spirituai Crisis

Chapter III: The Lie in the Soul. the Noble Fiction. and The M isappropriation o f the Microcosmic Order

Section 1: Athens in Spirituai Crisis

Scction II: The Effect of Spiritual Crisis. and the Role of the Noble Fiction in Republic

Section Ill: Bringing Plato to Modernity

Acknowledgements

This project began almost a year and a half ago. when my then cunent professor.

Dr. Horst Hutter. recomrnended the study o f lies within the Republic as an interesting

area of study. Following his advice, 1 attended to the issue in a paper for the course.

I lowver. due to the immense scope o f the topic. 1 felt that the despite the completion o f

the paper. i had barei y begun to scratch the surface o f the issue. This paper makes me feel

the sarnc way. 1 can say this because 1 have completed the work required of me. and yet.

so much st i l l rcmains unsaid.

When I begun to write this thesis. I intended to contend with the possibility of

rcconciling a benevolenl Socntes with the tkequency ofhis lies. However. as 1 furthered

m- pursuits. thc work took on a lire ofi ts own. By its end. I realized that this work was

riot s i rnp l~ about the use ol'a particular ticiitious story. but really about the rrlationship

hctwcn philosophy. politics and living well.

Man only lives wll when he is growing and leaming. Intrinsiç to human nature

i s the nwd to intrract with the world or people. places. and things ihai envelops human

existence. We touch the world around us with every sense we possess. and we integrate

cach cxperience into the conglomerate o f ideas. thoughts and past experiences we

çomrnonly refer to as our mind or soul. I t is this mind. soul. or integrated conglomeration

of past rsperiences that gives meaning to Our experience. Our ability to qualify new

esperience hinges upon the etTon we as humans put in to cultivate our minds. When it

comrs to leaming or experiencing something new. ail we have to go on is our aptitude for

metaphorical leriming. the way in which we apply what we have already inte_mted (or

knon ). i\- ith that which we have not (do not know).

Philosophy. as the love of wisdom. is a way of life dedicated to the cultivation of

the minci. or as 1 will rekr to it in this work. the tacit dimension. Human contentment. in

i)pposiiion to this. is the çondi tion where personal experiencr is al ways comfonabl y

csplaincd hv the t x i t dimension. It is for this reiison that philosophy alwciys e n i r r p in

;i pcriod ol'crisis. for most people would Crrl no nrrd to cultivate the mind. when the' arc

coriil'ortnhlc with thrir experience.

Hinwver . history dictates thüt ai rimes. the ability of iht: taçit dimension to

p i - i p x l y csplain new experirnce breaks down. Kcw enperience f2el.s dkjointrd. and w r

h q i i i to doilhi whu we are. and whiit wr have becomr. This condition is what I.

hoiwwing froni Dr. Toni Dtirhy. will refer to tis spirituül çrisis.

Tlic .\then$ of the Repohlic is in ti condition of spirituül crisih. The diin~cr of this.

t h i h piiper will oryuc. is thüt when enperience no longer feels connected to who we :tic.

1r.c di) not always chose to shiipe oorsrlves to brttrr üdüpt to n r w experirnce. lnstead. w r

himian3 tcnd to reprcss this feeling: wr argue thüt it is not wc who nrrd to chlinsr. but

thc axirld around us. Thrn wr try to impose order on LI supposrdly chiiotic world. and wr

~iticnipi to rcconstmct the world in our own image.

Dr. Mnhen Poirier. anothcr professor to whom 1 am in drbt. ülwüys arpued thÿt

politic' wnz thc an of making do with an imperfect hurnan condition. By imposing our

order upon ;i \v«rld that wr see as chaoiic. we are in actuality not practicing politics. but

Gnuzticimi. in attempting to create heüven on Eünh. It is this attempt at ordrring the

iinivenc that 1 will rrfer to in this paper as the misappropriation of the microcosrnic order

on the miicrocosmiç structure. Unfortunately. often the consequence of tryin, a to create

hcaven on Eanh is the realization of the opposite occurrence. Apparently. the road to hell

i ic ptiwd with gond intentions.

This p;iper is ~ibout much more than truth and lies: it is about how to live.

Borrow ing tioni Strauss. 1 discuss the need for philosophers to bc prudent. a« that their

wird\ are not misiised. I introduce the rolr of the Grrek concept of r r t h r in this process

01' 11iis;ipprupriütion. and drlènd the role of Socrütes' lie in preventing its occurrence. 1

Iiiipc tu providc thc contexi lrom whiçh this argument takes places. and to this end. 1

;irpiic \vtiy i tiis coiitcxt is pürticulürl y significünt.

Howcw-. whür is iniponant ro note is that this not a dead issue. Spiritual crisis ia

iiot ;i distinctiy Xthcninn occurrence. for the West c;f the n r w milltnniuni is contendhg

with ihc 5anir. iss~ir.. We are wry rnuch in the rnidst of çreaiins a veritablr. teçhnoi«giçal

"ScconJ Rcditf ushich questions whai i t means to he human. .-\ man can live with a

~ I I C S P ' h hem und ule can clone sherp. We witness the boundarics of frintasy and reali t y

hlurrcd ihrmigh teicvision hy "Survivor" and "Bis Brother". The Intrmrt threairns the

i i * h ~ ) i r . notion of spücr. and açcording to Kojeve. we now rxist in the nul1 period üftrr the

cnd ot' tinie consciousness. The Holocaust has shown us the rçalized horror of instituting

ih is niistippropriation. but we do not see the iict itself as evil. but the act of rvil people.

X'c tell ourseIves that i t wüs simply the product of maniacally evil people. and that if i t

\ w e hcncv«!rntlp directcd. we cm. through it. creatr a new Eden. Wr have stspprd ovrr

thc threzhold into n rnillenniurn. where we teeter. as Niemeyer wrote. betwern

nothingness and paradisc. For this rrason. it is our responsibility to evoke this

d i u w h n .

Introduction

h is rnv intent to study the words of a repuied liür. Ovrr and over again. Plüto's

ch;~rxtcr S ~ c r m s ç«nceills tmth when he sres tït. makrs up siorirs when he decms i t

iicwhsu-y. and clircctly lies to his interlocutors if he perceives i t to be aduntagrous to his

c;iuw. This i \ ohviously problematiç. for as a bcautiticd tiçtionül chürricter reprcxenting

iIic phi lowpliicnl way of lit;.. ti lyins Socrates clin onlp rvoke the presrnce of srvcre

wntrridiçtioni within the body of the Platoniç dialogues.

One O 1' the niost intriyins apparent contrtidictions within Platci's masterpiccc

R c ~ ~ ~ r r h l i c - iiriws within his discussion of the relationship hetwern the philosopher and

triiih. Thc philowphcr. üs ü lover of wisdom. is one who also loves truth. This rnust bt..

t'or ii i h "cniircly nticessnry thüt a man who is by nature rroiicülly Jisposed toivard

wiiiconc ccirc tor everything related and akin to his boy."' and wisdom. as implird hy

S ~ w ~ t r s . is more ükin to inith than ünything rlse. This connection is rein forcrd w hcn

Socrates ask\ the question. "Will they say that philosophers aren't lovrrs of thüt which is

7

and of thc tnith'!" w ith Glüucon responding. "Thar would be strünge."-

Thc trrm implird must be used when discussing Plüto's associarion of wisdom

m i tnith. hecause thcre appeÿrs to be somr discrepüncy in Plato's choicr of phrüsing. In

thc Bloom tninslation. when Socrates asks Gltiucon- "Now could you tind anything more

akin t i ~ wisdoni than tmth'?" he responds in a quick and precisc rnanncir. nssrning with

ceriiiinty "Of course not." Howrvrr. in the Grube trmslation. this cenainty is not

directly sharsd. Whrn the question is posrd to Glaucon. this translation has Glaucon

sivin? no iinswer. Instead. hr poses a question. g'How could one'?'4 When glossed ovrr

q~iickl!*. this question apprlirs rhetorical. and implying an affirmation of the reliitionship.

Houeiw. gkrn that this work is founded on a principle of logographiç necrssity. nothing

iiiund uqithin thc houndaries of its paps deserves to bs simply "glossed ovei'.

Socriitrs cliooses noi to unswrr Glauçon's question. and instead ü s h Glaucon if i t

i \ pcisrihlc t i ~ r the same nature to lovc hoth wisdom and untruth. to which Glaucon rcplies

.%i n o \\.a).." in the Blooni translation. and "(it is) not possible al dl." in Gruhe's. I t

Lippcün r hai t ht. iwo trünslators are giving two distinct messaers. For Bloom. the

chiira~ici. Socraieh is quite cleür in his presentation of the friendship hctuwn uisdom and

iruth. For Gruhr however. the discussion is a littlr opaque. üs therc appeürs to he

\ignilic~inçc in jiixtlipoing the uncertainty oCGlaucon's t k s t rcsponse ol'"Hou c»uld

ont.'.)" aeith ihc forcc of his second. Glüucon's testimony can bc undrrstood m saying that

whilc i i ih definite that the philosopher cannot lovc both falsity and wisdom. i t rrmains t»

he secn whethrr truth is always in close proxirnity of that wisdom. 1s Grube-s trmslation

w;psiing ;i possihility thüt "untruth" can somrtirnes be found "closrr to wisdom" even

i t ' [tic philosopher hütes the lie?

At li niore basic level. the discrepancy between the rwo interpretritions epitomizes

the prohleniatic nature of understanding the relationship betwern tntth and wisdom. In

Tl10 Ci' trird Mm. Strauss provides his reüders with this insight:

". . .One cannot tüke senously enough the latv of Iogogr~phic necrssity. Nothin: is accidental in a Platonic dialogue: rvrrything is necrssary ~ i t the place where i t occurs.. .al1 Platonic dialogues lire radically lictitious. Thc Platonic dialogue is based on ü fundamental fdsrhood.

Plrito. Phro 'v Repitblic.. trm'r. G..M..A. Gruht.. Indianapolis: Hrickttt Puhlishing Cu.. 1974 . linc: 4X5c

a hrüutiful or beautifying fdsehood. ri:. on the denial of chance.'"

l t i \ for this rrüson t hat the Pliitonic dialogue c m be falsrly Iikened to a dmmatic

riia~icrpiecc. n\ i t creatss a world that retlrcts that of humün rxperience excrptionally.

d q i LL' being huil t on a radical1 y tlctitious l o p p p h i c nccessity. However. the

rcciigniiion ol' Platonic dialogue üs a dramii to be experiencrd is nqlcctful. in that ii hils

[ O ;iccount toi \orne of the niost fundamental elrmenrs of Pliiro's writinp.

N'licn reniemherinp S hakcsprare's ereat tragedy f f w l u r . one recoiints how

Hmilci. in thc interest of propoxing dangerous social criticism. hüd an acting trwp

pcrii>riii "Tlic Mouse Trap". In it. the actors mirrored the derdh of the diabolical

Cl~iiidiiih in thc ;ihsi\sinrition of his hrother and the repossession of his ~ v i k and kingdom.

T b diJ niit rciii;iin within ihe realrn of the dramli. for we. at the third degrce of

\cpiiraiion. ucrc still involveci in the bthominp of the rxperience. Whik the char~c t r r~

sc ilccted iipon i hc circumstlinces. we. as reliders. rc tlrcted not on1 y upon the experience.

hiii ;ilsi> iipon i h r retlection of the experience. One can lïnd the same manipulation of

distancc in the T~~rupesr. with Prospero's use of the "Mask" to rvoiie unsren spirits.

This rctlection upon retlrction is the üct prrformed by Bloom and Gmbe in the

trünslotion of Plnto'x dialope Rrpiihlic-. W hen approaching the text. thry attempt to

üchiew iinderstandinp ( rioesis ). by the application of reason ( t l i~ ir io ic t ) upon thüt whiçh

thcy sensually experience through thrir eyes. and opine upon (pisti.~). In Book IV.

Socriitcs explains "lt's plain that the same thing won? be willing at the siimc tirne ro do

or wffcr opposites with respect to the samr pan and in relation to the same thingo*" If the

cn~hodimcnt of philosophy is at this moment telling the truth. than al1 things must apply

to this rule. including Rrpitblic itself. By consequencç. the reader would have to ser

either Blo»ni or Gruhe or hoth fundarnentally incorrect in their interpretation and

trnnslntion of the dehated passase. given that both workrd from the same primary trxt.

H~u~c\~c 's . if the srinic set of Greek words (as tmth) c m by consrquençr hoth lead towtirds

and uwiiy honi \visdoni. one begins to cal1 into question their relütionship.

Tu rcniovc onesrlf from this argument. one would have to sussest that tmth could

t iaw wry difkrcni nirmings. depcnding upon with wliorn i t corncs into contact. I f

jii\ticc i \ fuund i n thc prtlctice of what "makrs him natiirally fit"'. could it not be a i d that

[tic j ~ i h t intcrpictiition and triinsllition for eüch is itself siihjective'! In essence. if sach

tainsliition djiisticc hegins with the nüturally tïtting standpoint of the person. eaçh

persim's iindcrst;inding iif justice is dependrnt upon both the rwosnition of ri nred for a

iiniq~ic stniidpoint. and on the unique standpoint itsrilf. This would seem to validatc

Siaiiis' argument on rs«tcric/exoteric writing Iound in P r ~ s c ~ i r t i o r i m d rlre Arr rf

I I . Houwer. i f this is the escape. can it not help but make a lirir out of the Soçrntrs

who just said the inipossihility of an entity to endure oppositrs sirnultanroiisly:> 1s cruth

iiluxp cliwr to wisdom than fiction. or is it the other wüy üround?

This question is asked in lisht of Socrrites' contrivance of a nohle lie. "one of

thusc lies thüt cornes into being in case of nerd" in discussing the foundation of the "city

in The use of this noble tiction is situated directly aftrr the character Socrates'

discussion on the evaluation of children with guardian prrsonalities. to determine which

cine> hilw the attributes required for leadership. XItrr supgesting thiit one loves the most

what one Jrern?; self-heneficiiil. Socrites suggests that those who arc to lead must be

"entirel y eagrr to do what they believe to br advantageous to the city and would in no

u x y hc willing to do what is not:') Glaucon reinforces this belief hy assenting with a yes

and identif'ing t hese people as "good men". Socratrs and Glaucon then begin to discuss

thc nccd tor tcstinz thesr children by making sure that they clinnot anci will not he

--chüriiied hy plcasure or terrifieci by fear.""' They then ügrer ihüt the young yurirdians

i i i i i \ t hc çspused io frnrs and plelisurs to test them. to identitj those that cannot be tainted

hy hc~\.iicliiiicni. By bewitchment. Socratrs intends n tom of seduction hy whiçh the

pinvcrt'iil m o t ions u i joy and k a r aroused hy thesr tests persuade the young guardians tu

;ihüiidon thcir "intelligent endunince" (the most r x e m p l q definition of courage siven in

thc L ~ I C S I of purpos~. in lieu OS the potrntial to rmbrxe or hidr from thexe emotions.

Oncc the ruling body hris been isolateci frorn the rest of the pm.iirins (the

iiiis i l iiirit.5 who rissist the rulm ). Socr~tes risks Glriucon. "Could we soméhou. contriw

one of those lics thüt çome into k i n g in case of need. of which we werc just now

\puking. sonir one noble lie to persuade. in the best case. r w n the nilers. but if not

iheni. the rest «E the çity.. ." that the guardians should rule. and that they mls in the

intcreit uf t hc çity. Then. Glaucon rrsponds by asking Socratrs what kind of fiction hr

lin\ in itiitid. Socrüies drlays his response. and then begins to pmfess a "Phocnician

itiing" whiçh u n ht. usrd to motivate the leadership of the city in speech to rulr for the

hencfit of dl. In his '7ranslator's notes". Bloom mentions thüt the Phoenician story to

whiçh Sucrates is rrferring is that of Cadmus. who founded Thebes with giants who

sprüng t'rom the rünh lifter the treth of a slain dragon were sown h~ him. In the second

Book ut' his work. The L m - S . Plato's Athenim stranger argues that. "this myth is ri grctat

c.saniplc for the lawgiver of how it is possible to persuade the souls of the young of just

abolit anything."' ' Funhermore. it follows that the lawgivrr should serk only the

coni.içtion5 ihüt would do the greatest good for the city. and thiit hy usin@ such myths the

I~iu,givcr cciiilcl tacilitaie the drvelopment of a shüred voice and purposr for his

coriiiiiiinity. Socrates justities its use hy reminding his entourage that the poets. who

Iiaw triiJitiimülly servrd as the moral authority in Athens. have previously usrd this myth

Iiis t hc \anic p~irposc.

Thih iiiytli hegins with Socrates appralin_~ first to rulrrs and soldiers. hy

cxpl;iinirig t t i ~ i t the "relirin; and education we gave them wrre liks dreams" for while the!

hclie\~cJ i t u r i happening to thcm thry were actually undrr the canh k i n g (ashion and

r c m d hy t hc eünh wh« is their çommon niothcr. '' Now thai thry have çomplrted the

tivriiaticin process. the cnrth hils sent them up. so that tbey can plan for and defend the

land. u-hich i i ths i r mother. and that thry should knoa that in protrcting other citizem.

thcy proieci ihcir hrorhers. I 3

Atier a quicl; interruption by Glüucon. Socratcs continues the lie by enplaining to

thchc hanie leaders and protectors thüt although al1 in the çity are çertainly brothers. "the

gocl. in liishioning those of you who are competrnt to rule. mixed gold in at thrir hinh.""

The ausiliariss have been mixed with silver, whilt- the craftsmen and hrn~ers have been

niised u i t h bronze and iron rrspectively. Although it is more likely that rach typc: of

pcrson u.ili haire a similar-type offspring. it can happen that a silvcr child be born from a

soldcn pcirent'. or a golden child from silver or any other type parent. It is the god's

c«iiinilindment that the tïrst responsibility of the ruler would be to watch over the

children. tti ses what metal is mixed with their soul. so that each child crin be thrust out

iiiiiimg the people of their similar type. This will bc ensured. as an oracle will hr created

! i ~ r thüt çit)' uhich will stüte ihat the city "will be dcstroyrd when ün iron or bronze man

i t i i i n This is obviously a lie. for even G!aucon States. 9 t wtlm't for nothing

i I i ; i~ y o ~ i wcrc for \ci long nsharned to tell the l i r . " ' ~ ~ o w s v r r . Socriites. the chüriicter ihiii

hc\i rcprehcnis the philosophic nature. and who should hy his ourn standard3 love on14

[tic [sui h. ir prepnrcd to propqüte the lie. citins utility as a justification.

Le i l S r r w ~ . in his wwk. The Ch!. crtitl M r r i . alludrs to a possible chsape from the

puaidm. Wliilc rccoyizing that the Platonic dialogue is riidiçally fictitious. he ciiniiniirs

IO i i r y c thüt thc didosue hiis the ability to reço_onize and rlucidate iipon key elements of

rcdity. Lcon Crüig. in his work T11e Wltr Lorer. takes up the argument of Straus\. when

Iic rugc.3t.r thüt the probleni of understanding Platonic dialogue is the süme prohlem as

undcrhinnding ihc world.'' In al1 of Plato's dialogues. inciuding Rrpirhlic. al1 writtrn

in limiütion is qunli tird by the particular c.o.snto.s establishrd by Plato. The namcs given

to chmçicrs. the location. the phrasing of the responses. ihe choices of speakers. the

unhaid words. the Srstures and so fonh. al1 color the discussion Ionvlirdcd by those

involveci in the dialoye. Thrre is more. for as Craig identities. "the age and outward

iippcnrünsc and social class and political status and popular reputation" also in tluencr

heliiiviour. '"he charaçtrn do not a r p c as machines. hut as people: tlattrring. hoast ing.

swüring. threatening. and often embürrassing themselves. revealing more of their

pcrsonality thnt thry rvrr intrnded to.

I t i* this malleahle nature of language as ri svhololr thiit allows for a division

hetwen a lie in speech and a lie in the soul. When the chriracter Socrates discusses

~pcccti in the Rephlic. he links it with fine music. pcefulnrss. and fine rhythm. as

clciiicnts thot cstahlish a truly zood and fine charricter." It is csscntial to note that the

u t hci- tiil-cc attri butes tire al1 elements of anistic creation. If. for Socrrttes. the use of

lanpiiugc u n hc iindrrstood ris an anistic practice. this understanding niust hshion the

muctiirc in which the diüloz~ie tlikes place.

Wiihin Ploto's picce of anistic creation cor drrima within a drarna). srvcrril

di t ' t i x n t çhürüçicrs are using the anistic tool of langurigr. This tool itself has no intrinsic

~.:iliir.. as i r is only a tool for manipulatine acting characters. Whrn Polymarchus inhcrits

Cephiilus' ür_ounient in the first book. hr rejects the notion that justice unquiilifiedly

rcqiiircs truth. as he rrcognizrs the nred to subjrct verhilige to the geütrr nrrd of sivin@

to .*c.üch what is owed to hirn."'" And so follow al1 the othrr chÿractrrs of the dialogue.

csp«iinding thcir selves through the vehicle of language. Howrver. despitr the f x t thüt

amds do no[ possess an? intrinsic tmth-value. they are h r from impotent. for it is onl!

ihrough ltinyase thnt the dialectic form can rmrrge.

W hen disciissing dialectics in his work. Plzilosopli~ cis Wcry c>l' L f i . Pierre Hüdot

rcniürked "whiit çoiints i for dialectics) is not the solution of ti puticular problrm. but the

roüd travelled to rrach ii: a roiid dong which the interlocutor. the readrr. and the disciple

Plritir i Rcp. Blot)nii. Op. Cir.. lint.: 4Mkl 'I I

- Itkl.. linc: 35lc

i'«rtii thrir thought. and niakr it more apt to discover the tmth." In Repitblic. dialectics

11

~irc refcrred to as "deliverance from bonds and the tumint around from the shadous.-- 1t

ha4 thc poufer to rollse the hrst pan of the sou1 and leap i t upward touwds the

contcniplütion of the "Good". It is ii discourse "without any hrlp from the sensrs but hy

i.c;ism8'. which elewtes its willing practiiionrrs to a vantagr point from where the- u n

' t di\iingtii41 cihjcct.; t'rom thcir pure and iipplied identities.*- As Cushman notes in

9 ' 1 ~ i 1 p L i : Plrilosoplr~~ji~- tlw Sick SoiiI. "Nothing lrss than the powrr of dialectic is cible

..24 i o yic1J apprclicnsion of the ultimatr object of knowlrdge. Onl- the reccptive prxtice

ot'dialcctics ciin transtom the person inio an entity that can. if only in tlretin, moments.

pcrcciw clcn~cntz 01' grtxiter rrrility. When Hadot argues that the subject mütrer of

clitiloyc is Ics.; iniportiint than the niethoci applied to it. he does so with the

iindcrstmding thilt dialrçtic\ are cornpnriihle to mental cxerciscs. in that the' train human

cosnitive t'ticulrics. and conven thrm into recrpton Ior the truth of the "Good".

Thk con~wsion occurs through a dirilectical puri fication process identifid uith

the Scicrcitic elciic1w.s. The purpose o f the ele~ithirs. as Cushmiin noies. is to rrsolvtt

confiision and c»ntrridictions among espousrd opinions ( & m i ) by sepürüting the truc

-5 IToiii the 1àlsc.- In the Mrrro. aher Socrates has subjected a y o u q boy to the elrricirris.

he asks k n o to observe the change in hirn. for while "at the bqinning he did not

know.. .nor does he know i t now. but then he thought he knew it. Now however hr does

iècl perplessd. Sot on1 y does hc not know ihr answer. hr doesn't rvcn think he

knows."'" This is the essence of the Socrûtic elertchirs. as it is a method applied at the

consent of hoth parties. which clarifies a subject of thought by examining ail assumptions

and hypothesrs. and sifting through ili-considered opinions. Once puritïed. the mind.

iiccordins t« Pllito. u n engage in diülectics. "doing iiway with hypotheses and procerding

to [tic iirht prinçipir wherc it will find cenainiy.""

This is not *iniply ü drstnictive procsss. for to examine hypotheses is to rekr

t licni to wnic highcr principlr as t hcir nrccssary just i ti~ation.'~ In an ordered universe.

ilicrc niii\r bc (i greüicr good to which each sood tïnds its justitication. its 1-~iisoti-d'erre.

Thir "G~iod". as ;i first principlr. is non-hypotheticül. Thc rlerrc*lriis üttempth to çlear the

iiiind fnmi l ' ~ k opinion and ihç double ignorance thüt follows frorn i t i belirving one

powsscs Lnowledgc dcspite k ing ignorant ). When Pliito mentions the "doing a w y

wi t h hyoihcscs". he intrnds this: Hyporhcsrs. in thrir Iirnitcd çapacities i aï they cannot

Li5sunie io embract. the total richness of rxpcrience) always point beyond themselvc to

2'1 wiiicthing else. Even knowledge is noi benrficiül to its ownrr. unlrss i t is knowlrdge

oI' the "Good". 'iothin:. with the exception of this first pnnciple. possrsses any element

O t. trlinsccndentd tnith within it. It is for this reason that the chiirricter Socrritrs rqutitrs

intcllipce with proximity to the "Good". for nothing besides the "Good" is intrinsiciilly

intell igihlc or self-cvident. Throush the dialectical stance. the mind is able to achicvc a

position of mutuality with the "Good". When rnposed to the tirst principle. the mind can

recognizt. the conncction between the hypothesrs and the "Good". Gnibe reaffirms this.

' Plato. "blcno" tiikcn f r i m T h Collecr~d Ditr1og1ru.s o$ Pluro: lnr.liidi~rp rlte Lerrers. cd. Huntington Cairns ririd Edith Haniilton. Ptinctmn: Princeton C'nivcrriity Press. 1973. linc: XJa - Pliiro i Rcp Gnihc) Op. Cit. linir: 533d -' Cu~hnian. Op. Cit.. p. 175 - . / f % f . . p. 1 71)

when h r explains thüt in that the previously unproved assumptions can consrquently be

Jeduçed from knowledge. they cease to be hypotheses.'"

With this understanding of tmth rstüblishrd. one cm return io the "noblc fiction"

~ i w d hy the çhüracter Soccites and determine whethsr his action opposrd it. One is

liiircd into ihc c«nclusion thlit within ihr structure of the fictionül "çity in speech-'. the

cli;iractcs Socrates' lie in speech is simply an ÿnistic çrçation thai üttempts to illustrate

clciiicnts o f rccility. Its words do not protest to have üny intrinsic rruth-value. hiit ihcy are

inicndcd to elwlitc the city to li Iwel of rnutuality with its previously anointed pod . that

k i n g jiisiicc. It ttierefore serves the macroçosm's first principle hy directine the city

tw-mis it. Whtln we recognize this myth outside the realm of the "city in speech". and

ciiiincct it to the body «C the Rqithlic aï ü whole. it becorties quiçkly identitlahle as an

~ingroiinded hypothrsis. just as any othrr. It tlikrs its place in the gcater diülectic of the

w r k l i h il "springb~ard" frorn which the rerider cm launch hirnself towards the first

principlc. In that Socrrittts' noble fiction üids in the conversion of' the rcader towrirds the

proper reccpt ion of the "Good". it cannot be sren lis a lie. Quitr oppositrly. this

particiilrir "lie in speech" must be seen a possrssin_g ri viable çonnection to essential truth.

While this argument may appear to hr difficult to xcept. it is noi unfounded in

Plüto's othcr writ inp In his Seiwztll Lettrr. Plaio uses the following passage to explain

rclility:

I ccnainly have cornposed no work in regard to it. nor shall 1 cver do so in ihe future. for there is no way of putting it into words like other studies. Acquriintancc with it must corne rat her rrfter a long period of attendance on instruction in the subjrct itsrlf and of close companionship. whrn. suddenly. liLc ri blaze liindled by a leaping spark. it is generated in the SOLI[ and is at once self-sustaining."

If Plato protests that in no way can rsality be identified throush words. one c m make the

üryment that the vocaiized lie is no longer a corruption of reülity. as it never aïsumed to

po~srss 'in understanding of rerility in the first place. The vocalized lie becomrs the

arrist ic cspreshn tliüt wtis previousl y described. However. the consequencrs for a lie in

[tic w i l art. niiicli niorc severt. t'or it receivrs no suçh pardon for its inirntionül

dcccpiion. Fur i f the hunian sxperirnce of truth is dependent iipon a panicular condition

ut' hcitig dcve1opc.d hy "a long period of attendance and close compmionship to hciing". ti

coi-nipriim ci i tlint condition. or a "lie in the soul". u n preveni that wprriçnce. If rcrtlit)

i h r i ) hc c.sp1ainc.d throu~h the tr los of the "Good". and intelligence is cquivalent to proper

iiiniing ;it its f~ilfilmcni. than a soul in t'iilsrhood removes it lunher lrom kinship with it.:'

Thc ch;irüctsr Socrates introduces his discussion on the niaks up of the hiiman

m i l hy idcntiîjinp i r as a divided rniity. possrssing many "diverse drsires. pltimurrs and

. . .. > 9

pains. These desires cire suh-çhssed into three preiitrr divisions of the soul. with r x h

ilcrivcd h m a püniculür motor of human action. The tïrst of which is spokrn of is the

dchiring part. or the c~pirliu11ierikor1. for which rros is the motivation. Its apprtites includr

[tic dcsirc for "eating. drinking. sex and dl their fol~owers."'~ Socrates also mentions that

i h i h pan cün also h r rquütcd with money loving. for dl thesr appetites can be saiiütrd

throiigh money. The second element for Socmes is the tiirrnioeides. or that "with which

ii nian hecomes spiritrd."" Guided by the rliirms. this section is identified as the

&nient of the soul that is tïery. and is dedicated to the richievement of power. victop.

and high rcputr. Socratrs labels it as the honour-loving aspect of the human. and is

identified always with courage. Distinct from the other pans of the soul is the io,qi.srikoii.

LN- th<: sutional. ciilçulating elemrnt of the human being. In that it is in constant pursuit of

is~iih. his part i associütrd with a love of lcarning. and the philosophic nature as ü wholr.

.Ah clements ot'ti cornplrtct seul. these divisions do not and cannot manifest in

indi\.iduiil vriciiiims. Huniün experience dictates t hrit these üppetites cün work

indcpcndcnrly ;ind often connict with one ünother. Plato's Socrates sneniplifies this

ttisough thc \tory o f Lcontius. a man who fuund himself in interna! çonflicr as tu whethttr

tir ntji to Io& at cwcuied corpses that wrre lying nrar him. In the trnt . Soçntes enplriins

t t i i i t "i Lcimtitis desircd [o look. but ai the same tirne hc. upüh di~~i i s ted ."~" His erot ic

h i r c t r i '~cnsiidly experirnce the vision of rwcuted bodies wris in conllict with the rest

O t. hi\ hcing. Cpon hein? overcome by his desire. he pushes his eyes wide open. nished

ion-;irds the c ~ x p s e ~ . and spouted with angrr. "Look you dtimn uretchcs. tAe your t i l l of

. - ;s thc (air sight."' p rov iy that anger can wür against the appetiies.

"' l l~ id . . ltnc: 4 . W ' 111iJ.. linc: 44k i

*rIiib slior~ Lic'count i h h~ no rncans a cornpletc prescntaricin of the dcpth and insight of the Lccmtius 111!1I1. 1-ctmiiu.\ . iust its Scicrriich was in the îïrst hook 01' the Rrpithlic ia travelling from the Piririeuh proh;ibl> to~v;rrcl> Athcns. Hc. rcprcscnting svcry hurnrin. is an cntity trrippcd within thc mritaxy u f the c~cr-changing Erirth and the pcrmrincnt pattern ofchringe o f the stars, the physicril and the rnctriphysicrii. [tic niundrinc anci ihe divine. Notice thrit hc wris facinp upwrirds until k i n g tcrnpcd at ri h i c . ~;cnsuril IcveI io c\pcricncc dcad corpses. Thcsc derid corpses arc of nien who were cxccuted. whost. ph"sicril houndarich Ii;iJ Iwcn \ tolrttcd. and tvhosc intc.rnril/cxternriI structure ot'dichotomy hrid hem dissoI\.t.d. This 1.4 mort

iiiari ;i c;i.ru;il poiniing tcnvards our currcnt fascination with horror nitnies and car crrishcs. as tt notes thc h~ihic 1iurii;in dcsirc to ~ichicuc human synthcsis. so that WC crin sympathire tvith Dickinson'\ "1 hcrird a tl) tiw/ i\ hcn I clicci.

()tcrpiit~crccl h~ this primordial desire. Leontius turns riround. and in doing sr). his soul orients I [\cl 1' 1 1 1 ~ ~ ;ir& crotic hl tilrnent. and the epirhrrnietikor~ ovcrcomcs the [ogisriko~t. I n spiic of this. Lcontius is \cIt'-ionhcioux and awarc o f his actions. Thc logiçal sicment of his st.lî+enlists thc riid of the anpp elemcnt of Ili.\ \OUI IO ..niatic svar" against his unlriwful dcsires. So e w n in his moment rif rihsdutc ~clikncss. he is \riIl hic to linci hrrcngth cnough to iiddress his t y s as "drimn wretchcs".

In Lcon i iu~ ~ v c î?nd the condition of c v t q man. and in hi3 strugglc wc set. our own to ovcrcomc thlit \\hich i h haw. sci thrit wc bring oursclvcrs tri thrit aforc-mcniioned Icvrl o f muturilit! with the "Gocd".

Because these appetites have a tendency of conflicting. Socratrs explains

thrit t h m exists a virtue that serves to maintain order in the chaotic soul. The virtue of

ordcrlincss is moderation. and it is drfined as a "mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and

dcsircs. as nicn sriy ahen they use.. .the phrase stronger than onesel f.".'" For Socmes.

iiiodcration is niuch like a harmony. ris i t spreads through the whole of the hcinp. It is an

~ifrccnient made hctwrn the naturülly worse and naturally bcttcr as to which of the two

Iiirisl riilc. horh in the çity and in the individual.

i t is thro~ish moderütion that the philosophical individual recognizes hoth the

iii~iltiplicity of the s«iil. and its natural hirrlirchy of apprtitrs.'"' This hierarçhy mirrors

t liai of the city in speech. where the few pardilins use the auxiliaries to govem over the

prolit-cornin2 clüss. For Ploto. it is the philosopher's l o ~ i s t i k o i ~ that uses the tlittniocit1e.s

[ O control and nioderite the individuül's sensual appetites. This is important. for it is ihis

liirrii <II' r q u laiion thüt cillows the philosopher to experience tr~nscendent relility. If t hc

chnrnctcr Socraies is correct in understanding justice as pursuing thiit which rach of us is

niennr to piirsuc. thcn the only just soul is thüt which pursurs the "Good". It is only the

ripidly nioderateci sou1 that cün experience truth. as it understands to pursuc: it outside the

rcüliii i1f human knowledgc. The lie in the sou1 begins to emcrge out of a lack of

niudcriition. in uhich the nütural hierarchy of üppetites is restructured. çausing the

individual to pursue tmth in the wron: manner.

When the çhüracter Socrates says "to be ignorant.. . is w hat most men want to

ciwid."" he rnrikes ;i formidable statrmrnt. By suggrsting that men se& to avoid k i n g

. \ # Plrrtti (Rcp Blormi Op. Cir.. linc: 43k 1' 4 Cr~iig. Op. Cit . . p. 95 " Pliiio ( Rcp Gruhc) Op. Cit.. line: 383h

ignorant ahout reality. he forwards the position that al1 error is donc involuntarily.

Siihscquent l y. as Cushman notes. the characier Socrates ill-prepares the reader for an

iindcnimding of the complications of the Platonic conception of ignorance. -1'

For Plrito. there is a hrirmless form of ignorance that crin br identitied with ri

lacl; ol' in tl~rrnat ion ahoui essenrial Bcing. The i_gnormçe is couplrd with self-rcco_oniiion

. . 0 1 ignoimçc. and is besi c.xrmplitïed by the Socraies of Plato's ;\polo,q~. who i \

rccognizcd hy the Delphic Oraclc as the wisest hrcause he knows he hus no knoulrd~ti of

ihc "Gmxi". Ii is ihis iznorance within the modrrated sou1 that inspires the person to

;ichicw niorneni\ of ciariiy. while uccepting the Fici that outside these moments rcality ih

iriiicccr5sihlc.

This simple ignorance is distinct frorn the double ignorance caused hy ri lie in

t i c i l It is 1i state of folly. whrre the man possessed of it thinks he is wisc. wcn

ihiiugh hc is nut: *-l t is to ihink that one knows what one does not know."" U'ithin tliis

\tait. ot'double ignorance. the igorant man wiltÜ1ly drludes himsrlf into believr that he

hns uçhievrd knowlrdge of reality. and stubbomly holds io thüt belief. The cause of ihis

t'on11 of ignorance is what Cushman refers to as the '*old crror of turning rerility upside-

down and idcntifyins the reiil with objects of b e c ~ r n i n ~ . ' ~ ~ The ignorant man not only

[ries tu find transçendence in the matrriül world of man. but dso blindly assens and

cherishcs his opinions as truth.

The resuli of this condition is illustraled in Plato's allegory of the cave. where

the d~iihl!~ ignorant man's devotion to opinion kerps him prisoncr. Thcre is contentment

in the sel f-irnposrd hondage. where shadow is happily accepted as redity." They cannot

sec the light directly. as these bonds prevent them lrom tuming towards the light hehind

them. The? art. ignorant voluntariiy. as their intentional misrepresentation of reality is

yxirred h!, t hc sorcrry of scnsuous plrasure that Socrütrs requires the guardians to

wcrçonic. "Becü~ise ihis Iippetency masters the wholr nature" the self-incurred

i p x i n c r . i h mhhurn. and rrsists cniightènmrnr.'h

Tliiis. une u n prrcei~c why n lie in the sou1 is li morc siyihccint corruption of

trutli thun is a iic in speech. By rcistnicturin~ the naturül hierarchy of üpprtites so thai the

c~pirllrnmvikr,,i cxcrts dominance over ttie rest of the self. the mind is forced to understand

r c d i i y t h i ~ g l i the srnscz. The reconstmcted sou1 forces man into a selCdeçepiion to

whic ti tic ir plrdged. and unlèss by good fortune his "affectional biiis" crin he altrred. he

i \ Jooriictl i n io doil ble ignorance. and consequently cnslaved hy i t .'" The douhi y iznoran t

r iun will not asçend towards the good. and by consrquencc will ncvrr lichieve ;i moment

o f clürity. He is drstined to remain in the cave of shadowy opinion. without rvrr

rcalizing. «r desiring to realize. that he does not evrn sre.

ii is with this understood that one can bq in to envision another possible

c x q e froni the piirüdox. ln the Tlierrterirs. the character Socrates refers to his an as

"niidivikry". in thiit h r bcilitates the binh of souls. Socrates statrs that "the highest

point of m!. nn is the power to prove by rvrry test whether the offsprinp of ri Young

niiin'r thought is ti Idse phantom or instinct with life and tn i th ."4~l thoueh he himself

hüs no wixiorn to g i n he can hrlp others bring binh to admirable tmth. He reco_onizes

that some nirn who Icavt: his charge prernaturely have miscarriages of thought. caring

niorc for Palsr phantoms thlin truth. and hl1 inio büd Company (Criio. Alcibiates. etc.)."'

Hc hüs thc iihility to hring on or üllay the pains of mental concepiion. and is awarc that

wrtic have never conceived at d l .

This maieutiç an can be sern as a cause for the "good fortune" which altrrs

tlic al'kçtionlil hiases of men irüpped in double ignorüncc. Through the purifying proçrss

o f [tic e1~~1rdiir.x. Socrater forces his panner into thc recognition that the reality perceivrd

itiroiigh ihc wnses icaiised hy the reconstruction of the soul's hicrarchiciil appetitrs) is

iiot the trclnsccndcntal truth it was perceiveci to he. Thouzh Soçrütes admittedly hns no

w i d m i to givc. he can hcilitatr others into the reçopition of their own ignorance.

Froni therc. the individual ccin restructure his own intemal hierürchy. Once puntied.

Socr:itc\ cün use diiileciiçs as a means of cultivating the individual's tacit self. so that hc

iiiigtit r cxh the nrcrssary level of mutualit y required for tleeting clarity.

W ith this explünation given. one çün retum to the noble fiction introdiiçrd (it

tlic he~inning of this introduction. While Socrcitrs' noble tiction is obviously a physiçiil

inipossihility. the context frorn which it is said is of the urmost importance. It must not

bc hrpottcn rhat Socrates is speaking before a large group of young men. highlighted by

the hrothers Glaucon and Adeimantus. Thesc two brothers. and especially Glucon. are

dcsçrihed as "Sons of Ariston. divine ofkpring of a hmous man" who are drstined to

rulc Athens.'" They have shown great intelligence. and an alarming aptitude at

clucidating the position of injustice. Glaucon himxlf already has shown disinterest in the

"city of pigs". os this ciry lacks the relishes he frels it requires for human life. Also.

Soçrütcs is wsll a w m thnt these two men initiülly sided with Thrasymachus. and

continued Iiis argument when he fell silent.

Knowing this. it would srem thüt this settins would be a perfect opponunity

Ior the çliüriiçtcr Socrates to bqin his work on the reconstruction of Glüucon and

,-Idt'ini:intii~. If not. his c l h r o r r would not let him continue. In the brothers. Socrates

\cc\ c m iiirin wtio nseds to leam the lesson of moder~tion (Glaucon ). and another who

iiccJs 10 Ji\co\.cr his Iingrr and his appçtitrs (Adeirnimt~is). In the implrmentation of this

i i i y h Socrates hoprs to introduce hoth thesr lcssons to the hrothcrs. On ii niorc basic

poliiicnl Icvrl. i t ç i~ild he strongly suggested that Socriites proposrd this myth so that

thcy w i d d reiiicnihrr their lesson when they hecamr strong political voiçcs. Xlso. hy

rcinhrcirig the notion ot' rriling for the henefit of ail. Socrates heeins to iillow the hrorhrtrs

t o qucsti»n u-hg the) wish to nile. This could be the "pood fortune" which they require

for thc prwcss of wlf-rcçonstniction to begin. If this is the case. it can br: ürgucid that the

philowpher i noi Iying. but instrad allowing for his charges to relocus upon the truth of

;i firsi principle.

Despite its aitempt üt properly treating the subject of tnith. lies. and their

rcliiiionship to the philosopher in Plato's Repr~biic. i t is piiintùlly obvious that thus ftu. it

itsclf is nothing more than an ungrounded hypothesis. of no grcatrr quality that Socratrs

\optiisni in the tïrst book of the Reptblic. It musc br understood to tmly begin p s p i n p

t hc nieaning of Platonic dialogue. one must fully enter Plato's hcrmeneutic rircle. Thus

kir. this work hiis not done this. and instsad stands at the door. attempting to observe

through the prrrholr. rather than entering the home itself. And yrt. it cannot bc

cornpletely wasteful. for as demonstrated in the allegory of the line. i t is only upon the

retlection of hypothrses that one crin orient oneself towards knowledge. Perhaps this

introduction has s~~ccessfully brought us to Plato's door. and now it is time to open it.

This work will attsmpt to contextualize. pround. and elucidütc on both the

nohlc fiction seferreci to at the hepinning of this text. and the aqumenis presented which

; i l l w tlic rclniionship hetwern tnith. lies. and the philosopher to he sern as cohesive and

intclligihlc. Finally. this work will üttempt CO illustrite how this understanding u n apply

i o wriic O!' the niose inllurntial writines of todny. This is important work. for no timr in

I i i \ i ~ q Iiii cwr resemhled the twrntieth crntury üs much as Socraies' Athtrns. To htudy

thcir contliticm is to hetter know our condition. To know Soçrrites is to know us.

Houc~ci. . duc tlic rnorrtious scope of such a project. it will have to be stiidied in

4 t Ll!JC3.

Bcco~isc the content of Plütonic thoqht is indiscrrnible outside «f the

p~irtic~ilar contest of his writing. in the tint chüpter. 1 will üttempt to "set the stage" of the

Jisc~is\ion hy cnploinine the contextual plirameters of the argument. Divided into two

wctims. [hi\ chiiptrr will provide the background information necessary for

iindcsstnndin= the use of the particular "noble fiction" in question. In the first section.

[hi\ work w i l l discuss the physical location whrre the dililogur takrs plücc. I will discuss

the si=niticanct: of the discussion occurrinp in Polymlirchus' housr. which itsrlf exixrs

hoth bctween and outside Athens and the Piraeus. In the second section. this work will

cvokr. a diswssion on the personalities involved in the discussion from which the use of

the nohlc fiction emerzcs. By discussing Socratrs. Glaucon. Adrimantus and

Polyniirc hus as drrirnatic characters. I h o p to illustrate how the panicuiar personalities

01' the characters involvcd influence the direction and style of the discussion. From this. 1

will introducr some of the perceptions of the chmcters involved. By illustrating the

contrastins exprctations of Socrates and his entourage. 1 intend to suggest that these

di t'lèring exprctations causrd the need for Socratrs io evoke the noble fiction in question.

Chriptcr Two will be concerned with a discussion on spiritual crisis. By initililly

dcscribing Pliito'h twufold ~indcrstrinding of wholeness. this chapter will procesd to

cxplain spiritual crisis as the condition in which a person (or many people) can no longer

icconci Ir. nea. esperiencr w ith previously hrld practices and perceptions. 1 w i l 1 argue

ih;it ail knowledge is pcrsonal knowlrdse. and that within a spiritual çrisis the nirnns of

kniwinp req~iircd for personal knowlrdgc is forgotten. 1 will concludr the chapter hy

dctining tlic Greck terni rcclirie. and explaining how it. as a rnrans of knowing. crin

inoppropriately he used io attempt to reconcilr spiritual çrisis.

1 will cunclude this work wirh a third chapter rntitled. "The Lie in the Soul. the

Nohlc Fiction. and the Misappropriation of the Microcosmic Order". In it. 1 will argue

ihat within Rrpihlic.. Socrütes' entourage al1 possess lies in thcir souls. causins them to

niisunderstand the Soçraiic project. Because of this. Socrates uses the "noblr fiction" as

;t niciin3 o f removinp them from this condition. so that they can truly understand his

rilessage. and hegin cont'onning their souls to bccome more receptive to vinur and

uisdi~ni. T« acconiplish this. 1 will dividr the chapter into three sections. The tirst

section a-il1 de fend the proposition that Socrates' Athens was in a condition of spintual

crisis. Driiwin_o (rom Thucydides. this work will illustrate thüt the Athenian body had

lost their sensr of bçing after their trmble defeat in the Peloponnesian War. In the

second hcction. I will demonstritr how and why Socntes used the "noble fiction" to

çoriihüt lies in the soul. This work will explain why Socntes kr ls the need io do so. by

cixplüinin_o the pote ntial for and consequences of leaders misappropriating a microcosmic

order o n a mnçrocosmiç structure. Finally. in the third section. 1 will use Hobbes'

Lt.isi<r rliccii and Nazi Gcrrnnny as modem examples of t his misappropriation.

Chapter 1: The Context of the Argument

"Nothing is üccidrntal in a Platonic dialogue: everything is necessary at the place whert. i t orçurs. Evrrything which would be nccidcntal outside of the dialogue becornes nictiningf~~l w ithin the dialogue ... ail Plaionic dialogues are radically tïctitious. The Plarunic dialogue is hasrd on a fundamental hlsehood. a brüutiful or beautifying Iàlsetiood. ii:. on ihe denial of chance." T h Cin mu/ Mtrrr - Leo Strauss

Onc of the prcwlent dilficultics of attrmpting ro trunsposc the praçtice of

phil»sophy to the written word is the recurrent need to ovrrcome the inhcrent limitations

01' t hc writtcn word itseif. In the Plzuednis. Soccrites argues that written münud is

malogous [o a painting. in that both products "stand hefore us as though [hep wcre

;ilicc.."" Bv using .*as though". Socrates sugpzst thlit writing and painting share the

condiiiun uT king noihing more thiit an imapr of living speech. This is supponed hjo

Siwatcs' recognition thüt both the painting and the writtrn work are statiç in content. and

cannoi iinswer questions. For Socrates. "thcy maintüin ü majrstic silence. ..the- seem to

inlk [O you as ihough they were intelligent. but if you ask them anything about whar they

w y . from 3 desire ta be instructed. they go on ielling you just the same thing f~revctr."'~

Bccau\c the witten word is stiitic in content. its composition çiinnot adapt itsclf to its

püriicular readrrship. As Socrates notes. both thow who have no business to r a d it. and

those that cannot understand it can read the written work. There is no opponunity for

pnidrntly adüpting the message for those who reüd it. The person that is serious about

hi\ idcas. as Cciig notes in his Prologue to The War Lover. "On Reading a Platonic

Dialogue". trecits them "as does a sensible fürmer ireitt his seeds. sowing them only in

+ l Phto. "Pluirrlnis". triken tioni Plrito: Collt.ctcd Dialwues Includinc the Letters cd. Hamilt»n. stxtinn '7Sc .- - - Ihid.. 7752

appropriütr soil. which hüs been properly prepared."" Socrates assens that the

diillrctician **srlects ü soul of the right type". so thüt the ideas implanted in that soul c m

Jcwlop the ilhility to defend thernselves and thosr who use them. and eventually breed

nca idrus. Because ilny literüte person can appropriate writtrn work. it cünnot choose to

c.xpow itsclf tu only the propcir souls. Thrrefore. neithrr the brerdinz of nrw ideas. nor

thc ;ih\urilncr. thüi the written content will not be misused can be guiirünved. Crriig

n.riic.5. "Cognizcint of the strengihs and wcaknrsses of writtrn speech.. .Plata çrriftrd a

n i w l litcrtiry kxm which çould fully exploit the one whilc greatly attenuating the

o t l ~ c r . " ~ ~ The Plütonic dialogue succerds in allowing for the full vitality of the

phili,sopliic "Bcinp-in-the-world" by concretrly situating it in living expericncc. Within

thc Plcitonic Jiülo=ue. l ivins people with veritable agendas tind themselves interacting

with [tic' philosophic wriy of iife. as embodirid by the charmer Socrates. "In ri Platonic

dicilogtic. j iist as in l iw conversation. the age and outwürd apprarançe and social class

~ i n d politid stcitiis and popular reptation of a person influence." how Socrites brhavrs.

md hou ahers treüt him." The participants in the dialogue have panicular strengths and

wiiknesscs. and these detriils ail affect the mood and process of the dialogue. Also. thrse

participants do not sirnply a r p e dispassionaiely. but tlaiter. boast. swrar and threatrn.

whilc tlicy intempr each other. whisper. and jostle in the background. Very often. what

is hcing sciid in the dialoyr is overshadowed by what is not being said.

By using the dialogue form. Plato not only avoids the sttitic nature of traditional

written work. but ülso allows himself the opponunity to provide esoteric messages within

. \ c ~ i i g . Lcrm Harold. "On Reading ri Plsitonic. Dirilogut.". triken from The \Var Lover: -4 Studv 01' Plrito'?;

R ~ ~ p t i h l i ~ - . T1)rontc): University of Toronto Press. 1993 p. xiv - 4 M. p. \ K Y I i i W. p. \ x i i i

hi\ writ iris. Becausr rach reader associates himself differently with the plethora of

charmers and situations. rach person places himself in a unique position i i s (1 r is the

n iessap of the dialogue itself. Consequent. Plaro has the opponunity to dlow his text to

iiiake ccnciin siiggsstions to sorne charmer types. and different ones ro others. Also. the

dialogue hn i a t iillows Plato to provide one message for the causal readrr. and anothcr

tiw the mure dediccitsd reîder. It is not surprising thai each timc a readrr re-entrrs the

w r l d ot' tIic Platonic dialogue. ci new message ih found or discovered. Becausr the

rcaJr.r csisth in the world. his "Beinp-in-the-world" changes. and thuh his relationship to

Pluio'h uwkh c h ü n p . The Platonic dialogue never bccornes static. brcüusr the reîdcr

tiiri~sclt' is tliiid in nature.

To b q i n to üddress the plcthorii of messages found within the Platonic dialogue.

onc niusi LIW ciII of his talents and energies to reconstitutc Plato's çhüricters in one's own

litSc. Ii i h only when the content of the dialogue muges wiih the content of the

icoJr.r\liip. thüt one retilizes that questions can br asked. as one finds onesrlf in direct

con\.crs:ition with al1 the imponant kinds of men one will meet in the world. "In any

cvcni. ps !~ hocincil ysis of this kind is essential for asserting. correcting. cornpletinp and

reciihting thc othrrwisz incidequate arguments which occupy centre s t q t ? It is for this

rcason thüt the Platonic didogue can be liilsely likrned to a drarnatic masterpiece. as it

mates a world thüt retlects that of human cxperirnce exceptionally. despite being built

un n radiçiilly tïctitious logographic necçssity. Howçver. as previously mentioned. to

rtxognize it hirnply as ii drarnii to be experîenced misses out on one of the fundamental

clernents of Plato's writing.

In the "Introduction". it was suggested that when the character Hamlet wished to

propme dungrrous social criticism. he had an acting troop perform "The Mouse Trap".

In i t . the iictors mirrored the acts of the diabolical Claudius in the rissassination of his

brorliei the king. and his repossession of his wife and kingship. This did not remain

u iihin the reulni of thc drama. for we. at the third degrec of separation. wrre still

involnxi in fathoinin? the expcrirncr. While the characters retlectrd upon the

circuni\t;inccs. WC. 3s reliden. retlccted not only upon the rxpcrirncr. but aIso on the

~ - c ~ f l c c - ~ i r r r ~ of the expcritince.

This i \ important. for at the very heginning of the trxt. we are wa re thitt the

clicirxttx Socrwh i h recounting a story thar he has alreiidy had an opponunity to retlert

iipon. We. ah a rcriding audience. are not only retlecting upon the evrnts of rxperience.

hiit iipon thc r t ; / I ~ ~ - h r i connrcted with them. Plato's dialogue is not simply a dnirna. but

drnnia within n drama. or a "play within a play".

Ttic comequences of this distinction are quite srvere and relevant. and will be

niuch more thoroughly rspliiinrd through the alle~ory of the line later in the t e x

Howcvcr. brietly it nirist be mentioned that of the four divisions. the realm of sense

pcrccption or esperiencr is linked with the second section of opinion fpisris). The

rctlcction upon opinion leads to the third section of reasoning fditiiioiti). It is only upon

rcfleçt ion of reasoning. or third drgree reflection. chat one achieves the founh and highest

Icvcl of rxperirnce. understanding fnoe.siv). It is Plato's intent to facilitate our moverncnt

townrds this statr of rlorsis to achicve moments of clarity.

By following this reason. each book in the Repttblic can he seen both as separxr.

and as a \cens of the play within the play. It is for this reason that so much rmphasis

niust b r put on conrext. Content does not exist outside of context. and we. as rertders are

ris much content as content. Book III is no exception to this rule. and it serves as the

second to last sçene of the tirst act of the Rrpul>lic. with the conclusion of the creation of

tIic "city in speech". Note that it is tïctitious in the same way that the dialogue is. as it

h c s not incorporate chance into its vision. It in no wriy clin br ssen as the political tiim of

citt~ci- the historiciil Socrates. the character Socrates. or Plato himself. It is a rnacrocosm

t hai rctIcct\ ;L niicrocosm. so. in essence. man is not political animal. for i t is the polis

r hiir is a "hunirinli kc" construction.

Bcçli~isc thc content of Plato's writing is indivisible from the ~ i v e n çontrxt. this

ctinptcr will outlinc the provided context from which Socnites. in Rpp~~blic . inrroduçes the

iisc ~ 1 ' [lit. nohle tïctiun. This projcct wil l br: d i v i d d into two sections: ( 1 ) Location. and

i 2 Charnctcrs and their Perceptions of the Endeavour. By providing this contextual

;inidpis. 1 hopc [O brerithe iife into this discussion.

Section 1: Location

Book I of Repirhiic- hegins with Socratcs remrrnhrring i rc-mrmhering. or piccing

togctlicr in thc prchent what wüs in the past) his trip down to the Pirarus with Glaucon.

\i-hcre hc arent to siiy a pr;iyer to rhe goddess. and srr "how thry would put on the

ikstivnl. *incc iliey were now holding it for the tirst timr."" He then mentions thüt the

Atticni;iii piowssion urüs no more fine than the Thrüciün. and thai üfter prayrr and

'koking on". hc and Glaucon returned upwards rowards Athens. One nred only look to

tticse phrases to recognizc ü hmiliar theme. Socrates. by seing down ro rhc Piraeus and

priiying. is plinicipiiting in a pnrticular set of ritualizrd prüctices thlit trdditionülly find

t hcir riicming in thc sharcd ovrrarching metaphors of the Athrnian body. F«r an

.\tiit.nian. prayr hüs nieanins becausr the Athenian citizen prays to an Atheniün divinity.

whilc partaking in lin Atheniün ritual.

While Socrates' intentions were to pray to the nrw goddess. his motivation was

amder. I t wcis Soçrcites' fascination with witnrssing the new festival that motivated his

trip with Glüi~con to the Piraeus. Furthemore. Socrates concluded that the Thracian

Ièstival \vas no lrss fittine than the Athenian. By acccpting boih festivals as equal.

Socrates ir viilidtiting ii very non-Athenian perspective of piety. In doinp so. he is

i upp t i ng thcit muning of his actions concerned with piety is not rooted in the shared

nietaphor « f the Athenian citizrnship.

- - P h o . Thc Reprrblic. 01' Pho. zd cd.. crins. .Ut in Blriom. United States: Basic Books. IW l linc: i27a

This is significant when put in the perspective of Socntes' use of past tense to

discuss hi\ visit to the Piraeus. In so far aï Socrates is "re-membering" a past occurrence.

hc is reconstitiiting. or re-orderinp. the pcist into the present. Whüt he is reconstitutin_o is

~i \el f-refcrential rttlationship with the c o s ~ w s . or the macrocosmic order. This

reliiti«nhip is hoth Athenian and non-Athcnian. It is Aihenian becausr of Athens'

particular condition of spiritual crisis. and thrir consequent avüilability for wondcr and

phili)sophy. I t is non-Athenian becausr it breaks wirh the ritutilized Athenian tradition.

which. dut. to the condition of spiritual crisis. has lost al1 meaning.

01' the new Socratic relaiionship to the cosrnolo_oical ordrr. several pieces of

inlorni;iiion ciin bc ~Ieaned from this tïrst passage. Firsi. the cosmos çan be understood

cimtaining hoth an upper and lower dimension. as representcd by the Pir~rus and

c n . S«cratcs "goes down" to the Piraeus from Athens. and attrrnpts to "press back"

i«wrd\ Athcns. Xoiicrnbly. the upper and lower dimension of the whole can only enist

~ i z "iippcr" and "lower" hecause of their coexistence. Aihrns is highrr in comparison to

thc Pirxur. just as the Pimus is only lowrr in comparison to Athrns. It is the

rel~itionship thnt they s h m thrit constitutes the being of each element. so they cannot be

izolutcd and stiil understood for whüt they are. This is not ro suggest that thcre is no

niediiiting force soveming the relationship between 10 elements. for there cire border

wards who serve to maintnin the equilibrium of this relationship. Socratcs recnunts that C

üs hr and Gloucon made their way back to town. "Polymarchus. son of Cephalus. rrdered

bis slave ho- to nin atier us and order us to wait for him."" Joined by Glaucon's orother

Xdeirnantus. Niceratus. and others. Polymarchus. through compulsion (and not

i r. W. linc: 727t-1

persuasion ). ovrnakrs Socrates and Glaucon. and takes them to his home situated

between the Pi riieus and Athens.

I t ' Socrates is in the procrss of reconstituting his rrlationship to the macrocosmiç

ordcr rhrough his rrcollection of his trip to the Piraeus. one must recognizr the

i riipciiww of the conmpential location of Pol ymürchus' house within this schemli. The

w h d c ~ . o . s ~ ~ i o . v i h Sreüter than the sum of its parts. for what rquülly constitutes the wholr

i \ rhc rcl;itiimship shürcd between its parts. and e x h pan to the uhole. If in this Book.

Athcnr and thc Piracus reprrsent the two constitutive rlrrnents of the cosmol«gical

iiholc. whai allows the whole to exist is the boundnry between thrm. Because rach

clcnicni is nceded to reprcsent the upper and lower dimension. it is the dividing boundary

[liai cillaus Ior Athcns to bc the upper elemrnt and not the lower. and the Pirüeus to be

tlic Iiwcr clcnient and not the upper.

Socraies chooses Athens and the Pirüeus to represent the upper and lowrr

clcnieni of the whole. ünd thesr choices represrnt the tnily revolutionary elements of

Sixrates. and 1 contend Plato's. vision. In Book II of Rrpitldic. Socr~tes begins his attack

on Honicric poctry. ÿrguing that in his "city in speech": thrre is no place for it. as it

providcs a Msr reprrssntation of what the gods tni ly are. Notably. becausr the pwis.

with Horncr as the greatrst of d l . were considered to bc the moral liuthority of his time.

this i \ a paniciilar danperous argument that could only be made tit that panicular time in

[hot püniçular plücs. Why this is so will br rxplained shonly. Of the poetry Socrates

proposes to han. Soçrates statrs. "Thrn. we musn't iiccept Homer's-or any other poet's-

foolishiy making this mistake about the sods and saying that:

Two jars stand on Zeus' threshold Full of dooms-the one of good.

the other of wretched:

ünd to the nian to whom Zeus _oives a mixture of both." experirncrs both.'" Homer

dcpiçts Zeus and the gods that he rules over as being the dispensers of fortune. and thus

ihc iiiakt'i's of the. Within this systrm. there is no place Ior human rrsponsibility or

pditicol ncccssity. Huniüns do not have to be responsible for themsrlves or each other.

hcc;i~isc their fates arc. dependent upon the will of the pods. In the Homrriç systeni. man.

as u living hcing. rsihts within a cycle of nature. where he lives brlow the realm of the

gi>d. niid ;ihovc thc rcülm of the shüdes. Nature. as the force that _ooverns human

csistcncc. i \ the cuntinuous procsss of binh. maturity. decay and kath. and ÿcts

indcpcndcntly of human action. However. thcse repetitive stages can only he known and

iindcrwod throiish human perception. The sods. as boundlrss entities. laçk the

constitutive &ment of thçir creiition. human monality. Because of their irnrnonality.

tlicy Inck thc set of limits and possibilities that imbue meaning upon enperiencr. T h q

arc ctcrniil hodieh without souk and this made rvident by the frequrnt intervention of the

go& ~ v i i h i n hiinun experirncr. In Arschylus' Lotzenitles. afier Apollo is confronteci by

the chon~s for convincing Orestes to murder his mothcr Clytemncstrü (for hrr murder of

Iii. t'.ithcr Apmemnon i. Apollo cries. "But I shall givr the suppliant help and rescue. for

if 1 uillingly fail him who tums to me for aid. his wrath. before gods and men. is a fearful

thing.""" It is only hy intenwing in Orestes' affairs that Apollo ciin understand the truc

irasedy of Orestes' condition. By füilinp to avcngc his father's death. he is doomrd hy

. a l

Ihitl.. linc.: 379d - '4 ' .-\c.>c 11' lu>. " E I I I I I ~ ~ ~ ~ Y s " . takcn f r i m .4eschvlus 1: Orcsteiii, trrins. Lrittimore. New York: Wrishin~ton

Squrirc Press. I971. linc: 232-234

Atlicnirin traditional law. By avenging his father's murder. he would be forced to murdrr

his rnother. and then violate a non-traditional moral ~ a w . ~ '

1 f t hc ancient pant heon of gods can be seen as bodies without souls. the shades

tli;it l kt: hclinr the canh in Hades can be sern as the exact opposite. As souls without

hidich. thc h d c s are fully üware o l ttieir limits and possibility for action. However.

bcc;i~isc i h q laçk hodies. the y have no mrans for performing action. While in Hades.

Odysicus lctlrns !Torii Tcirrsias thot '-üny ghost ro whom you give ciccess io (the) hlood

\ \ + i l 1 tiold rutional speech with you. while thoss whom you reject will lewe you and

..O2 rctirc. With~~~trinyronneçtiontophysiccility.thrshadrscannotspeiik.anditisonly

wlicn n \haie actuül ly consumes blood that hr or shr can reiicquirc the most basic and

t'iindünientul elment of hunian existence. speech. Whrn in conversation with Achillrs.

who i h rccognized as a "mighty prince among the dead. Achilles can only respond by

q i n g . "rparc nie your praise of Drath. Put me on eanh again. and 1 would raihcr be 3

wrf in the housc of some Iandless man. with littlr enough t'or hirnsrlf io live on. than king

wi t h a1 1 these derid men thot have done with life.""' Without a body. Achilles cannot act

or afkri chanse. and thus the life of a poor serf is better than being a prince of the dead.

Tti he honwrcd as a god means nothing if one is impotent to affect change.

If the elrrnents of the Homeric cosmological system are the gods (etemal bodies

withoi~t so~ils as the upper. and the shades (erernal souls without bodies ). the constitutive

ho~indnry thüt sepiirates these two çkmrnts is the human race. The gods can only he

reçopizcd t hrouzh human prayer. and thus it is prayer and sacrifices that establish

1 1 I It is tijr this prcscntrition of ri non-traditional approrich to virtuc thrtt forws me to bc.licve thrit

. - lcsch~lu~ mi$ hc the trasic poct most rikin to Plrito. It w.s.ould bt' 3 ver! inrett's~ing study to examine the conntxtion'r tictuccn the Oru.srui~i and the Eirrlrypitn). f,: Honicr. Oci~ssc!.. OP. Cir.. p. 175

rdütionships hetween man and the gods. In the same way. the shade c m only maintain

any nieonin@il existence through the memory of the living. The first shade Odysseus

niccts in Hades is that of Elpanor. one of his own men. Elpanor begs Odyssrus "to

..t>J rcniciiiher nie then and not to sail away and torsake me utterly.. . It is through human

iiicriior) that the ihadc i x able to maintain any fom of rclevlinrr once i t has leti the retilm

o f thc living. J L N a s ihe wily Odysseus find hinisrlf stniggling brtwern lifr and drath.

rirandcd ;iinilcsily in the nictasy betwern the will of the gods and his evrntual death. i r

only when Odysseus overconies his hirbris. and realizrs that this position hetween the

go& ;ind duth is rhe irirtiitrrl coirditiotr. that he cm p home and livç a hurnan iife.

Sucrates' reconstruction of the human rrlationship to the macroçosrnic order

coiiiplctely inverses the Homeric traditional description. Socrütes goes h i i w io the

Piraciis t« celchriic rhe festival of a new goddess. The festival. the goddrss. and the

innoxition 01' torch rase on horseback. as cleménts of physicality arc üII rlrments of the

Iouw &nient u f the Socrat ic c*o.sr?io.s. Noticeabl y . the t wo mental processes involved

with experiencin_o a festival. cikasici (imagination) and pisris (opinion). lire represented in

S~icrntcs' iillcgory of the linc by the lowrr section of the line. which is concrmed with

iippcrirunçes. The Pirüeus itself rmbodies the rtrrnal bodies without souls. In Socmtrs'

inverteci cosmological order. the eternd bodies without souls represent the l o w r elerncnt

O t' thc wholé.

By cuntrrist. because Socrates went LI<111-12 to the Piraeus. ri return to Athens wouId

req~iirt. a rc-ascension. In the Athenian body. Socr~tcs recognizes the only opportunity to

practiçc philosophy. In the Crito. Socrates asks Crito. "What will (1 ) do in Thessdy but

kast. as i f ( 1) had gone to a banquet in Thessaly'? As for those conversations of (mine)

OUI justice and the rest of vinue. where will they be*?"" Socrates cannot leave Athrns.

hccaiist: the philosophic sou1 is the Athenian soul. and to leavr Athens woiild be to drny

his otvn Bcing-in-the-World. Noticeabl y. Socrates recognizrs that on1 y place w here

di;ilogiic. hoii t viniir çan rxist is in Athrns. When considrrin_o the nirntal proccsscs

req~iircd tOr nican iiigfii l dialogue to occur. t hc two most important are cii<irioilr

i iuwning) and iiocsis (understanding). Thrse two processes are rrpresentcd in Socrates'

"d lepry d the line" as rlrmrnts of the highrr division O C the line. which is çoncerned

ti.i t h ct5?;cnçcs. or. wiils. of the materilil in discussion.""

Whik i t is obvious Socrates intends Athens to represent a brm ofconnrction tu

r1i;ilogiic. i t is cqually apparent that the Athenian soul Iacks the body rrquired to perform

kiciicrn. This iinproiinded diiiloyci. or "sou1 without body" is hrst reprrsented in the

pidific. rolc played h y the sophists in rducating the future leaders of Athens. In Apolog.

Socaiies. in his iraditiondly ironic fashion. makes rekrencr to somr of thesr: sophists.

Socciiei e s plains. "Each of t hrsr men ( re ferring to Gorgias. Prodicus and Hippias I can

go t t i an>- ciiy md persiiade the young. who keep compüny with anyonr of thcir own

Idlu~v-citizcns they want without piiying. to lravr the compüny of these. to join with

ihenisdves. piiy (hem a fre. and be gratrful to them besides.""' In that thesç sophists can

maintain this prüctice il1 aliy ci'. they do not teach what is specitic to the Athrnian body.

1 , . Plmr, "Criri)". trihcn lixini Fivt. Diri1ocut.s. lint.: 5 . 3 ~ I i , ,

N'hcn Socrritcs 33 ks his trriditional '+ri YSCL?' question. hc 1s csscntirillv asking. "W hrit is the rcliii iondiip ticttvc.cn the rippcrirrincc of an m i t u ( ris discovt.rt.d through e ikrsk and pi.sti.s L and its soul (ri';

C I I X - I ~ c r d throu$ dimoilr itnd rt~~~u.siv) . The Mure of any of his intt.rlricutors to propcrly answr thc quc5tion i l . unri~ciidiihlc. ht.causc ris f h q rill rittcrnpt to know cnritiss thrnugh their own prirticular mcrins. rlicir inhcrcnt liniitcdncss from hcing mortal prwents [hem from k i n g ahle providc ri fuII answer. To hc ;hic 10 itcciiunt tiw thc Ilillncss o f definition rcquired hy Swrritt's wciuld nt.ccssitrttc thc interlocutor to cxist out~idc ot' timc iiscll'. Bccausc onlu divinity crin do thrit. Socratcs does not cxpect to rtxeivc ri proper ari'.;\tcr. His intcnt \vas simply to provide ri forum t'or the questions i o bc ponderd upon and reconsidcrc.J.

Funhcrmore. they do not texh a rediscovery of self. or recognition of what it is to be

Xthsniün. but only the technique availüblr to dismiss the consideration of such a

qiicsi ion. Most important1 y. the sophists practicr this for money. thus dcrnonstrating that

uwlth ih niorc important that loyülty to a shxed set of practices and perceptions. For

Socratc.r. word.r msün nothing unless supponed hy action. and h s demonstrates this in

. - \ p d o a q ~ . by imploring his iicçusrrs to chastisr his children if they cüre for money ovsr

"ihc ri$\ thinp".

II in ttic Soçriitic schcmü. the upper and the lower dimensions of the çosrnol«~ical

u~lidi: ;irc rrprcsented hy Athrns ieternal souls withoui bodies ). and the Pirarus cetemiil

hotlic.3 withoiit s«uls). the constitutive boundüry betwsrn thcsr two reülmx is represrntrd

szii in h! hiiman heings. In essence. the drama of this scene is one where Socrates is

prc4sins iotixds Athens hegin his pr~ctice of reformulatinp the boundary hstween the

iippcr and loaper. where he is captured by the border @uürds who defend the boundüry.

PoI~.nicirçhiis. anci the group of men that üccornpany him. are the bounday. Socriites

remiints thüt uhile pressins homrward. Polymarchus' slave boy took hold of his çoat and

\ciid. **Polymürchus ordcirs ?ou to wait.'""hen Socrates attempts persuade the border

yards to Ict hirn and Glaucon pass. Polyrnarchus responds. "Could you relilly persuade if

une don' t 1 isien."""

Polyrnarchus and the rest of the border guards are awüre of Socrates' plot. but are

iimiirc i f they should allow it to corne to pas. Consequently. the tAr him to a holding

ceIl ( Polyrnarçhus' housr) on the border. yçt outside the scopr: of the cosmos. wherr no

one other than thrm ran hex what is going on. There. in the "trmblr" outside. they give

hirn the opponunity to defrnd himself. and convince them that what he is about to do is

correct. In this respect. Bloorn is correct in his assertion that Rrpiiblic is the tmr apology

of S«ci.ates. for Socratrs must defend hirnself asainsi al1 the bastions of the old Aihrniün

tradition. $0 thiit the thumotic border guürds will allow hini to escape and reformuliite the

ho~indury lix [hem io dcîènd.

Frmi tiiis. oiic ciin hrgin to understand the sigificance of the location of

I'r~lyiiiu-chii' housc. Firstl y. it is locatrd on the border of the upper and louper realm. and

[huh in thc nicttixy ut' the two dimensions. However. it is also lcxatsci outside the scope

d' ihc giwn ccisniological order itself. In Pan One of his masterpiece F~1ii.r.r. Goethe

wrmx

Oh. happy who still hopes to rise Out of this sea of mors and hlse views!

What one does r ior know. one could utilize. And what one knows one cannot use.. .

Oh. that no wings lift me ahove the ground To strive and strive in his pursuit

In the etrrnd rvening lighi The quiet world would lie below

With every vallcy trmquil. on fire every height. The silver streüm to golden rivers flow. 71 i

B y "ri4 ng from n sea of errors and hlsr views". Goethe suggests that in ordrr to

iindcntünd nn rntity in its completion. one must take. as Hadot defines if. a "view from

:ihovc." While the philosopher must cilways ground his thought in rxperiencr. he at times

niust he "in the world but not of it". He must atternpr to stand in Goethe's "etemal

cwning light". and look down upon the world tiom an outside perspective. In Rrprihlic.

Plato uses the allrgory of the cave to demonstrate this samr necessity. Whilr the lover ot'

,111 W. linc: 327c - 1 1

Goethc. Ciiwtht".; Faust trrins. W. Kriufmrinn. New York: Anchor Books. 1990. lines: 10W-67. I074-79

uisdoni musi livr in the cave. he must be able to remove his shückles and step out into

dayli_oht. and look in from the outside. Because Polymarchus' housr exists outside the

estiihlishsd cosniological structure. it provides Socrates the opportunity to present to al1

i hc thuinot iç horticr yards this same view from above.

The prcsencc of Crphülus. who is Polymürchus' father. and master ou the house

ml!- Icinhcr rcinforccs this. In his "Interpretive Essay". Allan Bloom writcs of Cephalus.

"Ttic piirions of youth led him to hodily pleasures. a n d it is only with the hody's decline

ttirit tic turns to thc thines of the ~ 0 ~ 1 . " ~ ' Crphalus was born to sorntt wrülth. and

iiiiinngcd to incrcÿse his holding by hecoming an arms dealer. Açcording tci Bloom.

Ccphalus utüs noi an Athenitin but a metiç. an alien who is allowrd to scttlr in Xthenh

ihat hm no civil righis or privilrges. By hring an arms dealer. Cephülus had n» panicular

Iiiyalty to ;in>. \varring pan y. He is thus apolitical. having no friends and enemies to

niitiytc hctwcen. Ccphalus' apoliticül nature causes him to isolate himsrtll h m an-

t.ortii of o~crürching polirical structure. or the set of practicrs and perceptions thüt

acconipnny political allegiancr. When this is considered in retrospct of the Socratiç

~iccix~nt of the Athens-Piraeus cosmological structure. Cephalus could be clnssified as

\tnnding oiitside of it. He hüs no loyalty to eroiiç pleasures. as he has desened their

p~irsiiit. His quesiionable loyalty to piety and speeches is contingent upon his inability to

reccivc plerisure from üny othrr pursuit. His lacli of dedication is made evident when hr

dcscrt.; his discussion with Socntes. invoking a sharned Polymarchus to exclüim. "Am 1

not the hcir of what bclongs to you?"" In so fa- as the location of the discussion occurs

witliin Cephalus' home. this distance from direct political involvemrnt is reinforcrd.

Socrates. as a prisonrr of Polymarchus and his entourage. is being held captive in a

locüt ion uhrre no one can see or hear what he has to say. It provides him with the

iyywrtiinity to direct political thought in the third person. Insteüd of thinking direçtly

dmut piditicül action. hy taking a distant stance. hr is able to think about political

thoughi. I t is tliis distance that allow for al1 involved in the discussion (including the

rciidcri i c i cnguge in the procrss of reflection. which is a nrcessary cornponrnt of

~indcrstmding.

Section i l : Characcers and their Perceptions of the Endeavour

I t up«iild semi prudent to hegin any discussion of the various charücters in

Reprrldic. hy introduçing some information on Plato's protqonist Socratch. However.

duc to thc enornalu scope of üttrmpting to isolatr who the chünicter Socrates is ü c r o ~

[tic w)pc 01' the m i r e Plütonic corpus. 1 will limit my discussion of Socriites to the

s hürxtcs wh» i \ presented to the rcaders in the ru1 y s t a p of Repihlic. whrre the "noble

iïction" in question wos spoken.

I t i \ niy contention that the character Socrates is the Irast beliwable und "rrül"

chnrücici circulüt ing w i thin the dialogue ( and often monologue ) of the Rc~pirblic-.

Socrütrs is not s« much ri character as he is a beautiticd embodiment of the philosophiclil

u.uy o f lit;.. H'hen charactrrs intrr~ct with Socrates. ihey are interactinc~ with philosophy

itsclf. Inspired by the samr wonder that gives binh to philosophy. Soçratcs makes

hinisclf ilvililabl~ to a11 who have the propensity and courage to enter iota his vicinity.

and csperisncc the bonibiirdmrnt of doubt and questionin2 that is consequential to iheir

iiiceting. Soçrütrs is never alone in a dialogue. and his monologues are tools usrd to

rewüken [nie diaIosur. or to illustrate the potentid danger of dogmat izing philosophicd

questioning.

XI ii chariictrr. Socrates' name of "Sure Sirenpth" miikes reference both to his

consistency of purposc. and his ability to use and misuse the tools of his tradr. Because

the philosophic wüy of being cm be seductivc to different people in different ways.

Socrate3 hüs acçrss to d l hrms of rhetotic. irony. ÿnd logic to engage unique minds with.

He is not above flattery or reprimand. as both flattery and reprimand can motivate

di fkrcnt people to becorne acquliinted with the philosophical tradition. He hÿ?i an erotic

love for wisd«ni. and cannot help be attached to the Young men with the talent and ability

to cngage in philosophic dialogue.

In si) f a - as the çhürricter Socrütes embodies the spirit of the philosophic way of

"Bcing-iii-tlic-WorIciii. he does not protest to have tmth to trach. What Socrates dors

provide is hoth ;i niethodology for others tio beçome ware of and introducrd to the tmth

itwy cün h o u . hy bcins rlcrnents of a cosmologicd order. the forum for doing W. and

assistancc tbr hrin~ing this tmth Forth. Imponantly. Socrates' likens his work to that ofu

iiiidwik. but not 3 nurse. Socrates can assist in the binhing proçrss of wisdom. but once

itis i v i x h i i i is horn. his responsibility ovrr i t is tïnished. It is the parent'.; responsibility

io c m for it. and have i t g o u properly.

Ttic cliaraçter Socrates appelirs to differ substantially in rach dialogue. Howevrr.

i contcncl thrit this is so because Socrrites. as a tlctional character. h;is no substance other

[han his consisttincy of project. As an embodimeni of philosophy. Socriiies is the eternal

ipcstioner. the breaker «f houndaries in thought. It is Socrates' intent to cultivate the

iiiindh ot' thosc with potcntiiil for geat political powrr. Socrrites seiits out thesr men.

hccriuse philosophy is çoncrmed with askine the questions "Who am I'?" and "Why am

I'?" The lover of wisdom recognizes that the answers to these questions are alwüys

\hapcJ hy thc panicular set of practices and perceptions held to by the prnon. It is the

poli ticülly powrrful that have the opponunity to mould and shape these practices and

perceptions. i f they have the ability. The midwife provides the spiice for a baby to br

horn. j i i t as Socrates provides the clraring for wisdom to emerse. In the same fashion.

the philosophic wüy of life is the required methodology for destroying the overarching

tnetliphors that dictate over these practices and perceptions. so that new ones can take

I I . Howewr. philosophy only works through neglition. Just as Socrates' d w r ~ i o r i

on1 y telis Socrates what not to do. the philosophic way of being only negates metaphors

ihat x c inlici-cntly tlawrd or obsolrte. This work will later explain that the çonsrqurncc

of ~ising philosophy to çrsatr: rather than tear down is to sstablish the worst form of

p d ilicnl urdrr. dogmut ic t yranny.

Bccausc philosophy cannot br used to build new metaphors. it must be used to

ciindition the rishi kind of soul. so thüt the ri_oht person. who lives philosophicdiy. c m

m k c the niosr prudent political drcisions about rebuilding the overcirching metaphors.

P d i t ic\ i \ nrwr about creüiinp the idcial state. but about making do with the unavoidahlct

iiiipcriixtion uf huniünity. 50th Pliito and Aristotle makr mention of this when thèp

di\c~i\h thc iinavoidühle dissolution of al1 regimes. Two of the characters in Repddic who

iippcx to Iiaw this "right kind of soul" are Glaucon and Adeimnntus.

In addreasing the character of both Glaucon and Adrimantus. Saratrs mention3

thni hc *'hüd alwüys been full of wondei' at thrir nature." He cites a poem writtrn by

Glüiicim'\ lowr about their distinction in the battle of Megarü. hy referring to thrm as.

5 o n \ of hrisron. divine offspring of a türnous man."'" From these two phnsrs donc.

onc could hegin to understand much about the two brothrrs. If the charxter that best

represents the philosophic way of life is "full of wondei' at their nature. it becomrs

cvident thrit these two sons of ri man whose name trmslrites ris "Best" (Ariston). ;ire

dcstined fcir Sreatnctss. Thry are two potrntial timocrats with a noble background. who

will hecomr powerful voices in the Athenian Assernbly. It will be their voices that

grrcitly rt'kct changes made in the practices and perceptions of the Athenian body. By

wcognizing t hcir prowcss at war. Socrates reflects upon their courage. Courdge. as

dr fincd hg Laches in the L d w s is a form of intelligent endurance thüt üllows for the

CouragcoLIs miln io hoth recogize the proprr tinies to persist and retreat. and the rrsolve

i o îi~llo\\. throu;h with the ünülysis. It is this f om of courage that is attractive to

philosophic "Being-in-the wurld". as it niediates botween the time for the destniction of

O\-r.rcirçtiing nic'taphors. and the tims to leave them continue their function of connrcting

pcoplc to tlic cosniol«gical structure in which rhry circulate.

Socrate\' ~1111 rage i s not simply passive and çontemplativr. for courüge cmsrgsh

i i i i i 01' ;in "inncr tirc" rcferred ro by Socrates as t1irînzo.r.. A thumotiç charxter is

nioiiwicd hy shanie and thc feu bring shiimed to take violent action. Thumotiç violence

dtxx i i i ~ liniii i t d f to physiçiil violençr. but it always implies the destruction of $vsn

hoiindarics that werc previously rrected. When the rliio~zos is çontrolled inielligrntly. it

hcçoriisx courage. Howrver. whcn the rige is uncontrolled. it ülmost always results in a

srcilter shanie for the angry man. This is direçtly discussed in the Laches.

Thc L d r e s opens with Lysimachus asking. on behülf of Melesias. two well-

h o \ \ n generals. Yicias and Laches. whrther fighting in annour would bc a "lom of

instruction or practicr uhat) would make (their sons) tum out best."" Nicias proudly

praiscs trainiris in amour fighting for srveral reasons. Firstly. he argues that it is a good

idci for the Young to spend their timr not in leisure. but in improvinp their bodies.

.kcorciins to Nicias. amour training "is in no way inferior to _oymnastics exercises and

no less strenuous. and. at t hc same time. this and horsemanship are forrns of exrrcise

espeçially suited to 1i frer citizen.'"' Amour fighting is a usefril skill to know in war.

especially if ranks are brokrn. and one is forced to fight in sin$ combat. According to

Nicias. o nian with this skill "would suffer no harm at the hands of a single opponent. nor

cvcn pcrhap ai the hands of a larger number. but he would have the advantrige in every

- - \wy . ' More iniponlintly. however. the study of amour tighting will inspire intrrest in

;inothcr Ioriii of instniçtion. that beinp tactics. Whrn tactics are mastered to the entent

ihat a iiim takcs pride in his tactical ahilities. he consequrntially begins to Icam the

~ h l c art ut' the gcncrül. Armour ti_ohtin_o. given this. is the staninp for " d l the studies

..Th ml pursuii wtiich arc fine and of great value for a man to leam and to practice. Most

iriiportont lu. howrvtx Nicias argues that knowirdgc of iimiour tighting will m A c a man

%ildcr and hrriver in wor tlian h r was befort.."'"

Laches is çoiiipktely unsatistïrd with Nicias' account. He tirst sussrsts. from ü

pr;icric;iI pc.rspeçtivr.. that i f arniour tiehting wüs as beneticial iis Nicias says il is. thrn

ihc Spartans woiild themsclves be traching it. which they do noi. More imponantly.

Laches areiles that the possession of a ;rcline does not Èuaranter its proper use. By

;king i h c cwmplr: of Stesilaus. the rxpen in armour fighting who humiliated himsrlf in

hattlc. Laclies illustr~tes that the vinuousness of a person prrcedes the acquisition of iiny

tcthiw. and is thus independent of technical knowledge. If a coward. according to

Lxhes. h ü masiered the an. he would only üppear more rash. where othrrs who were

jcalous ~r~ould only scrutinize a brave man. It is only the man who is "outstandingly

' Lric.ilc.\, Op. Cit.. linc: 179d

- - " L ~ i ( 4 c s . Op. Cir.. linc: 1 SZri !/&. linc: l S 3

' Il,ill.. linc: IS2c - 8 1 Il,itl.. linc: IHZc

siqxrior to the rest" that could avoid becorning the Iaughingstock of al1 who meet hirn.")

For Lxhes. thcrt. is a substantial difference between possessing a skill and knowinz

when and how to use it. In the same spirit. Socratrs reco_onizes a large difference

hctwcn po~scssinp the littributes rrquired for accomplishing a goal (innrr tire). and

knwving huur and whcn tu propçrly use i t (courage).

Dcspiic ;LI] thüt Glüucon and Adeimantus share in ternis of charactcr and hcritage.

thcy tiaw fi~ndlinisniall y different pmonalitirs. as retlrctcd in thrir nilmes. Glaucon. or

Glcmiing. is rcpiitcd hy Socnites to br as **always most courageous in werYthing.""

Cisiig rcti'i's t u Glüricon üs an imaginative and restless spirit. and this is exrmpliticd uith

Clln~ictm'\ conduct throu_oh«ut the dialogue. Aftrr Socrates has devastateci Thrqmiachus

i \ LI vcrbol joust. Glüucon's desirc for recognition is provokrd. rather than recognizing the

poicntial i i ~ r a dumin; rxperirnce. Rather than acquicscin_o to a stron_orr powrr.

Glniicon chnllcngcs Socrates' strength. asking him. "Do y u want to seem to have

pcrïi~tlcd LIS. or iruly to persuade us. that it is in every wüy brtter to be just than

unjiisr.!"" W it h a strength and vigour that matches his name. Glaucon's major charmer

Ilaw iS his Iaçk of pnident moderaiion. Glaucon is constant1 y awüiting the opponunity to

h r d hoiindüries to pursiie his desires. However. Glaiicon has not lramcd to sclrctively

chuo~e the oppon~iniiirs for breriking boundarirs in both thousht and action.

Whilç hdeimlintus shares many of Glaucon's positive attributes. he is Glaucon's

pdür iipposi tc in one signi ficant manner. Adeimantus' namc translates as "Dnuntlrss". or

rcsolute. Adeirnantus shares Glaucon's couni-. intr lligence and potential for p a t n r s s .

Howevrr. his resolute charmer leaves him somewhat hesitmt towürdh pursuing his

desires. Adrimantus possesses the prudence thüt Glaucon lacks. but Iücks the inspirütion

rqiiircid to enforce chanse by irnplementing his desires into becoming reality.

Iniportantly. Adeimantus is not tirnid. only overcautious. and whils he must be more like

thc qgressivt.. sleeplrss hounds of the city in speech's p u d i a n class. Glaucon rnust

Icxn hou. to contain and çhünnel bis apgression.

l t i \ tlic piirticular çharacter traits of Socrütr~. Glaucon and Adrimantu.\ rhat affect

c ~ h tif thrir inique undcrstandin_os of the Socratiç search for justice. Ar the hepinning of

Book I I of Reptrhlic.. Glaucon recognizes chat Thcisymachus has not been provcn wons.

ml! "likc ;i make. has heen chamrd more quickly than he should have been."" He and

hi \ hrcithcr Adcinianiils then implore Socratrs to demonstrate. from his knowledgr. uhy

jii\ticc in iiscll' is wperior to injustice. despite the potential hcnevolent çonsequencrs of

ci t hcr. r\dciniiint~is' asking t'or a de finit ion of justice in itself is itsrlf cquivülent to

Socriiies "t i esri" question. Thus. by asking Socratçs to givr a technical de tïnition of

uelint justicc is. Adrimantus succrssfully reverse5 the elrtlc1iit.s on Socrates. putting

Socrates in ii bind. Socratcs is both compelled to defrnd justice. for it is his intent to

rcvi ta1 ize hi5 t humotiç çompany'x interest in vinur. Howevrr. Socrrites does not have

know lcdgc of the divine that is equivalent to a rechrte. To his crcdit. Socrütes responds

ihai hc is at loss of what to do. "On the one hand. I can't help out. For in my opinion

I'm not capable of it ... On the other hand. I can't not help out. For I'm afraid it might be

inipious to he h m uhile justice is being spoken badly of and :ive up and not brins help

while 1 ani still hreathins and able to make a sound."" Nier k i n g persuaded hy

Glaucon and the rest of his Company to "not give up the argument. but rather to srek out

whai each is."" Socrates qrees to lrad the investigation.

I t is iniportant to note that Socrates only agrers to puticipate in "srekinp out the

tnith ;incl hencfit of bot h" justice and injustice. While Socrütes docs not have ii technical

m s w r of whüt justice is. or for that niattrr any aspect of the macrocosmic order ir. he

Joch concedc that hc has the ahility to help others tind the ünswen for tlirmselve~. In the

Tlr~*lrrciirs Sucratch r e k n to his an as "midwifery". in that he hcilitiitcts the hinh of

L I . Socrate\ inhrnis the readrr thai. "the highest point of rny art is the potver to prove

h~ t.wsy t e h i ~vliether the offspring of a young man's thought is a filse phantasm or

inhiinct with l i f c and truth.""' Although he himsrlî' has no wisdom to give. he can help

otlicrs hring binh tu truth. Ii is in this rolr that Socratrs intends on participatins in the

w;irch. and hc justities this by referring to his wholr entourü_ot: ihirnsclf includrd~ cia nien

who nrc not clcwr. Despite Socratrs clcar admission of ignorance. Socrates' entourage

;ippc.;irs to disniiss the siairment aï standard Socratic irony. and. as niadr civident by the

tcsi. tliis sreatly affects their understanding (or misunderstanding) of the Socratic project.

In introducing the discussion on justice. Socratrs remarks that in his opinion.

j~isticc. on its own ih very difficult to see. rvrn for ii man who sees sharply. He argues. "If

\onicone hiid.. .ordcred men who don't see shÿrply to read littlr lettcirs from a h and th rn

wnieonr the thought that the süme letters are somewhere tlse dso. but b i g r r and in a

higger place." i t wsould he in their interest to read the bigger letters tïrst. and then procred

i o the \nialler lrtters." It is lrom this perspective that Socrates evokes the creation of a

\ -

/ i d . . linc: 76Sc * f i - Plrito. "T1ietircrli.s". trikcn from The Collecttxl Dial«eucs of Plrito: Includinc the Lettm. cd. Cairns.

Princctrm: Princeton Lrnivcrsit~ Prcss. 1977 lint.: S4a ' Ht ,p i i i l i ( . . Op. Cir.. linc.: 26Sd

çity in speech. This city is to represent m m wrir l<rrpr. and as a metaphor for the

microcosni. niakes the microcosm eaïier to understand. Because this city is purely

Iüntiistic. therc is no sugp t ion that Socntcs. from Book II to Book IV. has any intention

of niaking direct political commentary. The study of the city in sperch is supposrd to hr

i tic siiidy of nian throu~h the metaphor of the city. Howrvrr. becausr: Glüucon and

.Adcirniiniii~ arc thumotic men with a drsire for &ry. t h r y understand Socriitcs' words to

hc a ic:icliing of Iioul to properly build and lead a polis. T h q wrongly perceive the

philohophic pursuit of viniie to be a lecture on the rrclrrie of leadership.

Conscqiiently. at scvcral instances durine the creaiion of the çity in speech.

Glu~~cim iind .Adci rnantus make commcintary that suggest they have not iinderstood

Socriiics' intent of using the city as a metaphor for the hunian soul. [n the tïrst

consrrucrion of u tictitious city. Socrates provides the hrothrn with the most simple of

citic\. wherc the citizcns will livr off breads prepiired with barlcy meal and tlour. drink

winc. hiiild thrir own homes. and make thrir own clothing and shoes. Glwcon. in

rehponse tu this project. interrupis. süying. "You srem to make thrse men have their f a s t

without re l i~hes . "~~ For Glaucon. the city in speech is only fit for sows. as it nrglrcts the

iusurit.~ nccessary for someone of his stature. If Glaucon wcre fully aware thiit the city

\va\ Jircçted to bç metaphor for the soul. his commenta- on the nccd for luxunes

~ ~ o u l d nilike lit t le sense?

\ * Il,i</.. linc: 3 7 3 ~ 1 hc1ic.w thrit niqjor hctor in Socrritcs' cliuicc to huild a cit! in speech is the intent o t ' duc inp

GIaiiciin anci .4dciitiantus. In .4lcilzi~trus /. Socratch scduccb Alcihirites into studying wirh hirn hy ronimcing hini ~v i ih thoushts of political powcr- Glsiucon is hcinp romnnctid with a s imi lx opportunit!. ihc chrincc ~ i t building ri complcte ciri. and thus Icarnins ri ruc.l~rie of how io huild and rulc. Glriucon i s truiy cnthrdlcci uiili building ri mrtcrocosmic structure. or polis. in his own image. Xlthough this is ~iri~uh~i;intirttccl. I helicvcr that this construction is ris much ri test for Glaucon rind Adciniantus ris it is ri

\c:irili tiir.justicc. Glriuccin is a thurnotic charrictcr that nccds tu curh his rtppetiîcs i f hc ir; io rule ucll. .4clcirtiantux nccds discmw hi3 to rulc well. Thc prqiect cjt'Book II-IV is as much an rtttcmpt tu tiring the

When Glaucon complicates the projecr of the "city in speech" by introducing the

need for luxurics. Socrates cxplains thüt to bring luxuries into the city is to introduce the

need for w r . This goes unchallrnged. because al1 of the men surroundin_o Socrates are

thunioiic chürücters who crwe the opponuniiy for glory in war. For Soçrütes. \var

rniergch o u t (il the need to compromise the physical houndaries of the po1i.s and takr

rtxiiirce\ lbund outsidc t hose houndaries to maintain the "un1 imi trd xquisit ion of

Y( 1 riionef. 1-cqilircd io live lu?ruriously.

I f the polis Jcsirc's Iuxurirs. Socriies argues. "the city must he higger. and not hy

a m n l l numhcr hiit ii whols army. which will go out and do battlc with invaders for ail

[lie u.ciilth and ciII the things wr.e wcre just now tdking about."'" Glauçon rcsponds to this

coriinicnt hy ~ik ing why the citizrns thcrnselves cannot takr up amis and deknd their

borders. I contend ihat this is a h r more poip.int question than Glaucon is iiwtire of. By

hcing ;i citizen who hüs enjoycd success at wiir. Glaucon is thinking of his desires at thiit

iiioiiicni. Hix question npprars to sugzrst the thousht. "As the leader of the city. t would

likc tu \vin glory and fame by winning wars." Socratrs will catrr his answer to this

rcspimsc. by crcatiny a gardian class thüt resembles Glaucon. Howrvrr. what is more

iniporunt io the question is its relevancr on the human soul. By riskins why the citizens

ccinnoi iübr cimis. Glaucon. through the metaphor. is also asking why the soul must be

Jividcd into discemahlr parts. How corne the wming element of the soul is isolated and

iiniq~ir from the rest of the soul's constitutionb? Socratrs is aware that the human bcing

ctinnoi he so divided. as on the microcosmic level. the human being is a wholr. becausr

IN() hri~ihcr\ io ri position whcrt. the! rire cripahlt. of prricticing philosophy. hrtving justice in the soul. ris i t I \ to J ixovcr justice through the project itselt Glltucon and .L\deimüntus faii the test. and Book V is the rcwlt 01- thcir t'riiiurc. ' h 8

Kcpddic.. O p . Cit.. linc: i71d

therc are no discrrnablr boundaries sepuating its constitutive elements. However. üs

Adeiiiiantiis i mplored Socrates to give (despite its impossibility ) a complete de finition of

justice. ~ h ü i wos being asked of Socratcs was to give a definition of justice equivalent to

a todi~ic . While the concept of recliiir and its implications will be discussrd in the next

clinptcr. whiit ciin he said is that one of the çlçmrnts of a rrchrrc is its ability to break

duwi its sihjtxt mci~t'rial mathemiitically into its constitutive pans. and thrn rehuild the

\r.licdc ueitli thesr pans. Socrates must remain drdicated to the "One man. one art"

prciiiic esiuhlished ai 370a-c. hcçciusr of the rcquirernrnts placed on him at the outset of

[tic warcii. Whm one examines Socrms' response to Glaucon's question. i t must hr

rccogni~cd thar Soçratcs is wnding hetwcen his answer i what he knows for him). thc

pfi~pci. iin\\vcr I whnt hesi ünswers the question üt hand). and the prudent ünswer (what is

d c 10 [cil thosc listcning). Socraies' mrdiation hetwrcn thrse threr poles is whüi

cimdtuics the rnajority of the Rrpiihlic* as a whole.

Sucrates asks Glüucon. "Will a man. if he picks up a shield or any other wrlipon

or i w I of war. on that vcry düy br: an adrquate cornbatünt in a biittlr of heavy-limd

wldicrs. o r any other kind of battle in war?"'" By üsking this question. Socrates üppeals

t u Gl~iiiçon's pride. forcing Glaucon to concrde that not rvery person has eithrr the

nutiiral ahility or leürned aptitude for being successhl in w u . Thus. the guürdian class

hcconirs necrssity. for it is cornposrd of only those with the ability to be succrssful at

u x . Thry agree that in ordrr for people to tüke pan in the guardian çlilïs. thry must have

hoth the natural aptitude. and the proper education ünd trainin? tiom childhood on.

Froni this point. Socrates and Glaucon ensagr in ii discussion about what

consiitutrs a prrson with the natutal aptitude for guardian status. and how the? are to hç

sducatrd. Criiip writrs thüt the puardilin class can be scen as "a dangerous class of men

;~nilcd !vit h tcrth. of *meai-catrrs' ."'3 They are described by Socratrs as having the

\tiorp w w s o l n do= with the "irresistible and unbratablr spirit" to maintain their

inicllipnt cnditrancc in the face of evrrything. Most imponantly. howcvcr. any potentiül

gumii;in niiist ht. spiritrd. or possess the thumotiç nature sharrd hy Glmcon. Adcimantu\

;iiiJ tlis nst of tiis cntourüge. However. this providcs 1i prohlem. for the spirited guardian

iiiiisi nlw hc civilizrd. The guürdiün must ;ilways he aware of who his friend and who

Ili. c.iiciiiich are. He çiinnot hi: a wild heast"l, l ivins -gignor~ntly and awkuardly without

..'J5 tliythrii iind grlice. He must be çducated to bç warlikr. but moderate. and Itarn to makr

a,iir only on his encniies. when it benefits the people and the land chat hc proieçts.

I r i h in t h i h çonicst thnt Socriites proposes the noble tiction. as the earliest pan of the

gti~irdiiin'\ ediication. By explaining thnt (il1 gulirdians are born of the sanh. Socrates

intend5 l i jr thc guardirins to he inspircd to deknd their boundary as if i t is their own

iiiothcr. and that al1 of the nicn that sharr in its delence are likr brothers. In propapating

hi\ lie. Socrates sugeests that the nilers. or complète pud ians ( tliosc that clin guard over

eneniics from without and friends from within) c m influence the young. or au.uilimirs. to

sntorce ihc rulers' convictions. Howevrr. the question thiit musi liskrd is why such a

iiory is nccessary. In the nent chapter. 1 will discuss the condition of spiritual crisis.

wlierc the sharrd set ofoverarching metaphor are no longer successful in making sense of

espcrience. Chiipter Two will then identify the "noble fiction" as an attempt to form a

ctinncction betwen human experience and the cosmologicü1 structure. With this

;~cc~n~pl i shcd . this work will explain trcli~ir as another method of dealin= with the

wnciitiim of spiritual çrisis. and thrn discuss its tlaws.

Chripter I I : Tacit Knowine. Techne and Spiritual Crisis

" 1 \liüll rcconsidrr human knowledge hy staning llom the hct that wc brow /~ iow t l l ~ l l l \t'O c'l i l l IcII."

In the Introduction. 1 made rekrence ro the importance of the vinur of nioderation

in Plaio'r Rqwhlic. iind its rdationship two a twofold notion of ignorance. The t i n t form

, . r i t ipnorniicc. ;i liick 01 inforniaiion about essential Being. is fundamentül ro the human

ciiiidiiiun. Btxausc humans are monal. and thus elrmrnts enistins within a givrn

ci)sniologicnl structure. they are limitrd. The y cannot completel y know the macrocosni

in io tvhich they are thrown from binh. and participate in until drath. Although ail

hiirt~;ins arc ignorant in this miinner. no[ al1 arc aware of (or choosc ro rccognizc) this

conditiim. i t is only those with jrist souls. who have moderiteci thtiir cippctitrs to do what

the! arc hest titted for. that hüvc the opponunity to iichievr the clarity required for

rccugnizing this condition. Of thrse just souls. somc have the çourüge to persist in the

warch tor ii hetter understanding of the çosrnological ordrr in which they live.

Phili~sophy is the way in which these moderated souls [ive in the world.

Coupled with this simple form of ignorance is a more malevolent double

ignorrincc. or ris previuusly referred to. lie in the soul. When a man suft'ers from double

ignorance. he hic; forgottrn (or been self-deluded into for_oettin_o) his condition of

t'undanicntal iporcince. He chooses not pursue a funher understanding of the cosmos. ÿs

hr helirvrs he dready possesses a complete understanding of it. He tries to End

trtiniscendsntd truths in the material world. and cherishss do-nr as elrments of rioesis.

In thc süme Introduction. 1 suggested the possibility that Plüto recognized li

difkrcinçc hrtwern ;i lie in speech and a lie in the soul. In lishi of this distinction. ii is

11iy contention thut Socrritrs' noble tlction should not be considsred a lis. but in hct an

iittenipr hy Sc>cr;ltt's to removes the lies he found in the souls of Glliucon and Adeimantus.

In tclling the nohlc fiction. Socrates is concrrned with dirrctly (in the allrgory. and

indirectly iwith Glaiicm and Adrimantus) tàcilitiitin_o the propcr moderatr ordering of

tlic hutiiiin ioiil. h o that thc soiil can he virtuous. Howew-. brfore such ;in aryment can

he ni~iclc. ont' rn~ist t h be aware of what Socrates understands a wll-ordered human

hciiig t u hc. Thi\ chtipter will providc a brief discussion of what Soçrrites perceivei to hr

;i propcirl y ~~rdcrcd sou1 hy tïrst discussing "man-in-himseltg'. and secondl y. mm's

"Bei ng-in-t he-wrld". 1 will argue that man reconcilrs his existence as both "mm-in-

hiniself' und "riian-in-the-world by estüblishing relationships between the two modes of

hcing. Thih work will sursest ihat the pursuit of wisdom is the attempt to cstablish such

rclütionships. and in so P u as humans always lram rnetaphoriclill y. thrse rrlationships are

hiiilt iipon o\*eriirchine metaphors. 1 will then introduce spiritual crisis as the condition

ihar cnists when thcse reliitionships are no longer successful at reconciling these two

modcs of king. 1 will conclude this chapter by retuming to the issue of r e h e that was

üI liidcd to in the previous chaptrr. I will explain how rrcltiir could mistakrnly be seen ili

one uxy of ottempting to reconcilr spintual crisis.

In cspresing his feelings about discussion. the charactrr Laches. i n Plato's

diologue Ldrr.s. states that hr is both of one and two opinions. When listenins to a man

afho is discussing vinur. or imy son of wisdom. and that man is himself vinuous and thus

knoakdgriiblc about the subject of vinue. he is "delighted beyond meaïurr and (he)

conipcireis) the man and his words. and noteb) the harmony and correspondence of

thmi."'"' Thih nian is the truc musician. as his words and deeds hrrrmonize in the tnie

tlcllenic niodc. thc Doriün mode. Howevcr. when the man whosr actions do not agrrr

a.ith Ili5 \v«rdz spraks. it is an annoyance to him. and the brtter hr speiik. the mors

L'rt-1rr.r hatc.5 tiini. It is for this reüson the Laches wlçomrs the conlins of the Socnitic

clrii~*Irii .s. lilr although Iic has no knowlrdp of Socrates' ivords. "hin d z r d show that hç

i5 cntitlcd to nohlc smtinicnts and complrte frrcdom of speech.""'

For Lochcs. the niun qualitïed to speük of vinut: is hinisrlf a vinuous ivholc.. He

ih ~1 \vhulc. hccaiisc hc is more thm the sum total of al1 his parts. and thus more than a

itian who crin hot h rpeuk and açt. He is a wholr bectiuse rach clrmrnt of his heing is

engagcd i n sttll-rcl'crcntial relationships with each othrr rlemrnt. and with the rntire

ccin~lonicr~ition of elenients itself. ln thrit these relations cnnstitute whlit t 'xh of the

clenteni\ are. i t is functionülly impossible to separate one elrment from anothrr. and to

break down thc wholt: into its constitutive pans. While this mliy appeür confusin:.

Lachcs' musiciil metaphor sheds much light upon bis discussion. In the Dorian mode.

conihinciiions ot' notes are played simultanrously to create harmonies. Within these

harmonies. the individual notes themselves disiippear into the greüter sound of the

harniony hein: creatcd. The harmony itself is more that (i simple conglornrntion of its

cilcnienth. fur its sound crinnot be divided into its constitutive parts. for its existence

depend:. on the self-referential relationships between thrse elements. which themselves

stmc to bliir the boundaries between sach note.

Socr~ites addresses the question of a well-ordrred sou1 in Book IV of Reprrblic

throiigh the allegxy of the city in speech. Book IV opens with Adeimantus asking the

opirliciiiidc questi«n of how Socratrs proposes to krep the guardian class happy without

providirig tlicni with the nrcessary luxuries for a eood Iife. Socrates I-~~pondb hy

espliiining [liai thc happinrrs of a city is in "a wholr city. not setting apart a happy frw

and p~iiiinp thciii in it."""his statement is fundamentally important to the Socratiç

pusiiim. a-hen «nc reconsiders that the çit y in speech is ui«ir wi-it lm*,gc. If Socrates' city

in spccch i \ an iningc of man. çreiited to allow ü prnrtrating intrrpretation of the human

condition. Socraies is clcrirly sending the message that man is n a happy i f he only

indulip in lu'tury. The imponance of this statrmrtnt c m found hoth contr.utually and in

wntcnt. Contcstually. this is a message givrn directly to Xdeimantus. the potrntiül

iiriiocrüt uho nerds tc, hr more üware of his drsires. Pan of Socrites' project was to

arousc ,Adeini;intus' donnant drsires. By asking about luxunes for the purrrdians.

;\tleiriiüntiis denionstrates to Socratrs that his drsires have been successfully intlarnrd.

Socr:itcs lises his response as a reminder to Adeimüntus thüi while desiring is important.

hc niiist nlwys drsirr for the benetit of his whole entity. Luxurirs cissua~e the desires of

the tlcsti. but fail to satistj the desire for honour or wisdom.

In content. this statemrnt establishes a bridge for Socrates to r v o k a discussion

on iiioderütion. Socrates follows this point by recissening that the guardian class must be

hoth compellrd and persuadrd to think first of the whole. so that they do their job wrll.

Socrriies argues. "Wr must let nature assign to each of the groups its share of

hnppiness."L"' By this. Socrates implies that each element of the city in speech receives

Iiüppiness hy Iollowinp their own nature. and pan of that nature is the recognition thüt the

g«od of the whole supersrdes the ~ o o d of the part. Becausr the wholc of the city is

niilintaincd hy thc relationships formed betwrrn its elements. and its elemènts to the

ivholc. thehe elcmrni çcin only exist in themsrlves in refrrencr to r x h other and the

u*tii~lc.. Thcrefort.. the prsscrvation of the dement itself is dependeni on the priority of

iIic iivhi>lt. ta i t d t'. Again. while this rnay appcar con fusin?. Laches' musical metaphor

ciin providc h r i t y . Man. or the city in speech. at its hest I'unctions as a hümiony. This

liitriiwny i \ not only dependent upon the notes that compose its sound. but on the

purticiilnr rclationhip. sach noir has with the other. and with the hürmony itself. For the

noic i n thr hiirmony to müintain the üttributes it has within the hamon);. the hürmony

iihclf n i i l h i lirstly he presrrved. Without the prrsence of the proprr harmony. the note no

Iimgcr po\c.;st.s the same musical "bcing". Therefore. in ordrr for rhc note to remain

;iiithcntic to i t h ouen potentiülity for briing. it must primarily serve the nrrds of the whole.

W i t h r h;it haid. Socrates cün rnükr the cal1 for a moderation of wealth. citing

upccilth and poveny as two things thüt hindcr the production of ü çraftsman. The guiudian

cI;i'is nwst hr prevcntrd from becorning eithrr rich or poor. as wralth. "produces luxury.

idleness and i nnovütion. while ( poveny ) produces illiberality and wrongdoing as wcll as

inno~ütion."""' If ihr leadership of the city in speech lives modentely. the city will he

governsd niodrriltely. Consequrntly. according to Socntes. "As long as ( a ) city is

niodcrntely in the way it was just -mrlnged. it will be the biggest.""" The city in speech

will grow rnoderatçly. only up to the point in its growth which it is willing to remain a

iini lied whole. I t will protect itself from innovation. and even play will br monitored to

IO2 prcwnt Iawlessncss. The nurnber of lüws proposed and enforcrd wiil be limitrd. for i f

toi) niiiny Iliws are put into force. the suardians will. "spend their lives continually setting

dou-n man? such iulcs and corrcçting thrm. thinking they'll get hold of whüt's best."'"'

According to Socrates. the city in spcrch is good because i t is wise. couriigrous.

iiiodcratc und just. lis wisdom is rmbodied in the guardiüns' knowledse of rulership. and

i l3 coiir~igc i.4 cnihociied in the auxiliiiries thrit deknd the city from within and without.

Wi~it hinds thc city in speech together is the vinue of moderition. Socratrs argues.

"Sli~dcratiim is surely a certain kind of order and niastery of certain kind?; of pleiisurcs

ilnd tlcsircs."'"" Eüch clemrnt of the city in speech. whether i t is the monrymakers. the

Jct'cndcss. or the rulcrs. hiis panicular desirrs that ticcompüny their position within the

ci[!.. Fos tiic ciiy in specch to hi: nioderate. d i of thesc desires have to hr subordinated to

ihc proper Iùnçtioning of the city as a whole. The city is forced to succecd becriuse

u-hethcr or not they wish to. the smüller calculüiing element of the city niust rule. and rule

i n thc intrrcsi ot' the whole. It is in this way that the city can be stronger than itsrlf. as

"that which is hetter hy nature is master over that whiçh is worsr."'" The desires

1 1 1 ' 5' J c n ~ i n g the rtvailability of inncivation in the city in spcch. i t appcirirs that Socrates. through thc rlic~;tpl~or. i\ proptlhing ri humnn with rt fcirrn o f "prc-hl1 c»ntentrncnt*'. B! "prc-t'rill". 1 am suggcsting a Iiunirin condiiion Iricking di'-consciciusnrrss rcsemhling that of.i\dsirn and Eve betiire their " h l l (rom p c c " and c~puI3ion tloni Eden. 1 do not hclicvc thrit Socrlitcs has this in minci. tiw Socrates clocs not cn\ i\i(in the iicil-iirdcrcd wu1 tr) mirror Homcr's Lotus Earcrs. Scicrritcrs ducs nut rillow for innovaiion in IIIC ~i.t.11-orclcrd rirul hec;1usc w.hcn the sou1 is propcrly structured, it hris ri ccinsistcnt relritionship with thc ti~;ic'rcic'o~n~ in \t hich i t participates. Man connecrs with thc cosmos by pcrsistt.ntl~ doing uhat is k t titttld to rlicir k i n g in thc u.urld. Innovation is necessary t« rccrcsitc lost connections. or dcvclop ncw imcs ir-lieri r i ~ t ' v t r w I ~ ~ J C I J S S ~ ~ M ~ ! H~IH'CVC~. ticcausc thc ci[? i n spticch is an image for ri sou1 with ri consistent ionncclitin to the cosmos. therc is no place for innovation within it, In essence. if nccessit~ is the rnother ijf in\cntion. thcrc e ~ i s t s no nect'ssit). i n this image. 1 0 ;

Kt-pi ih l ic - i Bltrcim 1. OP. Cir.. Iinc: 4 3 f i l 1 lhid.. linc: 470c I l l < - w- linc: 4-7 1 il

pursued hy the city are always simple and moderütr. as the- are alwiiys accompanied by

intelligence and right opinion. as providcd by the cdculating _ouardians. Unlike wisdom

or coiirüge. the virtue of moderation. "stretchrs throughout the whole.. . making the

if-caker. t he monger. or those in thc middlr.. .sing the same chant t~~ethrr."""

Moderation is not hund wirhin any pünicular element o i the city. but in the entire citfs

rh;ircJ rclationship to the whole of its beinp. thus the city is moderatr only whcn the

u.tic~lt. city is nioClt'r;lte+

I t i b with this süid thtit Socr~trs can provide a preliminiiq definition of justice for

thc cit! in \pecch. Thc jusi. or wrll-ordered city exists when eüch mcmher of the ciry

rccognizch thc rule that "each one must prüctice one of the functions in thc city. that one

I'ur ~f-hicti hi\ nütiire made him naturally niost tït.""" Justice involves minding onc'r own

hiibinch\. ; i d thus provides the powrr by which moderation. sourase and prudence ail

conic into k ing and rcmain preserved within the city. I t is a balance where wralth cannot

;illoti. one pcrwn of the moneyrnakine clüss to bu' into rithrr the iiuniliary or guardian

I t ih cit tliis point in the discussion thüt Glaucon replaces hdeirnlintus as the active

iiicnihcr ul' the Jiscussi»n. The city in speech has been biiilt. and i t i s time for Glaiicon to

~1st. it. anci reduce its example to the level of man. Adcimantus. who Socrates wished to

\ce bcçcinie mort' spiritrd. is allowrd to participate in and witness the culmination of the

huilding proçess. Gliiucon is sufficiently spirited. but needs to leürn moderation. and so

he rcplnces his brother to participate in a lesson about moderation in the human soul.

With the prernisr that the justice descnbed in the city in speech mirrors the justice of

wel l-ordercd hurniin soul. Socrates asks Glaucon about the soul's constitution. Socrates

a-ishes [il kiiow whether humrins learn with. hrcome spiritrd. and desire with srparate

parti of thc soiil. "us do wc act with the soul as a whole in eüch of them once we are

~ti~stcd..."" GIüuc~n hnx no answer for Socrates. so Socratrs addresses his own question

in ihr. t'~)llowing niannrr. He tïrst rstablishrs that the sou1 cannot prrform opposites at the

ranic tinlc. and ihen uses the c~arnplc: of ü human body to s u g p t that whrn an cntity is

Jividcd into elcnicnts. each elrrnent ciin act indcpendently. despite k i n g pan of the same

wholc i handh crin niove while fret stay still ). I t is thrn arsurd and consentcd to that

dc\i ring and "non- Jesiring" arc opposites. From these statemrnts. Socrarrs constmcts a

iiiurc \.iviJ snaniplc of thirst to answer his own qurstion. Glaucon. in rrsponse to and

;iy-etment with Socrates. explains. "Erich panicular desire itself is only for thrit prirticular

ihing iirclf of uhiçh i t niiturally is. whilr the desire for this or that kind depends on

;iddiiii~ri\."' '" To thirst is simply to desire drink. while the conditions p+rtainin_n to the

pliniçular instance of thirst account for the specificity of the rnrinner in which the thirst is

3atistïed. While ihc condition of thint is always a need for drink. "hmt would also cause

t hc dcsirc t'or cold ris well: and where coldness. something hot.. . . . I I I

In this frarne of opposites. Socratrs argues that things can either be relatrd to a

kind of thin?. or to on1 y a thing. That is itself'. Knowledge. as an example. crin be

1-cliitcd to i i I I fomis of Iraming or a specific kind of learning. Knowled_or as Irarning

i t d f difkrs froni the panicular knowledge of constructing houses. Thirst. for Socrütes.

is Ionginp for drink and a striving towards it. The soul of a thirsty man wishes only for

drink. and yet sonir nien in some circumstances are not willing to drink. Socrates asks.

"Isn't therc sonicthing in their soul bidding [hem to drink and something forbidding thrm

10 du W. wn~etliing different that mastrrs that which hids?'"' Glliucon assens thlit he

4iair.h thü t opinion. concluding that the human soul n~ust br divided into desirin:

clcnicnts. whicti either ügrre or contlict with each other.

Socrates siiggcsts to Glauçon that they primarily liçcept that there at least tu1o

clsiiicnt\ rhat iliflèr froni one mother. "namin_o the part of the sou1 with which i t

C ; I I C I I I ; I ~ L ' ~ the ( Iog i~ t iko t~ and the pan with whiçh i t loves. hunprrs and thirsts. and is

~igiiatccl hy the other desires. the irrational and desiring i rpirhiit~reiiko~r 1. çompanion of

..I 1 ; ccrtiiin rcplenishrnents ancf plcasures. As mentioncd in the Introduction. while the

Io,qistikori is rnotivütrd by a love of leming and the philosophic nature w a whole. Eros

and ttic iiillillment of physicd satisfaction motivüte the cipithumrtikon. Brcausr of thrir

difkring motivation. these two elements often tind themselves in contlict. and it is this

contlict that evokcs the prestrnce of the third element of the humiin tripmitr soul. the

rliiirirocidcs. The ihiu~toeiclt..~. or "the pan thrit contains spirit and with which we are

*piriid." is niotivatcd hy the desire for honour and victory. It is always identified with

wiirnge. and i t serves to maintain the boundary betwren the iqicrikr~u and the

~ ~ p i t / ~ ~ ~ ~ r ~ c ~ t i k o t ~ .

When hürkeninp bück to the city in speech. it c m be seen that the guardian çlass

tinds its equivültrnt in the logisrikon. the auxiliaries tlnd theirs in the r/tlimxiLIL'.s. and the

nionr ymakers are equivalent to the epiriwwrikon. It was arped that justice in the city in

speech was found only when rach element of the city's population restricted itself to

whiit i t w s niiturally fitred for. and respecting the boundaries betwern class divisions.

The guürdian çlass \volilci rule brcause it was most naturally suitrd for rulership. and the

iiiirlii~riiy of its nile would be defmded and rnforced by the auxiliwy class. The

iiioiicyiiinking class continucd to pursur wealth within the yidrlinrs cstablished hy the

y m i i i i n h anci cnfcmxd by the auxiliaries. The city's wisdorn was smbodird in the

giinrdians. its courage in its auxiliaries. and its moderation in the entire city's ahility to

\ L I hordinlitc inmwiirire naturd desires to the needs of the whole. With this said. Socrates

rcriiincis G1;iiic.m. "LW m u t rcmember that, for each of us too. the one within whom each

01 thc parts niindh his own business will be just and rnind his own business.""' In the

wrll-ordered. or just sod. the calculating elcment rules over the desirin? clrment. and

cntlmxs ihis rulc through the angcr and courage of the spirited clcment. This proccss is

cueriiplilicd in the prcviously discussed Leontius myth. where Leontius' cülculüting

clciiicni iiscd the soul's anger to invoke disgust when Leontius couid not restrain himself

li-mi looking at mutilüted corpses. The rolr of rducation. through music and gyrnnastiçs.

iz t c ~ brin2 these three rlements into accordance. so that the soul may have the wholrnrss

prisrd tri Laches in the Ltrclies. Moderation. in this instance. çan be understood as whtm

"the ruling pan and the two ruied parts are of the single opinion that the calculatinp pan

ri~izhi to rule and don't raisr faction agüinst it."' " When 3 sou1 is immoderate. and one

clcnient of its çoniposition risrs up against the good of the whole to rulr. the soul is in (t

*tate of imbalance. or injustice. However. when a man "doesn't kt each pan of him rnind

other people's business. or the threr classes in the sou1 meddle with rach other. but really

\cts his own house in sood order and rules himself.. . hmonizing the three pans exüctl y

likc ihree notes in (i harmonic sclile." he is intemally just. and thus well-ordrred and

iirholc. I I f ,

Thih is not (i coniplete presrntation of the well-ordered human heing. hccause the

tiuiiiiin dueh not rxist i n n vacuum. The just man is vinuous hscause despite being whole

t Iic iiiicii)costtiic Ievel. he recognizes that üt the mticrocosmic Irvel. he is simply one

part icipatinf clcnient in the harmony of the patternrd change that is the cycle of nature.

Virtiic i \ t h u h properly doing whrit one is fitted for. in so für as the vinuous m m

rccognizes the nesd to strive for wholeness at the rnicrocosrnic level. and the need tu hoth

crtxiic dl-rckrcntinl rclationships with other elernentn of the whok. and to seek out the

ivholc iit the ni:icrocusniic 1evt.l.

I t tor this retison that I helicvr Aristotle cnn identify rnün lis a "roorr polirikoiig.

Arisioilt. is not simply suggesting that man niust eiiher live in cities or engage in politics

to açhiew iis hillest potential. I believe that Aristotle intends to suggrst that the actual

Ilciinition o t' man hinpes on man's ability to create these relütionships. The polis is itself

;t niciaphix for man's being-in-the-world. The polis mirrors the cosmos in that i t

triinsct'nds its constitutive elernents. Men live and men die. but it is the established

relationships hetwsrn the living. and interestin& enough the living and the dead. that

niaintain the wholençss of the polis. In so far as politics is the ut of shaping thrse

rt.l;itionships t« maintain the wholenrss of the polis. man is a political animal in this

riianner ah 1ve11.

I t w s mrntionsd that within the polis. wholeness was maintained through

rrlüiionship.; both hrtwren the living. and the living and the drad. It may apprar

awkawd to suggest that the relationship between the living and the dead actually

rcintixc\ thr constitution of this polis. However. consider Plato's notion of the

"icrrihlc". and ont. cm hesin to recognize what is heing suggested. A whole is w h d s

~ C ' C ; I L I S ~ i~ not only rncurnpassrs the rntirety of its scope. but also places tim houndaries

;ircuiiicl whar i \ tvithin its scope. To rrcoenize what raists outsidr the scopti of the W ~ O ~ L I

i h tu kiiiiw the "tcrriblc". Thus. the whole also contains its opposite within in. by heing

itblc tt) cldine what is o~itsids of its bounciaries as "that whiçh rxists outside of its scopr.

Tlirciiigti the Leontius niyth. or through a simple recognition of the hunian lascination

ir. iih ii car crash. an- readrr or observer can rccognize thai hurnans art: fascinatrd with

limking at niangled bodies. I contend thüt the reason for this. us argued by Dürhy in Tlw

Fwsz. i \ thiit hunians are hsçinated by thc violation of humün physical houndaries.

H o w w r . [hi> i \ itsc'if an insufticient statement. The reuson t'or this fascination is

hcciiiisc by witnessing the violation of this human boundary. they are able to know "the

tcrrihlc". what rxists outsidr the scope of the human physical boundary. Thus. Emily

Dickinsim u n wits "1 hrard a tl y buzz when 1 dicd." brcause ut that moment of death. a

pcrïon can t n i l y know what exists outside of their physical scope. and thus for a moment

achiwe complcte wholencss. Therefore. if wholrness does require a notion of the

terrible. the polis muxt rntenain some fonn of relationship with its oppositc. hponlintly.

ihc oppositr of rhr polis as a political structure is revolutinn. the oppositr of politics is

tyranny. and the opposite of being is death. Thus. the polis acts in the interest of

preventin_o revolution. poiitics is the art of preventing tynnny. and man livrs in the

interest of preventing his own death. This does not mean that the wise man livrs in Fear

of d yins. any more than political action is always taken in the interest of preventing

tyrannit. Howsvcr. the wise man attempts to live well. for. as Goethe writes. "...the spirit

lookr nsi t her ahead nor behind. Only the prrsrnt is our hüppiness." Just as every

politicul institution decüys and dies. cach institution iittempts to maintain its wholensss

IOr as long as i t is justified.

Whilc i t nioy he that the po

and tliur providcs the wcll-ordrred

1-clationship\ with other people by

is providrs the forum for speech and political action.

human the opponunity to build self-rcferentirtl

ntegrütiog thrm as rither frirnds or cnernies. afhÿt

rciii~iins to he c r n is Iiow the prrson ciin build similar relationships with the rest of the

cosniological stnicture in which hr lives. The pursuit of wisdom is the artrrnpt to build

tlic\c rcliitiimships. and in so f ~ r üs the pursuit of wisdom is always carrird out

tiictaphorically. these reliitionships are bridacd by metaphors. ~Mün ~indersiands the

ivorld ;ir«und hini. and pursurs tùnher understanding by üpplying what hr does know to

uhot hc does noi know. and integraies nrw findings into his personal set of nieraphors

used ti~r cmntxting with the world around him. It is this personal set of metaphors that

Michlic.1 Polrtnyi refrrs to as the -'tacit dimension".

ln his work. T1rc Tlrcit Diuiensio~i. Polünyi begins with the supposition that

hiinicins knou more than thry are able to directly articulate. and this has brcn

demonstrated through Gestalt psychoio_oy. Humrins have the ability to recognizc

paniculass without being able to give an account for thrim. This is not a rrvolutionq

tindine. for Soçrates himself. in Book X of Rrprblic. attücks Homeric poetry on the

sro~inds that Homer hlis the samc ability to recopize paniculars of the human condition

without hein? able to pound thrm in a justifying system. Polanyi's break with the

Gcistiilt psycholo$s is his retum to Plato. for according to Polanyi. Gestalt should be

iindcrstmd "as the mitcorne of an active shaping of rxperience perfomed in the pursuit

ol knowlcdgc.""i This ahaping of experience is the product of what Polanyi rekrs to 3s

ilic ..tiicit powr hy which l i l l knowledge is discoverrd.. . and héld to be tnie."' ' " ~ a t

pou-cr. f i ~ r Polanyi. ih the ahility to achirve lin understanding of neu expericncrs by

j ils tapoii np t h m w i r h the set of intrpted rxperiences already absorhed into the human

lliculty Ior kniwlsdgc. In essence. tacit power is mctaphoriç power. for i t is alwüya

conccrncd ~ i * i t l i üpplyin; what one dors know upon chat which one Joss not know.

Thc h~nic stnicturç of tacit knowing always involves the use of two terms. one

which the person attends liom. or the pmsimrl rem (metaphor). and the one which thc

pcrson cittends tu. the &.sril terni (experiencc). According to Polanyi. "Such is the

)ii~~crioud idtrfiotl bsiwcen the two rems of tacit knowing: we knoii rhc jirsr rerm orily

II!. wl\-i,ig ou oirr miïrrcfne.s.s (,f'ifjhr crrtem~iri,q ro the .seco~rcl."~"' It is only hy focusing

iipon the distil teml through the proximal. thüt the distil term is imbued with a panicular

iiiccinin_i !.or the human engaged in a new experience. It is the metaphor that ?ives the

ncu. cxpcrience meaning. os it providrs the context necessary cornparison and contrw.

grouping and dividing. In essence. just as politics imbues melinin: upon humün

interaction hrcausc i t provides the methodology and forum for the division of friends and

cneniies. t x i t linouring imbues meüning upon man-world interiiction. as it provides the

h~nini and iiiethodolot_y for prouping and dividing enperience.

" - Pol;m! i. XItch<icl. Thc Txi t Dimension New York: Douhleday & Cornpan-. IYhh. p. h l l \

/h l ! . . p. 6 - I l " m. p- IO

Polanyi uses the example of a probe to help demonstrate how tacit knowing

oççurs. He writes. "Anyone using a probe for the first time will feel its impact against his

t ï n y and pülm. But as we leam to use a probe.. .our awarenrss of its impact on our

hnnd is triirislormrd into a srnsr of its point touching the objects we are exploring.""" In

thc process of tücit knowing. nrw experiencc i?; dways prodded and poked hy the

espcriençc piwiously intepted into the set of metaphon that irnhur mcaninp upon

1111111311 cxpcricnct'. These metaphors that niake up tacit dimension are unique io cach

person. ;is no w« lives proccrd cxiict ly the samr way and in the same ordcr. Whrn n new

cspcricncc ixcurs. i t is intcmalized into the tacit diniension and hecomes piin o l the self.

The cstension ot' the tncit dimension. like the use of a probe. hecomc the extension of the

wll'. iind when the person recognizes how to use it. it can he an effective tod for

~inclc.rstmdin~ the world riround him.

The issue of the neçessity for a t x i t dimension of knowing is at the forefront of

Pl;ito's dialog~ic M u r o . In the Mr~ro. the chüracter Meno inquires about the possibilitv of

cngqing in a setirch fur a detïnition ofvirtur. When Socrites admits to not being able to

Jcl'ine what hc is scürchins for. Meno asks. "How will you airn your srarch for

wniething y011 do not know at dl'? If you shoiild mret with it. how will you know thiit

[hi\ i \ the thing that you did not know.?"'" This question is more than a simple question

;ihoiit niethcdolo_ny. for i t is an attack on al1 foms of reseürch and rhought. which

presurne io hc conçerned purely with explicit knowledge.'" Socratrs responds to this

question by nsking Meno. "Do you realizr what a debatrr's argument you are bringing

Lip7"1:.: Socratrs is aware that a11 research s t m s with the recognition of a problem to be

wlwd. If the problern is diqnosed properly. than the research cm be successful. If

diagnoseci poorly. the results of the reseiirch will fail to correspond with the reülity of the

prihleni.

Thonw Kuhn. in his work. T1ir Srnrcriirc~ of'Scimrific Rew1irriuii.s. miikrs thir

point rsplicit. According ro Kuhn. the practice of 'normal science' is deeply rooted i

p i i h t c i e n t iliç achievenients thiit "somr pÿnicular scienti tic communit y acknowledges for

A tiriic ;i wpplyinp the foundation for its hnher practicrs.""J Thesr. xhievrmrnts.

~iccmting 10 Kuhn. possehs an cnduring quality io aitract adhrrents. and are sufficicintly

open-endcd ici Icüw in its wükr ii plethorri of puzzles to be resoived by thrse adherents.

TIicw achicvenients arc uph<it Kuhn refers to as paridigms. in that thry serve to consritute

iiiodch of pructisrs and perceptions from which particular trends and traditions of

\cientilïc prxticc and resrarch are formrd. These par~dismatic ordrrs constiiute the w y

i n whicli scittniists üpproacli thrir fields. for "Men whosr resrarch is hased on s h w d

pü~idignis are cornmi ttrd to the same rules and standards for scienti fic practicrs."'"

Nriticcahl y. accordine to Kuhn. the acquisition of a puadigm is considered a sign of

;I Ilici- duc distinction. thc modern cmpiricist attcmpts to divorce the human participatiim from thc ncutral tlndinp dcrivcd t'r1)ni thc scicntitSc mcthod. In rigrccing with this linc rifcriticism. 1 contend thrit ihc cnipiricii*t \vho chor~ses to limit all tlndings to thosc derivcd through paniculrir hrms of iesting arc ~hcniscl~c.; involvcd in the discovcr~ process. Stxondl!. ht.criust. riIl empiricril findings art. discovertxi and proccsi*cd h> the hurnrin sensor? and cogniiivc apparatus. the human again crinnot help but hc diwctly i n ~ o l \ ~ d in tlic discuvt.r~ proccss. Finally. on ri simple Icvcl. the scit'ntist hrw inilnite opportunitics to rccord in llni tc daia with intlnitt. vririühlcs. And yct. the scient ist chooses which dsiiri is most important. Thai ctioo\ing proccsh is itsclf 3 manikst;ltion ol'humrin involvement. The rcvolutionrir> scicntist i s thc cine i v h i i proposci'; tht* right questions to üsk. whiic it is rhc normal scitintists. or Irib rats. that do thc grunt \\ iirh. Tlic c hrirxicr Socrritcs will argues thai i t is throush the proccss of uricrnrrre.si.s. or rccollecrion. thrir r i i m x q u i r c ~ i tic ;thlit! IO risk the right questions. Socriws argues thrit man is born with ri sou1 thrtt ha\ intiniations ot'tlic rnricrocosmic ordcr. and the search fur wisdom is thc proccss hy which man crtlatcs rt c l c ~ i n ~ t;)r his tiirgr~ttcn wisdom tr) bt: evoktld into Bt.in,u. While ont. nced not acccpi SCK'KWS' argument rn full. i t docs shed lisht cm the nccd for an explrination for thc human capricity for non-explkit knouiedge. 1 ' . .\/c,ro. Op. Cir.. linc: SOc 1'1 Kuhn. Op. Cir.. p. 10

ninturity in the dsvrlopment of any given scientist. The pwadigrn serves to estüblish

wmues of inquiry for a scientist. just as it provides a guideline for the formulation of

questions. It dictates rnethods of questioning. identifies the relevance of paniculür

findings. and play n dominant rote in giving meming to investigation and its results.

Kuhn writes. "To bc accepteci as a parxligm. a thcory must seem hetter (han its

c~>tiipctitors. hiit i t n t t d not. and in hct never dors. rnplain al1 the facts with which it cnn

hc con t'rontcd.""" Hoawer. ;i parüdigm is not often an object for reproduction. This is

tu siiggcst thrit 11 paradigrnatic structure should no[ br dismissed üs a tlreting. illogical

iiiid iïcti t ious set uf preniises. "Insteüd. l i ke an üccepted judicial decision in the common

0.127 I W . i t i \ an ohjecr for funher articulation and speçifiçation.. . John Haugelünd. in his

cswy "Thc Nariire and Plausibility of Cognitivism". writcs. " A pïiniïii,qi~i is a major

~cicntitïc triumph. so impressivr in breaking nrw ground. and yct so pregnant with

iinf~iliïlled pmsi hilitirs. that a technicul rcsearch tradition coalrscrs around it as ü

i i i~i~cl . '"'~ The pamdigm could be understood as an esiablished. rrgulatrd zone from

wliich inkmmtion ;thout the world cornes into presence. The acceptance of a paridigm is

thc agreement to puticipate in a select set of rules and obligations that sovcm the

nicthodology of scientitic study. and the rnatrrial studird. Kuhn argues ihat the par~digm

contnins. "The existence of a strong network of commitments-conceptud. theoreticai.

instniniental. and method~lo~ical."~" It is this responsibility for its ternis. and

I :- Il>itl.. p. I l "" id. - p. 17 11' i l~id. . p. 13 - l 2 h Haugcl~ind. J o h n "Thc Naturc and Plausihility ot'Coipitivisrn" triken frnm Havins Thou~ht : Eshrivs in thc Xlct;iph~ sic\ 01' hIind bIrissrichust.tts: Harvard Lrnivcrsit~ Press. 1 W X l :" Kuhn. OP. Cit.. p. 42

Iiçceptiince of the paradigrnatic rules that distinguishes normal science from üny other

hunian prnctice.

The Sucratic problem is much like the Kuhnian paradigm in so fàr as they hoth

c\it;lhlish the houndaries that dictate the methodology. scope and drpth to which iiny

rchetisch clin he prxticrd. recorded and used. The plirameters set for the rrsearch into

wlution o h prohleni are set by the prohlem itself. Howevrr. this svokes a plir~dos of its

own kind. Ior to scarch for n solution to a problem is an absurdity. To know the rquircd

pai-iiiicters lbr the diswvery of the solution to a problrrn. one rnust have an

iiiidcatnniling of thc prohlem irself. As Socr~tes argues. a mm "çannot search for what

tlc knou+c;incc he knvws it. there is no need to swrch-nor for what he does not know. for

~ i c doch noi linou* what to look t'or."""

Thc ;ueptünce of a tacit diniension provides a way out from this paradox. Bu

wggesting thüi nui nII knowlcdge is explicit knowlcdgr. Polanyi. or for that matter Plato.

cun s i i ~ p t that man. through his tacit awareness of the world around him. has inkiings

of thc purameters that define the problems hc faces. It is this non-exprrssiblr inkling that

giiidcs and shapes the direction and methodoiogy of the rescarch done to solve the

prohleni. As Polanyi writrs. "Our whole articulate equipmrnt tums out to hr merely a

iiiol-bon. a suprernely effective instrument for drploying our inaniculate ~aculties."'"

Resenrch is nothing niore than an effective subsidiq process to true genius. which is

itwlfon authentic relationship to a drveloped tacit awiireness of the world. In this

respect. dl knowledgr is personal knowledge. as resçarch is limitrd to the fulfilment of

1 .O Jlt~uo- O p . Cit.. linc: 80e

[ : I

Poliin> i . hliclirtt.1. "Clnderstanding Oursclvts". triken h m Thc Studv of Man: Thc Lindsay Mcmoriril Ic.cturt.s civen rit thc Univcrsitv Collcw uf North Striffordshirc. 19% London: Routledgc & Krigan Paul. 1958. p. 25

answers preconcrived by the human tacit dimension. In this respect. "the whole universe

of human sensihility-of Our intellectuiil. moral. artistic. religious idcas-is evokrd.. .by

dwlling within the frramework of ( a ) culturiil heritage."'" Once apin. it becornes

svidcnt wtiy Soçrates cannot leave At hens to escape his impending death. Socrates' ivay

dheing in ihe world is a product of his Athenion background. just as Athens in the only

piditical institution in his world that would providr the nrccssary conditions for the

pr;~cticc 01' pldosuphy. For Socnites. heing Athenian is more than a set of privilepes and

rc.\pm\i hi litics. Miens is the nieans hy whiçh Socrates dwelops the self-rcfersntial

icl;itionship\ i l irit nllow him to br Socnites. The metaphors thot imbue meiining and

ciinsc.qi~c'ntly diçtiitc Socrates' prxticrs and perceptions are insrparable from Athens

i t x l t ' .

Soçmres refuseh Crito's offer of escape because of the impending dümüge his

C'\C;LPL' will do w the laws of Athens. Socrates posit that i f the Iüws thrrnselvcs uferr to

ask Socrates whiit hc intendrd hy tleeing. would thry not di. "Do p u not hy this action

y i i are attrmpting intrnd to drstroy us. the Iüws. indeed the wholt city. as Par as you are

concemed? Or do y«u think it possible for a ç i ty not to be drstroyed if the verdicts of its

CO^-ts.. .arc nu I l i tïrd and set by private individuals'?""' B y cornpromisine the sançtity of

Athenian Socr~tes would be effectively damaping the ability of the polis to mediate

human espcrirnce by imbuing it with rneaning. If the polis is responsiblr for providing

thc condition!. nrcrssary for human interxtion and the drvelopment of the Athenian tacit

diniension. Socrates. who is reputed for his interest in vinue and wisdom. would by

fleeing br destabilizing and thus hindrring the polis' ability to do so. It is for this reason

' '' Ii~id.. p. 39 1 : ; - Plaio. "Crirr~". trtkcn frorri Five Dialogues. line: SOh

thrit Soçratrs frars beins recognized as an "enemy of the govemrnent" and a "destroyer of

Iiiws". with no one to have socid intercourse with or tdk to.IJ4 By divorcing himself

ICoiii Athens. and thcn attacking its sanctity. Socrates would rssentially be divorcing

tiiiiisell' froni Iiis own taçit dimension. and atracking the sharrd ovrrarchin_o metaphors of

the .\thenilin citizrnship. Both the intrmalizrd metaphors Socrütes uses for

iindcrstcinding the world. and the sharrd metaphors of the Athenian people. would he

duniqxl to the Jcgrec that Socrütes could no lon_oer be Socrates. and the Athenian

pcciplc uw~ ld hc hindered from being Athrnian.

I f this were the case. what would br the condition of Socrates in Thrssüly?

St~criitcz. as a jiist nicin. is whole because his sou1 is properly moderaird and ordered. His

eiitirc hcing is coniposed of elements engazeci in self-refrrcntilil relütionships with each

othci. and with the wholci. And yrt. Socritrs' rxperirncrs in the world would no longer

hc i~nilcrstiindable throuph the probing of his tacit dimension. as hoth the intemal and

cstcrnal nietopliors usrd to imbue experiencr with meanins would no lonser be

wcct.~stùl ot doing so. One could explüin this simply as "Socr~trs-in-himsr1F' fiilin_o to

properly correspond with Socrates' "Bèing-in-the-World".

Kuhn disçusses this phenornenon in the redm of natural science throush the terni

crisis. Accordin? to Kuhn. the process by which the crisis itselfcomes into presencr

hqins with blurrins of the paradigrnatic boundaries. which attempt to cornpensate for

ttic presence of recopizrd anomalies. These anomalies are funher inspected. causing the

hcienti tic tkld of study to shape itself differently. Scientists begin rxpressin_o discontent

with the difkïculty of the anomaly. and attempt to rearticulate the paradigrn in ways to

~icconiniodrite the tinding. T hese scientists' claims are juxtaposed with one another in

compctition. whilct the scirntists see the goal of their field to resolve the difference. In

scarçhing for resolution. these scientists isolate the anomaly more precisely. push the

rulcs of normal science. and attempt to generate sprculativr theories. The crisis itsclf

pcaks in this period. when thsories u r thought out to replace that which is no loyer

:ippri>priatc. Thc crisis clin only hnd end in one of threc situations. In the tirst. the

normal 5cicnc.c of thc old paradicorn sufriçiently contains the crisis-provoking anomüly.

and :il) rcturns to as i t was. In the second. the problem rrsists. but i t is determinrd hy the

\cicrititïç coniniunity thiit they Iück the tools to rectify the problem. and so tlicy table the

dimi\si»n. Ieaving i r for future ~_rneriitions to concem themsclvcs with. ln the final

\itiiütion. a ncu. ciindidate for paradigmatic stütus rmrrges. and ovenhrows the old

piinidigrii. I t shoiild he noted that this is not a cumulative transition. "Rlithrr." according

t u Kulin. "it is tilt. reconstruction of the field from new hndrimentals. ri rcçonstruction

t hiii c h ü n p orne of the tïcld's rnost rlemrntary iheoretical pcralizations. üs well as

iiinny of its panidigm methods and applications.""' When the trmsition to li nrw

poradigm is complctr. the scientists ascribing to it accordingly change their soiils and

iiictliods. while. throuph its own naturalizing effect. the paridigm shift elmost removes

ICom niemory ciny devotion once hiid to the old paradigmatic order.

By borrowin_o from this tradition of discussion. Tom Darby expropriates the

notion of crisis and the blumng of boundat-ies into the political by means of the spintual

cri% hcçordin_o to Darhy. spiritual crisis occurs when the set of practices and

perceptions iiseii hy (i person to explain and justify his cnperirnce cm no longer

siiçcesstùlly do so. The person. who is both a unity unto himselt and m elrment of a

lorgrir rnaçroçosmic order. losrs the ability to reconcile himxlf as both "one". and pan of

**man y-. 1'" Bccause of this. the person's action no longer makes sense to him. and he is

consrqiicntly s~isceptibls to drep sentiments of self-alienation. Although such a crisis

pro\-ides the person with an opponunity to rxperiencr the wonder nrcessary for

rcconstituting a rslritionship with the macrocosmic order. this act of rcconstitution is

oticn diftïcult. and requirrs a particular type of individual with a vrry particulor form of

diiciition. Bcca~isc. of thib. the common effect of a spiritual crisis is that the person.

ciivorccd t'roiii hi3 position within the LI(ISIIIO.S. assun~rs t hat there is no mocrocosmic order

iii pürticip;~tc in. When ihis oçcurs. therc art. two paniciilar outcornes that mriy corne in[«

hcing. In ihc tirsi outcorne. the person. stteins no justifiable memin; for action. cclises to

;ici pi~rpo\c.l>~. and rcducrs himself to a missionary of self-denial. prexhing a

cciiintsrlkiied virtue. and romancing the strong into joining his cause. Nietzsche hirnsell'

sckn to tliesc pcople üs sickly. for t h ry tind themselvrs. "reoprnin; old wounds.

i+-cillo~ving in self-çonternpt and depression."'." The condition of sickliness impiirs one

ii#hcrc ninn c«wc.rs froni his own potentiality for hring.

The second poteniid çonsrqurncr. tind quite possibly the more dan_orrous option.

i \ thiit ihc pcrson assumes thüt brcausr there is no cosmological structure in which to

part içipiitc. humans have the opportunit y (or responsibility ) to reconstruct macroçosmic

ordcr in their own i m q e . By doing so. the person or people would then apply the order

ttit'y kneu from their own microcosmic perspective. on ri mlicrocosmic scüle. Thus.

1 i f , The \i holc hodr of Pre-Souritic philnsoph~ concerncd itsel1' with rt'cunciling thc philowphiciil problcrii iurrciundin? "the one and the manu". For rhc Prc-Socnitics. uho iittemprcd t i i sivc ri direct iiticstlttiiin 01' Bcing. the dit'ticultly ofdiscussing whrit is cmcrged riut ot'everything hein: in ri stt i t t ' tif Ilux. and bc~ng ' \ conxxptnt trrinsitnt nature. PIato dws nat rnlike the srirnt. rittenipt. Hc i n s t d dis~usst.~ prirticulrir "prc~cncings" o f Bt.ing. and discusst.~ thcse "prtxncings" in tcrms of"mrin" and the "polis". For ;i Ïiiritit'r cv iur ion ot'thc "onc and the miin!". c m necd onlv look t i t Ueidcgpr's return to Ht.rrrciite;in phiIc~ioph>. 1 ;-

'iict~schc. Friedrich. Thc \Vil: t o Pinver: An Atttmpted Trrinsv;iIurition of Al l Valut~. trms. Anthiin! Ludo\ ici. New York: The Mricmillrin Company. 1 'J8-l #ZZ3

instead of rcbuildin: a rnacrocosm/microcosrn dichotorny. the two spheres would bs

irierged into one. It is in this context that ~echrrc c m be misused into becornine = one

niriins of allevitiiing the suffering caused by spiritual crisis.

Thc terni rrc-lrrro itst'lf is ohen an elusive one. as it tinds itself embedded in so

iiinny niodcrn Enslish uords. such as technocrat. technique. and most prominentiy in

icchiiikxy. To tind the hest translation of rrchrie into modem English. onç needs to look

;IL thc Jctiniiion provideci hy Martin Hridrgser in his work. '*The Origin of the Work of

t . In i t . Heidegger is quiçk ro note that r e h e is not synonymous with modem

notiim of practicd perhmancc. criftsmanship or art. "Thc word ~ecltrie." Heidegger

wggcrits. .*dcnoies r i l t h ~ r 3 mode of knowing.""?his kind of knowing can he seen as

the proccss by which tnith. as producrd by the "good". rrvttals itself to the hunian actor.

For thc Greeks. Cnowinp wüs always related to the srnse of vision. as i t çonsisted in

trlctiwi~c. or thc iincovcring of beings. Teclirtr. as a means of knowing. was undrrstood as

thc proccss hy a*hich hcing that is hidden revrüls itsrlf to the knowrr. The techrlirrs.

ilirougli hi.; works. hecomes the agent hy which **beings come fonvard and bt: present."'i'

Thc classiciil craftsmiin is not an innocent retlector of truth. for in knowinp tnith through

rcr*ltiic) the criiftsman evokrs reality through his work.

In addition to this. thrre are several characteristics of rrclirrr thüt allow its practicr

to he ~indentood as unique. Primarily. the techrie has a particular subject mattrr. and one

c m uee this as rvident throughout the whole body of Rqlrblic. with Socrates' insistence

thiit one person must always concentrate on one job. In the second Book. Socrites asks

.Adrimantus. "...Dors one person do a better job if he pnctices many cnfts or- since he's

1 :\ Hcidcggcr. Martin "Thc Origin ot'tht. W o r k ot' Art". trikcn from Poctni. Lrincusicc Truth. New York:

Hrirpcr k Ri in Putilishcrs. 197 1 p. SC)

one pcrson himsrlf- if he practices one?"'J" Adeimantus responds. "If he practices one."

and this hticonies an underlying premise to the whole text. A shormaker is only a

stiucniakcr. juht as famer should only be a hmr r .

Sccondly. the ideül rrclriir is mathematics. in its übility to break down any whole

into iis wn\titiicnt pans. and reformulate these pans into ii whole. Thus. the rec-hrrit~#s

cnn I'iilly aççount for his knowlcdgç. as he has the ability to deconstnict and reconstnict

~ v i i i h into and froni parts. The knowlrdge of n rech~iirrs in this respect is total and self-

rctkrcntinl. One can witnrss this e.urrnplifird in Socrites' attack on Charmides in the

di:iliyic. Clilrn~lirl~s. In this dialogue. Socrates brstows the onrrous iask of _oiving lin

;iccount o 1' niodest y upon young Chiinnidex. Aftrr two hiled attempts. Chürmidrs

\iip~zsts. ..I hiive just rtimembered having heard somronr say that temprrmce is minding

~inc'. inrn business. Tell me if you think that the person who said this is ripht."'" An

angcsed Socrates responds hy calling him a thicving wretch. Noticeiibly. Socrdtrs was

noi iinpered cit Charmides' revrrence for Critias. but thüt Charmides. who is reputrd of

hcin; dcwutly temperite. chose to cower and look outsidr his own discoursr. rather than

ückni~wlcdijng he lackcd total knowlrdge. The truc rrclniites dors not have to look

outsidc the spectruni of his craft to visualize the rmergrncr of bcing.

Thirdl y. a icclrr~r crin be taught hy one who possessrs it to one who does not.

Provided the apprentice is willing to Irani. the tedinites can teach the apprentice his crÿft.

E w n i f the apprentice builder h a never built a house. the apprentice can be taught how.

Onçc tnught. the üpprentice becomrs a builder. Funhermore. whçn the mastcr builder

decides he no l o n p wishes to build houses. h r does not lose possession of his technical

knowledge. Associüted with this is the final characteristic of reclrnr. Once one becomes

a ,r~.lriiir~.s. one sencrülly uses the status to provide for oneself financially. On can

ohscn*~ this diniension of f e h e plüyed out in the accusations of Socrairs made by

klr.lt.tit~ in Plnto's .4poio.q~. One of the charges against Socrates laid out hy Meletus WLÏ

i hai Socrates. l i k an y othcr possessor of technical knowledge. taueht his belirt; to

oilicrs. and in particiilar. corrupted the Athenian youths. In his defençr. Socrates

cspl;iincd. ". . . I f -ou have heard from anyone thrii L undrnakr to t r x h people and charse

.. 112 ;i tdc for il. that is not truc.. . Socriitrs. unlikr the possessor of a trchric. had no

posit il-c doctrine to teach. nor did he use his knowlrdge for tinünciül gain. By

csi;ihlishing. ttiat hc. iinlikc tlie teclti~irrs. does no[ directly teach or charge fers. his

icstimuny w w \ iu reinterce the notion that irchnical knowlrdge is commonly wu_oht and

isdd.

Thus. wlien examining the use of the term rethrre. one understands a veq

panic~ilür rnethod of cvoking reülity. This method of rvocation providrs a clearinp into

wliich aspects of reüliiy reveal thernselves. However. in thiit i t is Iimited in scope. not al1

of redity is hrousht into presrncing. The recir/zitr.r. through his knowledge. is

cimsistcntly able to re-presrnt the samr rlrments of reality. and thus can give an account

o f ttic prcsencing from the perspective of his craft. In so friras the recluic çan repeat the

rcs~ilts of re-prrsenrlition. i t is able to mmter this act. Not only this. the trc-lrnites can

i c x h otticrs the proccss of evocation. and this knowledge cm be used for finlincial

henc tl t .

I I I "Cli<rrwirdc~s". t a k n ti-rim Plato: Cornpicte Works. cd. Cooper. linc.: 16 1 b 111 ., -\polo!:\-'. t A c n t'rom Plsitu: Cornillctt. Works. cd. Cooper. lint.: 20d

Howw.r. despite the reclznites ' ability to give an account of the relationship

hctween his evocation and its lirnited results. his knowledge fails to account for the

rclütionship hrtweii elemenrs of reality. and reality itself. It is for this reason that

Socraies. in the Apolo~y. cün criricize the craftsmen 3s serminp to have the same h u l t ;LI

thc poc t~ . in that "eüch of thern. because of his success at his crati. thou$u himsell' very

wiw in other most iniponiint pursuits. and this error of theirs overshadowed the wisdom

t h q t ~ d . ' . ' ~ '

Thc piirsuit of "technical" wisdom is especially dun-rous in a period of spiritiial

crisib. hcc;ii~w the constitutive houndriry between the macrocosm and rnicrocosrn is so

O ~ S C L I S L ' . The redtriires. unahle to recognize any ordrrrd rnacroçosmiç structure outside

oi' hi3 ucccssful. crüft-based re-presentation of redity. is subject to rnaking the

wiinipt iwi thnt therc is no ordered macrocosm to relate to. Consrquentially. the

r d u i i r ~ ~ s u:«uld thcn assume that his çraft did not creatr the nrcessary conditions for the

prcwncing ol rcolity. but instrad served to effect and shape a new. human macrocosmic

structure. wperiur (O an- othrr that humanity ever falsely belirrved in. Thus the rechiirrs.

;i\ 3 r l i i~ro~»srni~ unit within the pattemed change-man dichotemic structure. throuph his

niicrocosmic up isdoni. reconstitutes a macrocosm t or overarching metaphor Ni ltis owri

imrgc. The product of this reconstitution of the understanding of tcclzrir is what 1 will

rekr to us the "idrolog of rr~*lzrinc".

In Iiis w r k . Brniw~l Norliing~wss cirid Pmuiise. Grrhan Niemeyer detïned

i deo lup as. "the subordination of contemplative throry to the libidu dmiiiitrndi. which

iiinni frsts i tsel f in the buildins of closed systems around dogmatically will "positions". in

rcducri«nism of hoth scope and materials of analysis. and in the detemination to

siibstitutr **Second Rrality" for the reality given to man."'u In order to properly elucidnte

upon the full mraning of this definition. 1 will üpproach its analysis in stases.

By initiail' explainine ideology as a subordination of contemplative throry to the

hunian uill t« doniinate. Niemeyer is consciousl y opposing idrology with the clashical

~ippru;ich t u piirsuing uisdom. As demonstrated in Polanyi's exphnation of the tacit

di riicnsion. the classicd ripproach to wisdom involve!, format ion. not information. To

iichiew iiwürcnrsr of the macrocosm. the wise man çultivüres his iacit dimcnsion by

twilding and dcveioping the set of intcmd metaphors thüt imbue nicüning upon hi\

cspcric.ncc. This cu lt ivation procrss conforms the cognitive and enpcrirntial façiiliies

intu ;i C I C X r~1ccpt~çIc of thc mlicrocosmic reality. so that elrmrnts of that retility can he

ii~ichcd and integraicd into the tacit dimcnsion. As previously rnrniioncd. by integrating

iIic\ç cleiiicnts. and çonsequrntly crrütin: new self-rekrentiül relationships with the

ivorld iiroiind hi m. the wisr man nchieves greater clarit y and undrrstandin_o of hoth the

ii~ocrixi,mic ordcr. and his rdationship to it.

In ordsr to drvelop thüt sense of clarity. the wise man must have ti panicular

prcdisposition tu cultivate. In other words. in order to build self-referential relationships

wi th the niacroçi>smiç order. the man pursuing wisdom must approach his pursuit wiih a

cimiplctive attitude. The wise man must be attentive. and receptivr to the clues that are

\hcd hy t ht: rnücrocosmic order. The faculties of explicit knowled_or cannot disturb the

»pcnncs\ of the tacit dimension. or rlse the cleÿring provided for the reception of thcse

dues w i l l he comprornisrd. The practitionrr of ideology approaches the knowinp process

in ü complrtcly contradictory mannrr. As Poirier writes. "He very much cornes upon the

scms \i.ith a preconception or plan in mind. to meet the rxigencies of his

.. 145 preconçrptions. Rather than subordinating himself into an attentive position. the

prüçtitioner of ideology actively seeks to force the universe to revral ithelf to him. He

Iiüh il prc-concrived plan or hchsrna of how the macrocosmic order exists. and it is

ihr~iigh the lilter O!' this schernü thüt he intcnds to forcc the univrrsr to revetil itsslf to

him.

It i \ t h ~ ' l w ~ t i o n O C the accepted schema thlit Niemeyer rrfers to as the building

o t' clohcd \ptcnis around doy-nliticall y will positions. The schema ut i l ized hy the

idcological thinktx is a product of the creritive gcnius of either thüt panicular thinker. or

mothcr thinker from which i t wcis borrowed. Beçüuse is entirely the product of çreative

scni~ih. rhc plm itsrlf is non-referential. as it requires no conformation to the reality of

the niiicrocomic order. Ttierefore. the schema does not need to make nny rrkrence or

cimncçtion tu anything that rnists outside its own boundaries. For the idrological

thinker. the houndriries of thé schema are the boundaries of whcit is. and because the

hoiindarieh are subjeci to the creative p i u s of its originator. i t provides the ideological

t hinker ait h ii world that contains nothing more and nothing iess than the scope of whît

hc wiliv t o /W. I t is rntirely xlf-sufficirnt. having no reason to go beyond itxlf. and is

ihus niihtnkenly closrd. not recognizing the validity of any element of the macrocosrnic

order that t'lis13 ot~tside the scope of its boundaries. The ideologue. alwliys content by

hi3 tindines (due to the f ~ c t thüt he has set his own parameters). holds tight to the

dclusionul schema. sustüining its existence by willing i t to be true. It is only recognizrd

as fla\vrd hy thosr who have not lost contact with the miicrocosmic order. For the

I l i Piiiricr. Aliihcn. Idciiliii. tnken lrom POLI 470 course hnndouth. Concordia Universii>

idsologiçal t hinker who assumes the schemri to be correct. every discovery made t hrouzh

the schenia socs unchlillenged.

By rttfrrring to the do_omaticülly held will positions as being reducrd "of both

wopc mi niiitrrials of anrilysis. Niemeyer recognizes that no matter how inpenious ttir

cstiibl is lied sçliriiin nia- he. i t can never üchieve the degree of richness and suhtlety of the

triic iiiiicrocosmic rcality. The reason for this is simple. Bccausr the schema is a product

01' il liniiicd hcing thnt is only one elrment of the macrocosmic order. the schcniti can

i d y dr:iw on the genius of that prinicular human being. In thüt a limitrd humiin crin

ncwr know thc whole of the ~~o.siw.s. an? human construction hils to riçhieve thc

coiiiplcir.ncss of the mricrocosmic order. Consequentiaily. the ideolo_oicai thi n h r is

clesti nctl to encoiinter ii dissonance ktwçen "the imri_oined pseudo order and the ordrr

g i w i to niün. and this dissonance creatrs in man somethin_o in the nature of a bifurcatrd

cspcricncr of the ~ o r i d . " " ~ This dissonance causes the ideolo~ical thinkrr to interxi

wiili tlic wxld from thc perspective that somethinp is not risht with the world. for the

ordcr ihat imhiird n~elininp upon his experirncr is put in contlict with the plethora of

clucs ribout the niricrocosmic order he encounters in the world. To use Kuhnirin

voçahulaiy. the houndriries and methodology for study established by the affirmed

püradigni çannot contüin the countless amount of anomaiies round by the thinker. Yet.

the ideologue çannot :ive credence to the findin? of these anomalies. for to do this would

hc ici contest the sanctity of the original schema. to which he holds dogmatically. Instead.

thc ideulogicd thinker rrpressss his concem. believin_o it is the fault of his own tlawed

cop i t iw fdcult): for not properly acting within the guidelines set by the tme schemii.

This uncertainty. as reflected by the last element of Niemeyer's definition.

motivates the ideolo_oiic into clinging tighter to the certiiinty of the paradigm or schema.

The ideological thinkçr. in rxprriencing this uncenainty. is subject to believing that there

ir no niacrocosniic order outside the one created through the application of the

ideological \chc.rnii. By drny in? the existence of the macrocosmic ordrr. this man ceüses

r o atieiiipt tu conforiii himself to hrholding the truth of the cosnios. for he dors noi

h ~ l i c w in thc caistcnce of uny tninscendental truth. Instead. h s kr ls the nccd to upply

Iiis iiiicroci)sniic scheniri upon ihe world iiround him. so thiit this world clin have ordcr. It

i s [hi\ ordcr thüt Nirnieyer d e n io as "Second Reality". The truc idrologist. hy

inicnisiing uith the world üround him üh if i t is shapeless and chaotic. assumes that the

universe n c d s to be ordered t'or the benstït of mankind. and thrit he. throush the genilis

of hi5 niicsocr)siiiic scherncl. has the mrans of establishine that required order. Insteüd of

iittcniptin: tu build self-rcl'erentiril relationships with other elemrnts of the macrocosmic

order. hc aciively üttempts to namr. define. and constitutr the world around him in the

iniiigc of his \cherna. and consequently. iti hisy owi irriqe!

Given this. i t is not difficult to imagine thüt while the condition of spintual cnsis

crin pnn-ide the classical. theoretical thinker with the opponunity to renrgotiate

relütiunships with the macrocosmic order. it also (and more likely) providrs the

opponuniry for the instrurncntiition of the ideology of ~ecizrre. Becausr spiritual cnsis

w u r s uhen t hr çonstituting self-rekrentiai relationships betwern the macrocosm and

the niicrocosm break down. it can be sern as a cütalyst for renewing human wonder. and

cstahlishinp neu. t v a y for humanity to interüct within the world. As Dxby writes. in the

cimcludin~ sentence of The Frut . 'This wonder could broaden the horizon. for it would

rntüil another choicr. This choice would bç real and courageous. for to wonder is the

heginning oî' philosophy. and to philosophize is to have the courage to be a man.""' It

ha?; alrtlady besn su_o~ested that estüblishin? self-referential relationships with other men.

recognizing one'.; own boundaries. and usin? thesr to develop a conneciion with the

ordercd niacrocosni (~ ï ) s r~ tos ) . are al1 constitutive of man's beinp. If philosophy is the

coiiragt. i« hc 3 nun. thcn i t is the love of wisdom that allows a man to recognize and

m x p t h i \ i w n limit.; and possibilities. so that associations with both other men and the

i . o . s t r ~ o . s cîn hc niade. Thus. crisis can providr the conditions rhat niust pmain in order

! i>s Iiiiinciniiy t« qiiestion about who t h r y are (and why the? arc ). and çonseqiientiülly

rcclisco~~cr a l o w Tor ü particular form of wisdom that will lead them towards the answen

i tint t hcy scrli. l J S

H o ~ w u - . the choice to return to philosophy in the lime of spiritual crisix is the

nimi di t'ficiilt. aiid consequrntiall y t hr lsast likel y to occur. Spiritual crisis marks the

hrciich hctwcen man-in-himsel t' and man-in-the-world. and the conglomerate of

iniernnlized and overarching metaphors usrd by the man to explain his experience fail to

sitisfriçtorily pive meaning to this rxperirncr. Bccause of this. it is much more iikely

thoi whrn ti n u n finds himself in the position of k ing unable to makr sense of his own

11- Dath-. Tom. The Fcrist: Meditations on Politics and Timti Toronto: University o f Toronto Press. 1982. p. 227

11- Tlic noticm ut' wondcr shrircs much with Hcidcggcrian guilt. In the section U~rdersrmtliri~ tliu . - \ p p w / . ( 1 1 d Giiilt. 0t' his g r u t work Bt>irrg mid Tirw. Heidegger explains thrit Dasein's (or the authentic tii;in in t hc tvcu-ld r guiIl should be undcrstorid in tcrms of ri Iack. This kind at' Iack. ris explriincd h> Hcidcgxr. " i y ;L 1';Lilurc to salisf? some requirerncnts which appiiesto onc's existent Bcing with Othcrs." i 7S:ISZ l\'licn Diiscin hcrirs the criIl o t' his conscirince. hc rccognizcs that hc i s not living authcnticrill~ . and tliu\ tiot living the t u > hc i s fitted tOr. In rccogni~ing that hc hris hccn hidinp from his truc nature. Dasein c.\pcricncc~ guiit. I t i s tor this rcason that Heidegger can q u e that "Beiri.q-guiin. does riorfïrsr resirlr~ronr 1111 i~rd~+rtd~ir.ss. h r rir~rr. ori rire cnrirnrn. itidebtetlrres.~ hecrmr~- possible orrl! ori rile buis o f ~ t priniordid Ht~irrc-qrrilr\.." i5iS:TXJi \Vho Dascin owcs i s Dasein itself. and what i t owes is an riuthentic cxistencc. ii ticrc i t riukch its c,ivn t-undamcntril choies on ho~v to hc in thc world. Wonder. likc guilt. is thc whiclc h! uti icl i rririn ih nicitivatcd to retnvestigate who hc is and whrlt ht. is i3tt.d for.

csperisncr. h r will turn to a form of wisdom thüt produces tangible. repeatable results.

Thi5 wisdorn would be completely human in scope. and would provide the illusion that

thc lissiire hctwren the macrocosm and the rnicrocosm was repaired. drspite the fact thai

i t only fiinhcrrd the blurrins of their boundary.

Techrie. ils ;i tcochable. iiccountable means of knowinp that can consistently

piudiicr tünpiblc rcsults. üppears to br a perfrct escape from the feelings of rilienation

hnwghi h l thc stcitr. of spiritual crisis. Tec~ l t~x itself can heçome the schrmü from whiçh

c lowd iysttms o i Jogmat icüll y hrld "will positions" u n he huilt. Howcw-. hrçausr.

t e < - i w cnn newr account for the relationship betwren the elements of reality evokrd by

i t \ paiçtiçc and the macrocosmic ordcr. an idrology of rrclirir mükes no Littempt at

rc hiii lding t hosr b r m s of connections. Insiriid. the technical ideologue rcmains isolatcd

i n Iiis "Second Reality". believing thüt the chüotic univene is his to rnouid in his own

iniligc. Thc ideologiclil thinker t'ails to rrconcile the dissonance brtwecn man-in-himsrlf

and nicin-in-the-uorld. becausr he dismisses man's bcing-in-the-world as the subjective

wliini oi' his oatn personal discretion. He then repressrs the ünxirty cüusrd by this

~inresolved dissonance. hrlicving i t to be the product of his existence in ü chüotic world.

which hiis yet to he ordered. Consrquently. he uses al1 of his cnrrgy to ÿpply his personal

idc»lwy 3s â means for ordering the macrocosmic structure.

I t ha?; been ürgurd that the vinuous man is vinuous because hr only does thnt

which ht. is tïtted for. His sou1 is well ordered and moderate. so that he can achieve the

a~iiheniiçity reqiiireh for truly being who hr is. and thus doing what he should do.

Throughout the Rqmhiic.. Socrates stresses the importance of the prope: rducütion and

ciiiiii.ation of souls. so that these souls c m be content wholes in of themsrlves. and just

çitizens in the reülm of the political. 1 contend that when the authenticity of the soul is

conipr»misrd. where the man chooses not to recognize his twofoid nature as both 1i

\ing~iliir uliole. and an rlement of a p a t e r whole (one and the mÿny). the man is in a

condition best exemplitirci by the tenn "lie in the soul". This condition is marked hy the

~ilim-iiientioned "double ignoriincc" of not recognizing one' own i_onocincr of the

iiincrocosriiiç order. and the propagation of the ideology of ~rciuit.. Through the

i d c d i x ~ ~ o f t r r . / i ~ i c ~ . the miin with the "lie in the soul" üttempis to reconcile his repressed

I'I-~i\triition hy aiiempting to cipply his microcosmic order. or schrma. on the rnacrocosmiç

muciiirc. Pl;itii ih fiilly nware of the potential for the misappropriation of the microçosm

i i p m r he nimucosni. and uses whatever meüns necessary to avoid its coming to fruit ion.

[n ihc ncxt and tinül chüprer. 1 will defend the proposition that Socrates' use of the

"nciblr ficiion" wüs a direct iittempt to removc the "lies in the soul" he found in his

cntoiirqc. so thiit his üttempts iit con forming thcir tacit dimensions to he more recrptive

t o uni\~crscil dues werc nor misunderstood as direct political doctrine. To do this. 1 will

iïrst denionstrate thüt hthens. during the time of Plato's writing. was in ü condition of

spiritiiül crisis. Secondiy. 1 will defend the notion that Socrates' entourage hüd lies in

thcir soiils. and thü t thesc lies preventcd them from properly understanding whüt Socrates

ho\ professed to do. I will then forward the fear of a misappropriation of the

n-iicrocosn~ic order on the mricrocosmic structure as the reason for Socr;itesg need to use

the noble liciion. Finally. I will conclude the chapter and work by prewnting N u i

Gcrmüny üs a modem manifestation of this misappropriation. as a means of discussing

the coniinuing rrlrvancr of this discussion.

Chapter Ill: The Lie in the Soul. the Noble Fiction. and the

Misappropriation - of the Microcosmic Order

"To be unable to have done with an eaperiencr is rilready a sign of decüdrnce. This rcopt~ing of old wounds. this wallowing in self-contempt and depression. is an additional forni of disease: no "salvütion of the soul" cvrr resultrd from it. but only 3 ncw kind of spiritual illness.. ." The IViil [O P o w r - Frirdrrich Nietzsche

In the "lntsodiiction". 1 askrd the question of how one could reçoncile the

ctiihiidinicnt of the philoophical way of life. the vrritable tmth sreker. as a consisrrnt

lix. By cvoking the "noble fiction". 1 demonstrüted thnt Socrates evcn recognizes his

wi rn u.illingne\s r« lic when hr secs fit. Up to this point. tliis work has attemptcd to

provide thc nccessary contextual information For answerins this question. This çhapter

\vil\ rcspond direcrly to the qriestion asked. and üttrmpt to bring this discussion into

riicidcrnity by disciissing how thi5 arymrnt can relate dirrctly io the twrntirth. and now

thc twt't~ty- tïrst century.

Socrates protests that rüch man should do whrit hr is best fitted for. In doinp so.

Socr;iics rccoyizcs thüt both the natural aptitudes. and the consequcntial tacit diniension

ut' tach hiiman king are rxclusive. causing rach person's set of prxiicés and perceptions

to he unique. Brcausr the pursuit of knowledge is alwüys personal. in iis constant

~ippliçation of uhat one does know to what one dors not. the divenity of humlin

pcrsprciivr alwüys results in the diversity of hurnan interpretation.

In the Plr<dn<.s. Socrates criticizrs the written word-s inability to iidapt itsrlf to

thc partiçulrir context of its readership. He notes rhat both those that have no business to

read certain material. and those who will not understand the material. have equd

cipp«nunity to read ü written work. Consequently. the written word is subject to grave

niisusc or niisunderstanding Leo Strauss is aware of this when he. in Per.securinrr mid

rlie .-b-i O/' I V r i r i ~ i ~ . evokrs the concept of esoteric writing. Not everyonr is f i t for hrarine

and ~indcrstrindinp the same message. One must ülways considrr the audience hetore one

clccidcs ahat niessagr is t« h r conveyed. and the mrthod of convryinp it. This awareness

ot- [tic ;iiidiencc that one is writing or spraking to is one elemrnt of prudence. a political

virt tic t u which Swrates holdh dear.

Whcn cinc rc-euniines the çontext within Rcprrblic*. whrrc Socratcs professes the

i iw\ il t' t h i \ "Phocnician t hing". one primliril y reçognizes thai Socrates is disçussing the

cduc~it ion and ciinditiming of the gulirdilin çlass. In essence. within the contcxt ol' the

city in ipwch. Socrates is discussin~ how someonr with the nütural apiitudes brst

cxcniplificcl hy thc pardian class. clin effectively dcvelop thrir personal tacit dimension

io achiew thc greütesr authrnticity. If this person is naturally thumotic. with natural

;iptitiiJcs htx f i t to defend a polis from within and tiom without. how dors one cultivate

tlic person's xoul. and thus his being-in-the-world. so that he cün do best what hc is titted

tbr. and drvclop the required self-rrferential relationships with other people. and the

wr ld u r i u x l him? The noble fiction. from this perspective. is ü meüns by which

Socrates intends to shüpc: the souls of the guardian and auniliary classes. so that they

hccunic more effective receptaclrs for the dues provided by the macrocosmic order about

the tnirh of thrir brins. Its intent. despite being fictitious. is to prevent the condition of

the l i t . in the soul. wherr the wise guardians forget they mie in the interest of the whole.

;ind the thumotiç auxiliuies forget that they do not rule. but enforce the pardians' law.

Socrates introduces the noble fiction as "one of those lies that corne into being in

.. 1 JO thc case of nerd.. . The need for this lie is twofold. as it t int ly contirms the

;1uxiliu-ie<r'. or yoilng guardians. rok as enforcers of the guardians convictions.

Secondly. hy idrntiîjing the whole city lis brothers bom of different rnerals. i t enforces

ihc necd liv thc yardians and auxiliarirs to always rule and protect in the intcrest of the

~vtiolc pditicnl hodp. without trying to estüblish a lesacy of thrir own. Soccites explains

ihai ~ C ' S ; ~ L I S C 311 ;ire rclîted. parents çan producr çhildren of differcnt compositions.

Tlicrcibrc. "the g«d commünds the rulers first and forrniost.. . to kerp over nothing so

curct'~il ~i wütch as the çhildren. serine which of thcse metals is mixrd in thcir seuls."''"

By pripgnting iliis lie. Soçratrs iniends on disrnissing the rnosi seduciive motivation for

ruling in onc's oarn intcrest: immonality through a lepcy of power. By rernovin_o

lincapc as an attribute of leadership. the noble fiction inspires rulers to rule for the benetit

dtticir wholc fiimily. the çity. and not simply their immediiitr hmil..

Howwr. t his only represents the surface merining of Socrrites' use of the noble

tictii>n. Thc city in speech. from its introduction in Book 11 of Reprhlic. has been

presrnicti iis a mrtaphor for the human soul. In introducing the çity in speech. Socrates

inhtriicih his entourase that. "Thrre is. we say. justice of one man: and thrre is. surely.

jiistice of n whole çity too."'" Upon Adeimantus' consent. Socrates engagea upon the

construction of an allegorical city. so that its tlndings can he reüpplied to the search for

hunian justice in the soul.

Socrates dors not engage upon this project iilone. but invites Glaucon and

.4Jeirnantu.; to sharr in the constriction of this alleponcal city. He inflames thrir

I 1'8 Rrprtidic.. triinil. Bltium. l i n c 4 l4h i - I I W. linc: -!!Y7

passions hp offering thrm a chance to panicipate in the most glonous of political acts. the

huildinp of a city. Thus. Socrates offers Glaucon and Adeimantus an opponunity to fulfill

tiiiihitiun neither of t hem rver dreürned of. Bloom notes. in his bzrrrpreriw E s s q . "The

tiwndcrs o f ti ç i ty are much more powerhl and revered thün are its tyrants. Ali

wcccrding gcnerîtions honor them: thry have none of the obloquy tittached to the

a n Both Glaucon and Adrimiintus. as previously rnentioned. are young thuoiotic

iiicn. iiicitiwtcd hy honor and desiring to rule. By inviting thrm to play the role of the

Icading huildcrs of the city. Socrates ~ i v r s thcm the opponiinity to açhiwc the greciresi

tionor hy hiiildinp a çi ty in thçir own image. Brcause the city wiil be built in their own

itiitigcs. thc huilding process within Books II - IV of Rq>iibIic allows fur the consihient

rcwding of thcir souls. By ofkring thcm a city to build. Socriites sucçessfully seduces

Glniicon and Adtirnanius into rewaling thçir internai compositions. so that Socrate\ can

cngügc thcni. and shapr thcm.

If Socrütcs' intent. during the construction of the city in speech. is primarily to

ciiltiv~itc the souls of Glüucon and Adeimantus. whilr secondarily üffecting his entire

entmimpe. what role dues the noble fiction play in doing sob? Given that the succes!, of

thc city hinses upon the c lex division of interests. and the ability of the thurnotic

~i~isiliaries to en force the guardiüns' Iaw. a blatant weakness cornes blaring to the

tore front. Hour does one convince the thumotic chxacter to subordinate himseif to the

nilc of a phpically u-eaker gucirdiün? In the microcosmic order of the humnn soul. it is

Ji flïciilt. t hou_gh possible. to have angrr controlled by rrason. However. in the political

realiii. thumotic prrsonditirs. because they are motivated by a love of honor. generally

intend on rulins to achieve the greatest amount of honor. There is nothinz to prevent a

t humot ic persondi ty frorn becoming a t yrünt. brealring al1 nec r s sq boundaries required

for iiiling over dl. in the interest of persona1 glory.

Bccoiise Socrates' çntire entourage. hi-lighted by the rwo sons of Ariston. are al1

iliiiiiioiic. nohly hred. potential timocmis. with a lust for glory and rule. Socrites is wcil

w;ii.c t t i ~ i i thcw young inrn are dcstinrd to becorne powrrfui voices in the Assenibly.

Accordi ng 1 0 Socrütcs. "nature ahsien( s to cach O!' the groups I _ouürdi;ins. aux i l iürirs and

..1i; iiioncy-niuker~ irs \ h m of happiness. If these men are nüturally horn to mie. i h r y

ni i ih i hc c«nipcllr.d and prrsuaded to rule in the interest of the whole çity. "so that ihey'll

i 94 hc thc heht pmsihlc crdthrnen at their johs." and thus be happy. The? ail posïchs the

natiirül apiitudcs neçrwry ior rulrrship. but lack the proper conditionin2 required for

riilin: adl. Thc conditioning thçy are lacking is the well ordered. just soul. thüt

prioritizc\ the Iow of wisdom over the love of honor.

In t hi\ chapter. 1 will a r p e that Socrates' Athens is in a period of spiritual crisis.

~ ind ihat Soccites' entourage. as a product of this condition. do not rrçognizr any form of

co\nioiogicnl stnic t w ro connect to. Insiad. as demonstmird by Glaucon and

.Ucirnnntux' unwtling defencc of injustice in Book II. they understand the world tiround

tlicm as o chüoric hall of clay. ready to be shaped. Thcy have no inierest in reconcilin=

thrir heing-in-thernsçlvrs with their beingin-he-world. for they understand their being-

in-thc-world ab product of their will. Thcy do not see themselves as poiitical brings.

but vimdizt the politiccil üs the arena in which they assen the order of thrir k i n g upon

L i . h ! c ' p l t h l i r . . Op. Cii.. linc: Ill c.

i i 4 m. linc: 4ZIc

thc world. It is for this reason that Socrates' thumotic entourage are attrictsd to Socrws.

for tlicy sec in Socratss a reclrriires who can teach thern the tecli~ie of rulership.

Socrritrs' entourage are al1 in the condition of the "lie in the soul". Thry aII crave

tiimur. Jcsirc political powçr. and will çvçntual be the ruling voices in the Atheniün

politicd hody. If. while possessing lies in the soul. thrse men do acquire the political

pcwcr tlicy cmic i t is hiphly possible for thrm to use their political power to enforcc

ihcir pcrsonril. Jir«rirntc.d schsmas of interprrtation upon the entirri polis. In essence.

t hcy \v i l l hiive t hc opport unit?. and motive. to mislippropriate their niicrocosmic orders

iipon t hc niiicrt~cosrnic struct~~rt.. Plato clcar! y arprs against t his. and t hs

iiti~pi;in/disiupi:in vision of Reprrblic's Book V denionstrates Plüto's fcar of this potenrial

iiiisipproprintim. Therefore. i t is Socr~tes' intrnt to attempt to reorient the souls of

Gl~iiicon and Adcini~intiis. and consequently his entire entourage. so thrit his words rire

not niisiinderstood üs the basis for a rrcliw of leadership. and then used to support a

d~i~mlitic~illy held. microcosmic wili position to he enforced at the macrocosmic Irvrl. I t

i3 ni) contention that Socraies* noble fiction is one of the tools usrd by Socratrs to affect

t hi3 wnversion.

In order to support this contention. this chaptrr will be dividrd in the followin~_

riiunncr. In the first section. I will drmonstnite why Socriites' Athens must bc seèn as in

condition of spirituül crisis. Becüuse of this condition. 1 will argue in the second

wction thrit Socmtes' entourage had lies in their souls. and that this affected their

iindcrstandinp of Socrates. This section will also demonstrate how Socrates usrd the

noble tiction as a means to reconstitute the disoriented souls of his entourage. In

presenting Socrates' fear of a misappropriation of a microcosmic order on ü macrocosmic

structure. in the third section. 1 will discuss why Socrates M t that this reconstitution was

nrçrssary. 1 will conclude this work by bringinp this argument into modemity. In a

hiirih nnd final section. 1 will discuss Hobbes' Leviathan. and Hitler's Nazi Germliny. as

iwu c'rliriiples of modern misiippropriations of microcosmic orders on niacrocosmic

r ~ ~ t i s . T h i h is not to suggest chat Plaio dircctly foresriw rither of these two

iuurrcnçss. Houwrr. I will sugest rhat it is possible that Book V of Repiiblic had the

riiriic rclationstiip to classicül Greek philosophy thiit Nazi Germany hüd ici niodem

Gct-iiiün phi lowph y. with eiich k ing an imprudent misappropriation of ii personal ordrr

o n thc prditiul structLirc.

Section 1: Athens in Spiritual Crisis

Spiritunl crisis cxists whrn human snprrirnce within the macrocosmic ordcr no

1ongr.r niaLes wnw. as it is seen to br bereli of niranine. and lackine any scnsc of

hclunping or direction. Crisis. üs Dlirbp argues. "is about an acute disjunction hctwern

thai which nimt conçerns us and the common or overarching metaphors we emhrace in

.. 1 ï.5 or~1ic.r to tïnd wrncthing cornmon in the manifold of varird and dense experienct.. In

csxncc. the i-clüt ionship betwern the microcosm and maçroçosm is out of place. ht.ç<iuse

itic hoiindüry thüt hoth separates and brings them tosrther hüs eçlipsed. Thuçy.îidc.3

dwi~iiicnis hihens' tüII into this condition. throush the destruction of the Atheniün

riwrolc diiring their concurrent militriry hilure in the Peloponnesian War. From the

pcriod niürkcd hy Periçlrs' Funrral Oraiion. the Melian dehüte. to Athens' tïnül defrat.

the .\thmirin sense of self dissipates. only to be replüçed by fcar and unçenainry.

One needs only to look üt the content of Pericles' Firuenil Orariori to begin to

~indcrstand thc strensth of the Athenian conviction at the beginning of the Peloponnesicin

H ' x . Pcriclch. as Finle y Hooper recognizes in his work. Grrrk Rctr1iric.s: Lijè <rd Thoii,qlr I

i l , .4/rc*inir Greec~c. was the niainstay of the Athenian spirit."" Brçüuse of his

*'intelleçtiiiil giRs and for his p e r d reputütion"'5i. Periclrs was asked to take pan in a

piihliç fiinerril for thosr who had bren first to die. by making an appropriate speech in

praiw of the dead. Knowing that the Athenian morale was going to b r chollenged hy the

1 <. Darb?. Ttm (ln Spiritual Crisis. Glohrilizrition and Plrinetan. Rulc. p. 1

l if, Hoopcr. Finlq. Grcck Rt'alitits: Lire and T h o u ~ h t in Ancirnt Grecce Detroit: IVaync Srarc LTnivcrsit)

Prcsh. 1978. p. 284 ; * -

TIiuc~diJc~. Op. Cir.. Bciok 234

potcntid Iensth and srverity of the war. Pendes directed his omtion towards evoking the

hhared o\wuchins metaphors of the Athenian body.

Periclzs hqins his oration by questioning the tippropriateness of his speech itself.

rccogiiizing that an orntion that appeds to a person's love of honor has the possibility of

maki ng l ihtrners jeiilous and incredulous. However. hr justifies the institution hy

recognizing ttiat i t hiis hecn establishrd and approved of by their shared Athenian

ti~rcPciihcrs. and thus i t is his responsibility to follow the trcidition set hy these long drad

men. BSS~LISC 01' t h i h . Pericles explains thlit he will bssin hy speakin_o about thrir rhared

mcchtr);. incc i t is the right and proper thin2 to do so. He dccliires. "in thih land of ours

ilicrc Iiaw rilw\.ay heen the same people living frorn grneration to p w r ~ t i o n up t i l l nous.

and ihcy. hy t hcir courage and their vinues. have handed i t on to us. ü frer countru.""'

Ttiih rhiircd iincestry. distinct from any other recognized lincage. hris possessed a shared

\ci of \.iniies thai have rillowed Athens. as ti political unit. to remain consolidüted and

rinm? thr«ugh«iit the passin? of history. It is this distinct set of vinues. which miinifests

itsrlf in the set of practicrs and perceptions of the Athenian body. that rendu Athrns as

Athenian. and the strcngth of the Athenian body is thrir participation in Atheniiin vinues.

Tticse vinurs are the Athenian overiirching rnrtaphors. and Prriclçs uses this

introduction as an opportunity to evoke thern. He tirst praises the Athenian democratic

pvernnient. whrre .*weryone is rqual before the law."'" In the Athenian democricy.

;1cti1;11 ability h;ls Sreatrr importance than class membership. no one is put into political

ohx~iriry hrçausr of poverty. and Athenian political and day-to-day l i k are frer and

open. While none uf this is necessarily factually accurate. this view of Athenian

democrticy represents the Athenian aspiration towards a benevolent political order.

Pericles nest evokrs Athenian militiiry pride. by mentioning thrir panicular

~itiitudc iouwd\ military superiority. According to Periclrs. Athenilins rel y "not on secret

~vc;ipon\. hut i thcir) own red courage ~ o ~ a l t ~ . " ' ~ " Unlikr the Spiinans. who invadc

.-\t hm ian territciry hy hringing ii l l irs. the Athenians launch assciults kom abroüd hy

iIicni~cl\~cs. and. despite îîghting on forrign soil. are oftrn viçiorious. Their milirary

\*irtiic lich in thcir "wny of meeting danser voluntarily. with an easy minci. instead of with

LI lahorit~iis training. with naturiil. rather than state-inducrd courage. - l h I

.Acccirdins to Pericles' orütion. thrre is an inherent dignity to k ing Athenian.

iiniii;itcheJ hy any «[lier body of people. They have a love of beauty and wisdom. and

iii:ikc ti.icnds h y hclping others. rather than expccting benefits in rctiirn. For Pericles.

"iwr city is an educütion to Greece. and.. . in ihis) opinion. each one of our citizrns. in ÜII

ihc iiiünifold aspects of lik. is able to show hiinsclr the rightful lord and owncr of his

i w n person. and do this. rnorrover. with exceptional g rxe and exceptional ~ersat i l i t~." '~ '

Athens is thc benchmark to which every other political entity aspires. as no invading

c n m y iz iishnrncd ai heing defeated. and a qualificd leader governs every suhject.

As Hooper notes. Pericles rnakes it slear of the dead that "their lives had bren

richer in rwry way than those of other men. They had given up lire itself thar their

i;.ilow citizens niight continue to enjoy the benetïts thai they had known.""; In rehsing

to coniproniise thrir tactical positions. accepting the $orious risk of death. and willing to

part with evçry luxury to strike down an enemy. the Athenian dead were courage made

iiiiini fest. The intelligent endurance displayed by thrse men was wonhy of their city. and

their derith occurred. "in a srnaIl moment of time. the climax of their lives. a culmination

of giory. n«t of f ~ i i r . " ' ' ~

Pcric1t.h closes Iiis oration by striting thüt the _oovernmrnt woiild care for the

widow\ ml children of the lest citizens. He suggrsts that the womrn hs have

timoi~rrihl~. Ior tlic "preatest glory o l a wonien is to be Ieast talked about by men..""i

\ \Ï i t i Ili\ orarion linixhed. he thrn asks a11 to deptvt. Hoopcr note.; thüt rqually important

io itic çonrcnt of thc orütion was Prricles' stylistic approach. The speech had an

~indcni~ihlc ring ol'dignity. and it priiised al1 thincos Achenian. despite not bcing a

.. Ihh "\cntinicntül harangue . Prriclrs did not sing the praises of Athens to his audience. but

in\tcrid rciiiindeii 3 sroiip of ciquüls of something the? alredy knew. ln Pericles' orütion.

ont. witnss~cs an unabashed prrsrntation of the overarching metaphors that imbue

nicanin? upon the Athcnian existence. Being Athenian means possessing a set of

prcicticeh and perceptions shüped by these samr brlieh. In so hr as Prricles is able to

iiiake siiçh <i speech üh (i funeral orrition. it must be recopizrd that the entire Athenian

ho&. ai lcast tacitly. werc products of these belieb.

And ycr. ilone examines the poAion of the Athrnians durin2 the 4 16 Mrliciri

Deblm. it hecomrs quickl y apparent that Athens has somewhüt hllrn away from her

dewtion to this set of Xthsnian metaphors. In her harsh treatment of Melos. Thucydides

presenth Athens in the rok of an m o p t and ruthless pourer. disjointed from the lofty

prehentlit ion of Periç les' funeral oration.

Thucydides introduces the Melians as a colony from Spana that had first refused

to loin the Athenians. in the interest of rernainins neutriil throughout the war. However.

aRcr the Athenians. "had hrought force to bear on them by Iüying wastr their land. they

t id bccoiiie open rnrmirs of ~thens .""~ This is significant. as Melos did not pose any

iiiilitar) ihreai io Athrnian sovereignty. or even to the Athcnian conquest of the

Pclopr)nnrx. The At hrniiin represçntatives were çornplçtrl y aware of Mrlos'

. . in~ipniiicansc when they üttxkcd. and justitied their Lise of forcc by stating that sharing

Ii-icndly tcrnih aith Melos would he a sign of weakness. while their hatrrd is rvidence of

powcr. Whtm sonsidering the milit- vinuousness espoused by Pericles in his funrrd

imtiim. ii hcconies evident that Athens has lost her h i t h in heroic conception of war.

Ttic taking o f Mclos wüs essent iall y purposeless. x c o r d i n ~ to the previously establihhrd

\ci d' Athcniiin iiietüphors. There wüs no $ory in the takins of an insignificant powrr.

nii clt.nicni\ of Homeric heroism. no storirs of devout piety. unwavering courage. or rvcn

t ' i n a n d bendit.

After laying siegr to Melos. the Athcnian army sent a delegaiion of representutive

tu "ncgoti~itc a srtilsment" between the two parties. Upon cntrring a discussion. the

'vlclian rcprescntativcs appralrd to the repiited Athrnian sensr of justice. The Athenian

rcpresentiitives responded by saying. "when these matters are discusscd by practical

peoplc. the standard of justice depends on the equality o f the power to cornpel and that in

hct the strong do whiit they have power to do and the weak accept what thry have to

.- 1 h* Foreshadowing the Thrasyrnachan argument of Book 1 of Rrprrhlic-. the

,\thenian represrntativrs reduced justice to the ability of the stronger to talie advantüge of

the wsliksr. Again. this represents a fa11 t'rom Periclean vinue and traditional Atheniiin

senhihilit>?. for the Athenian body always envisioned itself to be engaged in just political

action. whsther or not they were. The dismissal of justice is itself a dismissal of the

.At heniiin over;irchin~ metaphors. ris one cannot reconçile Homeric justice wir h a might

nicikcs ripht argiinient. The Mrlirin representatives. in responsr to this. appealed to

Athcninn renw 01' kiir play. asking whethrr the Atheniün subjects would acçrpt thrir

trccitiiicnt of .Llcl»s as proprr. The Athenians replied by arguin_o. "So t i r as risht or

R.I.OII~ ;ire concerncd they think there is no differencr brtwern the iwo."'"' To disbclisve

in an'. notion o l right or wrong is completely antitheticril with the traditional Athenian

l ow of \visdoni. for i t is impossible to love wisdom without any sense of truth.

Acciwding to the iraditionril Atheniün sensibility. knowins truth irnplied participation in

thc di\.int.. t'or thc p d s were the rulers of the cosmolo_oical ordrr. To deny the existence

i>I-giwn tnith is to question the sanctity of the püntheon itself.

This q~icstioning of the püntheon occurred again in the Melian debatc in a more

dircct nianner. After the Atheniün reprexntütives complried thrir attack on the notion of

tiopc. ttic blclians ürped that they "trust thüt the gods will give us fortune as good as

170 y i i r h . hecn~csc (they) are stündins for what is ripht agüinst whüt is wrong ... In saying

th;\. the hlelians adoptrd a similar stance to the one that Athens itself adopted against

D~iri~is. "the prr;rl Gng who had corne in 490 to punish the insi_enificrint Athenims for

inierkring in a corner of his mighty empire."'" The Athenians blatantly disre_oardrd the

sinctit!* of the pantheon. as they responded by süying "Our opinion of the gods and our

knosledge of men lead us to conclude that it is a genenl and necessüry law of nature to

rulc whatever one can."' '' The gods. according to the Athenians. struggled amongst

t henixlvrs. and ihus t h sy could be seen to care no more for justice thün humanity did.

Apaiii. hy rejecting the silnctity o f the divine. the Athenians funhered their break from the

troditiunal Athcnian srnsibility cultivated by their shared set of ovcrarchins metaphors.

.Ab ;i IL~ .L ' s CI!' hcaiitv. wisdom. honor and al1 virtue. Athens traditionally considrred itself

to hc ;L 13wuritt' of the gods. By this presentlition. Athens has divorcect itselt' h m this

position. sccins itsrlf iis a powcr unchscked by any mrans of force.

W hi lc t hc trials and tribulations of the gruellin_o war forced Athçns hrther and

iiirihcr i'roni i heir trüdi t ionai set of perceptions and prtictices. their war r ffon provided

tlicni with a teiiipcirüry and incomplrte mrans of imbuing nieaning upon thrir exprrirnce.

Tticis punicipatim in the wür brcame the standard hy which al1 sxperirnw was judgcd.

;ind a11 action a n s dircctçd iowards f u l f i l l i n ~ the objections of war. The condiiion of

\pi ritual criais. whcrc esperience becomes completr l y ungrounded. accuratel y describes

thc condition of the Athenian citizrnship iifirr thrir drfeat in the Peloponnrsian War. To

rcco@c the vülidity of such a claim. one needs only to re-examine Thucydidcs. Of the

dc tf atcd Ai tienilin army. Thucydides writrs:

Anci then there a a s the depdation of it d l and the fact that a11 without exception were afflicted. so that. although there may be somc lightening of the burden when it is shared by many others. this stiII did not mrike the burden seern any erisier to bear at the tinie. rspecially when they remembered the splrndour and the pridr of thrir setting out and saw how mean and abject was the conclusion. No Hellenic army had ever suffered such li reverse. They had corne to enslave others. and now they were goin_o away tiishtened of k i n g rnslaved themselves: and instead of the praycrs and parans with which they had sailed out. the words to

br heard now wcre directly contrary and boded rvil as they staned on thsir ur;iy back. sailors travelling on land. trusting in hoplites rüthcr than ships.. . 173

ht'ter its dcvastating niili tary loss. the Athenian citizenship was discourageci and lost.

;\then\. which had once pridrd herself on her intellectual. culturd and naval suprriority.

ti;id hccn scduced "sailors travelling on land". One çnn sec the signi ticünce of

Thiicydidc>' wurd5 when one compares the condition of the Athcniün citizenship to

Hmicr'\ 0 i ly~st .u~. Odyssrus. ;i king (thus tird to the land). tvandcrs lit sea until hr is

d d c t o o\*crc.«mc his izrthris. leiim his actual liniits and possibilitirs. and retum home to

1 il I i ih kingdimi with ii ref»rmulated purposr. The Atheniiins. who had left by sra with u

piirposc in hnnd. insrcad returnrd home as a lost people. They no longer hüd ii purposr or

;i scnsc 01' who t h q wcrc üs 1i people. and despite their history as a naval pouter. they

w r c rcdiiccd to return home hy land. Their faith and devotion to the sods hnd heen

repliiccd hy wi~rds rvhich hodrd so evil that Nicias wcis rrquired to remind them thiit he

hiid hopc bec:iiisc. Iir %as worshipped the gods as (he) ought. and ( hisi conduct towürds

mcn and has heen just and without reproach.""'

.-\then\' condition of spiritual crisis is directly made reference to in the tïrst Book

0 1 ' Rcp~hlic.. with Sucrates' attempt to reconstitutr: a relationship with the macrocosmic

ordcr. Book 1 of R ~ p h l i c begins with Socrates (Sure Strength) remrmbering (re-

mcnihering. or piecing to_orther in the present what was in the past) his trip down to the

Pirüt.~i\ uith Glaucon (Gleaming). where hr went to say ii prayer to the goddess. and sec

1 - ; //>id.. 7:75

1 -1 i;oticcahl y. ()dysscus' rcturn homc cu1rninli~t.s in senuril iniercoursc with Penclopc in his k J . ~vfiicfi 1 4 itscll'huilt dircctl> into ri long-ltmd olive trw. Thc image ot'thc bed bcing t.mbc.ddr.d in nature. ;ml OI' ( Id' w u s . actions in the hed. hoth syrnholizt. Odysseus* rcncwd cornmitmeni to his purpose as ri King. and 01' ttic future ti'rtility of'his lands under his carc. For anoihcr exarnplc. one crin rilso look rit Jc~sit. L. iVcbron'\ Froni Rirual to Romance. and her discussion of the Fisher King.

..how the- would put on the festival. since they were now holding it for the first time."'76

He then nientions that the Athenian procession was no more fine than the Thracian. and

ihat nl'ter prqcr and "looking on". hr and Glüucon retumed upwards towards Athens.

Onc n e d only look to ihrsr phrases to recosnize ü farniliar theme. Socrates. by going

diwn the Pirxus and prnying. is paniçipating in a prirticular set of ritudized practicrs

t hat taidit ional!>, lind their mranin_o in the shared overuchino_ metaphors of the hthcnian

h d y . Fos an .\thenilin. priiyer has meüning because the Athrnian citizen prays to an

Athcnian divinity. while panaking in an Atheniün rituül.

Whilc S«~ïiitcs' inientions were to prüy to the nrw goddrss. his motivation w s

windcr. It \va', Socrü~cs' fascination with witnessing the new fcstivül that motivatsd his

trip wiih Glüuçon to the Pirwus. Furthemore. Socnites concluded that the Thracian

I L i i v c i l \\.ii4 no less fitting than the Arhenian. By accrpting both festivüls as cquül.

Socrcitcs is validüting a very non-Atheniiin perspective of piety. In doing su. he is

wggc\ting thüt niecining of his actions çoncrrnrd with piety is not roored in the sharrd

iiietaphor of the Athenian çitizenship.

This is signi tîçünt whrn put in the perspective of Socrites' use of past tensr to

Jisciiss his visit iu the Piraeus. ln so far as Socrates is "re-rnembering" ri past occurrence.

hc is rcconstituting. or re-ordrring. the past into the present. What he is reconstituting is

a self-refcrrnti;il reliitionship with the cosnios. or the macrocosmic order. This act of

rcccinstitution would only be necrssary if the original relationship was no longer in place.

Sucnitr.' relationship is hoth Athenian and non-Athenim. It is Athenian because of

Xthens' particular condition of spiritual crisis. and their consequent availabiliiy for

1 - < Tliuc> dides. Op. Cir.. 7:77

1 - t . Plütii. Thc R t w h l i r . oI' Plato. zd cd.. Op. Cit.. linc: 327n

wondcr and philosophy. it is non-Athenian because i t breaks with the ritudized Athrnian

tradition. which. dur to the condition of spiritual crisis. has Iost al1 meaning.

11- Socrarrs' Athens is in a period of spiritual crisis. this condition musr have somr

kind olcflrct on the "bcing" of the charactrrs in Reprihlic. In the next section. I will

i l ix~ i sr thc cf iç i of the condition of spiritual crisis on the intrrxtion of the chüraçters in

K c p i l l d i c . . Givcn the nrgativc impact of spiritual çrisis. 1 will discuss hoa Socrates uses

ihc. n u b k fiction ii\ ;in iittrmpt at rrsroring i~rdcr in his entourage'.; çhüotic souls.

Section 11: The Effect of Spiritual Crisis and the Role of

The Noble Fiction in Republic*

I r tiah previoiislv bren argurd in the work thar the most common potentiül

wnscqwncc of spiritual crisis is the possihility for the ideology of reclilw. In the lirst

Book of Rcpi<hlir*. Socratcs reiiiains consistrntly opposed to that occurrence. and hccüuse

01' [hi\ dcnionstrato the inadequüçy of technicd knowlrdge for discussing the

ni;icroço\niic order. Socrütes m e n s the importance of his attiick on rec*/i~tr hy

introducing it with an oüth to Zeiis. He appropriates Polymarchus' aryment thüt justice

i i t o ciw cverycint. what is tïttin:. and transposes i t into the lanyagr and metaphor of a

rwlrrtc hy \tathp. "In the name of Zeus. if someonç were to ask him. 'Simonides. the an

cdlcd niedicinc pivcs what thÿt is owrd and tittin_o to which thinp.?' whlit do you

wppow hc \i.ould answrr us'?"'i7 Polymarchus tacitly acccpts Socrates' innovation. and

arpi1r.s that drugs. food and drinks to bodies. is what is owed. While the details of

Pdynicirchu\' a n s w r are themselves unimportant. three elrments of his response are

rclc\mt to this discussion. Firstly. the rase by which Polymarchus accepts the trmslaiion

into the rcche rnetüphor is somewhüt unsrttling. This unwttling feelins is mügnitied by

the ahility of the rrclzrie allegory to translate a discussion of justice on the mücrocosrniç

i u l e . i.c. justice is to help one's friends and ham one's enemirs. to one on the

niicroço.;niic sctilc. in discussing the pûrticular justice of a püniculiir vocation üt a

p;iniçular timr. rhus blumnp the boundaries between the two dimensions. David

Roochnik. in his work Oj'ilrr trrtd Wisdoni: P k ~ t o ' s U~idersr~uzdirr!:~ of Trchne. submits

thai. "Piato understood t hr basic "flaw" of the (rrcliïie) analogy j h ~ i rile hqi~tïiirtg: if

&rc is assumed to hr knowlrdge. and rrdtrre is the mode1 of moral knowled, W. an

* * 17s ~inricccptablt. conssquence-namely. t r r k ~ is not knowlsdge-ensues. This anaiysis is

prinui to hc coi-recr by Socrates himself. as the entire Socratic criticism of Polymürchus'

argunwni was direcil- solel y at the trchnicül ( of tec*lrrre ) implications of his statrmrnt.

mcl not thc \tritr.nient itssit'. In hct. Socrates' own Book IV conclusion that "justice i'i

iloing whoi onc is fitrcd for" only reinforces Polymürchus' position. Howrver. S«cratrs'

clidlcngcs Polyiiiarchiis' iihility dctïnr justice. which would entail isolaring the suhjeçt

nuitci.. pointinp out thc boundaries that set its limits and p«ssibilities. and breaking it

Jown 10 its ç~nstitutive pans. Socrates calls for a dctïnition with the mathematical

;icciiriicy rcq~1irt.d of tec hniciil knowledge. Howevrr. because justice. as al 1 vinue. ex ists

hiith ~ 1 3 a rniçrt~cosni. and lin elrment of the macrocosm. this analysis is impossible. A s

iiicnrioned carlier in this work. the relationships in which elements of the macrocmm are

cngaged in art: themselves constitutive of the elcmrnt. It is impossible to give ii proper

definition ot'iiny rlernent that isolatrs the clemrnt from other èlements. or its position

within the whole. jiist as i t is impossible to detïne it musical note outsidr of its scdr. kry.

mi position within a harmony. If this is the precision requires by a rrclrnr. then a r c ~ h c

ccinnot he the rneans to iindrrstrind the relütionship between the microcosrn and the

I I I ; I~~OCO~RI .

It is for this reason thüt Plato writes of Thrasymachus that. "hunched up like a

wild beast. hr tlung himself at us as if to tear us to pieces.""' Thrasymachus. as a

wph is t . ha.\ ü personal stakr in the discussion. Brcause it sopirisr e m s his living on the

cliiini rhat hr. poshesstis a rech~iic.d knowled_oe of virtur. he Irimsrlfis on trial in Socrates'

cmwr\ütiim. In his rnrüged state. Thrasymachus is persuaded (and paid tori to use his

kniwledgc os a ~rchiiir<~.s to explain to his aiidirncr what justice is. After dçnouncing

SOCI-:.IICS ÿ?i sonleime. "unwillirig himself to teach". Thcisyrnüçhus. in the interest of

iviniiing a gimi repiitation. instnicts his listeners thüt. "the just is nothing other than the

1 HO ;idvnnt;igc 01' the sironger." Once again. Socr~tes. as n rnastrr of rhetoric. attacks the

prccision uf thc nrgiinicnt. and not the argument itself. Socrates becoins his refutation

uith Thrasyniaçhiis* premisti. and forces Thrasymachus to concede that whilr it is just to

ohcy the nilen. the rulers sometimes rnak mistakes. Because the ruling body can rndx

niirtAc.5 thnt ;lit. homifiil to the ruling body. and al1 laws must be tollowrd. justice çan

cqiiall> bc what is disadvmtrigeous. At this point in the discussion. Cleitophon offers

Tlir;is~~iiinchiis a way out throush relütivism. Cleitophon argues that what Thrasymachus

wid wos "thüt the advantage of the stronwr is what th<: stronger heliei-es to be his

. . l S l ;id\.uniiifc. By ~ising the term belirves. Cleitophon offers an option that removes the

r q i i i r d preçision nccessüry from a rrclzrir. Thrasymachus. whosr reputation and

finiincial sccurity is dependant upon his ability to givr a mathçmaticdly precise answer.

connoi nccept Cleitophon's suggestion. Book 1 proceeds with Socrates adrninistering a

vcrbül heiiting ont0 Thrüsymachus. and concludes with Socratrs demonstmting his

tcchnical siiperiority in the cin of rhetoric. By the end of the Book. Socrates has

succrssfull y rein forced Thrasymachus' position that justice is the advantage of the

sironger. for Socrates never once challensed the validity of Thrüsymachus' cliiim.

lnstead. hc has only demonstrated that hr is a more powrrful rhctoriticiün thün

Ttirüsymachus. It is for this reason that Thrasymachus remüins silent for most of the

rciiiüindrr of iext. for his point has bern made. and he aççepts Socritex' superiority.

I t i \ Socriites' superior use of rhctoriç that allows him to accept the mantlr of

r t d r ~ i i t ~ ~ s in Book I I . Glnucon recognizes that Thrüsymachus has not bern proven wrong.

imljf "likc a snakr. has bern charmed more quickly thiin hc should have bern."'" He and

Ili\ broihcr Adrimantus thrn implore Socratcs to demonstrate. lrom his knowledge. why

j i i h t icc in i tsel f is siiperior to injustice. drspitr t hc benevolcnt consrqurnccs of eit hcr.

Xdciriinnt~is' asking for LI detinition of justice in itself is itsrlf equivalent to Socmes -'ti

csti" qiicstion. Thus. hy üsking Socrütrs to ?ive a technical definition of what justice is.

Adcini:intus succesafully reverses the rlerrcliris on Socrates. putting Socrates in 1i bind.

Siicrritt.~ is both compelled ta defend justice. for i t is his intent to revitülize his thumotic

conipany's intrrcst in vinur. Howevrr. Adeimantus is not asking this question with the

inteni o f denionstrütin_e the inhrrent failure of trcltne to üccount for virtue. Adcimantus

ih ilsking the question brcausr hr really wants to know! As products of spirituai crisis.

;mi men who intend on breaking boundarics in the reülm of act ion. Adrimantus and

Glaucon are açtuall y asking for technical mswers. Socrates dms not have knowledge of

the divine ihat is rquivalrnt to a rrche. To his credit. Socrates responds that he is at a

I(.w of whnt to do. "On the one hmd. 1 can'i help out. For in my opinion 1' rn not ctipüblr

of it.. .On the other htind. 1 cnn't not help out. For I'm afraid it might be irnpious to be

here whilr justice is being spoken badly of and give up and not bring help while 1 am still

hreat hing and able to make a sound."'"' After being persuadrd by Glaucon and the rrst

of h i \ Company to * * n a give up the argument. but rather to scrk out what each is."'"

Socraies rigrers to lead the investigation.

It is iitiportant 10 note that Socrates only iigrws to participate in "sccking oiit the

m i t h and henefit of hoth" justice and injustice. Whilr Socrates dors not have n technical

;mwer ol'whüt justice. or t'or that mattcr ciny aspect of the niacrocosmic order is. he does

conccdc thüt he hüs the ühility to hrlp othrrs find the answers t'or ihemselues. In the

T/ierrrct~~.s. Socrntes rcfm to his an as "midwifery". in thüt he Iàcilitates the hinh of

widoni in hurnün m u l h . Socrütes intorms the reader that. "the highrst point of my art is

the pcwt'i' t c ~ prow hy wery test whether the offspring o h youncg rniin's thought is a

Id\c. pli~ininsni or instinct with life and tnith."'" Although he hinisrlf hiis no wisdom to

g i w . hc u n Iiclp othrrs brins binh to truth. It is in this rolc that Socrates intcnds on

pxtiçipotinp in the seürch. and he justifies this by referring to his wholr entourage

i hiniseif inçluded) as men who are not clever. Despitr Socrates' clear admission of

ipnorancc. Socntss' entourqe üppears to dismiss his statemrnt as standard Socratic

iron).. and. as ni;ide evident by the text. this greatly affects ihrir understanding (or

riiisunderstandin~) of the Socratic project. Glaucon and Adrimantus believe Socrate* to

hc n political techitrs. (i "technician" who possrssrs the teachable skill of govrming.

Thcy have already witnessed Socrates' use of might throughout the first Book of

1 - ; Ihid.. linc: 368h - l \-: I l i i t l . . linc: M S c - l \ - Phto. "Tiicwrrirs". taken frorn The Collecttrd Dialocucs of Plrito: Indudini the Letters. cd. Cairns.

Princeton: Princeton Universiiy Press. 1973 line: 84ri

Repirblic.. and they understand his words as teachings of how to achieve political power

and nile.

In introducing the discussion on justice. Socrates remarks that in his opinion.

justicc un its own is very diftlcult to see. even for a man rvho sces sharply. He arsues. "If

\oiticonc had ... orderrd men who don't see sharply to reüd littlr lrttrrs from a h r and thcn

wnicime thoughi that the samc lcttrrs are sornewhere else ülso. but bisser and in a hi_ozer

placc." i t a-oiild btr in their intrrest to rend the bilger letters first. and thrn proceed to the

I Si> s i l l r l t t r I t is froni this perspective that Socrates evokes the creation of a city in

spcccti. This ciiy is to reprcsent ~ ~ i t r ~ i w i r liir,qr. and as a metaphor for the microcosm.

iiiciLc\ the niicrocosni casier to understand. Because this city is purcly fiintastic. thrre is

ni) wggestion ihat Socraies. from Book II to Book IV. has tiny intention of making direct

politicd çonimentary. The study of the city in speech is supposed to be the study of man

thsi~iigh the nictaphor of the çity. Howevcr. because Socrates* tntourqe has tüken him to

he ;i r ~ d r r i i r c ~ . ~ . and the' assume Socrms' words to br the direct teaching of n t eche .

h n i their prrspcctivr. the boundary between what is the mücrocosm and whüt is the

riiicrocosm becomes ciouded.

Consequcntly. at several instances Juring the creütion of the city in speech.

Gliiucon mi Adcimantus miikr commentary that supgests that they have not undrrstood

Soçrates' intrnt of usin? the city as a metaphor for the human soui. Thry sre themsrlves

Socrates' "piiardians". and misintrrpret their project of building n city in speech as a

hlueprint for building a succrssful political regime. In the first construction of (i fictitious

city. Soçrates provides the brothen with the most simple of cities. where the citizrns will

livc off breads preptired with barley meai and flour. dnnk wine. build their own homes.

and miike thcir own çlothing and shoes. Glaucon. in responsr to this project. intenupts.

sriying. *.Yeu seem to make these men have their feast without reli~hes."'~' For Glüucon.

the cit). i n speech is on1 y f i t for sows. as it neglects the luxuries necrssüry for somrone of

hi \ htnturc. If Glauciin were fully awiire that the city was directrd to hc a metaphor for

tlic sciul. hi3 cimirnentüy on the nred for luxuries would müke little scnsct.'" ln Book III .

Sricriites intrduccs ii discussion on what fom of music that concems sons and melody

a,ill hc ;illouui t« reniain in the city in speech. He then leiids the brothcrs into allciwing

[tic Dorian and Phr>rgian modes. w t h r y lippropriütely imitate the sounds of the

ci~ir:igcc~~s nian in hüttlc. and the man who pcrforms a voluntary peiicehl dred. This

dixiissim ot'hamiony is ü direct refercnce to Lüches' speech. and his prckrencr for the

n i m nshn li\.cs as thc Dorian mode. with word and deed in unison. When Socrates

nicntioni thi \ . hc is intentionally reminding his Company thai the çiiy is m m wrir l<rr,qe.

Adcinimti~s dues not piçk up on this. Socratrs attrmpts to remind him hy çontinuing his

;irynicni. siizgcsting ;il1 the instruments thüt must br bannrd from the city. Disturhed.

Adsiniantus çan only respond to Socrates propositions by süying. "At least so our

..' SL) ~irgiinient indicaies. If Adeimantus were truly aware that this city was a meiaphor for

tlic hiimiin soul. he would not be disturbed by Socratrs' selection of music or instruments.

" ' Kcpirhli~.. Op. Cir.. l i nc 31iXJ l \ - m. liric: i72c 1 \.* I hc l i c~c ~ha t ri nirijor factor in Scxrates' choicc to build ri city in speech is the intent ofsc.Jucing Cil;iucon and :\dcirririntus. In .-\lcihitrres 1. Socrites seduces Alcihirites intri studying with him hy romlnc lng him u ~ t h thoughth o l political powcr. Glaucon is k i n g romanccd with ri sirnilrir opportunit'. ilic iti;incc ;it building i i cornplctr: city. and thus Ierirning a rechrie of how tu build and rulc. Glriuccin is truly cnrlirrillcd n i th huildtng a macrciccisrnic structure. or polis. in his own imrigc. .Although this is uriwb\trinticitcJ. I h c l i c ~ c thrit this construction is ris much ri test for Glriucon and ri\deirnantus ris i t ts ri ,carch t i r juhticc. Glriucon ih a rhumotic chrinctcr thrit nccds to curh his sippctites if he is to rulc wcll. ..\dcinixttuh neccl> to dirici>vt'r his rippt'titcs to mie wcli. The projcct o f Book II-IV is ris much an ritrcmp1 11,

hring thc tu^^ hrothers tr, ri position whcrt. they rire çriprihlt: ot'practicing philosoph). hriving justice in ihc 4r ~ 1 . ah t t i'; to ci iwwcr juhticc through the projcct itst'lf. Glriucon and Adtirnrintus hi1 the test, and Book i' 14 ttw rcsult O(' ~ h c i r friilurc. 1 \'> K ï ~ p ~ h l i c . . OP. Cir.. linc: 799J

Hotslever. as the boundaries between the microcosm and macrocosm seemed biurred to

Adcimiintus. hr responds üs if he feels the city itself less pleaïant to Iive in.

In Book IV. Adeimantus once again questions about luxuries. when he iisks

Soci-atcs. "What would your üpology be. Socrates. if someone wrre to say that yoii're

tiiirdly 11i;iliing tlicse men (the puadians) happy ..." as thry reçeive no benetits for thcir

! ' t ( I rdc. Later in the Book. he asks the thumotic question. "How will our city be able to

iiiakc war when it possessss no money. cspecially if it's çompcllrd to make uar iigiiinst a

wcditiy ont..!""" In .;pite of this. Socrates continues to buiid his metaphor by tlncilly

dct'ining (thrcc tinies in different words) justice in the city os. "t.ach (çlass division i.e.

riilcr. aux i i iiiry. nioncy-makers > one must practice one of the functions in the city. that

one Ir which his nature made him naturally most tit."""

I Iiwc argued thüt Sucrates' use of the noble tïction was ü response to Glaucon

and .AJciiiiantus' niisinterpretation of the Socratic project. Socrates is çoncrmed with

scstorinp order to a çhaotic Athens. whiçh suffers from spiritual crisis. I t is his intrnt to

iisc his niaicutiç arts to reinspire the Atheninns into pursuing vinur. Because of the

rpiritucil crisis. the traditional methods of pursuing virtue are no longer functional.

Honieric puetru. and the portic tradition that follows it. can no longer be the üuthority on

vinuri. as Athrns. through the Peloponnesim War. haï bumed that bridge. Socntrs'

pr.jrçt is to inspire the building of new bridges. or relationships. to serve the oid position

of inihuing mecining upon human experience. These relationships can only begin to br

huilt on t hc. individual lrvel. when one recognizes the nerd for thrm. On the

riiricrocosniic. or political level. a politicai entity clin only begin to build thex

relritionships whrn it is prepared to prictice politics. the art by which ü political entity

difkrentiiites fricnds from cnemies. right from wrong. in the interest of making do with

an iniperfecf human existence.

For t h r individual to recognize the ncrd to establ ish self-referenticil rrlationships.

tic tïrst has to becorne authentic to who he is. This mow to authrnticity requires a

rcliirniing of the self. through the çultiviltion of the t x i t dimension. so that hr çan heür

thc cluc.; t hlit the mücrocosrnic order presents to him about who he is. Tu use

C-!ci Jcg~_eriün ternis. in ordrr for a person to achirvr authenticity. the pcrson niust br:

rcwlutc. Rrsolutc Dasein. ciccording to Heidegger. is prrparrd to malte its own çhoiçss.

;ih ii h ü LI çlcür virw of its options. and the determination to deçide whiçh option i t willh

i o [AC. Thih rcsoluteness cannot br sren as an ungrounded metaphysical catqory. as

Dawin ciin only bc resolute within the world. Heideger illustrates ihis when hr:

csprchses thiit "Rcsolutrnrss brings the Self risht into its currrnt concrimful Bring-

donpidc whrit i h ready-to-hand. and pushrs it into solicitous Being with ~~~~~~~~~~~' It

does not "withdraw itsrlf from xtuality". but instead forces Dasein into confruntins what

i \ po~siblc.''"

In order for a political unit to re-rogagr politics. and thus begin to prricticr

political üciion. its composition must become political. By this. 1 mean that Sroup of

pcoplc who arc to compose the political unit must be willing both to takr action. and to

idcntify themselves as a unit. In order to do so. the people who are to compose the

politiccil unit must concede sorne t o m of shared identity. as detinrd hy a pÿnicular

selrction of ovrrürching metaphors. It is for this reason that rvery political unit

ha.; hsrn draftrd in the wake of a founding myth. for without a shared constitution of

heing. no goup of people can rver unify in the prxtice of separaring friends and

rsncmies.

Socrate3 is aware that Glaucon and Adrimantus have misundrrstood his projrct.

m d ihai they çonscquently identiîj themselves as iictuülized "gudians". They percrivr

Sc~crattA discussion on the yardian class not as a description of the logical element of

I R C tiiiriian wul. hiit ü Iesson on how thry. as future guardilins of Athens. should nile over

thc 1invc.i. clüssss. Socrates uses this to his advantagr with the propagation of the noble

tïction. I contend ihiit Socrates' noble tïction is used as an attempt (although an

LI nwc~~ss1111 one ) io restructure both Glaucon and Adeimantus' bring-in-thrmselves. and

hci ns-in-t he-world. by disçussing how to cduçate the yardian class. In that Socratcs'

~irg~inieni in Rcpihlic ülways has a macrocosrnic and microcosmic rneanins. Socratcs

d l ~ w s cadi pan of his noble fiction to relate to one Içvel of meanins. The first section

( 4 I-IJ-c i priniaril~ attempts to influence their being-in-the-world. whilc the second

i 4 l5a-c I priniaril y üitrmpts to shape thrir interna1 constitution.'" One needs only to

csriniinc thc messases conveyed by these two sections to rrcognize how the noble fiction

cotild tlt this rolc.

Socraies introduces the tirst section of his noble fiction by enplaining. thiit he will

"üttenipt to persuade first the miers and the soldiers. then the rest of the city. that the

l '4 M. h( 1: 2 W j ili I use "priniriril>" hccausc 1 helicve there arc ohvious pciliticrll iniplicririons madc whtm Socratci, discusscs rnriintriining ihc purit! of clrisscs. Earlicr in the tcirt. 1 mcntioncd how this rcmovcs the possihilitv I i r tichicvins imrnortality through lint'ligc. Ttierc is also suggestion in the second section of sepririting rulcn l'rom the Jcsirc (or honor and wedth. 1 do not wish to ciirninish eithcr of thest' messages, ri'; thcy arc h r h signiticrinr to the Socr~tic argument. Howver. dut. to [he scopc of this work. 1 will noi invcstigritc ~iic'w ~ u , o implications. Insicad. 1 will acknowledgt. the correlation bt'tween this section. and Socratcs' Biioh Ik' conipiisiticm of the tripartite soul.

rttarinp and eduçütion we gave them were like dream~."""~ using persuasion as the

mciins to convey the message. Socrates harkens back to the iïrst Book of Repihlic. where

hc is owrtükrrn hy force and broupht to Cephalus' house. Socrates offered to persuade

his coprors to do othenvisr. but they argurd that they would accrpt no such persuasion.

By iising pcrsuüsion. Socrütes is puttins in their mind the ideü that when they do corne to

rulc. thcy hhould not rule with iron fists. The success of the polis is contingent upon the

c';t;ihlishnit.nt 01' a shareci sense of brins. and this shared sense of being cünnot exist

whcn a Iciides doniinütes hy force.

Thih ciiltivütion of a shared srnse of being. is rrinlorcrd hy Socrites' refrrring to

tticir rcaring iind rducation as drearnlike. and thereforc fictitious. "ln truth". according io

Soc.riiic.5. "iit thc tiiiie the? werc undrr the eanh within. bcing fishion and reared

.. 1 <)-

riss. . In tliat t h e ~ all were fashioned in the same manner. under the sanie

carth. Socrates' citizsns would understrind themselvrs as posssssing n cornmon hrritage.

I I is Socratch' hope. thiit hy recognizing the importance of a shared founding myth.

Glüwon and Meimantus might rralize the nrcessity of reuniting the Atheniün

ciminiiinity in the sümr wüy. Consequently. whrn it wüs k i r opportunity to Irüd and

rulc. the! would t ü k r from this lcsson the need to unite through a shared set of Athenian

nietaphors.

Socrates concludes the Tint section by stating rhat a k r they have finished k ing

craAed. the eünh. which is their mother. sent them up to the surface. And thrn. according

to Socr~tes. "as though the land they are in wrre a mother and nurse. thry must plan for

and defend it. if anyone iittacks. anci they must think of the other citizens as brothers and

horn of the eanh."'" This section is the most significant: as it summarizes the complete

Iesson thüt Socnites intends Glaucon and Adeimantus to l e m . By refemng to the elinh

as hoth n niother and a nurse. Socrates intends for both the guardians. and indirectly

Glaiicun iind .Adcimantus. to recognizr a shared heritlige. lineage and home. Therr is a

r;.*ponsihility for this eanh. because it was the eanh that raisrd the citizrns as a family.

The citizcns dso have a rrsponsibiiity for building reiütionships by prorrctin~_ othrr

ciiizcns. The nicssqt: to the two brothrrs. and to the rest of Socr~tes' entourngc. is c l e x

Ti) propcrly livc politically. citizrns of a political unit mvst primarily recognizs the

inhcrcnt ci~mrnonali t y of al1 citizrns. and use that comrnonality to build self-rekrential

rclaiionship with e x h citizen. and with the politicül unir itself. When the political unit

~ C ' C O I I I C ~ \VIIOIC' ( i n that al1 of the citizens are involvrd in self-referential relationship with

thc oiher citizsns. and with the politicül unit itself). i t çan act politically by establishins

hoiindlirich. Socrütes explains thüt these boundaries must br plannrd For and defended.

and hy this suggcsts through the ollcgory that politicül action involvrs erectine and

Iidding houndaries betwern the brniliar and the "terrible". the friend and the tnrmy.

Howwer . i t is Socrates' contention thüt one can only propcrly live politically if

hi \ soiil i properly orderrd. With justice detïned in the city. Socrates uses the metciphor

ti, translate ri definition of hurnan justice. Socrates introduces his discussion on the make

up of the sou1 hy identifying it as a divided rntity. possessin_p many '*diverse desires.

plcas~ires and pains."'"4 Thrse desires are sub-classrd into threci geüter divisions of the

w~i1. with e x h drrivrd liom ü particular motor of human action. The first division

Soçrcites nümes is the rpirliimietikon. or the desiring rlemtnt. which can be equlitrd to the

money niaking class in the city in speech. The second element is the rlieniorides. "with

\\,hich nian bçcornes spiritçd.""" This section is identitied as being the tiery tlement of

ihc soiil that is motivatrd by the love of honour. victory. and powrr. and can bs equated

io the aiixiliüry class o f the city in speech. The calculatin_o element. or the lo,~isrikorr. is

ihc thirtl rlcnient of thc human soul. which. in the bzst conditions. govenls thc body as

ihc ~u;irdiiin cliiss z o v m s the city. Justice. as Socnites presents it. occurs whrn one

"ilocm'i lei each part in him rnind othrr people's business or the three classes in the soul

iiicddlc with cacli other. ..the three parts. (harmonizr together) exactly like threc notes in

..>O 1 ;i hitr-riicm ic scdc. . .

Thir is thc nirssiige that Socrates attempts to send to Glaucon and Adeimantus in

ihc iccond section o f the noble fiction. In the second section. Socr~tes cxplüins that

alihoiigh dl citizens arc ccrtainly brothers. those competent to nile were niixrd with gold

~ i t hinh. the nu'riliarics. silver. and the hrmen and craftsmen. iron and bronze. In saying

hi\. Soçrntes niükes reference to the hurnan soul as being a composite of diffrring

r.lcnients. Iust as the city is successful when çach group of people perforrn their proper

tiisk. in thc intercst of brnefiting the wholr. so too does the soul work in that hshion.

Exh element of the sou1 has its own unique erotic longing. and the soul is well ordered

whcn oach of thess longing are subordinated to the nerds of the whole. The logical

hçi110- niust use the soul's inner tire to rule over iis lrsser appetites. Socrites states that

thc first iind forernost rrsponsibility of the guardian is to maintain the purity of each clus.

I;,r thc destruction of the polis is predicatcd on the mixing of classes. In professing this.

Socrates is arsuins that the intemal hirnrchy of the soul must always br maintained. so

' 1 4 1

- - lhitl.. linc: 5HOc :fiil I l d . . linc: 443d

thiit the soi11 rernains well ordered and authentic. This again is a direct message to

Glaucon and Adeimantus. Socratss is aware that the souls of Glaucon and Adeimantus.

diic to the Xthcnian spiritual crisis. are not properly ordered. ctiusing thsm to prictice the

idcology of ZCJC-hile. B y presenting this noble fiction. Socr~tes. through the veil of the

yiirdianh. iitirmpts io sugsrst the nrrd for interna1 reconstitution. In reshaping their

wulir. Socri~trh hopes thrit Glaucon Irarns the lesson of moderrition. so thrit he crin

whorciinatr. Iiis love of honor to the piirsuit of wisdom. and t h t Adeimantus lecirns to

chnnncl t i i s inner tïrc to piirsue his drsires more cfficiently.

Thus. when examinint the messages of the noble fiction. it hscomcs apparent

why Socrtitcs is not violating his lovc of tmth hy propagating it . The noble fiction is

Si~çiatcs' tiwl for lïghting ayinst Glaucon and Adrimantus' lies in the soul. By using i t

10 rcconsritiite thcir soiils so that they cm beein to reconnrct wiih the niücroçosmic ordrr.

Socrate\' noble fiction is in the service of tnith. of helping thrsr brothrrs ?ive binh to

discovr.ric.\ o f who they arc. and what bring human entails.

Huwvcr. it hüs yet to be cstablished why it is so important for Socrates to use the

nohle liction to combat the lies in their soul. Socrates takes great interest in thrse "divine

i~l'fspring of Ariston" brcause he is üwiirc: thüt when one practices the ideology of rcclirie.

ii hcilitlitçs thc misappropriation of a microcosmic schema. or a schrma of heing-in-

onesrll. upon 3 ~ Ü C ~ O C O S ~ ~ C structure. This misappropriation is dün_oerous. brcause it

l i kel y causes the ç r n e r p c r of ii tyrannical regime. This is demonstr~trd in the fifth

Book of Rcrp~rblic.

.4ticr Socrates has completrd his discussion of the city in speech. he is prepared

to move on to a discussion on the types of resimes that match the different types of sauls.

Howevrr. he is once again intempted by Polymarchus. who detèrs to Adeimanius by

iisliing him. -5 hall we let i t go or what shall we do'?"''' Adeimantus responds by

--qxAins ~iloud". s tat in~ that Socrates has robbed them of "u whole section of the

iirgiinient." hy not disçussing the rolr of women and çhildren in the city of ~~crch." '~ ' ;

Frcmi this c p ~ ion. Socrates receives ri tïnal confom~ation of whrit has occurrecl.

Socrate\ intcndrd to lcail a discussion in search of onswrn. and proposed the

~Icwlopiiieni of ü tictitious "city in speech" to use as a rnrttiphor for the human soul. By

siiidying the huinan soul. Socrates intrndrd to lrarn about virtue. which is. as prwiously

dcfincd. itiün'r relationship tu the co.si>io.s. By studyin? the microcosm. Socrütes intendrd

Itr lciirn ~ibout its relationship to the macrocosm. and thus h m about the macrocosm

t . It \vas Socrtites' primary intent to use this discussion tu intluence his entourage to

hcgin a reinvcstiytion of tiieir relationship to the rnacrocosrnic order in which they live.

Flou-cvcr. Socrates' company misintrrpreted his projsct.

I t a a s nientioned earlier that i t is men with thumotic natures the y a r d the

bouncliiry bt'twrn thc microcosm and the macrocosm. the knowable and the terrible.

Thesc thumotic men ore the shepherds that guürd the Hock. and are the "strongerrr" that

Th~isyntichiis niakrs referencr to in his discussion of justice. Erich membrr of Socrates'

ent«urqe couid he considered as one of thex thumotic men. and that is why they

o\.cno«l; Socrates in the first place. In the city in speech. Socrates' notion of justice

hin~ed iipcin the agreement of the auailiary c l m to sene the guitrdians. just as the

ihepherd Iigrcies tu protrct the tlock for the owner. However. within the macrocosmiç

order. this ürymrnt breaks down. Thurnotic men do not wsily acquiesce to rulers. for

the y w ish to rule themselves. When they used force and persuasion to conunit Socntrs

io hegin a study of justice. they interpreted what they perceived as Socrates' wisdom to

hc a rrdirie. Froni Socrates. they intrndrd to learn how to build and rule a city. Because

they undersrood Socrütrs' words to br teaching a ml i~rc . thry neglrctfully disregardrd

itic htiundliry heiween the macrocosm and the microcosm. Consrqurntly. they

qy-mpriated the disç~ission of the rnicrocosrn upon the macrocosm. and assumed they

w r c idking about the builciin: and govemance of a rra1 city. Froni that çontext.

Socriitcs had füiled to givr a full account. becausr he has nrglectèd to mention the role of

wnicn and childrcn.

Wlien Socrates is üsked this question by Adrimantus. hr is greatly disturbcd. as

hc did not want to discuss ihis issue. Socraies did not want to make d i r m political

coiiiiiicntüry. Howevsr. because ht: was asked to funher dcvclop the city çlcmrnt of his

prcvious discussion. he once again finds himself trapped. To continue the discussion (if

the city in speech outsidc of its intended rolr as a metaphor for the microcosm. would be

to siniply f~inher its misappropriation. However. hr is not in a position to sirnply

disregard dl that has already been said. Hüving only one choice. he continues the

discussion. but undcr his trrms. In continuing the argument. Socnites discusas the

process of unit'ying power and wisdom as that which occurs in threr waves. or three

births.

The lirst wave that Socrates refers to ocçurs through men and women exercising

n;ikeJ togrther in tlic _oymnasium. Socntes suggests that. "ln makine a woman fit for

..?CM yarding. one education won't produce men for us and another women.. . Becausr

nien and women share similu natures. their education for gurudianship should also be

s hlirrd. There fore. Socrates can make the argument that femde guardians will "clothe

themsrlvrs in vinur instrüd of robes." and share in the duties of guürding the city2"' In

essencc. ulhut Soçratss is drscribing is a de-rroticisation of the relationship of men and

wo m e n.

Socrates' second wave occurs when women brcome the comrnunül proprny of

iiiçn. ~vticre *IO wonian is aloud to live priviitely with any man."'n' Children.

ciinir.qiicntly. arc to he rtiared çommonly. isolatrd from their parents. so chat no parent

knoui hi3 or hcr i~flbpring. und no child knows its parents. The major significünce

rcwlrin~ from this wnve is the destruction of the bürrier betwren the public and the

privait rt.üliii. Hand in hand with the removal of the private rsalni is the destruction of

thc Iiouwhi~ld environment. Given that wiihin the household structure. the mothcr taught

ttic childrcn iintil they wcre old enough to be tutored. its destruction also removes thc

u.oriinn'\ rcponsihilities of early childcÿre and rducation.

Thc ciilmination of the unification of power and wisdom cornes with the nile of

the philosopher. Socrates' third wavr cannot tÿke place unless. "the philosophers rule as

kinfs or those nou c d led kings and chieh pnuincly and adequately philosophize. and

..'O7 political power and philosophy coincide in the same place ... The king. iis prrsentrd

hy Socrates. is n man who loves power. and by extension has no reservcs about breÿliing

houndaries in action. There is no act that a king cannot or will not commit if it serves his

ncrdh. The philosopher. as a lover of wisdom. is also prepüred to break boundürics. but

unly in the rçalni of thought. Ii is his love of wisdom and tmth that propels him to it. and

nothing will prevent hirn from seeking that which he covets. The unification of the

philosopher and kins is an entity bound by nothing. and when examinrd closely. very

rnuc h niirrors the character Socrates himself.

Housver. when the results of this unification are examined. i t becomes quickly

Lippürcnt rhat the rule of the philosophic nature is the %est possible condition" for the

inicr«ci)sni i nian ). but the political nile of the "philosopher-king" is very muçh a

iiintcliing distopin. hencr the worst of al1 possible worlds. In the world of the

phi lmuphcr-king. hunianity is bred like horses. for Socrates cm argue thar. "there is n

nctxi for the bcst mcn to have intercourse as oftrn as possible with the best ~ornen."~"'

Intcrc»ursc w i th upomen is given %ong with othrr prizcs and reward~."~'~' whik childrcn

Lire torn apün froni k i r parents. and hrought "into the pen to certain nurses who live

;]part in a ccritiin section of the city.""" This is cornpletcly unnuturül. in so hr as i t

icvcrs the swicil and bioloeical tie betwcrn mother and child. In this politicül systrm.

pr(icrctition ne& to be rcplated. for when the houndaries hetween the public and the

priwtc are rcmovrd. regulation is nreded to prevrnt incestuous rclütionships. No adults

who hiive not bwn unitrd for breeding are allowed to have intercourse. for "when a man

i t i l l of ihr agc to bqet touches a woman of thüt age i f a rulrr has not united thrm ... he's

iniposing LI hastarci. an uniiuthorized and unconsecratrd child. on the city ."" ' Becausr of

this. i t wouid hr incorrect to recognize Socntes' three waves as a plan of political action.

S«ccitcs uses ihese threr waves to demonstrate the ridiculousness and danger of

rtiisappropririting ri microcosmic order upon the macrocosmic structure.

Section III: Bnneine Plato to Modemity

While Socnite\' presentation of the misappropriation of the microcosmic order on

tlir niricr«c«smic stnictiire may appear corniciil. one nreds onlp to look rit "The

Inrroduction" to Thomiis Hobbes' Ldmlr trn to find a more striking example of this

niiqqxiyx-iot ion of the microcosm onto the macrocosm. In "The Introductionw*. Hobbes

tiiakch rckrcncti to seth of r n i ç r~c~s in /mi l c r~ç~~m dichotemic structures. and then equates

tlicir rcliitionship. Whrn Hobbes writes. "Nature (the A n whereby God hath made and

~ t ~ v c r n c ~ tlic World) is hy the An of man. üs in many othrr thinss. so in this also

itiiit;itcd. thot i t can tnake an Adficial nim mal.""' this statement is hein2 niiide: rlemrnts

01' thc WorlJ ( micro) are ta G-d (rnacro ). as man (micro) is to the Artificiiil Animal

i riixroi. The houndary by which the tïrst dichotomy is reguliitrd is 'iaturc. and it is

t hiiiugh Nature t hüt t hi: macrocosm. or "overarching metüphor" is ühlr to regdate

csperiencc. Becüuse man is an rlcment of the World. his experirnce. as occurring within

the first dichotcmic framework. is mitigated and thus explainable through Nüt~ire.

Hwsver . Hobbes continues to explain that. "For iry An is creatsd ihr geai

LEV IATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH. or STATE. which is but ;in Anit?ci;il

Man: though of greater stature and strength than the Naturill. for whosc protection and

J r fcnçe i t upa\ intendcd."'" In writing this. Hobbes' message becomes cln i r . Through

art I I C ~ ~ I W ) . miin hlis brrn able to create ti new boundary brtwrrn the ovcnirchin_o

nictaphor and the undrrlying concem. Brcause this boundary is also constitutive in

"' ffohhcs. Thorna>. Lcvirithan h.1iddlt.srx: Penguin Books. 1986 p. 8 1 11 ; W. p. XI

nature. the variables cstablished by this boundary have chünged. When the boundary

hctwsn the macrocosm and the microcosm is techne. the microcosrn becomes man. and

the niilcrcicusni becomes Leviathan. or the state. However. in so h r as man has created

ihc Lcviüt han. and that the Lrviathan is of greater stature and strength thm man. man's

crciition ix grcatcr than him. and thus greater than G-d's crerition. Bruuse man's

crcarion is greliter t han G-d-s. and brcause man has succrrdcd in creating something

grciitcr than himseif (somrthing G-d drbaiably cannot do). Hobbes riryes thai man is

grcatcr thün G-d. This Iippeors somewhat confusing until one examines this argument

iii;it heniat içnll y . When Hobbes introducrd the macrocosm/microcosmiç systems. hr dorb

w o h rqiii d m ratios. G-d. through nature making man. is equivalent to man. through

rccliric. crtxtinp Lwiathrin. Notice. in the first system. it is the müçrocosm that creates

tlic rriicrcicosni in iis image (G-d creates man ). In the second. the microcosm re-crrsrites a

mucrocosni in i ts own imape ( m m creates Artificiiil Man. Leviathan ). Because the ratios

in the t w o sysrems arc equiviilent. one must understand the argument as stating "*a is to b.

;t c is to d ( In this statemrnt. a represents G-d. b rlemrnts of the world. c man. and d

Lcviüt han I." Beciiuse the y are equivalent rations. the mat hrmatic relütionship betweso a

and h. niiist alulüys match that of c and d . Thrrefore. because d is greatttr in value than b.

thc value of c (man). must always be Sreater than the value of a (G-di. Hence. man is

grcriter thün G-d.

When enaminin? Socrates' presrntation of the threr wüvrs. severül rlrments of

Socrütcs' description translate easily to elemrnts of Nazi prxticr. In so far as both males

as krnüles plinicipütrd rqually as participants in the Nazi project. one cm srr an example

of thc de-eroticisation of women. In Socrates' first wave. men and women train for battle

tosrthrr in the gyrnnasiurn. while in Nazi Germüny. men and women participate togethcr

in ihc kill ing machine. The infiltration of Nazi propüganda into children's schools. the

iisc of children and the incredihle strensth of the Nazi youth wins are quite sirnilx to

Si>cr;itcs' second wave. ahere chi ldrrn are raisrd communall y. outsidc thc private

ilirisdiction of n parentlchild relationship. In actuality. the wholc destruction of the

pritatc bphcrt. in Nazi Germany reinforces this conneciion. If Hitler \vas a leader who

h r r k buundaries in hoth thought and action. and wiis bound by ooihing. Hitler çan he

rccn a\ ;i potcnrid conscquence of Socraies' third wave. the rule of the philosopher king.

4licliacl hlairus. in his work. Thc Holoc~i~ts i ~ i Hisrop.. argues. "In the final

;inalpi\ ihr. dcstruçtion of the Jews was not so rnuch ri product of Iaws and çommands as

i t wüs u mitter of spirit. of shüred comprehrnsion. of consonance and

'14 \ynçtirc~nizÿtion."- The Nazi "Final Solution". the Nuremberg Lriws. and al1 the

ciipcnic projwts thüt are associütrd with the Nazi projcct. are al1 consistent with a

iiiis3ppruprt;ition of ii microcosmic scalc upon the macrocosm. This is only reinforcrd hy

rhc t x r thai Niizi soldien ciimed panicular collections of quotations from Nietzsche with

r hcni. Nictzsc he. whose message was intended to influence a panicular k w individuais

on ihc niicrwosmic .;cale. wlis lippropriated "en müssc" as an i d for trünsmittina the

niümicoiniic messase. However. to fully grasp the connection between Socratcs'

axninr and Nazi hscism. several key questions musc be askrd. Firstly. was Germany in

;i period of spiritual crisis before Nazi hscism. and was Nazi hscism a proposed

soliition'? Srçondly. is Nazi hscisrn a misappropriation of a microcosrnic order on a

mücrocosmic scale'l Finülly. was this misappropriation hcilitated by techne'? Jrffrey

i -I hImui \ . h1iciilit.I R.. Thc Holcicriust in Historv London: Penguin Books. 1987 p. 49

Herf provides the answers to these questions. in his work Rrrictioricin Modemisni:

Tc~c.liriolo,q~. cli1till-r m d p01iric.s i~ i Weim~u- m d the Tlrird Rricli.

In his hook. Herf rxplains thai the history of the Weimar Republic is çustomarily

dividcd into three periods. "The fint period". begins Herf. starts in Novrmber 19 18 with

the Gcrnitin defeat in World War 1. "followed by the imposition of the Versailles treriiy.

rc~.olutioniiry uphravals frorn the Left. civil war and counterrevolutionary rimicd

rcymnw t'roni t hc ~ i ~ h t . " ~ " W ithin t his prriod. the Gcrman population witncssed the

French wcupation of the Ruhr. and escalaiing intlation rates that angcired the rniddle

clas\ and "wrükencd the strength of the republic's strongest defenders in the trade unions

~ i n d in ihc Socin1 Demouritic ~ ü n y . " ~ " This prriod wüs replüccd by whai is rrcognizrd

a s ;i "\t;ihilization period". in which the German population was bombardrd with

Aiiicriciin Fordism. causin_e i t to re-orient itself to goals of tiscül eftïcirncy. N'hile this

period c»uld he ciitcgorizcd hy "rxpanded invrstmeni and rritionalization in industry". it

did not succced in consistently restructuring G e n a n institutions. The Gctrman people.

havin; lost thcir scnse of self in what they percrived to be the trtigic rnding of the First

Worid W w çould not properly restore their scnse of selves within the model of Arnerican

Fordisni. The Anirrican attrmpt at applying their microcosmic ordrr upon Germüny. ü

distinct rnicrocosrniç unit on the global scale was a hilure. Consrquently. bciwrrn 1929

and 1933. "unemplo yment and political extremes grew. the centre parties shrrink. (and 1

the lower rniddle clriss becrime attracted to the Nazis. .. n.2 l ?

'1' Hcrt: Jct't'rc!. Rcacrionriru bfodt.mism: Ttxhnolocv- culture. and politics in Weimar and the Third Reich Ncw \rmork: Crirnhridgc University Press. 19% p. 19

:Ir' Il>i<b. p. I Y II - 1 M . . p. 3 1 -

Herf rxplains that within the Germün Righi after World War I. there existed a

mult i tudc of wri ters who voiced opinions for a more nationalist ideological approach.

These uriicrs. collrcr ive ly known as the "consrrvative revolution". argued against the

LVèiniar Rcpiiblic. idrntifyins it with "the lost wrir. Versailles. the intlation of 1923. the

Jc\\.r. cosiiiopo l i ilin n ias cul turc. and polit icd liberalism.""hith its membcrs

inçliitling sanie of Gcrmcmy's most notrd intellects. such as Spengler. Junger. and

5l;innlicini. the consenutive revolutionists were found to be quitr artrictive to rhs niiddle

c i m . md thc rcvdution took place "in and around universities. political clubs. and

..: ] \ )

i i iüga~i ne$. Theu inîiuenccd the German peoplc to recovcr their lost soul. and to hark

hock 10 "thc niudern bat t le field and trenchrx". where ihey wère most Germün.

LVitli tliiz as thc çontext hehind the evolution or Nazi tüscism. it is easy ro notice

thnt Gcniiany tiras in a prriod of spiritual crisis after their defeat in the First World War.

Tlic proud Grrnian peoplc. who would have conqucred Europe without the ~fcii.s es

I ~ C - l i i t t ~ l entrnnce of the United S tatrs into the Wu-. hÿd been rrducrd to impotence. The

nlitionalist ideolo_oy thüt had brought [hem to the pinnricle of thrir glory had been

sniashed. replucçd hy interna1 fracturizaiion. American cultural imperdism. and social

dienation. The?. li kr the Athenians sftrr the Peloponnesian War. had lost the essence of

tvhu tlicy were. and could not hthom what they had become. The "German Soul". or the

set of practices and perceptions that defined the prinicular Grmiin experience of

csistençe. was irreconciiablr with the contemporary condition of the Germcin population

indi\-iduall y and nation lis a whole. In post World War 1 Gemany. the Gcrmün

population wris a lost people.

I t is in this historical context that Nazi fascism emerged. Nazi fascisrn attempted

to reçonstitutr ii German understanding of self that was able to account for their defeat in

thr First World War. This nrw understanding of self would recognizc that Germany

itsell' W ; I ~ not the cause of its own demise. Insterid. it would understand that. "Jewish

;tb~trxii»n wüs dicn to the autonomous lik rlement of the German ~olk ." '~" It was

"Jeu ihh nilitcrialisin" that had infiltrated and poisonrd the purity of the Aryan race. and

conscq~icnily t~irnishcd its prima1 lik instinct. Nazi tàsçism. from the Nurembrrr Iaws to

iIic "Finiil Solutiun". was recognized as a means hy which the Germany people rrrnove

iIiciii\clvrs froni their spiritual çrisis hy being ahle to cxplain their rxpcrience through the

4i;ircJ wrrürcliing mctüphor of ihc German Volk.

Ir a v a h preïiously mentioned that Nazi soldies carried ii paniculür selrction

Sictzsçhclin ciphorisnis in their pockrts. This is signiticant to note. because the

niicriicosniiç order driiwn upon hy the Nazis was borrowed from Nietzsche. In his Olt rire

Gt*,lc(rlog>* of' iClords. Xirtzsche writes. "the more normal sickliness bccomes anlong

nicn-and wc çünnot den. its normality-the hieher should be the honour üccorded the r x c

cascs o f Srciit powcr of sou1 and body. man's litcX7. ~iirs."'" To bqin to understand the

riimitïçations of sicklincss among men. it is probübly easiest to compare it with

Nietzsçhe's understanding of hralth. In Tiw Will t o Powrr. Nietzsche suggests that a nian

ih hcalthy "when hc can Iüu_gh at the srriousnrss and ardour with which he has dlowed

hiiiisclf to bc Iiytori:cd to any rxtent by iiny drtail in his lifr.""' From this. one ciin

initiolly ascenain that heiilth is not primarily a degrec of physical w l l heing. but a

y '1 \

- - m. p. 192 "' Nict lsche. Frtt.dcrich. On thc Gcnerilocv tif blor~ls and ECCC Homo. trrins. Walter Kautmrinn New 1-orl: \ Ïni ïgc Books. I Y 89. 3" Essûy. # 14 s . 7 - --- i7w ICïII ro Power. Op. Cir.. #233

condition of sel f-acceptance. To be healthy is to love onesslf enough that man. as

Nietzsche piits fonh. is ashamed of his repentance."""n so far as sickliness is in

iipposition with rare cases of great power of sou1 and body. it should not br üssumed that

hcnlth esclideh the physical realm. This is drrnonstrated in Nietzsche's daim that purely

pychiciii practiçes shoiild thrmselves bc decried as ditngrrous to the health. As he

rigtitl! si~gfcsis. "No invalid is ever cured by prüyrrs or by the exorcising of rv i l

\pirits.**'2J

Wlien a nian is i l l . according to Nietzsche. it is his very goodncss that is sickly.

Tlic iiinn tinds himsclf "reopening old wounds. wüllowin_o in self-çonternpt and

~c~rcssion.""' For Nietzsche. sickliness is the condition whcre man rejrcts his oun

csccll~ncc. and rcpents his power. Whcn in this condition. man çowers from his own

poteni iül i t y. and toçiises 111 1 his rnergies on rqret and remorse. In essence. man is no

longer nian. With this understood. the readrr can move hack to the original stliternent.

mi bcgin to interpret Nietzsche's diügnusis. For Nietzsche. it is bcçoming more and

niore nuriiial for humanity to rejcct ifs own humanity. Rather than striving for

cscellencc. i t tïnds itself wallowing in self-pity. Man has lost its manhood.

Fiirt hern-iore. in those rxe instances where man does act. as man should. he does so

hlindly. upi thout recognizing the significance of the action. It is for this reasoo that

Nietzsche clin idcntify these moments as " l i i c ~ lIit5'.

Nietzsche concludes the first piirügrüph of the aphorism by stating. ". . . we should

protect the well-constituted t'rom the worst kind of air. the air of the sickroom." and then

asking. *.Is this donr'?""b For the reader. the question now becomes. *'What is the air of

ihe sickroom. iind how does this endanger the healthy?" This question is answered

iiirtüphoricülly in Thirs Spoke Lmtirirstnr. through Ziirathustra's conversation with the

t'irc hound.

Ziirnthustrci hesins his discussion hy explainine that the ranh "hüs ü skin. and this

1 17

&in hi15 diwrixs."--' In so h r ris the exth's skin is the location of these diseases. i t must

hc iinclcrstocid that the air of the sickrooni cxists throughout the Fice of the ranh.

Thercibrc. thcre is no physiçal area of the world whrre bad air does nor rxist. This is

\ignilïcünt in so far as i t is plain thÿt Nietzsche does not suggcst thüt hcalthy man should

hc iwlntcd iind preservcd: i t is the air itself thüt must he puritïcd.

hccording to Zanithustrÿ. the "tire hound" has pollutrd the air. which is itself one

~ t ' i h c carth's discrises. The t'ire hound. which feeds t'rom the surface of the eürth. is

Jcicrihtxi as hcing "salty. mendacious. and superficial". which darkens the world with

- 3

~isties iind srnol<e.--' 1n profcssing to support freedom. the tire hound sells the belirf that

if nian t r w s life with contempt. life will rise again "with godlike I'eatures. arductivc

3 Tl)

iiiroiigh sulkrinp: and verily. it will yet thank you for hüving ovenhrown item*--

I t is only when Zrirathustra recomrnends to the fire hound and its scum-devil

;issociatrs thüt they let thrmselves be ovenhrown so that they could retum to life. that the

rcridcr fully understand what the fire hound represenis. When Zarathustra makes his

rrconimrndation for "all that is wrak with agr and weiik in vinué'. he refcrs directly to

kings and ~hurchrs.~"' When the hound intempts Ziathustra by asking what a church

is. Zarathustra snrips brick. '"This is a kind of state. ..but be still. you hypocritical hound!

Yo~i knou. your own kind bçst !""' However. just as the state polluies the air with its

m o k e iind scuni. 30 to does the church. for i t is itself a kind of state. Both believs

tlicni~rlve\ to hc "ialkinp out of the belly of reality". riich wanting to be recognized üs

thc niost iniponant.

In tranmittins the microcosmic perception upon the macrocosm. Nazi fiiscisrn

rnildc the üssurnprion that the wholr of Grrman culture wüs sick. Dreply embçdded in

tlic corc c i l ' d l Nazi ideolqy stood the premise thüt the entire Germün sou1 was bcin:

pol1utc.d hy "the potver of money.. .the Jewish rnatrrialist suffocating emhraçt: of

t Gcmiün i l i k tilcnients.""' Nazi tàscism saw in the Jew whüt Zulithustra noticed in the

"tire tio~ind". The Grrmün world was blackened and polluted hy the parasitic Jrw. who

kcl o f f its trcnpth and hid brhind the cloud of his own lies. Herf notes. "At the centre of

dl Sazi vicws.. .siood a mythic historical construction of a racial battle between Ayan

and JCW. hlood and pld."'" This is fundamcntülly correct. for in misappropriiiting

Nictrsçhe's arguments upon a macrocosmic scde. Nazi fascism determined that the

culniinating element in the reviialization of the German Volk would be the purge of its

cliwasc. and the rrawükening of its sel f-responsibility. In Hrideggeriün terms. the

Gcniian K d k could only achieve the authenticity required for resoluteness if they

prcparcd thernselves to hear iheir cal1 to conscience.

I t is through the metaphor of cultural sickness that one can fully understand the

Srizi treütnlent of the Jews that lead to the Final Solution, and the concurrent

rcvitülizütion of Gennan culture. In a Jünuüry 3orh. 1939 iiddress to the Reichstag. Hitler

uxrned his listenrn. *'If the international Jewish financiers outsidr Europe should

\~icçrcd in plunging the nations once more into a world war. then the rrsult will not be

ilir holshwisution of the ranh. and thus the victory of Jrwry. but the annihilation of the

..'.id Jcwi\h i'acc' in Europe. N u i t'ascisrn was distinct from any othcr hm of i'ascism

hccoiiw i t t u s grounded on the anti-Semitic notion that identi tird the Jew lis the produçt

i i t ' thc "had air" which poisoned the Grrman soul. Bccause of this. the Nazi treatmrnt of

I I I C "Jcwish Qi~t'stion" couid he parallrlrd io a doctor's treatment of a dismse. Germün

Iegi\lntiun uwkcnrd the position of the Jew in Grman society. just as an iintibioiic

~ittacks and wcakenh a virus. By placing the entirc Jewish community in ghettos. the

N u i resinic. \vas able to isolate the "Jewish disease". Most horrificall y. hy implementing

t hc Final Solution. tlirough eu p i c s projects and concentration camps. the Nazi regimt:

put into motion the means by which the entire "disease" would be drstroyed. leaving no

lingering eflècts. Finallu. Hitler's persona1 intrrest in creating a musrum to document his

triuniph owr the Jswish prohlem can dso be understood as a means of documenting a

casc wdy . so that in case ii sirnilar problrm occurs. one could referencr his '-succrss".

I f N u i hscism was a misappropriation of a Nietzschean microcosmic ordrr upon

ii Gernian rniicrocosmic state structure. and it was used üs means of removing the

conditions of n post World War I Grrman spiritual crisis. did feclrrzc have a role in

dlorvinp this misappropriation to occur'? To this question. Herf admantly argues y.

In Retrctioiitii~. itIo<lrniis~~i. Herf argues that within the period of post-First World War

Gcrmiin y. u cultural tradition that he calls reactionliry modernism grew to becorne the

Gcrnian y idsology within the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. Reactionary

iiii~dcrnim. ils ü n important current within Nazi idrology. attrrnptrd to reconcilr mti-

niixicrn Gerrniin niitionalisrn and modern technolog. For the reactionary modsrnist

t li inkcr. ..Gcrniunp could he Imir technologicall y adviinced triid trur to its ~oul."~-" As

;in t i t t x hricil«gic;iI virwz could onl y lead to national bückwardness and impotence. it was

ttic \ icw 01' thc reactionary modemist thinkrrs that it wah only through the dsvel«prncnt

iiI'tcchn«l«g that Gcirmiiny would have the power to recover its lost soul.

Hcrf noici thür idcologists have the übility to "transform sentiment into

\ i y i liçiince iind makc i t sociall y ü*miliible" throuzh symbolism. mrtaphor and

' :O n o . Thc e1Tect of the reactionary modernists was the ability to hring the

di scordiinr nicaninp of Trci~iiik and Kitlrctr into a uni tïcd framework. Culture was

tniclitiimlly identified with the Gtinieimiwji (comrnunity i existence. and thus ernbedded

in a lanpuap of blood and communiiy. Technology. üssociatrd with the GrseltshciJr

i wcier y existence. was traditionally embedded in the languasr of modem materidism.

I t \vas this wt of metaphors. practices. and perceptions thüt Nazi fiiscism associated with

thc Jewish community. As a people without a land of their own. the Jewish people

reprcsented the love of wealth and productiuity associated with the Geseltskrrji

cnpcrience. Conscquently. the success of reactionary modernism wüs the ability to

resi t iiütc tec hnology in the lanpagc and mrtaphor of the Gonicirisiioj~: "communi t y.

S . . . - - Hcrt'. Op. Cir., p. f . . -'<'N. p. 16

blood. will. self. form. productivity. and finally race.""' Thus. the Autohdzn becamr a

y i h o l of Geman power. just as the trench warfüre of World War 1 becamr symbolic of

the vigilance of t h s Gcrman Volk.

By intcgating technology into the Ianguagr and metüphors of the Grrman Volk.

9 i i ~ i t'riclcim uw able to translate the microcosmic Nietzscherin principlt-s into the

iiiiicrocomiiç muçture of the rntire Nazi Gerrniiny. In essence. the advancemm of

tcclinolw~.. and the "teçhnologizing" of Cermany wüir the condition that must penain in

ordcr tbr the mihüppropriation of Nietzsche to ocçur. It was the National Sociiilist goal

..tu lihcratc tcchnology from the domination" of Jrwish materialisrn."?hr: propagation

01' N a ~ i idcolog) Jependrd on. as Herf recounts. "An üppeal io librriite n \+dl or rclos suid

t c ) in h m n t in the force3 of production irom restrictions irnposed by the existing

' z c j hcwr:ci)is hociil1 rdutions of production."-' The will that the Germiin people hiid heen

cimvinccd to liherüte aüs their own. and thüt will wüs tcchnology. Withoui technolo_oy.

thc hoiindüry hcturrn cornmunity and society. culture and civilization. could not be

blurrcd t« a110w the misappropriation of the microcosm upon ihc macrocosm.

Il' onc çomrnits to thoroughly reading Plato. a panicular trend may rrnerge in

one'\ txperience with the writing. and that is the recurrent discovery of the sentiment.

"do what y111 arc best fitted for." It is the inherent goal of al1 humans to excel at being

humlin. to würch for inner completrness and consistency. To order onesrlf is to seek out

thc consistsncy which best tits one's own nature. and strive to rnaintain that consistrncy

to liw the best lifs. Wowever. Plato warns. do not assume chat because one has been

wcçesstU1 ut tinding inner consistrncy. that one is fundamentally completr. While one

could be sucçrssfully at harmonizing one's inner diversity. every human is still an

dcnient O t' a macrocosmic whole. For Plato. that whole is pattemed change. For us. it

iiiay very well be soniething dil'frrent.

Tu lose si_oht of that macrocosmic whole. or rosaros. is taniamount to

cspcricncing ci spiritual crisis. Spiritual çrisis is the inribility to reçoncile one's own

c.ipcricncc iviih Liny prwiously held set of metaphors. Iiinpuiise. signs. or syrnhols. This

condirion ci~ild inspire the crelition of nrw nietaphors. signs. Ianpage or sy mhols that

icrw t o nicJi;ltc the rdationship humans have with the cosirlos. Becüusr this is ohen a

difliciili choicc. it is niore cornmon thüt the people choose to dismiss the existence of the

ni;icrocosiiiiç whole all together. Consequentl y. people traditionall y put their hi t h in

iimicthinp tliat produces tanpible. if not çomplete. results. In Plato's time. i t was a rediilr.

.At thc tiirn of the twenty-tirst century. it is technolog.

Thc danger of dismissing the co.sitro.s in its entirety is thal we. as humans çould

conwivc of the iiniversr as something void of order. and waitinp for lin ordrr to be

r~t;iblished. Socrates is i i w m of this danger. and through the use of the noble fiction. h r

citttin~pts tu reshape the means by which his entourage engasrs the world around them.

Ploto w m s . through the fifth Book of Repipltblic. that drüwing an order frorn the

riiicrocosmiç realm to üpply to the macrocosrnic structure is tantamount for disaster. for it

crcütes nui the best possible regime. but the worst possible regimr. It is his hop.. that by

reordrring thrir souk so that their lust for honor is moderated md dominatrd hy their

will to n i l e for the bcst interest of dl Athenians. h r can prevent the coming of iyranny.

whai he considers to be the worst possible order.

The Nazis. in misappropriating incomplete elemrnts of the Nietzschean doctrine

i incomplcte. üs Nietzsche was entirely anti-nationalistic ). created the worst possible

rcpinir.. . a ivninny. This tyranny was responsiblr for a set of unique atrocities thüt only

w r w tu fiirthcr denionstrate itz status as perverse and evil. When one examines elements

d' B u i kiscisi doctrine in reirospect of Socrates' '~Three wavrs". one can only funhrr

rccognize iiic fu l l conscqurnces of this misappropriation.

Que tu viennes du ciel ou de l'enfer. qu'importe O Braute! Monstre enorme. rffr~yant. ingenu!

Si ton oeil. ton souris. ton pied. m'ouvrent la porte D'un Infini que j'aime et n'ai jamias connus'?

Hyrinr ri Brmire - Charles Baudelaire

This philosophical life is a way of being in the world in which the practitioner of

p h i l i ~ p h y drdicütes the essence of his existence to cultivüting his self. so that he çan be

;in open rt.ccptricls for the intimations of tnith provided t'or him hy a universal and hencr

tiiacriicosriiic order. Only ii human can be philosophicai. for i t requires n sel f-çonscious

rcwgnition ut' human limitation and rnonality. Wisdom is not ri pr ix to he won. nor ri

platforrn d huniiin aptitude to be reached. It is instead a condition of k i n g that

scci~gnizc~ human limitation. yet works within the given guidelines to cxperience as

iii~icli ~ i s possihlc.. so that the conglomeration of internalized püst experiençes hcçornçs

iiiorc and niore wbtle at idrntifying new experirncc.

l t is Ior this ruson that the philosopher has no answers to give. for al1 his

knowledgc i persona1 knowlrdge. As human life is of finite duration. and the multitude

i~t'cxpcriençes within the univrrse are infinite. one can never have cornplete clarity and

~indcrstünding when detïning experiencr. The philosopher's wisdom is threefold. Firstly.

the philosopher. in being aware of the human condition. has dedicated his lifr to pursuing

cxperiencr. and thus can give a subtle (ihough not cornplete). definition of çxperirnce.

Sccondly. the philosopher is able to recognize that as his devrlopment of experiencrs is

distinct. no one çan understand him with the sarne crnainty thrit he understand himself.

In essence. e x h person possesses his own t x i t dimension. which he uses for

understanding the süme way the philosopher does. The philosopher's wisdom allows hirn

io recopizr thüt some people do not have ü sufficiently. or properly developed tacit

dimension. to allow them to approximate the knowledge that he wishes to share. Thirdly.

$*en the lirst two aspects. the philosopher's wisdom allows him to mitigate betwern the

t\w. givinp him the judeement io decide what to share with whom. and how to sharr it.

1t i h in this context that I cün evoke Socrates' "noble tiction". and state thrit it

cannut bt. heen tu sharc the same char;icteristics of a lie. Whcn one looks at the manner i t

ws u d . ivho i t upüs usrd for. and why it was usrd. the noble tiction must he seen as the

c s x t opposite. Socrütrs used the noble tïction. üs a way of addressing a truthful mcssüge

io Glauccin and Adeirnanius. Only through this vrhiclr of fiction çould the brothers

iindcrstand Socrotes' meaning. and perhaps lram from it. The use of this fiction

Jcnionstrate\ hoth prudence and purpose. and althouzh it wüs not entirel y succrssful in

tlic c h c n ~ c of the dialogue. the reüder of Rrpithlic is succrssfully influrnced by Socriitrs'

words.

But what of Socrates' purpose? I have q u e d throu~hout this work that Socrates

iiscd thc nohlc tïction to remove the lies rmhcddrd in the souls of his entoura_oe and that

hc did $0 to prrvent thrm from misunderstünding his search for justice as ü lrsson on the

rcihlrrio of rulrrship. i t hen furthered the argument by stating that Socrates' fwred this

i i i i h i i nderstanding. because i t could allow Glaucon and Adeimantus an opponunity for

reco_enizin_o rhe universi: as lacking order. and that it was their responsibility to

niisiippropriate thcir personal srnses of order upon the cntire political unit. I l this is a

rcnst>ncihlc interpretation. as 1 believe i t is. then one must ask the question: 1s this

niisundrrstiinding distinct to this scenwio. or possibly much funhrr reaching3 Strauss

\\.rote ahout the need for philosophicd texts to be writtrn rsoterically. because there

always h a bren a struggie between politics (the lut of making do with imperfection) and

ptiilosophy (the srarch for the tleeting moments of perfection ). Can this suggest that al1

wiirches Ior wisdom. if misappropriated from the personal realm onto the macrocosmic

scalrn. have the potrntial for hrcoming idrological. or tyrannical? And what of

iiioderniiy? Can one argue that the entire modem projrct is a misappropriation of

B;iciminn principles iipon the rntire western. and now ?lobal world? Is Rousseau's

Gcntxn an actunlization of this misappropriation? 1s More's Utopic~ ideoiogicrilly similrir

t u thc Nazi projtxt. and is Girllirur's T m - r l s and conscientious iittriçk on dl of this?

Thcsc. arc dl qiicstions thüt need to bt: iisked. if wc are ro have the courage to be human

in to rhc ncst tiiillt.nniiirn.

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