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Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agenciesand their contractors;Administrative/Operational Use; 10 NOV 1967.Other requests shall be referred to Office ofthe Adjutant General (Army), Washington, DC20310.

AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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SECURITY MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies

to eacli page, unless otherwise marked.

Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFI-ECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TiiANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When governaent or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a defi- nitely related government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY omcs or rum ADJUTANT wtMCNAi.

WMMIMOTON. DC. Wtl«

AGAM-r (M) (7 M«r 68) FOR OT U)-67X186 13 March 1968

CO CO

<

SUBJECT: ConbaC After Action Uport • Battl« of AN THACH, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, 3d Bda TF, 4th Infantry Dlvlalon, Period of 20 August 1967 (U)

SEE DI5TIIBUT10N

I. Subjact report !• forvardad at Incioaura Cor ravltw and avaluatlon In accordance with paragraph 3b, AX 323«13.

2« Information contained in thia report it provided to Insure appro- priate benefits in the future fro« lessons learned during current operetions end aay be adapted for use in developing training tsaterlal.

BY QKDEK OF THE SECRETAJtY 0* THE AIMYi

I Incl as

DimiBunoN

^ KENNETH C. «CKHAM Major General, USA The Adjutant General

and

oasaanding Centrals US Continental Arwy Coseaand US Anry Coabat Developments C

oessendants US Aray War College US Arery Coanend and General Steff College US Ar«y Adjutant General School US Anay Air Defense School US Army Armor School US Army Artillery and Missile School US Army Aviation School US Army Chemical School US Army Civil Affairs School US Army Engineer School US Army Infantry School US Army Intelligence School

^D D C

APR 1119(3 ,|| n1

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified indosure.

•This dooucmt conlalrn infornwtl.i nrf-ot,'-^ tJ;o NatlocaA Oefenae of tb9 Ih-.'K'I 5tftt«j s'. • s'.-« t. • »/'.::lr.g of tl)9 / IspKnege I*i»3, Iltla 13, U. S. C. , T'Ct;»!, • JI r„nj ?94. 1 Xl3 transalsalon or tho rut^'-iai,:. uf Hi; Ctuitii:»j :a toj fujior to on uiMuU-cnl.od pers^a is ^runltit.o^l by las.'

DISTR1RUTI0N (Cont'd) US Army Medical FUld Strvlca School US Army Military Pollca School US Army Missile and Munitions School US Army Ordnance School US Army Quartermaster School US Army Security Agency School UC Army Signal School US Army Southeastern Signal School US Army Special Warfare School US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished: Office, Chief of Staff, US Army Deputy Chiefs of Staff Chief of Engineers Chief of Research and Development Aasistant Chiefs of Staff The Surgeon General The Provoat Marshal General Reseerch Analysis Corporation (Library) Dr. Martin J. Bailey, OSD(SA) Defense Documentation Center Planning Reaearch Corporation CG, 5th Infantry Diviaion

i CO. 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry

i

*! 'Vnr.^iOf iß Mormber 1967

SUBJECTt Conbat Operations After Action Report

s

1. Name of Operation; Battle of An Thach.

2. Data of Operation: 201100 to 202000 Auguat 1967.

3. Location: An Thach Hamlet, Duo Pho Diatrlct, Quang Ngai Prorlnc«, RV.l.

4« Command and Control Headquarters:

a. 2d Battalion, 35th Infantrx.

b. Reporting Off leant

(1) LTC Norman L. Tiller, Sr, 00, 2d to, 35th Infantry.

(2) CPT Larry V. Hicks, CO, Go A, 2nd B>» 35th Infantry.

(3) CPT Jamet L. Lindsay, 00, Co 0, 2d Bn, 35th Infantry.

(U) CPT Willl*B E, Hocker, CO, Co C, 2d Bn, 34th Armor.

(5) 1LT Hooar L. Krout, Platoon Leader, Reconnalsoance Platoon, 2d Bn, 35th Infantry,

c: Task Organlaations

a. Coa^iany A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infmtry«

b. Company B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry.

c. Team Hooker 1 Ccmpany C, 2d Battalion, 34ih Amor and Refomu seance Platoon, 2d Bn, 35th Infantry,

6, Supporting Forcest

a. The Tactical Air Ooatrol Party attached to the brigade pro- Tided an airborne forward air controller (FAO) on' lanedlate motioe. The PAC played a rltal role aa an aerial obeerrar, by informing the ground eanander« of enemy moreraent and dispoaitions and by using marking roakete to indicate enemy locations.

b. Obsemtlon hellooptera from 3d Brigade Arlation Section maintained «lose eurriillanee of the lomedlate contact area and adrlaed ground elamenta of eneoy moveoerte.

Downyraded at S year inUnxxit DtcUuiifitd afUr It y«ara DOD DIE itoOJO

FOWOT «10

AVrc-O-OP 10 Nombvr 1967 S' FCTt Co&bftt Operationa After Action IUp«H

c. Gunahip« form the 174th Aviation Coapany «oraraA poaaibla routwa of anaqy withdrawal prrr«ntia«'tha anaay from «aoaping, f

V .

7« Inttlllgtncei

a. Weath«n Ob 20 Auguat 1967, fron 1130 hour« to 1630 hour« -who tamparatur« rariad fron 92 degraea to 97 dagraaa F; vlaibility WM aavan to tan allaa and the wind waa fIT« to tan knote from the south- southwest» Vialhility waa excellent with scattered cirrus douda at 15,000 feet. y

bt Terrain« The site of the battlefield wae characterized by thick bamboo and cacti hed^erova famine Irnlgular reotenglee with flat open ground between than. Concealed behind theae hedgerow« the aneigr h--A. excellent fields of fi."«. The hedgerows afforded the eneny natural obstaola« not easily penetrated by a dismounted soldier.

c. Enesjyt A reinforced rifle ooopany of approximately sixty men was the antagonist In this eontaet. They fought desperately, from bunkers and trenches, to hold on to their positions without success. The enemy was quickly encircled. Realising hi» predicament he attempted to escape to the west» aoviqg from trench to trench pausing only long «hough to fir« a few burst« and move again* Realising that he was trapped, his resistance beoaas fanatical and sereral enemy soldiers made suicidal charges at tanks with automatic weapons. The enemy choae to die rather than surrender. Other« atteayted to evade by taking refuge in family bu-iknn. They war« diecovered by friendly element« making a final search of the battlefield. They, too, refused to surrender and oontlnued to resist until they ware killed. The 2d Company, 97th En, 2d VC Regiment, Jd NVA Division wai identified from captured documenta. A captured per- eooneL roster listed forty-one men present for duty, fourteen men wer« on other ciissions, sick leave, or RAH. This unit was equipped with twenty- «even weapon« as indicated by a captured weapons roster. Eighteen of tboee veapona were eapturvd, listed below in paragraph lib.

d. Analysis« The 2d Company, 97th Bn, 2d VC Regiment aasenbled its forces in the Village of An Thaoh presumably to accos^Oish one of two Bissions. One mission could hare been to conduct an attack on a nearby ?. f, ootpoet. Another po««ibllity would have been to evacuate the unit by boat t« Binh Dinh Provinoe. The nount of ^amunition collected from the bodies «as sufficient for th» enemy to moont and sustain a limited srttack} however, their sixty-man company was kn inadequate force to engage a U. S. Company or base eanp. Nevwrthelea«, a unit of this sise could easily overrun a P. P. outpost. It can be safely assumed thrt the enemy Intended to stay only long enough to assemble forces and formulate final plans.

1

y kVlP-O-ap 10 November 1967 SUBJECT: Combat Operations Alter Action H*port

Ö. Mission: Ths nlssion of Team Hocksr (C/2-3i» Amor (-) and Recon Plat 2-35) «as to conduct a detailed search of the hamlet of An 7na, vicinity 35312454. Once contact with the «neogr was nude, by a hev.y tank section Investigating a "ground 4o air" fire report at 35800/69» Captain Hocker altered the nission to do«« with the enemy, Thivai£3ion8'of Company B and Company A were to block from the north and south resp^etivily and to aasist Tesa Hooker in the "mopping up" phase of the battle.

9. Concept of Operation: Evolving from the enemy's maneuvers and from the gerwrtl nature of the terrain, the concept was that Team Hocker would push the enemy from the hamlet of <ui Thach (2), vicinity 856004^4, to the west toward the open rice fields« Company B, operating 150C meters north of An Thach, was to aaasuvsr to the south, blocking enemy escape to the north} while Company A was air assaulted at BS805458, south of An Thach, to engage the enemy fleeing in that direction. Obser- vation aircraft were to keep watch over the open areas to the west.

10. Execution:

a. At 1118 hours the battalion net control station received a r«port from the 174th Aviation Company that a helicopter delivering reaupply to Team Hocker had received small arms fire from vicinity B58004£C, tDottt 5^0 meters northwest of Team Hocker's location. Captain Hocker oent a section of three tanks to the north, and at 1146 this sec- 'tlor.Teporied chasing two VC into a trench and killing on» at BS812455. Almost iMediately the tank section became heavily engaged from several m^y position« firing avttcmatie and semi-automatic fire. (See sketch 1),

■Oentaln Hooker deployed the remainder of his team to the northwest and reqtiested ah observation aircraft. The Brigade FAC, MaJ, Murray L. anith already airborne over the AO, was above the area of contact within five sdnotes. He was able to observe the main enemy force and advised Captain Hockar accordingly. By 1210 hours all of Team Hocker had deployed on line moving to the northwest and had killed two additional VC. At 1222 hour» two men f raa C/2-34 Armor (-) were winded when their tank was hit by «ncxplo«irs round of unknown type. The tank was not disabled and while they awaited aercmadical «vncuation the team »ontinued to pursue and to engage the anomy. At 1240 hours the battalion requested gunships to support the battlej they were on station fiva minutes later. C-ptain Hocker estimated the enemy force to bo at least a platoon and reported that they were moving to'the west. While Major anith and gun^hip pilots kept watch over the western edge of the hamlet, the tank-infantry team routed and killed eight enemy In trenches vicinity BS79646C. By 1315 huurs, eleven enemy had been killed end two friendlies wounded. The enemy was not attanpting a ra^id withdrawal but was being moved out by the firepower and the close order tactics of the tanks and

Con -f »dent »oJ

Co"f< dent {o^ U

AVDI-C-OP 10 Novembe. 1967 SUBJECT: Cocbat OporEtiono After Ictioa Report

infantry. Eiiony fire wva still moderat« to heavy «nd at 1313 hours LTC Tiller, the Battalion Conoander, ordered Company B to move from their location north of the battle area eouthwert toward the scene of oohtact.

b. As B/2-35 moved to the southwest UC Tiller directed them fron the *Ar, "When they were within 150 metere of An Taoh hamlet B Coi»- pany cl8r,ioyed or line and began searching to the south. , Team Hocker, still in con-act, reported another eneqy killed at 1358 hours. At H00 hours the Battalion Cocmnder alerted A Company to prepare to be picked up from

"^their location and be air assaulted south of An Thach. Between 1M00 and 1A17 hours. Team Hocker pushed through the last heavy enemy resistance, killin? fourteen enemy, many at pointblank range. (See sketch 2~). As soon a? Team Hocker reached the western edge of An Thach, Captain Hocker requested permission to reverse his course and move slowly back through the contact area. LTC Tiller granted permission and instructed the team to search the contact area for hidden 7C and for weapons and equipment. ;;hen Teac Hocker began the "mopping up" phase of the battle at 1A20 hours n total of 26 enemy had been killed and nine weapons, Including a 6Qmm mortar, had been captured.

o. As B Conpany swept on line to the southwest and Team Hocker ««arched on line back through the battlefield to the east. Company A was •ir assaulted south of An Thach, completing insertion at 1510 hours and be-on a syst ■matic search to the north. (See sketch 3}« • Team Hocker

sorted energy kills at five to ten minute intervals throughout the follow- \£ hour, bringing their total killa to 39 by 1505 hours. At 1630 hours

the Brigade S2 reported that Brigad» Aviation aircraft supporting the battle had killed eight VC and captured three weapons. At 1800 hours Conpany A engaged and killed two eneny anc captured two automatic weapons. Elements of A/2-35 and B/2-35 made contact with Team Hocker securing the pick up zone vicinity BS800A62, while the remainder of Team Hocker oon- tinued the search. Conpany B moved northeast towards their night location along the beach. The extraction of A/2-35 began at 1843. At 1905 with two platoons of Co A extracted, the rerviining platoon located a bunker with arned enery inside. The last lift »-as delayed until 2005 hours. In the Interim, 1A/2-35 killed five VC arH captured thtlr weapons. Fol- lowing extraction of 1A/2-35 the tank plr-\oon moved to Teen Hooker's night location. (See sketch 4 ).

d. Contact with the enaoy was moderate between 1100 and 1500 hours. Contact was light from 1500 until 2000 hours. Range of engagement varied from one deter to one hundred caters. Communication* were good within the contact area and also between reporting stations,

11, Results:

a« Ermay personnel losses ,.,., S3 KIA

•»••w Co^.Jeni i a I

C^rtf id<*i4»o ATOC-C-OP 10 Novanh^p 2067 SUBJECT: Conbat Operationo ATtw Action R«pwrt

b. b*«iir woapona seized:

(1) 6Qm Morv~» (conplet«) 1

(2) IW9 1

(3) SKS ...i 9

(4) Soviet Machinegun , 1

(5) BAR 1

(6) AJC-47 1

(7) ChicoQ SHC 1

(8) H-16 , 1

(9) M-l Carbine 1

(10) 45 cal automatic pUtol 1

12. Cannandere'e Analysis:

This victory can be attributed directly to the cooperation and teanuork of all the units and individuals involved. It la a lasting «naple of several wall trained units working toward a common goal. When the Initial report of eneny ground to air fire came in it was immediately relayed to the nearest friendly unit which took Inmediat« action. Captain Mocker's quick response coupled with the aggressive tactics and thorough search techniques of his team brought about this enemy defeat. This action points up the abeolute necessity of having air observation over the target. area» Major Smith« USMF, greatly Influenced the course of action by as- sirting Captain Hocker in the maneuver of his elements directly Into the enemy position. Major Smith continuously reported on the enemy maneuvers until the 3d Bde Aviation Section helicopters were able to arrive on the scene. This type of aerial observr.tion paid off handaome 7 in the ex- tremely high kill ration of this contact, fifty-three en-i'.iy KIA to tero US KIA. Continuous aerial observation allowed Captain Hook''" to maneuver his forces and defeat the enecy unit piecemeal. Captain Hocker repeatedly concentrated his forces in overwhelming strength at the enecy's location as reported by the aerial observers. This outstanding aoployment of tanks and infantry together, the firepowere and maneuver of the tanks with the close in fighting of the infantry, reeulted In the virtue annihiiÄtion of the 2d Ccopany, 97th Battalion, 2d VC Regiment.

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OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.O. 20310 Confldentiial I*. OMOU*

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Combat After Action Report - Operation AH THACH, 3d Bde TF, 4th Infantry Division

Oi»CH*»Tivl NQTia <ry^« •/ rwpmt m*4 #n«HMfv« *•*••)

Experiencga of unit encaged in countertnaurgencv operational 20 Au&ust 1967 « »u TMonm (fitir nmmm, mt4dl» tflttml. (••' W——J

CO, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, 3d Bde TF, 4th Infantry Division

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11. I^OMtO«IM« MILITAftV ACTIVITV

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

DD.'r..l473 UNCI.ASSIFIKP