496

The Weekly Law Reports,-April 1, 1977

II977J

[chancery division]

TITO AND Others v. WADDELL and Others (No. 2)

[1973 R. No. 2013]

TITO AND Others v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL B

[1971 R. No. 3670]

1975 April 8-11, 14-18, 21-25, 28-30; Megarry V.-C.May 1, 2, 5-8, 12-16, 19-23;June 3-5, 9-13, 16-20, 23-27, 30;July 1-4, 7-11, 14-18, 21-25, 28-31; „Oct. 22-24, 27-31;Nov. 3-7, 10-14, 17-20, 24-28;Dec. 1-5;

1975 Dec. 15-19;1976 Jan. 12-16, 19-23, 26-30;

Feb. 2-6, 9-13, 20, 23-27;March 1-5, 8-12, 15, 18, 19, 22-26. 29-31; ^April 1,2,5-9, 13, 14,27-30:May 3-7, 10-14, 17-21, 24-28;June 8-11, 14-18;

Nov. 29, 30;Dec. 1-3

E

Crown—Colony—Triisls—Phosphate island—Compulsory aajuisi-lion of land for mining under colonial legislation in name ofCrown—Lease by colonial official to mining commissioners—Royalties to be held " in trust " for islanders—Funds applicablefor benefit of island community and landowners—Whetherfiduciary obligation on Crown—Whether indivisibility (jfCrown imposing liability for colonial government's obligation p—Applicability of limitation period or doctrine of lachesWhether bar against Crown proceedings—Whether conflict ofinterest and duty—Whether breaches of self-dealing or fair-dealings rules—Mining Ordinance 1928 (Gilbert and ElliceIslands Ordinances No. 4 of 1928J, ss. 6, 7—Limitation Act1939 (2 & 3 Geo. 6, c. 21), s. 2 (2) (7)-—Crown ProceedingsAct 1947 (10 & 11 Geo. 6. r. 44), 40 (2)

Trusts—Nature of trust—Crown—Colonial official acting under qlocal legislation in name of Crown—Compensation and royalties to be held on "trust" for natives—"Trusts in highersense" and " trusts in lower sense "—Whether enforceabletrust or governmental obligation—Whether Crown trustee

Mines—Mining lease—Construction—Right to extract phosphatesfrom Pacific island—Obligation to " replant " with trees andshrubs—Prescription by resident ccimmissioner—Mining undertaking passing to mining commissioners—Abolition of office {.jof resident commissioner—Appointment of governor—Extentof obligation to replant—Whether prescription of trees enforceable obligation—Whether condition precedent—Whethermining commissioners liable under doctrine of novation—Whether liable under doctrine of benefit, and burden •Appropriate remedy—Damages

Mines—Mining lease—Construction—Removal of sand and shinglefrom " beach " of Pacific island—Extent of beach—Jurisdiction of English court in relation to foreign land

The XVeckly Law Reports, April 1, 1977

2 W.L.R. Tito V. Waddcll (No. 2) (Ch.D.)

A Contract—Benefit and burden—Pure or conditional doctrine-—Mining leases with replanting obligation—Government appointees taki^^benefits—Changes of appointees—Whether presentappointf^^able on obligation to replant—Whether obligationrunning^Wih land—Whether in law as well as ecpiity

Specific Performance—Obligation to replant—Suitability of remedy—Phosphate mining on island—Obligation to, replant withtrees and shrubs prescribed by colonial official—Whether

g prescription contractual or governmental obligation—Whethercourt able to prescribe—Difficulty of supervision—Need forconcurrence of all parties—Whether damages more suitable

Damages—Contract—Breach—Obligation to replant devastatedland—Measure of damages

In 1900 phosphate was discovered on Ocean Island, a smallisland in the Pacific. The island was called Banaba by the

Q inhabitants, and they themselves were known as the Banabans.•In the same year the island became a British settlement. In1900 and 1901 the Crown granted to a British companyexclusive licences to occupy the island and mine the phosphate. In 1902 those were superseded by the third and lastlicence, granted to a subsidiary of the company for a term of99 years from lanuary 1, 1902, and providing for certainpayments to be made to the Crown. From 1907 onwards the

Q payments were to be a royalty of 6d. per ton on all phosphatesexported; and in 1909 that royalty was made payable to theGovernment of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Protectorate bywhich the island was administered. In 1916 the protectoratebecame the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, and OceanIsland became part of it. At all material times English lawapplied to the island, apart from any relevant native customarylaw. The colony had a Residept Commissioner who admin-

E istered it under the High Commissioner for the WesternPacific.

The land on Ocean Island was divided up into a largenumber of small plots (most of them being less than one acre inextent) owned by individual Banabans or groups of Banabans.Under King's Regulations made by the High Commissionerunder the Pacific Orde-- in Council 1893 there were severerestrictions on the purchase and lease of land from native

F landowners, and the transactions that were permitted requiredthe approval of the Resident Commissioner. The companysought to avoid those restrictions by evolving " P and Tdeeds," under which the company merely bought the right toremove phosphate and trees from the land for five or ten years.By 1909 the legality of the P and T deeds was being questioned, and the company was finding it difficult to obtainfurther land for mining from the Banabans. Prolonged

G negotiations took place between the company on the one handand the Colonial Office in London and the High Commissioner and the Resident Commissioner on the other hand.Finally, the terms that should be put before the Banabans forthe acquisition of further land were agreed. In November1913 an agreement based on those terms (the " 1913 agreement ") was made between the Banaban landowners and thecompany, with the Resident Commissioner as witness to the

H signatures or marks. The 1913 agreement provided, inter alia,for the acquisitions to be made only in three specified areasof the island. In addition to agreeing to pay certain sums toeach landowner who granted mining rights to the company,the company agreed to pay the government an additionalroyalty of 6d. per ton. The first year's additional royalty(apart from £300) was to be expended for the benefit of theexisting Banaban community. Subject to that, the £300 andthe interest on those royalties were to be distributed asannuities to all Banabans who thereafter leased mining land

497

498

The Weekly Law Reports, April 1, 1977

Tito V. Waddell (No. 2) (Ch.D.) [1977]

to the company. The agreement also provided that the com- ^pany should return all worked-out lands to the original owners,and should " replant such lands—whenever possible—withcoconuts and other food-bearing trees, both in the lands alreadyworked out and in those to be worked out."

Pursuant to that agreement many Banaban landownersexecuted deeds granting the company the right to removephosphate and trees from their lands for a term ending in 1999.Two forms of deed were used, the A deeds where a P and T Bdeed was to be replaced, and the C deeds for new acquisitions.Each form of deed provided that when the company ceasedto use the land the company " shall replant the said land asnearly as possible to the extent to which it was planted at thedate of the Company's operations under Clause I (i) hereofwith such indigenous trees and shrubs or either of them asshall be prescribed by the Resident Commissioner for thetime being in Ocean Island and the land was to revest in Cthe landowner when in the Resident Commissioner's opinionthat might be without prejudice to the company's operations.

In 1920 the governments of the Unitea Kingdom, Australiaand New Zealand purchased the undertakings of the companyon Ocean Island and Nauru, a nearby phosphate island whichhad become mandated to the British Empire. All the rightsof the company on those islands were vested in three BritishPhosphate Commissioners, one to be appointed by each of the Dgovernments; but the governments agreed not to interfere withthe conduct of the phosphate business. Though they werereferred to as the " Board of Commissioners," the commissioners were never incorporated. The agreement was thatphosphates were to be allotted to the three countries on anon-profit-making basis and according to their percentageinterests, though in the event very little was ever sent to theUnited Kingdom. The change of ownership from the com- Epany to the commissioners was explained to the Banabans, whoall seemed satisfied. From 1923 onwards the commissionerswere seeking to acquire more land for mining. By 1927 theyhad agreed with the Colonial Office, the High Commissionerand the Resident Commisioner upon the terms that were to beput before the Banabans for a further 150 acres. The ResidentCommissioner then put those terms before the Banabans; butwith minor vacillations they strongly opposed any further pacquisitions.

The Mining Ordinance 1928 of the Gilbert and ElliceIslands Colony was then enacted, authorising the compulsoryacquisition of land in the colony for mining purposes. Underthe Ordinance the Resident Commissioner was empoweredto take possession of land, thereby making it Crown land.He could then lease it to the holder of a Crown licence tomine in return for compensation for the land (apart from Gminerals), which was to be fixed by arbitration, and a royaltyfor minerals, which was to be prescribed by the ResidentCommissioner. Under the Ordinance any compensation orroyalty was to be held by the Resident Commissioner " intrust" for the former owners of the land, subject to thedirections of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. In 1931,the Resident Commissioner, acting under the Ordinance, byproclamation took possession of 150 acres of phosphate land Hand leased it to the commissioners ("the 1931 transaction").The proclamation and lease provided for the commissionersto pay a royalty of 2d. per ton, to be accumulated in a" Banaban Provident Fund," and a further royalty of 8-1-d. perton, to be held (not saying by whom) " in trust" for theBanaban community generally as the Secretary of State shoulddirect. The provision in the Ordinance of 1928 for royaltiesto be paid to the former landowners was ignored. In 1937,however, the landowners concerned agreed to waive their

The Weekly Law Reports, April 1, 1977

2 VV.L.R. Tito V. Waddell (No. 2) (Ch.D.)

^ rights to royalties, and the Mining (Amendment) Ordinance1937 was enacted which amended the Ordinance of 1928 by(inter alia) removing any mention of a trust. It also providedthat ^^Ities should be paid to the Resident Commissionerwho to pay or apply them as the High Commissionerdirect^ for the benefit of the natives of the island or atollfrom which the minerals were derived. There was also aretroactive validation of past payments,

y In 1940 the Banabans petitioned the Secretary of State,seeking to acquire an island in the Fiji group which wouldserve as a second home for them, in view of the extent of themining on Ocean Island; and in 1942 Rabi, which was part ofFiji, was bought for them out of their funds. In the meantime the commissioners had made proposals to the Banabansfor the acquisition of a further 230 acres of mining land onimproved terms. The Banabans found the terms acceptable,though they wanted to have paid to them more of the moneythat was going to the funds being held for them; and no firmagreement was made. In 1942 the Japanese occupied OceanIsland. They killed or deported to other islands most of theBanabans, and devastated the island.

After the war ended in 1945 the High Commissionerarranged for the Banabans to be collected together; and asOcean Island was uninhabitable they agreed to go to Rabi for

Q an initial period of two years. In 1947 the commissionersnegotiated with the Banabans for the acquisition of most ofthe remaining phosphate land on Ocean Island, with an areaof 671 acres. The terms offered were an improved versionof the 1940 offer, but although the High Commissioner thoughtthem reasonable, they did not fully allow for inflation. TheBanabans had little knowledge of the value of phosphates andthe effect of inflation, and the officer whom the High Com-

g missioner had appointed to assist them on Rabi was instructedto take no part in the negotiations. Subject to a smallimprovement the Banabans accepted the terms offered. Soonafterwards, by a majority of some 85 per cent, in a secretballot that they conducted, the Banabans decided to makeRabi their headquarters and home, fn 1948, in return for anannual payment, the Banabans agreed to the commissionersremoving sand and shingle " from the beach at Ocean Island "

p for making concrete and other work. From 1956 onwardsthe Banabans sought increases in the royalties, and althoughthey were not legally required to do so, from time to time thecommissioners made certain increases; but they were considerably less than those which the Banabans claimed. In 1971the office of Resident Commissioner was replaced by that ofGovernor.

After various claims had been made by the BanabansG politically and internationally, in 1971 they caused a writ to

be issued against the commissioners and Her Majesty'sAttorney-General. For convenience, in 1973 the action wasdivided into two actions, one mainly against the commissionersbut with the Attorney-General a defendant (" Ocean IslandNo. 1 "), and the other against the Attorney-General alone(" Ocean Island No. 2 "). By consent. No. 2 was heard first,and No. 1 immediately afterwards.

H In Ocean Island No. 2, the plaintiffs were a Banaban landowner and the Council of Leaders, a Banaban body that hadbeen incorporated by a Fiji Ordinance which provided for allroyalties accruing to the Banaban community to be paid intoa fund under the Council's control. The plaintiffs claimedthat the rates of royalty payable under the 1931 and 1947transactions had been less than the proper rates, and that inrelation to those transactions the Crown had been subject to atrust or fiduciary duty for the benefit of the plaintiffs or theirpredecessors. The Crown was therefore liable to the plaintiffs

499

500

The Weekly Law Reports, April I. 1977

Tito V. Waddcll (No. 2) (Ch.D.) [1977]

to make up the amounts actually paid by way of royalty tothe amounts that ought to have been paid.

In Ocean Island No. 1, 12 Banaban landowners sued thethree British Phosphate Commissioners and the Attorney-General, with 14 Banabans as nominal defendants who tookno part in the proceedings. One plaintiff sued the commissioners for damages for the conversion of sand removed fromhis land and the destruction of a burial ground. Other plaintiffs sued the commissioners for the specific performance of gcontractual obligations to replant the worked-out land withtrees and shrubs, or alternatively for damages, and claimedagainst the Attorney-General a declaration that the UnitedKingdom Government, acting by the Governor of the Gilbertand Ellice Islands Colony, was bound to prescribe the treesand shrubs that were to be planted: —

Held, (1) that in Ocean Island No. 2 the use of the term" trust" in relation to the Crown did not necessarily create a qtrue trust, enforceable by the courts (a " trust in the lowersense"), but might create a "trust in the higher sense," orgovernmental obligation, not enforceable in the courts; thatit was a question of construction whether in all the circumstances a true trust had been created, one material factor beingwhether the person required to hold on trust was described inhis personal or in his official capacity; and that as there wasnothing in the Ordinances or in the various instruments or otherdocuments which sufficed to show that the Crown had undertaken any enforceable trust or fiduciary obligation such as wasalleged, none had been created (post, pp. 596g—597a, b-e, 602G-H, 603b, 605d-e, 607h, 610b, 6I4h—615a).

Kinloch v. Secretary of Stale for India in Council (1882) 7App.Cas. 619, H.L.(E.) applied.

(2) That neither the statutory duty under the Ordinance of1928 to fix a royalty and hold it in trust nor any statutory gduties imposed by the Ordinance of 1937 sufficed to imposeon the Crown any enforceable statutory obligation of a fiduciarynature; and that the principle that the Crown was one andindivisible did not make the Government of the United Kingdom liable for any equitable obligation of the Government ofthe Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony (post, pp. 607D-H, 608A-B. 609f-h, 611c~d. 613b-d. 614G).

(3) That in Ocean I.sland No. 1, under the agreement of p1948 for the removal of sand and shingle from the " beach,"the term " beach " was not confined to the foreshore, butincluded both the foreshore and all that lay to landward of itand was in apparent continuity with the beach at high watermark, or was more akin to the foreshore than to the hinterland; that the burial ground was not part of the beach andhad not been destroyed by the commissioners; that the sandtaken by the commissioners in about 1964 had been removed qonly from the beach, as so construed, and not from the burialground; that jurisdiction was not excluded merely because thesand had been removed from foreign land; and that in anycase the claim was barred by limitation and should be dismissed (post, pp. 644B-D, 646d, h—647a, 648d-f, 649a).

Government of the State of Penang v. Beng Hong Oon[1972] A.C. 425, P.C. applied.

(4) That the obligation to "replant" in the 1913 agreement Hand in the A and C deeds must be construed in its context, and.so construed, it was an obligation to replant the land as it wasafter it had been worked out or had ceased to be used by thecompany; that in the circumstances existing when those documents were signed " replant" meant planting in suitablepositions in the worked-out land in a few feet of loose phosphate and did not require the extensive levelling and otherengineering operations and the massive importation of soil forwhich the plaintiffs contended; that that construction was sup- •

The Weekly Law Rcportb, April 1, l")!!

2 W.L.R. Tito V. WaddeU (No. 2) (Ch.D.)

A ported by the qualification of the replanting obligation by thewords "whenever possible" in the 1913 agreement, and "asnearly ^^ossible " in the A and C deeds, which referred towhat ^H(reasonably practicable and not to what could beachieve^mnly by a vast expenditure of time, elTort and money;and that merger might take place distributively, so that despitethe differences in language between the replanting obligationsin the 1913 agreement and in the A and C deeds, the former

D had merged in the latter for all land subject to an A or C deed(post, pp. 654b, 655E-H, 658c-d, 660f, h—661b).

(5) That the defendant commissioners, who had not beenparties to the 1913 agreement or the A and C deeds, could notbe made liable to the plaintiffs on the obligations to replantunder any doctrine of novation, because on the facts it wasimpossible to infer the making of the multiplicity of new contracts in place of the old that novation required (post, pp.

/-< 663 B-c, 664i>-e).(6) That as a matter of construction the benefits of the 1913

agreement and the A and C deeds had not been made conditional upon bearing the burdens of them, and the defendantcommissioners were accordingly not liable to the plaintiffs underthe doctrine of conditional benefits and burdens; that nevertheless there was an independent doctrine of pure benefit andburden; that whether a person was subject to the pure doctrine

n depended upon whether the circumstances in which he cameinto the transaction showed that the doctrine was intended toapply, and whether he had some claim to the benefit; that thecircumstances of the present case showed that each commissioner was intended to take the benefits and also the burdens;that although the defendant commissioners had not sufficientlytaken any benefits under the 1913 agreement to make themliable for the burdens of it, they had taken enough benefits

£ under the A and C deeds to make them subject to the burdensof those deeds; that as the plots of land subject to those deedshad been treated globally and not individually by the commissioners, the effect of taking the benefit of the deeds mustalso be treated globally; that each commissioner who took anybenefit was liable for the whole of the burden; that as thereplanting obligation in the A and C deeds imposed a legalburden the defendant commissioners were liable on it at law;

p that the benefit of the obligation to replant ran with the landboth at law and in equity, and jurisdiction was not excludedmerely because the land was foreign land; and that the defendant commissioners were accordingly liable to the plaintiffs fordamages for any breach of the replanting obligations in theA and C deeds (post, pp. 676c—677a, o—678c, G—679a, g,68lEr-G, 682a-€, 683a, E)-g, 684e).

HahaU v. Brizell [1957] Ch. 169 applied.(3 (7) That the prescribing by the Resident Commissioner of

the trees and shrubs to be planted was a minor or subsidiarypart of a minor or subsidiary part of the A and C deeds as awhole, and the court was reluctant to permit the non-performance of such a provision by a third party to provide a defenceto an action on a contract, especially where the contract hadbeen partly performed; and that if specific performance wereto be decreed the court would provide for the specifying of the

H trees and shrubs, while if damages wfere awarded insteadprobably no such specifying would be required (post, pp.689B-C, G-H).

(8) That in the A and C deeds the Resident (Commissionerentered into no contractual obligation to prescribe trees andshrubs either on behalf of himself, his successors, the Crown orthe Government of the United Kingdom; that the function ofprescribing trees and shrubs was governmental or administrative, and not contractual; that no declaration should thereforebe made that the Government of the United Kingdom, acting

501

I 502The Weekly Law Reports, April 1, 1977

Tito V. Waddell (No. 2) (Ch.D.) 11977]

by the Governor of the Colony (who had replaced the Resident ^Commissioner), was bound to prescribe any trees or shrubs;and that the claim against the Attorney-General accordinglyfailed (post, pp. 691c-f, 693g—694a).

(9) That if what was to be done was sufficiently defined, adecree of specific performance would not be refused on theground of difficulty of supervision; that the obligation to replantwas not of such a nature as to make it necessarily unsuitablefor specific performance; that specific performance would not gbe decreed unless alj parties entitled to enforce the contractwere before the court, and that such requirement could not beavoided by seeking an order conditional upon the concurrenceof those who had not been made parties but ought to havebeen; and that in the circumstances the order for specific performance, sought in respect of 15 small and scattered plots ofland, would be an order of futility and waste, and ought notto be made, especially as damages would be a far more suitable (3remedy (post, pp. 694g-h, 695h—696b, 697g, 699o-f).

Wilson V. Northampton and Banhury Junction Railway Co.(1874) 9 Ch.App. 279 applied.

(10) That damages for breach of a contract to do work onthe land of another might be assessed either on the basis of thecost of doing the work or on the diminution in the value ofthe land by reason of the work not having been done; that indetermining which basis to apply the fundamental rule was that J3the plaintiff was to be compensated for his loss or injury, andnot that of requiring the defendant to disgorge what he hadsaved by not doing the work; that the plaintiff could establishthat his loss consisted of or included the cost of doing the workif he could show that he had done the work, or intended to doit, even though there was no certainty that he would; that thatapplied whether the damages were awarded at common law orunder the Chancery Amendment Act 1858 (Lord Cairns' Act); £but that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the cost ofreplanting represented their loss, and so they could notrecover damages on that basis; and that the damages should bemore than nominal or minimal, and in the absence of agreement they should be reserved for further argument (post, pp.700h—701a, 704D-B, 705f-g, 707a, 708a-b, 709e).

Wigsell V. School for Indigent Blind (1882) 8 Q.B.D. 357,D.C. considered. p

Per curiam. If in Ocean Island No. 2 the Crown had beenin a fiduciary position towards the two plaintiffs and their predecessors their claims would not be barred by any periodof limitation, for a breach of the fair-dealing and self-dealingrules is not a breach of trust. Although the doctrine of lachesapplies to such claims, it is no bar because it has not beenpleaded (post, pp. 626e-f, 627g, 628a-b, 629f).

Even though the right of the Council of Leaders to sue Qdepends in part on Fiji legislation taking effect in Ocean Island,and the right of the other plaintilT to sue depends on hisshowing title to land outside the jurisdiction, the objection thatthey lack any title to sue ought not to prevail (post, pp.638h—639b).

Although the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 provides a barto the claim based on the 1931 transaction, it is no bar to theclaim based on the 1947 transaction (post, pp. 632g—633a); j-jbut even if there is jurisdiction, either under the old Exchequerequity jurisdiction or under the general law, to make thedeclarations sought, the court ought not to make them (post,p. 636e-g).

No claim in respect of the 1931 transaction can in anyevent be based on a conflict of interest and duty or the grantof a lease by a fiduciary to itself, for although the Crown hadat least a substantial interest in the commissioners' undertaking and so could be said to be self-dealing, the Resident "

The Wekly Law Reports, April 1, 1977503

^ 2 W.L.R. Tito V. Waddell (No. 2) (Ch.D.)Commissioner had acted in obedience to the Ordinance of 1928;and in respect of the 1947 transaction the fair-dealing rulecannot in any event be said to have been infringed by anyfailure Crown to disclose to the Banabans what sums thecommis3®S"s were paying to the colony in lieu of taxation, orthat they operated on a non-profit-making basis, or by anyfailure to see that they had proper advice, for the Banabanswere disposing of land that they owned free from any trust,and they could not be said to have been disposing of bene-ficial interests under a trust to the trustee or his creatures (post,pp. 617e—H, 618e—619b, 620h—621c).

The following cases are referred to in the judgment in Ocean Island No. 2:Ackbar v. C. F. Green & Co. Ltd. [1975] Q.B. 582; [1975] 2 W.L.R.

773; [1975] 2 AllE.R. 65.„ Attorney-General v. Wilts United Dairies (1922) 91 L.J.K.B. 897, H.L.(E.).

Ayerst v. C. & K. (Construction) Ltd. [1976] A.C. 167; [1975] 3 W.L.R.16; [1975] 2 All E.R. 537, H.L.(E.).

Banda and Kirwee Booty (1866) L.R. 1 A. & E. 109.Banda and Kirwee Booty, (No. 2) In re (1875) L.R. 4 A. & E. 436.Bank voor Handel en Sclwepvaart N.V. v. Slatford [1953] 1 Q.B. 248;

[1952] 1 AllE.R. 314.Barraclough v. Brown [1897] A.C. 615, H.L.(E.).

^ Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Maclay [1920] 3 K.B.402.

British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mogambique [1893] A.C. 602,H.L.(E.).

Buhner, In re [1937] Ch. 499; [1937] 1 All E.R. 323, C.A.Burghesv. Attorney-General [1912] 1 Ch. 173, C.A.Calgary and Edmonton Land Co. Ltd., In re [1975] 1 W.L.R. 355; [1975]

E 1 All E.R. 1046.Cannon Street (No. 20) Ltd. v. Singer & Friedlander Ltd. [1974] Ch. 229;

[1974] 2 W.L.R. 646; [1974] 2 All E.R. 577.Chapman v. Michaelson [1909] 1 Ch. 238, C.A.Chippewa Indians of Minnesota v. United States (1937) 301 U.S. 358.Chippewa Indians of Minnesota v. United States (No. 2) (1939) 307 U.S. 1.Civilian War Claimants Association Ltd. v. The King (1930) 46 T.L.R.

F 581; 47 T.L.R. 102, C.A.; [1932] A.C. 14, H.L.(E.).Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Queensland) v. Livingston [1965] A.C.

694; [1964] 3 W.L.R. 963; [1964] 2 AllE.R. 692, B.C.Deschamps v. Miller [1908] 1 Ch. 856.Dyson v. Attorney-General [1911] 1 K.B. 410, C.A.Dyson v. Attorney-General (No. 2) [1912] 1 Ch. 158, C.A.Edgeter v. Kemper (1955) 136 N.E. 2d 630.

G Edwards v. Bairstow [1956] A.C. 14; [1955] 3 W.L.R. 410; [1955]3 All E.R. 48, H.L.(E.).

Esquimau and Nanaimo Railway Co. v. Wilson [1920] A.C. 358, P.C.Fort Berthold Reservation Tribes v. United States (1968) 390 F. 2d 686.Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay & Co. [1915] 2 K.B. 536, C.A.Hardoon v. Belilios [1901] A.C. 118, P.C.Hodge V. Attorney-General (1839) 3 Y. & C.Ex. 342.

(4 Holmes, In re (186i)2 J. &11. 521.Ibralebbe v. The Queen [1964] A.C. 900; [1964] 2 W.L.R. 76; [1964]

1 AllE.R. 251, P.C.Imperial Mercantile Credit Association (Liquidators) v. Coleman (1873)

L.R. 6 H.L. 189, H.L.(E.).Johnson, In re [1903] 1 Ch. 821.Kayford Ltd., In re [1975] 1 W.L.R. 279; [1975] 1 All E.R. 604.King V. Victor Parsons & Co. [1973] 1 W.L.R. 29; [1973], 1 All E.R.

206, C.A.