University  of  San  Carlos  Student  Supreme  Court  

En  Banc        

Tingog  Carolinian,  Petitioner,  vs.  University  of  San  Carlos  Commission  on  Elections  (COMELEC),  Respondent.  

   

D  E  C  I  S  I  O  N    

ALO,  CJ:    

Before  us  is  a  petition  by  the  Tingog  Carolinian  Party  (Tingog)  assailing  the  validity  of  Section  6  of  Article  8  of  the  2014  Election  Code  and  seeking  for  the  nullity  of  the  resignations  tendered  by  incumbent  officers  pursuant  to  said  provision.      

The  Facts    

The  essential  facts  of  the  case  can  be  summarized  as  follows:      On  November  2014,  the  2014  Election  Code  (referred  to  as  Code  hereafter)  

was  duly   approved  by   the   Supreme  Student  Council   upon   recommendation  of   the  Commission   on   Elections   (COMELEC)   after   having   gone   through   the   process   of  preliminary  drafting  by  the  Ad  Hoc  committee  and  final  deliberation.    Among  other  changes  to  the  previous  Election  Code,  Section  6  of  Article  8  was  added  to  the  Code,  which  provides  that  an  incumbent  officer  shall  be  required  to  tender  his  resignation  as  one  of  the  requirements  for  filing  his  Certificate  of  Candidacy.      

On   February   5,   a   formal   complaint  was   filed   by  Tingog  with   the   COMELEC  questioning  the  validity  of  Section  6  of  Article  8  of  the  Code.    Tingog  contends  that  the   said   provision   is   contrary   to   our   laws,   specifically   BP   881,   known   as   the  Ominibus  Election  Code,  and  the  1987  Philippine  Constitution,  and  is  violative  of  the  2001   Constitution   of   the   University   of   San   Carlos   –   Supreme   Student   Council  (hereafter  referred  to  as  Constitution).  It  argues  that  a  hierarchy  of  laws  ought  to  be  respected,  and  therefore  the  USC-­‐SSC  Constitution  takes  precedence  over  the  2014  Election  Code;  and  that  the  latter  must  be  submissive  to  the  spirit  and  intent  of  the  former.  Specifically,  Tingog  argues  that  forcing  incumbents  to  resign  in  order  to  seek  re-­‐election   is   unconstitutional   being   contrary   to   Article   VII   which   says   “The  president,   vice  president,   and   the   twenty-­‐one  councilors   shall  hold  office  during  a  term   of   one   year   and   shall   be   elected   by   a   popular   vote   of   the   students   of   the  University.   The   term   of   office   of   the   president,   vice   president,   and   twenty-­‐one  councilors  shall  end  by  the  time  the  new  set  of  officers  shall  have  taken  their  oath.”      

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For   its   part,   COMELEC   contends   that   BP   881   or   the   1987   Philippine  Constitution   finds   no   application   since   the   University,   being   a   private   institution,  can  promulgate   its  own   rules   as   to   the   conduct  of   its   internal   affairs.   Such   can  be  said   the   same   for   the   student   body   and   organizations   incorporated   within.  COMELEC   advanced   its   argument   by   stating   that   the   purpose   of   the   contested  provision  was  to  promote   fairness  during  election.  The  provision  seeks   to  prevent  an  incumbent  running  for  re-­‐election  to  spearhead  any  SSC  project  during  election  time  and  use  such  avenue  to  solicit  votes.  Furthermore,  COMELEC  raises  the  point  that  the  council  duly  approved  the  Code  by  majority  vote.      

COMELEC,   recognizing   that   it   has   no  power   or   jurisdiction   to   interpret   the  law,  then  raised  the  issue  before  this  court  for  resolution.    

Issue    

Competent   authority  would   tell   us   that   the  Omnibus  Election   code   and   the  1987  Philippine  Constitution   find  no  direct  application   in   the  case  before  us   since  what  the  court  is  dealing  with  is  a  student  election  and  thus  a  purely  internal  matter.      

The  sole  issue  of  this  case  before  us  is  whether  or  not  Section  6  of  Article  8  violates   the   2001   Constitution   of   the  University   of   San   Carlos   –   Supreme   Student  Council.      

This  Court’s  Ruling    On  the  issue  of  Constitutionality      

We  find  the  petition  to  be  meritorious.  Section  6  of  Article  8  may  seemingly  appear  innocent  on  its  face,  but  a  deeper  inspection  of  the  provision  and  its  effects  will   tell   us   that   it   is   indeed   unconstitutional.   We   agree   with   Tingog   that   such  provision   has   the   effect   of   a   forced   resignation   thus   reducing   the   term   of   office  provided  for  under  our  Constitution.      

Our   Constitution   recognizes   instances   wherein   the   term   provided   may   be  prematurely  terminated,  they  are:  removal,  death,  resignation,  and  incapacity.  What  is   common   among   these   instances   is   that   it   recognizes   the   inability   of   an   elected  official   to   further   carry   out   his/her   function   for   one   reason   or   another.   It   is   clear  therefore  that  the  term  of  an  elected  officer  under  our  constitution  begins  from  the  time  he/she  takes  his  oath  and  ends  by  the  time  the  new  set  of  officers  are  elected  and   shall  have   taken   their  oath;   this   is   the  general   rule.  The  exception   to   the   rule  would  then  be  the  inability  or  incapacity  of  the  elected  officer  to  carry  out  his/her  official   functions;   such   inability   or   incapacity   shall   terminate   the   term   before   its  prescribed  end.  In  the  case  at  bar,  the  resignation  under  the  contested  provision  is  no  way  grounded  on  one’s  incapacity  to  further  exercise  his  functions,  but  rather  by  

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his/her  desire  to  continue  public  service  for  another  term.  Therefore,   to  recognize  such  provision  as  valid  and  constitutional  would  be  tantamount  to  adding  another  exception  to  the  general  rule,  which  would  be  re-­‐election.    This  cannot  be  done,  for  it  is  sound  legal  principle  that  the  law  can  in  no  way  amend  the  Constitution;  a  spring  can   never   rise   higher   than   its   source.   Our   Constitution   provides   the   proper  procedure  for  amendment,  and  such  ought  to  be  followed.    

As  pointed  out  by  Tingog,   the   implementation  of   the  assailed  provision  can  have  dangerous   implications.   Theoretically,   if   all   incumbent   officers   decide   to   run  for  another  term,  they  would  all  have  to  resign  upon  submitting  their  Certificate  of  Candidacy.   In   such   an   instance,   there   would   be   no   SSC   throughout   the   election  season  and  a  vacuum  of  office  would  be  created  for  approximately  a  month.  This  is  contrary  to  the  spirit  and  intention  of  the  Constitution,  which  mandates  that  there  should  be  a  Supreme  Student  Council  sitting  in  office  to  represent  the  student  body.  Though  the  situation  is  highly  hypothetical  and  seemingly  unlikely,  but  one  cannot  deny   that   in   at   least   theory,   it   is   a  possibility.  Nor   can  we  discount   the  possibility  that   even   losing   half   of   the   officers   due   to   resignation   under   this   provision   can  already  greatly  cripple  the  function  of  the  council,  especially  when  there’s  a  need  to  address  a  contingency  or  other  pressing  matters  that  may  arise  during  the  election  season.        

Though  the  intent  behind  the  provision  is  commendable,  but  its   implication  and  possible  consequences  far  outweigh  any  benefit  that  can  be  derived  from  it.        On  the  nullity  of  the  resignations       Though  we  find  the  contested  provision  to  be  unconstitutional,  we  cannot  rule  in  favor  of  the  Petitioner’s  request  to  nullify  the  resignations  of  the  incumbent  officers  seeking  re-­‐election.      

It   was   brought   to   this   court’s   attention   during   the   hearing   that   there   had  been  enough  time  and  opportunity  to  question  this  provision  before  its  passage  into  law.  Therefore  it  begs  the  question  from  this  court  why  Petitioner  has  only  seriously  raised  this  up  as  an  issue  at  this  late  hour  when  elections  are  already  upon  us.    The  filing  of  a   formal  complaint  was  raised  only  on  February  5,  2015,  a  day  before  the  supposed  deadline  for  submission  for  certificates  of  candidacy.      

According   to   COMELEC,   the   ad   hoc   committee   furnished   a   copy   to   the  proposed   Code   to   political   parties,   including   Tingog   Carolinian,   during   the  preliminary  stages  of  drafting   this  Code.  With  regards   to  Section  6  of  Article  8,  no  question  or   issue  was  raised  at  this  stage.  Petitioner  did  not  object  to  this   fact  nor  did  it  attempt  to  present  contrary  testimony.    

During   the   final   deliberation   and   voting   for   the   now-­‐approved   Code   held  some  time  during  November,  this  section  was  questioned  by  one  of  the  Petitioner’s  

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incumbent  councilors.  But  as  both  parties  admit,  COMELEC  was  able  to   justify  and  explain   its   position,   which   the   councilors   then   agreed   and   approved  without   any  issue,  with  the  belief  that  the  resignation  is  after  all  a  mere  formality.       In   light  of   the   foregoing,   this   court  believes   that   those  who  have  submitted  their  resignation  pursuant  to  this  provision  ought  to  be  bound  by  it,  as  if  they  were  already   estopped   from   taking   an   opposition.   The   theory   of   Estoppel   in   our   legal  system  is  said  to  be  a  principle  based  on  equity  and  fairness;  and  though  what  we  are  dealing  with  in  this  case  is  not  estoppel  in  its  strictest  legal  sense,  but  we  find  no  cogent  reason  not  to  apply  a  similar  effect  to  that  of  estoppel  in  this  instance.       It   is   clear   to   this   court   that   Petitioner   had   ample   opportunity   and   time   to  question  the  said  provision  since  its  inception.  The  events  that  transpired  during  the  deliberation   in   November   leads   this   court   to   believe   that   whatever   opposition  Petitioner  had  regarding  this  provision  were  quelled  by  COMELEC’s  reasoning  and  the  Council’s   subsequent  approval.  Therefore,   those  who  signed   their   resignations  ought   to   be   bound   by   the   same.   After   all,   these   officers   are   presumably   the   same  persons  that  were  present  during  the  deliberation  and  approved  the  said  provision.  This   court   is   of   the   belief   that   the   Election   Code   (and   all   provisions   therein)  approved  by  the  Council  shall  be  the  same  Code  which  shall  be  binding  upon  those  council  members  seeking  re-­‐election  in  this  year’s  election.       We  believe  this  to  be  the  just  and  equitable  solution  given  the  circumstances.  Had  Petitioners  been  timely  and  firm  on  their  opposition  of  Section  6  of  Article,  this  court  would  have  been  inclined  to  rule  differently.  But  such  is  not  the  case  here.  We  cannot  allow  Petitioners  to  be  fickle-­‐minded  as  to  their  opposition  now  that  we’re  at  the   threshold   of   elections.   Petitioner   ought   to   be   precluded   from   now   opposing  something   they   were   fully   aware   of   and   initially   approved,   especially   at   this   late  hour.   The   court   also   sees   that   such   solution   poses   no   grave   threat   to   the   current  operations  of  council  since  only  5  officers  are  seeking  re-­‐election.        

A  Final  Word    

We  commend  COMELEC  for   its  earnest  efforts   to   improve  the  SSC  elections  by   ensuring   that   it   is   fair   and   equitable.   But   imposing   a   compulsory   resignation  would  be  a  far  too  extreme  measure;  there  are  other  means  in  which  the  same  end  can  be  derived.  This  court  suggests  that   if  COMELEC  truly  wants  to  ensure  that  no  officer  spearheads  an  SSC  project  during  election  season,  perhaps  in  future  drafts  of  a  revised  Election  Code  a  provision  can  be  provided  that  would  specifically  prohibit  such.   It  may   recommend   such   provisions   to   the   same   effect   as   long   as   it   remains  within   the   frame   of   the   Constitution.   For   no   matter   how   earnest   or   purest   the  intentions  may  be,  any  law  passed  should  not  violate  the  present  Constitution.        

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As  to  Petitioner,  though  we  sympathize  with  them  that  the  possible  adverse  effects  were  only  made  apparent  to  them  recently,  we  cannot  agree  with  Petitioner  to  hold  such  as  a  valid   justification   to  nullify   their   resignations.    This   court  would  like   to  make   it   clear  not  only   to  Petitioner  but  any  persons  seeking  office   that   the  passing  or  revision  of  any  law  ought  not  to  be  taken  lightly.  It  is  of  the  earnest  hopes  of   this  court   that   this  case  serve  as   lesson  and  reminder   to  all   future  councils  and  officers  to  be  scrutinizing  and  thorough  whenever  passing  a  law  or  resolution.  The  Supreme   Court   of   the   Philippines   has   reiterated   in   numerous   cases   that   “public  office  is  a  public  trust”.  The  same  can  be  said  of  our  own  student  government.  The  student  body  has  entrusted  the  great  responsibility  of  representation  to  the  hands  of   the   elected   officers   of   the   SSC.   Therefore   it   is   imperative   that   these   officers  exercise  due  diligence  in  the  conduct  of  the  affairs  of  the  SSC.  We  do  not  expect  the  Council  to  be  privy  with  all  the  complexities  of  the  law  and  its  principles,  but  we  do  however  expect  that  Council  posses  some  foresight,  to  a  reasonable  extent,  as  to  the  implications   and   effects   of   any   law   or   resolution   it   may   pass,   especially   when   it  affects  rights  and  obligations.  In  short,  we  urge  the  Council  and  all  its  members  to  be   constantly   cautious  and  prudent,  because   in   life   there   is  no  undo  button;  and  not  everything  can  always  be  reversed  by  the  swish  of  a  magical  wand.  

   WHEREFORE,   the   petition   is   partially   granted.   Section   6   of   Article   8   is  

deemed   unconstitutional   from   the   promulgation   of   this   decision   and   therefore  should   be   stricken   off   from   the   2014   Election   Code.   However,   any   resignation  tendered  by  an  incumbent  officer  seeking  re-­‐election  for  the  2015  elections  should  still  be  upheld  and  such  officers  are  still  deemed  effectively  resigned.    

 SO  ORDERED.  

   

(sgd.)  Kyle  Joseph  A.  Alo  

Chief  Justice      

WE  CONCUR:                      (sgd.)                                (sgd.)     Russell  Randall  L.  Gocuan       Zachary  Walter  Mari  Z.  Selma                    Associate  Justice                                        Associate  Justice            The  two  other  justices  were  unavailable  as  of  the  resolution  of  the  case.