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timed out:statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries

1 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries

Table of ConTenTs

exeCuTive summary 3Glossary 41. inTroduCTion, main findinGs and reCommendaTions 72. The naTure of sTaTuTes of limiTaTions 14 2.1 Therationale 15

2.2 Therelevanceforcriminal,civil,administrativeanddisciplinaryproceedings 15

2.3 Thelengthofstatutesoflimitations 17

2.4 Thestartingpointofthelimitationperiod 17

2.5 Aspectsofcriminalproceedingscovered 18

2.6 Groundsforsuspension,interruptionandextension 19

2.7 Theabsolutelimitationperiod 21

2.8 Comparativelengthsofstatutesoflimitationsfordifferentproceedings 21

2.8.1 Thelengthforcriminalproceedings 21

2.8.2 Thelengthforcivil,administrativeanddisciplinaryproceedings 28

2.9 Otherprocedurallimitsinteractingwithstatutesoflimitations 29

2.10 Recommendationsfrominternationalinstitutions 30

2.11 Recentandcurrentreformefforts 31

3. weaknesses and Good praCTiCe 32 3.1Mostsignificantweaknessesidentifiedintheresearch 33

3.1.1 Limitationperiodsarenotlongenoughtoensureeffectiveprosecutionofcorruption 33

3.1.2 Inclusionofappellateinstancesinthedurationofstatutesoflimitationscanleadtoimpunity 33

3.1.3 Absenceofimmunityasagroundforsuspensionorinterruption 34

3.1.4 Absenceofrequestsformutuallegalassistanceasagroundforsuspensionorinterruption 34

3.2Examplesofgoodpractice 35

3.2.1 Flexibilityregardingthestartofstatutesoflimitations 35

3.2.2 Verylongorabsenceofabsolutestatutesoflimitations 35

3.2.3 Prioritisingcasesclosetostatutesoflimitationsexpiry 36

3.2.4 Suspensionorinterruptionofstatutesoflimitationswhenadefendantcommitsanothercrime 36

3.2.5 Availabilityofdataandstatistics 36

4. eleven CounTry profiles in brief 37 Austria,Bulgaria,CzechRepublic,Greece,Hungary,Ireland,Italy,Lithuania,Portugal,RomaniaandSlovakia

annex NumberofclosedinvestigationsandcourtproceedingsduetoStatutesofLimitations 44endnoTes 46

transparency international (ti) is the global civil society organisation leading the fight against corruption. through more than 90 chapters worldwide and an international secretariat in Berlin, germany, ti raises awareness of the damaging effects of corruption and works with partners in government, business and civil society to develop and implement effective measures to tackle it.

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Author:AnjaOsterhausProofreadingandediting:StephanieDebereDesign:Lemke-MahdaviKommunikationsdesignCoverphoto:©istockphoto/NickSchlax

Acknowledgements:Theauthorwishestoexpressherappreciationtothemanyindividualswhocontributedtothepreparationofthisreport.ThisincludestheexpertsfromTInationalchapters,listedbelow,whocoordinatedtheresearchandwrotethenationalreports.ParticularthanksareduetoMarieChêneandGillianDellfromtheTI-Secretariatfortheirinvaluableadvice,andtoHelenTurekforhersupport,particularlyinthefinalstagesofthepreparationofthisreport.ThanksarealsoduetoJulioBacioTerracinoandSkirmantasBikelisforsharingtheirexpertiseandknowledge.

ExpertsfromTInationalchapters(projectpartners):SimonEllmauer(Austria),RalicaIlkova(Bulgaria),EliskaCisarovaandZuzanaNavratilova(CzechRepublic),IoannaAnastassopoulouandArtemisiaPapadaki(Greece),ÁdámFöldes(Hungary),JohnDevittandAndrewSheridan(Ireland),GiorgioFraschini(Italy),SkirmantasBikelisandNeringaMickeviciute(Lithuania),DavidMarcãoandLuísMacedoPintodeSousa(Portugal),VictorAlistar,AngelaCiureaandIuliaCospanaru(Romania),PavelNechala(Slovakia).

Otherexpertsandauthorsofoverviewstudies:YannBaden,ChristophBurchard,JulioBacioTerracino,SimonaHabic,MiklósLigeti,JoachimMeese,AssoPrii,EliasStephanou,JaanusTehver,XavierVandenBosch,AndrewSheridan

WithsupportfromthePreventionofandFightagainstCrimeProgrammeoftheEuropeanUnion EuropeanCommission-Directorate-GeneralHomeAffairs. Thispublicationreflectstheviewsonlyoftheauthor,andtheEuropeanCommissioncannotbeheldresponsibleforany usewhichmaybemadeoftheinformationcontainedtherein.

©TransparencyInternational.Allrightsreserved.

Everyefforthasbeenmadetoverifytheaccuracyoftheinformationcontainedinthisreport.AllinformationwasbelievedtobecorrectasofNovember2010.Nevertheless,TransparencyInternationalcannotacceptresponsibilityfortheconsequencesofitsuseforotherpurposesorinothercontexts.

ISBN:978-3-935711-62-3Printedon100%recycledpaper

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transparency international 2 3 Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries

exeCuTive summary

Thisreportassessestheimpactofstatutesoflimita-tions(SoL)ontheprosecutionofcorruptionoffencesacrosstheEuropeanUnion(EU).Itisbasedon27studieswhichexaminedthenatureofSoLindifferentnationallegalcontextsinordertoidentifyweaknessesandgoodpractices.

Theresearchfoundthatimpunityforcorruption-relatedoffencesisamatterofsignificantconcernacrosstheEU.Thekeyproblemsidentifiedwerethelackofdetectionofcorruptioncasesandthelackofhumanresourcesandexpertiseoflawenforcementbodiesandjudicialstaff.InthemajorityofEuropeancountries,lengthyproceedings,sometimescombinedwithahighlevelofbureaucracyandexcessiverequirementsofproof,constituteseriousobstaclestoanti-corruptionlawenforcement.Insuchacontext,statutesoflimita-tionsareoftentooshorttoallowtheprosecutionofcrimes,particularlyiftherearenotsufficientoptionstoexpandthelimitationperiodincaseofdelays.

InsomeEuropeancountries,particularaspectsoftheSoLregimeconstituteseriousproblems:inGreece,ItalyandPortugal,proceedingscaneffectivelybeclosedevenifanoffenderhasbeenfoundguiltyinthefirstinstance.Inaddition,theGreeksystemprovidesanextremelyfavourableSoLregimeforcertainpersons,mainlypoliticians.InFrance,statutesoflimitationsformostcorruption-relatedoffencesaretooshorttoensureeffectiveprosecutionandinSpain,theyareveryshortforsomecorruptionoffencesbutcanbeconsideredadequateforothers.

InthemajorityofEuropeanjurisdictions,theSoLregimehassomeweaknessesorloopholes.Internationalcooperationoncriminalmattersorimmunityprovisionswhichcancausesignificantdelaysareoftennotconsideredasreasonstoprolongproceedings.Eventhoughthishasnotledtothedismissalofasignificantnumberofproceedingssofar,itisamatterofconcern,particularlyincomplexcaseswhichmayhaveacross-borderdimensionrequiringinternationalcooperation.

Onlyin10ofthe27EUmemberstatescoulddataregardingthenumberofproceedingsclosedduetoSoLbecollected.Whiletheavailablestatisticsshowaratherlowpercentageofclosedproceedingsinmostcases,therearetwonotableexceptions.InItaly,since2005onein10trialswasdismissedduringtheprosecutionphase,aswereuptofourpercentofcriminalproceedingsinSlovakia.

SeveralEuropeanjurisdictionsprovidegoodpracticeandmostrecentreformeffortshaveledtoanimprovementofSoLregimeswithregardtoprosecutingcorruption-relatedcrimes.Inseveralcases,SoLperiodswerelengthenedsignificantlyorthegroundsforsuspensionorinterruptionwereextended.Incontrast,recentreformsinItalyhavefurthershortenedthelimitationperiods.

Themainrecommendationsfromtheresearcharethatnationalpolicymakersshouldcarefullyreviewtheircountry’sSoLregimeinordertocloseanyloopholesfortheprosecutionofcorruptionoffences.Giventhatparticularlycomplexcorruptioncasesareoftendifficulttodetectandprosecute,limitationperiodsforseriouscorruptionoffencesshouldbe10yearsorlonger.ThecalculationofSoLshouldreflectthespecificitiesofcorruptioncases.TheSoLregimeshouldprovidefordelaysifaproceedingisputonholdbecauseapartyinvolvedisprotectedbyimmunity,andfordelaysduetointernationalcooperation.SoLshouldnotallowforproceedingstobeclosedafterthefirstinstancejudgement.Otherwise,thereisariskthatasentenceagainstanallegedoffendercannotbeenforcedbecausethecaseprescribedduringtheappellateinstances.DataoncriminalcasesclosedduetoSoLshouldbecollectedandmadeavailableinordertoidentifytheimpactofSoLontheadministrationofjustice.Thespecificreasonsfortheclosuresshouldalsoberecordedinordertoidentifyandaddressweaknessesinthesystem.

Timed ouT: statutes of limitations and prosecuting corruption in eu countries


Absolute limitAtion periodTheabsolutelimitationperiodisthemaximumperiodwithinwhichactioncanbebroughtagainstanallegedoffender.Regardlessofanygroundsforinterruption,suspensionorextension,theabsolutelimitationperiodcannotbeextendedunderanycircumstances.

Abuse of functionsTheabuseoffunctionsorpositionisreferredtoastheperformanceof(orfailuretoperform)anact,whichisinviolationofthelaw,byapublicofficialinthedischargeofhisorherfunctions.Theperformanceof(orfailuretoperform)suchanactiscarriedoutbythepublicofficialforthepurposeofobtaininganundueadvantageforhim-orherselforforanotherpersonorentity.

AdministrAtive proceedingAnadministrativeproceedingisanon-judicialdeterminationoffaultorguiltandmayincludepenaltiesofvariousforms.Administrativeproceedingsareoftencarriedoutbygovern-mentsorotherpublicentities.

AggrAvAted offenceAcrimeortortthatbecomesworseormoreseriousduetocertaincircumstancesthatoccurorarepresentduringthecommissionofthecrimeortort,forexample,possessionofadeadlyweaponorrecklessdisregardforotherpeople’ssafety.Theperpetratorofanaggravatedoffenceisusuallysubjecttomoreseverepenaltiesthanforunaggravatedformsoftheoffence.

Alleged offenderApersonwhohasbeenaccusedofacrimeoranotheroffence,buthasnotyetbeenprovenguilty.

AppellAte instAnceAppellateinstanceisthestageinlegalproceedingswhentheunsuccessfulpartyinalawsuitresortstoasuperiorcourtempoweredtoreviewandchangeafinaldecisionmadebyalowercourtonthegroundthatthedecisionwasbaseduponanerroneousapplicationoflaw.

AppellAte jurisdictionAppellatejurisdictionisthepowerofasuperiorcourttoreviewandchangeafinaldecisionmadebylowercourts,onthegroundthatthedecisionwasbaseduponanerroneousapplicationoflaw.Dependingonthetypeofcaseandthedecisionbelow,appellatereviewprimarilyconsistsof:anentirelynewhearing;ahearingwheretheappellatecourtgivesdeferencetofactualfindingsofthelowercourt;orreviewofparticularlegalrulingsmadebythelowercourt.

briberyTheoffering,promising,giving,acceptingorsolicitingofanadvantageasaninducementforanactionwhichisillegal,unethicalorabreachoftrust.Inducementscantaketheformofgifts,loans,fees,rewardsorotheradvantages(taxes,services,donations,etc.).Theactofofferingabribeiscommonlyreferredtoasactivebriberyandtheactofacceptingthebribeaspassivebribery.

burden of proofBurdenofproofisadutyplaceduponacivilorcriminaldefendanttoproveordisproveadisputedfact.Burdenofproofcandefinethisduty,oritcandefinewhichpartybearsthisburden.Incriminalcases,theburdenofproofisplacedontheprosecution,whomustdemonstratethatthedefend-antisguiltybeforeajurymayconvicthimorher.Butinsomejurisdictions,thedefendanthastheburdenofestablishingtheexistenceofcertainfactsthatgiverisetoadefence,suchastheinsanityplea.Incivilcases,theplaintiffisnormallychargedwiththeburdenofproof,butthedefendantcanberequiredtoestablishcertaindefences.

civil lAwAbodyoflawderivedandevolveddirectlyfromRomanLaw.Theprimaryfeatureofcivillawisthatlawsarestruckinwriting.Theyarecodified,andnotdetermined,asinthecommonlaw,bytheopinionsofjudges.

civil proceedingsIncivilproceedings,civilactionsarebroughtbyentities,personsorthestatetoobtainremedyfordamagesufferedasaresultofadefendant’sactions.

common lAwAbodyoflawbasedoncourtdecisions,thedoctrinesimplicitinthosedecisions,andoncustomsandusagesratherthanoncodifiedwrittenlaws.CommonlawformsthebasisofthelegalsysteminEnglandandmanyotherEnglish-speakingcountries.MostformerBritishcolonieshavealegalsystembasedoncommonlaw.

Glossary

continuous offenceAcontinuousoffenceisallegedwhereadefendantissaidtohavecommittedacontinuousseriesofcloselylinkedoffenc-es.Forexample,ifanactofbriberyisrepeated.

criminAl proceedingsCriminalproceedingsareactionsbroughtbythestateagainstanindividualoralegalentitysuchasabusiness.

defendAntApersonorlegalentityagainstwhomanactionorclaimisbroughtinacourtoflaw.

disciplinAry proceedingsDisciplinaryproceedingsincludesanctionstakenagainstapublicorprivatesectoremployee,whicharebasedoncontractsorotherlegalobligationsthatariseoutoftheworker’sindividualpositionoremployment,ratherthanthegeneralobligationscreatedbycriminaloradministrativelaw.

embezzlementWhenapersonholdingofficeinagovernmentinstitution,organisationorprivatecompanydishonestlyandillegallyappropriates,usesortrafficsthefundsandgoodstheyhavebeenentrustedwithforpersonalenrichmentorotheractivities.

extensionWithregardstostatutesoflimitation,extensionprolongsthelimitationperiodforaspecificlengthoftime.Groundsforextensionvaryfromonejurisdictiontoanother,butcanincludetherequirementofspecialtime-consuminginvestiga-tivemeasures.

felonyAgravecrime,suchasmurder,rape,orburglary.Afelonyispunishablebyamorestringentsentencethanthatgivenforamisdemeanor.

first instAnceThebeginningorthefirsthearingoflegalproceedings.Thefirstinstancetakesplaceinalowercourt.

grAnd corruptionActscommittedatahighlevelofgovernmentthatdistortpoliciesorthecentralfunctioningofthestate,enablingleaderstobenefitattheexpenseofthepublicgoodGrandcorruptionisusually(butnotalways)synonymouswithpoliticalcorruption.

illicit enrichmentThecorruptactofillicitenrichmentmaybedefinedasasignificantincreaseintheassetsofapublicofficialthathecannotreasonablyexplaininrelationtohislawfulincome.

immunityForthepurposesofthisreport,immunityreferstotheexemptionfromlegalprosecutionforpoliticallyexposedpersons.Insomecountriespoliticiansaregrantedpoliticalimmunityforactionstheycarryoutinperformanceoftheirdutiesinordertopreventpoliticallymotivatedlegalattacks.

impunityTheexemptionfromlegalpunishment.

indictmentAwrittenstatementchargingapartywiththecommissionofacrimeorotheroffence.

instAnceAnactionorstageinalegalproceedingorprocess.

interruptionWithregardstostatutesoflimitation,wheninterruptionoccurs,anewlimitationperiod,usuallyidenticaltothepreviousone,beginstorun.Groundsforinterruptionvaryfromonejurisdictiontoanother,butoftenincludedevelop-mentsinproceedings,suchasthecommencementorthefilingofthecasetocourt.

investigAtionTheprocessofuncoveringthefactsandcircumstancessurroundinganoffence.Whenstatutesoflimitationapplytotheinvestigationperiod,theinvestigationmustbecompletedandthechargesmustbebroughtwithintheperiodoflimitation.

misdemeAnourAminoroffenceortransgressionofthelaw,lessheinousthanafelony.

money lAunderingTheprocessofconcealingtheorigin,ownershipordestina-tionofillegallyordishonestlyobtainedmoneybyhidingitwithinlegitimateeconomicactivities.


mutuAl legAl AssistAnceMutualLegalAssistance(MLA)istheformalprocessthroughwhichcountriesrequestandprovideassistanceinobtainingevidencelocatedinonecountrytoaidcriminalinvestigationsorproceedingsinanothercountry.

obstruction of justiceTheobstructionofjusticemaybedefinedastheuseofphysicalforce,threatsorintimidationorthepromise,offeringorgivingofanundueadvantage,toinducefalsetestimonyortointerfereinthegivingoftestimonyortheproductionofevidenceinaproceedinginrelationtothecommissionofacrimeorotheroffence.

offenderApersonwhohasbeenfoundguiltyofacrimeoranotheroffence.

permAnent offenceAnillegalactivitythatoccursoveraperiodoftimewithoutcessation,forexample,theoperationofahumantraffickingnetwork.

prosecutionTheinstitutionandconductoflegalproceedingsagainstaperson.Whenstatutesoflimitationapplytotheperiodofprosecution,theprosecutionmustbefinalisedandajudge-mentreachedwithintheperiodoflimitation.

relAtive limitAtion periodTherelativelimitationperiodisthemaximumperiodwithinwhichacriminalorcivilactioncanbebroughtagainstanallegedoffender,butwhichcanbeprolongedduetospecificgroundsforsuspension,interruptionorextension.

repose of societySocietybeinginastateofpeaceandtranquillity.Statutesoflimitationaredesignedtocontributetothereposeofsociety.Theprosecutionandpunishmentofoldcrimesrecallsillfeelingandpreventssocialhealingofanoldconflictanditsnegativeconsequences.

stAtutes of limitAtionsStatutesoflimitationsarestatutoryrulesthatsetthemaxi-mumperiodwithinwhichacriminalorcivilactioncanbebroughtagainstanallegedoffender.Statutesoflimitations,alsocalledlimitationperiods,promotefairnessandtheefficiencyofinvestigativeandjudicialproceedings.

stAtutes of reposeStatutesofreposeisthetermusedfortheabsolutelimitationperiodincivilproceedings.

subpoenAAcourtorderrequiringapersontoappearincourttogivetestimony.Itisapunishableoffencenottoappearwhenasubpoenaisdecreed.

suspensionWithregardstostatutesoflimitation,suspensionfunctionslikeabreakorpause.Oncethesuspensionhaslapsed,thelimitationperiodcontinuesrunning.Groundsforsuspensionvaryfromonejurisdictiontoanother,butoftenincludeimmunityorillnessofthedefendant.

to prejudice one’s right to A fAir triAlTohaveadetrimentaleffectonone’srighttoafairtrial.

tortAcivilwrong,otherthanabreachofcontract,whichthelawwillredressbyanawardofdamages.Acivilsuitcanbebroughtagainsttheperpetratorofatort.

trAding in influenceThepromise,offeringorgivingtoaperson,orthesolicitationoracceptancebyaperson,directlyorindirectly,ofanundueadvantageinorderthatthepersonabusehisrealorsup-posedinfluencewithaviewtoobtaininganundueadvantagefortheoriginalinstigatoroftheactorforanyotherperson.Tradingininfluenceisalsocommonlydividedintoitsactiveform(givinganadvantageinexchangeforinfluence)anditspassiveform(requestingoracceptinganadvantageinexchangeforinfluence).

whistleblowingWhistleblowingisthedisclosureofinformationaboutaperceivedwrongdoinginanorganisation,ortheriskthereof,toindividualsorentitiesbelievedtobeabletoeffectaction.Earlydisclosureofwrongdoingortheriskofwrongdoingcanprotecthumanrights,helptosavelivesandsafeguardtheruleoflaw.Whistleblowingisincreasinglyrecognisedasananti-corruptiontool.

Glossary

introduction, main findings and recommendations1.


inTroduCTion

Statutesoflimitations(SoL)arestatutoryrulesthatsetthemaximumperiodwithinwhichacriminalorcivilactioncanbebroughtagainstanallegedoffender.SoL,alsocalledlimitationperiods,promotefairnessandefficiencyininvestigativeandjudicialproceedingsandcontributetothereposeofsociety.

However,limitationperiodscanalsoconstituteobsta-clesintheprosecutionofoffencesbecause,inpractice,theytypicallyincludetheprosecutionphaseofpro-ceedings,i.e.evenifchargesarebroughtagainstanallegedoffender,theproceedingcanendduetothelimitationperiod.Particularlyinthecaseofcorruption-relatedoffences,whichoftencometolightafteralongpassageoftime,standardSoLprovisionscanleadtoimpunityiftheyareoverlyshortordonotprovideforsufficientflexibilitytoallowprosecution.Anadditionalconcernrelatestocross-bordercorruptioncases,asinternationallegalcooperationcandelayproceedingssignificantly.

Allrelevantinternationalbodieshavehighlightedthatadequatestatutesoflimitationsarecriticaltotheeffectiveprosecutionofcorruption,andhavedevelopedinstrumentsthatstipulaterelatedprovisions.1TheOECDWorkingGrouponBribery(WGB)andtheCouncilofEurope’sGroupofStatesagainstCorruption(GRECO)includedtheassessmentofSoLintheirreviewmechanismsregardingtheimplementationoftherelatedconventions.2

However,sofarthereisnodetailedinternationalstandardregardingcorruption-relatedstatutesoflimitations,andinternationalinstitutionshavenotalwaysprovidedclearandconsistentguidancetotheirmem-berstates.TheOECDWGBhasstressedthatthelackofcross-cuttingresearchonthisissueimpedesanappropriateassessmentofwhetherstatutesoflimita-tionsareadequatefortheinvestigationandprosecutionoftheoffenceofforeignbribery.3

TanGenTopoli a show-case for the relevance of statutes of limitations to anti-corruption law enforcement

Tangentopoli (literally ‘the city of bribes’), also known as ‘Clean Hands’, was a series of judicial investigations involving politicians and public officials in the Milan area. This scandal which exploded in 1992 uncovered the spread of bribery and illicit funding to parties involving ministries, members of parliament and businessmen.

After the preliminary hearings, 635 people (almost 20 per cent of the total) were acquitted. Of these, 314 acquittals (49 per cent) were because the expiry of SoL meant the case could not be pros-ecuted. After the trial, 40 per cent of cases were dismissed, with 57 per cent of those due to the expiry of SoL – not least because the courts were unable to manage this volume of proceedings.

Additional data shows that of the 4,520 people recorded in the General Register of Crimes’ Notices of the Court of Milan, 586 (13 per cent) were acquitted because of SoL.4

Another relevant issue emerging from this study is that the majority of cases which expired due to SoL did not even reach the trial phase because the first phase of the proceeding, the investigations, could not be completed in time.

ThisreportreducesthisgapbyprovidinganoverviewofSoLinrelationtocorruptionandcorruption-relatedoffencesacrosstheEuropeanUnion(EU).ItexplorestherelevanceofSoLforthefightagainstcorruption,analysesproblemsintheenforcementofanti-corruptionlawandidentifiesgoodpracticeacrosstheEU.

CoveraGe of The reporT

Thereportbuildsonnationalresearchfromall27EUmemberstates.Thenationaldatacollectionwascarriedoutattwolevels.In11countries(Austria,Bulgaria,CzechRepublic,Greece,Hungary,Ireland,Italy,Lithuania,Portugal,RomaniaandSlovakia),in-depthstudiesoftheissuewereconductedbyrespectiveTransparencyInternational(TI)nationalchapters.Intheother16EUmemberstates,5anoverviewassessmentwascarriedout.Thefindingswerediscussedatameetingofinternationalexperts,withrepresentativesfromtheOECDWGBandtheUnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC).

Theresearchcoveredallcorruptionandcorruption-relatedoffencesasdefinedintheUnitedNationsConventionagainstCorruption(UNCAC),i.e.bribery,embezzlement,tradingininfluence,abuseoffunctions,illicitenrichment,obstructionofjustice,andmoney-laundering.Itcoveredthecommissionoftheseoffenc-es,butalsotheparticipation,attemptandconspiracytocommitcorruption-relatedoffences.Moneylaunder-ingwasincludedbecauseofitsintrinsiclinktocorrup-tion:inorderforcorruptoffenderstoenjoythebenefitsoftheirillicitactivities,theymusthidetheoriginoftheirfundsandeventuallyconvertthemintolegalfunds.TheresearchassessedtherelevanceofSoLforanti-corruptionlawenforcementinthedifferentbodiesoflaw(criminal,civil,administrativeanddisciplinaryproceedings)aswellasinthedifferentstagesintheinvestigationandprosecutionofoffences.

However,thecomparabilityofdataacrosscountriesislimitedbecausenotallEUjurisdictionshavetrans-latedtheseoffencesintotheirnationallaw.Corruptionoffencesmayalsoberegulatedindifferentwaysinindividualcountries,withrelatedimplicationsforthedurationofSoL.

impuniTy beCause of The passaGe of Time

In September 2003, a Lithuanian judge dismissed a criminal case where defendants had been charged for the embezzlement of US $2.6 million. In 2007 the Judicial Commission of Ethics and Discipline refused to impose disciplinary liability on the judge with reference to the fact that the three-year period of disciplinary SoL had expired.6

meThodoloGy of The researCh

ThisreportispartofaEuropeanCommissionco-fundedproject.Themethodologiesforbothapproaches–thein-depthandtheoverviewstudies–werejointlydevelopedbytheprojectpartners,i.e.theTISecretariatandthe11TInationalchaptersinAustria,Bulgaria,CzechRepublic,Greece,Hungary,Ireland,Italy,Lithuania,Portugal,RomaniaandSlovakia.Informationwasgatheredthroughadeskreview,questionnairesandinterviewswithlocalexperts.Thedeskreviewincludedtheexaminationofrelevantlegalprovisionsandacademicpapers,assessmentsandreportsbyinternationalbodiessuchastheOECDWGBandGRECOandthecollectionandanalysisofstatisticsaboutthelengthofSoLperiods,aswellasthepercentageofproceedingsclosedduetoSoL.Thisinformationwascomplementedwithinsightsprovidedbyprosecutors,judges,academics,officialsfrominteriorministriesandlocalanti-corruptionagencies,andcivilsocietyrepresentatives.Thenationalstudies,methodologiesandarelatedbackgroundpapercanbeaccessedattheTIwebsitewww.transparency.org.The11in-depthstudiescanalsobefoundonthewebsitesofeachcountry’sTInationalchapter.

inTroduCTion, main findinGs and reCommendaTions1.


swedish invesTiGaTion inTo alleGedly CorrupT exporT deals dropped due To sTaTuTes of limiTaTions

In June 2009, the Swedish prosecutor Christer van der Kwast closed three investigations into SAAB’s involvement in allegedly corrupt export deals with the Czech Republic, Hungary and South Africa. He stated that there was evidence which clearly indicated that the case was “very serious, both in terms of the systematic approach and the amount. It involves hundreds of millions of Swedish crowns in hidden payments in several countries, and there is strong reason to believe that bribery also has occurred.” The inquiries examined evidence from the middle of the 1990s to the beginning of this millennium. However, the period of limitation did not allow for the prosecution of incidences that occurred before July 2004. Mark Pieth, chairman of the OECD anti-bribery working group, expressed concerns about the halt of the investi-gation. “It raises the question whether Swedenis really committed to the OECD convention,” he said in an interview.7

main findinGs

AcrosstheEuropeanUnion,impunityforcorruptionandcorruption-relatedoffencesisamatterofsignificantconcern.TheroleplayedbySoLinthiscontextdifferswidelyfromcountrytocountryandiscloselylinkedtotheoverallefficiencyofenforcementagenciesandthejudiciary.

generAl findings About the reAsons for corruption-relAted impunity• Thelackofdetectionofcorruptionwasidentifiedas

akeyproblemacrosstheEU.Corruptbehaviourisusuallyofbenefittothepartiesinvolvedandinmostcasesthereisnoimmediatevictimwhocanbringcharges.Theclandestinenatureofcorruptbehav-iourmeansthatitmaynevercometolightunlessreportedbyathirdperson.Therefore,theimpor-tanceofwhistleblowing8andtheneedforeffectiveprotectionofwhistleblowerswaspointedoutas

amajorissuethatneedstobeaddressedinmostEuropeancountries.

• Thelackofhumanresourcesandexpertiseoflaw-enforcement-bodiesandjudicialstaffwereidentifiedasfurthermajorobstaclestotheeffectiveinvestigationandprosecutionofcorruptioncasesacrosstheEU.Incidencesofcorruptionareoftendifficulttodiscover,investigateandprosecute.

Inmostcountries,qualifiedinvestigativemanpowertopursuecorruptioncasesandeconomiccrimeingeneralislacking.

• InmostEuropeancountriesitislengthyproceed-ings,sometimescombinedwithhighlevelsofbureaucracyandexcessiverequirementsofproof,whichconstituteseriousobstaclestoanti-corruptionlawenforcement.Insuchacontext,SoLareoftentooshorttoprosecutecrimes,particularlyiftherearenotsufficientoptionstoexpandthelimitationperiodifnecessary.

• InmanyEuropeancountries,thereisalsoalack oftrustinlawenforcementwhichresultsinunwill-

ingnesstoreportwrongdoing,reinforcingthelack ofdetectionofcorruptioncases.

specific findings About the stAtutes of limitAtions regime in eu member stAtes• Insomecountries,particularaspectsoftheSoL

regimeconstituteseriousproblems:inGreece,ItalyandPortugal,proceedingscaneffectivelyrunout

oftimeevenifanoffenderhasbeenfoundguiltyinthefirstinstance.Inaddition,inGreece,thereis

anextremelyfavouralbeSoLregimevis-a-visparliamentariansandmembersofthegovernment.

• InFrance,statutesoflimitationsformostcorruption-relatedoffencesarethreeyears.Eventhough

therearemechanismsforsuspensionofthelimita-tionperiod,suchashortlimitationperiodcannotguaranteeeffectiveprosecution.InSpain,statutesoflimitationsareveryshortforsomecorruptionoffences,e.g.activebribery,whiletheycanbeconsideredadequateforothers,suchasmoneylaundering.

• InthemajorityofEuropeanjurisdictions,theSoLregimehassomeweaknessesorloopholes,suchastheabsenceofimmunityorofarequestformutuallegalassistanceasagroundforsuspensionofthelimitationperiod.Whileinmostofthesejurisdictionstheresearchdidnotdetectcorruptioncasesacquittedduetotheseweaknesses,itcannotbeguaranteedthattheywillnotcauseimpunity

ofallegedoffendersinthefutureandtheyshouldthereforebeadjusted.

• Atthesametime,severaljurisdictionsprovidegoodpracticesuchastheapplicationofSoLexclusivelyfortheinvestigationphaseofproceedings,ormechanismstotakethespecificitiesofcorruptioncasesintoaccount.

• Overall,theresearchshowedthatSoLhaveparticu-larlyimportantimplicationsforpoliticalandgrandcorruption,casesinvolvinghigh-levelpoliticiansandcomplexcaseswhichmayhaveacross-borderdimensionrequiringinternationalcooperation.

• InmanyEuropeancountries,recentreformeffortshaveledtoanimprovementofSoLregimesforprosecutingcorruption-relatedcrimes.Inseveralcases,SoLperiodswerelengthenedsignificantlyorthegroundsforsuspensionorinterruptionwereextended.Incontrast,recentreformsinItalyhavefurthershortenedthelimitationperiods.

lAck of dAtA About proceedings closed due to stAtutes of limitAtionsAsmentionedabove,thenationalresearchforthisprojectincludedthecollectionandanalysisofstatisticsaboutthepercentageofproceedingsclosedduetoSoL.However,thisdatawasonlyavailablein10ofthe27countriesstudied.Evenwherestatisticscouldbecollected,theydonotshowcasesthathadnotevenstartedbecausetheywerereportedlate,andofficerscouldalreadypredictthatinvestigationorprosecutionwouldnotbecompletedwithinthesettimeperiod.9

ItwaspointedoutbyseveralresearchersthattherealnumberofcasesendingindirectlyduetoSoLislikelytobesignificantlyhigherthanstatisticscanshow.Thisrendersthefindingsinconclusive.

Theavailabledatashowsthat,inmostcases,lessthanonepercentofinvestigationsandproceedingsareclosedduetoSoL,althoughtherearesomeexceptionswhichshowsignificantlyhighernumbers.InBulgariaandHungary,25oreven32percentofcriminalinvestigationswereclosedinsomeyears.However,thereisnoinformationastowhetherthiswasduetoSoLorforotherreasons,suchasalackofevidence.

OfparticularconcernarejurisdictionswithahighnumberofcriminalcourtproceedingsclosedduetoSoL.ThefiguresareexceptionallyhighforItaly:since2005,10to13percentofallcriminalcourtproceedingshavebeenclosedduetoSoL,meaningthatonein10trialsendedwithimpunityfortheallegedoffender.InSlovakia,uptofourpercentofcriminalcourtproceedingshavebeenclosedinthepastyears.



reCommendaTions

Itwaspointedoutbymanyresearchersandlocalexpertsthatinefficienciesinlawenforcementandthejudiciaryarekeyconcernsfortheeffectiveprosecutionofcorruption,andneedtobeaddressed.

GeneralconclusionscanbedrawnregardingSoLregimesspecifically,eventhoughtheyneedtobeassessedcarefullyinthecontextofeachjurisdiction.Theseconclusionsleadtothefollowingrecommenda-tionstonationalpolicymakers:

1. the grAvity of corruption crimes needs to be AdequAtely reflected in domestic lAwSoLperiodsaregenerallycalculatedinrelationtothegravityoftheoffence.Forlimitationperiodstobesufficientlylong,itiscriticalthatcorruption-relatedoffencesbeadequatelyweighed.If,asinFrance,mostcorruptionoffencesareclassifiedasmisdemeanoursandnotasfelonies,theresultingSoLislikelytobetooshort(threeyears,inthiscase).

whaT The GraviTy of The Crime means for The lenGTh of sTaTuTes of limiTaTions

In the Portuguese Freeport Case, involving the waiver of environmental restrictions, the question of whether the case has prescribed depends on how the Prosecutor’s Office qualifies the type of crime. If it is qualified as ‘bribery with breach of duties’, a 10-year SoL period applies. If it is ‘bribery without breach of duties’, it is only five years. In the latter case, the criminal procedure itself should be dismissed.

2. limitAtion periods for serious corruption offences should be 10 yeArs or longerTheemergingguidancefromrelevantinternationalbodiesforaminimumSoLperiodforcorruptionoffencesisfiveyearsormore.However,particularlyincomplexcorruptioncasesandinthecontextofslow,inefficientjudicialproceedings,fiveyearsmaynotbeenoughtoensuretheeffectiveadministrationofjustice.ASoLperiodofatleast10yearswouldreducetheriskofcomplexcorruptioncasesprescribing.Inthecontextofinefficientandlengthyproceedings,aswellasininternationalcorruptioncases,evenalimitationperiodof10yearsmightnotprovidesufficienttime,unlesscomplementedbyflexiblegroundsforsuspensionorinterruptionofproceedings.

3. the cAlculAtion of stAtutes of limitAtions should reflect the specificities of corruption cAsesAs‘covert’offences,manycasesofcorruptiondonotcometolightformanyyears,forexample,untilaregimechangeoccursorwhenanofficialorcompanyemployeeleaveshisorherpost.Therefore,inthecaseofcontinuousoffences,SoLshouldbeginrunningfromthemomentthelastoffencetookplaceandinthecaseofapermanentoffence,theyshouldbecalculatedfromthedateonwhichtheillegalactivityceased.

4. the regime should ensure extensions for cross-border cAsesGiventheincreasinglytransnationalcharacterofcorruptpractices,theSoLregimeneedstoadequatelyreflectpotentialdelayscreatedbyinternationalcooperation,suchasrequestsformutuallegalassistance(MLA),whichcantakemanymonthsorevenyearstobegranted.InthecaseofanMLArequest,theSoLregimeshouldprovideforadditionaltime,forexample,throughthesuspensionofthelimitationperiod,inordertoensuretheeffectiveprosecutionofinternationalcorrup-tioncases.

5. no impunity for politiciAns And members of the government Incorruptioncasesinvolvingpoliticiansorgovernmentmemberswhoareprotectedbyimmunities,eitherasallegedoffendersoraspartiesinvolvedintheproceed-ings,SoLshouldprovideforsuspensionorinterruptionaslongasthepost-holderisinoffice.Thiswillenablethecasetobetakenupwhentheofficialorpoliticianleaveshisorherpost.

6. no stAtutes of limitAtions After A decision of first instAnceASoLregimeshouldnotallowforproceedingstoprescribeafterthefirstinstance.Otherwise,thereisariskthatanallegedoffenderisfoundguiltyinthefirstinstance,butasentencecannotbeenforcedbecausethecaseprescribedduringtheappellateinstances.Inordertoensuretheadequateprosecutionofcorrup-tionoffencesitisevenquestionablewhetherthereshouldbeanylimitationperiodafterformalchargeshavebeenpresentedtothecourtforhearing.

7. systemAtic collection of stAtistics About relevAnce of stAtutes of limitAtions for impunityDataoncriminalcasesclosedduetoSoLshouldbecollectedandmadeavailableinordertoidentifytheimpactofSoLontheadministrationofjustice,bothingeneralandspecificallyforcorruptionandcorruption-relatedoffences.Specificreasonsfortheclosureofcasesshouldalsoberecordedinordertoidentifyandaddressweaknessesinthesystem.

The usefulness of daTa for GuidinG poliCy reforms

In Portugal, between 2004 and 2008, only 0.5 per cent of corruption-related cases were dismissed because of SoL. However, the very few cases that end in impunity are usually the ones involving the greatest sums of money and known political actors. Therefore, the related provisions need to be adapted because they leave loopholes for grand corruption to end in impunity. This conclusionis drawn from detailed data analysis by Portuguese research institutes.10



the nature ofstatutes of limitations2.

limiTinG Time delayswiThouT sTaTuTes of limiTaTions – The Case of ireland

In Ireland, rather than imposing limitation periods on the prosecution of crimes as in civil law jurisdictions, the common law doctrine of delay prevails. Under this, the defence may make submissions asserting that the defendant’s right to a fair trial is prejudiced by the effects of the passage of time. The charges will be dismissed if his or her right to a fair trial is found to be prejudiced by the culpable delay of the prosecution. Where delay is pleaded, the case is considered on its individual merits within the parameters set by the jurisprudence on delay.

2.2 The relevanCe for Criminal, Civil, adminisTraTive and disCiplinary proCeedinGs

Inthecontextofthisresearch,SoLforthefourdifferentbodiesoflawwereassessedinthe11in-depthstudies.Fortheother16EUMemberStates,theresearchwaslimitedtocriminalandcivilproceedings.Amongtheresearchersandtheexpertsinterviewedtheviewwaswidespreadthatcriminalproceedingsarebyfarthemostrelevantbodyoflawfortheassessmentofthelinkbetweenlimitationperiodsandimpunityforcorruption-relatedoffences.Thereforethisreportfocusesoncriminalproceedings.

criminAl proceedingsCriminalproceedingsareactionsbroughtbythestateagainstanindividual.Corruptioncasesareoftentreatedundercriminallaw,becausetheyareusuallyoffencesforwhichpenalsanctionsapply.Large-scalecorruptioncasesareoftencomplexandcombineamultitudeofoffences,whichcanalsobeofacivil,administrativeordisciplinarynature.

2.1 The raTionale

Thevastmajorityofjurisdictionsprovideforlimitationperiods.Themainrationalefortheconceptis:

• Topromotelegalcertainty,fairnessandaccuracyofcriminalproceedingsbyprotectingindividualsfromhavingtodefendthemselvesagainstchargeswhenthebasicfactsmayhavebecomeobscuredbythepassageoftime.

• Toimproveefficiencybyencouragingprosecutionauthoritiestodivertscarcelaw-enforcementre-sourcesfromoffenceswhichwerecommittedalongtimeagowithlowprobabilityofsuccessfulprosecu-tiontothepursuitofmorerecentoffences.SoLperiodsarealsointendedtoimproveefficiencybyencouragingthepromptinvestigationandprosecu-tionofcriminalactivity,consistentwitharticle6(1)oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms,whichprovidesthat‘everyoneisentitledtoafairandpublichearingwithinareasonabletime’.

• Tocontributetothereposeofsocietywhichconsti-tutestheultimategoalofcriminallaw.Theprosecu-tionandpunishmentofcrimescommittedlongagostirsupillfeelingandpreventssocialhealingofoldconflictsandtheirnegativeconsequences.Duetothepassageoftime,thepurposeofpunishmentaswellastheneedforrestitutionmaybecomeirrel-evant.

Exceptfortwocountries(IrelandandtheUnitedKingdom),allEUmemberstatesprovideforlimitationperiodsforcriminaloffences.11Themostseriouscrimesarenotsubjecttoanylimitationperiod.Theseincludewarcrimes,crimesagainsthumanity,genocide,actsofterrorismandsimilaroffences.Insomejurisdictions,intentionalhomicideisexcludedaswell.InAustria,therearenoSoLforoffencesrequiringlifeimprison-mentorsentencesof10to20years,whileinItaly,alloffencesleadingtolifesentencesareexcludedfromSoL.


civil proceedingsIncivilproceedings,actionsarebroughtbyentities,personsorthestatetoobtainremedyfordamagesufferedasaresultofadefendant’sactions.CivilSoLlimitthetimeinwhichaplaintiffcanbringalawsuitagainstanotherperson.Inthecontextofthefightagainstcorruption,civilproceedingsarerelevantbecausecivilremediesenablepersonswhohavesuffereddamageresultingfromactsofcorruptiontoreceivefaircompensation.Incountriesthatdonotrecognisecriminalliabilityforlegalentities,suchascompanies,civilremediesenablevictimstotakelegalactionagainstthem.

AdministrAtive proceedingsAnadministrativeproceedingisanon-judicialdeter-minationoffaultorguiltandmayincludepenaltiesofvarioustypes.Therelatedlimitationperiodsareofthemostvariedformsandcomeunderdifferentregulations.Ingeneral,theSoLperiodsinadministra-tiveproceedingsareveryshortandmayconstituteanobstacletotheeffectivefightagainstcorruption,especiallyincountrieswherelegalpersonscanonlybesanctionedthroughciviloradministrativeproceedings.Theymayalsoconstituteobstaclesfortheprosecutionofviolationsofpartyfundingregulations.

disciplinAry proceedingsDisciplinaryproceedingsincludesanctionstakenagainstapublic-orprivate-sectoremployee,whicharebasedoncontractsorotherlegalobligationsthatariseoutoftheworker’sindividualpositionoremploy-ment,ratherthanthegeneralobligationscreatedbycriminaloradministrativelaw.Thesecanincludetermsorconditionsofemploymentcontracts,publicservicestandardsorcodesofpracticeandtherulesappliedtoprofessionalgroupssuchasdoctorsandlawyers.Inthecontextofcombatingcorruption,disciplinaryproceedingsarerelevantbecauseofthepossibilityofimposingdisciplinarysanctions,suchasprohibitiontopractiseaprofession,whichcouldnotbeimposedbycriminallaw.

fiGure 1: the different types of statutes of limitations periods and their main elements12

sol on prosecution****

statutes of limitations period

sol on investigations***

in criminal proceedings

in civil procedings

in administrative procedings

in disciplinary procedings

sol on execution of the sencence

sol on investigation and/or prosecution

sol* statutes of repose**

* period begins on the day of discovery of the offence or damage** period begins on the day of offence or damage*** period begins on the day of offence and runs until the end of investigation or the beginnig of prosecution**** period begins on the day of offence and runs until the end of the trial or end of prosecution or day of sentence

2.3 The lenGTh of sTaTuTesof limiTaTions

AcrosstheEU,thelengthofSoLincriminalproceed-ingsvarieswidely.Generally,itiscalculatedinrelationtothegravityofthecrime,i.e.anoffencewithahighersentence,suchas10years’imprisonment,willhavealongerSoLthananoffencewhichisconsideredlessseriousandfacesamaximumsentenceofthreeorfiveyears.Yetthedetailedcalculationisverydifferentfromcountrytocountry.Insomecountries,forexampleHungary13andItaly,thelimitationperiodisequaltothemaximumdetentionpenaltyfortheoffence.Inothers,suchasAustria,Greece,Portugal,Romania,SlovakiaandSlovenia,theperiodisrelatedtothemaximumpenaltybutnotnecessarilyequaltoit.Forexample,inRomania,thelimitationperiodforprosecutionisfiveyearsplusthelengthofthepenaltytobeexecuted.

Inmanycountries,adistinctionismadebetweenshorterSoLperiodsforbasicformsofoffence,andlongeronesfortheaggravatedformoftheseoffences.InSlovakia,forexample,theoffenceofacceptingabribecanhaveSoLoffive,10or20years,dependingonwhethertheoffenceisaggravatedornot.

InothercountriesthelengthofSoLiscalculatedrelatedtothecategoryofcrimes.InBelgiumtherearethreecategoriesofcrime:seriouscrime,crimeandmisde-meanour.Eachofthesecategorieshassub-categoriesandSoLarecalculatedaccordingly.

Regardingspeciallimitationperiodsforcorruptionoffences,onlyPortugalhasrecentlyapprovedsuchmeasures,whichwillcomeintoforcein2011.TheRomaniananti-corruptionlawdefinesspecialpenaltiesforcorruptionoffences,whichindirectlyleadtospeciallimitationperiods.

2.4 The sTarTinG poinT of The limiTaTion period

SoLforcivillawoffencesareusuallycalculatedfromthedaytheoffencewasdiscovered.Inmanycountries,suchasAustria,CzechRepublicandSlovakia,amongothers,theycountonlyfromthedaythedamageisknowntotheinjuredparty.Onlyexceptionally,forexampleinMalta,docivilproceedingsrunfromthedaythattheactgivingrisetothedamagesoccurs,andnotfromthemomentthedamagewasdiscovered.

Incriminallaw,however,thelimitationperiodusuallybeginstorunonthedayonwhichthecrimewascommitted.Forcorruptioncases,thisisasignificantproblembecausemanycorruptionoffencesdonotcometolightformanyyears,forexample,untilaregimechangeoccursorwhenanofficialleaveshisorherpost.

However,manyEuropeanjurisdictionshaveimple-mentedmechanismsthataccountforthespecificitiesofcorruptionandcorruption-relatedoffencesinSoL–seetable7page35.

exTendinG sol ThrouGh The idenTifiCaTion of The mosT serious offenCe

Prosecutors and judges can seek to qualify, where possible, corruption offences as offences which are considered more serious under national law. For example, judges in France have qualified bribery offences as the misuse of corporate assets or receiving of misused corporate assets in order to make it possible to sanction acts which otherwise would not have been punishable (should SoL expire), or which would have been difficult and taken longer to prove.14

The naTure of sTaTuTes of limiTaTions2.


2.5 aspeCTs of Criminal proCeedinGs Covered

Limitationperiodsmayconcernthephaseofinvestiga-tionandprosecutionofanoffenceaswellasthephaseoftheexecutionofthesentence.Thevariousregimescanbecombinedindifferentways.

ThecalculationofSoLforinvestigationindicatesthetimelimitforfinalisingtheinvestigationandinitiatingprosecution(i.e.theinvestigationmustbecompletedandthechargesmustbebroughtwithintheperiodofSoL)whilethecalculationofSoLforprosecutionindicatesthetimelimitforfinalisingprosecutionandreachingajudgment.

Limitationfortheexecutionofsentenceappliesifasentenceisnotcarriedoutorissuspended.ThesetypesofSoLperiodsaremeanttodealwithveryspecificsituations,where,forexample,asentenceisnotexecutedduetonegligence.However,suchsituationsrarelyoccurinpracticeandSoLperiodsforexecutionofthesentencearealmostneverenforced.Theyhavethereforenotbeenassessedindetailintheframeworkofthisproject.

Table 1: overview of Aspects of criminAl proceedings covered18

CountrieswithSoLforinvestigation

CountrieswithSoLforprosecution

CountrieswithSoLforexecutionofsentence

Austria19EstoniaFinlandFranceGreeceHungaryLatviaLuxembourgMaltatheNetherlandsPolandRomaniaSloveniaSpainSweden

BelgiumBulgariaCzechRepublicDenmarkEstoniaFinlandFranceGermanyGreeceHungaryItalyLithuaniaLuxembourgMaltatheNetherlandsRomaniaPortugalSlovakiaSloveniaSpain

AustriaBelgiumBulgariaEstoniaGreeceHungaryItalyLatviaLuxembourgtheNetherlandsPolandPortugalRomaniaSlovakiaSlovenia

franCe: jurisprudence determines late start of statutes of limitations

French SoL are particularly short and have been considered a serious obstacle for the prosecution of corruption offences.15 However, related leads to a significant delay of the starting point of SoL, which can help to overcome the problem of impu-nity. The Cour de Cassation, France’s highest appellate jurisdiction, has ruled that the offence of bribery, committed from the moment the agreement between the briber and the bribed person is concluded, is renewed on each occasion that the agreement is acted upon.16 As a consequence, the triggering of SoL is moved forward from the day the bribery agreement was concluded to the day of the final payment or the last day of receipt of the advantage that was promised.17

2.6 Grounds for suspension, inTerrupTion and exTension

Inmostjurisdictions,SoLcanbesuspended,extendedorinterruptedforspecificreasons.Suspensionfunc-tionslikeabreakorapause,andoncethesuspensionhaslapsed,thetimecontinuesrunning.ExtensionprolongstheSoLforaspecificperiod.whileinterruptionmeansthataftertheinterruption,anewlimitationperiod,usuallyidenticaltothepreviousone,beginstorun.Intheenforcementofanti-corruptionlawoneofthekeyconcernsiswhetherthegroundsforsuspen-sion,extensionandinterruptionareextensiveenoughtoallowforproperenforcementofthelaw.

Accordingtosomescholars,ajurisdictionshouldeitherprovideforlongSoLandremoveanygroundsforsuspension,extensionorinterruption,orforshorterSoLwithanextensivenumberofgroundsforsuspension,extensionandinterruption.20Thereality,however,showsamixtureofdifferentregimesbothwithinandacrossEuropeanjurisdictions.



Table 2:overview of frequent grounds for suspension in eu jurisdictions

Groundforsuspension Countries21

Theallegedoffenderevadedtheadministrationofjustice

Estonia,Italy,Lithuania,Portugal,Slovakia,Slovenia

Theallegedoffendercommittedanothercrimeofthesamenature

Austria

Theallegedoffenderisaminororissick

CzechRepublic,Hungary,Lithuania,Luxembourg,Romania,Slovenia

Stepsintheproceedings,suchasthebeginningofproceedings

Austria,Greece

Legalobstaclestotheinitiationorcontinuationofprosecution

Austria,Belgium,Bulgaria,Greece,Italy,Luxembourg,Portugal,Romania,Slovakia,Slovenia

AnMLArequest,internationallegalassistance

Hungary,Lithuania

Immunityandotherstatutorybarrierstoinvestigationorprosecution

Austria,Belgium,CzechRepublic,Hungary,Portugal,Slovakia,Slovenia

Referralofthecasetoanothercourtortoadditionalinvestigation

Italy,Belgium,Lithuania,Portugal

grounds for interruptionInterruptionfunctionsasa‘reset’oftime:aftereachinterruptionanewlimitationperiod,usuallyidenticaltothepreviousone,beginstorun.AcrosstheEU,thereisawidevarietyofdifferentregimes.WhiletheCzechRepublicandItalyprovideformanydifferentprovisions,AustriaandGreecedonotusetheconceptatallforcriminalproceedings.

Table 3: overview of frequent grounds for interruption in eu jurisdictions

Groundforinterruption Countries22

Theallegedoffendercommittedanothercrime

CzechRepublic,Latvia,Lithuania,Romania,Slovakia,Slovenia

Beginningofcriminalprosecution Belgium,Bulgaria,CzechRepublic,Estonia,Hungary,Luxembourg,Portugal,Slovakia

InternationalorEuropeanarrestwarrant

CzechRepublic,Hungary

Designationofthedefendantasaformalsuspect

Hungary,Portugal

Notificationofanyproceduralacttotheallegedoffender,suchassubpoena,arresting,summoning,confrontation,etc.

Belgium,CzechRepublic,Estonia,Hungary,Italy,Romania,Slovakia

2.7 The absoluTe limiTaTion period

TwelveEuropeanmemberstatesprovideforanabso-luteSoLperiodperiod(seegraph),i.e.regardlessofprovisionsfortheinterruptionand/orsuspensionofthestatute,thereisanoveralllimittothelengthoftheperiod.InBulgariaandRomania,forexample,theabsoluteperiodcannotexceedhalftherelativeSoLperiod.Theothercountriesdonothaveanabsolutetimelimitfortheprosecutionofcriminaloffences,i.e.theoreticallythelimitationperiodcanbeinterruptedorsuspendedindefinitelyifneeded.

Atthesametime,thenewSoLregimeinSlovenia,whichenteredintoforcein2008,exclusivelyforeseesabsolute,notrelative,SoLperiods.AlmostallgroundsforsuspensionwereabolishedinfavourofaregimewithlongabsoluteSoL,i.e.aminimumofsixyears,butupto20yearsforseriousoffences.23

2.8 CompariTive lenGThs of sTaTuTes of limiTaTions for differenT proCeedinGs

2.8.1 the length of sol for criminAl proceedingsAcrosstheEU,statutesoflimitationsforcriminalproceedingsvarywidely.Thetablesonthefollowingpagesshowthelimitationperiodsforcriminalproceed-ingsinallEUmemberstatesexceptforCyprus,IrelandandtheUnitedKingdomwherenoSoLexist.24



Table 4: period of limiTaTion (years) unTil end of invesTiGaTion or iniTiaTion of proseCuTion

aCTive bribery of offiCial

frAncehungAryspAin

AustriA*estoniAfinlAnd*greece*mAltApolAndromAniAsweden*

lAtviAluxembourgsloveniA

netherlAnds*

1210

5 3

year

s

20

15

passive bribery

frAnce AustriAestoniAfinlAndgreece*hungArymAltApolAndsweden*

lAtviAluxembourgromAniA

netherlAnds

1210

5 3

year

s

spAin sloveniA10

bribery of foreiGn publiC offiCials

frAncehungAryspAin

AustriAfinlAndgreece*mAltApolAnd

netherlAnds* romAniA

86

5 3

year

s

luxembourg

defalCaTion / embezzlemenT

AustriA frAnce estoniAfinlAndgreece*

lAtviAluxembourgmAltAromAniAsloveniA

10

5 3

1year

s

TradinG in influenCe

frAnce AustriA*estoniAfinlAnd*greece*hungArylAtviAmAltApolAnd

romAniA luxembourgsloveniAspAin

108

53

year

s

abuse of publiC funCTions

hungAry AustriAfinlAndgreece*lAtviAluxembourgpolAnd

sloveniA romAniA

10

65

3ye

ars

15

12

money launderinG

sweden* frAnce AustriAestoniAfinlAndhungArylAtviAluxembourg

romAniAsloveniAspAin

10

532

year

s

netherlAnds greece*mAltA

10obsTruCTion of jusTiCe

luxembourg AustriAfrAnce

romAniA finlAndspAin

54,5 3

1year

s

lAtviAsloveniA

InAustria,dejuretheSoLperiodrunsuntiltheendofprosecution,butdefactotheformalaccusationandsometimesevenotherinvestigativemeasuressuspendtheSoLperioduntilthelegallybindingendoftheproceedings.

*minimum,extragivenifaggravatingcircumstance(cp.detailedclauses)




* minimum,extragivenifaggravating circumstance(cp.detailedclauses)** Therelativeperiodoflimitation isfiveyearsplusthelengthofthe sentence.Forthegraphic comparisonofdata,thefigures forRomaniaarecalculatedforthe lowestpenalty.

Table 5: period of limiTaTion (years) unTil end of proseCuTion or senTenCe relaTive period of limiTaTion (Can be exTended ThrouGh suspension or inTerrupTion)

20bribery of foreiGn publiC offiCials

czech republic*frAncegreece*hungAry*spAin

belgium*denmArk*estoniAfinlAnd*germAnymAltApolAnd

itAlynether-lAnds*romAniA**

bulgAriAportugAl

10

6 5

3

year

s

luxembourgslovAkiA*

20

15

1210

6 5,5


czech republic*frAncegreece*hungAry*spAin

belgium*denmArk*estoniAfinlAnd*germAnymAltApolAndslovAkiA*

romAniA** itAly

year

s

5 3

bulgAriA netherlAnds* portugAl luxembourg

20

15

1210

8

passive bribery

frAncegreece*

belgium*czech republic*estoniAfinlAnd*germAnyhungAry*mAltApolAndslovAkiA*

romAniA**

year

s

5 3

bulgAriAdenmArk*

itAlynetherlAnds*

portugAlspAin

luxembourg

20

15

10

6


czechrepublic*frAncegreece*slovAkiA*spAin

belgium*denmArk*estoniAfinlAnd*germAny

bulgAriAitAlymAltA

53

year

s

portugAl luxembourgromAniA**

20

10

76


frAncegreece*

belgium*bulgAriAdenmArk*estoniAfinlAnd*hungArymAltApolAnd

romAniA**

53

year

s

portugAlspAin

luxembourgslovAkiA*

itAly

15

108

6


greece*hungAry*

belgium*czech republic*denmArk*finlAnd*luxembourgpolAndslovAkiA*

romAniA**

53

year

s

bulgAriA portugAlitAly

15

1210

8

money launderinG

frAnce belgium*czech republic*estoniAfinlAnd*germAnyhungAry*luxembourg

bulgAriAslovAkiA*spAin

53

year

s

itAlynetherlAnds*

mAltAportugAl

romAniA**

108

obsTruCTion of jusTiCe

luxembourg frAnce belgium*czech republic*finlAnd*germAnyportugAlspAin

romAniA**

65

32

year

s

itAly* denmArk*slovAkiA*


* minimum,extragivenifaggravating circumstance(cp.detailedclauses)

2422,5

15

10


itAlyromAniA

greece*lithuAniA

estoniAgermAnylAtviAsloveniA

bulgAriAsweden*

year

s

87,5

portugAl netherlAnds

2422,5

20

15

12

passive bribery

greece* estoniAgermAnylAtviA

lithuAniA bulgAriAitAlyromAniAsweden*

year

s

108

sloveniA portugAl netherlAnds

15

1210

bribery of foreiGn publiC offiCials

itAly greece* estoniAgermAny

lithuAniAnetherlAndsromAniA

year

s

87,5

bulgAriAportugAl22,5

15

12,5


greece*lithuAniA

estoniAgermAnylAtviAsloveniA

itAly bulgAriAromAniAsweden*

year

s

108

portugAl

15

1210


bulgAriAitAly

greece*lithuAniA

estoniAsloveniA

romAniA

8

portugAl

7,5

year

s

5

lAtviA

22,5

15

8


sloveniA itAly greece*lithuAniA

bulgAriAromAniA

7,5

portugAl

6

year

s

5

lAtviA

2422,5

20

money launderinG

estoniAgermAnysloveniA

bulgAriAitAlylithuAniAromAniA

greece* portugAl

15

netherlAnds

10

year

s

5

lAtviAsweden*

10obsTruCTion of jusTiCe

portugAl lithuAniA germAnyitAly*lAtviAsloveniA

87,5

year

s

4,5

romAniA


Table 6: period of limiTaTion (years) unTil end of proseCuTion or senTenCe absoluTe period of limiTaTion (no furTher exTension possible under any CirCumsTanCes)


2.8.2 the length of stAtutes of limitAtions for civil, disciplinAry And AdministrAtive proceedingsSoLincivil,administrativeanddisciplinaryproceedingsalsovarywidelybetweenjurisdictions.

Forcivilproceedings,inmostcases,therearedifferentlimitationperiodsfordifferentactions,andinsomecases,suchasSpain,theperiodsevenvarybetweendifferentregionsinthecountry.CorporateorcertaincommercialdisputescanalsohavetheirownSoL.

Inthemajorityofcountries,SoLforcivilproceedingsvarybetweenthreeandfiveyearsformostoffences.InSpain,thelimitationperiodforcivilproceedingsagainstthepublicadministrationandfortortsisoneyearaftertheactoriginatingtheclaimtookplace.Thisisexcep-tionallyshort.

CountriessuchasAustria,Estonia,Finland,Greece,SlovakiaandSlovenia,haveanabsoluteperiod,alsocalledstatutesofrepose,whichcanvarybetween10and30years.

SoLforadministrativeanddisciplinaryproceedingsvarybetweenthreemonthsandsixyears.Eventhoughlittleevidencewasfound,someresearcherspointedoutthattheshorterperiodmightconstituteanobstaclefordisciplinaryliability.InAustria,forexample,theconnectionwiththecriminalproceedingscodecouldbeparticularlyrelevant.Thisprovisionstatesthatthepolice,prosecutororcourthavethedutytoinformthecompetentbodyifacriminalproceedingagainstapublicservantisinitiatedorterminated.ThisdutyofinformationmightlaunchtheshorterdisciplinarySoLperiodandmightthereforeleavelesstimefordiscipli-naryproceedings.ThiseffectisfurtherheightenedbythefactthattheshortSoLperiodisnotprolongedtotheleveloftheSoLperiodforcriminalproceedingsifthepublicservant’sbreachofdutiesconstitutesacriminaloffence.25

InLatviaandLithuania,GRECOfoundthatcurrentadministrativeSolmaybetooshorttoensuretheeffectivecontrolofpoliticalpartyfinancing.InLatvia,underthegeneraladministrativeprovisions,theSoLareforoneyearaftertheoffencewascommitted.Giventhedeadlinesforthesubmissionofannualfinancialreportsbypoliticalpartiesandthedelayssometimesobservedinthesubmissionofthesereports,theseperiodsaresomewhatshortinthecontextofcontrollingpoliticalfinancing.GRECOthereforerecommendsinbothcasesthattherelatedSoLbeextended.26

2.9 oTher proCedural limiTs inTeraCTinG wiTh sTaTuTes of limiTaTions

InadditiontoSoL,inmanyjurisdictionsthereareotherprovisionsthatmaylimitthelengthofcriminalproceed-ings.Therationalefortheseprovisionsisthatthereshouldbenounreasonabledelayincriminalproceed-ingsinanyofthestages.Timelimitsareposed,forexample,forpre-trialinvestigationsandthegatheringofevidence.

IntheCzechRepublic,thepoliceneedtoestablishwithintwotosixmonthswhethertheoffencewascommitted.However,thistimelimitcanbeextended.Thereisalsoatimelimitforissuinganorderforatrialtobeheld,forthepreliminaryhearingandfortheindict-ment.Furthermulti-levelapprovalsareneededbythepolicebeforecarryingoutproceduralactsandthereareexaggeratedrequirementsfromthePublicAttorney’sofficeconcerningtheformalnotificationofpoliceacts.

InGreece,pre-trialdetentioncannotexceedasix-monthperiod,unlessinlightofexceptionalgrounds,withpriorapprovalbytheJudicialCouncil.InLithuania,theaccusedcanfileacomplaintiftheinvestigationisnotcompletedwithinsixmonthsofthefirstenquiry.InPortugal,criminalinvestigationsmustbecompletedwithinsixmonths(andcanbeextendedto12monthsincertaincases).Slovakiahasnospecificlimits,buttheallegedoffendermayappealtotheConstitutionalCourtifheorsheconsiderstheproceedingunreasonablydelayed.

Therelevanceofprocedurallimitsisparticularlyobviousincountrieswithoutlimitationperiods,suchasIreland,whereofficialstatisticsondecisionstoprosecuteclearlyshowthatthehighevidentialburdenofproofinIrishcriminallawisthemostsignificantfactorindecisionstoendprosecutions.

The Case of irelandhigh evidential burden as an impediment to anti-corruption law enforcement Thestatisticsrevealthataround30percentofcasesinIrelandwerenotpursuedinrecentyears,thevastmajorityoftheseduetoinsufficientevidence.

Graph 1: direction given by the director of public prosecutions on files received

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

No prosecutionProsecution on indictment

Summary disposalFiles still under consideration

Graph 2: mAin reAsons for not prosecuting A cAse

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Other Undue DelayTime Limit Expired

Sympathetic Grounds Public InterestJuvenile Diversion Programme

Insufficient Evidence



2.10 reCommendaTions from inTernaTional insTiTuTions

TheimportanceofSoLinthefightagainstcorruptionisrecognisedinmanyrelevantinternationallegalinstru-ments.TheUnitedNationsConventionagainstCorrup-tion(UNCAC)providesthat‘[e]ach State Party shall, where appropriate, establish under its domestic law a long statute of limitations period in which to commence proceedings for any offence established in accordance with this Convention and establish a longer statute of limitations period or provide for the suspension of the statute of limitations where the alleged offender has evaded the administration of justice’(Article29).Regardinglegalpersons,UNCACstipulatesinArticle26,paragraph4:‘Each State Party shall, in particular, ensure that legal persons held liable in accordance with this article are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions’.

Further,theOrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)ConventiononCombatingBriberyofForeignPublicOfficialsinInternationalBusinessTransactionsprovidesthat‘any statute of limitations applicable to the offence of bribery of a foreign public official shall allow an adequate period of time for the investigation and prosecution of the offence’(Article6).

EventhoughtheCouncilofEurope(CoE)CriminalLawConventiononCorruptiondoesnotstipulateanystandardregardingSoL,GRECOhasbeenassessingtheissueinitsThirdEvaluationRound.27

TheEUConventionagainstcorruptionhasnorelevantlegalprovision.28

Intermsofcriminalcases,theOECDWGBandGRECOhaveprovidedfurtherguidanceoninterpreta-tionoftheterms‘adequate’and‘long’inrelationtoSoLperiods,thoughonceagaintheyprovideonlygeneralrecommendationsratherthanminimumstandardsorbestpractice.

TheOECDWGB,whichassessesexclusivelytheadequacyoftheframeworkforforeignbriberyoffences,hasindicatedthattheSoLperiodshouldbecalculatedinaccordancewithacountry’sgeneralconditionsofenforcementofnationalcriminallawandinlightofrelevantproceduralrules,suchasgroundsforsuspen-sionorinterruption.Specifically,theWGBrecommend-edthatinFrance,SpainandHungary,aperiodofthreeyearsforcertaincorruptioncasesmightbetooshort,andinthecaseofHungary,fiveyearswouldbead-equate.InthecontextofitsThirdEvaluationRound,GRECOconsideredthatthethree-yearSoLperiodsforbriberyinFranceweretooshort.InLatvia,aperiodoftwoyearsfortheoffenceoftradingininfluencewasalsoregardedbyGRECOasinadequate.

Insummary,OECDWGBandGRECOhaveoftenconsideredfiveyearsasanadequatetimeforSoLwhileassertingthattheseperiodsneedtobetailoredtothejusticesystemsandrealitiesofeachcountry.Thusincertaincircumstances,theOECDWGBhasalsocriticisedafive-year(orhigher)thresholdasbeinginadequate,forexampleinBelgium,Bulgaria,GreeceandItaly,wherecriminalproceedingstendtofacelengthydelays.TheOECDWGBandGRECOalsohighlightedthatSoLshouldbeflexibleintermsofgroundsforsuspension,extensionandinterruption.

Aspreviouslymentioned,theUNCACmonitoringmechanismhasonlybeenadoptedrecentlyandassuchithasnotyetproducedanyinterpretationonSoL.

Bycontrast,thebasisforSoLstandardsforcivilproceedingsistheCoECivilLawConvention,wherethestandardsforthelengthofSoLarespecific.ThisConventionstipulatesthatproceedingsfortherecoveryofdamagesresultingfromacorruptionoffencemustbesubjecttoalimitationperiodofnotlessthanthreeyearsfromthedaythepersonwhohassuffereddamagebecameaware(orshouldreasonablyhave

beenaware)thatdamagehadoccurredorthatanactofcorruptionhadtakenplace.Inaddition,thecivillawrequirementthattheidentityoftheresponsiblepersonbeknownisapplicableinsuchcases.29Moreover,incivilproceedingsmostcountriesalsoprescribealongerperiodbeyondwhichproceedingsmaynotbecom-menced(statuteofrepose),regardlessoftheplaintiff’sdateofknowledge.TheCoECivilLawConventionprovidesthattheabsolutebaroncommencingpro-ceedingsshouldnotcomeintoeffectbeforetheexpiryof10yearsafterthecorruptact.30

2.11 reCenT and CurrenT reform efforTs

SomeEuropeanjurisdictionshaverecentlyundertakensignificantreformsinthisareaorareintheprocessofrelatedreforms,sometimesinspiredbyguidancefrominternationalinstitutions.InLatvia,forexample,sub-stantialamendmentswereelaboratedin2009inlinewithGRECO’srecommendations.AmendmentswereadoptedintheCriminalLawregardingprovisionsonprivateandpublicsectorbribery.Criminalliabilityfortradingwithinfluencewasextendedfromtwotothreeyearsforacceptinganoffer,andfiveyearsforofferingmaterialvalues.Asaresult,SoLperiodsforcasesoftradinginfluencebecamelonger(andarenowfiveyears).InPortugal,recentchangeshavegreatlyextend-edSoLformanycorruption-relatedoffences.InLithua-nia,newlegislationhasjustbeenadoptedwhichextendsSoLforalloffences,andthereisadeclaredpoliticalwilltoextendSoLformisconductinoffice.

Romaniahasadoptedanewpenalcode,butitisnotyetimplemented.Whilethenewcriminalcodeprovidesforshorterpenalties,leadingtoshorterSoL,Romaniahasananti-corruptionlaw,31whichestablishesspecialpenaltiesforcorruption-relatedoffencesandprovidesforadditionaltoolsfortheinvestigation,prosecutionandtrialofcorruptioncaseswithinthelimitationperiod.Forthesereasons,thenewregulationisseenasapositivedevelopmentbylocalstakeholders.

InGreece,reformsintendedtocombatdelaysintheadministrationofjusticewereadoptedinSeptember2010.TheSupervisoroftheprosecutor’sofficeap-pointedsixprosecutorstobeexclusivelyresponsiblefortheinvestigationandmanagementoffilesconnect-edwithcorruptionandcorruption-relatedoffences.Casesconsideredasextremelyimportantwillbeallocatedtotwoprosecutorsandwillbecloselyfol-lowedbythesupervisingprosecutor.

Giventhatthesereformswerepassedrecently,theireffectscannotyetbeassessed.However,itisimpor-tanttonotethattheywereundertakeninthespiritofreducingloopholesduetoshortorinadequateSoLprovisions,ortoimprovethelegislativeframeworkinotherways.

ContrarytothegeneraltrendofprovidinglongerSoL,recentreformsinItalyhaveledtotheirshortening.Areformin2005reducedSoLformostoffencesbyhalf.In2010,anewbillwaspresented,whichisstillunderdebate.Thisproposalprovidesforthedismissalofproceedingsinrelationtodeterminedphasesintheprocess.Forseriouscrimessanctionedbymorethan10years’imprisonment,SoLwouldendafterfouryearsforthefirstdegree,aftertwoyearsfortheseconddegreeandafteroneandahalfyearsforthethirddegree.Whilebothrecentreformeffortshavebeenexplainedbyanintentiontoreducethelengthoftrials,thusprovidingforareasonabledurationincompliancewithart.6oftheEuropeanConventionofHumanRights,thestatisticsraiseseriousconcernsabouttheireffects:since2005,between10and13percentofallcriminalcourtproceedingshavebeenendedduetoSoL,meaningthatmorethanonein10trialsendedwithimpunityfortheallegedoffender.32ThisnumberisparticularlyhighandraisesseriousconcernsabouttheefficacyoftheItalianjusticesystem.



3.1 mosT siGnifiCanT weaknesses idenTified in The researCh

Whetherstatutesoflimitationsaresufficientlylongandadequatefortheeffectiveprosecutionofcorruptionandcorruption-relatedoffencesdependsonaseriesofissues.Thereisacloselinkwiththeoverallefficiencyofthejudiciary,whichclearlyhasastrongimpactonthetimeneededtoinvestigateandprosecuteanoffence.Thelackofhumanresourcesandexpertiseofjudicialstafftoinvestigateandprosecutecorruptioncaseswereidentifiedasmajorobstaclestoenforcinganti-corruptionlawacrosstheEU.

Overall,thefollowingweaknesseswereidentified:

3.1.1 limitAtion periods Are not long enough to ensure effective prosecution of corruptionInsomeEuropeancountries,SoLperiodsaretooshorttoensuretheeffectiveprosecutionofcorruptionandcorruption-relatedoffences.InFrance,therelativeSoLperiodfortheprosecutionofmostcorruptionoffencesisthreeyears.Formostcountries,SoLdifferbetweenvariousoffences.InSpain,theSoLperiodislimitedtothreeyearsinseveralcriminalproceedings.Forcivilproceedingssuchastortsorproceedingsagainstthepublicadministration,thelimitationperiodisoneyearaftertheactoriginatingtheclaimtookplace.Thisisextremelyshortandcanseriouslyimpairtheabilityofvictimsofcorruptiontobringchargesagainstthoseresponsible.

InGreece,itisparticularlystrikingthatSoLperiodsforministersareshorterthanforregularcitizens.Therelevantlaw,whichisalsoapplicabletotheiraccom-plices,limitsthestatuteoflimitationsfor‘punishableactions’–bothfeloniesandmisdemeanours–tofiveyears(theabsoluteperiodbeing10)commencingonthedaytheoffencewascommitted.Ineffect,duetoimmunityprovisions,nocriminalactioncanbebroughtagainstministersunlessanduntilparliamentgivesitsconsent.33Duetothisprovision,thecrimemaynotbeprosecutedatall.

Shortabsoluteperiodsareparticularlyproblematic:Italyhasanabsolutelimitationsperiodofseven-and-a-halfyearsformostcorruption-relatedoffences.34InFinland,thelimitationperiodcanonlybeextendedforamaximumofoneyear.Thisextensionperiodistooshorttoensuretheconclusionofmanycases.

3.1.2 inclusion of AppellAte instAnces in the durAtion of stAtutes of limitAtions cAn leAd to impunityMostcountriesprovidethattheperiodsoflimitationsrununtildeliveryofthejudgementatthefirstinstance.ThelengthofproceedingsintheappellateinstanceisnotlimitedbySoL.Insomecountries(forexample,Germany,Greece,Italy,PortugalandSlovakia),periodsoflimitationsrununtilthejudgementcomesintoforce,i.e.theperiodoflimitationscoverstheproceedingsintheappellateinstance.

InGreeceandItaly,thisprovisionhasrepeatedlyledtothedismissalofcasesafterthefirstinstancejudge-ment.InGreece,wheremanyoffenceshaveanabso-lutelimitationperiodofeightyears,thereisagreatriskofproceedingsendingduetoacquittalwhenpendingforjudgmentbeforetheAppellateCourtorevenbeforetheSupremeCourt.Moreover,owingtoaprovisioninthePenalCode,theProsecutorhastheauthoritytostoppenalprosecutionanddismisspendingcasesifthelimitationperiodisabouttoexpire.

Germany,PortugalandSlovakiasolvethisproblembyothermeans.InGermany,thejudgementinthefirstinstancesuspendstheperiodoflimitationsuntilitbecomesfinal.35Portugaladoptsasimilarmecha-nism.36InSlovakia,anyfurtherstepintheproceedings,suchastheappealafterthefirstinstance,interruptsSoLsothatanotherfullperiodcommences.GiventhatthereisnoabsoluteSoLperiodinSlovakiaandGer-many,defacto,aproceedingneverprescribesafterthefirstinstance.

weaknessesand good practice3.


3.1.3 Absence of immunity As A ground for suspension or interruptionInmanyEuropeancountries,parliamentariansandgovernmentmembersareprotectedbyimmunityprovisionsagainstallegationsthatmightbepoliticallymotivated.Fortheeffectiveprosecutionofcorruptionandcorruption-relatedoffencesinvolvingtheseper-sons,itiscriticalthatimmunityconstituteagroundforsuspensionorinterruptionoftheSoLperiod.However,thisisnotalwaysthecase.

countries where immunity does not provide A ground for suspension or interruption of sol

Bulgaria,Denmark,Estonia,Finland,Greece37,Italy,Lithuania,Malta,theNetherlands,Romania,Spain

InAustria,thereisagroundforsuspensioninthecaseofimmunity,butitonlyappliestotheimmunedeputyhimself,andnottoallotherinvolvedpersons.AccordingtoarecentinterpretationofadecreefromtheMinistryofJustice,thisalsoappliesifanimmunedeputyisoneofmanyparticipants,forexampleawitness.Insuchacase,theproceedingmaybedelayed,buttheSoLperiodissuspendedonlyfortheparliamentarian,notforallotherparticipants.Giventhatdeputiescanneverbepursuedbylawenforcementauthoritiesforcriminaloffencesrelatedtotheirparlia-mentarywork(professionalimmunity)andcanonlybepursuedfornon-professionalcriminaloffencesifaspecialcommitteeoftheparliamentgivessanctiontotheprosecutionmeasures(extra-professionalimmu-nity),thisprovisioncaneasilyleadtothedismissalofcaseswheredeputiesareinvolvedbecausethelimita-tionperiodforotherpartiesrunsoutoftime.

3.1.4 Absence of requests for mutuAl legAl AssistAnce As A ground for suspension or interruptionMutuallegalassistance(MLA)andextraditionrequestsmaytakealongtimetobegranted–severalmonthsorevenyears–whichmayconstituteabarriertotheeffectiveprosecutionofcorruptionoffencesbeforetheexpiryofthelimitationperperiod.ThereareseveralEuropeancountrieswhichdonotestablishMLAandextraditionrequestsasgroundsforsuspensionorinterruptionofSoL.Someofthem,suchasAustria,donotprovideforMLAasaspecificgroundforsuspen-sion,butaccordingtoexpertsinthesecountries,thisislargelycompensatedforbyotherprovisionswhichcanextendSoL.

countries where An mlA request does not provide A ground for suspension of sol

Austria38,Belgium,Bulgaria,Denmark,Estonia,Greece,Italy,theNetherlands,Portugal,Romania,Spain,Slovakia,Slovenia39

Insomecountries,thereareadditionalproblemsincasesofinternationalcooperation.BelgiumandDenmark,forexample,willnotprovideassistanceiftheirownSoLperiodhasexpired,eventhoughtheunderlyingconductisstillactionableintherequestingstate.GiventhatSoLarelimitedtofiveyearsinDen-mark,thiscanseriouslyimpairtheprosecutionofcorruption-relatedoffencesinothercountrieswhereinvestigationmaytakemorethanfiveyears.

3.2 examples of Good praCTiCe

RatherthanthelengthofSoLinisolation,itistheinterplaybetweentheirlength,thegroundsforsuspen-sionorinterruptionandtheoverallefficiencyofthejudiciarywhichdefineswhetheraparticularSoLregimecaneffectivelyprosecutecorruptionandcorruption-relatedoffences.Nevertheless,somegoodpracticecanbedrawnfromtheresearch.

3.2.1 flexibility regArding the stArt of stAtutes of limitAtionsIncriminallaw,thelimitationperiodusuallybeginstorunonthedayonwhichthecrimewascommitted.However,manyEuropeanjurisdictionshaveimplement-edmechanismsthataccountforthelatediscoveryofcorruptioncases.

3.2.2 very long or Absence of Absolute stAtutes of limitAtions Insomejurisdictions,therearenoabsoluteSoLperiodsinCriminalLaw.WherethisapproachiscombinedwithacomprehensivesystemofgroundsforsuspensionandinterruptionandadequaterelativeSoLperiods,thereisaverylowriskofcasesbeingclosedduetoSoL.

InAustria,forexample,therearenoabsolutelimitationperiodsandtherelativeSoLperiodsaredefactoonlyrelevantbetweenthedayacrimewascommittedandthefirstinvestigativemeasures.Whilethisminimisestheriskthattheprosecutionofcorruptionbedismissedbecauseofthepassageoftime,italsominimisestheeffectivenessofthesystemforthepromotionofafairtrialwithinareasonablelengthoftime,asprovidedbyarticle6(1)oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms.

Table 7:mechAnisms thAt Account for time delAys due to lAte discovery of corruption And corruption-relAted offences – some exAmples from eu member stAtes

Startofcalculation Countries(examples)

Continuousoffence:calculatingtheperiodonwhichthelastoffencetookplace

Austria,Belgium,Bulgaria,CzechRepublic,Estonia,France,Greece(forsomecrimes),Hungary,Portugal,Slovakia,SloveniaandRomania,

Permanentoffence:calculatingSoLfromthedateonwhichtheillegalactivityceased

Austria,Bulgaria,CzechRepublic,Estonia,Greece(forsomecrimes),Italy,Portugal,Romania,Slovakia,Slovenia

Attemptedcrimes,calculatingSoLfromthedayofthelastexecutionact

Austria,Bulgaria,CzechRepublic,Hungary,Italy,Portugal

CalculatingSoLfromthedaywhenconsequencesarise

Austria40,Bulgaria41,CzechRepublic,Lithuania

SpecificSoLforspecificeconomicsectorsorparticularoffences

Greece,Romania

weaknesses and Good praCTiCe3.


3.2.3 prioritising cAses close to stAtutes of limitAtions expiryAlmostnocasesprescribeinPortugal,owingpartlytothefactthatcaseswhichposeahighriskofdismissalaregivenahigherpriorityininternaldistributionandinvestigationwithintheProsecutor’sOfficeandtheJudicialPolice,ensuringthattheState’sjus puniendi42isaccomplishedbeforethelegallimitationsterminatethecriminalproceeding.Duetothisprovision,thenumberofcriminalproceduresdismissedduetoSoLhasreducedsignificantly:theaveragepercentageofproceduresdismisseddroppedfrom6.8between1990and2000to0.5intheperiodfrom2000to2007.However,atthesametimetheproceedingsinCourthavenotbeengivensuchpriorityandthenumberofcasesterminatedinCourtduetoSolhasbeenrisingoverthelastfewyears(2007to2009).

AsimilarprovisionexistsinGreece,buthasyettoyieldsignificantresults.

3.2.4 suspension or interruption of stAtutes of limitAtions when A defendAnt commits Another crimeInAustria,SoLperiodsaresuspendedifanallegedoffendercommitsanotheroffenceofthesamenatureduringtheSoLperiodoftheoriginalcrime.Inseveralothercountries,SoLisinterruptedinthiscase.ThismeansthattheaccusedmustrespectthelawforthewholeSoLperiodinorderforthecasetobeabletoprescribe.Consequently,itisseenasappropriatethattheaccusedcannotbeprosecutedafterareasonableperiodoflaw-abidingbehaviour.InAustria,thisgroundforsuspensioncontributestofewerprescribedcases.Italsomeansthatthefewcaseswhichdoprescribeareseenasacceptablebecauseofthelaw-abidingbehav-iouroftheoffenderforthewholeperiodoflimitation.

3.2.5 AvAilAbility of dAtA And stAtisticsInsomecountries,suchasHungary,Ireland,LatviaandPortugal,detailedstatisticsareavailable.Theseareparticularlyvaluableiftheyprovideinformationnotonlyaboutthenumberofproceedingsthatprescribe,butalsoaboutthereasonsforthedismissal,asinthecaseofPortugal.InIreland,statisticsaboutwhycaseswerenotprosecutedcanbeeasilyaccessedonthewebsiteoftheDirectorofPublicProsecution.Availabilityofandeasyaccesstodataisofgreathelpinidentifyingandaddressingweaknesses.

eleven country profilesin brief4.

weaknesses and Good praCTiCe3.


Aspreviouslymentioned,thenationaldatacollectionwascarriedoutattwolevels.In11countries,theissuewasstudiedindepthbytheirrespectiveTInationalchapters.Intheother16EUmemberstates,43anoverviewassessmentwascarriedout.

Thischapterbrieflysummarisesthemaincharacteris-ticsoftheSoLregimeineachofthe11countriesstudiedindepth.Thedetailedreportsandtheoverviewoffindingsforallstudiescanbefoundatwww.transparency.org

ausTria

Overall,theAustrianSoLregimeworkswell.TheabsenceofabsoluteSoLperiodsincriminalproceed-ingsiscombinedwithacomprehensivesystemofgroundsforsuspension.Infact,theSoLperiodsareonlyrelevantbetweenthedayacrimewascommittedandtheformalaccusation,orevenearlierinvestigativemeasurescausingsuspension.Ifanoffendercommitsanothercrimeofthesamenatureduringthelimitationperiod,theearlieroffencecannotprescribebeforetheSoLperiodoftheoffencecommittedlaterhasexpired.Incivilproceedings,theinjuredpartycanclaimfordamagesresultingfromcriminaloffenceswithin30yearsfromthedaythedamageoccurred,evenifthedamageandthewrongdoerareknownfromthebeginning.ThisprovisionavoidsSoLobstaclesincorruption-relatedcivilproceedings.

ThemainweaknessesintheAustrianSoLregimerelatetothelawenforcementagencies,whicharenotwell-equippedfortheinvestigationandprosecutionofeconomiccrimes.Accordingtosomeexperts,thelackofbusinessexpertiseisaccompaniedbyagenerallackofhumanresourcesandbythepoortrainingofprosecutors.TheestablishmentofaSpecialisedAnti-CorruptionProsecutionOfficein2008aimedtoaddressthisproblem.Recently,theMinisterofJusticepresentedadraftlawwhichforeseestheupgradeofthisagencytoanationalprosecutionoffice.Underthisdraftlaw,thescopeofthisofficewouldnotonlyincludecorruptioncrimes,butalsoseriouseconomiccrimes.Theofficewouldalsoreceiveafive-foldincreaseinresources,whichmightimprovethesituation.

Inaddition,thereareloopholesregardingthegroundsforsuspensionincaseswhereparliamentarydeputieswithimmunityfromprosecutionareinvolvedinpro-ceedings.Accordingtothecriminalcode,deputiescanneverbepursuedbylawenforcementauthoritiesforcriminaloffencesrelatedtotheirparliamentarywork(professionalimmunity)andcanonlybepursuedfornon-professionalcriminaloffencesifaspecialparlia-mentarycommitteesanctionstheprosecutionmeas-ures(extra-professionalimmunity).Thisprovisioncouldalsodelayinvestigationsandproceedingswherea

deputywithimmunityisonlyoneofmanypersonsinvolvedor,accordingtoarecentMinistryofJusticeinterpretation,evenonlyawitness.Giventhatthegroundforsuspensionappliesonlytothedeputyhim-orherself,theSoLperiodforotherparticipantscontinuesrunningeveniftheproceedingisonholdinordertowaitforsanctionbytheparliamentarycommittee.ThisisdefinitelyaloopholeintheAustriansystemofthegroundsforsuspension,whichareotherwiseverycomprehensive.Giventhatmanyparliamentariansalsoholdotherpublicfunctions,forexample,asmayors,thisprovisioncanposeobstaclestotheprosecutionofasignificantnumberofcases.

bulGaria

Overall,SoLinBulgariaarepostulatedinawaywhichsimultaneouslyaimstodisciplinetheauthoritiesentrustedwithfunctionsrelatedtoinvestigationandprosecution,andtoprovideanopportunitytodeterminetheresponsibilityoftheoffenderwithinaprolongedtimeperiod.AparticularityoftheBulgarianpenalcodeisthattheSoLappliesfromthedatewhentheoffencetookplaceuntiltheexecutionoftherespectivejudicialdecision,whiletherearealsoprovi-sionalgroundsforsuspensionorinterruption.UnlikeSoLforcriminalprosecution,SoLconcerningtheothertypesofresponsibility–administrative,disciplinaryandcivil–arecomparativelyshort:uptofiveyearsstartingfromthedatetheoffencetookplace.

InBulgaria,statisticsforthenumberofpreliminaryandjudicialproceedingsterminatedduetoSoLhavebeencollectedsince2005.Itisindicativethatintheperiod2005-9between50and80percentofproceedingssuspendedduringthepreliminaryphaseweresuspend-edduetoSoL,whilethepercentageofjudicialpro-ceedingssuspendedduetoSoLislessthanone.Themainconclusionfromthisisthatthereasonforthesuspensionofproceedingsisthelatestartandthelengthofcriminalproceedings.Inthiscontext,inordertodisciplinetheauthoritiesundertakingthepreliminaryproceedingstocompletethemontime,aninitiativehasexistedsince2005fortheperiodicalrenewalofsus-pendedproceedings.

ThemainweaknessintheimplementationoftheSoLisdue,ononehand,tothedifferencesininterpretationandimplementationoftherulesbyofficialsinvariousfieldsofthejudicialsystem,andontheother,theexistingopportunitiesfordelayingproceedingsinsuchawaythattheSoLexpiresbeforethefinaljudicialstate-ment.ThemostrecentchangesintheBulgarianPenalCode,whichsignificantlyreducedthechancesoftheblockingofproceedings,especiallyonthepartofthedefendant,alreadyshowgoodresults.

Insum,SoLisnotamongthekeyobstaclestodeter-miningtheresponsibilityofoffenders.Whathinderstheuncoveringandinvestigationofcorruption-relatedcrimesisthemutualinterestoftheparticipantsinthecorruptactandtheopportunityforallparticipantstobearresponsibilityfortheirdeeds,aswellasthedistrustofmembersoftheinvestigatingauthoritiesandthelackofeffectivewitnessprotection.Improvementswouldbemadeifguaranteesforalawfulandefficientjudiciarywereestablishedalongwithwitnessprotectionforthoseinvolvedincorruptioncases.

CzeCh republiC

Thelimitationperiodforcorruption-relatedcriminaloffencesincriminalproceedingsisnotperceivedasacriticalissueintheCzechRepublic.ExtensivegroundsforsuspensionandinterruptionareprovidedandtherearenoabsoluteSoLlimitingtheriskthatcasespre-scribe.ThereisalackofstatisticsavailableonSoLasagroundofterminationofcriminalproceedings.YettheexpertsinterviewedidentifiedotherreasonsfortheobstructionofcriminalproceedingsevenbeforeSoLexpire,whichcancontributetotheimpunityofcorruptconduct.Acriticalissueistherequirementtoproveintentbeforeproceedingscanbestarted.Therangeofoffencesthatarenegligent(notintentional)shouldbewidenedandthepoliceshouldbemadeabletodocu-mentcorruption-relatedcriminalactivitywithoutfirstinitiatingcriminalproceedings.

eleven CounTry profiles in brief4.


AnotherweaknessoftheCzechSoLregimewasintroducedonlyrecently.ThenewcriminalcoderemovedthesuspensionofSoLincaseswheretheallegedoffenderisabroad.Thisprovisionshouldberestored.IncompliancewithinternationalandEuropeanobligations,criminalliabilityforcorporateentitiesshouldbeintroduced,inparticularforbribery,proceedsfromillegalactivities,etc.IntheCivilCode,thesub-jectivelimitationperiodforliabilityfordamageshouldbeextended.

CapacityissuesarealsoaseriousproblemintheprosecutionofcorruptionintheCzechRepublic.Thereisaneedtoincreasethedetectivecapacity(e.g.specificoperatingtechniques)ofthebodiesresponsibleforcriminalproceedings.Inaddition,complexeconomiccrimesorcrimesagainstpropertyaresometimesqualifiederroneouslyasother,lessseriousoffences,resultinginshorterSoL.

GreeCe

InGreece,themainproblemisthecomplicatedregula-toryframeworkwhichhampersthespeedyadministra-tionofjustice.Theco-ordinationofenforcementbodies,thetrainingofpersonneloreventheestablishmentofaspecialprosecutionauthorityforcorruption-relatedoffencescouldhelptoovercomethisproblem.

ThemainweaknessoftheSoLregimerelatestothefactthatSoLformembersofparliamentandcabinetmembersareshorterthanSoLforothercitizens,andthatitisextremelydifficulttoliftimmunityinGreece.Thisunequaltreatmentisaquestionofpoliticalwillandshouldbeaddressedasamatterofurgency.Further,despitethelackofstatistics,itmustbeassumedthatcasesprescribeduetothefactthatappellateinstancesareincludedinthedurationofSoL,whichare,insomecases,alsotooshorttoensuresufficienttimeforprosecution.

However,therearealsosomeinnovativeprovisionsinGreece,suchastheprioritisationofcasesandthespeedytrialofcorruption-relatedcases,aswellasthenon-suspensionofdisciplinaryproceedingswhilecriminalonesarepending.However,thelatterisnotalwaysimplementedanditisquitecommonfordiscipli-naryproceedingstobehalteduntiltheissuanceofafinalcriminalcourtdecision.Moreover,inordertoanswertheincreasingneedforstatisticaldatainthisrespect,corruptioncaseshavebeenrecordedbytheProsecutor’sOfficesinceSeptember2009.

Inordertodecreasethebacklogofcasesandmovetowardsfacilitatingthespeedyadministrationofjustice,aseriesofmeasurescouldbeintroduced,forexample,creatingspecialisedchamberswithintheexistingcourts,de-penalisingminorinfringementsordividingandtransferringthejurisdictionofcentralcourts(suchastheAthensCourtofFirstInstance)toregionalcourts.

Inordertoimprovethedetectionofcorruptioncases,whistleblowersshouldenjoyahigherlevelofprotection.Thesesafeguards,aswellasraisingawarenessamongthepublicandeducatingyoungpeople,shouldformadditionalcomponentsofastrategytocombatimpunity.

hunGary

InHungary,SoLprovisionsarenotthemostrelevantfactorsthatleadtoimpunity.EventhoughtheOECDWGBandGRECOfoundthatthethree-yearlimitforcertainbriberyoffences(includingforeignbribery)istooshort,theresearchcarriedoutintheframeworkofthisprojecthasnotidentifiedsignificantproblemsinthisrespect.Otherfactors,notablythelackofdetectionofcorruption-relatedcrime,aremoresignificant.Thislackofdetectionisdetermined,ontheonehand,bystruc-turesofdependenceandbypersonalinterests,andontheother,aswellasbythelackofacultureofintegrityandconfidencethatauthoritieswilleffectivelyinvesti-gateandprosecutesuchcrimes.

TherearedetailedstatisticsavailableonSoLandothergroundsofterminationofcriminalprocedures,enablingtheProsecutorGeneral’sofficetocarryoutqualitycontrolovertheworkoftheinvestigativeauthorities.Thedatashowsthatbetween2005and2009therehavebeennumerouscasesthatwereclosedduetoSoLduringtheinvestigationphase,totallingbetween0.7-andto11percentforcorruptioncases,andevenupto25percentin2007forothercriminalcases.Duringtheprosecutionphase,between0.5and2.2percentprescribed.

Toimprovethesituation,thereisaneedforbetterco-operationbetweenHungary’scontrollingandinvestigativeauthoritiesinHungary,aswellasamonginvestigativeauthoritiesatatransnationallevel.Ascorruption-relatedcrimesareveryoftenconnectedtoeconomiccrimes,steppingupeffortsininvestigationandprosecutionofthelatteronesmayhelpfightcorruption.Aswithothertypesofcrimes,betterpersonnelandtechnicalresourcescouldhelptheworkofeconomiccrimeandanti-corruptionunitsinthepoliceandtheprosecutionservices.Theinvestigativeindependenceofthepoliceandtheprosecutor’sofficeshouldbestrengthenedinordertoprovideneutral,non-politicalandnon-arbitrarydecision-makingaboutovertheapplicationofcriminallawandpolicytorealcases.

ireland

DespitethefactthattherearenolimitationperiodsforcriminalproceedingsinIreland,thereisalowincidenceoftheprosecutionofcorruption-relatedoffences.AcriticalissueforthisisthatthereareverystringentstandardsofevidencerequiredbytheIrishcourts.Further,theDirectorofPublicProsecutions(DPP)recentlyaddressedthesubjectdirectly,citingthecomplexityofcorruptionandwhite-collarcrimeasaseriousimpedimenttoitssuccessfulprosecution.Therearealsopracticalproblemswhenaprosecutorisfacedbyajuryof12randomlyselectedcitizens.

Theseeminglyintractableproblemofthestate’sinabilitytoprosecutecorruptionoffenceshasledoverthepast20yearstotheestablishmentofTribunalsofInquirysimply,astheirnamesuggests,toinquireintomattersofcorruption.Theveryfoundingprincipleofthetribunalsofinquiryisthattheyarenotconcernedwiththeadministrationofjustice.Aconsequenceofthisisthatevidencegivenbyapersoncompelledtoappearatatribunalcannotsubsequentlybeusedagainstthatpersonincriminalproceedings.Afurtherandnaturalconsequenceofthisispublicoutrageatthespectacleofthecorruptbehaviourofnumerousindividualsbeingshownpubliclyatthetribunals(andathugepublicexpense),withanegligiblenumberofthosepersonsfacinganycriminalsanction.

TheIrishstateshouldrecognisetheself-confessedinabilityoftheDPPtoprosecutecomplexcorruptionandwhite-collarcrimesuccessfully.Thesolutiontothisseriousproblemrequiresbothanincreaseinthecapacityoftheinvestigativeauthoritiesandlegislativechangeincludingtheprovisionofwhistleblowerprotectionforthosewhoreportfraud,taxevasionandcrimesundercompanylaw.

Itwillalso,astheDPPrecognised,requireachangeintheprevailingcultureinalargesectionofsociety,includingmanyofthoseinapositionofauthority,whoatpresentdonotappeartoregardwhite-collarcrimeasequivalentto‘ordinary’crime.

iTaly

LengthyproceedingsandSoLarehighlycontroversialissuesinItaly.Theanalysisfoundthatthecurrentregimeshowsseriousweaknesses.Withonein10criminalproceedingsbeingdismissedduetoSoL(nodataisavailablespecificallyforcorruption-relatedcases),thecurrentSoLregimeconstitutesasignificantreasonforimpunity.



ItisthecombinationoflengthyproceedingswithshortabsoluteSoLforoffencessuchasthefalsificationofbalancesheets,theabuseoffunctionsandtradingininfluence,aswellasthelackofpoliticalwilltocloseloopholes,whichhampertheprosecutionofcorruptioncases.Thefactthatproceedingscanprescribeafterthefirstinstance,evenifanoffenderhasalreadybeenfoundguilty,isparticularlystriking.

Problemsariseduetothehiddennatureofcorruption:whentheoffenceisdiscovered,aconsiderableperiodoftimehasoftenelapsedandtheremainingtimeisoftennotsufficienttocompletetheproceeding.Thecalculationofthemomentofcommencementshouldthereforebechanged,forexample,byre-introducingtheconceptofacontinuouscrime.Thegroundsforinterruptionsshouldalsoberevisited,aswellasthesuppressionofadifferentiateddisciplinebasedonthesubjectiveconditionofhabitualcriminals.

Undertheseterms,itbecomesparticularlyimportanttochampiontheearlydetectionofcrimesinordertoallowprosecutorsalongeravailableperiodoftimetocarryoutproceedings.Theintroductionofwhistleblowingregulationsandtheassignmentofresponsibilityforforeignbriberycasestospecialisedandadequatelyresourcedstaffcouldaddresstheseproblems.

liThuania

LithuaniareformeditscriminalSoLregimeinJune2010.ThereformsdiminishtheriskthatSoLmighthampertheenforcementofanti-corruptionlaws.However,itistooearlytoassesstheirimpactinprac-tice.

Analysisofthepre-reformsituationshowedthattheSoLregimeusedtoconstituteanobstaclefortheinvestigationandprosecutionofcriminaloffences,mainlybecausethetimedelaysweretooshortandtherewasadegreeofinflexibilityinthewaytheywerecalculated.

ThenewregimecombinesdifferentmechanismstocalculateSoL.Itextendsthetimeperiodstoeightor12years,dependingontheoffence,decreasingtheunreasonablyhighrelevanceofSoLfortheenforcementofcriminallaw.SoLinadministrativeandcivilproceed-ingsarenotparticularlyrelevantinLithuania.

WhilethemechanismofcalculationofdisciplinarySoLisquiteflexible,thesix-monthabsoluteperiodofSoLisrathershort.However,initsactionprogramme,thegovernmentofLithuaniahascommittedtoextendingperiodsofdisciplinarySoL.Arelatedbillhasalreadybeenproposedandiscurrentlybeingdebatedinparliament.TheauthorsoftheamendmentproposetoextendtheabsoluteperiodofdisciplinarySoLtouptooneyear,anduptothreeyearsinthecaseofaseriousbreachofduties.

porTuGal

InPortugal,theSoLregimeworkswelloverall,withadecreasingnumberofcasesbeingdismissedduetoSoL.Since2004,thenumberhasfallenfrom2.4percenttolessthanonepercentofallcorruption-relatedcases.Themainconcernrelatestolengthycriminalproceedings,whichcancauseSoLtoexpireduringthecourtphase.Againstthisbackground,thePortugueseParliamenthasrecentlyenactedalawwhichextendsregularSoLperiodsformostcorruption-relatedcrimesto15years.Nevertheless,thefewcaseswhicharedismissedtendtobelarge-scaleandshouldthereforenotbeunderestimated.

AremainingweaknessofthePortugueseregimeisthattheSoLperiodincludesallstagesoftheproceedings,includingtheappellateinstances.Further,neitheranMLArequestnordelayscausedbyinstitutionalco-oper-ation(beitwithpublicorprivateentities,suchasbanks)orappealstotheConstitutionalCourtconstitutegroundsforinterruptionorsuspension.

Toaddressthelengthycriminalproceedingswhichareasignificantconcernintheenforcementofanti-corrup-tionlegislation,itisrecommendedthatthenumberofcriminalinvestigatorsbeincreased,thenumberofproceedingseachinvestigatordealswithatoncebereducedandacentralised,easilyaccessiblesystemofinformationandco-operationbetweenentitiesbeprovided.Inaddition,thedetectionofcorruptioncasesshouldbeimproved,forexample,byprovidingbetterprotectionforwhistleblowersandbyraisingpublicawarenessinordertoensuretheearlierdiscoveryofcrime.

Aspecialisedanti-corruptionunitwithintheProsecu-tor’sOfficeandspecialisedcriminalcourtsforcorrup-tion-relatedcrimesshouldalsobeestablished.

romania

TheRomaniananti-corruptionlawprovidesforspecificpenaltiesforcorruption-relatedoffencesand,asaconsequence,forspecialSoLfortheseoffences.Moreover,specialisedanti-corruptionbodieshavebeenputinplaceinordertoreduceimpunityforcorruptionoffences.

TheexpertsinterviewedfeltthatthelimitationperiodsregardingSoL,areadequateforcorruptionoffences.Insteaditisthecriminalproceduralsystemwhichraisesissuesinthefightagainstcorruption,bycreatingopportunitiestoblockanddelayproceedings.TheRomaniancriminalproceduralsystemisdeeplyunstableandeventhoughthelimitationperiodsseemtobesufficient,theproceduresstipulatedbylawcreatediversepossibilitiesforoffenderstoavoidprosecution.Thesolutionthereforeliesnotnecessarilyintheaug-mentationofthelimitationperiods,butintheimprove-mentoftheproceduralsystem.

Specifically,theRomanianSoLregimeshouldextendandbetterdefinethegroundsforinterruptionandsuspensionofSoL.Thereshouldbeaconsistent,unitaryandstablecriminalpolicyforcorruption-relatedoffences,withathoroughimpactanalysisofthechanges,includingconsultationof

relevantstakeholders.DataandstatisticsregardingtheincidenceofSoLshouldbegatheredandanalysed,andevaluationcarriedoutofthe‘blacknumber’ofcorrup-tion-relatedoffencesandthenumberofpotentialcaseswithinthelimitationperiod.Thejudiciaryandlaw-enforcementbodiesshouldbeadequatelyequippedtoinvestigate,prosecuteandtrycorruptioncasesinordertoclosetheproceduralgaps,leadingtothecompletionofthelimitationperiod.

slovakia

InSlovakia,theSoLregimedoesnotconstituteamatterofsignificantconcernfortheprosecutionofcorruption-relatedoffences.Problemsrelaterathertotheinappropriatedefinitionofcriminaloffencesandtothelackofdetectionofcorruptioncases.Detailedstatisticsareavailableregardingthenumberofcasesdiscontinued;however,theydonotshowthegroundsfortermination.

WeaknessesintheSlovakianSoLregimerelatetothefactthattheimmunityofgovernmentmembersdoesnotconstituteagroundforsuspensionofSoL.Infact,theholdingofahighpositionwithinthestateadminis-trationpracticallyprecludestheinvestigationofcriminaloffences.Further,inordertosuspendtheperiodoflimitationbecauseanallegedoffenderisabroad,itneedstobeproventhatheorsheintendedtostayabroad.Thisprovision,onlyintroducedin2006,shouldberevoked.

AnotherproblemistheabsenceofaconnectionbetweentheperiodoflimitationforthecompensationofdamagespursuanttotheCivilCodeandthecompletionofcriminalproceedings.ThelegalregulationallowsforSoLwithregardtothecompensationfordamagestoexpirepriortoavalidcompletionofcriminalproceed-ingsandtheconvictionoftheoffender.



Table 8: number of closed investigations and court proceedings due to statutes of limitations

InvestigationsclosedduetoSoLTotalnumberofclosed

andcompletedinvestigationsPercentageofinvestigationsclosed

duetoSoL(%2of3)

Country YearCorruption-related

offences Criminal Corruption-related Criminal Corruption-related Criminal

belGium 2009 4 1.344 252 712.591 1,6 0,2

2008 2 1.218 232 707.589 0,2 0,2

2007 3 2.104 302 711.458 1,0 0,3

2006 3 1.373 291 738.866 1,0 0,2

2005 1 1.627 265 787.853 0,4 0,2

bulGaria 2009 70.985 375 226.478 n/a 31,3

2008 235.659 1.068 653.777 n/a 36,0

2007 274.122 1.319 743.467 n/a 36,9

2006 11.848 3799 243.337 n/a 4,9

esTonia 2009 2 172 48.359 1,2 n/a

2008 16 310 50.977 5,2 n/a

2007 0 232 50.375 0,0 n/a

finland 2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

hunGary* 2009 2 2.097 276+961 199348+185005 0,7 1,05

2008 10 108.332 285+490 375226+191279 3,5 28,87

2007 6 91.893 254+311 366829+205721 2,4 25,05

2006 5 36.556 258+423 207570+220943 1,9 17,61

2005 46 5.763 414+857 99512+217536 11,1 5,79

iTaly** 2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

laTvia 2009 2 16 12,5

2008 3 16 18,8

2007 0 18 0,0

2006 2 41 4,9

2005 1 27 3,7

liThuania 2009 0 5.672 441 42.263 0,0 13,4

2008 1 2.967 371 37.013 0,3 8,0

2007 1 1.964 398 34.511 0,3 5,7

2006 0 1.200 365 37.260 0,0 3,2

porTuGal*** 2009 466692***

2008 1 125**** 470.780 0,8

2007 1 128 446.428 0,8

2006 0 62 442.993 0,0

2005 4 278 431.171 1,4

2004 6 245 394.365 2,4

slovakia 2009 12 193 945 32.266 1,3 0,6

2008 21 219 869 30.070 2,4 0,7

2007 9 123 899 29.926 1,0 0,4

2006 13 137 922 27.523 1,4 0,5

2005 15 220 2.365 38.513 0,6 0,6

slovenia 2009 2.537 87.465

2008 23 346 2.601 81.917 0,9 0,4

2007 42 430 2.735 88.197 1,5 0,5

2006 25 381 2.686 90.354 0,9 0,4

2005 25 637 2.118 84.379 1,2 0,8

annexCriminalcourtproceedings

closedduetoSoLTotalnumberofclosedcriminalcourt

proceedingsandconvictionsPercentageofproceedings

closedduetoSoL(%4of5)

Country Corruption-related Criminal Corruption-related Criminal Corruption-related Criminal

belGium

bulGaria 13 80 1.584 69.289 0,8 0,1

7 87 1.631 69.389 0,4 0,1

16 82 1.859 65.601 0,9 0,1

9 82 2.111 66.283 0,4 0,1

esTonia 25 7.881 n/a n/a

14.533 n/a n/a

12.706 n/a n/a

finland 0 301 78 731.648 0,0 0,0

0 696 81 684.598 0,0 0,1

2 737 111 628.592 1,8 0,1

3 394 84 583.236 3,6 0,1

1 245 100 601.367 1,0 0,0

hunGary* 3 444 200 87.743 1,5 0,5

2 520 242 88.902 0,8 0,6

3 633 348 93.800 0,9 0,7

10 776 456 102.037 2,2 0,8

8 1.034 502 104.262 1,6 1,0

iTaly** 806.918

153.388 1.509.455 10,2

163.635 1.467.677 11,1

159.533 1.406.082 11,3

189.345 1.502.504 12,6

laTvia n/a 14

n/a 16

n/a 14

n/a 16

n/a 4

liThuania 2 28 353 16.832 0,6 0,2

n/a 15 290 16.082 n/a 0,1

n/a 10 318 16.066 n/a 0,1

n/a n/a 317 16.832 n/a n/a

porTuGal*** 5 1.489 198 120.846 2,5 1,2

10 2.592 219 130.545 4,6 2,0

3 667 187 126.035 1,6 0,5

0 312 130 98.697 0,0 0,3

0 306 118 95.404 0,0 0,3

5 384 112 98.185 4,5 0,4

slovakia 20 589 510 30.953 3,9 1,9

22 578 812 28.681 2,7 2,0

18 572 749 27.067 2,4 2,1

33 517 931 25.764 3,5 2,0

34 494 1.645 27.729 2,1 1,8

slovenia 15.885

14.277

14.484

15.288

14.222

* the first number in the cell is terminations without indictments, the second is the number of indictments

** 2009: only first semester

*** number of total criminal proceedings closed in police entities

**** numbers referring to criminal proceedings for bribery, embezzlement and unlawful economic advantage which have been referenced by the Central Prosecution and Investigation Department


1 SeetheOrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)Anti-BriberyConvention,article6andtheUnitedNationsConventionagainstCorruption(UNCAC),article29.RecommendationsfromtheCouncilofEurope’sGroupofStatesagainstCorruption(GRECO)ThirdEvaluationRoundhaveraisedtheissueaswell.

2 TheUnitedNationsConventionagainstCorruption(UNCAC)ReviewMechanismhasonlyrecentlybeenestablished,andtherearenooutcomessofar.

3 Seee.g.Corruption-AGlossaryofInternationalStandardsinCriminalLaw,OECD(2008)p.55f.http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/57/41650182.pdf)andMid-termStudyofPhase2Reports,OECDWGB2006http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/39/36872226.pdf

4 Davigo,PiercamilloandMannozzi,Grazia:LacorruzioneinItalia.Percezionesocialeecontrollopenale,Bari,Laterza,2007.MrDavigoisCouncilloroftheSupremeCourtofCassazione,andMsMannozziisUniversityProfessorofCriminalLawatUniversitàdell’InsubriainComo.

5 NamelyBelgium,Cyprus,Denmark,Estonia,Finland,France,Germany,Latvia,Luxembourg,Malta,theNetherlands,Poland,Slovenia,Spain,SwedenandtheUnitedKingdom

6 EBSWpalankųsprendimąpriųmusiteisųja–nebaudžiama(ThejudgewhohasmadeadecisioninfavourofEBSWgoesunpunished)//www.delfi.lt(July122007),http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=13767288

7 http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bribe/2009/07/global-corruption-roundup-ii.html;

http://svt.se/2.58360/1.1597692/utskriftsvanligt_format?printerfriendly=true

8 Whistleblowersdiscloseinformationaboutaperceivedwrongdoinginanorganisation,ortheriskthereof,toindividualsorentitiesbelievedtobeabletoeffectaction.InmostEuropeancountries,whistleblowersarenotsufficientlyprotectedandtheirreportsarenotproperlyfollowedup.Formoreinformationseehttp://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/other_thematic_is-sues/towards_greater_protection_of_whistleblowers

9 InHungary,relatedstatisticsdoexist.TheyshowthattheinvestigativeauthoritiesrejectedacomplaintorreportoncorruptionoffencesduetoSoLinfourcasesin2006,threein2007andtwoin2008.

10 DCIAP-PGRandCIES-ISCTE,AcorrupçãoparticipadaemPortugal2004-2008Resultadosglobaisdeumapesquisaemcurso,FinalReport,2009

11 InCyprus,therearenoSoLforanyoffencepunishablewithmorethanthreemonthsimprisonment;giventhatallcorruption-relatedoffenceshavehighercharges,defactotherearenoSoLforcorruptionoffences.

12 AdaptedfromBacioTerracino,JulioandBikelis,Skirmantas:BackgroundNote-Corruption-relatedStatutesofLimitations,16April2010.

13 InHungary,theperiodisequaltothemaximumsentence,butmaynotbelessthanthreeyears.SeeOECDWorkingGrouponBribery,Hungary:Phase2Report,May2005,para.115

14 OECDWorkingGrouponBribery,France:Phase2Report,January2004

15 OECDWorkingGrouponBribery,Phase2Report,January2004,para.98.

16 Carignonruling,Crim.27October1997,Bull.Crim.No.352.

17 Crim.13December1972,Bull.No.391,andCrim.9November1995,12May1998.

18 DataismissingforIrelandandtheUKbecausetheydonotdisposeofSoLincriminalproceedingsandforCyprusbecausedefactonoSoLapply.

19 DejuretheSoLperiodrunsuntiltheendofprosecution,butdefactotheformalaccusationandsometimesevenotherinvestigativemeasuresbeforetheaccusationsuspendtheSoLperioduntilthelegallybindingendoftheproceedings.

20 BikelisS.,NikartasS.,ÜseleL.StatutesofLimitationsintheSystemofCriminalJustice.InLithuanianLawInstituteofLithuania,2009(unpublished).

21 Thistableprovidesexamplesbasedonthe11overviewstudiesplusinformationfromBelgium,Estonia,LatviaandSlovenia.Inthecourseofthisprojectitwasnotpossibletocompileacomprehensivelistofallcountrieswhereanyoftheseprovisionsapply.

22 Thistableprovidesexamples,basedonthe11in-depthstudiesplusinformationfromBelgium,Estonia,LatviaandSlovenia.

23 ItisinterestingtonotethattherearestillsomecaseswhereSoLcanbesuspendedinSlovenia,namely1.immunityofMembersoftheNationalAssembly,2.iftheaccusedaftercommittingcriminaloffencehasbecomeafflictedwithamentalillnessormental

endnoTes

disturbanceorsomeotherseriousdiseaseand3.,theterminationoftheinvestigationwhentheperpetratorisunreachablebythestateauthorities.

24 FordetailsaboutCyprusrefertoendnote11.25 SeeAustriareportpage14.26 2008:GRECOThirdEvaluationRoundEvaluation

ReportonLatvia,onTransparencyofPartyFunding,para83and2009:GRECOThirdEvaluationRoundEvaluationReportonLithuania,onTransparencyofPartyFunding,para117.

27 GRECOwasestablishedin1999bytheCouncilofEurope(CoE)tomonitorCoEmemberstates’compli-ancewiththeorganisation’santi-corruptionstandardsthroughmutualevaluationandpeerreview.GRECOevaluationreportscontainrecommendationstotheevaluatedcountriesinordertoimprovetheirlevelofcompliancewiththeprovisionsunderconsideration.StatutesoflimitationsarebeingassessedintheThirdEvaluationRound.

28 WhiletherearelegalprovisionsonSoLtheydonotapplytocorruptionoffences.Thisisthecase,forexample,ofRegulation2988of1974onlimitationperiodsinproceedingsrelatingtotransportandcompetitionandRegulation2988of1995ontheprotec-tionoftheEuropeanCommunity’sfinancialinterests.

29 CoECivilLawConvention,Art.7(1).30 Ibid.31 Law78/2000ontheprevention,uncoveringand

punishingofcorruptionoffences.Aproblemliesinthefactthatseveralcorruptionoffences,suchasconflictofinterest,arenotcoveredbythisnewlaw.

32 Italianreport,page10.33 Forthisconsent,theabsolutemajorityisneeded,

followingarequestbyatleast30membersoftheParliament.Suchconsentmustbeobtainednolaterthantheendofthesecondregularsessionoftheparliamentarytermwhichcommencedaftertheoffencewascommitted.

34 Exceptforembezzlement,moneylaundering,passivebriberyandcorruptioninjudicialacts

35 §78b(3)CC36 TheaccusationsuspendstheSoLperiod,butonlyfora

maximumperiodofthreeyears.Fromthemomenttheaccusationisnotified,theSoLperiodisalsointerrupted,providingforanevenlongerSoLperiod.UnlikeGermanyandSlovakia,however,Portugaldoeshaveabsolute

SoLperiods,whichcanexpireduetoslowproceedingsinthefirstinstanceandintheappellatecourts.

37 InGreecetheprosecutionofministersissuspendedforthedurationoftheparliamentarysessionwithinwhichtheoffencewascommitted.Inaddition,thereisaveryshortextinctivedeadlineforprosecutionthatrelatestotheendoftheparliamentarysessions.

38 However,researchersandexpertsfeltthatotherprovisionsmaysomehowcompensatefortheabsenceofanMLArequestasgroundsforsuspensionorinterruption

39 GiventhatrelativeSoLperiodswererecentlyabolished,thereare(almost)nogroundsforsuspensionanymore.Instead,absoluteSoLperiodsareparticularlylong.

40 Iftheresultsoccurafterthepunishablebehaviourceased.

41 Thereareefficientandnon-efficient(formal)crimesintheBulgarianPenalLaw.Inthecaseof“efficientcrimes,Soliscalculatedfromthedaytheconsequencesarise.Therearenocriminalconsequencesprovidedforthenon-efficientcrimes,soSoLbeginsfromthemomentofexecutionofthecrime.

42 JuspuniendiistheState’srighttosanction43 NamelyBelgium,Cyprus,Denmark,Estonia,Finland,

France,Germany,Latvia,Luxembourg,Malta,theNetherlands,Poland,Slovenia,Spain,SwedenandtheUnitedKingdom

transparency internationalinternational secretariatalt-moabit 9610559 Berlin germany

phone: +49 - 30 - 34 38 200fax: +49 - 30 - 34 70 39 12 [email protected]

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