Tim Maudlin - Boris Lenhard Discussion

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    Tihana Dauenhauershared a link.10 December 2012

    Moj mu!ek Nenad Jari"Dauenhauernapravio super interview o super temi. :)

    http://www.tportal.hr/scitech/znanost/230988/Je-li-filozofija-mrtva-kao-sto-tvrdi-Hawking.html#.UMW5q5G9KSM

    Je li filozofija mrtva kao !to tvrdi Hawking?www.tportal.hrUgledni ameri#ki filozof znanosti Tim Maudlin, profesor na Sveu#ili$tu u New Yorku, koji je pro$li tjedan sudjelovao nasimpoziju 'Filozofija u dijalogu sa znanostima' u Zagrebu, poku$ao je u intervjuu za tportal pojasniti koje je mjestofilozofije u suvremenom svijetu kojim dominira znanost te koja...1070Like%%Share

    Tamara Cacevand 9 otherslike this.

    Boris LenhardPitat "u i ovdje:

    "Uloga filozofa je da upozore fizi#are da ne bismo trebali biti zadovoljni samo prediktivnom to#no$"u, ve"datrebamo tragati za razumijevanjem onoga $to stvarno jest. "

    A question for professor Maudlin: How do you know when you have gotten there? How do you know when youhave accomplished the kind of understanding that you are seeking?

    This is a question central to whether what you are trying to accomplish is meaningful or not. So far I haveasked that question on several occasions, and I haven't heard or read any answers to it that are even remotelysatisfactory.11 December 2012 at 00:14 %Like

    Tihana DauenhauerVishnya Maudlin? - jer ja ne znam odgovor. Pa ako "e ona imati vremena.11 December2012 at 07:25 via mobile %Like

    Boris LenhardPitanje izri#ito nije za Vi$nju. Nego za Tima. Vi$nju sam ve"poku$ao pitati.11 December 2012at 10:37 %Like

    Tihana DauenhauerOk. I will tag his name. Maybe he will find some time to answer your question. He is verybusy at the moment. But, who knows. Tim Maudlin? 11 December 2012 at 10:40 via mobile %Like

    Tim MaudlinIn response: there is a positive and a negative aspect to this. In a positive sense, one will neverbe able to certain that any precise theory is, in fact, the true account. There may be alternative theories thatare known and provably empirically equivalent, and so cannot be decided by data. There can be theories thanmake different empirical predictions in principle but cannot be checked in practice. And there can be theoriesthan no one has thought up, or even, given human capacities, can think up. So certainty in the positive senseis not going to be had.11 December 2012 at 11:21 %Like%1

    Tim MaudlinBut, in a negative sense, one can see that some approaches are internally inconsistent, or notprecisely defined. The most common approaches to understanding quantum theory fall in this category. If thebasic axioms of the theory invoke measurement, for example, but no precise account of what counts as ameasurement is given, then theory is, as Bell would say, unprofessionally vague. Given vague rules of thumbthe theory can be used to make predictions, but it is not even a candidate for a precise physical account. Someprecisely defined, mathematically exact approaches to understanding quantum phenomena do exist, but themajority of practicing physicists are not aware of them and do not appreciate the problems they solve. This isdue to an odd history that goes back to Bohr. What we want to do is develop as many exact theories aspossible, and see how far data can go to decide between them. No one expects complete certainty to come atthe end.11 December 2012 at 11:27 %Like%1

    Boris Lenhard(EDIT: this is only a response to the first part of the answer) Professor Maudlin, thank you foryour response. However, I feel none the cleverer for it. I still do not understand what understanding means inthis context (no pun intended). If theories are empirically equivalent, what is the criterion for choosing one

    over another? Is it, what Roger Penrose suggests, that one would feel more right than the other? Isn't there adanger of confounding the truth (or reality) with the simple preference for a model that is more within ourintellectual/cognitive comfort zone - which is basically an aesthetic criterion, and a rather anthropocentric

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    attitude to begin with? (Sorry if I use some terms in a crude ir imprecise way - I am still only a biologist. )11December 2012 at 11:27 %Like%1

    Tim MaudlinYou are confusing two separate issues. Understanding the phenomenon is getting the trueaccount of it. What you are after is easy to state. The hard question is how one can have good grounds forbelieving that an account is, in fact, true. Empirical data go some way to addressing this, but there are other

    grounds for making judgments. For example, some people have believed that the universe was created 6,000years ago, with apparent evidence for a longer age (dinosaur bones, etc.) intact. Clearly, there can be noempirical basis to reject the theory, in the sense that it can be made consistent with all data. Equally clearly, noscientist would take it seriously. So there are other grounds on which such judgments can be made. These aremost usefully discussed on a case-by-case basis. I would not call the grounds for rejecting the theory justmentioned either aesthetic or anthropomorphic. I would call them rational. 11 December 2012 at 11:45 %Like%1

    Boris Lenhard"Understanding the phenomenon is getting the true account of it. "

    This only means, if there is no objective criterion for getting a true account of phenomenon (and from whatyou are saying, I don't see one), there is no way of claiming one has understood it.

    What you (and many other people) mean by understanding, as I see it, still refers to a model and consists of 1)knowledge of the assumptions of the model, 2) knowledge of the predictive consequences of the model, and

    3) BELIEF that the model is a true physical description of the phenomenon. There is no way to make beliefsobjective or to decide that they do correspond to reality.

    "For example, some people have believed that the universe was created 6,000 years ago, with apparentevidence for a longer age (dinosaur bones, etc.) intact. Clearly, there can be no empirical basis to reject thetheory, in the sense that it can be made consistent with all data. Equally clearly, no scientist would take itseriously. "

    No scienctist would take it seriously because the empirical basis to reject the theory that the world is 6000years old is that it has no predictive power - it is a model overfitted to one ancient set of (made-up) data(Genesis) and each new observation of the real world clashes with it and only very convoluted retrofitting couldbe attempted to reconcile it. Of course, one could argue that the world was really made 6000 years ago, butthat God made it to look precisely as it was 4.6 billion years old. (Or, as by Bertrand Russell, 5 minutes old).That idea we cannot dismiss out right - but for practical purposes there is no difference and no way to know.That is where Occam's razor comes in handy, to slash all the unnecessary variables and actors - to me, that iswhere one acts rationally or not, not elsewhere (as you seem to imply). If some interpretations of QM introducenew variables to make the QM more BELIEVABLE as an account of physical world, we are back to chasing thecomfort zone, aren't we? 11 December 2012 at 11:58 %Like

    Tim MaudlinThe theory I mentionedthat the universe came into existence 6,000 years ago in the state thatorthodox science says it had 6,000 years agoobviously has exactly the same predictive power as theorthodox theory. It makes precisely the same predictions for all future experiments. So your claim that it isrejected for lack of predictive power is obviously false. If you want to state that you yourself think it is no morereasonable to believe that the universe began about 13 billion years ago than that it began 5 minute ago, thenyour opinion is not scientific. If you think that "Occam's razor" settles the issue, please state just what youthink the principle is and how it settles the case. As for quantum theory, I take it that a decent account shouldhave as a consequence that experiments have determinate outcomes and should be mathematically welldefined. If denying either of those criteria is inside your "comfort zone", then I have no idea what you arecomfortable with.11 December 2012 at 12:08 %Like

    Boris Lenhard" The theory I mentionedthat the universe came into existence 6,000 years ago in the statethat orthodox science says it had 6,000 years agoobviously has exactly the same predictive power as theorthodox theory. It makes precisely the same predictions for all future experiments. So your claim that it isrejected for lack of predictive power is obviously false. "

    No, please read what I wrote again. I said for the theory overfitted to the Genesis account that it has nopredictive power. For the scenario you mentioned (6000 years or 5 minutes), I said precisely what you aresaying:

    "Of course, one could argue that the world was really made 6000 years ago, but that God made it to lookprecisely as it was 4.6 billion years old. (Or, as by Bertrand Russell, 5 minutes old). That idea we cannotdismiss out right - but for practical purposes there is no difference and no way to know. That is whereOccam's razor comes in handy, "

    First, most people who believe the Earth is 6000 years old, believe it in the former sense (the one with nopredictive power), so your sense is purely academic. Second, the latter sense differs from the account that theEarth is 4.6 billion years old (or universe 13 billiion years) in that it has more parameters and/or actors. 6000years-timepoint is an extra parameter, which is completely arbitrary (could indeed be any timepoint). No

    predictive power is lost by ditching it.

    "As for quantum theory, I take it that a decent account should have as a consequence that experiments havedeterminate outcomes and should be mathematically well defined. If denying either of those criteria is inside

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    your "comfort zone", then I have no idea what you are comfortable with."

    I am a biologist, not a physicist, but no, I do not necessarily crave determinate outcomes in your sense.Perhaps it really is the limitation of our cognitive apparatus and the macroscopic scale that we inhabit that weexpect that.11 December 2012 at 12:22 %Like

    Tim MaudlinAs a biologist, I would expect that you want cats to end up either alive or dead, even afterSchrdinger's experiment. That is what I mean by a determinate outcome. If you are happy to forgo that, I haveno idea what you think is acceptable. If you are not really conversant with the issues surrounding theinterpretation of quantum theory, then a lot of background has to be provided.11 December 2012 at 12:27 %Like

    Boris Lenhard"As a biologist, I would expect that you want cats to end up either alive or dead, even afterSchrdinger's experiment. That is what I mean by a determinate outcome."

    Not really. I wouldn't be surprised if no interpretation of quantum mechanics would ever tell you whathappened to the cat before you actually look.

    "If you are not really conversant with the issues surrounding the interpretation of quantum theory, then a lot ofbackground has to be provided."

    I did not intend to discuss the interpretation of quantum theory, just the criteria for "understanding what reallyis". I am still not convinced that "what really is" is not simply an overambitious code for "what we arecomfortable with". The difference between the two is that the former at least im my view is supposed to beobjective, while the latter can never be. That is why most practicing physicists probably do not appreciate it.They need an objective measure of progress.11 December 2012 at 12:34 %Like

    Tim MaudlinAgain, you just are not understanding the issue. The issue about the cat I mentioned is not aboutwhat happens before you look but what happens after, and if there is a physical account of the process oflooking. That is a straightforward demand of an adequate physics. As for "what we are comfortable with", thatis your own notion and has nothing at all to do with anything I said. Please directly answer: do you think youhave a defensible, rational ground for thinking that the world existed 10 minutes ago or is it just "what you arecomfortable with"? If the former, then you think there are rational grounds for preferring one theory overanother that is not just a matter of prediction. If the latter, then you are outside of scientific opinion.11December 2012 at 12:42 %Like

    Tim MaudlinSInce I asked a straightforward question half an hour ago and there is no answer, I infer that youhave no adequate answer. I reach 2 conclusions and a comment. 1) You have not though clearly about groundsfor belief in theories that go beyond predictive adequacy. 2) You do not understand the interpretive problemsthat confront the quantum formalism. The comment is this: my wife understands both of these things perfectlywell, and would have been able to say enlightening and useful things about them, but by all accounts you havebeen unspeakably and indefensibly obnoxious to her. You owe her, and everyone else on the blog, anapology.11 December 2012 at 13:13 %Like%1

    Boris LenhardWrong inference sir, I had a meeting in the meantime. I have an academic job, tooThe answer is coming in a few minutes.11 December 2012 at 13:29 %Like

    Boris Lenhard"Again, you just are not understanding the issue. "

    Quite possibly. It doubles the problem, since I still do not know what you mean by "understanding".

    "Please directly answer: do you think you have a defensible, rational ground for thinking that the world existed10 minutes ago or is it just "what you are comfortable with"? If the former, then you think there are rationalgrounds for preferring one theory over another that is not just a matter of prediction. "

    I think that, while we have no means of distinguishing between the two scenarios, in _this_case_ there arerational, defensible reasons for preferring one over another. In the model that claims that the world as weknow it was made into existence 10 minutes (or 6000 years) ago, 10 minutes (or 6000 years) is not areplacement for 13 billion or 4.6 billion - by studying the properties of the world as it is, even if it is 10minutes or 6000 years old, the numbers 13 or 4.6 billion will come out of the model - as extrapolations. Onthe other hand, if you work out the details under the assumptions that the Universe is 13 billion years old (orEarth 4.6 billion), 6000 years or 10 minutes will not come out of anywhere. Rather than being alternativeexplanations, these are just arbitrary values of an additional, arbitrary parameter that come out of nowhere,could be replaced by any other value, and are unnecessary for the model. Getting rid of such parameters is, atleast to me, a textbook application of Occam's razor.

    On the other hand, while I do not understand anywhere nearly enough about quantum mechanics or its

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    interpretations, I am quite confident that what you are trying to achieve there is unrelated to what I have justdescribed above. If it was, I am pretty sure that practicing physicists would have done it themselves by now.

    The bottom line, making predictive models more complicated and adding additional parameters that will notimprove their predictive ability, but serve to cater to one's (religious or cognitive) preconceptions is just notscience, and in many cases is anti-science. That might be the reason why there are top practicing physicistswhom you cannot convince to take your path. 11 December 2012 at 13:43 %Like

    Boris Lenhard"The comment is this: my wife understands both of these things perfectly well, and would havebeen able to say enlightening and useful things about them, but by all accounts you have been unspeakablyand indefensibly obnoxious to her."

    I apologise for being obnoxious to your wife (in which I admit that I went way overboard even for my relaxedstandards), but it started when she accused me of not understanding and not being able to understand what Iam doing as a scientist rather that trying to explain the issues and to defend her opinions. I tried to have areasoned discussion, but some attitudes just bring out the worst in me...11 December 2012 at 13:48 %Like

    Boris LenhardIncidentally, I agree that Hawking's remark on the death of philosophy was wrong and uncalledfor. He really might not be up to date with developments in philosophy of physics, which you suggest has beenseamlessly integrated with cutting-edge physics. But, if one (or several) leading cosmologists can becomeleading cosmologists without being aware of what you and your colleagues have accomplished, isn't it at least

    obvious that the knowledge of what you have accomplished is not necessary to be a world leadingcosmologist, at present date? Could Hawking's hyperbole have meant just that - that it simply provides nouseful input to working physicists (such as him), which does not prevent them from leading the way in science?The question then becomes - should scientists pay attention to what you are doing? I think it is your job toconvince the scientist that they should, while avoiding the temptation to suggest that those who decline theinvitation are bad scientists - because many are clearly not bad at all. 11 December 2012 at 14:53 %Like

    Tim MaudlinThe problem is that you keep thinking that the sort of thing that philosophers want is different inkind from what physicists want. This is not the case. The strongest proponents of the sort of clarity in thefoundations of physics that I am advocating were Einstein and Bell, and Schrodinger was very dissatisfied withthe sorts of thing Bohr was saying. Or you could go back all the way to the Copernican Revolution, when andinstrumentalist approach (all we want are hypothesis from which one can calculate planetary positions) wasrejected in favor a a demand for a clear physical account of what is going on, of the sort the Newton offered.You also might reflect on the difference between, say, Poincare who took the atomic hypothesis purelyinstrumentally, and Boltzmann and again Einstein who took atoms seriously as a physical posit and then were

    able to work out the consequences of the posit for phenomena that had not been considered (e.g. Brownianmotion). The idea that physics ought to offer proposals with a clear account of what exists and the precise,mathematically formulated dynamical laws that govern it is not something that only philosophers want. Nor isit a demand for something familiar or comforting, as you repeatedly suggest. Everyone in foundations I knowis happy to consider theories, for example, according to which Schrdinger's cat is neither definitely alive nordead until a certain sort of physical interaction takes place. They just want a clear physical account of theinteraction, expressed in precise mathematical terms.11 December 2012 at 18:53 %Like%1

    Tim MaudlinOne then proceeds in two steps. First, formulate as many precise theories consistent with thedata as possible. Only once this is done can one ask whether there are some rational grounds other thansimple empirical accuracy for thinking some of the theories to be more plausible than others. There have beenmany such criteria proposed and used in the history of science, which can go be somewhat vague names like"simplicity" or "obeying Occam's razor" to much more exact accounts in terms of various confirmation theories.But as I said at the beginning, I don't think that very much of a general nature can be said here: one has tolook at the particular case. I could give you the sorts of considerations that, I think, make the GRW collapse

    theory less plausible theory than a Bohmian theory, but there is no reason to think that those will generalize toother cases. The issues that I focus on have to with the the foundations of physics, and I can provide anyamount or detail you like about why the textbook versions of quantum theory are not up to proper professionstandards of clarity and rigor. Of course, the textbook version is, as John Bell said, fine FAPP, i.e. For AllPractical Purposes. But there are other purposes than practical purposes. Indeed, one might well say thatcosmology has no practical aspect at all. As for whether actual scientific practice would be improved incosmology if there was more rigorous and clear thinking, I will defend that it would be, but we again have toget into technical detail (e.g. about so-called "black hole complimentarily") that is probably of no professionalinterest to you. If you really want to understand the situation, I suggest you at least start with John Bell's essay"Against 'Measurement'". These are the complaints of a leading physicist about the lack of clarity and rigor inphysics. I think Bell is perfectly correct. One can, no doubt, become a "leading cosmologist" while havingconfused or incoherent views on foundational issues. But one could not have accomplished what Bell didwithout having a high regard for rigor and clarity. Nor what Einstein did. Philosophers of physics are notEinstein...but neither are almost all physicists. What we can do is advocate for some of the same intellectualvirtues that Einstein demanded. If you personally have no interest in this sort of clarity, there is probablynothing to be said. But to think that these questions, the questions of Einstein, Bell and Schrdinger, aresomehow merely philosophical and not scientific is to denigrate the greatest scientists in history.11 December2012 at 19:14 %Like%1

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    Boris Lenhard"The problem is that you keep thinking that the sort of thing that philosophers want is differentin kind from what physicists want."

    The reason I keep thinking this is that your criteria for the plausibility of Bohm vs GRW vs Everitt interpretationof quantum theory (of which I know nowhere nearly enough to have my own opinion) are against the majorityopinion of practicing physicists. Your ranking of importance of physicists is quite different from the consensusof practicing physicists (with Bell and Bohm - especially Bell - much higher up the list than most physicistswould put them, and with objections to Bohr, Heisenberg or Dirac most practising physicists would not findrelevant or at least not scientifically relevant). (It is similar with the ranking of living biologists by importance,

    where a list that practicing biologists would come up with would be very very different from that assembled byeither philosophers of biology or by non-biologists in general.)

    "The strongest proponents of the sort of clarity in the foundations of physics that I am advocating wereEinstein and Bell, and Schrodinger was very dissatisfied with the sorts of thing Bohr was saying."

    Well if you trust me to speak as a scientist who works with other scientists (and, even though I am no physicistand definitely no Einstein or Bell, or Bohr, I am the scientist of a kind you or your equivalent in philosophy ofbiology would have to deal with), "dissatisfaction" with what somebody is saying is not a relevant criterion forfinding problems with one's science. One either has demonstrably unjustified assumptions, conclusions thatdo not follow from assumptions+observations. It can phenotypically manifest itself as general dissatisfaction,but it has to be accompanied by a clear case against either assumptions, conclusions which do not follow, orpredictive power that is lacking.

    "One can, no doubt, become a "leading cosmologist" while having confused or incoherent views onfoundational issues.[...]"

    The problem is that most often, one will never become a leading cosmologist (or biologist) by trying to come

    up with a clear, coherent view of [what to you look like] foundational issues instead of focusing on problems inwhich he/she can make real and - wait for it - _measurable_ progress in one's lifetime. That is a problem thatsomebody who tries to do what you are doing cannot afford to either ignore or treat with what may evenremotely look like contempt (and some attitudes do appear like that).

    The problem - and I think this is where you and many practicing scientists, including world-leading ones, partways - is that what you consider foundational issues (in science) are simply not foundational issues in theirview. I had a long and occasionally unpleasant discussion first with Vi$nja then with Pavel about the(un)importance of defining the concept of "gene" in biology, where I tried to convince them that no workingbiologist would spend any effort on trying to come up with an exact an universally true definition of theconcept, even though to a philosopher looking from the outside it looks like an inexcusably irresponsibleattitude to leave such "foundational issue" "confused" or "incoherent". Well, I can tell you that science (and byall criteria by which both scientist and society measure it, very successful science) simply does not work likethat. Francis Crick (a physicist by training) said that if in the 1960s their goal was to define a gene exactly, thiswould likely would have halted the progress of molecular biology by several decades. Even now, attempting todefine a gene exactly (which I could discuss in much more detail) is a progress-halting effort, both from theviewpoint of biology and from the viewpoint of a biologist's career. Again, expressing contempt toward suchstate of affairs is likely to antagonise you to many world-leading scientists.

    "Einstein, Bell and Schrdinger, are somehow merely philosophical and not scientific is to denigrate thegreatest scientists in history."

    I would never call philosophical questions "merely philosophical" but I would also not call philosophicalquestions scientific merely because they were asked about scientific theories by people who also did somegroundbreaking science. From what I can see, you and your colleagues in philosophy of science have noproblem denigrating many other of the greatest scientists in history, precisely because they did not ask thequestions that _you_ find interesting or they explicitly found those questions uninteresting. In doing that, youimply (or at least that is what often appears) that your criteria for estimating the greatness of scientists aresomehow superior to those of practising scientists themselves. Since practising scientists are still the onesdoing science and deciding which of the existing scientific results are fundamentally worthy of building upon,this is bound to create conflict. Any good scientist whom you cannot convince about your view of what isimportant in science will tell you - anybody who thinks that he/she has a better way of doing science, or moreimportant problems to solve, or a superior way of solving them, is welcome to do the science him/herself.Telling scientists how they should go about their business from the sidelines is simply not going to fly. Mostgood scientists are neither muddle-headed nor confused about what they are trying to do, but they job is toclearly identify questions they can meaningfully and unambiguously _answer_, and not merely _explore_.

    Philosophers might help, but they cannot prescribe what is important.12 December 2012 at 09:09 %Like%1

    Tihana DauenhauerAlthough last comment by B. Lenhard sounds somewhat intentionaly provocative, I mustadmit that it got my attention. (sorry, for spelling and grammatical errors. I don't have spell check on mymobile phone) 12 December 2012 at 09:22 via mobile %Like

    Boris LenhardI did not mean to be provocative - I can assure you that I wrote it with the best intention toclarify my view, and that Professor Maudlin would be interested in what scientists think and how to have amore productive dialogue with them. Without it, the sample of scientists that he will get to talk to is unlikely tobe representative. I apologise if anything in the comment sounds disrespectful - it is not meant to be.12December 2012 at 09:24 %Like%1

    Tim MaudlinI really think you ought to have at least some actual data or examples to back up the claims you

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    make. First, to say that an issue is foundational is not to make some sort of subjective claim. It is to saysomething about the precision with which the foundational postulates of a theory have been articulated. To saythat there are foundational problems in the standard formulations of quantum theory isand I'm getting alittle tired of repeating thisto point out that those presentations are not mathematically precise. This is whatBell's complaint is about. If you haven't read his work read it. If you have, read it again because you haven'tunderstood it. As for the relative rankings of "practicing physicists" about the importance of Bell...I am notdoing sociological surveys. Bell stands head-and-shoulders above the rest on foundational questions, and inaddition his work arguably is the source of the interest in entanglement on which quantum computation andquantum cryptography rest. In any case, if you want to argue that Bohr, for example, is better on foundational

    issues than Bell I am happy to have that argument. Just cite and defend what Bohr actually said, don't give mea list of the offhand opinions of physicists who mostly have not read either one. If you yourself don't havefirst-hand, defensible opinions about these things, then you shouldn't have opinions at all.

    Blind reverence for anyone, including the "famous physicist", is not intelligent. Here is a concrete example.Feynman was a first-class scientist. No doubt you would rank him above Bell. And the Twins Paradox is one ofthe central puzzles that occurs in discussions of Relativity. But in his famous lectures, Feynman gives acompletely incorrect account of how that paradox is resolved. Bell's paper, "How to Teach Relativity" in contrastis perfect. Bell does not treat the Twins Paradox, but if you want a correct account of it you can read it in mybook. I am sure, of course, that Feynman would have acknowledged his error if pointed outhe was notdogmatic. But he did make the mistake, in a prominent place, and in a way that makes the actual content ofthe theory hard to understand.

    Is pointing out that fact about what Feynman wroteand it is a fact"denigrating" him? I really don't care whatyou say, because it is a fact that he made a mistake, and it improves matters to point it out and correct it.Bohr's account of quantum theory is simply atrocious, as is his attempt to respond to the EPR paradox. If youwant to dispute this assessment, then do so on factual groundsread and exposit Bohrnot on some offhand"survey" of who physicists like. To do anything else is just lazy and irresponsible.And yes, I do think that my

    own estimate of which physicists were clearer thinkers and had better things to say about foundational issuesis superior than opinions of most practicing physicists, who have neither the interest nor ability to think clearlyabout foundational issues. If you want to dispute these judgments by actual argument, make the argument. Ifyou want to just say that "practicing scientists" have a high opinion of themselves, so what?

    So: do you want to defend Feynman on the Twins Paradox against a mere philosopher like me? Let's have theconversation. Do you want to defend Bohr over Bell? Any time. But there is not a single concrete example orfact that you cite. If you don't like philosophers claiming that physicists make mistake, then show that theyaren't mistakes. The rest of this is just empty rhetoric.12 December 2012 at 14:56 %Like%2

    Boris LenhardProfessor Maudlin, I have said this and I will say it again - I am neither a physicist nor aphilosopher of physics. I can not argue with you about the details of Bell's vs Feynman's account of anything.Likewise, you would probably not be able to figure out where a philosopher of biology like Philip Kitcher in hiswritings gets the concept of "regulatory gene" dead wrong - repeatedly. In short, I cannot give you examplesfrom your own field because it is quite remote from my own field.

    Feynman might get a thing wrong here and there but, sociological surveys or not, there are very few physiciststhat will doubt that his overal contributions to physics (and scientific thinking) vastly exceed those of Bell. Ithink that I have right to notice that, and that it is relevant - just like you have the right to point out one thingin which he was apparently wrong and Bell was right.12 December 2012 at 15:09 %Like

    Tim MaudlinFoundational issues are foundational issues. Some overall judgment about Bell and Feynman,again by physicists who have probably never read Bell, is just worthless as a way to decide which had moreprofound things to say on these issues. I do make strong judgments about this, and will defend them in detailif asked. If you are not actually interested in these issueswhich are the ones I have been discussingI haveno idea why you feel you have to take sides or issue any judgement at all. As you say, I have not been makingany claims at all about philosophy of biology. It is not my field, so I have no basis to judge. If you are in thesame situation with respect to physics, then take the same attitude.12 December 2012 at 15:15 %Like%1

    Boris LenhardI am worried about this:

    "And yes, I do think that my own estimate of which physicists were clearer thinkers and had better things tosay about foundational issues is superior than opinions of most practicing physicists, who have neither theinterest nor ability to think clearly about foundational issues. "

    That is the same attitude that Vi$nja had before and that is bound to instantly antagonise you to many workingscientists, including, I suspect, many who are equally or more accomplished that you in their respective fields.In a nutshell, if you think that some (excellent) physicists do not have ability to think clearly, then your notionof "thinking clearly" is simply unneccesary for doing relevant physics (or other scientists). And it still soundsoffensive. So it is better not to express that attitude - at least if honest dialogue with scientists is desired.Because cherrypicking those scientists who agree with you (or say they do) will not result in a sample ofscientists doing the most relevant science. 12 December 2012 at 15:17 %Like

    Tim MaudlinAgain, I will argue particular cases. I will go through what Bohr says or Feynman says and pointout the errors. The fact that they make errors shows that clear thinking on these issues is not so trivial as youseem to think it is. If the actual facts antagonize working scientists, so what? If I'm wrong, make the argument.

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    If I'm right, then they shouldn't be antagonized by that. Maybe they have overestimated themselves. But theissue is who is right and who is wrong. Which example would you like to discuss?

    By the by, I wonder if you ever censor yourself out of fear of antagonizing anyone.12 December 2012 at 15:23%Like%1

    Boris LenhardThe problem with foundational issues is that, if you look at the history of science, no vigorousscientific advances ever started by defining foundational questions or ny trying to sort out foundational issues.Foundational issues have come out of scientific activity and might represent _conclusion_ (as in closing down)of a scientific research program, and not the beginning of something new and scientifically (notphilosophically) exciting. Since foundational issues are defined by _existing_ scientific knowledge, any newscientific knowledge could in principle derail them (as it happened with any attempts to define the "gene"). Andfoundational issues that you have to keep modifying as new data comes in are not foundational after all.

    Looking at the case of Einstein, it is no accident that he started with annuus mirabilis and not by demandingclarity on foundational questions - without the papers from 1905, nobody would pay attention to his demandsfor clarity. His early work gave him a megaphone for his demands for clarity, but the more philosophical hisinterests became, the more his scientific output dwindled. The same happened to many other scientists withphilosophical interests.12 December 2012 at 15:33 %Like

    Boris Lenhard"The fact that they make errors shows that clear thinking on these issues is not so trivial as you

    seem to think it is."

    Is your definition of a clear thinker "the one that does not make errors"? Do _you_ _never_ make errors? I wouldbe very sceptical about such claims coming from _anybody_.

    Again, some of the most important scientists made some very serious errors in their days. Einstein madeerrors. Linus Pauling was a walking disaster much of the time. And it is not philosophers who typically caughttheir errors - but other scientists who made their own errors on other occasions. If your goal is to rid science(in this case physics) of errors, even regarding foundational questions, I must say that I am sceptical about thatambition.12 December 2012 at 15:38 %Like

    Tim MaudlinDo you really want to argue cases in the history of science? (I take it we are now leaving theissues about the foundations of contemporary physics.) You might as well note, in case you are unaware of it,that in Einstein's 1905 paper there is not any mention of experimental results (and specifically no mention ofMichelson and Morley), but a long and completely conceptual discussion of the different accounts of

    electromagnetic induction given by Maxwell's theory for a moving magnet and a moving coil. Maxwell's theorywas perfectly empirically adequate about these phenomena, but, for Einstein, conceptually inadequate. So thevery case you cite argues against your claim. Shall we discuss Newton's foundational interest in the nature ofspace and time?

    All of this is, in any case, misdirection. My present work is largely on the foundational situation incontemporary physics. If you personally don't care about that, fine. That's not my concern. If you think thesearen't interesting questions, fine again. Then just stop having opinions about which work in this area is welldone and which poorly done. My interest is getting clear about these things, and if doing so antagonizesanyone I can't think of a reason why I should care. If the claims I make are false, then I very much need to havethe mistakes pointed out. The rest is just a side show.

    But again: it was Einstein's interest in foundations that led to the EPR paper, and Schrdinger's reading of EPRthat led to the cat paper and the first explicit discussion of entanglement. It was worries about non-localitythat arise from EPR (and specifically Bohm's theory) that led Bell to his theorem, and then to the renewedinterest in entanglement, and then to quantum computation and quantum cryptography. The historical claimthat foundational issues are somehow sterile is demonstrably false. 12 December 2012 at 15:47 %Like%1

    Tim MaudlinWhy in the world would you attribute to me such a definition of a "clear thinker"? I never said, norimplied, any such thing. In fact, categorizing people in this regard is pointless: Feynman was, on average,splendidly clear. But the fact that he made such a basic mistake shows that it is hard work keeping everythingstraight. The issue is always a particular argument in hand, not who made it. Contributions to keeping thingsstraight ought to be valued, even if they come from philosophers.12 December 2012 at 15:54 %Like%1

    Boris Lenhard"Contributions to keeping things straight ought to be valued, even if they come fromphilosophers."

    I, for once, never doubted this. I only doubted some of the philosophers' opinions of what is important inscience - because in the cases they disagree with practising scientists, they imply that they know better whatare important problems in science than the scientists themselves.12 December 2012 at 15:58 %Like

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    Tihana DauenhauerI just need to say few things (I will be very short). 1. This is for me very, very interestingdiscussion. 2. I'm sorry that for now very few are reading this conversation. Lenhard is, as I see it, openlyasking questions about philosophy of science that are usually hidden inside minds of most Croatian scientists?3. Boris Lenhard, didn't Tim Maudlin already elaborately answered your last question? 12 December 2012 at16:01 via mobile %Like

    Tim MaudlinThere is just no point in debating this. There are foundational issues. Some scientists think theyare important and some don't. If you don't, then don't bother about them. If you think there just are no suchissues, then you are wrong, and we can talk about what they are. If you think that work on foundational issuesnever leads to other sorts of progress then you are also wrong and we can go through cases. If you are upsetthat philosophers are much more attracted to foundational issues than to non-foundataional issues, then getover it. My own assessment is that you are much more concerned to denigrate philosophers than philosophersare interested in denigrating practicing scientists. What is annoying are scientists who take themselves to beexperts on topics about which they have not thought hard or clearly. And this happens with some frequency infoundational topics. But this is a claim to made only on a specific, case-by-case basis.12 December 2012 at16:05 %Like%2

    Boris LenhardI do not understand the details of the EPR paper, but the paper is from 1935, and I understandthe issues raised there are still not settled. Bell theorem is more than 50 years old, and so are most of theinterpretations of quantum mechanics. For the standards of a molecular biologist, as a scientific field this isbeyond stagnant - even if it ensued (long time ago) from interest in foundational questions. If I understand

    your goals correctly, your goal is to get it moving again (at least above the glacial speeds of past half acentury). And my initial question in this discussion is - how do you know that you are succeeding at it? If thecriteria are not something scientists wold recognise as scientific, they will not recognise the progress as such,either.12 December 2012 at 16:06 %Like

    Tim MaudlinWhy in the world should the "standards of a molecular biologist" be of any relevance here? I haveno reason to think that the situation in the two fields have anything at all to do with each other. A foundationalproblem, now, in physics is the reconciliation of quantum theory and the General Theory of Relativity. By yourstandard, that problem is "stagnant" since it could have been raised in the 1930s, or whenever you thinkquantum theory became established. One of the problems for a quantum theory is the so-called problem oftime. And some non-standard approaches to interpreting quantum theory (in particular Bohm's) have no suchproblem. So that's reason to think that interpretational issues can be fruitful. If you want to discuss what theproblem of time is, and how this approach avoids it, that's fine. If you want me to explain the sociology ofphysicists about this, I don't have much useful to say. It is only by first understanding the issue that you can bein a position to judge whether the physicists are making good judgements.

    Again, you seem happy to just endorse whatever most scientists do, without understanding what the issuesare. So anyone who says they are making mistakes must somehow be wrong. This is just lazy. If you want tohave well-reasoned opinions on these matters then you have to learn about them. If you don't want toand itis hard workthen just stop having opinions. 12 December 2012 at 16:17 %Like

    Boris Lenhard"There are foundational issues. Some scientists think they are important and some don't."

    If scientists are free to disregard foundational issues and still be (good) scientists, then the foundational issuesare either not scientific or net necessary for scientific progress.

    "If you don't, then don't bother about them. "

    I am interested in what you think. I have already learned a lot from this discussion.

    "If you think there just are no such issues, then you are wrong, and we can talk about what they are."

    I don't think that. But I do think that they are philosophical, not scientific issues.

    " If you think that work on foundational issues never leads to other sorts of progress then you are also wrongand we can go through cases."

    I have no trouble believing that they can inspire other sort of progress. I am not necessarily convinced thatthey are necessary for it. But I might be wrong there, too.

    "If you are upset that philosophers are much more attracted to foundational issues than to non-foundataionalissues, then get over it. "

    No I am not. I am only occassionaly upset when philosophers assert that I am unable to think or understandthings when I have an opinion of an allegedly fundamental issue that differs from theirs (such as the conceptof the gene).

    "My own assessment is that you are much more concerned to denigrate philosophers than philosophers are

    interested in denigrating practicing scientists."

    I am sorry if I came across as such, that was not my intention. My experience with some philosophers are thatthey get too hostile too soon when I start asking questions - like that they are not used to the sort of

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    questions I ask, or tha they are somehow beyond them.

    " What is annoying are scientists who take themselves to be experts on topics about which they have notthought hard or clearly."

    I hope that I have stated clearly what my expertise is and what isn't - whenever I referred to something I knewlittle or nothing about, I said so. This is an open-ended conversation - I couldn't have possibly thought hard orclearly about everything we have covered here - and neither could you. 12 December 2012 at 16:20 %Like%1

    Tim MaudlinSo let's try to think clearly about one of your claims:12 December 2012 at 16:23 %Like

    Boris LenhardI am not suggesting that my standards should be relevant here - I was just comparing timescales. Fifty years is an entire career, and I would hate to spend it with little measurable progress. But I am notclaiming that this should be the standard.12 December 2012 at 16:25 %Like%1

    Tim Maudlin"If scentists are free to disregard foundational issues and still be (good) scientists, then thefoundational issues are either not scientific or net necessary for scientific progress."

    by analogy

    If scentists are free to disregard biological issues and still be (good) scientists, then the biological issues areeither not scientific or net necessary for scientific progress.

    Now by your argument, since there are good scientists who have never given a thought to biological issues,biology must not be scientific or necessary for scientific progress.

    Someone well trained in philosophy would not make such a mistake. This is the sort of thing I mean.12December 2012 at 16:26 %Like%1

    Boris Lenhard"Now by your argument, since there are good scientists who have never given a thought tobiological issues, biology must not be scientific or necessary for scientific progress."

    Well, that IS true, isn't it? Biological problems do not underpin all of science. My impression was that you

    claimed that every field of science has its foundational issues that underpin it (which is why they are calledfoundational) and that no understanding is possible without working them out. If they are optional... 12December 2012 at 16:31 %Like

    Tim MaudlinWhat I was pointing out, by example, is that you argument is not valid. Your argument is that ifgood science can be done without X then X is not scientific. By that standard, nothing is scientific. It is aridiculous standard. I made no claims at all about foundational issues in biology. None. It was you who offeredan argument to the conclusion that the study of foundational issues is not scientific, by means of an argumentthat is obviously invalid. This is really not getting us anywhere.12 December 2012 at 16:35 %Like

    Boris Lenhard"Your argument is that if good science can be done without X then X is not scientific"

    I said:

    "If scientists are free to disregard foundational issues and still be (good) scientists, then the foundationalissues are either not scientific or not necessary for scientific progress."

    Note the form of the statement - even I know enough logic to know that it cannot be cast in the form you havestated above.

    "I made no claims at all about foundational issues in biology. "

    Neither did I. Are you suggesting that physics is somehow different than biology with respect to the existenceor importance of foundational questions? I would be very interested to know.

    "This is really not getting us anywhere."

    I beg to differ - I am trying to understand the issues here, and I think I am making progress. I can see that youare annoyed, but it was not my intention to annoy you. I am a scientist, working in a field that is not yourspecialty. If you are interested in dialog with scientists on things you do, this is how it is going to look withoutcherrypicking 12 December 2012 at 16:42 %Like

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    Tihana DauenhauerFranjo Sokolic, Oudeis Oudenos- I named my two friends because I know that they haveinterest in this subject.12 December 2012 at 16:47 via mobile %Like%1

    Tim MaudlinSo let's at least get clear on this point. I cannot possibly have misrepresented your argument,because all I initially did was cut-and-paste your sentence, then replace the word "foundational" with the word"biological". That change cannot change the argument form. And in the new form, the argument purports toprove that if there are good scientists who disregard biological issues (and there obviously are), then biologicalissues either are not scientific or not necessary for scientific progress. One any usual reading that conclusionis false. If you mean only that it is *possible* to do good scientific work without regard to foundations...well ofcourse. No one ever denied that. It was rather you who seem to argue that foundational work must besomehow sterile or pointless. And against that claim there are clear counter-examples. As for the practice ofbiology, again I make no claims at all. It is not an area of my expertise. 12 December 2012 at 16:51 %Like%1

    Boris Lenhard"If you mean only that it is *possible* to do good scientific work without regard tofoundations...well of course. "

    That is exactly what I meant - in fact I do not see how my original statement could be interpreted otherwise.

    "It was rather you who seem to argue that foundational work must be somehow sterile or pointless."

    No, but the examples you have given are not shining examples of a start of a new and vibrant scientific field,either. Please correct me if I am wrong, but I (as a complete non-expert) see them as inconclusive attempts totie the loose ends of (basically philosophical) implications of quantum theory. Meanwhile, the predictive powerof quantum theory has been exploited much more productively elsewhere.

    I am not trying to disparage the former effort, just like I think nobody should disparage the scientific value ofthe latter.

    But the fact that they have been inconclusive is what made me ask in the first place - are you trying toconclude them? Or persuade practicing physicists to work on trying to conclude them? 12 December 2012 at17:00 %Like

    Boris LenhardMate, thanks - just a couple of points:

    "Since the beginning of quantum mechanics, we have continuous discussion "

    Discussions do not necessarily mean progress, let alone vigorous progress. Maybe, as a molecular biologist, Iam more of a progress junkie than people in this field are. I remember that Feynman in his lectures (1962) inone of the first lectures in book one stated several big questions of (molecular) biology - look them up. 35years later, ALL OF THEM were solved.

    "For example, in the Perimeter Institute there are two research groups working on foundation of QM andquantum gravity."

    Any testable hypotheses yet?

    "But last month Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph published paper about that problem in the Nature (Nature Phys. 8,476 (2012)). "

    Nature Physics is not Nature . Other than that I am glad that things are

    happening.12 December 2012 at 17:07

    %Like

    Tim MaudlinIf all you mean is that good scientific work can proceed without worrying about foundations, whyeven assert that? No one has ever denied it. As for the claim that the interpretational issues are philosophical,that is not true. They are physical. Once again, Bell was interested in physics as physics, in clarity and precisionof physical postulates.

    The aim for precision and clarity in the postulates of a theory is an end in itself, not a means to some otherend. As for how much progress is being made...well it is obvious that exactly zero progress wil l be made if noone works on it. Why does it annoy you so much that people do?

    On a more concrete note, one could argue that the last three decades of work on string theory has not yet ledto any clear empirical success. If you want to go argue with the string theorists to stop work, be my guest. Iwould rather look in detail about the problems they have and the progress they have made before making a

    judgement.12 December 2012 at 17:09 %Like%1

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    Boris Lenhard"On a more concrete note, one could argue that the last three decades of work on string theoryhas not yet led to any clear empirical success. If you want to go argue with the string theorists to stop work, bemy guest."

    Well, there are a number of physicists who see many problems with the lack of empirical success of stringtheory. As far as I understand it is not science YET. It may be one day. On the other hand, it may never becomeone (if it never produces any practically testable hypothesis), it may be proven wrong, and it may simply fizzleout as people lose interest in something that is supposed to become science but never does...

    "I would rather look in detail about the problems they have and the progress they have made before making ajudgement."

    I cannot judge the progress they made, obviously. But there is no consensus about it in the community, either.In the absence of testable hypothesis or any predictive power beyond what already exists, any progress ispurely mathematical I guess. But I might be wrong there, too.

    "The aim for precision and clarity in the postulates of a theory is an end in itself, not a means to some otherend. As for how much progress is being made...well it is obvious that exactly zero progress will be made if noone works on it. Why does it annoy you so much that people do?"

    It does not annoy me. I understand that "exactly zero progress will be made if no one works on it". Whatworries me is the possibility that exactly zero measurable progress will be made even if people do work on it.It should worry those people even more. Much more.12 December 2012 at 17:12 %Like

    Tim MaudlinNow we are just having a semantic debate about the word "science". The string theorycommunity has gotten enough funding from the National Science Foundation to conclude that most peoplethink it is science. I don't care much about how you use the word "science". Foundational issuesissues ofclarity and precisionhave intrinsic value. One can use a theory and not understand it. To recur to myexample, most physicists cannot explain the Twins Paradox because, although they can calculate with thetheory they do not understand it. Getting people to understand it would be progress even if it leads to no newpredictions.And to be clearby "understand" here, I mean something simple. You do not understand Relativityif you cannot give the correct account, according to that very theory, of the effect.12 December 2012 at 17:17%Like%1

    Boris Lenhard"Foundational issuesissues of clarity and precisionhave intrinsic value. "

    That is where I might have be confused. I was convinced that you choose work on the issues of clarity andprecision because you are convinced that lack of them hinders progress - for everybody, not just for thosespecifically interested in those issues. Now we have concluded that it is not necessarily the case - or have

    we?12 December 2012 at 17:21 %Like

    Tim Maudlin"It should worry those people even more. Much more." Why? You won't know what can be doneuntil you try. If you try to do something valuable and fail, that is no great tragedy. Deciding to do somethingrather unimportant because you know you will succeed might be said to be worse.12 December 2012 at 17:22%Like%1

    Boris Lenhard"You won't know what can be done until you try. If you try to do something valuable and fail,that is no great tragedy."

    Tell it to a tenure review committee...12 December 2012 at 17:23 %Like

    Tim MaudlinIf tenure review committees are to be the standard of value, God help us. Maybe it's easier to gettenure doing deconstruction. Why bring it up? 12 December 2012 at 17:25 %Like

    Tim MaudlinI work on issues of clarity and precision because they are intrinsically important, so progress onthem is progress full stop. And progress can be made. Actually, pointing out Feynman's error is, in a smallway, progress: more people will understand Relativity.

    Why should progress require satisfying people with no interest in the issues? That is just plain bizarre. Yourfundamental principle seems to be: if I don't care about it, then it is worthless. Good luck with that. 12December 2012 at 17:29 %Like

    Boris LenhardIt was meant as a joke. Maybe I should have ended it with a smiley. (And unfortunately tenure ISimportant - if you are over 40 and don't have it, you will be working on these problems as a hobby only...) 12

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    December 2012 at 17:29 %Like

    Boris Lenhard"Your fundamental principle seems to be: if I don't care about it, then it is worthless."

    You are being unfair, sir. My principle in this discussion is the question "why should anybody (you, I,somebody else) care about it?" And it is not put in the way that you should get defensive about it - no, it is

    open-ended. The answer that I would not be happy about is "If you don't see it, well just dont do it". I want tofind out what you see. That is why I am asking all this. Starting from the simple "if you claim that your aim is tounderstand something, how do you know when you have accomplished that?" 12 December 2012 at 17:34 %Like%1

    Boris LenhardJust a note: if I was as defensive about my research as you seem to be here, I would never getany funding for it. And trust me, I get asked much dumber and more contemptuous questions by people whoare deciding on it 12 December 2012 at 17:43 %Like

    Tim MaudlinSo we have two concrete examples. 1) There is, at present, a lack of fundamental precision in thefoundations of quantum theory, which makes itself manifest in the Measurement Problem. One can use thetheory without resolving that problem (obviously), but this basic problem means that you can't really

    understand anything in terms of the theory, because of a flaw in the theory itself. 2) Relativity is, in contrast,an intrinsically clear theory, but still widely misunderstood. Conceptual progress can be made by explainingthe theory clearly, and pointing out the errors in popular presentations.

    I think both of these sorts of issues are intrinsically important. If you don't, you don't and I can't quite see whyI should try to convince you. I can point out that some great scientists thought they were important, or thatthinking about them did lead to other sorts of progress, but those are side issues. I take them to beintrinsically important. If you are willing to say that you neither care that the foundational principles of atheory be precisely articulated, or that the precisely articulated principles of a theory be properly understood,so long as some other sort of "progress" can go on unimpeded, fine. Then there is no further discussion. SinceI take these sorts of thing to be intrinsically important, I feel no obligation to show that trying to solve themmight have some other consequences.

    As for progress, Mate mentioned the PBR theorem, and your response was, I think it is fair to say, dismissivebecause of the venue of publication. I guess I find that rather shallow. Maybe you should read the paper, or tryto understand the issues.12 December 2012 at 17:44 %Like%1

    Tihana DauenhauerThank you Tim M., you explained this very nicely and in a simple way: "So we have twoconcrete examples. 1) There is, at present, a lack of fundamental precision in the foundations of quantumtheory, which makes itself manifest in the Measurement Problem. One can use the theory without resolvingthat problem (obviously), but this basic problem means that you can't really understand anything in terms ofthe theory, because of a flaw in the theory itself. 2) Relativity is, in contrast, an intrinsically clear theory, butstill widely misunderstood. Conceptual progress can be made by explaining the theory clearly, and pointingout the errors in popular presentations."12 December 2012 at 17:51 via mobile %Like

    Boris Lenhard") There is, at present, a lack of fundamental precision in the foundations of quantum theory,which makes itself manifest in the Measurement Problem. One can use the theory without resolving thatproblem (obviously), but this basic problem means that you can't really understand anything in terms of thetheory, because of a flaw in the theory itself."

    Two questions:

    1) Are you actually working on resolving the flaw in the theory?2) By what criterion will you know that you or somebody else have resolved it?

    "2) Relativity is, in contrast, an intrinsically clear theory, but still widely misunderstood. Conceptual progresscan be made by explaining the theory clearly, and pointing out the errors in popular presentations."

    Put this way, this seems l ike a pedagogical aim. Am I wrong?

    "I think both of these sorts of issues are intrinsically important. If you don't, you don't and I can't quite see whyI should try to convince you. "

    Again, as a practising scientist, I can NEVER afford to assume this attitude about my research. Not even in acasual conversation. Defending it before doubting people - especially educated people who can be argued with- is simply part of being a scientist. I thought it was the same for philosophers. Maybe I was wrong.

    "As for progress, Mate mentioned the PBR theorem, and your response was, I think it is fair to say, dismissive

    because of the venue of publication. I guess I find that rather shallow. Maybe you should read the paper, or tryto understand the issues."

    My response was not dismissive at all. Nature Physics is an excellent journal - it is just that Mate's statement

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    that the paper was published in Nature is, as you say, demonstrably false. (And trust me, I published in Natureand Nature Genetics, and to a scientist it is _not_ the same. I understand that philosophers do not worry aboutsuch distinctions, but for us it _is_ part of the job. Again, if I did it your style, I would ask "why I should carethat you don't care about the difference between journals?"...)12 December 2012 at 18:00 %Like

    Tim MaudlinThis has just become hilarious. First you ask why foundational issues are important, and when I

    answer you say " if I was as defensive about my research as you seem to be here, I would never get any fundingfor it." Then when I say I have no need to try to defend the claim that precision is intrinsically important yousay "Defending it before doubting people - especially educated people who can be argued with - is simply partof being a scientist. I thought it was the same for philosophers. Maybe I was wrong." DO you stay up mightsworking on silly rhetorical traps like that? Answer the questions and you are defensive, don't answer it and youaren't doing what you are supposed to! Nifty!12 December 2012 at 18:20 %Like%1

    Boris LenhardI am trying to add some casual notes to a casual discussion. Sorry if my sense of humour fallsflat with you... 12 December 2012 at 18:22 %Like

    Boris LenhardAnd to me, to defend one's research is not the same as being defensive about it. Beingdefensive includes a hostile response. Merely defending something does not... 12 December 2012 at 18:24 %

    Like

    Boris Lenhard(It is my hope that I have managed not to be obnoxious in this discussion. I sincerely regretbeing obnoxious to other people whom I debated about related topics before, and I still feel the consequencesof this in Tim's attitude in this discussion. That makes me sad because the discussion could have been evenbetter without it. But I accept responsibility for it.) 12 December 2012 at 18:27 %Like

    Tim MaudlinIt is easy to say that you have some sincere interest in understanding things. It is harder toactually do it. I have made what seems to me a perfectly clear claim: that the sort of precision and clarity I amtrying to achieve is intrinsically valuable. If you want to reject it, then reject it. Anyone else can make their owndecision. I think I have shown that I will spend time to try to explain things. But you simply give no indicationof caring to have them explained. You claim not to understand why anyone should pursue foundational

    questions. I have explained. Now are we really supposed to get into a discussion of the status of themeasurement problem, and my own contribution to it (why would that be relevant to the general question?).What is the point of that? Are we supposed to argue over the use of the word "pedagogical"? Why? I have justpointed out a silly rhetorical trick you tried to play (which I refrained from pointing out until you started upagain) and now its just a joke. This is, in Lakatos's phrase, a "degenerating research programme". You seem tobelieve that having the last word on a comment thread is somehow winning. By that standard, you win. Letanyone else following the thread make their own judgment.12 December 2012 at 18:36 %Like%2

    Boris Lenhard"that the sort of precision and clarity I am trying to achieve is intrinsically valuable. If you wantto reject it, then reject it."

    I do not want to reject it. But to state that something is "intrinsically valuable" without defending it amounts toa revelatory statement about objective reality, not an academic argument. I want to know why (you think)something is intrinsically valuable. The response "if you do not see it/accept it, just b***r off" is not really aresponse I can take seriously.

    "But you simply give no indication of caring to have them explained."

    How does one give indication of caring to have them explained? (I thought I gave ample indication for it, butyou obviously find something in my response grating. Please tell me what it is.)

    "Now are we really supposed to get into a discussion of the status of the measurement problem, and my owncontribution to it (why would that be relevant to the general question?). What is the point of that?"

    The point is to find out if you are working towards solving a problem that you claim you want to see solved.Isn't that a legitimate point? The reason i am asking is that I am not sure if you expect that the solution shouldcome from a physicist or a philosopher of physics.

    "Are we supposed to argue over the use of the word "pedagogical"?"

    No. I am pretty clear what "pedagogical" means - but the aim the way you have phrased it could as well be ageneral aim of any physics teacher or textbook author. I asked if that was it or is there something more to it.

    "I have just pointed out a silly rhetorical trick you tried to play (which I refrained from pointing out until youstarted up again) and now its just a joke. "

    It was a joke to begin with. It was never my intention to play any tricks in this discussion.

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    " You seem to believe that having the last word on a comment thread is somehow winning. By that standard,you win. Let anyone else following the thread make their own judgment."

    Again, I do not understand why this level of hostility is necessary. I do not want to win here. I just wanted youto clarify a statement whose meaning was not obvious to me. That is all. I am grateful that you haveresponded. Even if it ended on a hostile note.12 December 2012 at 18:50 %Like

    Boris LenhardSince the discussion is over, let me just summarise what I got from it:

    Based on professor Maudlin's statement of goals in the interview, and a couple of previous discussions withphilosophers on what it means to "understand an issue" (especially since some of them accused me of notunderstanding, not caring to understand and/or not being able to understand an issue from my own scientificfield, even though they knew next to nothing about it) I really wanted to find out what it means to "understandan issue" in the sense that goes beyond what I consider scientific understanding. By scientific understanding Imean

    1. there is a reasonably well-performing predictive model of a phenomenon2. one is aware of the assumptions of the model3. one knows the basic statements the model makes (mathematical as an equations or a series equations, orphysical, such as e.g. details of a molecular structure of DNA)4. one is able to assess the predictive ability of the model and further testable (or testable in principle)predictions/implications.

    To distinguish between two models whose testable predictions are exactly the same, the only criterion thatalways works in scientific reasoning is to choose one with fewer parameters - which, in the case of modelswith identical predictive power almost always means that one contains parameters that are not needed. This iswhat is normally meant by Occam's razor. I think that the previous example about the 6000-years or 5/10minutes universe nicely demonstrates that point.

    Based on previous discussions, I had an uneasy feeling that any further "understanding" beyond the abovepoints is basically a subjective preference for one formulation of a model over another, or an insistence thatone should have a clear idea/definition of a notion that was arbitrary or never corresponded to any physicalobject to begin with (such as "gene").

    Since Professor Maudlin is a philosopher of physics, I could not hope to understand the details of concreteissues he deals with in his professional work. (But please note that people with whom I had a heateddiscussion of the gene concepts had very little knowledge of molecular biology or genetics, but still had verystrong opinions about it, and I was perfectly willing to discuss it with them.)

    Let me rephrase the main things from Professor Maudlin's response that I think are relevant, and whoseimportant details I do not understand:

    * Professor Maudlin states that current formulations of quantum theory are inexact and mathematicallyimprecise. From what I know, quantum theory makes impressively accurate measurable predictions, so I do notunderstand what it means to be "imprecise" in this context.

    * To choose among different formulations of quantum theory which do not differ by measurable or otherwisetestable predictions they make, Professor Maudlin suggests a program that would proliferate many alternativeformulations, and then by some criteria that I cannot grasp - but which obviously do not include measurement- decide which is the most acceptable. In it, he is apparently willing to forego the basic Occam's razor principle- because he already prefers formulations that do not have the lowest number of parameters, such as Bohm's.He claims that there are more sophisticated, "exact" criteria to justify such choices that include neithermeasurement nor Occam's razor. As a scientist, I am completely in the dark about what these criteria shouldbe and how they are supposed to inform our decision-making - not only in quantum theory, but in any branchof science. Professor Maudlin claims that those principles cannot be stated generally but only concretely forspecific cases.

    ### Foundational issues and intrinsic importance

    On the question of foundational issues, here is what I have learned:

    1. There are foundational issues in physics. Professor Maudlin would consider those who doubt this simply andflatly wrong.2. Professor Maudlin implies that, or at least acts like, the issue he considers foundational in physics are THEfoundational issues in physics. It is unclear to me if there is disagreement of what the foundational issues are,and if there is, if professor Maudlin also considers those who disagree with him wrong and why.3. Professor Maudlin claims that he works on those issues because they are intrinsically important. I do not seehow something in science can be intrinsically important without being extrinsically important at the same time(i.e. having practical consequences as well), but I am aware that this does not contradict his claim.

    I have no reason not to accept that there are foundational issues (although I would have trouble defining themmeaningfully in e.g. biology) and that they are important.

    However I asked professor Maudlin about the details of his work because working on an important issue by nomeans guarantees that what one does about it is important, meaningful or that it will lead to anythingimportant. Perhaps I am too much into the mindset of science grant proposals, but in grant proposals inscience we have to justify things such as "impact" ("intrinsically important" would not be a convincing

    argument, even in most basic science, as remote from applications as science can be), and "feasibility"(anything along the lines "so what if it fails, it is important to try" would guarantee that you will not get funded;or attract any good PhD students or postdocs, for that matter).

  • 8/13/2019 Tim Maudlin - Boris Lenhard Discussion

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    ### Field consensus ###

    Professor Maudlin is also oddly dismissive about the majority opinion in physics, calling it a sociologicalquestion. I try very much not to draw parallels with climate science community because the criteria in this caseare basically not scientific in my ("narrow") view of what scientific is, but dismissing majority attitude orpriorities as "worthless" with respect to ranking the importance of John Bell because the majority hasn't readhis work strikes me as problematic and lacking objectivity on ones own position in the field. It is as if ProfessorMaudlin is implying that everybody who has read what he read will either see the light or, failing to see it,

    prove to be an irredeemable nincompoop that just cannot grasp the foundational issues in his own field. Manyof the great scientists were actually familiar with Bell's work (Feynman was, apparently) and yet did not found itof equal importance. Not to mention that they probably read many other things that Professor Maudlin neverdid, so it would be appropriate to at least consider the possibility that some of his opinions and rankings couldbe seen as "worthless" in their eyes, too. It is not a matter of specialisation - it is a mere question of objectiveworth of something vs mere personal preferences.

    ### Conclusion ###

    The concept of "understanding" as used by philosophers in discussions with me, is inherently vague (should Isay "unprofessionally vague"), subjective and occasionally circular. Nobody, not even professor Maudlin,managed to explain to me how they distinguish the state of not understanding something from the state ofunderstanding it, when this understanding is not based on "simple-minded" principles of practicing sciencethat I have outlined above. It is at best a fuzzy feeling of intellectual achievement after having explored someissues and ranking some alternatives by criteria that cannot be ever universally agreed upon. For that reason, Iam still in the dark about the basic questions concerning the feasibility of his project - about what is there inhis approach that will resolve long-standing issues that many great mind couldn't resolve for many decades, ifresolving of these issues is even his goal, and if is, what are the criteria for deciding that this goal has been

    achieved, or at least that he has come closer to it. 13 December 2012 at 10:09 %Like