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TICAD's Directives for Southern Africa:Promises and PitfallsScarlett Cornelissena Stellenbosch University, South AfricaPublished online: 19 Sep 2012.

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TICAD’s Directives for Southern Africa: Promisesand Pitfalls

SCARLETT CORNELISSEN, Stellenbosch University, South Africa

The Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), now in its fifth

iteration, has significantly evolved both in its content and as a process. Over the years, successive

conferences have placed emphasis on various aspects of African development, and there have also

been attempts to make the conference and its spin-offs more inclusive. The fourth TICAD, held in

2008, signalled the most significant effort by the Japanese authorities to improve the effectiveness

and impact of the TICAD process. This was against the background of Japan’s continued

economic troubles and increased domestic pressure to more efficiently use Japan’s dwindling aid

resources. As a result, while the product of deliberation with African stakeholders, the TICAD IV

outcomes reflect many of Japan’s domestic and strategic priorities. This essay takes stock of the

principal outcomes of TICAD IV and their implications for Japan’s economic cooperation with

the Southern African region. It does so from the position that Japan’s broad economic links with

Southern Africa have followed a distinct pattern over the past 10 to 15 years. The essay reviews

general tendencies in Japanese aid and investments to Southern Africa against the backdrop of

developments in Japan’s wider Africa policy. It discusses some of the prominent outflows of

TICAD IV and concludes with an assessment of their implications for the subregion.

Introduction

In its more than 15 years of existence, the Tokyo International Conference on African

Development (TICAD) has often been criticised by scholars, development practitioners

and other observers for not having delivered on many of the initiative’s founding

intentions to bring about a real reversal in Africa’s developmental fortunes.1 For

instance, in spite of many promises of increased investments to boost African growth,

Japanese investment and trade with the African continent have been minimal, with the

value of traded goods for example remaining below 2% of Japan’s world total.2 One

major deficiency of the TICAD process, therefore, is that its rallying calls to promote

ownership and partnership in Africa’s development have had little effective impact on

Japan’s longer-term economic relationship with the continent.

The fourth TICAD meeting (hereafter TICAD IV) held in 2008 seemingly broke this

general pattern by mapping a number of specific implementation measures, placing

emphasis on the bolstering of investment and trade with African countries, including the

1See for instance Kitazawa, ‘Japan’s PM Betrays the G8 Grant’; Horiuchi, ‘TICAD After Ten Years’;

and Morikawa, ‘Japan and Africa After the Cold War’.2JETRO, ‘Japan’s International Trade in Goods’.

Japanese Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2, September 2012

ISSN 1037-1397 print/ISSN 1469-9338 online/12/020201-17 � 2012 Japanese Studies Association of Australiahttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10371397.2012.708398

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provision of market access to African goods, and by setting in place follow-up

mechanisms aimed at ensuring the implementation of TICAD goals.3 The post-TICAD

IV follow-up mechanisms differed from similar measures introduced in the wake of the

two prior conferences, in that they involved the establishment of bureaucratic structures

within the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to oversee the implementation of

TICAD projects, and the creation of a Japan–Africa ministerial committee which meets

annually to monitor TICAD’s progress.

All of these changes came on the back of significant reorientations of Japan’s overall

development assistance approach in recent years, stimulated by changing internal and

external conditions, which have affected major institutions of aid-giving. These include

the overt adoption of a human security agenda in Japan’s aid programs, attempts to

improve both the efficiency of Japanese aid and accountability to public sentiment

regarding aid provision, and most recently, the merger of the Japan International

Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the overseas economic cooperation section of the Japan

Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) into the ‘New JICA’.

All of this seems to imply a shift in Japan’s aid, buttressed not least by the country’s

parallel manoeuvres in multilateral forums such as the Group of Eight (G8), aimed – at

least as far as Japanese rhetoric is concerned – at drawing a greater responsiveness on

issues of poverty from the world’s most industrialised states. It would also suggest that

TICAD IV was part of a reinvigoration of the TICAD process, something which has

taken many critical observers – who had expected the meeting in 2008 to be the final in

the series of conferences – by surprise. Certainly, from some of the espousals made at

TICAD IV, it would appear as if there is an attempt by the Japanese government to give

new direction to its economic cooperation with the countries of Africa.

This essay takes stock of the principal outcomes of TICAD IV and their implications

for Japan’s economic cooperation with the Southern African region. It does so from the

position that Japan’s broad economic links with Southern Africa have followed a

distinctive pattern over the past 10 to 15 years. This has been typified by a trade–

investment relationship in which Japan’s interests have centred on resource extraction or

other resource-based industries in the region. It has also been characterised by the close

parallel between aid provision and trade and investment concerns, such that a significant

portion of Japanese aid (incorporating official development assistance [ODA] as well as

other official flows [OOF]) was focused on major infrastructure developments.

The essay reviews general tendencies in Japanese aid and investments to Southern

Africa against the backdrop of developments in Japan’s wider Africa policy. It discusses

some of the prominent outflows of TICAD IV and concludes with an assessment of their

implications. For ease of analysis, Southern Africa is here taken to encompass the 15

member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which

incorporates the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Tanzania.4 This

classification differs from the official categorisation of Africa’s subregions in Japanese

statistical documentation. It does, however, help reveal some significant trends in

Japan’s relations with the region.

In all, TICAD’s potential ramifications should be read against the broader changes in

the Japanese aid setting in recent years and related shifts in the country’s foreign policy

3See TICAD, ‘The Yokohama Action Plan’.4The member states of SADC are Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho,

Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania,

Zambia and Zimbabwe.

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interests. These include, from the perspective of Japan, a desire to balance dwindling aid

resources and domestic and international pressures for greater aid accountability with

the need to deepen the country’s involvement in sectors – particularly resource-based

ones – deemed of strategic significance.

The Contours of Japanese Assistance to Africa

Although Japan was at one point the top aid donor to sub-Saharan Africa, since the late

1990s there has been a steady decline in Japanese aid disbursements to the continent,

which paralleled trends in Japan’s global aid contributions. For example, from a peak in

1999, when overall Japanese ODA totalled US$10.3bn, Japan’s aid fell to an average of

about US$7.7bn during the subsequent decade. Since the start of the new millennium,

Japan’s bilateral ODA to Africa has wavered, for instance comprising less than 10% of

Japan’s total disbursements in 2002 and 2003.5 ODA has for a long time been an

important aspect of Japan’s foreign policy and over the years had become a major

component of its relations with Africa, constituting an instrument through which Japan

had sought to exercise diplomatic influence.6

In 2005, during the G8 Gleneagles Summit, Japan announced that it would double its

African ODA over the next three years and that it would increase ODA cumulatively by

US$10bn over the next 10 years. Then Prime Minister Koizumi heralded it as part of

Japan’s efforts to help Africa transform itself from ‘the home of issues’ to ‘the home of

self-endeavor’,7 but the announcement had a clear political intent to it, as Japan was well

aware that the cyclical downturn in aid to the African continent could jeopardise set

diplomatic objectives.

The impact of the announcement on Japan’s ODA to Africa was tangible and

immediate: in 2006 for instance, Africa received more than one third of all Japanese

bilateral disbursements.8 In 2007 however, Japan’s overall ODA budget declined

severely, largely due to unforeseen cuts to multilateral assistance. It was therefore

somewhat unexpected when, during the TICAD IV summit held in May 2008, Prime

Minister Fukuda announced another doubling in its ODA to Africa, this time projecting

disbursements of US$1.8bn by 2012. As part of this he pledged the establishment of a

loan facility (amounting to approximately US$4bn) for the development of the

continent’s agriculture and infrastructure sectors until 2012.9

Since its inception in 1993, TICAD has framed diplomatic relations between Japan

and Africa. It was only during the second conference, however, that specific priority

areas for the focusing of Japan’s economic cooperation were identified. These were

education, health and gender (under social sector development); agriculture, industry

and private sector (as guidelines for where to focus economic support); and assistance

for measures to improve governance, conflict prevention and post-conflict develop-

ment.10 At TICAD III these priority sectors were linked to the three newly defined

5MOFA, Japan’s Official Development Assistance White Paper 2007.6See for instance Ampiah, The Dynamics of Japan’s Relations with Africa; Cornelissen, ‘Japan–Africa

Relations’; Morikawa, ‘Japan and Africa after the Cold War’.7Koizumi, ‘Africa – the Home of Self-Endeavor’.8MOFA, Japan’s Official Development Assistance White Paper 2007.9JICA, Direction of JICA Assistance, 7.10TICAD, ‘The Yokohama Action Plan’.

TICAD’s Directives 203

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pillars of Japan’s assistance to Africa, which were declared as the consolidation of peace,

human-centred development and the reduction of poverty through economic growth. A

commitment to human security and South–South cooperation was also made, and a

pledge was made to support the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)

initiative, which was a fairly recent creation at that point.11 As part of the goals to deepen

South–South cooperation and to engender greater private-sector development on the

continent, a number of Afro–Asian business and investment meetings were held at the

end of each of the first three TICAD meetings.12

In February 2006 the Japanese government launched what it termed the Initiative for

Consolidating Peace in Africa. This saw the provision of US$60 m for various

demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration, emergency relief, and community

development projects in the Great Lakes region (northeast DRC, Burundi and

Rwanda), Sudan, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Japan has also been participating in some

large-scale, multilateral programs to prop up peacebuilding initiatives on the continent.

Two of these were the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (which Japan co-

founded) which aims to support community empowerment and peacebuilding projects,

and Japan’s Peacekeeping Support Program for UN operations.13

Broad Patterns in Japan–Southern Africa Economic Cooperation

Under the broad directions of Japan’s economic and ODA relationship with the wider

African continent, the country’s policy towards, and economic cooperation with,

Southern Africa has been influenced by three distinct factors. First, the general lack of

warfare in the region and the comparative degree of political stability in recent years

(with the exception of the simmering conflicts in the Great Lakes) have helped shape a

Japanese policy where much attention has been placed on supporting regional

development by enhancing existing economic complementarities and favourable

political conditions. This has been related to a second factor, which has seen a close

linking between Japan’s diplomatic involvement with the region and Japan’s broader

multilateral objectives.

Together, these have led to a diplomatic focusing on South Africa, which with its

economic size and political influence in the wider region has for a long time been

regarded by the Japanese government as an important partner for development

cooperation.14 Indeed, Japan has fostered a ‘special relationship’ with South Africa since

the re-establishment of diplomatic ties after the end of apartheid. Japan disbursed two

major aid packages in 1994 and 1999. Informally termed the ‘Mandela and Mbeki

packages’ in Japanese aid circles – signifying the major role that post-apartheid South

Africa’s first two presidents played in the engendering of closer relations between the

two countries – the aid packages were distinguished by their sheer volume. Mostly

11TICAD, ‘Tenth Anniversary Declaration’.12In 1998 the Asia–Africa Investment Technology Promotion Centre was established in Malaysia and in

1999, 2001, 2004 and 2007, Africa–Asian Business Forum meetings were held to explore possible

economic links between the two regions. In 2004 the TICAD Asia–Africa Trade and Investment

Conference was held in Tokyo.13In 2007 Japan for example provided US$15.5m for the support of five UN-led peacekeeping centres in

Kenya, Ghana, Mali, Rwanda and Egypt. See MOFA, Progress Status List, 18.14See for instance JICA, The Study on Japan’s Official Development Assistance, and Keidanren, ‘South

Africa As We See It’.

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comprised of loan assistance and dedicated to infrastructure projects, however, they

were also intended to help reinforce efforts by the South African government to rebuild

the national and regional economies.

Over the past number of years the aid relationship between the two countries has

soured somewhat, as South Africa has been unwilling to expose itself to the currency

risks which Japan’s loans – all yen-denominated – posed.15 By the start of the new

millennium the South African government had cancelled most of the projects initially

supported by the aid packages. According to Japanese aid-giving criteria the country has

also graduated from loan-recipient status. Since 2000 Japanese ODA to South Africa

has therefore been much reduced, consisting of small-scale grant assistance and the

deployment of technical experts.16 Most recently, however, fostered in part by political

changes in South Africa (following the election in 2009 of a new president) and in part

by an electricity supply crisis, the South African government has reconsidered its

approach to Japanese loans.17

The third factor which has influenced Japan’s ties with the Southern African region is

related to the particular structure of the regional economy and the existence of specific

economies of scale, which have proved alluring to the Japanese private sector.

Investments by Japanese corporations in Southern Africa have been quite distinctive,

marked by a higher degree of private-sector penetration and being more diversified than

elsewhere on the continent. This has been influenced by a perception that the Southern

African region offers a more conducive environment for business. A recent survey by the

Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) for instance found that among the factors

highlighted by Japanese corporations active in Southern Africa, the region’s ‘market

promise’ and ‘profitability’ were considered the major aspects of attraction.18 The

presence of large resource industries and the availability of strategic resources were cited

as other important factors. Movements towards deeper regional integration by the

Southern African Development Community have been seen by Japanese economic

interests as enhancing the potential for market growth.19

Japan’s ODA disbursements to Southern African countries over the past decade have

been varied in nature (see Table 1). The provision of bilateral development assistance

has been consistent, although it has seen decline more recently, consonant with the

reduction in Japan’s overall ODA budget. Some states in the region – such as Zambia,

Tanzania and the DRC – rate among the top African recipients of Japanese assistance.20

Grant aid and technical cooperation have been the two predominant modalities of

assistance in the region.

In recent years grants and technical cooperation to other Southern African countries

have become more tailored to meet the new emphasis on human security and attaining

15For an overview and discussion of aid and other ties between Japan and South Africa, see Alden, ‘The

Chrysanthemum and the Protea’.16Personal communication, charge d’affaires: economy and trade, Embassy of Japan, Pretoria, South

Africa, 15 April 2009.17Personal communication, director, JETRO Southern Africa, Johannesburg, 19 November 2009.18JETRO, Survey on Japanese Companies.19Ibid.20Tanzania was one of the earliest African recipients of Japanese ODA, and has consistently received the

bulk of Japanese assistance over the years. In 2007 the East African country was the main destination for

Japan’s ODA, which amounted to US$722m (most of it grant aid). Following at some distance were

disbursements to Madagascar (US$112m), Zambia (US$94.5m), Morocco (US$64.7m), Kenya

(US$57.2m) and Sudan (US$51.6m).

TICAD’s Directives 205

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the Millennium Development Goals which Japan has placed on its international aid and

economic cooperation programs. Most of the grant assistance provided by Japan to

regional members over the past number of years has therefore been directed to food

assistance and the enhancement of the agricultural sector, while technical cooperation

has been focused on the improvement of health provision.21 Several Southern African

countries have also received debt relief from Japan under its commitments to the World

Bank’s Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and G8 debt relief pledges.

The relative stability in Southern Africa has meant that with the exception of the

DRC, the region has not been a major destination for new assistance mechanisms such

as Japan’s Initiative for Consolidating Peace in Africa. Paradoxically, despite the new

stress on peacebuilding in Japan’s African aid, the country has customarily maintained a

hands-off stance in its peacebuilding initiatives, for instance channelling peace support

financing to countries such as the DRC through multilateral bodies like the UNDP and

UNICEF. This reflects the country’s constitutionally imposed constraint on active

involvement in international conflict, its relatively belated entry into the field of

peacekeeping, and the limited field experience of Japanese personnel in the case of

African conflicts.22 Recognising the limitations of this, the Japanese government is

considering following a different approach, through providing support to strategic

countries to help them establish peacekeeping operations centres. South Africa is likely

to be an initial recipient of such a scheme in the near future, to support its peacekeeping

operations in the DRC.23

Financial flows other than ODA distinguish Japan’s economic cooperation with

Southern Africa. This is dual-natured. First, over the years Japanese investments in rare

TABLE 1. Trends in Japanese Bilateral ODA to Southern Africa, 1999–2006.

Country

Net disbursements, US$

Totaldisbursements

Loanaid

Grantaid

Technicalcooperation

Angola 226.97 70.32 201.91 25.38Botswana 134.76 62.94 34.36 37.48Democratic Republic of Congo 863.47 549.86 250.90 62.73Lesotho 59.70 – 52.09 7.60Madagascar 753.06 716.13 657.31 111.83Malawi 787.97 146.14 415.97 225.90Mauritius 106.55 31.20 37.82 37.53Mozambique 777.46 33.49 676.98 66.98Namibia 84.97 – 57.06 27.94Seychelles 37.41 – 23.05 14.38South Africa 198.79 10.86 107.34 80.59Swaziland 122.75 34.19 62.18 26.34Tanzania 2,054.69 734.36 1,585.29 494.77Zambia 1,506.31 7311.48 1,466.50 351.26Zimbabwe 668.79 143.79 386.80 138.79

Source: Compiled from MOFA, Japan’s ODA Data by Country.

21MOFA, ‘Japan’s ODA Data by Country’.22See for instance ‘JICA Reorganisation’.23Personal communication, Embassy of Japan, Pretoria, 14 April 2009.

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metal industries, particularly ferrochrome and aluminium, and value-added manufac-

turing, specifically of stainless steel and automotive assembly, have increased. More

recently Japanese investments have extended more robustly into the areas of consumer

goods, automotive components and industrial machinery, with several corporations

investing in countries such as South Africa, Botswana and Namibia. As a result of these

developments, Japan had built up a very strong trade relationship with South Africa, so

that South Africa is Japan’s main trading partner in Africa (see Table 2). Similarly, for

South Africa, Japan is one of its principal export destinations. The trading relationship is

characteristic of North–South economic relationships, with South Africa importing

technology-intensive goods from Japan and exporting base metals. South Africa has

been the main source for Japan’s platinum imports for numerous decades.24

In recent years however, South Africa has exported a greater volume of value-added

goods, particularly of motor components (see Table 3). This has been underpinned by

the increase in Japanese investments in South Africa’s automotive sector. For example,

the export of motor vehicles and related components from South Africa to Japan rose by

41% between 2002 and 2006, carrying a value of approximately US$1bn in 2006.25

Over the years specific corporations such as Toyota and Nissan have been major

developers of the automotive sector in South Africa,26 but others including Honda and

Suzuki have also started to develop a significant marketing presence.

Second, Japanese corporations have undertaken some major investments in Southern

African countries through public–private collaborations and joint ventures. One of the

largest has been Mitsubishi’s investment in a joint venture with the transnational mining

group BHP Billiton and the Industrial Development Corporation, a South African

parastatal, to create an aluminium smelter plant in Mozambique. Since its creation in

1998, Mozal, as the facility is known, has come to account for 60% of all goods exported

from Mozambique. In 2001, in a somewhat interesting variation on conventional

instruments of Japanese aid finance, a Mozal Trust Fund was established which provides

TABLE 2. Japan–Africa Trade (US$bn).

Principal partners

Exports Imports

South Africa 4.40 7.71Egypt 1.29 0.84Nigeria 0.73 0.67Algeria 0.85 0.39Liberia 1.19 0.0001Morocco 0.37 0.32Kenya 0.55 0.03Zimbabwe 0.02 0.22Tanzania 0.17 0.08Cote d’Ivoire 0.04 0.02

Source: JETRO, ‘Japan’s International Trade in Goods, 2007’.

24Also see Ampiah, ‘Japanese Investments in South Africa’ and Morikawa, Japan and Africa: Big Business.25Department of Trade and Industry of South Africa, ‘South African Trade by Countries’.26See Cornelissen, ‘Japan–Africa Relations’.

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financing for the construction of schools and other educational support for the local

community, and which has financed health care and water utility developments.27 In

2008, Japanese corporations have also acquired shares in a chrome ore mine and

refinery in South Africa which is responsible for the fourth largest output of ferrochrome

in the world. A further recent case of a large-scale public–private project partially funded

by Japanese investment is Sumitomo Corporation’s involvement in the planned

development of a nickel and cobalt mine and smelting facilities in Ambatovy,

Madagascar and the related development of a port pier along the east coast of

Madagascar. The project will involve a Canadian mining corporation, Sherrit, and a

consortium of Korean and Japanese corporations led by Sumitomo.

Although not readily evident from Table 1, Madagascar has become a major recipient

of Japanese ODA in recent years. In 2007, for instance, Madagascar received

US$112m, mostly comprised of grant aid for transportation development, from Japan,

one of the latter’s largest disbursements to Africa for that year. This disbursement

appears to be related to the plans around the Ambatovy project, and is reflective of a

broader pattern in Japan’s economic cooperation in Southern Africa in which ODA (i.e.

public financing) often complements private financing from Japanese entities. Another

instance is to be found in the November 2007 agreement concluded between the

Japanese government and Botswana to establish a Remote Sensing Centre, a unit to

detect metals such as nickel, cobalt and platinum through the use of Japanese-owned

satellite technology. In return, Japan gains preferential access to mines in Botswana

extracting such metals. The Remote Sensing Centre was opened in July 2008 with the

assistance of the Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC), an

agency created by the Japanese government a few years ago, and funded through public

finances to source new international supplies of minerals and metals. JOGMEC

principally establishes joint venture agreements with third parties for the exploration of

resources before transferring rights to interested Japanese corporations. The agency has

targeted platinum group metals, nickel and zinc as priority resources for exploration in

Africa.28

These moves reflect a wider emphasis in Japan’s aid policy to secure stable access to

needed resources, which has come to define Japan’s orientation to Africa. The 2007

ODA White Paper for instance comments that

TABLE 3. South Africa–Japan Total Trade (Rands – 000).

2004 2005 2006

Exports 26,601,871 33,156,988 41,315,989Imports 20,942,096 23,750,596 30,261,109Total trade 47,543,967 56,907,584 71,577,098Trade balance 5,659,775 9,406,392 11,854,880

Source: South Africa Department of Trade and Industry, ‘South Africa Trade by Countries’.

27MOFA, Japan’s Official Development Assistance White Paper 2007.28JOGMEC, ‘Facilitating Mining Investment’. Since its establishment in 1994, JOGMEC has

established close to 30 joint venture mining contracts for Japanese corporations. In Africa, in addition

to the Botswana agreement, two further contracts have been drawn up with Niger and the Democratic

Republic of Congo. See ‘Japan Joins the Rush’, 17423.

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the international environment for rare metals is growing in severity.

Additionally, especially in Africa, China is intensifying its diplomatic efforts

for securing natural resources. Against this backdrop, it is tremendously

important for Japan to secure stable supply of these resources over the long

term through direct investments by Japanese enterprises for gaining access to

vital resources such as rare metals. It is considered that supporting these

corporate activities through the utilization of official aid will become more and

more important in the future. Specifically, possibilities include the develop-

ment of an environment where Japanese enterprises can conduct activities

smoothly in developing countries through assisting infrastructure building

such as harbors and roads, and social development of local residents of

surrounding mines.29

In line with these aims several large Japanese corporations have stepped up their efforts

in recent years to gain entry to the African resources market. In West Africa, for instance

corporations such as Mitsui have proactively sought to secure contracts for underwater

oil and gas scouting projects. That particular corporation is involved in energy

development projects along the Gulf of Guinea, where fresh discoveries of submarine

reserves have meant that exploitation along the coasts of Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea,

Gabon and Cote d’Ivoire has become very lucrative.30 In studies, JETRO has also

documented how the desire to tap Africa’s resource reserves has become a more general

motivation for Japanese business interests on the continent.31

Against this background it is noteworthy that, compared to other regions in Africa,

Southern Africa has generally attracted more consistent levels of investment from

Japanese corporations in mining and metal extraction industries. This could be due to

geological as well as economic and political reasons, influenced by the location of

specific rare metals and the presence of viable mining operations. The preferred

investment form for Japanese corporations is by means of joint ventures, pointing to risk

aversive strategies. The investment environment in Southern Africa may be considered

more conducive and less precarious than in other African regions. Despite the lucrative

potential of energy exploration in West Africa, for instance, many Japanese corporations

have withdrawn operations following rising political instability in countries such as Cote

d’Ivoire. A general decline in Japan’s ODA to the West African region has also reduced

incentives for Japanese corporations to launch greenfield investments.32 Even so,

Southern Africa does present its own investment risks. Following a coup d’etat in

Madagascar in March 2009, for example, the new government announced its intention

to cancel major infrastructure development projects that involve large-scale foreign

investments deemed not to be in the public interest, and to renegotiate mining contracts

concluded under the previous government. The Ambatovy project is one among several

that risk being rescinded.

29MOFA, Japan’s Official Development Assistance White Paper 2007, Section 2.4.30‘Africa–Japan: TICAD Summit’.31JETRO, Survey on Japanese Companies.32One JETRO field officer has for instance remarked, ‘Japanese ODA has long been an attraction for

Japanese companies to invest in West and Central Africa but the recent retrenchment of ODA means

there is no advantage for Japanese companies to maintain an office in West Africa to win an ODA-related

business contract.’ Cited in JETRO, Survey on Japanese Companies, 56.

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In sum, there are shifts in Japan’s economic cooperation with Southern Africa, with

changes in ODA, other less concessional public financing, private investments and trade

creating new patterns of economic involvement. As far as ODA is concerned, a general

dwindling in Japan’s aid budget has impacted on its ODA disbursals to the region,

translating into lower overall volumes of grant aid and technical cooperation in recent

years. At the same time, prompted by a stronger human security orientation in the

country’s wider foreign policy, Japanese ODA has become more streamlined and

targeted, accentuating poverty alleviation, health, sanitation and agricultural develop-

ment in the region. Emergent focuses for OOF from Japan suggest a changing set of

interests, defined in part by the rapidly evolving energy and resource landscape in Africa.

In a general sense, the continent’s resource reserves have more overtly become regarded

as an untapped potential by Japanese corporations. In particular, China’s appetite for

African raw materials and minerals has sparked a self-conscious attempt by the Japanese

government to demarcate its interests. This has provided the context for a strong change

in tone in Japan’s aid policy, as articulated for instance in the 2007 ODA White Paper.33

TICAD IV Outcomes and Their Implications

The fourth TICAD meeting in 2008 was convened in an atmosphere of mounting

cynicism surrounding the series of five-yearly conferences. This firstly related to the

degree of inclusiveness of these meetings, and the impacts they had on Japan’s overall

economic policy to the continent. TICAD has for instance drawn growing criticism

from civil society bodies and even some African leaders for being a Japanese-driven

affair, with little real input from African counterparts.34

Second, the TICAD forum has in recent years become overshadowed by other similar

forums, such as China’s Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) which was

launched in 2000. China’s generally more robust involvement on the continent

(manifested in stronger trade, aid and investment ties) has allowed forums such as

FOCAC to play a more influential role in shaping development discourse on the

continent.35 Finally, as far as aid is concerned, while TICAD has provided the

framework for increased aid commitments to Africa by Japan in the very recent past,

there has often been little direct linkage between the espousals and principles of the

TICAD processes and Japan’s broad practices of aid-giving.36 It has generally been on

the basis of the idiosyncratic and fixed procedures of individual aid bureaucracies (13 in

total), rather than on the objectives defined in successive TICAD meetings, that aid

33While more muted, the emphasis on matching aid to Africa with Japan’s strategic interests persists in

the ODA White Papers of 2008 and 2009. The former for instance states that ‘Africa has 53 countries in

the UN, comprising nearly 30% of the overall membership, and possesses a wealth of natural resources

and a gigantic potential market. Deepening a friendly and cooperative relationship with Africa, thereby

developing a stable economic relationship with the continent, would significantly contribute to enhancing

Japan’s diplomatic infrastructure as well as its economic prosperity.’ See MOFA, Japan’s Official

Development Assistance White Paper 2008, 25. The 2009 White Paper states that ‘for the sustainable

development of Africa the advancement of public companies and resource development are also

important’. See MOFA, Japan’s Official Development Assistance White Paper 2009, 36.34See TICAD Civil Society Forum, TCSF White Paper.35See ‘Africa–Japan: TICAD Summit’.36See for example ‘JICA Reorganisation’ and International Development Center of Japan, Thematic

Evaluation of Japanese Aid.

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practices have been determined. Given this, the commitments undertaken by the

Japanese government, and changes promised by TICAD IV regarding the extension and

improvement of Japan’s economic cooperation, are significant.

As stated previously, TICAD IV pledged a major increase in Japan’s ODA to Africa

over the next five years. It also had a more focused and hands-on tone than the three

meetings that preceded it. The 2008 Yokohama Plan of Action for example listed some

specific development targets and also called for the establishment of follow-up

mechanisms to monitor progress. This has had some very early offshoots in that the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up a unit (or secretariat) to oversee the implementation of

projects under the broader framework of TICAD IV objectives.37 TICAD IV identified

three priority areas: boosting economic growth through infrastructure development and

agricultural sector support; promoting human security through encouragement of the

attainment of the Millennium Development Goals and the consolidation of peace and

good governance; and supporting measures to improve environmental protection.

By early 2009, however, more negative outlooks for the world economy, and that of

Japan in particular, led some observers to question whether Japan would be able to

deliver on its much publicised TICAD pledges.38 In an attempt to placate African

concerns, at the first TICAD ministerial follow-up meeting held in Botswana in March

2009 the Japanese government not only recommitted to the Yokohama goals, but went

further, promising to increase grant aid and technical assistance to US$2bn (more than

the US$1.8bn initially pledged by Prime Minister Fukuda) and to speed up its

disbursement of the pledged US$4bn of yen loans.39 Other commentators have

questioned the wisdom of this, as it would place additional burdens on an aid

bureaucracy that was already battling to contend with recent major institutional

realignments.40

To gain a sense of what the further implications of TICAD IV could be for Southern

Africa, it is useful to review some of the immediate practical outcomes of the meeting, as

well as the longer-term plans and projections that are shaping up in Japan’s primary aid

institutions.

In this regard, it is firstly noteworthy that at the TICAD IV meeting a great deal of

emphasis was placed on the need to invest in Africa’s resources as a means to stimulate

development. In his speech, Prime Minister Fukuda for instance stated that ‘if we are

able to utilise Africa’s plentiful resources more fully by harnessing Japan’s technologies

this will surely be a major trigger for growth and without a doubt benefit Africa’.41 To

this end the Japanese government promised to seek to double Japanese investments over

the next five years. JBIC was allocated US$2.5bn to establish a Facility for African

37As an outcome of TICAD IV, a three-tier follow-up mechanism was formalised, which consists of the

MOFA secretariat (Tier 1) to gather, monitor and disseminate information on the implementation of

TICAD; a joint African and Japanese Monitoring Committee (Tier 2) which meets on an annual basis

and produces a yearly progress report; and annual follow-up meetings (Tier 3) which involve public and

private Japanese organisations and counterparts from the African continent.38See ‘Japan/Africa: Missing the Target’, 4.39MOFA, ‘Communique’.40‘Japan/Africa: Missing the Target’. At the ministerial meeting the Japanese government also announced

that to help stem the international credit crisis, and to improve developing countries’ access to loan

facilities, it would contribute US$100bn to the International Monetary Fund, and that it would provide

US$3bn to a Recapitalisation Fund created by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation and the

International Finance Corporation. See MOFA, ‘Communique’.41Cited in ‘Africa–Japan: TICAD Summit’, 17836.

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Investment to provide equity, guarantees and loans for projects undertaken in

manufacturing, energy and natural resource and infrastructure development in various

parts of the continent.42 This facility was established in April 2009.

As part of the fourth summit’s focus on the enhancement of African investment, three

Japanese trade and investment missions visited 12 African countries at the end of 2008.

Composed of officials representing in particular economic and trade ministries in Japan

and representatives of Japanese corporations, the missions were despatched to

Botswana, Mozambique, Madagascar and South Africa in Southern Africa; Kenya,

Uganda, Ethiopia and Tanzania in East Africa; and Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and

Cameroon in West Africa.43 It is significant that the Southern Africa mission visited all

of the sites of mining and other projects where Japanese corporations have equity. These

included the Mozal smelter plant in Mozambique, the Madagascar nickel mine and pier

development, the chrome ore mine in South Africa and the newly established Botswana

Remote Sensing Centre. The importance of Southern Africa’s resources for Japanese

interests was noted during the mission. In a summary of the visit, Japan’s Ministry of

Foreign Affairs for instance stated that ‘with rich natural resources in southern African

countries, making full use of those resources is the best way for those countries to realize

self-sustaining development. To that end, assistance from the Government of Japan and

expansion of business with Japanese companies are important.’44

Second, following the streamlining of Japan’s aid institutions, JICA has gained a new

role as implementer of grant aid, technical cooperation and yen loans. JICA has also

defined new medium-term focuses under the framework of the Yokohama Action Plan.

These have included four priority areas: assistance with regional infrastructure

development (mainly roads, ports and electricity); improvement of agricultural

productivity; assistance to promote private–public partnerships between Japanese and

African counterparts; and improving access to safe water.45 In line with this, some major

new financing projects have been undertaken in the Southern African region. For

example, Tanzania is due to receive a loan of US$21m in support of its sixth national

poverty reduction program aimed at enhancing institutional reform.46

JICA’s objective to bolster African agricultural productivity centres on a multi-agency

initiative to promote rice production on the continent under the framework of a project

termed the Coalition for African Rice Development.47 Based on the principle that rice

cultivation could address some of the food insecurity in Africa, and making use of a

hybrid of rice strains from Africa and Asia, the initiative aims to double the harvest of

rice in Africa over the next 10 years to 28 million tonnes. It was extended from an earlier

initiative, known as the New Rice for Africa, which was launched a decade ago.

In keeping with the Yokohama Action Plan’s objective to boost economic growth,

JICA has identified support to infrastructure development projects as a focus area for its

activities. The Appendix shows a number of infrastructure projects in Africa which have

received Japanese support over the past several years. These stem from a framework to

enhance the economic corridors developed by the African Union and NEPAD, many of

42JBIC, ‘JBIC Facility for African Investment’.43MOFA, Progress Status List.44MOFA, ‘Summary of the Joint Mission’.45Personal communication, Director-General: Africa, JICA, Tokyo, 14 January 2009.46MOFA, ‘Press Release’.47The major agencies involved in the Coalition for African Rice Development include JICA, the Alliance

for a Green Revolution in Africa and the Africa Rice Centre.

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them through public–private partnerships. Many of these projects are located in

Southern Africa. The intention is to extend Japanese support for these projects mainly

through the provision of grants and loans,48 although technical assistance has also been

provided for the training of border personnel to speed up the processing of cross-border

traffic. Known as One Stop Border Posts, Japan has given support for three projects,

between Zambia and Zimbabwe, Kenya and Tanzania, and Kenya and Uganda.49

A similar focus has been placed on Africa’s renewable energy sector. In Southern

Africa support has been provided to countries such as Malawi and Tanzania. In early

2009 JICA agreed to provide a loan to Zambia totalling ¥5.5bn for a project to improve

that country’s electricity grid and to build a new hydroelectricity plant.50 The Increased

Access to Electricity Services Project, as it had been named, is coordinated with the

World Bank. It marks the first loan to be extended by Japan to Zambia.

Overall, JICA has placed significant emphasis on the development of power and road

infrastructure in Southern Africa.51 Viewing recent reductions in the electricity

generating capacity of South Africa’s main utility provider, ESKOM, as a potential

threat to wider regional development – and from a Japanese perspective, as a deterrent to

Japanese investments52 – the agency has lobbied actively to commence a technical

cooperation scheme. No formal agreement has yet been reached between JICA and the

South African government; but Hitachi Corporation has undertaken a private initiative

to provide equipment and skills training to ESKOM.53

Conclusion and Prospects

As a multilateral initiative, the TICAD process delivered a number of diplomatic gains

for Japan. It drew on the support of several governments, donors and African

constituents and it helped to enhance Japan’s international profile. TICAD also

provided a means by which Japan could reposition itself in international politics, in part

as a result of the appealing rhetoric that it offered. By the beginning of the new

millennium, the TICAD process had provided an important point of contact with

NEPAD-framed initiatives. In all, TICAD helped in streamlining Japan’s diplomatic

relations with key African states.

While for the bulk of its existence the TICAD process has been largely de-linked from

the general thrust of Japan’s aid and broader economic cooperation with the African

continent, TICAD IV promises a different direction, at least in its espousals. Two of the

summit’s main achievements have been its pledge of greater development financing for

Africa, and the ramifications a seeming new commitment to Africa have had for Japan’s

aid institutions. Concerning the latter, while the Yokohama Plan of Action may turn out

to be over-ambitious and to contain too many unattainable and conflicting targets, it has

in the short term succeeded in focusing Japanese assistance into a coherent and more

coordinated set of actions. The institutional monitoring and follow-up mechanisms

48MOFA, Supporting Road Infrastructure Development.49MOFA, Progress Status List.50JICA, ‘Press Release’.51JICA, Direction of JICA Assistance.52See for example Fabricius, ‘Power Uncertainty’.53Personal communication, director, JETRO Southern Africa, Johannesburg, 19 November 2009.

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introduced as an outcome of TICAD IV may bear some fruit for Japanese agencies over

the longer term by helping to streamline their activities.

Yet, as promising as these early spin-offs of TICAD IV have been, some scepticism

about what the real effects of the fourth summit will be for Africa is warranted. First,

whilst commendable, the Japanese government’s pledge to double ODA to the

continent has to be interpreted against the political intent which underpinned it. ODA

to Africa has long been an instrument used by Japan (and other major donors) for set

diplomatic and political objectives. More recently, uncertainty about Japan’s access to

much needed resources, and alarm at China’s advance upon Africa’s resource

industries, have more directly shaped Japan’s policy towards the continent. As such,

the promised two-fold increase in ODA from Japan can be criticised for in part being an

ill-disguised strategy to safeguard its longer-term economic interests.

Given this, a second reason to be sceptical about the real developmental effect of

Japan’s new ODA pledge relates to how it will be apportioned between the various

modalities of aid that Japan makes use of, and what this could mean for recipients in the

longer term. Japan’s loan assistance has proven to bear some financial costs for recipient

countries. Much of the infrastructure development support that Japan aims to provide

over the following years will be in the form of loans.54 In addition, while some Western

donors have started to give budget support in their aid to African countries, Japan has

been unwilling to do this. While on the surface therefore bolstering development, the

fiscal burden of receiving, processing and possibly repaying aid could outweigh the

benefits for the recipients. Third, much of the pledged ODA will also be absorbed

through debt relief and debt rescheduling commitments, which means, in real terms, a

much lower value in net ODA disbursements than projected by the Japanese

government over the next number of years. Finally, some concern has arisen among

staff in Japan’s aid institutions about whether the capacity exists to deliver the

disbursements, for there has not been a comparable extension of personnel in Japan’s

aid bureaucracies.55

If anything, the most significant outcome of TICAD IV is its endorsement of a

resource-focused strategy for Japan’s involvement in Africa. In general, Africa has posed

little commercial interest for Japanese corporations. The Southern African region stands

out for the way in which there has been an active development of Japan’s resource

interests, with many large-scale investments and public–private partnerships in the

region’s mining sector. TICAD IV provides a framework for the extension of this

throughout Africa, although for reasons of familiarity with established business

networks, Southern Africa may continue to receive a large part of Japanese resource

investments.

African countries may benefit from resource-driven partnership with Japan. It is

encouraging for instance that Japan’s objectives for infrastructure and energy sector

development on the continent are principally framed under the continental development

blueprints of NEPAD and the African Union, with the offices of both organisations

involved in progress-monitoring. Individual countries should also seek to ensure that

economic cooperation and public–private partnerships with Japanese entities are not

one-sided or unequal arrangements. At the same time, it should be recognised that the

54Indeed, a school of thought holds that Japan’s Ministry of Finance has an interest in ensuring that loan

financing is provided to Africa, as a way to offset the impacts of fewer Asian countries being willing to

take up yen loans over the past number of years.55Personal communication, president, TICAD Civil Society Forum, Kyoto, 29 January 2009.

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interests of the Japanese corporate sector do not necessarily overlap with those of the

state. While the Japanese government may therefore promote greater investments in

Africa, it is not guaranteed that corporations will follow suit.

On a wider level, changes in the international arena over the next number of years,

and in particular possible prolonged recessionary tendencies in the world’s major

economies, could affect the TICAD process. Shifts in Japan’s domestic politics could

also lead to changes to Japan’s aid policy in the foreseeable future, in which Africa may

not feature very prominently. Following the election of the Democratic Party of Japan in

mid-2009, the new government has reiterated its commitment to honour the TICAD IV

pledges.56 In the wake of the triple environmental and nuclear crises of March 2011,

further, Japan quickly reassured African countries that its involvement will not decrease.

However, Japan’s aid budget to the continent has been dwindling, and in the context of

contemporary economic conditions in the international sphere, this provides a good

rationale for downsizing while demanding more from recipients.

Most crucially, from the perspective of many African countries, Japan seems to have

lost the edge to China in terms of economic involvement and its role in shaping

development discourse on the continent. The robustness with which China has engaged

in many economies in Africa has led it to overshadow Japan in many respects: Chinese

trade with Africa outweighs Japan–Africa trade by a factor of nearly six; Chinese

investment in the continent is far above that of Japan, and in spite of media-hyped

announcements of ODA increases by Japan, its aid to Africa has not matched that of

China. Indeed, today even China’s flagship conference on African development, the

Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, eclipses the TICAD meeting in profile and

number of high-ranking African delegates.

So, thanks in large part to its willingness to provide more resources, a more visible (if

less elegant) public relations machinery, and its philosophy of comradeship above foreign

policy ethics, China, not Japan, appears to be viewed as a partner for development by

many African countries. It can be argued that these factors played a significant role in the

recent revitalisation of the TICAD process. With a view to TICAD V, these forces might

help stimulate an aid policy which has been lacklustre and staid for a number of years.

Also, provided programs and initiatives are appropriately conceived and implemented,

they may yet hold real, long-term development gains for the continent.

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Appendix

Economic Corridors and Japan’s Assistance. Source: JICA, Direction of JICA Assistance forAfrica.

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