Thrane Berkeley Article

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Berkeley's "Proper Object of Vision"Author(s): Gary ThraneSource: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1977), pp. 243-260Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2708910

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BERKELEY'S "PROPER OBJECT OF VISION"BY GARY THRANE

1. In this paper I give an exegesis of Berkeley's doctrine of the"proper object of vision." This conception is, of course, a central part ofhis theory of vision. The principal exegetical difficulty here surroundsthe relation of the proper object of vision to the pattern of light on theretina. There are three relatively well-known positions on this issue. Inthe nineteenth century it was usually held that (1) Berkeley's properob-ject of vision was the pattern of light on the retina and(2) that this was areasonable thesis. A second, more recent position, is that Berkeleyindeed thought (1) that we see the pattern of light on the retina but (2)that this is absurd (D. M. Armstrong). And, finally, it has been held(Colin Turbayne) that, (1) since it is absurd to hold that we see the pat-tern on the retina, (2) Berkeley could not have meant that the properobject of vision is the retinal pattern. I shall urge that Berkeley doesindeed hold that the proper object of vision is the pattern of light on theretina. In part, my case rests on showing that this is not an absurdthesis. Further, I will show how Berkeley's characterization of theproper object of vision follows from the thesis that the proper object isthe retinal pattern.2. Berkeley's New Theory of Vision (1709) has had a curious his-tory. The first of Berkeley's precocious philosophical works, the NewTheory of Vision grew in influence. While the New Theoryof Vision didwell, most learned men regarded the rest of Berkeley's writings assomewhat mad, of interest mainly to philosophers and lovers ofparadox. So well, however, did the New Theory of Vision do, thatCharles Saunders Peirce, in 1868, matter-of-factly writes,There can be no doubtthat beforethe publication f Berkeley'sbookonvision,it had generally been believed that the third dimensionof space was im-mediately ntuited,although,at present,nearlyall admit hatit is knownbyin-ference.Indeed, throughout the nineteenth century, Berkeley's theory wasregarded as the standard or "received" account of vision. The influenceof Berkeley's theory was pervasive as well as profound. Even the artcritics were under its spell. Perhaps best knownis the famous remark of

'Charles Saunders Peirce, "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties," Charles S.Peirce: Selected Writings, ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York, 1966), 21; cf. Journal ofSpeculative Philosophy (1868), 103-114.

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Bernard Berenson: "The painter can accomplish his task only by givingtactile values to retinal impressions."2Ironically, in the twentieth century, Berkeley's New Theory of Vi-sion has fallen into disrepute, while his other writings have beenrehabilitated. In modern treatments of perception, Berkeley's NewTheory of Vision is either attacked or, more usually and worse yet,ignored. Not all philosophers, of course, are so oblivious. NelsonGoodman, for example, in his short review of Armstrong's book onBerkeley's theory, begins his remarks with the warm reflection that,"Berkeley's great small Essay, after long neglect, is beginningto receivesome of the attention it deserves."3 Berkeley thought enough of theNew Theory of Vision to append it to the first edition of the much laterAlciphron (1732). And an anonymous critique of the appended Essayprovoked Berkeley's last systematic philosophical work, the Theory ofVision Vindicated. Apparently, Berkeley was never shaken in his beliefthat his theory of vision was correct in all its essentials.3. The New Theory of Vision constitutes a thoroughgoing attemptto characterize the nature of one phenomenal field. Berkeley lays outthe objective and plan of the work in the opening section.My designis to shew the mannerwhereinwe perceiveby sight the distance,magnitude,andsituationof objects.Also to consider hedifference hereis be-twixt the ideas of sightandtouch,and whetherthere be anyidea commontoboth senses.4Of these, the two most important contentions of the New Theory of Vi-sion are: (1) the visual field is, strictly speaking, bidimensional;it has nodepth; (2) heterogeneity: there are no perceptions common to the visualand tactile fields.With regard to the limited thesis of visual immaterialism, the mostimportant contention in the New Theory is that distance (from the eye)is not immediately seen. Indeed, Armstrong contends that "almostevery conclusion that Berkeley comes to in the New Theory of Visionfollows simply from the view that all that is immediately seen is a two-dimensional arrangement of light and colours."5 Unfortunately, as weshall see, Berkeley does not explicitly argue in any detail why we shouldbelieve a view so contrary to what most of us regard as commonexperience. But in the Principles of Human Knowledge he does explain

2Citedby E. Gombrich,Art and Illusion (Princeton, 1961), 16;cf. Richard Wollheim,Art and Its Objects (New York, 1971), 45.3Nelson Goodman, "Review of Armstrong's Berkeley's Theory of Vision,"Problemsand Projects (New York, 1972), 80.4Berkeley,An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision(1709), The Worksof George

Berkeley, eds. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, 9 vols. (Edinburgh& New York, 1948), I,171, sect. 1;hereafter Works.5D. M. Armstrong, Berkeley's Theoryof Vision(London, 1960), 8.


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BERKELEY'S "PROPER OBJECT OF VISION" 245why he conceives it to be important to the immaterialist case that we ac-cept this doctrine.For, that we should n truth see externalspace,andbodiesactuallyexisting nit, some nearer,others fartheroff, seems to carrywith it someopposition owhat hathbeen saidof theirexistingnowherewithout he mind.Theconsidera-tion of thisdifficultyt wasthatgavebirthto my Essaytowardsa New Theoryof Vision,whichwaspublished otlongsince.6The logic behind this is simple. Berkeley is not concerned with how the(unextended) mind can "contain" a three-dimensional array of ideas.Indeed, in the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, he ex-plicitly notes this.Philonous:But, allowing hat distancewastrulyandimmediatelyperceivedbythe mind, yet it would not thence follow it existed out of the mind. For,whatever s immediatelyperceived s an idea:andcan anyideaexistoutof themind?7Also, Berkeley is not, after all, much concerned with explaininghow themind can "contain" a two-dimensional array of ideas. A three-dimen-sional visual field is not in the end incompatible with phenomenalism.Russell's sensibilia are, for example, in three-dimensional perspectives.8What then is the "opposition"to immaterialism in the notion that wesee three dimensions? Actually, the answer here relates to his doctrineof the utter heterogeneity of the objects of touch and sight. This doc-trine is central to Berkeley's immaterialism. If what we see is a two-di-mensional array, it is apparent that we do not see (immediately) thesame things that we touch. For we touch things that have the propertyof being solids; consequently, to establish that what we see (im-mediately) are two-dimensionalobjects is to establish the immaterialismof sight. Since sight is commonly deemed the best access we have to theworld, to establish the immaterialism of sight is to go a long way towardestablishing the general doctrine of immaterialism. It should be em-phasized that the principle of heterogeneity follows from the view thatthe visual field is, strictly speaking, bidimensional. I shall confine my at-tention to what now can be seen to be the fundamental principle of theNew Theory of Vision: the proper object of vision, strictly speaking, hasno depth.4. Let us turn then to the arguments that Berkeley advances in sup-port of his contention that the visual field is, strictly speaking, bidimen-sional. Berkeley does not argue at any length in A New Theoryof Visionthat distance, or as he sometimes quaintly calls it, "outness," cannot beimmediately seen. Polemically, such argumentation was unnecessary.

"Works,II, 58, sect. 43. 7Ibid.,202.8BertrandRussell, Our Knowledge of the External World(New York, 1960), 72-80.


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For, it was a commonplace among contemporaneous opticians thatdistance could not be immediately seen. The standard account and asuccinct statement of its rationale are given by Berkeley in section 2, ofA New Theoryof Vision,It is, I think,agreed by all that distance,of itself andimmediately, annotbeseen. For,distancebeinga line directedendwise o the eye, it projectsonlyonepoint n the fundof the eye, whichpointremains nvariablyhe same,whetherthe distancebelongeror shorter.9For the sake of brevity, I shall call this "the physiological argument."In the Three Dialogues,10the argumentjust cited undergoes a subtletransformation.Philonous:... Is not distancea lineturnedendwise o the eye?Hylas:It is.Philonous:Andcan alineso situatedbeperceivedbysight?Hylas:It cannot.Notice that there is here no mention whatever of what occurs on theretina. I shall call this "the phenomenological argument."

More interesting yet is the form the argument takes in the still laterAlciphron (1732).Euphranor: ellme,Alciphron,s notdistancea line turnedendwise o the eye?Alciphron:Doubtless.Euphranor: ndcan a line,in thatsituation,projectmore thanone singlepointon the bottomof the eye?Alciphron:t cannot.Euphranor: herefore he appearance f a longandof a shortdistance s of the

same magnitude,or rather of no magnitudeat all-being in all cases onesinglepoint.Alciphron:t seems so.1What is interesting about this version is that it combines the physio-logical and phenomenological arguments. The gap in the argument oc-curs at Euphranor's "therefore". But this gap can be bridged as I shallargue below. It should be remembered, too, that Alciphron is a ratherlate work and bears the weight of considered thought.12 1 shall call thisinteresting version of the argument "the physio-phenomenological argu-ment."

Although these arguments may seem compelling, the conclusion is9Works, I, 171, sect. 2. 10Ibid., I, 202."Ibid., III, 150.'2It should be noted, however, that Berkeley does not raise any form of the distance

argument in the Theory of Vision Vindicated. Of course, there he is much moreconcerned to defend and explain the heterogeneity thesis against the anonymous critic.Moreover, Berkeley's technique in the Theory of Vision Vindicated is "synthetic" (cf.sect. 38), proceeding deductivelyfrom his conclusion not inductively from his evidence.


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BERKELEY'S "PROPER OBJECT OF VISION" 247most implausible. It takes a considerable effort of imagination even topretend that the visual field is bidimensional. It is in fact quite impossi-ble to do this in any adequate way if the objects in view are anythinglikenear to hand.

Naturally Berkeley is quite aware of this. He gives us many eloquentcomplaints against the intransigence of habit and ordinary speech. In ANew Theory of Vision,Berkeley reluctantly notes:We are nevertheless exceedinglyprone to imaginethose things which areperceivedonly by the mediationof others to be themselvesthe immediateob-jects of sight;or, at least, to havein their own naturea fitnessto be suggestedby them, before ever they had been experienced o coexist with them. Fromwhichprejudice veryone, perhaps,willnot find t easyto emancipatehimself,by anytheclearest convictions f reason.13Unraveling the colors that we see from the habitual interpretation thatwe put on them proves to be impossible (at least for me). Artists some-times claim to be able to do this. But such a claim is clearly hard toassess. The implausibilityjust noted is not, however, incompatible withBerkeley's view of the nature of natural philosophy.The work of science andspeculations to unravelourprejudices ndmistakes,untwistingthe closest connexions,distinguishing hings that are different,insteadof confusedandperplexed, ivingus distinctviews,gradually orrectingour udgment,andreducingt to aphilosophicalxactness.14

5. Most discussions of Berkeley and Berkeleyan theses have turnedon the putative distinction between "immediately see" and "mediatelysee." Although this seems a natural place to begin an analysis, such adistinction is, as is well-known, fraught with controversy. Instead, then,I shall concentrate on Berkeley's positive characterization of the properobject of vision.To begin, then, Berkeley tells us, "The real objects of sight we see,and what we see we know."15This is not very helpful. Or, again, we see"visible ideas,"16or "the proper objects of sight." Many have noticedsuch tautologous "explications," but not everyone has paid close atten-tion to Berkeley's more enlightening accounts.

One of the best phenomenological descriptions occurs in The Theoryof Vision Vindicated.The proper, mmediateobjectof vision s light, in all its modes andvariations,variouscolours n kind, ndegree, nquantity; omelively,othersfaint;moreofsomeand ess ofothers;various n theirorderandsituation.17

3 Works, I, 195, sect. 66.'Berkeley, The Theory of Vision or Visual Language Showing the ImmediatePresence and Providence of a Deity Vindicated and Explained (London, 1733), Works, I,

263, sect. 35.'5Ibid.,258, sect. 20. '6Ibid.,256, sect. 10. '7Ibid.,266, sect. 44.


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248 GARY THRANE

Again, in the early New Theoryof Vision,... it is to be observed that what we immediately and properly see are onlylightsand colours n sundrysituationsand shadesanddegreesof faintnessandclearness,confusionanddistinctness.18We see, then, colors alone immediately. What properties do these colorshave? They assume shapes (although they may be indistinct or"confused"). It is clear also that these colored shapes that are arrangedin an order are, in Berkeley's words, "various in their order and situa-tion." But Berkeley is adamant that these colored shapes are at nodistance. In the New Theory of Vision, Berkeley writes, "they may,indeed, grow greater or smaller, more confused, or more clear, or morefaint. But they do not, cannot approach, (or even seem to approach) orrecede from us."19In his notebooks, Berkeley wrote these entries:1 No extensionbutsurfaceperceivablebysight.203

X,1 Wt I see is onely variety of colours & light. wt I feel3 is hardor soft,hot orcold,roughor smooth&c. wt resemblanceX, havethesethoughtswiththose?21One question that deserves clearing up is suggested by the first ofthe above-quoted journal entries. Berkeley there speaks of perceivingonly surfaces. But such a way of speaking is confusing. Surfaces are sur-faces of solids. In his published work Berkeley makes quite clear thatthe visual field is not a surface. He also rejects the notion that the visualfield is a plane. For, a plane is a bidimensional space with, as we might

say, a zero curvature in a third dimension. Speaking of a purely visualintelligence, Berkeley writes,Andperhapsupona niceinquiryt will be foundhe cannoteven have anidea ofplainfiguresany more than he can of solids;since some idea of distance isnecessaryto form the idea of a geometricalplain,as will appearto whoevershall reflecta little on it.22 Andagain]23.. plainsare no morethe immediateobjectof sight than solids.What we strictlysee are not solids,noryet plainsvariously olored: heyareonlydiversityof colours.The visual field, if the argument from the bidimensionalityof the retinais any indication, is bidimensional, but neither is it a surface nor a plane.This sounds paradoxical, but there is no contradiction. This point is con-vincingly made by Armstrong.The paradoxvanishes f we assumethat whatis immediately een is a two-di-

'8Ibid.,202, sect. 77. '9Ibid., 197, sect. 50.20Berkeley,Philosophical Commentaries, Works, I, 11, #35. 21Ibid.,29, #226.22Berkeley,New Theory of Vision, Works, I, 234, sect. 155. 23Ibid.,235, sect. 158.


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BERKELEY'S "PROPER OBJECT OF VISION" 249mensional manifold, for since the two-dimensional manifold is not a surface, itis quitecapableof independent xistence.24Thus, quite apart from the data of the other senses (notably touch),Berkeley would hold that the visual field consists of colored shapessituated next to one another; but, I take it, the third-dimensional shapeof the visual field as a whole is indeterminate. It is a bidimensional spacewith no determinate third-dimensionalshape.Berkeley is not always very helpful on this point. In the Theory ofVision Vindicated, Berkeley illustrates his contention that there is nonatural relation between apparent magnitude and real (i.e., tangible)magnitude, by imagining that there is a diaphanousplane erected beforethe eye.25In so far as this suggests that we see planes, the illustration ispoorly taken. Another illustration that may also confuse is that of thepicture plane. This last is used to emphasize the disparity of the worldsof sight and touch.26 Indeed, the nineteenth-century critic andaesthetician, John Ruskin, appears to have read Berkeley to be sayingthat we see flat pictures.Theperception f solidForm s entirelya matterof experience.We see nothingbut flatcolours;andit is only by a seriesof experimentshatwefindout that astainof blackorgreyindicates hedark sideof a solidsubstance .... 27

Yet another erroneous interpretation is offered by Luce in his noteson the Philosophical Commentaries. Referring to entry #97, Lucewrites, "the visual sphere must be the total field of vision from a point,which seems spherical, but which Berkeley holds, has a zero radius, i.e.,the objects in it are seen at no distance."28 In the entry in questionBerkeley notes,+Two demonstrations hat blindmadeto see wouldnot take all thingshe sawXto be withouthis mindor not in a point,ye one frommicroscopeeyes, theother fromnotperceiving istance .e. radiusof the visualsphere.29There is, to use an eighteenth-century turn of phrase, a certain repug-nancy in the notion of a sphere of zero radius. The status to accord thisentry is not too unclear. First, the marginal plus sign, as Luce notes inanother connection, "may be an obelus, marking entries not needing at-tention."30 Luce's remark may well be a correct description of

24Armstrong,Berkeley's Theoryof Vision,op. cit., 14.25Berkeley, Works, I, 270, sect. 55. Berkeley's "diaphanous plane" is antedated atleast by Leonardo da Vinci's similar conception of a window. I have developed a likeidea, "the occlusion screen," in my paper, "The Proper Object of Vision," Studies inHistory and Philosophy of Science, 6 (1975), 13-14.26Berkeley,New Theoryof Vision, Works, I, 2i4, sect. 108.27Citedby Gombrich,Art and Illusion, 296. 28Luce,Works, I, 111.29Berkeley,Philosophical Commentaries, Works, I, 17,#97.30Luce,"Introduction," Works, I, 4.


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Berkeley's embryonic thought on the matter. Yet, it is hard to believethat Berkeley could long rest content with so abstract a notion as asphere of zero radius. Its use would serve no purpose. And, in fact, sofar as I can determine, the notion appears nowhere in Berkeley'spublishedworks.Most decisively of all, however, there is an advantage in holding thatthe shape of the visual field is indeterminate. It would be hard to see howthe "diversity of colors" could "suggest" objects at different distances ifthe visual field had its own intrinsic, clearly determinate shape. Sincethe visual field is of indeterminate shape, it may, like a piece of Indiarubber, be "pushed" and "stretched," according to various cues, to apimply topography.The literal description of the proper object of vision is then this: Theproper object of vision is a bidimensional array of light "in all its modesand variations" (a "diversity of colors"). But this bidimensional arrayhas no intrinsic shape; it is not, for example, a plane. Nor is it at any de-terminate distance "from the mind," neither "near" nor "far."6. These last considerations suggest a possible explication of"mediately see." For we say something is mediate, meaning therebythat it stands between, or is (spatially) intervening. It might be temptingto suppose that it is this spatial sense of "mediate" that Berkeley has inmind. The visual field would thus be a two dimensional array that standsbetween us and the tangible objects arranged at distances from us.But this is quite clearly not what Berkeley means by "mediate." Thetrouble, in a sentence that only a philosopher could write, surroundstheword "between." The visual field can only be between the mind and thetangible objects in three dimensional space if the field is itself in thethree dimensional space. But Berkeley is quite clear about this. The vi-sual field is, strictly speaking, spatially unrelated to the tangible field.Orrather, o speaktruly,the properobjectsof sightareat nodistance,neithernear nor far from any tangible thing ... if they are one tangible and the othervisible,the distancebetween hem doth neitherconsistof pointsperceivablebysightnorbytouch, .e. it is utterly nconceivable.31The only "link" between the tangible and visual fields is contingent (andtherefore learned) association. This point is elaborately made byBerkeley in his discussion of situation. Indeed, Berkeley holds that all ofthe spatial attributions we normally make of the elements of the visualfield are "metaphorical."It is true that terms denoting angibleextension, igure, ocation,motion,andthe like, are also appliedto denote the quantity,relation,and orderof thepropervisibleobjectsor ideas of sight.But thisproceedsonlyfromexperienceandanalogy.There is a higherand owerin the notes of music.Menspeak n a3'Berkeley, New Theory of Vision, Works, I, 216, sect. 112.


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BERKELEY'S "PROPER OBJECT OF VISION" 251

highor low key, andthis, it is plain, s no morethanmetaphoror analogy.Solikewise, o expressthe orderof visible deas,the wordssituation,highand ow,upanddown,aremadeuseof, andtheirsense,whenso applieds analogical.32Thus, the bidimensional space of the visual field is, according toBerkeley, completely separate from (real) tactile space. It is worth list-ing these "geometrical" features. What is immediately seen is a (1) bidi-mensional array of "light and colors," (2) indeterminate in its third-di-mensional shape, (3) such that its elements cannot be treated of by(plane) geometry, (4) not oriented in three-dimensional space, (5) withno intrinsic metric (size) relation between its elements and ordinarythree-dimensional objects. Thus, while we still have no fully satisfactoryaccount of what "immediate seeing" is, we do now, I hope, have a veryclear account of what is immediately seen. Berkeley's proper object ofvision is a very strange brute, indeed. It is this latter fact, I think, thathas led exegeticists largely to ignore it. It is now appropriate to ques-tion, however, whether Berkeley's conception here is a sober theoreticalposit or an unusuallygrotesque chimera.7. The reader will recall that in section 4 above, I cited three ver-sions of Berkeley's argument that we do not immediately see depth. Thefirst of these I called the physiological argument. None of the argu-ments are as explicit as one might wish, but of the three the physio-logical argument is the most truncated. The argument, it will be re-called, may be stated in a single sentence: we cannot (immediately) seedistance because distance is a line directed end-wise to the eye and assuch invariablyprojects but one point on the retina.The foregoing argument, concerning what is projected on the retina,is not usually admired. Ritchie refers to it as "ill-fated."33And it iswidely thought that the argument is, as Armstrong asserts, "valid onlyif we assume that the immediate object of sight is the fund of the eye.But this is obviously false."34 Berkeley does indeed seem to commithimself to the idea that we see the pattern of light projected on theretina. In the New Theory of Visionhe roundlydeclares,Thereis at this day no one ignorant hat the picturesof externalobjectsarepaintedon the retinaor fundof the eye; that we see nothingwhichis not sopainted;andthat, accordingas the picture s moredistinctor confused,so alsois theperceptionwehaveof theobject.35

32Berkeley,Theory of Vision Vindicated, Works, I, 267, sect. 46.33ArthurRitchie, George Berkeley:A Reappraisal (London, 1960), 1.34Armstrong,Berkeley's Theoryof Vision,9.35Berkeley, Works, I, 206, sect. 88. Turbayne suggests in his "Berkeley andMolyneux on Retinal Images," JHI, 16 (1955), that Berkeley does not really hold thishypothesis. Rather, he suggests, Berkeley is merely assuming a "vulgar error" for thesake of argument. But, if this is so, it is hard to see why retinal inversion is a problem forBerkeley. And, Berkeley set great store by his solution of this "knot." Further, there isBerkeley's language itself in the passage cited above: he scarcely seems to be saying


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BERKELEY'S "PROPER OBJECT OF VISION" 253But the pointwhich,in this rather oddway, Berkeley s seekingto make is adifferentone.... The gap betweenmyself andanyobject at whichI look is agapwhich,we mightsay, I canonlylook at from one end;and of coursefromthe end it does not looklike a gap-not likethegapbetween he two trees. It isto this thatBerkeleywishesto point.39It is interesting to note that both authors speak as if they are unaware ofthe explicit phenomenological argument in the Three Dialogues.Armstrong is also guilty of this exegetical oversight. In his book onBerkeley's New Theory of Vision, Armstrong is very keen on demon-strating that Berkeley really was deluded into thinking that we see the"fund of the eye." Armstrong discusses only what I have called thephysiological argument. Since this is the only argument in the NewTheory of Vision, there is some justice in his narrow inquiry. Yet,Armstrong does freely use the Theory of Vision Vindicated, and referson occasion to the Principles of Human Knowledge and the Three Dia-logues between Hylas and Philonous. Armstrong himself develops a ver-sion of the phenomenological argument which, he says, "does seem totell a little in Berkeley's favor."40Surprisingly, however, he presentsthis as an argument Berkeley should have used. Since a purelyphenomenological argument does occur in the Three Dialogues, it wouldseem that Armstrong has read only the New Theory of Vision with care.He makes no mention of the most explicit argument in Alciphron. Onecan take one of two attitudes here: first, one could hold that the physio-logical argument in A New Theory of Vision is the full and explicit argu-ment; or, second, one could hold that the physiological argument is but acondensed version of the still none-too-explicit argument in Alciphron.My attitude is the second. That is, I hold that each of these arguments isbut a version of the same argument. The fullest version of the argumentis that in Alciphron. Indeed, the physio-phenomenological argument inAlciphron is Berkeley's explicit combinationof the other two versions.In any case, whether one notes Berkeley's own phenomenologicalargument or "charitably" invents one for Berkeley, still any purelyphenomenological argument is subject to serious objections. Each of theabove-mentioned commentators is aware of the limitations of this sortof argument, for depth is a phenomenological given of the visual field.True, the gap between me and distant objects is not "spread out" beforemy eyes. Yet, I do see objects as distant from me. The argument that Ido not see the gap spread out before me only raises questions about themechanism of depth-perception. What one ought to conclude fromphenomenological inspection is simply that one does not see depth byviewing the gap between oneself and distant objects, instead of conclud-ing that one does not see depth. Those that resist a purely phenom-

39Warnock,Berkeley, 27. Warnock then cites the physiological argument from sec-tion 2 of The New Theory of Vision.40Armstrong,Berkeley's Theoryof Vision, 15.


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enological argument here most likely do so (correctly in my view) onprecisely these grounds.This is a feature which will plague any purely phenomenologicalargument. As long as we merely inspect our visual field, we will findsolids ordered in a three-dimensional array. What may become puz-zling,just from phenomenological inspection, is how this is possible. Thediscussion of the gap is but one variant of a consideration that makesthis possible puzzlement vivid. More generally, I may wonder how I cansee something as there even though I am here. But, again, what seemstransparent is that we shall not be tempted to doubt the three-dimen-sional nature of the visual field; rather, we shall be, at worst, puzzled asto how it is possible. If, on the other hand, one chooses the method ofphenomenological reduction, one runs up against the followingdifficulty:however many properties are "reduced away," no amount of plausiblephenomenological reduction will rob the objects of vision of their three-dimensionality. Three-dimensionality is not consciously inferred, esti-mated, nor even "suggested" to the mind. All of these processes are fartoo cognitive to adequately characterize the vivid and immediate solidityof the objects we see about us. Writing of the traditions he calls "Empi-ricism" and "Intellectualism," Merleau-Ponty points to this flaw (if Iunderstand him rightly): "the two philosophies take for granted theresult of a constitutive process the stages of which we must, in fact,trace back."41Of course, it is just this "tracing back" of the supposedconstitutive steps in the perception of depth that cannot be done on acognitive level. It is a brute psychological fact that the visual world ofsolids in a three dimensional array is conceptually primary. It is therethat any conceptual tracing back will end, at least if that tracing back isbased on phenomenological reduction.9. It may well seem now that Berkeley's case is hopeless. Thephenomenological argument seems to be profoundly inadequate. Andthe physiological argument seems to rest on the patently false assump-tion that we see the retina. Let us look, then, at the physio-phenomeno-logical argument in Alciphron. The argument in Alciphron representsthe most explicit version of the argument. The reader will recall thatEuphranorpoints out that the line which constitutes distance from theeye projects "one single point on the bottom of the eye"; "therefore," heconcludes, "the appearance of a long and of a short distance is of thesame magnitude, or rather of no magnitude at all-being in all cases onesingle point."42 Euphranor's "therefore" clearly turns on the principlethat we could not see the line out from the eye as anything but a pointsince that is all that there is, as it were, a record of on the retina.Now there are clear correlations between the (phenomenal) visual

4'Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, 255.42Berkeley,Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher (London, 1732), Works, III, 150.


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BERKELEY'S "PROPER OBJECT OF VISION" 255field and occurrences on the retina. When I remove my glasses, forexample, my visual field is blurred (or "confused" in Berkeley's lan-guage). This is because without corrective lenses the "little pictures"are themselves confused. Objects high and low in my visual field are lowand high in the (inverted) "little picture." Faint things in my visual fieldare the result of faint projections on the retina. Apparent (phenomenal)magnitudes are correlated rather closely with the magnitude of the pro-jections. Phenomenal colors, too, are correlated rather closely at leastwith the colors projected on the retina.But ought we to say that we see the pattern of light projected on theretina? Is the pattern of light projected on the retina the "proper objectof vision"? It seems to me that close readingof Berkeley reveals that theanswer is inescapably "Yes". Berkeley's argument, reformulated, goeslike this: strictly speaking, all that could be immediately seen are thosefeatures of the optical stimulus to which the photo-sensitive surface (theretina) is sensitive. The retina is sensitive to a bidimensional array ofcolors and to the intensity and hue of those colors, but the retina issensitive to nothing else.43The puzzle, then, to which Berkeley's theory addresses itself isroughly this: seeing, even at its most cautious, is far richer and more in-formative than the retinal irradiation pattern; but the retinal pattern oflight contains the entirety of the information "intromitted" by the eye.It would seem that all that is physically possible to see, without"processing," is this pattern of light-yet we always see more than this.One standard objection should be dealt with at once. As has been al-ready noted, Armstrong claims that the physiological argument is"valid only if we assume that the immediate object of sight is the fundofthe eye."44 Why does Armstrong think that such a view is entailed byBerkeley's theory? Consider the following argument which Armstrongdevelops in this connection:

.suppose it were true that the fundof the eye was the object immediatelyseen. Wouldwe not need anothereye to see the fundof the eye?After all,seeing requireseyes. But then, by parityof reasoning,all that wouldbe im-mediatelyseen wouldbe the fundof thissecondeye,whichwouldhave to be ob-servedbya thirdeye,and so onindefinitely.45This argument seems very plausible at first. Yet it rests on two falsepremises. First, there is the assumption that seeing the two-dimensional43Itis this insensitivity of the retina that accounts for the indeterminacy and "free-

floating" character of the properobject of vision.44Armstrong,Berkeley's Theory of Vison, 9.45Loc. cit. Armstrong may have gotten the argument from J. J. Gibson whom hecites in another connection. Gibson, who is also opposed to the Berkeleyan position,

writes: "If the retinal image were really a picture there would have to be another eye be-hind the eye with which to see it." Perception of the Visual World(Boston, 1950), 54.


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pattern of light on retina is equivalent to seeing the retina, and second,that all seeing requires eyes. As will be seen shortly, the first of theseaberrant premises follows from the second.First, what is the cognitive status of "All seeing requires eyes"? It isclearly not analytic. If it is a fact, it is most assuredly just an empiricalfact. The world might have been such that eyes were never requisite forseeing. Thus, despite theprimafacie triviality of Armstrong's principle,we must consider whether or not it is empirically correct.Is it true that all seeing requires eyes? It is clear that, if my in-terpretation of Berkeley is correct, one of the following is true: either welook at our retinas with another eye or it is not the case that all seeingrequires eyes.46It must be conceded that the first of these propositionsis oddly tempting. It is all too easy to think of the eyes as windows fromwhich a "little man" peers; or, noting the existence of the retina, tothink of the retina as a screen at which the "little man" looks.Armstrong is of the opinion that Berkeley is still subtly influenced bythis picture.. ..what is formedon the retina s a twodimensional imulacrum f theobjectseen.... This physiologicalaccident has profoundlyconfused both philos-ophersandscientists.Normally t has operatedto reinforce he idea thatper-ceptionwas a matterof seeingpicturesof the externalworld;Berkeleydoesnotbelieve this, but he is still deceived by the two-dimensional nature of thesimulacrum.And, ... accepting his argumentas he doeshere,landshimin agreat deal of trouble whenhe comes to discussthe 'knot'causedby the factthat the retinal mage s inverted.47Since Berkeley renounces the idea that we see the retina either he isconfused on this point or he would reject Armstrong's principle, "Allseeing requires eyes."If Berkeley's views are to be saved from Armstrong's interpretation(which involves the allegation of incoherency), it must be argued that itis false that all seeing requires eyes. This may seem a reductio ad ab-surdum, but it is not. What is the function of the lens mechanism? Bymeans of it a focused image is projected on the retina. So far as we knowthe only biological solution to the problem of discriminating sight in-volves the formation of images by crystalline lenses. Once the image isformed, however, what else is requisite to seeing? A sensitive retina anda working optic nerve. Consequently, although the entire mechanism ofthe eye is requisite to see distant objects, seeing the pattern of light onthe retina does not require another eye. The retina, or "fund of the eye,"just is the photosensitive surface.

46It ollows from this disjunct that not all seeing requires looking-at least if all look-ing requires (directing the) eyes.

47Armstrong, Berkeley's Theory of Vision, 10. The physiological argument isArmstrong's reference.


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Actually, Armstrong's principle may be meant as "All seeing re-quires looking at something with the eyes." This would be more in keep-ing with the "little-man" model. This principle is so incompatible withBerkeley's position that it is virtually a denial that we can see the pat-tern of light on the retina. Hence, this assumption of Armstrong's"refutation" is very close to begging the question. Obviously, too, on myaccount, the corollary that we must see the fund of the eye goes by theboards. We see the pattern of light projected on the retina but not theretina itself.It is interesting to speculate that seeing may have been uncon-sciously assimilated to touch. When I feel this page, I also feel the tell-tale pressure in my fingers. Whenever we feel an object, we feel the partof our body that is in contact with the object felt. Not so, seeing. We donot feel where the light impinges on the retina: we just see light. Seeingis not proprioceptive. It is only an externally discoverable fact thatseeing is connected with the eyes. This is obviously closely related toBerkeley's contention that there is no sensed (seen or felt) connectionbetween the visual and tactile fields. It is this fact, too, of course, thatsolves the "knot" of retinal inversion. That we just see a bidimensionalfield of light (and not its shape or setting) is sufficient to explain why wedo not see upside down.As further confirmation of the above interpretation consider thefollowing remark that Berkeley makes with regard to the problem ofretinal inversion:Fartherwhat greatly contributes o make us mistake in this matter is thatwhenwe thinkof the pictures n the fundof the eye,we imagineourselves ook-ingon the fundof another'seye,or another ookingon the fundof our owneye,andbeholdinghepicturespainted hereon.48Berkeley, thus, appears to understand the matter very well: we do notsee the pattern of light on the fund of the eye by looking at the fund ofthe eye (with, of course, another eye).Interpretive confusion about what Berkeley means is not entirely thefault of his readers. His own discussion of this issue suffers from an un-characteristic turgidity.Pictures, herefore,maybe understood na twofoldsense,or as two kindsquitedissimilarand heterogeneous, he one consistingof light, shade,and colours;the other not properlypictures,but imagesprojectedon the retina.Accord-ingly, for distinction, I shall call those pictures, and these images. The formerare visible,and the peculiarobjectsof sight.The latter are so far otherwise,that a man blind from his birth may perfectly imagine, understand,andcomprehendhem.49

48Berkeley,New Theory of Vision, Works, I, 217, sect. 116.49Berkeley, Theory of Vision Vindicated, Works, I, 268, sect. 50.


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It is easy, then, to see how one might well become confused.Berkeley's way of drawing the distinction is thus infelicitous.Berkeley's immediate object of vision is most emphatically not a pic-ture; it consists merely, as he goes on to say, of "light, shade and col-ours." The retinal irradiation pattern as immediately seen is just athree-dimensionally indeterminate bidimensional array of colors that is"free-floating" and metric-free. As seen in an ophthalmoscope, the"image" (as Berkeley would call it) is indeed tiny, upside down andcurved. But the "image" in the ophthalmoscope and the "picture"caused by the irritation of the photosensitive surface of the body arequite different. This is all that Berkeley needs to say to obviate the kindof objections that Armstrong and others have raised.10. A more apologetic tack has been taken by one of Berkeley's bestknown contemporary commentators. Because he accepts Armstrong'sargument that we cannot see retinal events, he urges that Berkeleynever maintained such a thesis. In an article devoted to this subject,Colin Turbayne concludes,To say that pictureson the retinaare the properobjectsof sightis to commit"thepsychologist's allacy",a fallacyto which hewritersofopticswereprone,andwhichBerkeleywas particularly nxious o avoid. It involves he supposi-tion thatwe maybe directlyawareof thingswhichwecanonlyknowabout.Ofwhatoccurs on our retinaswecan neverbedirectlyaware.It is thereforemostunlikely hatBerkeley,whoneveroncecategorically tated thatpictureson theretinaare theproperor immediateobjectsof sightmeantthattheyare.50Several things need to be said about Turbayne's argument. First, someargument is indeed necessary. For, as we have seen, Berkeley's ownwritings are somewhat confusingon this score. Indeed, I agree with Tur-bayne that we are stuck with arguing, as he does, about what Berkeleymust have meant.51Turbayne and I would also agree that Berkeley wasfar too clever to have thought that we see by looking at retinal patterns(with another eye). Any view (such as Armstrong's) which imputes suchnaivete to Berkeley is thereforeprimafacie implausible.What, then, of Turbayne's contention that it is absurd to speak ofbeing directly aware of retinal events? I certainly see no fallacy in sup-posing that we see the light that (as it happens) is projected on theretina. True, we do not know by seeing that this is what happens. Thephysiologist must tell us about the structure of the eye. But, do we notsee a light when the oculist shines one in our eye? Do we not fail to seewhen the lights are out? When we (as it happens) project little pictureson the retinas of our eyes with a stereopticon, do we not see scenes?

5?"Berkeleyand Molyneux on Retinal Images," loc. cit., 351.5"Inhis article (op. cit., note 35, above) on this subject Furlong notes, "what are weto say on this issue? I think it is no easy matter to decide" (311).


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BERKELEYS "PROPER OBJECT OF VISION" 259What, in the end, is the retina sensitive to if not light?Such, I would sug-gest are Berkeley's questions. And the obvious answer to them is indeedthe answer he gives, "light in all its modes andvariations."Turbayne's argument is thus curiously unsound. The trouble is notthe "psychologist's fallacy," but rather the "philosopher's fallacy."Crudely put, this fallacy is the view that what we do not know about can-not happen or exist. Perhaps, it is not a fallacy so much as a ratherextreme form of idealism. Nonetheless, it is some such view that mustbe behind Turbayne's argument. It is true that knowledge of retinas,lenses, etc. is rather recondite; but it is also true that these are requisitefor seeing. We do not know by seeing the retina that we see light imping-ing there. But it scarcely follows from this that we therefore do not seethe light that (as it happens) does impinge on the retina. Berkeley isafter all offering a theory of vision in which he discusses these reconditefacts in great detail. Why would he do this, if he thought it was a fallacyto do so? Turbayne's argument is, thus, rather close to Armstrong'swhich involves the erroneous assumption that seeing the retinal patternis equivalent to seeing the retina.Two personal examples may make this more vivid. The lenses of thisauthor's eyes do not give focused images on the retinas of his eyes;52things look blurred (out of focus) without glasses. I know things lookblurred without my glasses for this reason because my oculist tells methis-not by seeing my retinas. Nonetheless, the oculist's reason is (as ithappens) the reason. Like most people, I also, when staring at the sky,see several small specks. These are "vitreous floaters," bits of lens de-bris floating in the aqueous humor of my eyes (no longer a "clear-eyedyouth"). Once again, the expert, the ophthalmologist explainsjust whatit is I am seeing: I do not take my eyes out to examine them. But, noteagain, it scarcely follows that I am not seeing "vitreous floaters." I amin fact (as it turns out) seeing debris floating in my eyes. Turbayne wouldhave to maintain that I do not really see this debris because it had to beexplained to me what I was seeing.Finally, it has been suggested by some apologists that Berkeleychanged his mind about vision during the course of his philosophicalcareer. He was indeed deluded, they say, in a New Theory of Vision(1709), into thinking that one sees one's retinal patterns. But, they goon, he certainly had given up this view by the time he published TheTheoryof Vision Vindicated and Explained (1733).How does the TVV [Theory of Vison Vindicated]solution compare with that inthe TV [A New Theoryof Vision]?Withboth solutionswe beginwith two ap-parently conflictingthings and end by abolishingone of them. In the TVBerkeleyabolished he erectappearance nd retained he retinalpicture,deny-

52This s Euphranor's"therefore."


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ingthat this is inverted.In the TVVhe leavesthe erectappearance,but deniesthe retinalpicture.53Despite textual difficulties, such a view has little merit. First, such atheory is contradicted by the very title of the later essay. Second, thefullest argument that we do not see distance (because of what happenson the retina) is to be found in Alciphron, andAlciphron (1732) is nearlycontemporaneous with The Theory of Vision Vindicated (1733). Third,the absence of any distance-argument in The Theory of Vision Vindi-cated results from Berkeley's announced method in that work. He thereproceeds deductively from his conclusions not (as he does elsewhere) in-

ductively from his evidence. These considerations are, I think, sufficientto lay to rest the notion that Berkeley had a last-minute change of heart.In any case, once it is recognized that Berkeley's thesis in A NewTheory of Visionis not absurd, the need for such apologetics evaporates.Notice what seems to me decisive on this issue: that Berkeley took theproper object of vision to be the retinal pattern (as directly sensed-notlooked at with "another eye") explains why the proper object of visionhas the rather odd features he attributes to it. The proper object of vi-sion is free-floating because we do not see (or otherwise sense) its set-ting. It is bidimensional but lacks any determinate three-dimensionalshape because (again) we see the pattern but not the setting. A viewsuch as Turbayne's cannot give an account of why Berkeley's proper ob-ject of vision has these peculiar features. This alone, it seems to me,should settle the matter.

Illinois Institute of Technology.53Furlong,"Berkeley and the 'Knot'.. .," 314.

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