Thomas McKenna Incident and Emergency Centre Department of Nuclear Safety and Security
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Transcript of Thomas McKenna Incident and Emergency Centre Department of Nuclear Safety and Security
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Emergency Planning (Preparedness)Within The Development Of A National
Infrastructure For Nuclear Power
Thomas McKennaIncident and Emergency Centre
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security
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IEC - Mission Statement
Global Focal PointGlobal Focal Pointforfor
International Preparedness, International Preparedness, Communication and ResponseCommunication and Response
for for Nuclear and Radiological Safety or Nuclear and Radiological Safety or
Security Related Incidents, Security Related Incidents, Emergencies, Threats or Events of Emergencies, Threats or Events of
Media InterestMedia Interest
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IEC – Rational - Why are we needed
TODAY’S WORLD:TODAY’S WORLD: Expansion of use of Expansion of use of nuclear power and use of nuclear power and use of radiation sourcesradiation sources
Treaty obligationsTreaty obligations
2121stst century threats century threats
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IAEA emergency preparedness requirements and guidance
• Based on an examination of all past emergencies
• Address what should be in place for an adequate response
• Clearly reflected by the milestones
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All severe NPP emergencies Caused –or – made worse by operator
actions:• TMI • Chernobyl• These emergencies essentially stopped
NPP development for 20 yearsBecause it was assumed it could not happen
– severe – low probability events - not considered in training and development of onsite response actions.
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Lack of local support over time
• Shoreham in 1984 given permission for low power tests but by the late 1980s local popular, political and business support collapsed (due to TMI & Chernobyl).
• In February 1983 local officials declared that the county could not be safely evacuated.
• Failure to agree on evacuation plan was the official reason for the plant never being operated.
• Billion $ plant never operated
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Emergency preparedness not just off-site
Need integration of on- and off-site response. Includes:• Actions being taken by the operators
• Prevent a severe emergency e.g. EOPs• Reduce the consequences of an emergency
• Security response. (security response has interfered with the safety response)
• Off-site response• Local • National
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Some big issues
On-site response should address severe very low probability events
• Plants can not operate unless severe events are low probability
• Failure to address contributed to TMI and Chernobyl
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Some big issues
What is the basis for off-site preparedness?
• Based on consequence projection (threat assessment)
• What probability event should be considered?
• How is this demonstrated?• How are advances in design and analysis
reflected? For example size of the emergency ones
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Some big issues
Sustainability: Who is going to pay?• Are the provisions in place to pay for
emergency response arrangements needed for both on and off site over the long-term?
• Is this part of license condition?
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Some big issues
No clear designation of responsibilities• Who is responsible for making off-site decisions
promptly?• Who coordinates the total national response (not
the regulatory body)?• Have all the national and local response
organizations been included?
• £,€,¥, $ involved – who will get the money?
• Must decide early
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IEC is the IAEA focal point of EP & Rand is available to assist