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Thomas Kent, Beyond System. the Rhetoric of Paralogy.
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Beyond System: The Rhetoric of ParalogyAuthor(s): Thomas KentSource: College English, Vol. 51, No. 5 (Sep., 1989), pp. 492-507Published by: National Council of Teachers of EnglishStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/378007.
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8/10/2019 Thomas Kent, Beyond System. the Rhetoric of Paralogy.
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Thomas Kent
B e y o n d
S y s t e m
h e
R h e t o r i c
o
P a r a l o g y
Systemic
rhetoric
is the
conception
of
rhetoric that treats discourse
production
and
discourse
analysis
as
codifiable
processes,
processes
derived from
the idea
that
language possesses
a
foundational
or
conventional
center of some
sort.
This
formulation of rhetoric as system traces its genealogy to Plato's and Aristotle's
responses
to the
pragmatic
rhetorics of the
Sophists.
As
we now
know,
the
Sophists
fulfilled a
very
valuable
social function
in
Greek
society by providing
the
practical
training required
of
young
men in
order for
them to succeed
in the
democratic
city-state.
Best
represented by
Protagoras
and
Gorgias,
the
Sophists
travelled
from
city
to
city
instructing
citizens,
primarily patrician
young
men,
in
the
important
art
or techne of
rhetoric,
and
this
instruction
typically
included
practical training
in
the
routine but
important day-to-day
activities
required
in
Greek
political,
legal,
and
economic
social
life.
Steeped
in
Gorgiasian
ag-
nosticism and
Protagorean
materialism,
the
Sophistic conception
of
rhetoric
treated
discourse as a social
instrument,
and as
the
practical
treatment
of
language-in-use,
the
Sophistic
rhetorics were
thoroughly
pragmatic,
decentered,
and
anti-metaphysical.
For
Plato,
this kind of
pragmatic approach
to discourse
obviously posed
a
di-
rect
threat
to his
entire
metaphysics,
and for
Aristotle,
Sophistic
materialism
led
directly
to
an
untenable
relativism
that threatened
the
foundation
of his
catego-
ries.
Although
I
cannot
pursue
here all the reasons
that
Plato and
Aristotle
so
vi-
olently
condemned the
Sophists,
reasons
that
clearly
included
the
problem
of
economic
competition
for
students,
one
important
reason
no doubt
concerned
the Sophistic rejection of foundational epistemology based on the Protagorean
contention that
man and not
eternal forms or
categories
is
the center
of
all
things
(see Rankin;
Coby; esp.
Kerford).
For
epistemological
foundationalism
and
a
metaphysics
of
presence
to
endure,
Sophistic philosophy,
which
consisted
pri-
marily
of
rhetoric in
its
practical
uses,
had
to
be
eradicated,
and for
the most
part
it
was. The
Sophistic
conception
of rhetoric as
a
social
art
grounded
in
the
everyday
uses of
language
has
been
lost
to
us;
in our
contemporary
genealogy
of
rhetoric,
no continuous
Sophistic
rhetorical
tradition exists.
For
2500
years,
Thomas Kent
is associate
professor
of
English
at
Iowa
State
University.
He
is the
author
of
Interpreta-
tion and Genre: The Role of Generic Perception in the Study of Narrative Texts (Bucknell University
Press).
College
English,
Volume
51,
Number
5,
September
1989
492
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Beyond
System:
The Rhetoric
of
Paralogy
493
rhetoric
has been
dominated not
by
social
pragmatic
conceptions
of
language-in-
use,
but rather
by
epistemologically-centered
conceptions
of
language
as
system.
Aristotle
established the
boundaries of rhetoric
as we know it that from
antiq-
uity
to our time have remained
remarkably
stable,
especially
in the areas of
dis-
course
production
and
analysis.
In the
Rhetoric,
Aristotle
argues
that
discourse
production
may
be
described
according
to
a kind
of
organic
structuralism
where
a
text-usually
an
oral
address-transcends
the sum of its
parts.
For
Aristotle,
a
text-whatever
its
kind-cannot be reduced to discrete
parts
that,
in
turn,
may
be
abstracted
from the
process
of discourse
production
and then talked
about
without
concern
for each
part's
structural interaction
with all the other
parts.
In
the
Aristotelian
formulation,
discourse
production always
constitutes
a
systemic
process
characterized
by
what he calls the
enthymeme. According
to
Aristo-
tle,
rhetoric
stands in an
antistrophic
relation to dialectic
in
that dialectic
aims
for
scientific
reduction
characterized
by
the
syllogism
while rhetoric aims
for
rhetorical
reconstruction characterized
by
the
enthymeme
(see
Raymond).
Both
rhetoric and
dialectic,
however,
resemble one
another-they
are
not
opposi-
tions-in
that
both
are
based on
logical
constructs
(the
syllogism
and the en-
thymeme)
and
both
may
be
reduced to a
process
or
system. Employing
the
epis-
temological
foundation
provided by
the
systemic enthymeme,
Aristotle
generates
the
primary
function of rhetoric- the
faculty
of
observing
in
any
given
case
the
available
means of
persuasion
(11:1355b)-and
proceeds
to char-
acterize
the
process
of
persuasion according
to certain
proofs,
logical
categories,
and topoi (see Ryan). Beginning with the presupposition of the enthymeme-a
presupposition
derived
from
his initial
separation
of rhetoric from
dialectic-Ar-
istotle
generates
a
logico-systemic
superstructure
for
rhetoric that
stands outside
both
history
and
social
interaction,
and it
represents
a clear
reaction to
the
Sophistic
notion of
rhetoric as a
pragmatic
social
activity.
Ironically,
the
most
enduring legacy
of the
Aristotelian
systemic
rhetoric
has
been
the
non-Aristotelian
classical
reduction of
rhetoric into discrete
categories
of
inventio,
dispositio,
elocutio,
memoria,
and
pronuntiatio.
In the
Rhetoric,
Ar-
istotle
emphasizes
the
organic
and
interactive
character of
discourse
production
within
his
logical
system,
but within the
classical
Greco-Roman
paradigm,
Aris-
totle's organicism-his search for a systemic rhetorical method-was dropped in
favor
of a
formulaic linear
system
that
described the
stages
in
the
process
of dis-
course
production.
For
example,
the
primary
Aristotelian
thrust
in
Cicero's
De
oratore,
Tacitus'
Dialogus,
and
Quintilian's
Institutio
oratoria
concerns
the
proper
parts
that
come
together
to
form the
oratorial
text,
especially
the role
played
by
invention in
composing
these
parts.
The
founding
fathers of the
classical
rhetorical
tradition
studied the
categories
themselves,
and
they
paid
lit-
tle
attention
to
organicism
and
practically
no
attention
to the
possibility
of
re-
constituting
Aristotle's
formal
categories.
Certainly lively
debate
ensued about
the
function of
these
five
parts
of discourse
production
from
Boethius' refor-
mulation of the enthymeme-his epicheireme-forward to Ramus' further elab-
oration of
rhetoric
as
primarily
style
and
delivery
(omitting
invention and the
topics)
through
the
Port-Royal Logic
to Richard
Whately
who
considered rhet-
oric
(in
conformity
with
the
very
just
and
philosophic
view
of
Aristotle)
as an
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494
College
English
offshoot
from
Logic (8).
These
debates,
however,
never
questioned
the
logical
and
formalist
foundation
of the
classical
paradigm,
nor did
they
question
the
Ar-
istotelian
conception
of
system.
In our time, this classical
paradigm
still controlsour
conception
of discourse
production,
and
it
appears
regularly
as the
constitutive
schema from
which
the
entire
field
of
rhetoric
takes its
shape.
For the
most
part,
our
contemporary
metadiscourse of
rhetoric-the
language
we
employ
to talk
about rhetoric-has
remained
the
same
for
2000
years.
We
continue to
employ
the
classical
paradig-
matic
categories
of
discourse
production,
although nowadays
we
generally
reduce the
five
categories
to
three:
invention,
arrangement,
nd
style.
Of
course,
it
is
important
to
emphasize
that
current
notions about
discourse
production
reinvent
Aristotle
in the
sense that
they
attempt
to revive the idea of
organic
n-
teraction
among
these three
paradigmaticelements within somethingthat has
come
to
be
called
the
writing
process.
Although
these
contemporaryprocess
approaches
to
writing-approaches
usually
derived
from theories of invention-
attempt
a
return
o
Aristotle
by
adding
an
interactiveand recursivedimension o
the
act of
discourse
production,
they
do
not
attempt
to
go
beyond
Aristotle's
categories
nor do
they
attempt
to
conceptualize
a
rhetorical radition
outside
the
classical
paradigm.
For
example,
current
process
theories
of
discourse
produc-
tion
generally
follow three
epistemological
approaches:
the Kantian
approach,
the
neo-positivist
approach,
and
the
social-semiotic
approach.
The Kantian
ap-
proach
understands
discourse
production
to be
generated
from
innate
mental
categories that constitute humanconsciousness; modal theories of discourse,
tagmemic
theory,
the
Prewriting
School,
and
expressive
theories
represent
ex-
amples
of
this
approach.
The
neo-positivist
approach
understandsdiscourse
pro-
duction
to be an
empiricalphenomenon
that
can be tested
and
measured;
work
by
schema
theorists,
cyberneticists
and
information
heorists,
protocol
theorists,
and
brain
hemisphere
researchers
represent
this
approach.
The social-semiotic
approach
understands
discourse
production
o be a
communal
activity
that
is so-
cially
and
historically
determined;
ethnography,
collaborative
writing heory,
so-
cial
constructionist
theory,
and the
conventionalist semiotics
of the
Halliday
school are
examples
of
this
approach.
These three divisions
obviously
do
consti-
tute the only way to characterize current approaches to discourse production
(for
other
possible
divisions
see,
e.g., Faigley;
Berlin);
nor do
these
categories
possess
firm
boundaries
in
that
some rhetoricians
see themselves
working
in
more than one
category.
For
example,
many
neo-positivist empiricists,
especial-
ly
protocol
theorists like
Linda
Flower
and
Kantians
like
Peter
Elbow,
claim
that
their work
possesses
a
strong
social
dimension.
Although
strict boundaries
are
impossible
to establish
precisely,
most
of
our
approaches
o
current
research
in
discourse
production
conform
n
general
to the
outline sketched
out
here.
Although seemingly
different,
these
approaches
actually
share
a
set
of
com-
mon
assumptions,
especially
the Kantian and the
neo-positivist approaches,
which are
philosophically
akin anyway. First, each
approach
defines itself and
finds its
identity
within
the
classical
paradigm;
all
Kantians,
neo-positivists,
or
social
constructionists see themselves
working
within invention
theory, stylis-
tics,
or
some other
subcategory
of
the classical
paradigm.
Few rhetoricians
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Beyond
System:
The Rhetoric
of Paralogy
495
question
the
legitimacy
of
the
paradigm
or seek alternative
ways
of characteriz-
ing
rhetoric.
Second,
and
perhaps
more
important,
none of these three
ap-
proaches
sees
itself
reacting against
the Aristotelian
formulation
of rhetoric as
a
system.
Each
approach
may
describe
the
system
differently-as
mental
con-
structs,
phenomenalistic
data,
or social
conventions-but
all these
approaches
assume
nonetheless
that discourse
production
may
be
codified in
a
logico/sys-
temic manner. In
fact,
most
contemporary
rhetoricians
perceive
their work to
be
part
of one
long
and continuous
Aristotelian
tradition,
and,
today,
no influential
theory
of
rhetoric-except perhaps
Kenneth
Burke's
acknowledgement
of
the
unconscious
(e.g.,
Burke
167-69)-suggests
that
discourse
production
might
be
paralogic
and
unsystemic
in nature.
Much like
theories of discourse
production,
contemporary
theories
of
dis-
course analysis also conform both to the classical paradigm that defines the
boundaries of rhetoric and to
the Aristotelian
conception
of discourse
as
system.
Broadly speaking,
the
dominant
approach
to discourse
analysis
in this
century
corresponds
to the rhetorical
category
of elocutio
or
style,
which
constitutes
an
extraordinarily
wide
range
of
endeavors
(see
Bennett).
Contemporary
rhetorical
analysis,
which includes much
contemporary
literary
analysis
as
well,
has
been
dominated
by
one
aspect
of
style,
the
study
of
tropological
language--especially
metaphor
and
metonomy-and
this
preoccupation
is
the thread
that connects
rhetoric with
contemporary poetics,
linguistics,
and
philosophy
(see
Rice;
Gen-
ette;
Todorov).
In
one
sense,
the histories
of
twentieth-century poetics,
lin-
guistics, and analytic philosophy share a common horizon, the study of figura-
tion.
In
contemporary poetics,
for
example,
we
may
trace
a
genealogy
that
stretches from Russian Formalist
preoccupations
with
poetic
language,
struc-
turalist
descriptions
of
metaphor
and
metonomy,
New Critical
conceptions
of
irony
and
metaphoric complexity
to current
communitarian,
phenomenological,
and
deconstructive
conceptions
of
literary language.
In
linguistics,
we
may
trace
out a similar
heritage
from the
Prague
School's
structuralist
analyses
of meta-
phoric
and
metonymic
axes,
anthropological
linguistic
concerns
with
figuration
and
myth,
to current
discussions of
metaphoric
language
in
speech
act
theory
and
pragmatics.
Twentieth-century
analytic
philosophy
also has
been
centrally
concerned with figuration from Gotlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and the early
Wittgenstein, through
the
Vienna
Circle
and
Anglo-American
positivism,
to
the
later
Wittgenstein,
Gilbert
Ryle,
J.
L.
Austin,
and Donald Davidson
(to
cite
just
a few
of the
major figures
within
this one branch of
philosophy).
Although
contemporary
poetics, linguistics,
and
analytic philosophy
pursue
very
different
ends,
each
endeavor,
in
its own
way,
undertakes
a brand
of
rhe-
torical
analysis
that
takes
shape
only
against
the
backdrop
of
the classical
para-
digm.
Consider,
for
example,
Roman
Jakobson's
famous distinction
between
metaphoric-paradigmatic
constructions and
metonymic-syntagmatic
construc-
tions. To
comprehend
Jakobson's
distinction,
we
obviously
must
first under-
stand the
paradigm
in
which he is
working.
That
is,
we must
understand
that
Jakobson
employs
the traditional
conceptions
of
metaphor
and
metonomy
in
radically
new
ways;
we must
understand,
in
other
words,
that Jakobson
himself
accepts
the
boundaries of the
classical
paradigm
while he
simultaneously
sets
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College
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out
to
widen
them. We
must
also understand that
Jakobson makes no
attempt
to
destroy
the
paradigm,
for he
seeks
only
to
employ
traditional
rhetorical
concepts
in
new
ways.
Even
a
radically
subversive
analytical
strategy
like American
de-
construction theory, or at least the deconstruction
theory
practiced
by
Paul de
Man,
finds its
field
of reference
only
in
relation to its reaction
against
the
meta-
physically
centered
conceptions
of
tropes-primarily metaphor-represented
within the
classical
paradigm.
Certainly,
de Manian deconstruction seeks
to
un-
dermine
these
conceptions,
but
in
order to do
so,
it
must
accept
the classical
paradigm
as the
representation
for
rhetoric. Unlike
Derrida,
de Man does
not
seek
to
challenge
the
paradigm
itself, and,
in
fact,
he
seems
to view
his work
as
an
extension of the
classical
paradigm
(see
de
Man
6).
In
addition
to
accepting
the
representation
of rhetoric established
by
the
classical
paradigm,
most
contemporary
theories of discourse
analysis
also
corre-
spond
to
contemporary
theories of
discourse
production
in
another
important
way.
Like
theories
of discourse
production,
most
contemporary
theories
of
dis-
course
analysis-I
would
say
all
except Jacques
Derrida's deconstruction
theory
and some
versions of American
pragmatic
theory-follow
the Aristotelian
exam-
ple by
proposing
a
logico-systemic
foundation for the
analysis
of
figuration.
In
this
century literary
theorists,
linguistic
theorists,
and
language philosophers
have
quested
for the
holy grail
of a
totalizing system,
for a
definitive
and
final
explanation
of
language's
figurative
power.
In
fact,
the
history
of
discourse
anal-
ysis
in
this
century may
be
described as the
usurpation
of one
totalizing
system
by another totalizing system. In poetics, for example, the analysis of literary dis-
course has been
dominated
by
the
preoccupation
with formal
systems-the
for-
malisms of
Russian
Formalism,
New
Criticism,
Structuralism,
and
American
versions of
Phenomenology.
For
linguistics,
a similar
story
may
be told: struc-
turalist and
anthropological
theories,
generative
theories,
and
pragmatic/speech
act theories all
attempt
to describe how discourse
operates
by employing
the
foundational
notion of
system.
Analytic
philosophy
also
has been
dominated
by
the
quest
for a
logical system
that
might explain
the
operation
of
discourse,
and,
as Richard
Rorty
points
out,
only recently
have
some
philosophers
relinquished
this task.
Existing
within the classical
paradigm
that establishes
the boundaries
of rhetoric, the dominant contemporary theories of both discourse production
and
discourse
analysis rely
on the notion
of
system,
and little attention
has
been
given
to the
possibility
that discourse
production
and
analysis
may
be
non-
systemic
and
paralogical
in nature.
Within the
classical
paradigm,
the foundational
element
that
gives
both
dis-
course
production
and
analysis
their
systemic
identities
has
changed
over
time.
For
Aristotle,
the foundational
element that identified
his
rhetorical
system
was
the
enthymeme;
for
Ramus,
it
was
dialectic;
for
Jakobson,
it was
metaphoric
and
metonymic displacement,
and so forth.
In
contemporary
rhetorical
study,
the most
powerful
foundational
element,
the element that
cuts across
all
the
many different kinds of rhetorical systems, is the notion of convention. In con-
temporary
theories of discourse
production,
for
example,
some
conception
of
convention
provides
the foundational
element that
supports
every
rhetorical
sys-
tem.
Kantians
argue
that
the
logico-mental
categories
shared
by
language
users
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8/10/2019 Thomas Kent, Beyond System. the Rhetoric of Paralogy.
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Beyond System:
The Rhetoric
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Paralogy 497
possess
a
conventional
dimension.
According
to
the
Kantians,
these
schematic
categories
do
not
constitute
things-in-themselves;
rather,
they
represent
the
con-
tingent
and
conventional mental
processes
that we
employ
to
structure
reality,
and these
processes
may
even
change
over time. Similar to the Kantian
conven-
tionalists,
the
neo-positivists
argue
that
the
things
that
they analyze-protocols,
recall,
syntactic
maturity, given-new
constructs,
and so forth-do not
constitute
things-in-themselves;
rather,
they
represent
shared conventional
processes
that
remain
static
long
enough
to reveal
themselves to us so that
we
may
measure
and
codify
them.
Unlike the
Kantians and
neo-positivists,
the
social-
semioticians
argue
that
socially
constructed conventions
constitute
all that
we
can
know
about
reality;
for
these
materialists,
conventions become
the
things-in-
themselves,
and our
ability
to
produce
discourse becomes
contingent
on
our
more
fundamental
ability
to
understand our
social
and
historical
situation.
Similar
to
these
theories
of
discourse
production,
most
contemporary
theories
of
discourse
analysis
also
include a
conception
of convention as
a
foundational
element in
their
analytical
systems.
In
structuralist and formalist
poetics,
for
ex-
ample,
genres
like
poems
and
novels often are
distinguished
according
to
their
uses of
something
we
call
literary
conventions,
and,
in
turn,
stylistic analysis
becomes
the
description
of
these
conventions.
Contemporary
linguistics-espe-
cially
in
the
area
of
speech
act
theory-and
analytic philosophy
also
are
grounded
in
the
idea
that
language
is
conventional;
in
fact,
the one
assumption
shared
by
most
language
philosophers
in
this
century
is the
foundational
as-
sumption that language is conventional in nature. For example, David Lewis
claims
that
It
is
a
platitude-something only
a
philosopher
would dream
of
denying-that
there
are
conventions of
language
(160).
Language
philosophers,
linguistic
theorists,
and
literary
critics
only recently
have
begun
to
question
the
idea that
conventionalism forms the
foundation
for
all
of
language
study,
and
the
two
contemporary
philosophers
who have
contrib-
uted
most to
this
critique
are
Donald
Davidson and
Jacques
Derrida.
At
first
glance,
Davidson
and
Derrida
would seem
to share
little
philosophical
common
ground;
Davidson
represents
the
culmination of
analytic
philosophy
in
this cen-
tury,
and
Derrida
has
devoted
his
career
to
deconstructing
the
tradition
that
Davidson represents. On closer inspection, however, Davidson's and Derrida's
treatments of
convention
share
many
important
similarities,
and
although
they
approach
the
subject
from
very
different
angles, they
end
up
in
much the same
place
(for
a
further
discussion of
these
similarities,
see
Wheeler;
Pradhan).
Both
Davidson
and
Derrida
argue
that
language
is
not
convention-bound
and,
conse-
quently,
they
suggest
that
theories of
discourse
production
and
analysis
that
ground
themselves
in
this
assumption
require
reformulation.
By
calling
into
question
the
very
foundation
of
contemporary
rhetoric-and
of all
language
study
for
that
matter-Davidson
and
Derrida also
question
the
possibility
of a
totalizing
Aristotelian
systemic
analysis
of
discourse
as well as the
existence of
the classical
paradigm
that forces us to define rhetoric
according
to
categories
established in
antiquity
and
legitimated
by
habit
and
tradition. In
their
critiques
of
conventionalism,
Davidson
and
Derrida
require
us to reinvent
rhetoric ac-
cording
to a
different
paradigm,
a
paradigm
defined
not
by systemic
logic
but,
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8/10/2019 Thomas Kent, Beyond System. the Rhetoric of Paralogy.
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498
College
English
rather,
by
nonsystemic
paralogy.
Such a
reformulation
of rhetoric
offers
new
possibilities
for the
study
of both
discourse
production
and discourse
analysis
while
it
simultaneously
requires
us to
rethink
some of our foundational
assump-
tions
about
language
itself.
Donald
Davidson
formulates
his
critique
of conventionalism
in the
essay
Communication
and
Convention,
which he
concludes
by inverting
the con-
ventionalist
argument
that
language
is
convention-bound.
Davidson tells us:
if
I am
right
in
what
I
have said in
this
paper,
convention
is
not
a
condition
of
lan-
guage.
I
suggest,
then,
that
philosophers
who make
convention
a
necessary
element
in
language
have
the matter
backwards.The
truth s rather hat
language
s a
condi-
tion
for
having
conventions.
(280)
In
traditional
language
philosophy,
it is
convention that links
the
sign
we
pro-
duce to the act the sign produces in the world, and Davidson denies that any
such
link
exists that
connects what
our words mean
.
.
.
and our
purposes
in
using
them
(271).
By
denying
traditional
assumptions
about the nature
of
lan-
guage
conventions,
Davidson does not
explain meaning by reverting
to
a sim-
plistic
correspondence
theory
between
signifier
and
signified.
He does not
sug-
gest,
for
example,
that a
non-arbitrary,
one-to-one
correspondence
exists
between
signifier
and
signified.
He
admits
the arbitrariness of
signs,
but
insists
that
arbitrary
should not be
confused
with
convention,
for
clearly,
what is
arbi-
trary
is
not
necessarily
conventional
(265).
To
say
that a
particular
sound
or
a
particular
mark
arbitrarily signifies something
does not
mean that
the sound
or
the mark is conventional. Thus he departs from the tradition marked off by J. L.
Austin,
H.
P.
Grice,
John
Searle,
and Michael
Dummett,
and
many
other
lan-
guage
philosophers,
rhetoricians,
and
literary
theorists who hold
that
we
employ
language
in
order
to
bring
about certain
changes
in
the
world,
and
that because
language
possesses
illocutionary
force,
some
non-arbitrary
conventional
connec-
tion
must
exist
between the
sign
and its effect
in
the world.
If
such
a conven-
tional
connection were
non-arbitrary,
it
would
possess
regularity
or
what
Der-
rida
calls
iterability
across
language
(179).
That
is,
a
non-arbitrary
convention
of
language
that
signifies
the
illocutionary
force of a sound
or a
mark would
op-
erate
independently
of
any
particular
language
or
language
act.
Both
Davidson
and
Derrida
argue
that no such feature of
language
exists.
In
his
analysis,
Davidson isolates three
categories
of
theories that
attempt
to
describe the link
between a
sign's meaning
and its social
effect:
first,
there
are
theories
that
claim
there
is a
convention
connecting
sentences
in one
or
another
grammatical
mood
(or
containing
an
explicit performative
phrase)
with
illocutionary
ntentions,
or some
broader
purpose;
second,
there
are theories
that
look
to
a
conventional
use
for
each
sentence;
and
third,
there
are theories
to
the
ef-
fect that
there is a
convention
that ties
individualwords to
an extension or
inten-
sion. These are
not
competing
theories.
Depending
on
details,
all
combinations
of
these
theories are
possible.
(266)
The first kind of
theory
pertains
to theorists like Dummett who
suggest
that sen-
tences assert
something
and that assertions are convention-bound.
Davidson
identifies three
problems
with
such
a formulation.
First,
Davidson
points
out
the
commonsense notion that the same sentence
may
be
employed
for uses
other
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8/10/2019 Thomas Kent, Beyond System. the Rhetoric of Paralogy.
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Beyond
System:
The Rhetoric
of
Paralogy
499
than
assertion;
it
may
be
employed
for
telling
a
joke
or
asking
a
question
and
so
forth.
Therefore,
if there
is
a
convention
that
makes an assertion
an
assertion,
it
must reside
outside
the
sentence
itself
in
the context
where the sentence is
ut-
tered. No conventional element connected with the isolated sentence-like
mood,
for
example-can
mark the
sentence
as
an assertion or
any
other kind
of
performative,
and
when we move
our search
from the isolated
sentence
to
the
context in
which it is
uttered,
we
still
cannot
discover a codifiable
conventional
element that
gives
an
assertion its
identity.
According
to
Davidson,
we can
only
establish
some
very vague
criteria to
explain
why
a
sentence
may
be read
as
an
assertion in
one
context
and a
joke
in
another,
and
even
if we
could
establish
firm
criteria
to
explain why
we
agree
to
call
an
assertion
an assertion
in
every
context,
this
agreement
would not
necessarily
establish a
convention.
As
David-
son
reminds
us,
We
all
agree
that
a
horse
must
have
four
legs,
but it
is
not
a
convention
that
horses
have four
legs
(269).
Davidson's second
refutation
of the idea that
modalities
are convention-
bound
treats the
claim that a
conventional
element exists
that marks
an
as-
serter's
intention to
assert
something.
Since an
assertion
must be
recognized
as
an
assertion
by
an
audience and
is, therefore,
a
public
act,
it would
be nice
to
think
that
some
sort of
conventional
element
exists that announces
to the
world
our
intention to
assert
something.
Since no such convention
can
be isolated
in
ordinary
language
use,
Gottlob
Frege
tried,
unsuccessfully,
to
invent a
symbol
that
would
mark
an
assertion as
an
assertion.
But
such a
symbol,
as Davidson
indicates, cannot work. Clearly, if such a convention existed in ordinary lan-
guage, every
liar
or
actor would
employ
it to
convince
us of her or his
sincerity.
No
such
public,
identifiable,
consensual
convention exists nor could
exist
that
marks
a
sentence
as an
assertion
or as
any
other
kind of
performative.
Davidson's
third
refutation denies the claim
that
convention
marks the
speak-
er's
intention
to
utter a
true
sentence. Davidson shows that
this claim forms
part
of
an
analysis
of
what
assertion
means:
in
order
to
assert
something,
we must
by
definition
believe
what we
assert or we
would
not be
asserting.
No
conven-
tional
sign
could
exist that
announces
that
we
are
sincere about our
assertions,
for,
as
we
noted,
such a
sign
would
be
available to the liar as
well
as to
the
sincere. With these three arguments, Davidson demonstrates, I believe, that
whatever
it
is
that
links a
sentence
with a
performative
act in the
world
(e.g.,
whatever it
is that
enables
us to order a
hot
dog
and
get
one),
it
is
not a conven-
tion
of
language.
The
second
class
of
theories
addressed
by
Davidson
concerns
attempts
to
find
the
meaning
of a
sentence in
its
uses and not in some
attribute
(like mood)
of
the
sentence
itself.
Addressing
the first
class
of
theories,
Davidson
demonstrated
that
no
convention
can be
isolated that marks
a
particular
sentence
for a
particu-
lar
use.
He
now
addresses the
related claim
that a
sentence is linked to its
mean-
ing by
a
conventional
element
residing
outside the
sentence
in
something
fre-
quently called its conventional use. Davidson explains that Stated crudely,
such
theories
maintain
that there
is
a
single
use
(or
some finite number of
uses)
to
which a
given
sentence is
tied,
and
this
use
gives
the
meaning
of the sen-
tence
(271).
The
argument
employed
in
this kind of
theory
goes
something
like
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8/10/2019 Thomas Kent, Beyond System. the Rhetoric of Paralogy.
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500
College English
this: Because
any
sentence
may
be
put
to
myriad
uses,
any
one
use
(or
any
finite
number
of
uses)
of a
particular
sentence is
conventional.
Therefore,
when
we
produce
discourse,
we
always
seek,
according
to
this
argument,
the
conven-
tional element that will enable us to make our intentionsclear or, in Davidson's
terminology,
we
always
seek
to
express
an
ulterior
purpose,
an
effect
that
exists outside the
sentence itself.
Clearly,
in
speaking
or
writing,
an
intended
ef-
fect
always
exists,
but this
intended effect
cannot
be realized
only
through
the
writer's
or
speaker's
intention.
As
Davidson
says,
if I
intend to
get
my
audi-
ence
to
do or believe
something,
it
must
be
through
their
correct
interpretation
of the literal
meaning
of
my
words
(273).
(By
literal
meaning,
Davidson
means
something
along
the
lines of a
Tarski-style
theory
of truth
as
well as
the
semantic
properties
of
words
[271].)
In this
line
of
thinking,
a convention
would
be
required
to
link
up
the
literal
meaning
of a
sentence
with its ulterior
purpose,
and,
Davidson
argues,
no
such
convention
exists nor
could
there
be
one.
Davidson
cites
the
example
of
the
sen-
tence
Eat
your
eggplant,
where
a conventional
connection
supposedly
exists
between
the
ulterior
purpose
of the
sentence-getting
someone
to eat
her or
his
eggplant-and
the literal
meaning
of the
sentence.
Davidson
argues
that
if such
a
convention
did
exist,
it would
require
a
marker
that
indicates
the
speaker's
or
writer's
sincerity,
that what
he
represents
himself
as
wanting
or
trying
to
do
he
in fact
wants or
is
trying
to
do
(274).
In
this
example,
for
instance,
a conven-
tional marker
would be
required
o
tell
the listener
that
the
speaker
was
sincere
about her desire to get someone to eat eggplant.However, as we have seen, no
such marker
can exist.
According
to
Davidson,
an
unbridgeable
plit
exists
be-
tween
the
sign
and its effect
in the
world,
a
split
that
he
views
as
the
very
es-
sence
of
language:
I
conclude
that
it is not
an
accidental
feature of
language
hat
the ulterior
purpose
of an utterance
and
its
literal
meaning
are
independent,
n the sense
that the
latter
cannot be derived
from
the former:
t
is
of
the
essence
of
language.
I call this
fea-
ture of
language
the
principle
of
the
autonomy of
meaning.
(274)
Meaning
is
autonomous
because
any
sentence-no
matter
what
its
intended
literal
meaning-may
be
employed
for
any
number
of ulterior
purposes
or
per-
formative
acts.
Therefore,
no convention
exists
that
(1)
marksa sentence for a
particular
use or
(2)
marks
a
particular
use
(or
a
finite
number
of
uses)
for
a
par-
ticular
sentence.
The third class
of
theories
claims
that
meaning
s
conventional, or,
more
pre-
cisely,
that
it is
a convention
that
we
assign
the
meaning
we do to
individual
words
and sentences
when
they
are uttered
or
written
(276).
Davidson
begins
his
analysis
of
this claim
by employing
David
Lewis'
description
of
convention
as a
regularity
R):
(1)
Everyone
involved conforms
to
R
and
(2)
believes
that
others also conform.
(3)
The belief thatothers conformto R gives all involveda good reason to conformto
R.
(4)
All
concerned
prefer
that
there should
be
conformity
o R.
(5)
R is not
the
only
possible
regularity
meeting
the
last two conditions.
(6) Finally,
everyone
in-
volved
knows
(1)-(5)
and
knows
that
everyone
else
knows
(1)-(5),
etc.
(Lewis
164-65)
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8/10/2019 Thomas Kent, Beyond System. the Rhetoric of Paralogy.
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Beyond
System:
The Rhetoric
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Paralogy
501
At the
center
of
Lewis'
analysis
resides the
idea that the conventional
element
in
communication
consists of
a
systemic
hermeneutic method or
a
shared
inter-
pretive technique. According
to
Lewis, speaker
and
hearer
(or
reader and
writ-
er)
must
assign
the
same
meaning
to
the
speaker's
words
in
order for
successful
communication to
occur-although
clearly
the
speaker
and hearer
(or
writer
and
reader)
are not
required
to
employ
the
same
language.
In our
ordinary
day-to-
day
communication,
most of the conditions
set
out
by
Lewis
indeed
are
met:
communication
requires
that
speakers
intend their
listeners
to
interpret
their
words
in a
certain
way;
speakers
must
know that
hearers
have
the
ability
to
in-
terpret
what
they
intend;
speakers
and
hearers
must
share the
understanding
that
speakers
intend their words to
be
interpreted,
and
so
forth.
As Davidson
in-
sists, however,
the most
important
element
of
Lewis'
analysis-the
condition
of
regularity-cannot be met.
When we
communicate,
we
certainly
share some
conditions
of a common
in-
terpretive
method
or at
least
those
minimal
conditions
set out
above,
but
reg-
ularity
can
only
mean
recurrence
over time
(what
Derrida
calls
iteration),
not
simply
agreement
at
a
specific
moment.
According
to
Davidson,
the
only
candi-
date for
this kind of
recurrence
is sound
pattern:
speaker
and
hearer
must
re-
peatedly
. . .
interpret relevantly
similar
sound
patterns
of
the
speaker
in
the
same
way
(277). (As
we will
see,
Derrida
expands
the idea
of
recurrence
in
lan-
guage
to
include the mark
as well as sound
pattern.)
The
important
word here
is
interpret,
and
although
certain sound
patterns
may
recur,
it is
difficult,
if not
impossible, to say exactly how speaker's and hearer's theories for interpreting
the
speaker's
words must coincide
(278).
These
hermeneutic
strategies
must
coincide
after we utter a
word,
or
communication
cannot
occur;
but
in order for
a
convention to
be
established
that
represents
the
coincidence
of hermeneutic
theories,
regularity
dictates that
these theories coincide
before
an utterance.
However,
as
Davidson
indicates,
communication
can occur
even
if
speaker
and
hearer
possess
different advance hermeneutic
strategies
because
a
speaker
ob-
viously
can
provide
enough
clues
to enable a hearer to
interpret
what
the
speak-
er
intends
to
communicate.
Of
course,
a
speaker
must also
possess
some notion
about how
these
clues
coincide
with
the
hearer's
ability
to
interpret
them,
but,
again,
this coincidence cannot be
predicted
or
conventionalized;
it can
only
be
guessed
at.
Davidson's
point
(and
Derrida's, too)
is that we cannot
describe this
coincidence
in
any
formal
manner. That
is,
we
cannot
conventionalize
the
pro-
cess
by
which we
make our
theory
of
interpretation
coincide
with
other
theories.
In his
analysis
of
convention,
Davidson seeks to
displace
the idea that
lan-
guage
is
convention-bound
and
foundational.
In
place
of
a
hermeneutics founded
on
the
idea of
conventionality,
Davidson
suggests
something
that he calls
radi-
cal
interpretation
that
is similar in some
ways
to
Derridean
deconstruction.
Davidson
argues
that
It is easy to misconceive the role of society in language.Language s, to be sure, a
social art.
But it is an error
to
suppose
we have seen
deeply
into
the
heart of lin-
guistic
communicationwhen
we have noticed how
society
bends
linguistic
habits
to
a
public
norm.
What is conventional about
language,
if
anything
s,
is that
people
tend to
speak
much
as their
neighbors
do.
(278)
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502
College English
This
convergence
of
linguistic
practice,
the
fact that we tend to
speak
much
as
our
neighbors
do,
tells us
nothing,
however,
about the
interpretive
skills
re-
quired
to
bring
about the
convergence. According
to
Davidson,
our social
condi-
tioning
does not
provide
us
with
a
store of
language
conventions from
which we
draw when
we
wish
to
communicate
something;
social
conditioning simply
en-
sures us that
we
may,
up
to a
point,
assume
that the same method of
inter-
pretation
that we
use
for
others,
or
that we
assume others
use for
us,
will
work
for a new
speaker
(278).
In a
Gadamerian
sense,
social
conditioning provides
us with a
horizon
within which we
test out
interpretive possibilities
when
we en-
counter a
speaker
or
a
text,
and
the fit of one hermeneutic
strategy
with
another
can
never
be
prescribed
in
advance.
At
best, then,
social
conventions
represent
only
one kind of
hermeneutic
element that
helps
us
communicate.
Davidson ex-
plains that
Knowledge
of
the conventions of
language
s thus a
practical
crutch to
interpreta-
tion,
a
crutch
we cannot in
practice
afford to do
without-but
a
crutch
which,
under
optimum
conditions for
communication,
we can
in the
end
throw
away,
and
could in
theory
have
done
without
from
the
start.
(279)
Radical
interpretation
means
that
we
employ
our
knowledge
of
a
language
to
make
guesses
about what
speakers
and writers desire to
communicate,
and
no
formal
method
may
be established
to
ensure that our
guesses
will be correct.
A
knowledge
of
conventions-linguistic
or
otherwise-only
helps
make
us better
guessers. To return to the beginning of this discussion, then, convention does
not
provide
a
necessary
foundation for
language;
rather,
language provides
a
home
for convention.
In
Signature
Event
Context,
a
critique
of convention
that echoes
many
of
Davidson's
concerns,
Derrida traces
out
some
of the
implications
of
a
de-
conventionalized
language
theory,
and
by
arguing
that no
conventional link
exists
between
the
sign
and
the
sign's
effect
in the
world,
he,
in
a
sense,
cor-
roborates
Davidson's
critique
while
simultaneously
going
beyond
it.
Although
Derrida
concentrates on
the written
sign
where Davidson
treats
the
spoken
word, Derrida,
like
Davidson,
argues
that no identifiable
conventional
element
exists linking a written sign to its context because a context can never be abso-
lutely
determinable.
(Derrida
also
makes the same claim
for
the
spoken
word
al-
though
here I will
concentrate
only
on
his
analysis
of
the
written
sign.)
Accord-
ing
to
Derrida,
the written
sign
derives its
authority
from
absence,
for
One
writes in
order
to
communicate
something
to those
who
are absent
(177).
Writ-
ten
discourse
must, then,
remain
readable
despite
the absolute
disappearance
of
any
receiver,
determined
in
general
(179).
In
other
words,
any
written
sign
must be
repeatable
or
iterable,
and
this
iterability
gives
writing
its
identity
be-
cause A
writing
that is not
structurally
readable-iterable-beyond
the
death
of
the addressee would not be
writing
(180).
Derrida's
conception
of
iterability
and Davidson's and Lewis' analysis of convention as a regularity share an
important
common feature:
both
suggest
that the
sign
must
be
repeatable
in
order to communicate
anything
at all.
However,
where
Davidson
looks for
(and
fails to
find)
repeatability
in
convention,
Derrida looks
for it in
language
itself.
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8/10/2019 Thomas Kent, Beyond System. the Rhetoric of Paralogy.
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Beyond System:
The Rhetoric
of Paralogy
503
By claiming
that
no convention
may
be isolated that links
a
sign
with an effect
in
the
world,
Davidson hints
at the
possibility
that
language possesses
no
center,
no
anchor,
no
foundation
that attaches
a
sign
to a determinate
meaning.
Derrida,
however,
does not hint
at this
possibility;
he insists on
it.
Going
beyond
Davidson,
Derrida
argues
that
iterability implies
that there
is
no such
thing
as
a
code-organon
of
iterability-which
could
be
structurally
se-
cret
(180),
for the
very
feature of
iterability gives
every
language
code its
iden-
tity.
Because
every
organon
of
iterability,
by
definition,
must be
iterable,
no
code is
context
specific.
Derrida
explains
that
The
possibility
of
repeating
and thus of
identifying
the
marks
is
implicit
in
every
code,
making
t into
a
network that
is
communicable,
ransmittable,
decipherable,
iterable for a
third,
and
hence for
every
possible
user
in
general.
To be what it
is,
all
writing
must,
therefore,
be
capable
of
functioning
n the
radical
absence
of
every
empirically
determined eceiverin
general.
(180)
Rephrased,
Derrida's
formulation
argues
that
a
split
exists between
the
written
sign
and its
effect in
the
world,
a
formulation
that
supports,
it seems to
me,
Davidson's
claim for the
autonomy
of
meaning.
If
meaning
cannot be
isolated
in
the
sentence
itself
or in
its
context,
as Davidson
argues,
and
if the
meaning
of
a
word-either
spoken
or
written-is not
conventionally
or
contextually
bound,
as
both
Davidson and
Derrida
claim,
then
language
loses its
anchor
and resists
sys-
temic
formulation
altogether.
Although
Davidson
hesitates
to make
this conclu-
sion,
Derrida
does
not,
and he sees
clearly
the ramifications
of
such a de-
conventionalized language theory:
Every
sign,
linguistic
or
non-linguistic, spoken
or written
. . . in
a small
or
large
unit,
can
be
cited,
put
between
quotation
marks;
n
so
doing
t can break
with
every
given
context,
engendering
an
infinity
of new contexts
in
a mannerwhich is abso-
lutely
illimitable.
This
does not
imply
that the
mark is valid outside of
a
context,
but
on the
contrary
hat
there are
only
contexts
without
any
center or
absolute an-
choring.
This
citationality,
his
duplication
or
duplicity,
this
iterability
of the
mark
is
neither an
accident
nor an
anomaly,
it is that
(normal/abnormal)
ithoutwhich
a
mark
could
not even
have a
functioncalled
normal.
(185-86)
Derrida
argues
and
Davidson
suggests
that
language
possesses
a
paralogical
di-
mension, a dimension that, in any conventional sense, refutes formalization,
codification,
and
systemization.
Earlier in
this
discussion,
I
indicated
my
belief that
Davidson and Derrida
started
from
different
philosophical
directions
but ended in the same
place.
Working
within
the
analytic
tradition,
Davidson desires to
refute the
specific
claim that
language
is
convention-bound,
and
unlike
Derrida,
he
does not
view
his
project
as
the
decentering
of the entire
philosophical
tradition.
Derrida,
on
the
other
hand,
understands his
analysis
of both convention and context
to be
only
one
part,
although
certainly
an
extremely
important part,
of his
larger proj-
ect:
the
critique
of
a
metaphysics
of
presence.
Although
both Davidson
and
Der-
rida
approach
the
problem
of convention from
very
different
points
of view and
with
very
different aims
and
intentions,
both
agree
that
language
seems to
pos-
sess
no
conventional
anchor or at least
no anchor that we can
identify,
codify,
and
then
talk
about.
The
ramifications of such a conclusion for the
discipline
of
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8/10/2019 Thomas Kent, Beyond System. the Rhetoric of Paralogy.
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504
College
English
rhetoric
are
profound,
and here I
would like to
mention what
I
perceive
to
be
three
of
these
ramifications or
rhetoric in
general
and
for studies in discourse
production
and
discourse
analysis
in
particular.
(1)
If
no
codifiable
conventional link exists between a
sign
(or
a
sentence)
and
its
effect
in the
world,
then
no
systemic
rhetoric in
the Aristotelian
tradition
can
account
for
the
effects
produced
by
language.
This assertion calls into
question
the
foundational
presupposition
hat
supports
what I have
called
previously
the
classical
paradigm.
From
Aristotle
forward,
rhetoricians
have
presupposed
that
(a)
something
links
discourse
to the
world
and
(b)
this
something
could be
classified
in a
logico-systemic
way.
The
classical
paradigm
rests
on the founda-
tional
assumption
that the
correspondence
between the
sign
and
its effect in the
world
can be
represented
by
a
metalanguage
grounded
in a
conception
of
sys-
tem, process,
and
logic.
If
such
a
correspondence
between
the
sign
and its effect
in
the
world
cannot
be
represented
by
such
a
metalanguage
r,
even more to
the
point,
if
it
cannot
be
represented
at all in
any
sort of
logical
(enthymemic)
way,
we
are
forced,
then,
to reinvent
rhetoric;
we are
forced to
move
away
from
a
conception
of
rhetoric
grounded
n
ideas of
system,
process,
and formal
logic,
and
move
toward a
conception
of rhetoric
grounded
n
paralogy,
difference,
and
indeterminancy.
(2)
If
no
codifiable
link exists
that connects the
sign
to its
effect
in the
world,
then no
logico-systemic
account
of
discourse
production
is
possible.
I have
ar-
gued
here
that,
in
general,
three
broad theoretical
approaches
now dominate
the
study of discourse production: the Kantian, the neo-positivist, and the social
semiotic. The
Kantian
approach
assumes that
discourse
production
may
be
de-
scribed
as
a
formal
system
of
logically
coherent
categories
or modes-classifica-
tion,
description,
narration,
and
so
forth-that,
in some sort of
conventional
way,
link
the
sign
(or
the
sentence)
with
its effect
in the
world.
The neo-
positivist
approach
assumes
that an
empirical
system-a system
built on
a
scien-
tific
model that
measures
recall,
tests short-
and
long-term
memory, investigates
brain
hemisphere
function,
analyzes
protocols,
describes
writers
at
work,
and
kindred
activities-may
be
employed
to discover
the
link between the
sign
(or
the
sentence)
and
its
effect in the
world. The social semiotic
approach
assumes
that a conventional link exists amongthe membersof different discourse com-
munities,
and
meaning
as well
as
knowledge
are
grounded
in
socially
con-
structed
conventions;
therefore,
the
sign
(or
the
sentence)
may
be
interpreted
only through
the
sign's
conventional effect in these differentdiscourse
commu-
nities.
If
no
convention
can be
found to
link
the
sign
(or
the
sentence)
to
its
ef-
fect
in
the
world,
then the
presuppositional
oundation
hat
supports
all
three
of
these
theoretical
approaches
to
discourse
production
s
seriously
undermined
f
not
destroyed entirely.
(3)
If
no
codifiable
link exists that connects the
sign
to its
effect
in the
world,
then no
formal
system of
rhetorical
analysis-no
metalanguage-can
be
formu-
lated that will account for the tropological use of language. Any rhetorical theo-
ry, linguistic
theory,
or
literary theory
that
attempts
to
explain
the relation
be-
tween
metaphor
and
metonomy
or
attempts
to describe
the
uses of
language
(for
example
the
uses of
literary/non-literary language)
must
posit
or,
at
least,
must
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8/10/2019 Thomas Kent, Beyond System. the Rhetoric of Paralogy.
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Beyond System:
The Rhetoric
of
Paralogy 505
presuppose
a
conventional ink
between
the
sign
(or
the
sentence)
and its
effect
in
the
world.
This
connection
may
reside either
(a)
in the
sign
(or
the
sentence)
itself
represented
by systemic
(usually synchronic)
formulations like
paradig-
matic/syntagmatic
inks,
generative
grammars,
marked
binary
oppositions,
mood
indicators,
and
so
forth-or
(b)
in the context
represented
by systemic
(usually
dialectical)
formulations ike
performatives,
discourse
communities,
horizons
of
expectation,
base/superstructure
elations,
and other diachronic
representations.
All of
these
formulationsshare
the
presupposition
hat
meaning
s
conventional.
Clearly,
if
no
conventional
ink between the
sign
and its effect can
be detected
in
either
the
sign
itself
or in
its
context,
many
of our
most
influential
heories
of
discourse
analysis
can
explain satisfactorily
neither the nature
of
language
nor
how
the
effects of
language
are
produced.
I
do
not mean
to
suggest, however,
that
languageconventions
are
nonexist-
ent,
nor do
I
mean
to
suggest
that
they
are
unimportant
or communication
or
that
they
are
not
useful
crutches in
everyday
social discourse.
Along
the lines
of
Davidson's
and
Derrida's
critiques,
I
mean to
suggest
only
that
language
makes
convention
possible,
and
not the other
way
around. No one
questions
the
claim
that
convention aids
communication,
but as
Davidson
points
out,
after
we
make
this
claim
and after
we
demonstratethat the claim
possesses
validity,
we
have
said
nothing
about the
nature of
language.
We have commented
only
about
one
feature of
language:
ts
sufficient
ability
to
generate
social conventions.
As Marx
righted
Hegelian
theory
and
set
it
on its
feet,
Davidson and
Derrida,
I
believe,
right contemporarylanguagetheory by reversing its base/superstructurerela-
tion.
Language
does
not
represent
a
superstructure
built
on
convention;
lan-
guage
provides
the
base
on which a
superstructure
f conventions resides.
When
we
analyze
or
describe
this
conventional
superstructure,
we
say very
little about
the
nature
of
the
language
base that
makes the
superstructure ossible,
and
with-
in
the
boundaries
of
the
discussion
here,
we,
in
addition,
say very
little about
the
connection
between
rhetoric
and
language, especially
the
two
endeavors of
dis-
course
production
and
analysis.
By
rethinking
our
most
fundamental
assumptions
about the
production
and
the
analysis
of
discourse-assumptions
about the
convention-boundnature of
discourse and assumptionsabout the systemic natureof discourse production
and
discourse
analysis-we
may begin
to
move
beyond
a rhetorical
radition
hat
has
reached,
I
believe,
a
dead end.
Our current
conceptions
of
rhetoric,
drenched
as
they
are
in
the
Platonic/Aristotelian
ormulationsof
logic,
process,
and
system,
cannot
account
for
the
hermeneuticdimension ntrinsic
to
both dis-
course
production
and
discourse
analysis.
I
believe
that
we
can
begin
to account
for
these
living
social
acts
only by
reinventing
rhetoric and
thereby
accounting
for
the
paralogic
nature
of
language.
Works
Cited
Aristotle.
Rhetorica.
Oxford:
Clarendon,
1924.
Vol.
11
of The
Works
of
Aristo-
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