Third-Party “Hatchet” Ads: An Exploratory Content Study Comparing Third-Party and Candidate...

Atlantic Journal of Communication, 19:129–151, 2011

Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN: 1545-6870 print/1545-6889 online

DOI: 10.1080/15456870.2011.584506

Third-Party “Hatchet” Ads:An Exploratory Content Study ComparingThird-Party and Candidate Spots From the

2004 Presidential Election

Philip DaltonDepartment of Speech Communication, Rhetoric and Performance Studies

Hofstra University

Charlton McIlwainDepartment of Culture and Communication

New York University

The Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United ruling lifted several key rules limiting electioneering

communication. These changes are predicted to have significant effects on political campaigns.

Namely, the ruling allows third-party sponsored electioneering up until Election Day. Because of

the widespread presence of third-party issue advertising in 2004 presidential race, that election

offers researchers one of the first opportunities to compare the content of third-party spots with

candidate sponsored spots. This study examined the differences between third-party and candidate-

sponsored spots, to look at differences in areas of “magic word” inclusion (e.g., “vote for : : : ,” “vote

against : : : ”), negativity, and overall message consistency. Our findings show that few candidates

use magic words, third-party spots were significantly more negative, addressed more issues than

candidate spots, and made fewer explicit references to issues. Based on our results, we recommend

future research on the effects of ad negativity, sponsor salience, and third-party and candidate

message consistency.

Following the 1976 study conducted by Patterson and McClure, few academicians have ques-

tioned the influential role that televised political advertising plays in disseminating information

about candidates and issues. The value of this political communication modality has been

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Philip Dalton, Department of Speech Communi-

cation, Rhetoric and Performance Studies, New Academic Building 412, Hofstra University, Hempstead, NY 11549.

E-mail: [email protected]

129

130 DALTON AND MCILWAIN

recognized by campaign practitioners since the 1950s. Kaid, Chanslor, and Hovind (1992)

succinctly described the advantages of political advertisements for many campaigns: “Televisionadvertising reaches large numbers of voters, requires limited information-seeking behavior

on the part of the voter, and provides the candidate with complete control of the message”

(p. 303).

Determined to use televised spots to their maximum advantage, presidential candidates spent

what were at the time record sums of money during the 2004 race for the White House. Devlin(2005) noted a 235% increase in advertising spending in 2004 by the two major candidates

over 2000; Kerry and groups supporting him spent $358 million to Bush’s $262 million. Time

(“Numbers,” 2004) reported that $1.45 billion was spent on political advertising at all levels

during the 2004 election cycle. In light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Citizens

United v. Federal Elections Commission that frees corporations to electioneer right up to

election day, it appears that third-party1 uncoordinated advertising (including both issue spotsand electioneering spots) is likely to become an even more important fixture in future elections.

The decision caused President Obama to remark,

With this ruling today, the Supreme Court has given a green light to a new stampede of special

interest money in our politics. It is a major victory for : : : powerful interests that marshal their

power every day in Washington to drown out the voices of everyday Americans. (“Reaction,”

2010)

In light of this development, political advertising is likely to become even more important and

controversial than ever before.

This study examines third-party issue advertising in order to explore in what ways, if any,

it differs from candidate-sponsored advertising; such studies are “rare” (Cheng & Riffe, 2008).

Specifically, this study is an effort to understand whether the content of campaign-sponsored andthird-party-sponsored spots often speculated about are in important ways similar or significantly

different. Our findings also cast doubt on whether the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA)

of 2002 achieved its goals of making political campaigns more positive and transparent (Kaid

& Dimitrova, 2005). This study found third-party spots to be more negative, more opponent

focused, and more image oriented than ads produced by candidate’s campaigns. Our findings

raise questions about the efficacy of efforts to distinguish third-party issue spots from candidate-sponsored electioneering spots, inasmuch as the latter almost completely failed to use any

of the so-called magic words that the former are barred by law from using. Our findings

show that third-party advertisers discuss a wider array of issues than the candidates, causing

us to question both whether their independent advertising campaigns don’t detract from the

message consistency that candidate campaigns attempt to achieve by “staying on message”and whether they don’t function to expand debate and inject additional information into the

campaign.

1“Third-party” is used to identify the producers of “independent” PAC, 527 and other non-candidate affiliated

entities that advertise for the ostensible purposes of influencing the outcome of an election. We adopt this language

from Kaid and Dimitrova’s (2005) study The Television Advertising Battleground in the 2004 Presidential Election.

THIRD-PARTY SPOTS 131

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

BCRA and Soft Money

The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) was designed to help limit the influence of

special interest money in federal campaigns. The 1974 amendments to FECA created, among

other things, the Federal Election Commission (FEC), the contribution limits on the so-called

hard money, of which many are familiar, and legal distinctions between individuals, nationalparty organizations, and political committees as they pertain to campaign fund-raising. A

combination of weak state laws and FEC concessions in the late 1970s gave rise to soft-

money contributions, political money for which FEC limitations and reporting requirements

did not apply, as it was earmarked for “party-building” purposes only. Soft money allowed state

party and other political organizations to duck the spirit of the FECA rules, however. Moreover,the Supreme Court’s Buckley v. Valeo decision of 1976 determined that the FECA’s limitations

and disclosure rules only applied to nonfederal advertising expenditures if the advertiser used

“express advocacy”: language such as “vote for” or “vote against,” often referred to as magic

words (Falk, 2004).Thus, by the 1980s the national parties were soliciting contributions for

state committees and other organizations to help subsidize their hard-money advertising byoffsetting other expenses (e.g., get out the vote efforts).

Falk (1994) noted that by 1996 parties, unions, and corporations could use soft money to

produce “very effective federal campaign commercials : : : as long as they did not use the

‘magic’ explicit words” (para. 4). Although third-party advertisements have been shown to

be persuasive (Garramone, 1985; Kaid & Boydston, 1987), Engström and Kenney (2002);

An, Jin, and Pfau (2006); and Pfau, Holbert, Szabo, and Kaminksi, (2002) demonstrated thatelectioneering conducted by these groups can affect vote decisions, voter knowledge, and

awareness, respectively. To abate the influence of this unregulated money, the BCRA primarily

addressed soft money and “electioneering communications”2 by applying hard-money rules to

all organizations that produce electioneering political advertisements aired within 60 days of

a general election that specifically identify a candidate. In other words, if groups want to runsoft-money ads that specifically advocate for or against a federal candidate, they cannot be

broadcast within that 60-day window. Specifically, groups producing electioneering spots must

report their contributions and comply with contribution limits.

One common misconception used to account for the popularity of these groups as a political

mechanism is that the BCRA exempted 527s from its regulations. Unlike national parties and

campaigns, which may never use soft money, 527s are allowed to solicit and spend moneythat functions in a manner similar to soft money, provided they participate in “issue advocacy”

instead of “electioneering.” The root of the 527 controversy follows less from rule exemptions

than from the working definition of an issue advertisement. 527s produce issue advertisements

that depict candidates while implicitly advocating for and against them. These spots are without

both magic words and coordination with federal campaigns. Contributions channeled towardissue advocacy have no limits and are reported to the government in a different manner than

2According to the FEC, “electioneering communication” is any broadcast, satellite, or cable communication that

refers to a clearly identified candidate, is publicly distributed shortly before an election, and is targeted at the relevant

electorate; http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/electioneering.shtml


are electioneering dollars. It is ostensibly for these reasons that 527s are perceived to play a

significant role in elections. As The Economist put it,

Groups such as America Coming Together do not even try to disguise the fact that they are working

to defeat Mr. Bush. But they have been able to skirt the law mainly because the FEC has been

dozing. The agency has been slow to draw a line between groups that merely push issues and ones

that try to influence elections. (“United States,” 2004, p. 49)

For example, liberal 527 groups raised $140 million, whereas conservative 527s raised $75

million during the 2004 presidential elections (“Numbers,” 2004). Because the BCRA was

intended to limit the influence of third-party groups in presidential elections, this study examines

the content of third-party spots during the 2004 presidential election, and compares its content

with spots sponsored by the candidates’ campaigns.Does the BCRA, in effect, realize the separation between electioneering communication and

issue advocacy? The following review of literature outlines several prominent issues justifying

closer scrutiny of spot similarities or differences. First, research shows that scholars presuppose

a qualitative difference between the content of third-party spots and candidate spots. Second,

the mandated separation between federal campaigns and issue advocacy groups may insulate

federal candidates from media scrutiny. Finally, less coordinated messages and themes competewith one another for mind share. Understanding better the content of these spots will contribute

to our ability to understand their role in presidential elections.

Message Similarity and Difference

Although message consistency is important to campaigns, the growing role of third-party

advertising behooves communication scholars to better understand the differences between ads

produced by third parties and candidate campaigns. We do know that third-party advertising has

been found to be relatively more effective than candidate-sponsored spots, arguably because of

receiver perception that the advertiser is less biased (Garramone, 1985; Garramone & Smith,1984). However, it is often just presupposed that a substantive difference exists between these

two types of advertisements (e.g., Dreyfus, 1998; Greenblatt, 1998). Pfau et al. (2002) explained

that issue advocacy advertising “resembles candidate commercials” (p. 301). They added,

“Although they stop short of urging viewers to vote against the candidate, they intimate that

viewers ought to vote against the targeted candidate” (p. 302). With the exception of BCRArequiring candidates to endorse their spots (its “Stand By Your Ad” provision), there is nothing

else advertisers are mandated to do in order to distinguish third-party spots from those produced

by the campaigns. For instance, that issue advertisers must not use magic words doesn’t mean

candidate spots do use them. Krasno (2000) noted that only 4% of congressional candidate ads

in 1998 used magic words themselves. An et al. (2006) predicated their study on this samedistinction.

This presumption of issue and candidate advertising difference is notable also in a study

conducted by Pfau et al. (2002). Testing in 1998 (pre-BCRA) to identify the different effects

of issue spots and candidate spots on voters, they exposed subjects to these different spots and

measured attitudes afterward. Spots were distinguished by sponsor only; at that time the law

did not require federal candidates to verbally endorse their spots. Notable differences between


these ads due to sponsorship were, as far as one can guess, indistinguishable. This lack of

research begs the question whether the magic words prohibition helps distinguish third-partyspots from candidate spots.

RQ1: Will candidate spots use magic words more often than third-party spots?

Rhetorical Advantage of De Jure Separation

Describing independent expenditure groups like PACs in the 1980s, former National Conser-

vative Political Action Committee chairman John Terry Dolan stated the following:

Groups like ours are potentially very dangerous to the political process. We could be a menace, yes.

Ten independent expenditure groups, for example, could amass this great amount of money and

defeat the point of accountability in politics. We could say whatever we want about an opponent

of a Senator Smith and the senator wouldn’t have to say anything. A group like ours could lie

through its teeth and the candidate it helps stays clean. (as cited in MacPherson, 1980, p. F1)

Whereas the BCRA was intended to help reduce the amount of negative campaigning, it

may have had the effect of making such ads more prevalent by making groups, similar to

those Dolan just referenced in this article, even more influential. Research shows that issue-advocacy advertising, rather than candidate-produced advertising, is more likely to include

attacks against the opposed candidate (Stanger & Rivlin, 1998). Devlin (2005) made a similar

assertion, noting the “extreme negativity” of issue spots. Pfau, Park, Holbert, and Cho (2001)

suggested that “issue advertising may have replaced candidate advertising as the principle

source of campaign attack advocacy” (p. 2380). In addition, there exists reason to believe that

issue advertisers are in some ways more influential because they are perceived by audiencesto be relatively more objective third parties (Garramone, 1985; Pfau et al., 2002). Relatedly,

although federal candidates must now endorse their spots (e.g., “I’m John Kerry, and I ap-

proved this message: : : : ”), 527s make possible the use of negative advertisements that may

insulate the candidate from responsibility for the message. As such, 527s can potentially be

used as campaign surrogates, as “hatchet men” separating the candidate from the negativemessage.

This separation has two implications. On one hand, these advertisements are appealing to

campaigns because they hold the potential to insulate the candidate from criticism for going

negative. On the other hand, failure to coordinate may cause spots to harm the candidate

they were likely intended to assist. Regarding the former point, Swift Boat Veterans for Truthaired their Any Questions spot with no known coordination with the Bush campaign or the

Republican National Committee. Although initially run with little money ($500,000), the spot

literally referred to John Kerry as “a liar” and garnered the Swift Boat Veterans a great deal of

free media attention and helped to generate millions in revenue for the group (Devlin, 2005).

We seek to find if past conclusions about third-party advertising negativity are true of their

role in the 2004 presidential election.

H1: Third-party-sponsored spots will be significantly more negative than candidate-sponsored

spots.


Inconsistency

Devlin’s (2005) analysis of the 2004 presidential advertising strategies evidences some of the

problems with candidate reliance on third parties for advertising. Because BCRA prohibits

coordination between candidates and third-party issue advertisers, when candidates appear

to benefit from third-party advertisements they cannot depend on these groups to remain

adequately positive (if so desired), maintain message consistency, or target prioritized markets.

Candidates, from time to time, may need to rely on third parties to occupy the airwaveswith supportive messages as campaigns conserve their own funds they forfeit control over the

message. As a strategy, this can prove very valuable. To Bush’s advantage, Swift Boat Veterans

for Truth spent $19 million advertising in 10 states, whereas Progress for America spent nearly

$3 million, more than one third of Bush’s spending, on just the Ashley advertisement in Ohio

(Devlin, 2005). According to Devlin, 527s were a component of the Kerry campaign strategyto maintain an advertising presence between the end of the Democratic National Committee

convention and the start of the general campaign. A result, however, is that the messages may

end up being more negative than the candidate had desired. For instance, left-leaning groups

like MoveOn and former Clinton deputy chief of staff Harold Ickes’s Media Fund produced

and aired numerous advertisements that many maintain harmed Kerry because they were “tooextreme” (Devlin, 2005). The negative focus of these ads is of particular importance because

the predominant issue orientation or image orientation of an advertisement has been shown

to influence how audiences are likely to respond to these ads; issue-oriented attack ads are

more effective (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 1991) whereas audiences are more “bothered” by

personal attacks (Greer, 2006).

In addition to problems with negativity, campaigns may also face message consistency issuesby relying on these groups. The most memorable pro-Kerry3 527 spot in the 2004 election was

the Media Fund’s Saudi spot, about which Devlin (2005) noted the following: “The weakness

of the ad was that it was not linked to anything that Kerry was emphasizing in his campaign.

An isolated ad could be memorable, but it brought memorability to the ad and not the Kerry

candidacy or issues” (p. 307). Moreover, a Democratic National Committee operative describeddecision making as performed in a “vacuum”: “We were always trying to put in our heads the

thought of ‘What would the Kerry campaign want us to do?’ ” (p. 304). Sometimes candidates

may not desire the assistance of the issue advertisements, as in instances Greenblatt (1998)

described in which candidates are drowned out of the airwaves or forced to discuss issues

that were not part of the campaign strategy. Magleby and Holt (1999) described an Iowa

congressional race in which one candidate’s “campaign was whipsawed by outside spendingfrom both sides” (p. 24). Ultimately, the campaign could not maintain a consistent message

because it was competing with other interests groups. Even with the best of intentions, the

disconnect between candidates and third-party issue advocates can ultimately lead to third-

party advertisers prioritizing different issues and advertising markets. In terms of dollars spent,

5 of the top 10 markets for candidate spots were not included in top-10 markets for issueadvertisers (Annenberg Public Policy Center, 2004).

3Throughout the results section we refer to third-party spots as either pro-Kerry or pro-Bush. While evidence

doesn’t allow us to determine if the spot producers actually desired the success or failure of a candidate, the spots

were deemed helpful to a candidate if they appeared to assist a candidate by promoting an issue with which a candidate

was aligned or by attacking the issue positions of the opponent.


This research leads us to wonder to what extent the lack of consistency has been overstated.

As such, we examine advertisements from the 2004 race by looking at three content itemsoften measured in studies of political spots when determining the nature of the content: issue

emphasis, style, and theme. As such, we pose the following additional research questions:

RQ2: Were spots by third parties and campaigns consistent in terms of image/issue orien-tation

RQ3: Were spots by third parties and campaigns consistent in terms of appeal type?

RQ4: Were spots by third parties and campaigns consistent in terms of issues?

RQ5: Were spots by third parties and campaigns consistent in terms of style?

RQ6: Were spots by third parties and campaigns consistent in terms of theme?

METHOD

To investigate the differences and similarities between third-party-sponsored and candidate-sponsored television advertisements, a content analysis was performed. A total of 283 television

advertisements from the 2004 general presidential election were studied. The bulk of these ads

were made available by the University of Oklahoma’s Julian P. Kanter Political Commercial

Archive. Its archivists provided spots contributed to the archive by the candidates’ campaigns as

well as ads catalogued as those produced and contributed by third-party groups (e.g., politicalaction committees, 527s). Additional candidate-sponsored spots were obtained through the

Stanford University online Political Communication Lab archive. As complete a sample as

could be obtained at the time of the study was compiled. Spots were carefully vetted for

redundancy, as in some cases spots were subtly changed to air in different markets. When visual

elements were identical between ads, but the ads’ substance differed, both copies remained in

the analyzed pool. Otherwise, redundant spots were removed. In total, 173 candidate-sponsoredspots, consisting of 99 Kerry ads and 74 Bush ads, were included. The remaining 110 spots

were third-party spots. The unit of analysis was the advertisement. Intercoder reliability was

determined from a coded subsample, 10% of the spots. Cohen’s kappa was used to correct

for chance agreement. The instrument was deemed reliable with a score of .76. The coding

instrument was developed from a combination of content items devised by the researchers,in addition to instruments culled from reliable instruments made available in peer-reviewed

studies of similar phenomena.

Determination of the relative use of magic words required the coder to indicate whether

explicit advocacy for or against a candidate was present in the spot (e.g., “Vote for Bush,”

“Don’t vote for Kerry”). To analyze advertisement negativity, Kaid and Tedesco’s (1999)“focus” component of their videostyle study was employed. The primary focus of each spot was

identified by selecting whether the preferred or disfavored candidate dominated the spot. Spots

were also studied for dominant purpose of attack. Updated4 elements of Kaid and Johnston’s

(2001) videostyle instrument were also used to measure attack strategies, use of fear (determined

by presence or absence), and the types of negative attacks. Regarding the latter, focus on

a candidate’s past performance may dominate an attack ad, whereas other spots primarily

4Updated videostyle categories obtained from L. L. Kaid through personal correspondence.


criticize opponent affiliations. Attack type was assessed using Gronbeck’s (1994) categories

(implicative, assaultative, comparative). Overall negativity was also analyzed. To do so, werecoded a number of variables to construct a “negativity index.” The scale was constructed

by creating dummy variables representing the presence (1) or absence (0) of the following ad

characteristics: opponent focus, image/issue focus, explicit issue mention, fear appeal, name

calling, use of assaultative form, and emotional appeals. A total score was calculated for each

ad, then divided by the total number of variables included in the scale (7). The resulting valuescomprise an index ranging from 0 (low negativity) to 1 (high negativity).

The final five questions focused on consistency of candidate and third-party spots. Image

versus issue content was analyzed utilizing Kaid and Tedesco’s (1999) videostyle instrument.

Appeal type was analyzed using Kaid and Johnston’s (2001) scheme based on Aristotle’s

evidence types (logical, emotional, source credibility). Issue consistency was determined by

measuring the types and frequency of issues used in candidate and third-party spots. The issuescoded were derived from a list compiled from various studies and updated in light of recent

issues of interest (e.g., terrorism). Style was analyzed according to format categories developed

by Kaid and Davidson (1986). Style is understood as a function of the formatting used in the

arrangement of the video footage (e.g., documentary style or issue dramatization). Style also

included production techniques, including the use of cinema verité or animation.Theme consistency was analyzed by assessing first the communicative strategy used in

the spot. This study relied on the content categories for advertisement strategy developed by

Trent and Friedenberg (1991). These categories distinguish between types of primary content

emphasis, such as emphasizing a candidate’s incumbency or calling for change. Finally, Kaid

and Johnston’s (2001) categories for dominant candidate characteristics were used in evaluatingthe themes of advocacy spots.

RESULTS

Magic Words

An important finding in this study is the difference between the use of the so-called magic

words (see Table 1). No significant differences were found either between pro-Bush third-party

spots and the Bush spots or the pro-Kerry third-party spots and the Kerry spots. In fact, only

3% of Kerry spots (3 of 99) and 4% of Bush spots (3 of 74) made any use of the words

intended to distinguish candidate spots from third-party spots.

Spot Negativity

Summing the spot focus data of all third-party spots and all candidate spots, 59% of all spotswere found to feature a form of negative attack. Regarding third-party attack purpose, ads were

found significantly more often to utilize personal attacks, attacks on the opponents’ issue stands,

group associations, qualifications and opponent’s past performance more frequently than did

candidate ads.

Despite these significant differences, the majority of both candidate and third-party ads

attacked the issue stands of the stated opponent (see Table 2). When such attacks were


TABLE 1

Magic Words

Variable All Third-Party Spotsa All Bush and Kerry Spotsb

Magic words

Magic words present 0% 4%

Magic words absent 100% 96%

Pro-Bush Third-Party Spotsc Bush Spotsd

Magic words (Bush)



Pro-Kerry Third-Party Spotse Kerry Spotsf

Magic words (Kerry)



an D 107. bn D 197. cn D 30. dn D 74. en D 79. fn D 99.*Chi-square indicates difference is significant at p � .05. **Chi-square indicates difference is significant at p � .10.

made, they were similarly assaultative in nature (64% for third-party advertisers, 71% for

candidates). The only area of significant difference in this regard, however, is the degree to

which attacks were implicit rather than assaultative or comparative: Third-party ads were more

likely to make implicit attacks. In addition, although some form of negative association was the

dominant strategy of attack for both groups, they significantly differed in their use of humor andname calling (both used more often by third-party advertisers). Failing to show any significant

differences at all were variables related to the dominant form of appeal. Ads in both groups

similarly relied foremost on appeals to source credibility. Attack and negativity comparisons

of candidate spots with like-minded third-party spots follow.

Spot focus. With regard to spot focus, results indicate a significant difference between

third-party and candidate spots as to whether the spot focuses on either the candidate or the

candidate’s opponent; the majority of third-party spots (94%) are opponent focused (when

opponent focus and comparative focus categories were collapsed), whereas the candidate spotstended more often to be candidate centered. Despite the latter, almost 50% of candidate spots

focused primarily on the candidate’s opponent (when opponent focus and comparative focus

categories were collapsed). There was little difference between third-party advertisers and

candidates in their emphasis on images and issues.

Comparisons of spot focus between pro-candidate third-party spots and specific candidatespots show little similarity. For each item related to spot focus, both the Bush and Kerry

ads differed significantly from the ads favoring them by their respective third-party groups.

The majority of Bush ads focused on issues, whereas those by third-party advertisers focused

on image (see Table 3). Both Kerry and pro-Kerry third-party ads focused more on issues

than image, though pro-Kerry third-party spots emphasized issues significantly more often (see

Table 4). Bush’s ads were most often focused on Kerry, though significantly less so than pro-


TABLE 2

Negativity: Third-Party Versus Bush and Kerry

Variable Third-Party Spots Bush and Kerry Spots

Spot focusa

Candidate focus* 6% 50%

Opponent focus* 94% 50%

Image versus issueb

Image 38% 35%

Issue 62% 65%

Purpose of attacksc

Personal* 26% 10%

Issue stands/Consistency* 55% 42%

Group affiliations/Associations* 6% 1%

Background/Qualifications* 3% 0%

Opponent’s past performance** 4% 1%

Attack typed

Implicative* 21% 10%

Assaultative 64% 71%

Comparative 16% 20%

Explicit issue referencee

Explicit* 70% 84%

Implicit* 30% 16%

Attack strategyf

Humor/Ridicule* 18% 3%

Negative association 57% 47%

Name calling* 12% 4%

Guilt by association 1% 2%

Appeal typeg

Logical 44% 43%

Emotional 26% 27%

Source credibility 56% 57%

Fear appealh

Present 74% 81%

Absent 26% 19%

aThird-party spots, n D 109; Bush and Kerry spots, n D 173. bThird-party spots, n D 108; Bush and Kerry spots,

n D 173. cThird-party spots, n D 108; Bush and Kerry spots, n D 172. dThird-party spots, n D 102; Bush and Kerryspots, n D 95. eThird-party spots, n D 109; Bush and Kerry spots, n D 173. fThird-party spots, n D 108; Bush andKerry spots, n D 172. gThird-party spots, n D 109; Bush and Kerry spots, n D 173. hThird-party spots, n D 109;

Bush and Kerry spots, n D 170.*Chi-square indicates difference is significant at p � .05. **Chi-square indicates difference is significant at p � .10.

Bush third-party spots, which took aim at Kerry 87% of the time. Kerry tended most often

to focus more on himself, though pro-Kerry-favoring third-party spots were focused on Bushwith even greater frequency (97%) than the pro-Bush third-parties were on Kerry.

Purpose of attacks. Regarding the purpose of the attacks each made against the other,

there is some modicum of similarity between the Bush-sponsored and pro-Bush third-party

ads. That is, each of them rarely attacked Kerry’s group associations or qualifications. They

did differ significantly on the degree to which they attacked personal characteristics of Kerry


TABLE 3

Negativity: Pro-Bush and Bush

Variable Pro-Bush Third-Party Spots Bush Spots

Spota

Candidate* 13% 47%

Opponent* 87% 53%

Image versus issueb

Image* 80% 38%

Issue* 20% 62%

Purpose of attacksc

Personal* 12% 53%

Issue stands/Consistency** 44% 27%

Group affiliations/Associations 0% 3%

Background/Qualifications 0% 3%

Opponent’s past performance 0% 0%

Attack typed

Implicative 0% 2%

Assaultative** 77% 93%

Comparative* 23% 5%


Explicit* 33% 88%

Implicit* 67% 12%

Attack strategyf

Humor/Ridicule 13% 6%

Negative association** 27% 47%

Name calling* 49% 7%


Appeal typeg

Logical 20% 41%

Emotional 37% 31%


Fear appealh

Present 60% 74%

Absent 40% 26%

aPro-Bush third-party spots, n D 30; Bush spots, n D 74. bPro-Bush third-party spots, n D 30; Bush spots, n D 73.cPro-Bush third-party spots, n D 30; Bush spots, n D 73. dPro-Bush third-party spots, n D 26; Bush spots, n D 41.ePro-Bush third-party spots, n D 30; Bush spots, n D 74. fPro-Bush third-party spots, n D 30; Bush spots, n D 73.gPro-Bush third-party spots, n D 30; Bush spots, n D 74. hPro-Bush third-party spots, n D 30; Bush spots, n D 74.

*Chi-square indicates difference is significant at p � .05. **Chi-square indicates difference is significant at p � .10.

or his positions on issues; pro-Bush third-party ads attacked Kerry’s personal characteristics

significantly more often, whereas Bush’s campaign spots attacked his issue positions. On the

other hand, Kerry’s ads differed significantly only with regard to attacking the issue positionsof Bush. Kerry’s third-party spots attacked Bush’s issue positions with greater frequency than

did the spots Kerry sponsored himself. Although Kerry and his third-party group ads differed

significantly in their attacks against Bush’s past performance, this comprised merely 1% of

Kerry ads and only 5% of his third-party spots. On all others, there were no significant

differences between the Kerry spots and pro-Kerry third-party spots with regard to their attack

of Bush’s Group Associations and Qualifications.


TABLE 4

Negativity: Pro-Kerry Versus Kerry

Variable Pro-Kerry Third-Party Spots Kerry Spots

Spot focusa

Candidate* 3% 53%

Opponent* 97% 47%

Image versus issueb

Image** 22% 33%

Issue** 78% 67%

Purpose of attacksc

Personal 15% 8%

Issue stands/Consistency* 65% 41%

Group affiliations/Associations 6% 2%

Background/Qualifications 3% 0%

Opponent’s past performance* 5% 1%

Attack typed

Implicative* 28% 15%

Assaultative 60% 54%

Comparative* 13% 32%


Explicit 84% 81%

Implicit 17% 19%

Attack strategyf

Humor/Ridicule* 19% 1%

Negative association* 68% 48%

Name calling 3% 3%


Appeal typeg

Logical 53% 46%

Emotional 22% 23%


Fear appealh

Present 80% 85%

Absent 20% 15%

aPro-Kerry third-party spots, n D 79; Kerry spots, n D 99. bPro-Kerry third-party spots, n D 79; Kerry spots,

n D 99. cPro-Kerry third-party spots, n D 68; Kerry spots, n D 51. dPro-Kerry third-party spots, n D 76; Kerry spots,n D 54. ePro-Kerry third-party spots, n D 79; Kerry spots, n D 99. fPro-Kerry third-party spots, n D 78; Kerry spots,n D 99. gPro-Kerry third-party spots, n D 79; Kerry spots, n D 99. hPro-Kerry third-party spots, n D 79; Kerry spots,

n D 96.*Chi-square indicates difference is significant at p � .05. **Chi-square indicates difference is significant at p � .10.

Attack strategy. Bush’s preferred attack strategy was negative association, whereas pro-Bush third-party ads most often resorted to name calling. The groups differed significantly

in these two respects but were virtually similar in their infrequent use of humor and guilt

by association. Both the pro-Kerry third-party and Kerry spots infrequently used guilt by

association and name calling. The differences between them pertain to the degree of use of

humor and negative association as a strategy—both strategies being used more often in the

pro-Kerry third-party ads than in Kerry’s own ads.


Attack type. In terms of the explicitness and directness of such attacks, both the Bush and

pro-Bush third-party ads were highly assaultative in nature (93% and 77%, respectively), thoughthe two differed significantly in the frequency with which their attacks were characterized in

this manner. The Bush ads were significantly less frequently comparative in nature than his

third-party advertisers, but there was no significant difference in the frequency with which both

groups’ ads were implicative in nature. Kerry’s ads were significantly more comparative and

less implicative in nature than that of the spots run by third-parties supporting him. They wereassaultative in almost equal measure, each just above 50%.

Overall negativity. Again, we compared the Bush and Kerry ads with their respective

spots sponsored by third-party groups with regard to overall negativity. Individual ads ranged

in their scores from .05 to .73. The results of independent samples t tests show the mean scores

on the negativity index to be significantly different between each candidate and their respective

third-party ads.5 Overall, the highest mean scores were in the Bush group, with mean scores of.40 for pro-Bush third-parties and .27 for the Bush ads. The means for pro-Kerry third-parties

was .28, while Kerry’s was .19.

Image/Issue Consistency

There were no overall image or issue content differences found between third-party and

candidate spots.

Appeal Type Consistency

Kerry and pro-Kerry third-party ads show a high degree of similarity in terms of the types

of appeals used. Each used logical appeals most frequently, followed by appeals to source

credibility, and finally emotional appeals infrequently. The results were the same for Bush and

pro-Bush third-party ads with respect to logical appeals and appeals to source credibility. It is

clear that all groups’ ads relied heavily on fear appeals. But for both types of ad sponsors the

candidate and third-party ads showed no difference in the tendency of their use.

Issue Consistency

The types of issues ads focused on were examined because of the importance issue management

plays in a campaign (e.g., agenda setting, framing and priming). Most interesting is the finding

that third-party spots are significantly less likely to address an explicit issue than candidate

spots. More specifically, pro-Bush 527 spots were significantly more likely than Bush spots

to address no specific issue (67% addressed no explicit issue, whereas 12% of Bush spotsaddressed no specific issue). Ads designed to benefit Kerry (both his own and those from

third-party groups) were equally likely to make specific issue references (see Table 5).

5Negativity t tests: 527 spots (M D .32, SD D .16) compared with candidate spots (M D.22, SD D .17), p < .000;

Bush 527s (M D .40, SD D .18) compared with Bush spots (M D .27, SD D .16), p < .000; Kerry 527s (M D .28,

SD D .13) compared with Kerry spots (M D .19, SD D.17), p < .000; Bush 527s (M D .33, SD D .19) compared

with Kerry 527s (M D .33, SD D .19), p < .001.


TABLE 5

Issue Consistency


Issuea

Taxes* 7% 27%

Balanced budget 3% 0%

Unemployment/Jobs 7% 15%

Economy* 0% 22%

Education* 0% 16%

Crime 0% 0%

Healthcare 7% 18%

Seniors issues 3% 11%

Environment 0% 1%

Drugs 0% 0%

Dissatisfaction with government 3% 0%

Ethics/Morality 0% 1%

Women’s issues 0% 4%

Terrorism/Defense 33% 46%

International issues* 0% 14%


Issueb

Taxes* 9% 22%

Balanced budget 5% 2%

Unemployment/Jobs* 22% 36%

Economy 5% 12%

Education** 13% 5%

Crime 3% 2%

Healthcare 27% 33%

Seniors issues 10% 6%

Environment* 9% 1%

Drugs 0% 0%

Dissatisfaction with government 3% 0%

Ethics/Morality 1% 2%

Women’s issues* 5% 1%

Terrorism/Defense 37% 30%

International issues* 3% 12%

aPro-Bush third-party spots, n D 30; Bush spots, n D 74. bPro-Kerry third-party spots, n D 79; Kerry spots,


Comparing issue mentions in pro-candidate third-party spots versus the campaigns’ ownspots we see significant differences. Both the pro-Bush third-party ads and the Bush ads pre-

dominantly emphasized terrorism (33% and 46%, respectively). Issues emphasized significantly

more often in the Bush spots included taxes, the economy, healthcare, education, and other

international issues. No one area was addressed more often by pro-Bush third-party spots than

by Bush spots. In fact, in all 16 possible issue categories, pro-Bush third-party spots addressed

only 7 of these issues in advertisements with one identifiable primary issue focus.


Evidence suggests relatively less consistency between pro-Kerry third-party spots and Kerry

spots. Although both emphasized most often the same three issues (unemployment, healthcare,and terrorism, though not in the same order of emphasis), pro-Kerry third-parties ran signifi-

cantly more ads devoted to education, the environment, and women’s issues, whereas Kerry’s

ads were significantly more often devoted to taxes, the economy, and other international issues.

Of all 16 possible issue categories, pro-Kerry third-party spots addressed 13 different issues in

advertisements.

Style Consistency

Overall, candidates were significantly more likely to use documentary style, introspection, issue

statements, whereas third-parties were more likely to use opposition-focused formats. Mostnotable about comparisons of ad format was the likelihood of third-party advertisers to use

opposition style formats; both pro-Bush and pro-Kerry third-party spots were significantly more

likely to employ an opposition focus (72% of pro-Bush third-party spots used an opposition

focus, whereas the same was true for 66% of pro-Kerry third-party spots). Pro-Bush spots were

more likely to use testimonials than candidate introspection, ostensibly because it would havebeen illegal to do so. Bush’s campaign ads, however, did include him speaking. Kerry spots

differed from pro-Kerry spots in that Kerry used significantly more documentary and issue

statement formatting, whereas pro-Kerry third-party spots used far more opposition-focused

spots (see Table 6).

We found our most significant contrasts when comparing production techniques, finding

that third-party advertisers and candidate spots differed in every available category. Candidatespots were significantly more often multistyled, using cinema verité, slides, and candidate

head-on shots more often. Third-party advertisers relied significantly more on animation and

other head-on shots. Bush spots were more likely to utilize cinema verité and slides, whereas

pro-Bush third-party spots were more likely to employ others head-on. Kerry spots were

significantly more likely to be multistyles, with slides and candidate head-on shots, whereaspro-Kerry third-party advertisers were significantly more likely to use other head-on shots and

animation.

Theme Consistency

Overall, it appears that third-party advertisers used different dominant advertisement strategies,

further suggesting a lack of consistency. Both third-party advertisers and candidate spots

differed in 8 of 16 categories, with three of these categories unused by both. Ninety percent

of third-party spots relied on opponent attacks, significantly greater than the 53% of candidate

spots that did the same. Third-party spots, consequently, were significantly less likely toemphasize incumbency, charisma, calls for change, optimism, willingness to or experience

with negotiating with world leaders, endorsements, or surrogates (see Table 7).

Comparisons of candidate-sponsored versus third-party spots show significant differences

between the advertising strategies of individual candidates and the third-party ads supporting

them; however, the ways with which third-party advertisers and candidate spots differed in their

advertising depended on the candidate. Pro-Bush third-party spots were significantly less likely


TABLE 6

Style Consistency


Spot formata

Documentary* 3% 11%Videoclip/Music video 4% 2%

Testimonial 11% 7%

Introspection* 0% 8%Issue statement* 8% 27%

Opposition focused* 68% 44%Issue dramatization 10% 11%

Spot techniqueb

Multiple styles* 15% 27%

Cinema verité* 0% 5%Slides* 60% 84%

Candidate head-on* 5% 24%Other head-on* 23% 8%Animation* 12% 3%


Spot formatc

Documentary 3% 7%

Testimonial* 20% 4%Introspection* 0% 12%Issue statement 3% 12%


Spot techniqued

Multiple styles 13% 26%Cinema verité** 0% 10%

Slides* 73% 89%

Candidate head-on 10% 16%Other head-on* 23% 5%Animation 10% 4%


Spot formate

Documentary* 3% 14%

Testimonial 8% 9%Introspection 0% 0%Issue statement* 9% 39%


Spot techniquef

Multiple styles* 15% 27%Cinema verité 0% 2%

Slides* 54% 80%

Candidate head-on* 3% 30%Other head-on* 23% 10%Animation* 13% 2%

aThird-party spots, n D 108; Bush and Kerry spots, n D 169. bThird-party spots, n D 109; Bush and Kerry spots,n D 173. cPro-Bush third-party spots, n D 30; Bush spots, n D 71. dPro-Bush third-party spots, n D 30; Bush spots,n D 74. ePro-Kerry third-party spots, n D 78; Kerry spots, n D 98. fPro-Kerry third-party spots, n D 79; Kerry spots,



TABLE 7

Theme Consistency


Advertising strategya

Symbolic trappings 2% 4%Incumbency* 8% 23%Competency** 1% 5%

Charisma* 6% 34%Calling for changes* 2% 20%

Emphasize optimism* 0% 4%Traditional values 0% 0%Represent center 0% 0%

Consulting world leaders* 0% 9%Using endorsements* 7% 20%Accomplishments 2% 3%

Above trenches** 17% 9%Surrogates* 26% 65%Offensive position 2% 2%

Expert authority 0% 0%Attack opponent’s record* 90% 53%


Advertising strategyb

Symbolic trappings 7% 8%Incumbency* 13% 34%

Competency 3% 7%Charisma 0% 5%Calling for changes* 0% 24%

Emphasize optimism 0% 5%Traditional values 0% 0%Represent center 0% 0%

Consulting world leaders 0% 5%Using endorsements 20% 18%

Accomplishments 0% 0%Above trenches 17% 7%Surrogates* 20% 54%

Offensive position* 7% 0%Expert authority 0% 0%Attack opponent’s record* 87% 55%

(continued )

to emphasize incumbency, call for change, or utilize surrogates, whereas they were significantly

more likely to take an offensive position and attack the record of the opponent. Kerry spots,

on the other hand, were significantly more likely than pro-Kerry third-party advertisers to

use surrogates, call for change, and emphasize his charisma. Kerry was also more likely tofeature his experience negotiating with world leaders and his endorsements. Pro-Kerry third-

party advertisers were significantly more likely to attack the opponent’s record, doing so in

91% of spots.

Finally, our original intention was to examine differences between candidate characteristics

highlighted in third-party and candidate spots, but due to the dearth of positive third-party ads

there was too little with which to draw meaningful comparisons.


TABLE 7

(Continued )


Advertising strategyc

Symbolic trappings 0% 0%Incumbency** 6% 14%Competency** 0% 4%

Charisma* 9% 56%Calling for changes* 3% 16%

Emphasize optimism 0% 3%Traditional values 0% 0%Represent center 0% 0%

Consulting world leaders* 0% 12%Using endorsements* 3% 21%Accomplishments 3% 5%

Above trenches 17% 11%Surrogates* 28% 73%Offensive position** 0% 4%

Expert authority 0% 0%Attack opponent’s record* 91% 51%

aThird-party spots, n D 109; Bush and Kerry spots, n D 173. bPro-Bush third-party spots, n D 30; Bush spots,

n D 74. cPro-Kerry third-party spots, n D 79; Kerry spots, n D 99.*Chi-square indicates difference is significant at p � .05. **Chi-square indicates difference is significant at p � .10.

DISCUSSION

This study focused on the measurable content differences between third-party advertising and

candidate spots, seeking to understand if the BCRA helps realize the separation between

electioneering communication and issue advocacy. As with any study, one must be careful

to understand the limitations of the data; we collected only the ads from third-party advertisers

and major party candidates that were available. Future studies may include more spots as theybecome available. Our results are provocative.

That only 4% of candidate spots used the magic words suggests that the only content

mandated by the FEC to help voters distinguish between these ads is rendered virtually

inconsequential. Aside from the Stand By Your Ad endorsement candidates are now required

to include in their spots (“: : : I approved this message”), issue spots, by contrast, offer little tomake actual differences in sponsor salient to the receiver. To date, we have no reason to believe

that candidate endorsement or third-party sponsor tags make viewers aware of sponsorship.

Research of sponsor salience is warranted, as this might give additional reason to support efforts

like the Stand By Every Ad Act, a bill requiring all associations, corporations, third-parties,

and candidates alike to identify their messages as political advertisements (Price, 2010). Sucha development is particularly timely in light of the outcome of the aforementioned Supreme

Court ruling on the Citizens United case.

The finding that third-party spots in this election were far more often negative than were

candidate-sponsored spots is important for a number of reasons. First, it suggests that the

intended purpose of BCRA may have been undermined by the poor legal distinction between

electioneering and issue advocacy. Because of this lack of clarity, issue advocacy groups were


still allowed to both, in effect, electioneer and broadcast negative campaign messages. Second,

because of a lack of knowledge about sponsor salience, we don’t know if audiences drawa distinction between third-party negativity and the candidates. The latter point gives further

reason to study sponsor salience.

Most important, these findings, combined with the likely effects of the Supreme Court’s

Citizens United ruling, place more emphasis on the need for more conclusive research about

negative advertising. Negative advertising began to draw a lot of research attention followingthe publication of Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, and Valentino’s (1994) findings that showed

negative advertising possessing a “demobilizing” effect—depressing voter turnout. Since then,

Johnson-Cartee and Copeland (1997) described negative advertising as “one of the most widely

misunderstood concepts” in political communication (p. 19). As more research is conducted, the

complexity of the matter has become clearer. Greer (2006) published an exhaustive analysis

of nearly every well-known assumption held about negative advertising and its oft-believedharmful effects. He concluded that

attack advertising can enrich the information environment available to citizens. If we want voters

to have access to more discussion about important issues presented with specificity and evidence

to support candidates’ appeals, then negative information has clear advantages over positive infor-

mation. (p. 136)

Our own findings appear to lend support to the enrichment claim, inasmuch as third-party spots

addressed more issues than the candidate-sponsored ads. Pinkleton, Um, and Austin (2002)

questioned whether negative political spots have any effect on voter apathy at all while othershave evidenced positive effects. Mark (2006) noted that the most contentious and negative

campaigns have been shown to bring the most voters to the polls. Wattenberg and Brians

(1999) showed that in 1992 negative advertisements were associated with higher voter turnout.

Johnson-Cartee and Copeland (1991) demonstrated that negative ads are more memorable.

Lau, Sigelman, and Rovner (2007) found further evidence that negative messages stand out

better and function better as a motivator than positive information. They also found that therewas no evidence in their meta-analysis for a voter depression effect. Rivera (2009) found that

negative ads led voters to be more interested in the Mexican Presidential election, to be better

informed about the candidates, and more knowledgeable about politics. Brians and Wattenberg

(1996) found negative advertising consumption associated with greater issue knowledge and a

greater likelihood to make “issue based candidate evaluations” during campaigns (p. 185). Suchfindings cause us to question whether the intent of the BCRA was misguided. These findings

also help contextualize our findings that the attack purposes most often used are the attack

on issue stands and consistency: issue-oriented content. Few would question the legitimacy of

such candidate criticism. Characterizing it as “negative” misses the clear value of the content.

Consistent with previous research, such content appears to provide valuable issue informationthat may aid receivers in formulating more informed decisions about candidates.

The matters of negativity and sponsor salience are of further importance when one considers

the possibility of cover provided by the third parties. It has been suggested that third-party

advertisers may aid candidates by insulating them from the criticism or backlash resultant of

negative spots. Our results suggest that this may be occurring; the vast majority of third-party

spots are negative. All attack devices were found to be relatively more prevalent throughout the


body of third-party spots while also employing humor/ridicule and name calling significantly

more often than the candidates. But cover isn’t necessarily provided for candidates if receiversdon’t make the distinction between the third-party sponsor and the candidates supposedly aided

by the spot. Simunich (2005) failed to find evidence supporting the presence of this effect, but

these results were far from conclusive. There is more room here for exploration.

A surprising finding, consistent with Kaid and Dimitrova (2005), was that third-party

advertisers were significantly less likely to make explicit issue references. They are also likelyto be more image oriented than the ads of the candidates. This finding is counterintuitive

considering third-party advertisers are allowed to run ads only during the election cycle because

of their supposed role as nonpartisan groups with issue concerns. It is also cause for concern, as

it suggests that the negative content of third-party ads is more of the variety to which audiences

have the most negative reaction (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 1991).

Regarding consistency, the mandated lack of coordination between candidate campaigns andthird-party advertisers introduces to the campaign the risk of pulling a campaign off message

or reshaping the agenda. Overall, we found little differences of consequence in image and issue

focus or appeal type between advertisers; they were consistent. Comparing pro-Bush third-party

spots with Bush spots with respect to issues, we find that third parties may have reinforced

campaign messages by not producing messages addressing widely varying issues. Pro-Bushthird-party advertisers covered 7 issue categories, whereas pro-Kerry third-party advertisers

covered 14. That Republicans relied less upon third-party advertisers as part of their strategy

may help explain why both fewer third-party spots were produced and fewer issues were

covered. Although pro-Bush third-party advertisers prioritized Bush’s top issue (terrorism),

pro-Kerry third-party advertisers prioritized terrorism, and Kerry had most heavily emphasizedunemployment and jobs in his spots (though terrorism was a close second).

Looking closely at style and theme, this study suggests little consistency. Third-party

advertisers and candidates varied in their use of every available spot technique. Because third

parties could not explicitly support a candidate, it follows that third-party advertisers would

not use documentary, introspection, and issue statements; thus we found significant differences

in the employment of these formats. Considering the overwhelming negativity of third-partyadvertisers, it is little surprise to learn that their heavy reliance upon the opposition-focused

format and their use of the strategy focused on attacking the opponent’s record. This matter of

disparity between candidate message and third-party message may be something that changed

with the 2008 election and changes further in 2012. Although there is be no legal way to

coordinate messages, there were overtures in 2008 to avoid fragmenting candidate messagesby contributing directly to the candidate’s campaign as opposed to third parties (Sargent, 2008,

para. 1). It may also be worth studying the relationship between message consistency between

candidates and third-party advertising, as well as voter perceptions of consistency. Perhaps

the value of coordinated and consistent messages may function to limit the feared torrent of

corporate electioneering spots.

Implications

There are three general implications of our findings. The first regards advertisement negativity.

More research about the effects of political advertising negativity has to be conducted be-

fore scholars or campaign practitioners operate with any certainty about its effects, negative


or otherwise. Ansolabehere et al. (1994) started the discussion about negative advertising’s

negative effects with their findings, and they appear to have reinforced popular assumptionsabout negative advertising’s deleterious effects. Still, there is no consensus. Regardless of a

lack of consensus, elements of BCRA may have been propelled through Congress by popular

inaccurate assumptions about negative advertising’s harms. Although there are defenders of

negative spots, it is provocative to learn that so-called issue advertising was more image

oriented than candidate-sponsored ads. Although attack ads may be defended as informationbased and information rich, this facet of their content seems to challenge the argument that

these ads are harmless or positive. We believe more research should be focused on exploring

the nature of image-oriented attack spots to see if they are constructive. Future research might

also isolate the effects of different subtypes of ads to understand if both positive and negative

effects of negative ads result from different varieties of negative spots. Insulation from negative

advertising backlash is also a phenomenon that warrants further study. If third parties arerunning relatively more negative spots with the desired effect of protecting the preferred

candidate, the efficacy of the tactic should be established and understood so that scholars

aren’t left speculating.

The latter point relates to the second implication of this study. For three reasons, the role

of sponsor salience deserves to be further understood. First, whether third parties actually givecover to candidates with their negative ads is dependent upon whether viewers are actually

aware that third-party ads weren’t produced by the candidates. Second, requiring third-party

advertisers to “stand by their ads” also presumes that including the information increases

the salience of the advertisement’s producer in the mind of the receiver. Thus, whether ads

have the effect of making receivers aware of their producer becomes an important researchquestion. Third, questions about campaign message consistency could be addressed by future

producer salience research. Specifically, though third parties may produce ads with messages

that vary from the main focus of their preferred candidates, producer salience may enable

receivers to separate superfluous third-party messages from candidate messages, thus rendering

their candidate messages more coherent despite the competition of messages from third party

entities. We also point out that the results of this study make clear that the magic words

prohibition has little effect considering, so few candidate-sponsored ads actually use them.

Regardless, the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision effectively ends this prohibition.

Third, this study started with a question about message consistency. Because candidates

are barred from coordinating their messages with third parties, we sought to examine to what

extent candidate spots differed from third-party ads. We found that the two differ on a numberof measures. The next question is whether these differences matter in any substantive way.

Do candidate messages, as a result of competing third-party messages, become muddled and

less coherent? It seems likely that third parties run ads to help preferred candidates. Findings

suggesting negative effects of message inconsistency may cause campaign practitioners to

reconsider their advertising strategies. We are also left wondering if candidate-sponsored andthird-party-sponsored spots have a reinforcing effect when they communicate similar messages.

Perhaps messages reinforced by third parties render similar candidate messages more credible.

How third-party and candidate-sponsored ads differ is becoming more clear. As third parties

become larger players in political advertising campaigns, the effects of their ads on the political

process need to be better understood. More in-depth research is needed to understand the

effects of negativity, salience, and message consistency. It might also be valuable to understand


ad types from a phenomenological standpoint in order to ensure that negative advertising

effects studies are predicated on typologies that reflect how receivers actually make sense ofthe spots.

REFERENCES

An, S., Jin, H. S., & Pfau, M. (2006). The effects of issue advocacy advertising on voter’s candidate issue knowledge

and turnout. Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 83(1), 7–24.

Annenberg Public Policy Center. (2004). Issue advertising in the 1999–2000 election cycle. Retrieved from http://www.

annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/issuads/reports_previous.htm

Ansolabehere, S. Iyengar, S., Simon, A., & Valentino, N. (1994). Does attack advertising demobilize the electorate?

American Political Science Review, 88, 829–838.

Brians, C., & Wattenberg, M. (1996). Campaign issue knowledge and salience: Comparing reception from TV

commercials, TV news, and newspapers. American Journal of Political Science, 40, 172–193.

Cheng, H., & Riffe, D. (2008). Attention, perception, and perceived effects: Negative political advertising in a

battleground state of the 2004 presidential election. Mass Communication & Society, 11, 177–196.

Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission. (2010). 555 U.S. 08-205.

Devlin, P. L. (2005). Contrasts in presidential campaign commercials in 2004. American Behavioral Scientist, 49,

279–313.

Dreyfuss, R. (1998, January/February). Harder than soft money. The American Prospect, 36, 30–37.

Electioneering Communication. (2010). Federal Election Commission. Retrieved April 19, 2011, from http://www.fec.

gov/pages/brochures/electioneering.shtml

Engström, R. N., & Kenny, C. (2002). The effects of independent expenditures in senate elections. Political Research

Quarterly, 55, 885–905.

Falk, E. (2004). BCRA’s effect on candidate-centered and legislation-centered advertising. Political Communication

Report, 14. Retrieved from http://www.ou.edu/policom/1402_2004_spring/falk.htm

Garramone, G. (1985). The effects of negative political advertising: The roles of sponsor and rebuttal. Journal of

Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 29, 147–159.

Garramone, G., & Smith, G. (1984). Reactions to political advertising: Clarifying Sponsor Effects, 61, 771–775.

Greenblatt, A. (1998, February 14). Issue ads often more burden than blessing for candidates. Congressional Quarterly

Weekly. Retrieved from http://library.cqpress.com/

Greer, J. (2006). In defense of negativity: Attack ads in presidential campaigns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gronbeck, B. E. (1994). Negative political ads and American self images. In A. H. Miller & B. E. Gronbeck (Eds.),

Presidential campaigns and American self images (pp. 60–88). Boulder, CO: Westview.

Johnson-Cartee, K., & Copeland, G. (1991). Negative political advertising: Coming of age. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Johnson-Cartee, K., & Copeland, G. (1997). Manipulation of the American voters: Political campaign commercials.

Westport, CT: Praeger.

Kaid, L. L., & Boydston, J. (1987). An experimental study of the effectiveness of negative political advertisements.

Communication Quarterly, 35, 193–201.

Kaid, L. L., Chanslor, M., & Hovind, M. (1992). The influence of program and commercial type on political advertising

effectiveness. Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 36, 303–321.

Kaid, L. L., & Davidson, D. K. (1986). Elements of videostyle: A preliminary examination of candidate presentation

through televised advertising. In L. L. Kaid, D. D. Nimmo, & R. K. Sanders (Eds.), New perspectives on political

advertising (pp. 184–209). Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

Kaid, L. L., & Dimitrova, D. (2005). The television advertising battleground in the 2004 presidential election.

Journalism Studies, 6, 165–175.

Kaid, L. L., & Johnston, A. (2001). Videostyle in presidential campaigns: Style and content of televised political

advertising. Westport, CT: Praeger/Greenwood.

Kaid, L. L., & Tedesco, J. C. (1999). Presidential candidate presentation: Videostyle in the 1996 Presidential spots.

In L. L. Kaid & D. G. Bystrom (Eds.), The electronic election: Perspectives on the 1996 campaign communication

(pp. 209–221). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Krasno, J. (2000, October 1). What’s a campaign ad?: Judges should take a new look. Washington Post, p. B7.


Lau, R., Sigelman, L., & Rovner, I. (2007). The effects of negative political campaigns: A meta-analytic reassessment.

Journal of Politics, 69, 1176–1209.

MacPherson, M. (1980, August 10). The new right brigade: John Terry Dolan’s NCPAC targets liberals and the Federal

Election Commission. Washington Post, p. F1.

Magleby, D. B., & Holt, M. (1999, May). The long shadow of soft money and issue advocacy ads. Campaigns and

Elections, pp. 22–27.

Mark, D. (2006). Going dirty: The art of negative campaigning. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Numbers. (2004, November 15). Time, p. 20.

Patterson, T. E., & McClure, R. D. (1976). The unseeing eye: The myth of television power in national elections. New

York: Putnam.

Pfau, M., Holbert, R. L., Szabo, E. A., & Kaminski, K. (2002). Issue-advocacy versus candidate advertising: Effects

on candidate preferences and democratic process. Journal of Communication, 52, 301–315.

Pfau, M., Park, D., Holbert, R. L., & Cho, J. (2001). The effects of party- and PAC-sponsored issue advertising and

the potential of inoculation to combat its impact on the democratic process. American Behavioral Scientist, 44,

2379–2397.

Pinkleton, B., Um, N., & Austin, E. (2002). An exploration of the effects of negative political advertising on political

decision making. Journal of Advertising, 31(1), 13–25.

Price, D. (2010, February 4). Price, Castle to Introduce ‘Stand By Every Ad’ Act in Response to Supreme Court

Decision [Press release]. Retrieved from http://price.house.gov/list/press/nc04_price/020410.shtml

Reaction: Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Ruling. (2010, January 21). The Seattle Times. Retrieved from http://

seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/politics/2010852512_apussupremecourtcampaignfinancereaction.html

Rivera, G. (2009, April). Political knowledge and campaign interest: the role of campaign advertising in the 2006

Mexico presidential election. Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

Sargent, G. (2008, June 20). Exclusive: MoveOn to close its 527 in response to Obama candidacy. Retrieved from

http://tpmelectioncentral.talkingpointsmemo.com

Simunich, B. (2005). Investigating the effects of sponsorship of negative political advertisements on source credibility

and candidate ratings. Paper presented at the International Communication Association, New York, NY.

Stanger, J., & Rivlin, D. (1998). Issue advocacy during the 1997–1998 election cycle. Retrieved from http://www.appc

penn.org/issueads/REPORT.HTM

Trent, J. S., & Friedenberg, R. V. (1991). Political campaign communication: Principles and practices. New York:

Praeger.

United States: The rise and rise of 527. (2004, September 4). The Economist, p. 49.

Wattenberg, M., & Brians, C. (1999). Negative campaign advertising: Demobilizer or mobilizer? The American Political

Science Review, 93, 891–899.

Copyright of Atlantic Journal of Communication is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may

not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written

permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

Third-Party “Hatchet” Ads: An Exploratory Content Study Comparing Third-Party and Candidate...

Documents

Transcript of Third-Party “Hatchet” Ads: An Exploratory Content Study Comparing Third-Party and Candidate...