TheEuropeanUnion:

ADemocraticallyDeficientSupranationalBody?

Name:HansvanDeursen,UCU

StudentNumber:3984109

Tutor:RosemaryOrr

ThesisSupervisor:Dr.FrancescoMaiolo,UCU

SecondReader:External

Date:20/08/2016

CourseCode:UCSSCRES32

ECTS:15

WordCount:13212

2

Acknowledgments

TherehavebeenmanytimesthatIgaveup,andwithoutthehelpofthosearoundme,I

wouldnothavebeenabletopickmyselfupandgetthisthesisdone.Therearetherefore

somepeopleIhavetomention,aswithoutthem,therewouldnothavebeenathesisto

readinthefirstplace.Firstandforemost,LieslHildaAliceZiegler.Withoutyourincessant

trust,emotionalsupport,andlove,IdonotknowwhereIwouldhavefoundtheinspiration

tokeeponwriting.Secondly,RosemaryOrr.Infaceofalltheinstitutionalchallenges,you

havebeenabletoguidemethroughtotheend.

Thankyouboth.

3

ListofAbbreviations

- CAP:CommonAgriculturalPolicy

- CFSP:CommonForeignandSecurityPolicy

- CoE:CouncilofEurope

- CT:ConstitutionalTreaty

- EC:EuropeanCouncil

- ECB:EuropeanCentralBank

- ECHR:EuropeanCourtonHumanRights

- ECJ:EuropeanCourtofJustice

- ECSC:EuropeanCoalandStealCommunity

- EDC:EuropeanDefenceCommunity

- EEC:EuropeanEconomicCommunity

- EMU:EuropeanMonetaryUnion

- EP:EuropeanParliament

- EPC:EuropeanPoliticalCommunity

- EU:EuropeanUnion

- IGC:IntergovernmentalConference

- JHA:JusticeandHomeAffairs

- MP:MemberofParliament

- QMV:QualifiedMajorityVoting

- SEA:SingleEuropeanAct

- SWIFT:SocietyforWorldwideInterbankFinancialTelecommunication

- TEU:TreatyonEuropeanUnion

- TFEU:TreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion

- US:UnitedStatesofAmerica

- WEU:WestEuropeanUnion

4

Introduction

SincetheestablishmentoftheEuropeanUnionin1993andtheintroductionofthe

Euroin2002,theEuropeancountrieshavebeeninterconnectedonahithertounprecedented

level.Noothergroupofcountries isas interdependentasthecountriesthatmakeupthe

European Union today: national borders have all but disappeared, a joint European

democracyhasbeenestablished,andtherehasevenbeenanattemptatdraftingaEuropean

constitution– eventually culminating in the2007Treatyof Lisbon. Indoing so, individual

member states have increasingly transferred political and economic powers to the

supranational European Union, which has now assumed many functions that we have

traditionallyattributedtoademocraticnation-state.Thisprocessisadirectconsequenceof

the member states’ efforts since the Schuman declaration of 1950 that proposed the

EuropeanCoalandSteelCommunitytofurtherEuropeanintegration.

These66yearsofEuropeanintegrationhavebeenmarked,withitsupsanddowns,by

anunparalleleddegreeofeconomicprosperityformostWesternEuropeans.Fromtoday’s

point of view, it has therefore become difficult to imagine the post Second World War

rationaleforincreasedEuropeancooperation(Borrogan2).Thecombineddevastationofthe

FirstandSecondWorldWarhadleftEurope“inshambles”(Frieden259).Theoncedominant

Europeancontinenthadbeenreducedtoashadeofwhatithadbeen,withGDPpercapita

lessthan75%of1939levelsamongthecontinentalallies–suchasFranceandtheUnited

Kingdom (Ibid 261). The aftermath of the Second World War made European leaders

thereforeunderstandablydetermined toavoid suchdestruction in future. In sodoing the

preventionofwarbecamethedrivingforceforEuropeanintegration,as“warbetweenFrance

andGermany[hadtobecome]notmerelyunthinkable,butmateriallyimpossible”(Appendix

C). Today, however, this unity has become a given, and the primary goal of European

integration:toavoidfuturewars,afadingmemory.Thisisevidencedbyeuroscepticssuchas

GeertWilders,whoemphasisethatthefearofwarisa“lietheelitestellthepopulation”to

frightenthemintofurtherEuropeanintegration(PartyforFreedom10).1Nonetheless,the

fearofanotherwarandtheneedforeconomicrecoverywerethedrivingforcesforEuropean

1Originaltext:“Anderskrijgenweoorlog–liegendeelites”

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integration,anditcanbearguedthatinthispursuit,Europehasbeensuccessful(Borrogan

2).

Regardless,thedecadesfollowingtheSchumandeclarationwitnessedacontinuous

processofenlargementandincreasingcooperation.Fromsixmembersin1951theEuropean

Uniontodayhasexpandedtoastaggering28memberstates.AlthoughtheEuropeanproject

has largelybeensuccessful,as ithashelpedcreateeconomicprosperityandpeace, ithas

been far from unproblematic. Especially in recent years the European Union has been

increasinglycriticisedonseveralfronts:thefreedomofmovement,itsinefficienttreatment

of the euro crisis, the apparent choice of technocracy over democracy, and its lack of

solidarityinfaceoftherefugeecrisis(Ibid).Moregenerally,thereisanoveralldiscontentwith

thecurrentconfigurationoftheEuropeanUnionanditslackoflegitimacy,asGuyVerhofstadt

notedinhisConclusionsoftheECmeetingfollowingtheBrexit(EuropeanParliament).This

trendbecamepainfullyclearforthefirsttimein2005,withtherejectioninFranceandthe

Netherlandsoftheconstitutional treaty, itgainedmomentumwiththefinancialcrisisand

subsequenteurocrisis,andhascometoanewheadearlierthisyearwiththeso-calledBrexit.

Althoughovertimetheproblemshavevaried,theystemfromanunderlyingcause:thenature

oftheintegrationprocess.WhatistheEuropeanUnionreally:asupranationalbodyorgroup

ofsovereignstatesthatworkcloselytogether?Theanswertothatisconvoluted,andopinions

differ,as“thereisnouniversalagreementaboutwhattheEuropeanUnionisoroughttobe,

and[there]neverhasbeen”(Peterson17).IfthereisnoconsensusonwhattheEuropean

Unionisinitsessence,therewillalwaysbeconflictonhowtheUnionissupposedtodealwith

crisesandevolveingeneral.

Oneareainwhichthisissueisparticularlyapparent,istheattempttodemocratisethe

EuropeanUnion.Sincethe1980sscholarshavearguedthattheEuropeanUnionsuffersfrom

a“democraticdeficit”(Hix,ThePoliticalSystem155).Althoughthereisnostraightforward

definitionofthisterm,itsignifiesthattheamountofpowerstransferredtothesupranational

Union,mostnotablywiththeMaastrichttreatyof1993,hasnotbeenmatchedbyanincrease

initsdemocraticlegitimacy–oritisatleastnotperceivedassuch(Ibid68).Consequently,

theaverageEuropeancitizen feelsdisconnected frompolicymakingon the supranational

level. This despite attempts, such as the Lisbon Treaty, to create amore democratic and

transparentUnion.ThecurrentconfigurationoftheEuropeanUnionhasthusbeencalledinto

question, along with the nature of its democracy. This raises the question whether a

6

supranationalbodysuchastheEuropeanUnioncanevenbedemocratic,theanswertowhich

hingesonouraprioriconceptionsofwhattheEuropeanUnionisinitsessence.Iwilltherefore

proceed in this thesis toanswer thequestion: towhatextent can theEuropeanUnionbe

consideredasupranationalpoliticalbodywithademocraticdeficit?

ToanswerthisquestionthisthesiswillfirstbrieflygooverthereasonsforEuropean

integration and how it has evolved over the years; subsequently, the functioning of the

EuropeanUnionasweknowittodaywillbediscussedthroughananalysisoffiveofitsmajor

institutions: the European Parliament (EP), the European Council (EC), the Council, the

Commission,andtheEuropeanCourtofJustice(ECJ);thisisfollowedbyanexaminationof

theEuropeanUniontodeterminewhetheritisasupranationalbodyoratightcooperation

ofsovereignstates;lastly,thedemocracy,orlackthereof,willbeconsidered.Inordertoaid

me in this endeavour Iwill rely on secondary sources andmake use of the fundamental

treatiesoftheEuropeanUnion:theTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion(TFEU)

andtheTreatyonEuropeanUnion(TEU).

The last few months have shown, in light of the Brexit, that this topic is more

significantthaneverbefore.TheEuropeanUnionisfacedwithcrisesleft,right,andcentre,

anditdoesnotseemtohaveanadequateresponse.Questionsontheessentialnatureofthe

EuropeanUnionandtheextenttowhichitrepresentsitscitizens,arethereforeparamount.

WithoutathoroughunderstandingofthesefundamentaltenetsoftheEuropeanUnion,we

cannotproceedtoimproveit.AlthoughthisismostcertainlynotthefirstcrisistheEuropean

projecthasfaced,itisundoubtedlyoneofthemostfundamentalones.InthewordsofGuy

Verhofstadt:“EithertheUnionwillchange(…)oritwilldie”(EuropeanParliament).Whatis

lefttobedone,isdeterminehowwearetochangeit.

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1. TheHistoryofEuropeanIntegration

InordertodefinethenatureoftheEuropeanUniontodayandanalyseitsdemocratic

deficit, it is importanttoknowhowandwhytheEUgottowhere it isnow,andwhatthe

drivingforcesforintegrationwere.Althoughwehaveseenageneralincreaseinthedegree

ofcooperationbetweenthevariousmemberstatesovertheyears,thecompetingideasthat

give shape to this process have remained similar: supranationalism versus

intergovernmentalism(Dehousse22).Moreover,eachmemberstate,beingsovereign,hasto

haveasayinthisprocess,andaseachofthenow28membershasadifferentviewonthe

“pace and scope” of European integration, every step has involved difficult negotiations

(Lelieveldt 23). Consequently, themanner inwhich the EU evolved over the years, is the

productofacarefulbalancingactbetweenthismultitudeofcompetingideasthatarestill

relevanttoday.UnderstandingthepathofEuropeanintegrationisthususefulinanyattempt

atanalysingtheproblemsitfacestoday.

This chapterwill analyse the reasons for (increased) European integrationand the

treatiesthatformalisedit.

FromWartoCooperation

The Europe that we know today is most assuredly a direct consequence of the

devastatingeffectsof theSecondWorldWar,asoutlinedabove,but the ideaofaunified

Europewasnotnewatthetime.IntheinterwaryearstheadvocatesofamoreunifiedEurope

were“legion,”andseveralattemptsatincreasedcooperationweremade,mostnotablywith

thePan-EuropeanUnionin1923–amovementthatstillexiststoday(Urwin5).ThisUnion,

which includedmany influential figuressuchasKonradAdenauerandGeorgesPompidou,

however,failedtoachieveanypracticalresults,whichisrepresentativeoftheotherattempts

atthetimeaswell:therewastalkbutlittleeffectiveaction.Moreover,thepersistingeffects

of the economic crisis, the rise of fascism, and the resulting focus on national defence,

ensuredthatEuropeanintegrationwasnevera“serioustopicofdiscussion”formost(Ibid7).

Nonetheless,theideapersisted,andtheaftermathoftheSecondWorldWarproved

“fertileground” for the ideaofEuropean integration tobecomereality (Lelieveldt4).The

reasonforthis isthreefold.Firstly,theSecondWorldWarhad instilledadetermination in

European leaders that, “war may never break out again between the European people”

8

(Konrad Adenauer Foundation 14). Although this provided an important impetus, and

definitelycreatedmuchgoodwillamongtheEuropean leaders for thenotionofEuropean

integration,economicrecoverywasaseconddrivingforceforincreasedcooperation.Atthe

time,theEuropeaneconomieswereindirestraits,andinfaceofthenewSovietthreat,a

strongEurope,includingGermany,becameimperative,asaweakEuropecouldbecomeeasy

preytoSovietambitions.Thirdly,therealityofthepost-warworldwasthateachindividual

Europeancountrywasbutamiddlingpoweratbest.Topreserveitsglobalcompetitiveness,

theEuropeancountrieshadtocooperate(Dinan,EverCloserUnion2).Or,asWimKok,former

Dutchprimeminister,described it: “Europeancountriesbetterhang togetheror theywill

hang separately” (17). It was under these circumstances that European leaders, such as

WinstonChurchill,calledfora“UnitedStatesofEurope”(Zurich).

Thisconsensusatthetime,thatEuropeancooperationwasthesolewayforward,may

suggest in retrospect that the subsequent treaties of Paris in 1951 and Rome in 1957,

establishingtheECSCandEECrespectively,weremerelogicaloutcomesofasetofvariables.

However,nothingcouldbefurtherfromthetruth.Theinternationalpoliticallandscapemay

have been conducive of change, but this change still required significant effort. The first

decadeoftheEuropeanprojectwasthereforecharacterisedbya“periodoftrialanderror”

eventuallyresultingintheECSCandEEC(Dehousse22).

TheFoundingDecade(1948-1958)

The Congress of Europe inMay 1948 is a “landmark” in the history of European

integration aswe know it today, and is alsowhere it finds its origins (Walton 738; Ash).

Although few practicalmatterswere agreed to at this conference, it served to show the

attendants’commitmenttoaunifiedEurope,andwasthustobecometheimpetusforthe

eventualUnion tocome.However,alreadyat this conference, the first fissures started to

appear between those countries who desired a constitutional federation and those who

wantedanintergovernmentalunion,whichhascharacterisedtheintegrationprocesssince.

Nevertheless,what followedwasa seriesof treaties, agreements, andplansproposingor

creatinginstitutionthatwouldgovernatthesupranationallevel(AppendixA).

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ThefirstpracticalattemptsatunifyingEuropeweretheestablishmentoftheOEEC,

whichpromotedfreetradeandregulatedthereconstructionofEurope,andtheCoE,2which

wascreatedtopromotedemocraticvaluesacrossEurope.Althoughbothorganisationswere

inclusive,with17and10membersrespectively,beingintergovernmentalistbodies,neither

inspiredunity.EspeciallybecausetheformerwascreatedattheUS’insistence,andthelatter

“burdened by unanimity” (Phinnemore 14; Rittberger 687).Moreover, the CoEmembers

couldbe“exemptedfromdecisions[thatwere]founddifficult”(Ibid).Understandably,those

whohadadvocatedaconstitutionalapproachweredisappointedbythis.Asaconsequence,

the Shuman declaration followed short after. In this declaration Schuman proposed that

France,Germany,andanyotherwillingnation(s)would“pool”theircoalandsteelproduction

(AppendixB).The reason for thiswas that coalandsteelare important rawmaterials for

wagingwar,whichhadservedGermanywell inthepast,poolingthemwouldthusdiffuse

such tensions andprovide security (Rittberger 687). The independent, supranationalHigh

Authority would preside over this community, aided by the Council of Ministers. The

independenceofthesebodieswouldbesafeguardedbyaCourtandaCommonAssembly.

Interestingly,thisinstitutionalset-upstillpersistsafterafashionintheEUtoday,whichisa

testament to its durability (Ibid 674). Eventuallywhat is now known as ‘the Six’: France,

Germany,Italy,andtheBenelux,joinedthiscommunitybysigningtheTreatyofParisin1951.

Thesuccessofthisinitialforayintosectorialsupranationalismcoupledwithaheating

upof theColdWarstartedto“accelerate”the integrationprocesswiththeagreementto

create a European army under the EDC (Dehousse 23). Before this treaty could even be

ratified,aplanforapoliticalcommunitygoverningforeignpolicy,theEPC,wasalsoproposed,

whichwouldcomplementtheaforementioneddefencecommunity.Bothinstitutionswould

bemodelledafter theECSC.Notevenadecadehadpassedsince theendof thewarand

already European countrieswerewilling to transfer their sovereignty in twomajor policy

areas (Lelieveldt 11).However, inwhatwas to become the first setback in thehistory of

European integration, the French national assembly did not ratify the EDC treaty, thus

scrappingbothproposed institutions (Moravcsik,TheChoice forEuropep.86).Despite,or

perhapsbecauseof,thisinitialfailureEuropeanpoliticiansquicklyrallied.Barelyayearafter

rejectionoftheEDCandEPCtheSixcametogetherinMessinaanddecidedthataEuropean

2NottoconfusewiththeEuropeanCouncilorCouncilofMinisters

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unity“shouldbefirstofallachievedintheeconomicsphere”(MessinaDeclaration).Tothat

endtheTreatyofRomewasdraftedandagreedtoin1957.Thistreatycreatedacustomunion

calledtheEECandanucleardevelopmentcommunitycalledEuratomtofacilitateunityon

economicterms.TheEECeventuallybecametheframeworkforEuropeanintegration,and

shaped Europe aswe know it today, as it set out to establish freemovements of goods,

services,persons,andcapitalamongtheSix(Lelieveldt11).Furthermore,commonpolicies

wouldbepursued inareassuchas transport,commerce,andagriculture (Gilbert53).The

institutionalframeworkforthesenewlyformedsupranationalcommunitieswerelargelythe

same as those in the ECSC. Themost significant alteration, however, was that the EEC’s

equivalentoftheHighAuthority,theCommission,was limitedintheextentof itspowers.

Althoughitcouldstillmakelegislativeproposals,thesehadtobeapprovedbythecouncilof

ministers,amethodwestillseetoday(Lelieveldt11).

Withthefoundingdecadedrawingtoaclosethreesupranationalcommunitieshad

beenestablished:theECSC,theEEC,andEuratom.Despitethisapparentproductivity, the

agreementswere the subjectofmuch contestation. The various interestsof the Sixwere

difficulttoalign,andsovereigntywasnotaneasythingtorelinquish,asevidencedbythe

short-livedEDC,whichwouldalsobecomeproblematicinlateryears.Thefoundingcountries

hadgonefromanintergovernmentalistattitudetoaconstitutionalone,butwhenbothfailed,

theysettledforafunctionalistapproach:gradualintegrationthroughcooperationinspecified

policyareas(Dehousse23).Nonetheless,perhapsthemostnotableachievementofthisera

was symbolic, as the “dream” of European integration had become a reality (Konrad

AdenauerFoundation12).

ConsolidatingtheCommunity

ThedecadethatfollowedtheTreatyofRomewasmostlycharacterisedby internal

disagreements and a consolidation of the community model created in the 50s. This is

perhapsnotentirelysurprising,asthegoalsoftheEECwereambitious,thatwhichhadbeen

agreeduponrequiredtimetotakeeffect,andthemembersofthecommunityhaddiverging

interpretationsonEurope’sfuture(Phinnemore16).

ThedisagreementsbetweentheSixinthedecadeaftertheestablishmentoftheEEC

concernedthenatureofEuropeanintegration,andhasshapeditsince.TheFrenchpresident,

DeGaulle,feared“encroachmentsonFrenchsovereignty”whereasothermemberswanted

11

tointensifyEuropeancooperation(Dehousse24).However,theEEC’sinstitutionshadbeen

created with great care, as the subsequent crises would point out, with the Council of

MinistersastheintergovernmentalistcheckonthesupranationalCommission.Attemptsto

alterthatdynamicwouldthereforenotcometofruition.TheFouchetplanof1961isonesuch

attempt,commissionedbydeGaulleitadvocatedamoreintergovernmentalistapproachto

Europeanunion,butfailedduetofearsofFrenchhegemonyamongtheBeneluxcountries

(Gilbert 69). Similarly, efforts by Commission president Hallstein in 1964, to endow the

GeneralAssemblyandCommissionwithitsownbudgetarypowers,enrageddeGaulle,asit

infringedonFrenchsovereignty(Ibid80-1).Theupsetwassogreat,thatitledtothe“empty

chair crisis” with the French delegation refusing to attend council meetings for nearly 6

months (CVCE “TheEmptyChairCrisis”). This crisis came toa closewith the Luxembourg

Compromise, allowing countries in the Council a veto power even though officially the

decision-makingprocesswasbyQMV(Ibid).Thismadeunanimityvotingbydefault,ifnotby

treaty,thedominantforceintheCouncil,and,insodoing,reassertedintergovernmentalist

controloversupranationalistproceedings(Urwin136).

Although this may have been a victory for France and intergovernmentalism, a

concurrent,andunexpected,developmentwastakingplaceintheECJthatshowsanopposing

trend.ChargedwithsafeguardingtheTreatyofRome,theECJhassinceitsinceptionasserted

much control over the direction of the integration process by interpreting this treaty

constitutionallyratherthan“employing[a]traditionalinternationallawmethodology”(Stein

1). In doing so, the ECJ became a driving force for federalism rather than

intergovernmentalism(MaduroandAzoulai70).Thisbecamemostevidentintwolandmark

casesestablishingdirecteffectin1963,allowingindividualsto“invoke”Europeanlegislation

over the head of national jurisprudence, and primacy in 1964, which signifies thatwhen

nationallawconflictswithEUlawthelatterprevails(Lelieveldt12).Thismovecompensated

for the Luxembourg compromise by reaffirming the importance of supranationalism.

Interestingly,therehavebeenonly“smallpocketsofresistance”againstit,despitethefact

thatitclearlyinfringesonnationalsovereignty(Weiler,“AQuietRevolution”524).

TheLuxembourgcompromiseandthetwoECJrulingsmayhavebeen“paradoxical”,

but they strengthened the EEC’s institutional framework, as both supranationalist and

intergovernmentalist views on European union became entrenched in it (Dehousse 25).

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Despitedifficulties,thisprovedadefiningmomentforEuropeanintegrationastheTreatyof

Romewasgivenpracticalshape.

TowardsMaastrichtandLisbon

Althoughasignificantamountoftimeseparatesthecompletionofthecustomunion

in1968and theMaastricht treaty in1993,Maastrichtwouldbecome the firstbig change

since.AftertheconsolidationoftheEEC,inspiteofhighhopesthatDeGaulleleavingoffice

wouldopenupnewvistas for integration,aperiodof “eurosclerosis”began tobogdown

Europeanintegration(Dinan,EverCloserUnion56-9;Dinan,OriginsandEvolution170).This

optimism did appear, at first, to be correct,with longstanding disputes, such as the CAP

funding and increased powers for the Assembly, being resolved. Additionally, the EEC

successfully negotiated trade agreements, proposed a common monetary system, and

formalised themeetings of the heads of state in the EC – still an important European

institution today (Dinan, Ever Closer Union 70; Dinan, Origins and Evolution 170).

Nonetheless,unanimityvotinginthecouncil,whichbecamepracticeaftertheLuxembourg

compromise, three successive enlargements, and a weak commission complicated the

decision-makingprocess.Toaddtothat,theeconomicboomthathadcharacterisedpost-war

EuropecametoanendwiththeonsetoftheFirstOilcrisis,andwithit,thenationalfocus

shifted to thedomestic rather than the supranational (Dinan, EverCloserUnion70). This

became evident from the advent of leaders sceptical of European integration, such as

MitterandandThatcher,whichtarnishedcommunitysolidarity(Wood49).Inlightofallthis,

pundits feared for a disintegration of the EEC. A sentiment thatwas exacerbated by the

cancellationofthe25thanniversaryoftheTreatyofRome,towhichthepresidentoftheEP,

PietDankert,tellinglyremarkedthattheCommunitywaslike“afeeblecardiacpatientwhose

condition issopoorthathecannotevenbedisturbedbyabirthdayparty”(Holman2). In

otherwords,itwascleartoEuropeanleadersthatintheearly80stheEuropeanprojectwas

indireneedofinstitutionalreformandanewimpetus.

ThedefiningmomentforthisbecametheECmeetingatFontaineblueinJune1984.

Mitterand,infaceofhisdisastrousdomesticpolicy,wasdeterminedtoachieveasuccesson

the international scene, and, as Francewas to assumepresidencyof the EC in 1984, this

seemed the right moment. At the time, European decision-making had continually been

stalled by Thatcher’s insistence that theUK’s financial contribution to the EEC had to be

13

reassessed.Mitteranddid just that,whichhelpedcreatea favourablepolitical climate for

further steps towards European integration (Wood 49). This combined with impending

Mediterranean enlargement, a European-wide trend towards deregulation and enhanced

competitiveness,andamore“assertive”parliamentbackedbythepopularvote,clearedthe

way for renewed institutional reform (Dinan, An Ever Closer Union 87). In the words of

commissionerChristopherTugendhat,“thefeelingoficebreakingupandspringapproaching”

becamemoreprevalent(Ibid70).So,withtheleadersofthethreemajorEuropeancountries,

Thatcher,Mitterand,andKohl,onthesamepageattheECinFontainbleu,theECcouldset

theCommissiontowork(Wood50).

Under the auspices of Mitterand’s former Finance Minister Jacques Delors the

Commissionwasdeterminedto finaliseaEuropeansinglemarketby1992.Witheven the

Thatchergovernmentonboard,agovernmentgenerallyscepticaloffurtherintegration,quick

headwaycouldbemade,asasinglemarketeffectivelyderegulatedtheEuropeanmarketby

takingawaytradebarriers,whichwastothelikingoftheconservatives(Phinnemore19).This

wasformalisedsoonafterwiththeSEAagreeduponatanIGCin1985.Althoughmanypro-

integrationistsweredisappointedbythelimitedscopeoftheSEA,asitwasseenasmerely

moreofthesame,itcreatedgreatpotentialforpolicy“spill-over;”simultaneously,itwasnot

toohardtoswallowforgovernmentsscepticaloffurtherintegration(Dehousse26-7;Dinan,

Origins and Evolution 229; Phinnemore 19). Nonetheless, it became clear that the scant

institutional changesThatcherallowed for in theSEA, suchasmoreQMV inexchange for

trade liberalisation,were not sufficient to accommodate the imminent reality of a single

market(Wood52).Ideasthathadformerlybeenregarded“moribund,”suchasacommon

competitionpolicy,morecoordinated foreignpolicy, judicialcooperation,andamonetary

union,revivedasaconsequenceofthismove(Dinan,OriginsandEvolution229).TheSEAwas

thus promising, but talk of a Europeanunion still encounteredmuch resistance, andwas

regardedbymanyas“rhetoric”ratherthanreality(Phinnemore20).Thisdespitethefactthat

theSEAclearlystateditsintentionto“transformrelationsasawholeamongtheStatesinto

aEuropeanUnion”(SEA1)

Nonetheless, in light of the subsequent, and unexpected, fall of the communist

regimes in Eastern Europe, and with German unification at hand, a more political union

became viable, as the unified Germany had to be securely embedded in the European

framework (Dehousse 27). Consequently, two IGCs were convened in 1990 and 1991 in

14

MaastrichttonegotiateaTreatyonEuropeanUnion(TEU).Themostnotableoutcomehereof

wasprobablytheEMUandtheintroductionofasinglecurrency,butitalsointendedtoreform

the European institutions and extend its “scope” (Phinnemore 20). Although a complete

politicalunionwasnotachieved,withso-called“highpolitics,”suchasforeignpolicy-making,

remainingfirmlyinthehandsoftheindividualmemberstates,thepowersofsupranational

institutions,suchastheEP,weregreatlyexpanded(Ibid).

The TEU set forth a three pillar system that combined would form the EU: the

EuropeanCommunities3,aCFSP,andacommonpolicyonJHA.Thefirstpillarrepresentedthe

supranationalEuropeanbodies,whichwouldundergosignificantchanges,bothinstitutionally

andinthebroadeningoftheirpowers.TheEPwasmostaffectedbythis,mostnotablywith

theintroductionofcodecision,aprocedurethatprovidedtheEPequalpowersinlegislative

approvalastheCouncil;thepowertoapproveorrejectthecommission;andbybroadening

the rangeof topics inwhich theyneeded tobe consulted (AppendixC;CVCE “Maastricht

Treaty”).However,themosttellingchangewasperhapsasmallone,asthewordeconomic

wastakenoutoftheEuropeanEconomicCommunity.InsodoingtheEuropeanCommunity’s

scopewasextendedbeyondthatofeconomiccooperation,nowincludingareassuchassocial

policy, education, public health, and the creation of a European citizenship – provided it

abidedbytheprincipleofsubsidiarity.Moreover,anindependentECBwasestablishedtotake

chargeofthefusionofEuropeaneconomicpolicy,whichwasrequiredforthesinglecurrency

that would be introduced in 2002. The second and third pillar of the EU were

intergovernmentalistinnature;theycoverthecreationofacommon–notsingular–foreign

policyandaddresstheissuesarisingfromfreedomofmovementinasinglemarket,suchas

crimeandasylumpolicy,respectively(Ibid).Allinall,thisdepictsanintegrationprocessof

“bitsandpieces,”becausethoughtheeconomicintegrationfollowedadefinite“blueprint,”

assetoutbyJacquesDelorsandpresidedoverbytheECB,thepoliticalintegrationlackeda

clear“philosophy”(Curtin,“TheConstitutionalStructure”17-8).Thisisevidentfromthefact

that,dependingonthepolicyarea,therewouldbeadifferentapproachtodecision-making,

eithersupranationalor intergovernmental innature,andeachwithdifferent roles for the

variousinstitutions(Phinnemore21).

3TheEuropeanCommunitiesare:theEEC,theECSC,andEuratom

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Consequently, unlike the period following the Treaty of Rome, the Treaty of

Maastrichtdidnotusherinadecadeofconsolidation.Onthecontrary,thefollowingyears

witnessedtwoIGCs inAmsterdam,1997,andNice,2001,amendingtheEUasset forth in

Maastricht.Both IGCs focusedonreviewingwhathadbeenagreeduponandamending it

wherenecessary.InAmsterdamthefocuswasondistillingmoredemocraticprinciplesinthe

EU,suchastheinclusionofhumanrightsandtransferringaspectsoftheJHApolicytothe

supranational EC (EU “AConstitution for Europe”; Cini 24). The IGC inNicewasprimarily

focusedontheimpendingenlargementofanothertwelvememberstates,andtherequired

institutionalreformstoaccommodateit.Thismainlyinvolvedareassessmentofthevotingin

theCouncil,thenumberofdelegatespercountryintheEP,andadecreaseinthenumberof

commissioners. Although seemingly straightforward, this proved a difficult task, as the

enlargement had the potential to significantly alter the distribution of power in the EU

betweenthesmallerandlargerstates.Tothatend,abalancehadtobestruckbetweenthe

degreeofempowermentofthesmallercountriesandthedegreeofrestrictiononthelarger

oneswhilstmaintaining an effective decision-making process (Dehousse 28-9).With both

partiesseekingtomaximisetheirabilitytoexertinfluenceonthedecision-makingprocess,

and the fact thatone institutionalalteration in theexistingbalanceofpower requiredan

adjustmentelsewhere,madethisanarduousprocessthatledtomuchcriticism(Ibid;Moberg

280-1). Nonetheless, after a fashion, Nice and Amsterdam did prepare the EU for

enlargement,buttheirimportancewasnotintheinstitutionalchangesthatwereenacted,

butrathertheineffectualnatureofthereformprocess(Dinan,EverCloserUnion172).The

lackoftransparencyoftheIGCs,aggravatedbythesheernumberofamendmentsthathad

beenproposedsinceRome,andtheconstantstrivebetweensmallerandlargercountriesfor

relativepower,signalledthatadifferentapproachwasrequired(Ibid).

Thisdifferent approachwouldbeembodiedby theConstitutionalConvention that

rapidlysucceededtheNicetreatyin2001.Theresultofthisconvention,theCTof2004,was

generallyheraldedasagreatimprovement:themyriadofexistingtreatiesanddocuments

wouldbemergedintoone,itwouldsimplifyanddemocratisetheEU,itwouldgivetheEUa

legalpersonality,anditwouldgetridofthepillarsystem(Dinan,EverCloserUnion181-2;

Church,Phinnemore35).But,itwastonoavail,asitwasrejectedbyreferendainFranceand

the Netherlands in 2005, a stinging blow as both were part of the original Six founding

memberstates.Severalreasonshavebeenattributedtothisdefeat,suchasafailureofthe

16

conventionto involvethepopulation, fears,spurredbyeurosceptics, thattheconstitution

wasanattemptatcreatingaEuropeansuperstate,andgeneraldiscontentofthosepeople

whofeltdisconnectedfromEuropeanpolitics(Ibid;Dehousse33).Nevertheless,thesituation

lefttheEUinapickle,asthestatusquo,whichmanystillregardedasunacceptableinlightof

theenlargement,wasmaintained.Asaconsequence,theEUmemberstatesorganisedanew

IGCinLisbontodiscusshowtheEUwouldbereformedinlightoftheConstitutionalfailure.

ThisresultedintheTreatyofLisbonin2008,whichcontained“mostofthetechnicalreforms

proposedundertheCT,”butwithouttheconstitutionallanguage(Dougan622).Theresulting

institutionalframeworkistheonethatisstillineffecttoday,andwillthereforebediscussed

incloserdetailinthefollowingchapter.

Inshort,thehistoryoftheEuropeanUnioniseverythingbutuncontested.Everystep

oftheintegrationprocesssawfiercedebatesandrequiredagreatwillingnesstocompromise

fromall participants. Despite these efforts, however, important changeswere onlymade

possibleinlightofthepoliticalclimateatthetime–theaftermathofWorldWarIIisprobably

the most notable example hereof. Nonetheless, the scope of the European integration

processhasslowlydevelopedfromacoalandsteelcommunity,toacustomunion,andfinally

to a “quasi-constitutional” single market union with a single currency that encompasses

multiplepolicyareasnolongerlimitedtotheeconomicsphere(Dehousse39).Thismayimply

a linear process of steadily increasing cooperation, but it is interesting to note that the

questionsweaskourselvestodaywithregardtothefutureoftheEUareallbutnew.Take

theCToftheearly21stcentury,itmayhaveseemeda“grandioseproject”andanewexciting

stepintheEuropeanintegrationprocessatthetime,butthatneglectsthefactthattherehad

alreadybeena similar constitutionaldebate in the50s (Watt).Moreover, the reasons for

integrationandthegoalsofthevariouscountrieshaveremainedrelativelystableovertime.

Larger states, with the notable exception of Germany, generally favour integration on

intergovernmentalist terms, and smaller states generally prefer a supranational union.

Today’s problems may thus be different, but the way in which they are dealt with has

remainedlargelythesame.

17

2. TheInstitutionsoftheEuropeanUnion

Formany countries in today’sworld there is a clearly defined territory and set of

peoplethatmakeupthestate.Insuchcasesthereisnorealneedtothinkoverlymuchonthe

institutionsthatactuallyconstitutesuchanationasastate,becausethoughtheseinstitutions

mightdisappear,thenationwillliveon.TheEUisadifferentstory;itdoesnothaveaclearly

definedterritory,astherecentBrexitpointsout,noraclearlydefinedpopulationthatbelongs

toit.TheEUthereforereliesheavilyonitsinstitutionsforitscontinuedexistence,without

them,therewouldnotbeanEU,becausetheEUisacollectionofnation-statesratherthan

oneinitsownright.Inotherwords,athoroughunderstandingofthescope,workings,and

powersofeachinstitutioniscriticalinanyattempttounderstandwhattheEUisinitsessence,

andinthepursuitofestablishingwhetherithasademocraticdeficit.

Thereareseven institutions thatmakeuptheEU:TheEP, theEC, theCouncil, the

Commission,theECJ,theECB,andtheCourtofAuditors.Thischapterwillfocusonthefirst

five,astheseinstitutionscontainthethreebranchesofgovernment,afterafashion,thatare

foundinmostWesterndemocraciestoday:thelegislative,theexecutive,andthejudiciary.

Eachinstitution’stasksandpowerswillbrieflybeexplainedwiththehelpoftheTFEUand

TEU.

TheEuropeanParliament

TheEPisarguablyoneofthemostpowerfulinstitutionsoftheEUtoday;itistheonly

institutionthatisdirectlyelectedbytheEuropeanpopulationandisalsotheinstitutionthat

hasundergonethegreatestchangesinceitsinceptionin1950(Peterson124-5;TEUarticle

10).ThereasonsforthiscontinualincreaseinthepoweroftheEPistwofold.Firstly,itisnoted

intheTEUthat“thefunctioningoftheEUshallbefoundedonrepresentativedemocracy”

(article10).TheonlyEuropeaninstitutionthatembodiesthatarticlefullyistheEP,so,inthe

eyes of the drafters of the successive treaties, increasing the powers of the EP was the

simplestwaytoaddresstheallegeddemocraticdeficitwithinthecurrentconfigurationofthe

Union (Shackleton145). Secondly, a strongparliament is in linewithEurope’sdemocratic

traditions,andisthereforerelativelyeasytoagreeto(Ibid125-6).Thereareelectionsevery

fiveyears,whenEuropeancitizenscanvoteonrepresentativesfromtheirowncountrywho

areeachmembersofEuropeanparties.ThetotalamountofMPs intheEP is751andare

18

allocatedtoeachcountrybasedonpopulationsize,withamaximumof96andaminimumof

6representativespercountry.

Themain roleof theEP isoutlined in theTEUas follows: it “shall, jointlywith the

Council, exercise legislative andbudgetary functions (…) exercise (…) political control and

consultation(…)[and]electthePresidentoftheCommission”(article14).Thisjointlegislative

procedure,calledcodecisionortheordinarylegislativeprocedure,signifiesthateverypiece

oflegislature,in85definedpolicyareas,needstobeapprovedbyboththeCouncilandthe

EP(AppendixC).Ifone,orboth,institution(s)donotagree,orcannotcometoaconclusion

thatsatisfiestheEP,theCouncil,andtheCommission, itwillnotbeadopted(TFEUarticle

294).

ThepowersoftheEPhavethusincreasedextensivelyovertheyears–withanotable

accelerationaftertheintroductionoftheSEA–fromanadvisorybodythatcouldonlycensure

the High Authority in the 50s to a “strong” co-legislator on par with the Council today

(Rittberger701).Althoughprotocol1ontheroleofnationalparliamentsintheEUallowsfor

nationalparliamentstoobjecttoEUlegislature,providingitdoesnotabidebytheprinciples

ofsubsidiarity,muchpowerhasbeentransferredfromthenationalparliamentstotheEP

(article3).ThisbecamemostevidentstraightaftertheTreatyofLisbonenteredintoforce

withtheEP’srejectionoftheSWIFTagreement(Traynor).WiththisdecisiontheEPdefied

theCommission, theCouncil, thememberstates’nationalgovernments,andWashington,

whichfirmlyestablishedtheimportoftheEPinEUpoliticstoday.Thiswasfurtherhighlighted

by the US’ response, showing more respect towards the EP than before, as Joe Biden

advocatedtherevisedSWIFTagreementintheEPhimself,which,toeveryone’srelief,passed

(Biden;Pop).

TheEuropeanCouncil

DespitethefactthattheEChasexistedsince1974,ithasonlybecomeaformallegal

entitywiththeTreatyofLisbon,whichmarkeditasaEUinstitution(Peterson52;TEUarticle

13).Since its inceptiontheEChaswieldedasignificantdegreeofpower,which isadirect

consequenceofitsverynature,asitiscomprisedofthememberstates’headsofgovernment

(TEUarticle15).TheEChasthereforeanunmatcheddegreeof“politicalauthority”compared

totheotherinstitutions,becauseitsdecisionsaremadebyconsensus,unlesswhenotherwise

19

indicatedinthetreaties,bythemostinfluentialexecutivesoftheEU(Lewis142;TEUarticle

15).

TheECmeetsatleasttwiceeverysixmonthsinprivateandundertheauspicesofthe

ECpresident,currentlyDonaldTusk,whositsforatermof2,5years(TEUarticle15).Themain

tasksoftheECarebroadandextensive,asitischargedwith“providingtheUnionwiththe

necessaryimpetusforitsdevelopment[and]definingthe[EU’s]generalpoliticaldirections

andpriorities(…)[without]exercisinglegislativefunctions.”(TEUarticle15).Moreover,the

ECoutlinestheEU’s“strategicinterests”anddeterminesthe“goalsandguidelinesfor”the

EU’sforeignandsecuritypolicy(TEUarticle15,26;TFEUarticle68,222).Inthis,theECand

theCouncilsupersedeindividualgovernmentleaders,astheseleadersaretoconsulttheEC

and/orCouncilon“anymatterof[common]foreignandsecuritypolicy”beforeactingonit

alone(TEUarticle32).Inotherwords,theECsetstheEU’spoliticalagendaandkeepsthings

movingforward(EC“SettingtheEU’sPoliticalAgenda”).

For as long as full executive power will not be unequivocally transferred to the

supranationalbodiesoftheEU,theECwillremainanindispensablepartoftheEUdecision-

makingprocess.Thisdespite,orperhapsbecauseof,itsintergovernmentalnature,because

inacollectiveofstates, littlecanbedonewithouttheconsentofthehighestexecutiveof

eachsovereigncountry.TheEChasbolsteredthisimageseveraltimesinthecrisesthathave

beset the EU in the last decennium. Take the financial crisis of 2008. The then rotating

presidencywasinthehandsofPresidentSarkozywhoconvenedanECmeetingnearlyevery

monthtoprovideanadequateresponsetothebankruptcyofLehmanBrothers(Schoutheete

65).NootherEUinstitutioncouldhavedoneso.

TheCouncil

Duetoitshigh-profilecharactertheECgetsmuchmoreattentioninthemediathan

theCouncil–alsosometimesreferredtoastheCouncilofMinisters–butit istheCouncil

wheremuchoftheworkactuallytakesplace(Lelieveldt59).AlthoughtheCouncilisalluded

to as a single unit in most of the literature, it actually has many varying configurations

dependingonthepolicyarea.Essentially,“theCouncilconsistsofarepresentativeofeach

MemberStateatministeriallevelwhomaycommitthegovernment”toaparticulardecision

(TEU article 16). This is why the Council is sometimes referred to as an institutional

“chameleon,”becausenooneministerialofficialcanmakedecisionsonallpolicyareas,which

20

means the configuration of the Council is not fixed (Curtin 81). This constantly shifting

configurationcouldcauseinstability,so“consistency”intheCouncil isprovidedforbythe

GeneralAffairsCouncil,whichiscomposedoftheforeignministersoftheMemberStates,

and the President of the Council, a position that rotates every half a year between the

MemberStates(TEUarticle16).

The first task of the Council, as described in the section on the EP, is that of co-

legislator.In85policyareasithasasharedlegislativefunctionwiththeEPandinafewitis

thesolelegislator(Lelieveldt59;TEUarticle16).However,theCouncilalsofulfilsasecond

importantfunction,namelythatofexecutiveforCFSPdecisions.TheCouncil,initsForeign

Affairs configuration, is presided over not by the Council’s president, but by a specially

appointedHighRepresentative.TogetherwiththisHighRepresentative“theForeignAffairs

Council (…) elaborates the Union’s external action (…) laid down by the EC;” thus giving

practicalshapetothedirectionsetoutbytheECto,forinstance,sanctionRussiaorcombat

terrorism (Ibid article 16; Lelieveldt 59-60). TheHigh Representative subsequently enacts

thesedecisionsontheinternationalsceneincooperationwiththepresidentoftheECand

Commission. (TEU article 15, 18, 27). Although the High Representative’s appointment is

different from that of the other Commissioners, he or she fulfils the function of a Vice

PresidentoftheCommission(TEUarticle18).

Initsdecision-makingprocesstheCouncilmakesuseofQMV–amajoritybeing55%

oftheCouncilmembersrepresentingatleast65%oftheEUpopulationwithcertaindefined

blockingminorities–,whichhastodaybecomethedefaultvotingprocedure(Lewis148;TEU

article16;TFEUarticle238).AlthoughthelegislativesideoftheCouncilispublic,theexecutive

tasksareconcludedbehindcloseddoors(Lelieveldt60). In itsvariousdealingstheCouncil

representstheinterestsoftheMemberStates’governmentsandcooperatescloselywiththe

EP,EC,andCommission;itthereforehasanimportantroleinbothlegislativeandexecutive

functions(Ibid62).

TheCommission

Inaway,theCommissioncanberegardedasthegovernmentoftheEU,asitisthe

onlyexecutivepowerintheEUthatdoesnotrepresenttheinterestsoftheindividualMember

States,as theCouncilandtheECdo. Instead, its responsibility is to“promotethegeneral

interestof theUnionandtakeappropriate initiatives to thatend” (TEUarticle17).This is

21

underlinedbythefactthateachCommissionerhastoswearanoathtoonlyrepresentthe

interestoftheUnion,notthatoftheMemberStatefromwhichheorsheoriginates(Ibid

article17;TFEU245;Lelieveldt62).Unlikeanationalgovernment,theCommissionersarenot

electedbythepeople,rather,eachMemberStates’governmentputsforwardoneoftheir

senior officials. The governments do this in cooperation with the President of the

Commission,whointurnisselectedbytheECandapprovedbytheEP.OncetheCommission

hasbeenputtogether,itrequiresthefinalapprovaloftheEPtostartitswork(TEUarticle

17).

TheCommissionhasseveraltasks,themost importantofwhichisprobablythatof

legislative initiative,meaning that “legislativeactsmayonlybeadoptedon thebasisof a

Commissionproposal”inallareasexceptforCFSP(TEUarticle17,27).Onceaproposalhas

beenmade,theordinarylegislativeprocedurewillstart;theCommissionshallmanagethis

legislativeprocessandnegotiatebetweentheCouncilandEPwhennecessary,actingasan

“honestbroker”(TFEUarticle294;Peterson119).Theimplementationoftheproposalsthat

areultimatelyadoptedistheresponsibilityoftheCommission,asisthe“correctapplication

of community law” in general (TEU article 17; Lelieveldt 64). In this latter pursuit, the

Commissionhasthepowertosanctionstateornon-stateactorsandbringacasebeforethe

ECJ(TFEUarticle124;Lelieveldt64).Outsideoftheseinternallyorientedcompetences,the

Commissionalsohasaroleinexternalrelations,beinganimportantEUexecutivetheycan

representtheEUatimportantIGCs,forinstance(Egeberg127).Thisrolewasbolsteredinthe

TreatyofLisbonbytheincorporationoftheHighRepresentativeintotheframeworkofthe

Commission,eventhoughheorshestillreportstotheCouncil.

All put together the Commission seems an immensely powerful organisation,

assumingmany tasksusuallyattributed toanationalexecutivegovernment,which iswhy

manyhaveoftenvieweditwithsuspicion(Ibid136;Lelieveldt60).Inreality,however,the

Commissionlivesina“worldmadeexclusivelyofpaper,”asithasnomeans,otherthanthe

consentoftheMemberStates,to“dictatebindinglegislation”(Lelieveldt60).Nonetheless,it

remainsthe“principledesignerandmanagerofEUpolicy”despitepressuresexertedonit

fromtheEC,theCouncil,andtheEP.

22

TheEuropeanCourtofJustice

Wheretheexecutiveandlegislativefunctionsaredividedoveravarietyofinstitutions,

thejudiciaryislocatedinasingleinstitution:theECJ–alsoreferredtoastheCourtofJustice

(Lelieveldt 73). Unlike the other institutions the main task of the ECJ is relatively

straightforward,thoughcomprehensive,asthey“shallensurethatintheinterpretationand

applicationoftheTreatiesthelawisobserved”(TEUarticle19).TheECJshall“ruleonactions

broughtbyaMemberState,aninstitution,oranaturalorlegalperson[and]givepreliminary

rulings,attherequestsofcourtsortribunalsoftheMemberStates,ontheinterpretationof

Unionlaworthevalidityofactsadopted”(Ibid;TFEUarticle267).TheECJcanthusrulein

threetypesofsituations:whenchallengingthelegislativeactsofanEUinstitution,when“the

Commissionconsiders thataMemberStatehas failed to fulfilanobligation,”andwhena

MemberStates’courtasksforaninterpretationofEUlaw(TFEUarticle258,263,267).Inthe

lattersituationtheECJ’srulinghasprimacyoverthenationalcourts(TEU/TFEU“Declaration

ConcerningPrimacy”)

As pointed out before, the ECJ can be regarded as one of the most successful

supranational institutions of the EU; it has “no rival as the most effective supranational

judicialbodyinthehistoryoftheworld,”hasbeenacriticalactor intheharmonisationof

Europeanlaw,andhassobecomeadrivingforceforEuropeanintegrationonfederalterms

(StoneSweet18;MaduroandAzoulai70;Peterson11).AlthoughMemberStatesandnational

courtsdonotalwaysagreewiththeinterpretationofEUlawbytheECJ,oftenaccusingitof

“judicialactivism,”theyhaveovertheyearsfalleninlinewithitsdecisions,whichhasmade

itapowerful“toolinadvancing”Europeanintegration(Kapsis174-5).Nonetheless,ithasits

limitations,mainlybecauseitsscopedoesnotincludeCFSPandcriminalmatters,and,likethe

Commission, only exists in virtue of the Member States’ cooperation, as they have no

enforcementtoolsoftheirown(Lelieveldt75).

23

Inbrief,theinstitutionalframeworkoftheEUisset-upsoastotryanddividethethree

branchesofpowerasequallyaspossibleoverboththesupranationalandintergovernmental

institutions.TheEPrepresentsEuropeancitizensdirectly,andtheECandCouncilrepresent

theMemberStates’governments,whoare“themselvesdemocraticallyaccountableto”their

owncitizens(TEUarticle10). It isthisattemptthatmakestheEUsuchacomplexpolitical

body.ThelegislativeisembodiedbytheEPandtheCouncil;theexecutivepowersaredivided

overtheEC,theCouncil,andtheCommission;andthejudicialisfirmlylocatedintheECJ.

Thisshowsthatthevariousgovernmentsdowanttocooperate,evenifthatmeansa

transferofpowers to supranational institutions,butonly if there is an intergovernmental

check or ‘get-out-of-jail-for-free card’ available simultaneously. Because, despite the

“incremental” institutional changeover theyears,withmorepowersbeing transferred to

institutions such as the EP and Commission, there is still always the potential for their

decisions tobeblockedby the intergovernmentalaspectsof theEU (Peterson16).This is

perhapsbestevidencedintimesofcrisis,whenimportantdecisionsandcommitmentsneed

tobemadequicklytoensureanadequateresponse.Althoughotherinstitutionsmighthave

thecompetencestoact,itismostoftenstilltheECthatmakesthemostimportantdecisions,

astheyalonehavetheauthoritythatisrequired.Moreover,theECJandCommissionwield

muchpower,butcanonlydosoinvirtueoftheMemberStates’cooperation,astheyhaveno

enforcementpowerontheirown.Additionally,theEP,arguablythemostsupranationalof

theinstitutionsasitisdirectlyelectedbytheEuropeanpopulation,ischeckedbytheCouncil.

Inotherwords,everyinstitutionwiththesolepurposetofurthertheUnion’sinterests,

has an intergovernmentalist check, to ensure that its decisions do not infringe on state’s

sovereignty.Althoughthismayseemaroundaboutandineffectivewayofconductingpolitics

andahalf-heartedcommitmenttointegrationatbest,itisthiscarefulbalancingactthatgot

theEUtowhereitistodayinthefirstplace:“integrationthroughdeliberation”(Eriksen25).

However, it is also at the root of some of the EU’s greatest failings: its alleged lack of

transparencyand legitimacy, thedegreeof technocracy,and its inability toadaptquickly.

Nonetheless, in spite of this adversity, the EU’s institutional frameworkworks quitewell

overall,thisisparticularlyclearfromthe“waryinterdependence”oftheCouncilandEPasco-

legislators(Hayes-Renshaw88).

24

3. ASupranationalorIntergovernmentalUnion

In the previous chapters the integration process and the current institutional

configurationoftheEUhasbeendiscussed.Basedontheconclusionshereof,thisthesiswill

now proceed to discuss the nature of the EU and whether it is supranational or

intergovernmental.Althoughtheanswertothisquestionmayseemstraightforward,asthe

EU,inmanyrespects,clearlysupersedesthenational,thepreviouschaptershavepointedout

that this is not necessarily the case. Over the years, intergovernmentalists and people

favouring a supranational Union have vied for dominance, often resulting in hard fought

compromises.Thishasledtothecuriousbalanceintheinstitutionalframeworktoday.

InordertodeterminewhethertheEUsuffersfromtheallegeddemocraticdeficititis

importanttoanalysetheextenttowhichtheEUhasactuallybecomeasupranationalbody,

andonwhattermsthathasoccurred.Agroupofcountriesthatcooperateinanumberof

policyareaswithoutlettingdemocraticsupranationalbodiestakedecisionsontheirbehalf,

can hardly be called a democracy. Such a cooperation can therefore not suffer from a

democraticdeficitinthefirstplace.AlthoughtherealityoftheEUisfarmorecomplicated

thansketchedinthisexample,itisimportanttothinkon,asthemannerinwhichwedescribe

orinterprettheEU,informsusastowhatitis.EspeciallybecausetheEUhasverycarefully

setupitsinstitutionstobothadvancetheEU’sinterestsandmakesurethesedonotinfringe

onthecountries’sovereignty.Thischapterwillthereforeexplorewhetherwecanconsider

theEUasupranationalpoliticalbodybylookingattheoriesofintegration,themostimportant

ofwhichare:federalism,intergovernmentalism,andneofunctionalism.

TheoriesofEuropeanIntegration

BeforeexpoundingonthetheoriesofEuropeanintegration, it is importanttonote

thateachtheoryisnotanattempttoexplainthefullEuropeanproject.AsIhavepointedout

before, the EU is a multifaceted organisation incorporating both intergovernmental and

supranationalaspectsthatcanprobablyonlybefullyexplainedbyasetoftheoriesexplaining

bitsandpieces(Rosamund,“TheorisingtheEU”87).Nonetheless,thetheorieswechooseto

explainEuropeanintegrationwiththemselvesarenarrativesofthesocialrealitytheytryto

describe(Jackson73).Thesetheoriesthereforedomorethansimplydescribeandexplain,

rather,theybreathelifeintotheobject.ThisringsespeciallytruefortheEU,as,unlikewith

25

nationalgovernments, there isnopre-existingagreeduponsingularentity that isEurope.

Simplyput,ifthereisaclearlyobservableobject,sayacat,thereislittleissueindescribing

orexplainingit,asthemind-objectdivideisnotbreached;but,thefurtherwemoveaway

fromthecat,themorewehavetorelyon“tacit”assumptionsaboutwhatwesee,andthese

assumptionsareinformedbytheory(Wendt5).Thetheoriesdescribedherearenottheonly

theoriesonEU integration,buttheyarethemostcommonones,astheyaremostclosely

linkedtotheintentionsofthevariousnationalleadersinsettinguptheEU.

The most well-known theory with regard to European integration is probably

federalism. This theory describes a system that divides authority between regional and

centralactors(Rosamund,TheoriesofEuropeanIntegration24).ThecentralactorinEurope

would be regarded as supranational. The regional actor is leftmostly intact, but confers

certain responsibilities previously agreed upon to centralised institutions. This theory is

naturallyappealingtopro-integrationistsinEurope,asitallowsforunitywithouttarnishing

Europe’sinnatediversity(Ibid23).AfederalstatewouldleavetheEUmemberstatesadegree

ofautonomyandevensovereignty–somethingthatallstatesareunwillingtoforego–but

with a powerful unitary actor superseding the various states. Although there is no real

templateforafederalstate,EuropeanintegrationistsoftenlookattheUSAforapractical

example.Inthatspirit,someintegrationist,especiallyatthetimeofconstitutionaldebates,

have suggested that Europe needs its own Philadelphia (Castiglione 31). Nevertheless,

attempts to pursue federalism in the EU,most notably by trying to constitutionalise the

Union,havefailed,andthoughtheEUisdefinitelynotamereInternationalOrganisation,it

lackstherequiredunityforaFederationaswell.Nonetheless,talkofaPoliticalUnionhave

“reignited” in light of the Van Rompuy reports, which called for “strongmechanisms for

democratic legitimacyandaccountability (...) [that] shouldoccurat the levelatwhich the

decisionsaretaken”(Laffan386;VanRompuy16).

Attheothersideofthetheoreticspectrumthereis(liberal) intergovernmentalism.

Thistheorymarksthenation-stateasthemost importantactor intheintegrationprocess,

despitetheemergenceofvarioussupranationalentities(Rosamund,TheoriesofEuropean

Integration130).Byemphasisingtheroleofthenation-state,thistheorypostulatesthatthe

EUmemberstatesworktogetherwhentheirnationalinterestsalign,thattheycontinuously

“bargain forpower” relative tooneanother,and that theyactively setup“incentives” to

ensure“interstatecommitments”(Moravscik,TheChoiceforEurope3).Asadescriptionof

26

thefunctioningoftheEU,thereismuchtobesaidforthistheory,asitisindeedtruethatthe

mostimportantdecisionstodayarestillmadebynationalleaders.Forinstance,thetreaties

establishingtheEUweresetupatIGCsandtheECisarguablythemostimportantagenda-

setteroftheEUtoday(Schoutheete64).Moreover,thesupranationalinstitutionsthathave

beenestablished,existinvirtueoftheMemberStateswhoestablishedthem.However,the

fact that this theory disregards the influence that supranational bodies can exercise

independentofthevariousMemberstates,hasbeenheavilycontested,especiallyinlightof

thepivotal role theECJhasplayed in thepastasadriving force forEuropean integration

(Rosamund,TheoriesofEuropeanIntegration146).

Thelasttheorytobediscussedinthissectionisneofunctionalism.Thistheorywasfirst

proposedbyErnstHaasin1958andprovides“acausalexplanationofthedevelopmentofEU

institutions” (Sandholtz 28). Rather than focus on the role of nation-states, as

intergovernmentalism does, neofunctionalism’s focus is on the role of supranational

institutionsandnon-stateactors (Jensen53).Neofunctionalism’smaincontributionto the

field is the concept of policy spill-over. This term signifies that when several countries

cooperateinonenarrowlydefinedpolicyarea,itcreates“pressuresinneighbouringpolicy

areas,”whichsubsequentlyspursfurtherintegration(Ibid54).This“incrementalprocess”will

eventuallyleadtopoliticalcooperationandthecreationofsupranationalbodies,whichwill

in turn lead to more competences being transferred to the supranational (Ibid 63). The

transitionfromtheECSCtotheEECisperhapsthebestexampleofthistheory,ascooperation

intheareaofcoalandsteelmadeitdesirabletocooperateinotherareasaswell.Eventually

suchaccumulativeintegrativetendencieswouldleadtoan“evercloserUnionbetweenthe

peopleofEurope”(TheTreaties“Preamble”).Nonetheless,neofunctionalismwasabandoned

inthe70s,whenitbecameclearthatindividualmemberstatesretainedmuchinfluencein

spiteofthedegreeofintegration,butithasbecomerelevantagainaftertheintroductionof

theSEAandthesubsequentMaastrichttreaty.

The essence of the EU is not something that is set in stone, but rather

somethingthatisopentotheinterpretationofthepeoplethatareinchargeofexecutingthe

sometimesambiguousprovisionslaiddowninthetreaties.Consequently,thewayinwhich

thesepeople theorise thenatureofEuropean integration, isofcritical importance.This is

perhapsbestdepictedbytheunexpecteddevelopmentoftheECJ.Thepowerfulrolethatthe

ECJ has todaywas not envisioned as suchby the drafters of the Treaty of Rome.On the

27

contrary,theintentionwastocreatea“relativelyweak”court(Dinan,OriginsandEvolution

171).Thepowerithasaccruedovertheyears,isaconsequenceofits“ownjurisprudence”

andthus,byextension,thewayinwhichthejudgesconceiveofEuropeanintegration(Ibid).

Interestingly, Weiler suggests that it is this development that could have caused the

eurosclerosis of the late 70s (“Does Europe Need” 291-2). The realisation that a strong

European judiciary definitively committed Member States to legislation passed at the

Community level, made national leaders wary of it, which resulted in Member States’

insistenceinbeingabletoblockthemakingofthis“supreme”legislation(Ibid).Thiscauseda

shifttowardsamoreintergovernmentalistviewofEuropeanintegration,asnationalleaders

wanted to make sure that their governments had the final say. To the extent that

Neofunctionalismwasregardedas“obsoleteintheEuropeansetting”in1976byoneofits

founders Ernst Haas (208). Nonetheless, not even 15 years later Haas rescinded this

statementwhentheintegrationprocesswasspurredbytheSEAandMaastrichttreaty,which

showsagaintheimportanceofthewayinwhichtheEuropeanintegrationprocessisframed.

TheEUtodaycontainsboththeinstitutionstobesupranationalandthosethatwould

make it intergovernmental. Combined these institutions represent the three branches of

government.Arguably,theintergovernmentalistinstitutionsaresomewhatstrongerthanthe

supranationalones,withtheexecutiveECbeingthemainagenda-setteroftheEU;but,itis

exactly the EC that has been one of the main contributors to furthering the non-

intergovernmentalistsidesoftheEU(Schoutheete65).Moreover,thesupranationalaspects

of the Union may be checked by intergovernmental ones, but in general the national

governmentsletthesupranationalinstitutionsdotheirjob,withtheECJasacaseinpoint.

TheECJhasbeenheavilycriticisedforitsjudicialactivisminassertingprimacyovernational

courts,butcourtsandgovernmentsseemtohaveaccepteditandevenhelpenforceit,asthe

ECJisdependentonthemtoenforcetheirrulings(Kapsis174-5).Thesupranationalismwe

seetodayintheEUisaconsequence,foralargepart,ofEuropeanintergovernmentalism,in

otherwords,supranationalismiswhattheEuropean“statesmakeofit”(Wendt377).Inthis

respect,theEUcanthereforeberegardedasasupranationalbody,becausethoughthereis

anambiguous institutional framework, currently it is this framework that seems to foster

supranationalism.Theonlycaveatis,thatMemberStateshaveleftthemselvesaget-out-of-

jail-for-free card, by setting up certain safeguards to make sure there cannot be severe

infringementsontheirsovereignty.

28

4. TheEUandDemocraticDeficit

Having established that the EU is more than just a collaboration of states and is

actuallya“quasi-constitutional”supranationalbody, it is timetodiscuss towhatextent it

suffersfromtheso-called“democraticdeficit”(Peterson39;Marquand64).Democracyhas

becomeequatedintheWesternworldwithgoodgovernance,andisevenarequirementfor

country to become a Member State of the EU (TEU article 2, 21). The accusation of a

democraticdeficitisthereforeaseriousone,andonethatimmediatelyraisesthequestion

whathavingademocraticdeficitactuallymeans.Asaforementioned,there isnoclearcut

answertothisquestion((Gilbert)534).Despitethis“vagueness,”however,ithasbecomea

catchphraseforEuroscepticsacrossthecontinent,whohavebeenontheriseforthepast15

years(Millar).ThishasrecentlycometoanewheadwiththeBrexit,andhasheightenedfears

inotherEuropeancountries,suchastheNetherlandsandFrance,forarespectiveNexitor

Frexit(Lyons).Inotherwords,inlightofthisseeminglyexistentialcrisis,thereismorethan

everaneedtoanalysewhatismeantwiththisdemocraticdeficit,inorderfortheEUtotry

andcountertheEuroscepticmovementthathasbesetit.

Thischapterwillthereforefirstbrieflyexpoundontheactualproblembyanalysing

whatismeantwhenpeoplesaytheEUsuffersfromademocraticdeficit.Inanswertothat,

these claims will be set against the current constellation of the EU, as described in the

previouschapters,andagainstaspectsweexpecttoseeinacontemporarydemocracy.To

conclude,thischapterwillattempttogobeyondtheideaofademocraticdeficit.

DefiningaDemocraticDeficit

Thenotionofademocraticdeficitinmoderndemocracies,isanewone,andwasused

forthefirsttimeinlightofEUintegrationspecifically.Althoughthetermwascoinedinthe

late70s,itgainedmomentuminthe80swhenmorepowerswerebeingconferredontothe

EC(Marquand64).Morerecently,aidedbythevaguenessoftheterm,ithasbeenalmost

appropriated by far right Eurosceptics across the continent (Millar). The term inherently

suggestsalackofdemocracy,andtheabsenceofademocracynaturallyimpliesthattheEU

hasbecomesomekindofdictatorship.Thisbecomesevidentwhen listening topoliticians

suchasGeertWildersandMarielePensayingthat“theEUisamonster(…)force-feedingus

29

massimmigration”4andpromisingthattheywill“fightagainstthedictatorshipofBrussels”5

(Wilders; Le Pen). However, the actual thrust of the term, democratic deficit, is that the

transferofpowers to supranationalbodieshasnotbeenmatchedbyanequalamountof

democraticrepresentation,accountability,legitimacy,andtransparency(Hix,What’sWrong

67-8). This lineof argumentusually followswith fivepoints to substantiate it. Firstly, the

executivebranchhasgainedpower,intheCouncil,EC,andCommission,relativetothatof

thenationalparliaments,whocannolongerrestraintheirrespectiveexecutives(Schmidt1-

2).Secondly,thistransferisnotsatisfactorilycompensatedforbytheEPwhois,depending

on the policy area, at bestmerely on parwith the executives in the Council in terms of

legislativepower(Hix“ThePoliticalSystem”177).Thirdly,thereisno“politicalcontestation,”

astheparliamentaryelectionsthatoccurevery5yearsdonotelecttheEuropeanexecutive,

which means that citizens’ preferences are secondary in EU decision-making, being only

applicabletothelegislative(Follesdal556-7).Fourthly,despiteattemptstodemocratisethe

EU,itisstillviewedas“undemocratic;”itsinstitutionsarenotwhatEUcitizensareusedto

anditissimply“toodistant”fromthevoters(Magnette293;Hix,What’sWrong70-1).Fifthly,

Europeans are not against European integration in general, just not in its current

configuration;thesentimentis insteadthatthepolicy-makingoftodaydoesnotrepresent

thewillofthepeopleanddoesnotservethemeither(Verhofstadt;Hix,ThePoliticalSystem

178).

Althougheachofthesepointsdeservesattention,astheyhighlightpotential issues

within thedemocratic fabricof theEU.Therehasbeenvehementdisagreementas to the

veracityoftheseclaims.Mostnotableamongthosewholeadsthechargeagainstthiscritique

isMoravcsik.Accordingtohim,andothers,Europeandecision-makingbyandlargeabidesby

Westernnotionsofwhatoughttoconstituteawell-functioningdemocracy(Moravcsik,“Is

there a Democratic Deficit” 337-8). Moravcsik also questions the degree to which this

particularnotionofdemocracy,whichisappliedtoWesterndemocraticnation-states,canbe

transferredsuccessfullytoInternationalOrganisationssuchastheEU;hethereforeurgeshis

readersto“calibrate(…)democraticmetrics(…)tocheckifthecurrentarrangementsarethe

best feasible under real-world politics” (Ibid). By this he means that certain aspects of

supranational politics are bound to remain problematic. For instance, from the sheer

4Originaltext:“deEU,hetmonster(…)duwtonsdemassaimmigratie(…)doordestrot”5Originaltext:“Luttercontreladictaturedel’Europe”

30

multinational scope of the EU it must almost inadvertently follow that it is a distant

institution,andwherenationalpolitiesareabletodrawoncommonhistorytofosternational

cohesion,theEUislacking(Moravcsik“TheEUain’t”38).

Thisnotwithstanding,thefivepointsarguingthattheEUhascometosufferfroma

democraticdeficitseema“damningcritique”ofthecurrentfunctioningoftheEU(Hix,What’s

Wrong72).Althoughthereisprobably,tovaryingdegrees,truthtomostoftheseclaims,itis

worth to consider themcloselybeforeaccepting themas true. Thenotion that European

integrationhasrenderednationalparliamentstoothless,thattheEPdoesnotcoverthesame

amount of executive censure, and that, consequently, the executives can no longer be

checkedthewayitwasdonebeforeEuropeanintegration,raisestheissueofaccountability

inEUpolitics(Katz55).However,thiscriticismassumesthatnationalparliamentswere“in

control” before, which is untrue, as “parliaments have always been dominated by” the

executivebranch(Hix,What’sWrong72-3).Moreover,althoughnationalparliamentscannot

really callout theCommissionon itspolicy-making– something that theEPcando– the

government representatives in the Council and EC are still accountable to their various

nationalparliaments,and thus theirpopulation.Although the introductionofQMV in the

Councilhasdecreasedthisinfluenceofnationalparliaments,itisinexactlythesepolicyareas,

thattheEPhasbeenelevatedtoco-legislator,thusmaintaininganappropriateamountof

accountability(Ibid).ThenotionthattheEUsuffersfromalackoftransparency,isaproblem

thatmostpeoplewouldagreewith;however,howopaqueistheEUdecision-makingprocess

really? All conclusions, treaties, and other documents are available online, and most

discussions in the EP and Council can even be watched via a live stream. This level of

transparencyis“goldstandard”andnotevenmatchedbymostnationalgovernments(Ibid).

Lastly,theclaimthattheaveragevoterisnotbeingrepresentedinthepolicy-makingatthe

Europeanlevel,isalsodifficulttobelieveinlightoftheextensiveinstitutionalframework.For

anypolicytopass,itneedstogothroughastringentsetofinstitutionalchecks-and-balances,

theapprovaloftheCommission,theCouncil,andtheEPisrequired;anylegislationmustthus

bebroadlycarried,oritwillnotpass(Hix,ThePoliticalSystem179).Furthermore,anypiece

of legislation issubject to judicial reviewbybothnationalcourtsandtheECJ (Hix,What’s

Wrong75).Theargumentsforademocraticdeficitarethereforenotasdamningastheyfirst

appear.

31

Havingsaidthat,therearetwopointstopickupon.Firstandforemost,thecritique

thattheEUdoesnothaveanelectedexecutive.Inmostelectionsitisthelegislativebranch

thatweelect,but fromthat, the legislativechoosesandendorses thegovernment,which

makestheexecutive“dependentonthelegislative”foritscontinuedexistence(Kreppel170).

This processdoesnotoccur at the EU level, and though itmay seema small aspectof a

democratic system, it is criticalone,as itprovidespolitical contestation,whichgrants the

population an important modicum of influence on the agenda setting process. In

parliamentaryelections,weprimarilyvoteonpartiesandpeoplebecauseoftheirideasand

plansforthecountry,andwehopetheycanputtheminpracticebybecominganexecutive.

Politicalpartiesthenadjustorprofilethemselvesaccordingly.Onthisfront,theEUmaywell

beaproceduralrepresentationaldemocracy,butsubstantively,thereareseverelimitations

duetothepersistingissueofanunelectedexecutive,whichplaysintothepeople’sideathat

theCommissionersare“unelected(…)unaccountabletechnocrats”(Peterson96).Asecond

partofthecritiquetopickuponistheEU’slackoftransparency.Asaforementioned,theEU

hasdonemuchtoremedythisissuealready,mostnotablybyprovidingaccesstoalmostall

theimportantdocumentsoftheEUonline.However,suchtransparencyneglectsthathaving

athoroughpoliticalgroundingisalmostaprerequisiteinunderstandingtheEUasabodyof

politicalrepresentation.Sodespitethetransparency,nothinghaschangedabouttheinherent

complexity of the EU. This complexitymay be understandable, in light of the integration

processandthecontinualcontestationofsupranationalandintergovernmentalforces,butit

doesnotspeaktothepeople’simagination,nordoesithaverecognisablefeaturesfromthe

respectiveMemberStates’owndemocracies–withthesoleexceptionoftheEP.TheEUmay

thusbetransparent,butitisstillnotaccessibleforthepeopleitpurportstogovern,aseven

the most engaged intellectually grounded citizens experience difficulty in trying to

understandit.

All in all, the EU possesses all the institutional components for a procedural

representativedemocracy,becauseitenjoys:aseparationofpowers,electionsevery5years,

andchecks-and-balanceson“theexerciseofpower”(Hix,What’sWrong85;Moravcsik,“Is

ThereaDemocraticDeficit”338).Theproblemliesinamoresubstantiveissue;asEuropean

citizensarebarelyincludedinthepolicy-makingprocessonthesupranationallevel.Thishas

twomaincauses:thereisnoperceivedlegitimatesupranationalexecutiverepresentingall

Europeansdue toa lackofpolitical contestationand theEU’sdemocratic institutionsare

32

inaccessible to many Europeans because of their complexity (Bellamy 82-3). There may

thereforebealimitedsubstantivedemocraticdeficit,butitisdefinitelynotasextensiveas

manywouldhaveusbelieve.Thisconclusionthereforeautomaticallyleadsustothequestion

to what extend we can compare International Organisations such as the EU to national

democraciesasweknowthem.ThisthesismayhaveestablishedthattheEUisasupranational

bodywitha“quasi-constitutional”foundation,butitdefinitelylackstherequiredunityand

pooledsovereigntyforanation-stateorfederation;itisthereforeremarkablethattheEUis

stillexpectedtoliveuptothesamedemocraticmarkers(Dehousse39).Thatisabitlikerating

afishonitsabilitytoclimbatree.Inthisfashion,MoravcsikhasquestionedwhethertheEU

hasademocraticdeficitatall,arguingthatthereissufficientdemocraticlegitimacyforthe

amountofpowerstransferredtotheEU(“TheEUain’t”45;“IsthereaDemocraticDeficit”

338).Nonetheless,inanalysingthedemocraticstateoftheEU,theredoseemtobecertain

substantivelimitations,meaningthatthereisademocraticdeficit,toanextent.

MovingBeyondaDemocraticDeficit

TheissueofaEuropeandemocraticdeficitiscertainlyprofound,especiallyforaUnion

that is established on democratic principles and that prides itself on these very same

principles(TEUarticle2).However,thisanalysisdoesnotgofarenough,asthisdemocratic

deficit ismerelysymptomaticofanunderlyingproblem,whichisthatofpoliticaldirection

andwhattheEUisinitsessencetoday.Althoughthelattercanbeapproximatedthroughan

analysisofthefoundingTreatiesoftheEU,seechapters2and3,theambiguityandget-out-

of-jail-for-freecardswithinthesetreatiesleavemuchopentotheinterpretationofthepeople

executingthem.TheEU’s“democraticdeficit”isthereforereallyabout“thenature,functions,

and goals of the EU” rather than the extent towhich democracy has been instilled in its

institutions (Majone 27). Amongst other things, this becomes evident from the academic

debateontheEU’sdemocraticdeficitintheprevioussection.Moravcsikcontendsthatthere

isnodemocraticdeficitatall,whereasHixarguesthattheEUlackspoliticalcontestationand

isthereforedemocraticallydeficient(“TheEUain’t”45;Hix,What’sWrong85).Forthemost

part,theyagree,buttheirdifferingconclusionshingeontheiraprioriassumptionsaboutthe

natureoftheEUtoday,andwhatthe“end-point”oftheintegrationprocessis(Schmidt267).

In thepast thisambiguityhasservedtheEUwell,becauseenoughroomwas left forpro-

33

integrationiststohopeforaUnitedStatesofEurope;andsufficientrestrictionswereputin

placetopacifythosewaryofanything“beyondthenation-state”(Ibid).

However, we are currently at a point in history – one that was arguably already

reachedadecadeago–wherethevaguenesshasbecomecounter-productive,asthevacuum

intheexplanatoryframeworkoftheEUhaspermittedEuroscepticstofillthevoid.Thereis

therefore need for clarification, a good concerted answer from Europe and theMember

States’nationalgovernmentsastowhereweareandwherewearegoing.IfEuropeansdo

notknowwhattheycan,orshould,expectfromtheEU,subsequentreformsarelikelytofail,

irrespectiveoftheirquality.ClarifyingtheessenceoftheEU,anditsultimatedestination,is

thereforeparamounttothelongevityoftheEU(Ibid).Overtheyearstherehavebeenmany

suggestionsforpotentialalternativesrangingfromaregulativeUnion,toviewingtheEUasa

regionalstatethatgoverns“forandwiththepeople,”tothatofafederalstate(Majone28;

Schmidt268;Rosamund,TheoriesofEuropeanIntegration23).Whattherightsystemwould

be,isnotformetodecideatthismoment,butthatthecurrentconfigurationoftheEUneeds

tobeclarifiedandreconsidered,isclear.

Insummary,thecritiqueofademocraticdeficitintheEUisallbutnew,buthasinthe

past15yearsgainedinprominence.Althoughthetermdoesnothaveadefinitionassuch,it

generallyindicatesthattheincreaseofcompetencesattheUnionlevelhavenotgonehand-

in-handwithanincreaseinitsdemocraticstructures.TherearefivecharacteristicsoftheEU

generally associated with this democratic deficit: the power of the legislative national

parliaments has been eroded and that of the executives been increased by European

integration, the EP is tooweak tomake up for this asymmetry, EU policies are generally

regardedasnot representativeof thewishesof theaverageEuropeancitizen, there isno

executivecontestationintheEU,andtheEUsuffersfromalackoftransparency.Apartfrom

thelasttwo,thesecritiques,thoughnoteworthy,arebasedonmisconceptionsofthecurrent

configurationoftheEU.Toanextent,thisisthereforeindicativeofasubstantivedemocratic

deficit; however, can theEU, a “quasi-constitutional” supranationalorganisation reallybe

judgedondemocraticmarkersintendedforanation-statewithoutbeingone(Dehousse39)?

Inanycase,theissueofademocraticdeficit,thoughserious,onlyseemstobethesymptom

ofanunderlyingproblemthatisfarmoreserious,asthereisnoagreementamongtheEU

MemberStatesorinstitutionsastowhattheEUisorwhereitwillgo.Whetheryouconsider

34

theEUashavingademocraticdeficitisthusinpartdependentonyourinterpretationofits

inherent nature. Without clarity on this crucial point, it will be difficult to advance the

Europeanproject.

35

5. Conclusion

To determinewhether the EU is a supranational political bodywith a democratic

deficitthisthesisexploredthehistoryofEuropeanintegration,theinstitutionalframework,

supranationalityandintergovernmentalism,andconcludedwithanexaminationofthestate

oftheEU’sdemocracy.

Unlike what we may think, the history of European integration was not a linear

progressionofincreasingintegrationwiththeultimategoalofaUnitedStatesofEuropein

mind.Onthecontrary,though“incremental,”Europeanintegrationhaslargelybeenamessy

processofcontendingviewsonthefutureofEurope,andsohaditsupsanddowns(Dehousse

39). The reason that Europe is a “quasi-constitutional” political body today, is a direct

consequence of a great willingness of national leaders to compromise and the political

climateattimesofbigchanges(Ibid).Interestingly,however,thediscussionsthatEuropeans

havetodaywhenspeakingofEurope’sfuturefollowsimilarpatternstothoseof60yearsago,

and are largely centred around supranationalism versus intergovernmentalism. This is

perhapsbestevidencedbytheconstitutionaldebateofthe50sandtheearly21stcentury.

Overtheyears,thisdichotomousprocesshasledtoaninterestinginstitutionalframework

thatbothtriestoadvanceEurope’sinterestsingeneralwhilesimultaneouslytryingtoprotect

MemberStates’sovereignty.

In this institutional framework the three branches of government: the legislative,

executive, and judiciary are divided over five of the EU’s seven institutions. The EP,

Commission,andECJ,representthesupranationalaspectsoftheEU,andtheECandCouncil

the intergovernmentalist ones. The result is a complex set of powers attributed to every

institution,apartfromtheECJ,tomakesurethateachcankeeptheotherincheck.Inthis

manner,theEPandCouncilare,forinstance,co-legislators.Mostpoliciescannotpasswithout

the consent of both these institutions. This shows that there is awillingness to pool the

decision-makingprocess,butonlytoadegree,asthereareintergovernmentalchecks,or‘get-

out-of-jail-for-freecards,’availableforwhenaMemberStateisoftheopinionapolicywould

infringesignificantlyontheirsovereignty.

TheEUtodaythereforepossessesboththeinstitutionstobeanintergovernmental

andsupranationalUnion.Ingeneral, itappearsthattheintergovernmentalinstitutionsare

slightly better developed than the supranational ones, withmore “political authority” to

36

make important, far-reaching decisions (Lewis 142). Nonetheless, it has been these very

institutions that have built the EU as we know it today, including those aspects where

sovereigntyhasbeentransferredtothesupranational.Toaddtothat,thevariousMember

Statesevenenforcethedecisionsofsupranationalinstitutions,eveniftheydonotagreewith

them,asoftenhappenswiththeECJ’sdecisions(Kapsis174-5).Thisambiguityintheset-up

oftheEU’sinstitutionsthereforeallowsforadegreeofinterpretationintermsofwhatthe

scopeofeachinstitutionreallyis.Inlightofthis,theEUcanberegardedasasupranational

body,becauseitisinvirtueofthisambiguousinstitutionalframeworkthatsupranationalism

isallowedtothrive.Assuch,theintergovernmentalfeaturesoftheUnioncanbeunderstood

assafeguards,ifyouwill,toensuretheintegrityoftherespectivenation-states.

ThisbringsthisthesistotheissueofwhethertheEUhasademocraticdeficitornot.

Overall, it seems that the EU fulfils the requirements ofwhatwould usually constitute a

democracyintoday’sworld:thereisaseparationofpower,electionseveryfiveyears,anda

multitude of checks-and-balances for the “exercise of power” (Hix, What’s Wrong 85;

Moravcsik “Is There a Democratic Deficit” 338). What it lacks, however, is executive

contestation,meaningthatthe inclusionofthepopulation’svoice intheagenda-setting is

severely limited. Moreover, though strides have been made in making the EU a more

transparentplace,itlacksaccessibilitytotheaverageEuropean.Whatwesee,therefore,isa

political body that contains all the institutions for a well-functioning democracy, called

procedural,butnotonewheretheexecutivedecision-makingisnecessarilyrepresentativeof

thegoverned,anaspectofsubstantivedemocracy.

Having said that, it is interesting that we expect the EU to fulfil the democratic

requirementsusuallyattributedtoanation-state.Indeed,Moravscikhascontendedthatin

thecontemporarypoliticalrealitytheEUdoesnotsufferfromademocraticdeficitatall,as

thelegitimacytransferredtotheEUisappropriateforitscompetences(“TheEUain’t”45).I

argue that suchdifferences stem fromamore seriousproblem thanademocraticdeficit,

namely,aninabilitytocometoa“universalagreement”concerningthemostbasicessence

oftheEU.SolongasthereisnoclarityconcerningwheretheEUis,andwhereit isgoing,

discontentwiththeEUwillcontinuetogrow,irrespectivewhattheEUdoestoreform.

Inconclusion,theEUcantoanextendberegardedasasupranationalpoliticalbody.

AlthoughtheEU’sinstitutionsdonotbetrayademocraticdeficit,substantivelythereisalack

ofpoliticalcontestationandaccessibility,whichexcludesthepopulation fromshapingthe

37

agenda-settingoftheUnion.Thisanalysisis,however,contingentonmyinterpretationofthe

scopeandessenceoftheEU’sinstitutions,asputforthinthisthesis.

38

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44

AppendixA:TimelineofEuropeanIntegration(Cini13-38;“EverCloserUnion”71)

- 1948March:TreatyofBrussels

- 1948April:creationoftheOEEC

- 1948May:TheHagueCongressofEurope

- 1949May:CouncilofEuropecreated

- 1950May:ShumanPlanproposed

- 1950October:EDCproposed

- 1951April:TreatyofParisagreeingtocreatetheECSC

- 1952May:TreatyonEDCsigned

- 1952July:ECSCestablished

- 1953March:DraftTreatyontheEPCadopted

- 1954August:AssembleeNationalerejectsEDC

- 1954October:WEUestablished

- 1955June:MessinaDeclaration

- 1957March:TreatyofRome

- 1958January:EECandEurotomestablished

- 1961July:TheFouchetplanproposed

- 1963February:VanGendenLoosvNederlandseBelastingenestablishingdirecteffect

- 1964July:CostavsENELestablishingprimacy

- 1965June:Empty-chaircrisis

- 1968July:CustomUnioncompleted

- 1970October:ReportonEMUpublished

- 1973January:Denmark,Ireland,andtheUKjoin

- 1973October:OilCrisisstarts

- 1974April:Britishgovernmentrenegotiatesmembershipterms

- 1974September:formationoftheEuropeanCouncil

- 1979March:EuropeanMonetarySystemestablished

- 1979June:FirstEPelections

- 1981January:GreeceJoins

- 1982February:Greenlandleaves

- 1984June:Fontainebleausummit

- 1985March:SingleMarketagreedupon

45

- 1986January:PortugalandSpainjoin

- 1987July:SEAtakeseffect

- 1991December:MaastrichtECagreestotheTEU

- 1992February:TEUsigned

- 1993November:EUestablished

- 1995January:Austria,Finland,andSwedenjoin

- 1997October:TreatyofAmsterdamsigned

- 2001February:TreatyofNicesigned

- 2002January:IntroductionoftheEuro

- 2002February:InauguralplenarysessionoftheEuropeanConvention

- 2004May: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,Malta,

Poland,Slovakia,andSloveniajointheEU

- 2004October:theCTissigned

- 2005May:FrancerejectstheCT

- 2005June:TheNetherlandsrejectstheCT

- 2005June:ECannouncesapauseintheratificationoftheCT

- 2007January:BulgariaandRomaniajointheEU

- 2007December:TreatyofLisbonsigned

- 2008June:IrishelectoraterejectTreatyofLisbon

- 2009December:TreatyofLisbonentersintoforce

46

AppendixB:ExcerptsfromtheSchumanDeclaration(Schuman,1950)

Worldpeacecannotbesafeguardedwithoutthemakingofcreativeeffortsproportionateto

thedangerswhichthreatenit.(…)Europewillnotbemadeallatonce,oraccordingtoasingle

plan.Itwillbebuiltthroughconcreteachievementswhichfirstcreateadefactosolidarity.

The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old

oppositionofFranceandGermany.Anyactiontakenmustinthefirstplaceconcernthesetwo

countries.With this aim in view, the French Government proposes that action be taken

immediatelyononelimitedbutdecisivepoint.ItproposesthatFranco-Germanproductionof

coalandsteelasawholebeplacedunderacommonHighAuthority,withintheframework

ofanorganizationopentotheparticipationoftheothercountriesofEurope.Thepoolingof

coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common

foundationsforeconomicdevelopmentasafirststepinthefederationofEurope,andwill

changethedestiniesofthoseregionswhichhavelongbeendevotedtothemanufactureof

munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims. The solidarity in

productionthusestablishedwillmake itplain thatanywarbetweenFranceandGermany

becomesnotmerelyunthinkable,butmateriallyimpossible.Thesettingupofthispowerful

productiveunit,opentoallcountrieswillingtotakepartandboundultimatelytoprovideall

themembercountrieswiththebasicelementsofindustrialproductiononthesameterms,

willlayatruefoundationfortheireconomicunification.(…)Bypoolingbasicproductionand

by institutinganewHighAuthority,whosedecisionswillbindFrance,Germanyandother

membercountries,thisproposalwillleadtotherealizationofthefirstconcretefoundation

of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace. To promote the

realizationoftheobjectivesdefined,theFrenchGovernmentisreadytoopennegotiations

onthefollowingbases.ThetaskwithwhichthiscommonHighAuthoritywillbechargedwill

bethatofsecuring intheshortestpossibletimethemodernizationofproductionandthe

improvementofitsquality;thesupplyofcoalandsteelonidenticaltermstotheFrenchand

Germanmarkets,aswellastothemarketsofothermembercountries;thedevelopmentin

common of exports to other countries; the equalization and improvement of the living

conditionsofworkersintheseindustries.(…)Incontrasttointernationalcartels,whichtend

toimposerestrictivepracticesondistributionandtheexploitationofnationalmarkets,and

tomaintainhighprofits,theorganizationwillensurethefusionofmarketsandtheexpansion

47

ofproduction.Theessentialprinciplesandundertakingsdefinedabovewillbethesubjectof

atreatysignedbetweentheStatesandsubmittedfortheratificationoftheirparliaments.(…)

ThecommonHighAuthorityentrustedwiththemanagementoftheschemewillbecomposed

of independent persons appointed by the governments, giving equal representation. A

chairmanwillbechosenbycommonagreementbetweenthegovernments.TheAuthority's

decisionswillbeenforceableinFrance,Germanyandothermembercountries.Appropriate

measureswillbeprovidedformeansofappealagainstthedecisionsoftheAuthority.(…)

TheinstitutionoftheHighAuthoritywill innowayprejudgethemethodsofownershipof

enterprises.Intheexerciseofitsfunctions,thecommonHighAuthoritywilltakeintoaccount

thepowersconferredupontheInternationalRuhrAuthorityandtheobligationsofallkinds

imposeduponGermany,solongastheseremaininforce.

48

AppendixC:TheOrdinaryLegislativeProcess(Shackleton137)