THESIS ADVISERRECOMMENDATION LETTER

i

THESIS ADVISERRECOMMENDATION LETTER

This thesis entitled “SOUTH OSSETIA WAR: RUSSIAN FEDERATION

DEFENSE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ON GEORGIA AS RESPONDS

TO SOUTH OSSETIA WAR 2008-2009” prepared and submitted by Jonathan

Panaluan Damanik in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Bachelor of Art in International Relations in the Faculty of Humanities has been

reviewed and found to have satisfied the requirements for a thesis fit to be

examined. I therefore recommend this thesis for Oral Defense.

Cikarang, Indonesia

Recommended and Acknowledged by,

Hendra Manurung, SIP., MA.

Thesis Adviser

ii

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I declare that this thesis, entitled “SOUTH OSSETIA WAR: RUSSIAN

FEDERATION DEFENSE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ON GEORGIA

AS RESPONDS TO SOUTH OSSETIA WAR 2008-2009” is, to the best of my

knowledge and belief, an original piece of work that has not been submitted,

either in whole or in part, to another university to obtain a degree.

Cikarang, Indonesia,

Jonathan Panaluan Damanik

iii

PANEL OF EXAMINER APPROVAL SHEET

The Panel of Examiners declare that the thesis entitled “SOUTH OSSETIA WAR:

RUSSIAN FEDERATION DEFENSE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ON

GEORGIA AS RESPONDS TO SOUTH OSSETIA WAR 2008-2009” that was

submitted by Jonathan Panaluan Damanik majoring in International Relations from

the School of Humanities was assessed and approved to have passed the Oral

Examinations on 10 February 2016.

Prof. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Ph.D.

Chair – Panel of Examiners

Drs. Teuku Rezasyah, M.A., Ph.D.

Examiner

Hendra Manurung, SIP., MA.

Thesis Adviser

iv

ABSTRACT

South Ossetia War: Russian Federation Defense Policy

Implementation on Georgia as Responds to South Ossetia

War 2008-2009

2008 was a dark period for South Ossetia. Sudden attack by

Georgia on 7 August 2008 completely destroyed South

Ossetia. During the attack, Georgia wounding civilians and

Russian Federation peacekeepers. This military action

provoked Russia to implement its defense policy. In

implementing its defense policy, Russia has been criticized by

the West, NATO and the US.This thesis will analyze the

Implementation of Russian Federationdefense policytoward

Georgia in reaction to South Ossetia War (2008-2009).

The research was done in the period of December 2016-April

2017, employing qualitative method to construct narrative

and analysis from various news sources,journal, books,

official document and statement. Most of the research was

done at Adam Kurniawan Library.

Keywords: South Ossetia War, Russian Federation Defense

Policy, Georgia Military Act, NATO Engagement, National

Interest

v

ABSTRAK

Perang Ossetia Selatan: Implementasi Kebijakan

Pertahanan Federasi Rusia terhadap Georgia dalam Reaksi

terhadap Perang Ossetia Selatan 2008-2009

2008 adalah tahun yang buruk untuk Ossetia Selatan.

Serangan mendadak oleh Georgia pada tanggal 7 Agustus

2008 benar-benar menghancurkan Ossetia Selatan. Selama

serangan tersebut, Georgia melukai warga sipil serta

pasukan penjaga perdamaian Federasi Rusia. Aksi militer ini

memprovokasi Rusia untuk menerapkan kebijakan

pertahanannya. Dalam menerapkan kebijakan

pertahanannya, Rusia telah dikritik oleh Barat, yaitu NATO

dan AS. Tesis ini akan menganalisis Implementasi kebijakan

Pertahanan Federasi Rusia di Georgia sebagai reaksi

terhadap Perang Ossetia Selatan (2008-2009).

Penelitian dilakukan pada periode September 2016-April

2017, dengan menggunakan metode kualitatif untuk

menyusun narasi dan analisis dari berbagai sumber berita,

jurnal, buku, dokumen dan pernyataan resmi. Sebagian besar

penelitian dilakukan di Perpustakaan Adam Kurniawan.

Kata kunci: Perang Ossetia Selatan, Kebijakan Pertahanan

Federasi Rusia, Tindakan Militer Georgia, Keterlibatan

NATO, Kepentingan Nasional

vi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The paper I write will not describe the content of my thesis, but more like the

contents of my heart when creating the thesis. The contents are not sad, writing is fun,

just enjoy. Most importantly this funny column is presented as a thank-you note to

those who have given, supported, prayed, and a pile of passion to finish this Kitab

Sutasoma a.k.a Thesis as well as end a period that is considered beautiful or maybe

destroyed. First of all I thank my Lord God the most Holy Trinity because I still

breath and still have some best chance, so I can make my parent proud of me, yes

even though not much pride. Then for Dewa Jasin, my alternative god, thank you so

much for being a joke of entertainers.

Next to my mother Elizabeth Lucy Siregar and my dad Adrianus

Parlindungan Damanik, I want to say thank you very much, because both of you've

given me chance, my first chance I can live this world especially live with a beautiful

family and the second I can have the opportunity to school To scholars. Yes

hopefully in the future I also have a greater chance to give more pride for both of you.

Still in my family too, thanks to my two younger brothers Bonifacius Josua Naposo

Damanik and Joseph Sahkuda Damanik, even though you all just say the spirit and

not other thing more, but still thanks. Lol.

A thank you that is no less important must be given to all lecturers in the

President University. There are two best lectures, first is Prof.Banyu and second is Sir

Hendra Manurung. Thanks really both of them, yes it is not gently educated by both

of them, it feels hard as thrown by tanker ship fresh from harbor, but because of them

I can be strong in facing thesis defense. Continue also to other lecturers who I will

miss, Sir Reza, Sir Indra, Sir Eric, Ma‟am Witri, Ms Izanna, and Ms Natasha. And In

my opinion not only lecturers who I miss, I also will miss president university and all

Cikarang also. Definitely after leaving Cikarang I believe I will miss. Hot place, not

vii

nice place, harsh environment, and dusty, But here I am 4 years must study hard and

know the world.

Furthermore for the friends a.k.a begajul muda the world's vanity challenger.

Biggest thanks and respect for Richard Mattoali, 4-year roommate, 10 semester

classmates, Internship friends, crazy friends together until the death come. Continue

to friends from Kos Hijau Beseri aka The Nest of Green Rats, Luki, Danar, Achong,

Andi, Irland, Gerald, Aryo, Diwang, Gilang, Ryan, soul of Moeza and soul number 4.

Next for Budu Bagak who not came after I finished m thesis defense then only say

congrats it also because I have to came to them, Remon, Daniel, Richard, Ridho,

Hendra, Lily, and Monica. There are also families who claim to be family, Cosmic

Family who already fervor fit again stupidity when I‟m not work for my thesis,

ranging from Lae Elroy, Adit, Dharma, Sandro, Afdal, and plus-plus for Mustika,

Anggita, Fadli, and Alex. Which is not less important than the beautiful Berries

Family, thanks a lot for Conna, Bella, Milo, Gabby, Lily, Bryan, Indri, Alfin

especially for the KFC Bucket. Then there is also a request called, from the Warsun,

there are Alay, Bagus, Faris, Tuplo, Yogo, Jose, AA, and Teteh. Then also thanks

really the Newbun boy who ask me to finished thesis faster so I can play to Jakarta

early, Andika, Tigor, Alri, same Dodo. The last for those Unyu Supporter, she always

give me spirit when I‟m down, Jesslyn Julia Tanty, thanks so much.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THESIS ADVISERRECOMMENDATION LETTER ................................................. i

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY ......................................................................... ii

PANEL OF EXAMINER APPROVAL SHEET ......................................................... iii

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................. iv

ABSTRAK .................................................................................................................... v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ........................................................................................... vi

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1

1.1. Background of the study ................................................................................. 1

1.2. Problem Identification .................................................................................... 7

1.3. Statement of the Problem ............................................................................... 9

1.4. Research Objective ......................................................................................... 9

1.5. Significant of Study ...................................................................................... 10

1.6. Theoretical Framework ................................................................................ 10

1.6.1. Realism in International Relations ........................................................ 10

1.6.2. Defense Policy ...................................................................................... 12

1.7. Scope and Limitation .................................................................................... 13

1.8. Structure of Thesis ........................................................................................ 14

1.8.1. Chapter I – Introduction ........................................................................ 14

1.8.2. Chapter II – South Ossetia War August 2008 ....................................... 14

1.8.3. Chapter III – Russia Defense Policy ..................................................... 14

ix

1.8.4. Chapter IV – Russian Federation‟s Defense Policy Implementation on

Conflict Resolution with Georgia ........................................................................ 15

1.8.5. Chapter V – Conclusion ........................................................................ 15

CHAPTER II SOUTH OSSETIA WAR AUGUST 2008 .......................................... 16

2.1. History between Russia – Georgia – and South Ossetia .............................. 16

2.2. Georgia in USSR Era ................................................................................... 18

2.2.1. History of Georgia – South Ossetia War............................................... 21

2.2.2. Rose Revolution .................................................................................... 25

2.3. South Ossetia War ........................................................................................ 28

2.4. Russia Military Forces .................................................................................. 37

2.5. Georgia Military Forces ............................................................................... 40

CHAPTER III RUSSIA DEFENSE POLICY ............................................................ 46

3.1. National Strategic Concept ........................................................................... 47

3.2. Russia Defense Policy in 1990s ................................................................... 50

3.3. Russia Military Doctrine 2000 ..................................................................... 51

3.3.1. Russian military doctrine before South Ossetia War ............................ 53

3.3.2. Russian Federation military doctrine after South Ossetia War ............. 61

3.4. Russia Military Forces in 2008 .................................................................... 65

CHAPTER IV RUSSIAN FEDERATION‟S DEFENSE POLICY

IMPLEMENTATION ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION WITH GEORGIA ............. 70

4.1. Russia Involvement in South Ossetia War ................................................... 72

4.1.1. Russia before South Ossetia War .......................................................... 72

4.1.2. Russia during South Ossetia War .......................................................... 86

4.1.3. Russia after South Ossetia War ............................................................. 96

x

4.2. Russia Defense Policy Implementation ...................................................... 103

4.2.1. Military aspect ..................................................................................... 103

4.2.1.1. Russia Defense Budget .................................................................... 106

4.2.2. Politic and Diplomatic Aspect ............................................................ 109

CHAPTER V CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 111

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................... 115

1

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the study

Республикӕ Хуссар Ирыстон or which we know as South Ossetia. South

Ossetia is one of state in south Caucasus region. South Ossetia recognized as

independent state by some country like, Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru,

Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and Transnistria1. South Ossetia has 3,900

km2 square kilometers territory

2, with population over 53,000 people

3. Tskhinvali is

the capital city and Tskhinvali also city of administration of South Ossetia. South

Ossetia purchasing power parity GPD US$ 15 million4. Small industry is the most

contribute sector in South Ossetia Economic5. Even industry contribute on

development of South Ossetia economic but South Ossetia economic still below

average. For the fact that South Ossetia need 3,062 rubles a month in the fourth

quarter of 2007 or 23.5% below Russia but South Ossetia income way smaller than

Russia6. Other fact also says that Russia spend 10 billion rubles to restore South

1World Heritage Encyclopedia. “International recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” World

Heritage Encyclopedia.

http://www.worldlibrary.org/articles/international_recognition_of_abkhazia_and_south_ossetia 2Helen Krag and LarshFunch. “South Ossetia."KafkasVakfi (Caucasus Foundation), n.d.

http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/63/129.html 3Minority Rights Group International, “World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples –

Georgia.” Minority Rights Group International, October 2011.

http://www.refworld.org/docid/4954ce09c.html 4MamukaAreshidze, "Current Economic Causes of Conflict in Georgia", unpublished report for UK

Department for International Development (DFID), 2002. Cited from Georgia: Avoiding War in South

Ossetia by International Crisis Group, 26.11.2006 Archived August 6, 2009, at the Wayback Machine. 5Dzhioeva, Fatima, “Cost Of Conflict: The Economic Aspect.” South Ossetian State University.

http://scar.gmu.edu/sites/default/files/global-documents/cpp/cost-of-

conflict/Fatima%20Dzhoieva_Eng%20.pdf 6Delyagin, Mikhail (March 2009). "A Testing Ground for Modernization and a Showcase of Success".

Russia in Global Affairs.

http://www.worldlibrary.org/Results.aspx?PageIndex=1&SearchAuthor=World+Heritage+Encyclopedia&AuthorType=1

http://www.worldlibrary.org/articles/international_recognition_of_abkhazia_and_south_ossetia

http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/63/129.html

http://scar.gmu.edu/sites/default/files/global-documents/cpp/cost-of-conflict/Fatima%20Dzhoieva_Eng%20.pdf

http://scar.gmu.edu/sites/default/files/global-documents/cpp/cost-of-conflict/Fatima%20Dzhoieva_Eng%20.pdf

http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_12538

2

Ossetia in 20087. That fact give us information to prove that South Ossetia still weak

in economics.

8

Georgia or საქართველო is one of state that fraction from USSR. Georgia

independent on 9 April 1991. Tbilisi is Georgia capital city and by geographic

location Georgia is one of Caucasus country which has 69.700 km2

territory that

borderline with Russian Federation in North side, then Turkey, Armenia, and

Azerbaijan in South. Georgia has 12 province, include South Ossetia, Ajaria, and

Abkhazia as the breakaway region. Georgia is a country that apply semi-presidential

7Delyagin, Mikhail. "A Testing Ground for Modernization and a Showcase of Success". Russia in

Global Affairs, March 2009.

http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_12538 8 http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/georgia.pdf

Figure 1: Map of the Russia – Georgia War 2008


3

republic in its government system. So that Georgia led by president and also prime

minister. 84% of Georgia citizen ethnic is Georgian by number 4.5 million people

with Georgian language as their national interest.9

Росси ска е ера и , or which we know as Russian Federation. Russia

is one of state in south Caucasus region. Russia is the country which has largest

surface territory in the world, Russia has 17,075,200 km2 square kilometers territory.

Russia also the ninth most populous state with population over 146.6 million.

Moscow is the capital city and Moscow also city of administration of Russia. Russia

purchasing power parity GPD US$ $3.685 trillion or the big sixth in the world. Small

industry is the most contribute sector in Russia Economic. Natural Gas and oil are

contribute on development of Russia economic.10

The time after Soviet Union broke up, Russia and Georgia still has great

relation, but since 2006 their relation being deteriorate by some conflict chain. The

beginning of the worsening relation between those countries is when 2006 January

Georgia stated that Russia has blowing up gas pipe line in Russia-Georgia Borderline.

Georgia accuse Russia has been sabotaged the gas pipe line to distract the electricity

from Russia to Georgia. Then the next case in 2006 March is Russia stopped mineral

water and grape fruit import from Georgia by excuse Georgia product not

standardized with Russian standard. Those countries relation worse until its climax in

2008 August. At the time Georgia tried to provoke Russia to start the conflict. By

attacking the separatist of South Ossetia and Russia peacekeepers in South Ossetia,

Georgia successful to provoke Russia to build a big conflict.

Brief history, since 1993 Georgia government did negotiation to 3 provinces

region that want to breakaway which are South Ossetia, Ajaria, and Abkhazia but

until 2008 there is no positive significant progress for Georgia government. South

Ossetia as one of breakaway province has different story, as de facto since 1991

9 Georgia, https://www.cia.gov/library/publication/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html

10 Russia, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html

4

South Ossetia is one of independent state republic in Caucasus region. But in other

side by de jure South Ossetia not more than a province in Georgia. After Mikhail

Saakashvili elected in Georgia presidential election 2004, Georgia government try to

approach those three breakaway province. Saakashvili succeed to approach Ajaria as

one of Georgia territory, then he also try to approach South Ossetia and Abkhazia to

joint. Not only reconciliation of economic and the reformation of democracy, Georgia

government also has purpose to united Ajaria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia as their

priority.

In South Ossetia region conflict between Georgia government and Ossetian

separatist frequently happen. In 1993, there is conflict between Ossetian separatist

and Georgia government, and Russia government undertakes to mediate those party

in peace treaty. At the time both party agree to bind in that peace treaty and agree to

place Russia peacekeepers in both side to avoid conflict in the future. In 2008 Mikhail

Saakashvili who been elected twice promised to end that conflict between South

Ossetia, and Abkhazia. In South Ossetia side, there at least been 3 conflict like in

1991-1992, 2004, and 2006. And for Abkhazia there already 5 times in 1992, 1998,

2001, 2006, and 2008. Because of same target as independent state, South Ossetia,

Abkhazia,and Transnistria (located in Moldova) agreed to recognize each other as

independent state in 2006 November 17, even though there is no recognition from

other independent state.

July 2008 the big conflict begin, Georgian army start to attack South Ossetia

separatist. Then in 2008 August 7, Georgia decide to run their decisions are to take

South Ossetia region from the separatist and also to eliminate South Ossetia separatist

who not stand on Georgia government.1112

The operation of eliminating namely Clean

11

Emerson, Michael. "Post-Mortem on Europe's First War of the 21st Century." (PDF). Centre for

European Policy Studies, August 2008

http://aei.pitt.edu/9382/2/9382.pdf 12

Cachia, Joseph M. “Poor Georgia!” Countercurrents.org, 20 August, 2008

http://www.countercurrents.org/cachia200808.htm

http://aei.pitt.edu/9382/2/9382.pdf


5

Field Operation13

. Because of that conflict there are so many victim in South Ossetia

both separatist and civilian.

Georgia decision to eliminate South Ossetia been known by the international

world. Some state actors see that decision as bad thing14

. It be violation of human

rights. One of country that consider that as violation of human rights is Russia. Russia

As the emerging state in that region and neighbor state that border with South Ossetia

which located on top of South Ossetia15

, Russia senses to help South Ossetia to

elucidate the problem. To resolve violation of human right problem that happen in

South Ossetia Russia came with their military forces. Russian Federation who has

placing its peacekeepers in South Ossetia sent more troops to protect that region from

Georgia. To enter Georgia, Russian troops must pass Roki tunnel where connect

South Ossetia and North Ossetia. After pass the tunnel Russian troops forced

Georgian military forces to discharge its position from South Ossetia region.

From the culture perspective, Georgian ethnic in South Ossetia is the

minority, then Ossetian ethnic which the majority wanted to joint with Russia

especially in north Ossetia yet located in Russia territory. And the fact that before the

conflict happen, Russian government already offer 70.000 South Ossetia people to

move to Russia and change its nationality status. Majority of Ossetian in South

Ossetia agree for that so that almost of them has Russian passport.

Since 7 august 2008 South Ossetia is in danger situation especially when

Clean Field operation begin16

. Georgia use its military power to eliminate South

Ossetia when the clean field operation. Basically Clean Field operation have purpose

13

Roman, Kris. “South Ossetia. Operation “Clean Field”.” Rusmedia, August 30, 2008

https://eurorushomepage.wordpress.com/2008/08/30/south-ossetia-operation-clean-field/ 14

Georgia, Events of 2008.

https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2009/country-chapters/europe/central-asia-georgia 15

Helen Krag; LarshFunch. “South Ossetia."KafkasVakfi (Caucasus Foundation), n.d.

http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/63/129.html 16




https://eurorushomepage.wordpress.com/2008/08/30/south-ossetia-operation-clean-field/

https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2009/country-chapters/europe/central-asia-georgia



6

to eliminate South Ossetia militant. 17

Georgia consider that the crisis in South Ossetia

happen because of militant act. By artillery and aircraft fighter Georgia open the

attack on South Ossetia and after that asymmetric warfare begin. Then the condition

takes aside to Georgia and for the achievement, South Ossetia militant defeat easily.18

Problem that comes out is not because of the operation actually. It happen

because of the mental of Georgia military personnel. Many of Georgia military

personnel do not understand the rule of war which mean do not attack or violate

civilian. 19

Then because of it many on South Ossetia civilian die by Georgia armed

forces, both intentionally and unintentionally. Tskhinvali, South Ossetia capital city is

the silent witness of Georgia attack. The number of victims at most found in

Tskhinvali. 20

As we knew, human rights is one of the things that should be uphold by

all state even in war condition. Basically peaceful condition is a circumstances which

all people coveted. 21

One big factor that can support that condition is respect to

human rights. By uphold human right mean no one violate others both physical and

psychological.22

17



Stolz, Vadim. “A TRAP FOR RUSSIA. U.S NEOLIBERALS AND UKRAINIAN FASCISTS

BEHIND OPERATION “CLEAN FIELD”.” Лефт.Ру,

http://left.ru/2008/10/stolz_en179.phtml 19

“Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict over South Ossetia.” Up In

Flames, JANUARY 23, 2009

https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/01/23/flames/humanitarian-law-violations-and-civilian-victims-

conflict-over-south 20

"List of Casualties among the Georgian Military Servicemen". Ministry of Defence of Georgia, 7

June 2012

https://web.archive.org/web/20120607052439/http://www.mod.gov.ge/index.php?page=-

10&Id=31&lang=1 21

“Maintain International Peace and Security” United Nation,

http://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/maintain-international-peace-and-security/ 22

Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights

http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf


7

1.2. Problem Identification

According to the book which The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in

Georgia by Cornell, Svante E. and Starr, S. Frederick, authors analyses that Russia

involved in South Ossetia war in 2008 because of human right violation that happen

in South Ossetia region23

. The reason of the involvement of Russian Federation to

join the war because of consideration about the location of South Ossetia that

borderline with Russia24

. South Ossetia proper located in the south side of Russia.

Then Russia worried that the problem which happen in South Ossetia will be

overspread to the Russia territory, so to prevent that problem overspread Russia

decide to mediate South Ossetia War at the time.

In international world Georgia do not has many role and influence in politic or

other factor, but if we see from NATO perspective Georgia seen as essential state

especially for EU. Many European public believe that Russia military act in Georgia

is one of Russia strategic to dominate oil in Europe. The base of that accusation

because there is BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) oil and gas pipe in Georgia. As

emerging power of that region, Russian government refuse that accusation, Russian

government stated that their military act has purpose to protect Russian citizen who

live in those conflict area.25

Rejection of Russia on accusation of NATO supported also by the fact which

exist, that there Russian citizen with a large number living in South Ossetia become

victims of Georgian military act in South Ossetia. The data say that there were

already 70,000 citizen of South Ossetia, which Russia agreed a bid to become the

citizen of Russia. And obviously if they had agreed to become Russia citizens. Russia

23

Svante E.; Starr, S. Frederick. “The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia.” M.E. Sharpe,

1stjune, 2009

http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/6668107-the-guns-of-august-2008 24

Helen Krag and LarshFunch. “South Ossetia."KafkasVakfi (Caucasus Foundation), n.d.

http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/63/129.html 25

International Crisis Group, Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout (Europe Report no. 195), Tbilisi/Brussel:

ICG, @008 August 22, P. 12


8

as sovereign state must act based on its enactment, so military act in South Ossetia is

to protect its citizens. That‟slogical reason of Russian Federation denied to the

intention to take control of South Ossetia, precisely South Ossetia people who ask to

join his brother in north Ossetia.

As the president of Russia Dmitry Medvedev said that Russia's military action

has purpose to keep the peace in Caucasus region. As a neighboring country Russia

will feel the need to uphold human rights in Georgia, especially South Ossetia. When

South Ossetia situation worsened Russian Federation had sent its peacekeepers,

which be the turning point that stated Russia is care on human right and pro in peace

situation. On 8 August, 10 peacekeepers of Russian Federation has been killed by the

attack of Georgian military forces were admitted to cripple Georgia separatists.26

In August 2008 Georgia military began to attack South Ossetia by the reason

to cripple the South Ossetia separatists, but the fact that a military operation was also

hurt civilians. Data obtained on the victims of the Georgia military attacks on South

Ossetia in August, 2008 stating that there 1500 civilians became victims besides also

36 Russian troops were killed and 300 others wounded.

Base on Kremlin.ru when interview of Russia president Dimitri Medvedev at

the time state that Russia believe their act to resolve the problem that happen in South

Ossetia is their responsible. He believe Russian Federation has responsible to restore

peace in Caucasus region and Fending off foreign influences in CIS States. As we

know that in 2008 Georgia did the military act by eliminate Ossetian in South

Ossetia. At 8 August 2008 Georgia start attack South Ossetia, that attack caused

many of Russian citizen and 10 of Russia peacekeepers killed. As great country

Russia felt compelled to uphold human right in their neighbor state which is

Georgia. Russian military forces believe that act is shape of defending law and order

to protect Russian citizens. Russian Federation placed its peacekeepers in South

26

“Interview with Russian Television Channels.” Kremlin, Moscow, December 24,2008

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/2602

9

Ossetia area to protect that region from Georgia. Roki tunnel is the only way to enter

Georgia, after pass the tunnel Russian troops forced Georgian military forces to

discharge its position from South Ossetia region.27

1.3. Statement of the Problem

The Statement of the problem of this research is:

How did Russian Federation implement its Defense Policy on Georgia as

Responds to South Ossetia War (2008-2009)?

1.4. Research Objective

This thesis has purpose to find the answer from the question using scientific

methods. In this research the writer choose to use the methods of exploratory and

diagnostic research studies. According to C.R. Kothari on his book Research

Methodology: Methods and Techniques, he stated that exploratory research studies

used to gain familiarity with a phenomenon or to achieve new insight into it, while

diagnostic research studies used to determine the frequency with which occurs or

with which it is associated with something else28

.

Therefore, in accordance with the explanation above, this research objective is

to find out and gain more understanding about why Russian Federation did

Engagement towards South Ossetia during South Ossetia war. The analysis about

Russian Federation Defense Policy Implementation on Georgia as Responds to South

Ossetia War 2008-2009

27

“Interview with Russian Television Channels.” Kremlin, Moscow, December 24,2008

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/2602 28

C.R. Kothari. “Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques.” New Age International

Publishers, 2004

http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/15826312-research-methodology

10

1.5. Significant of Study

This research is mean to give valuable knowledge, information, and solution

for the reader, the significant of study is provide analysis and data for the reader

related to perspective of Russian Federation by Its defense policy toward Georgia in

Response to South Ossetia War 2008-2009.

1.6. Theoretical Framework

The main theories which will covers in this thesis research are; Realism as

paradigm with neo-realism as theory, foreign policy theory, and defense policy

theory. Political realism paradigm is the most appropriate concept that can describe

Russian Federation Defense Policy Implementation on Georgia as Responds to South

Ossetia War 2008-2009

1.6.1. Realism in International Relations

Realism has dominated study of international relations by emphasizing on

security competition and war among great powers over the past fifty years. Realism is

an approach to international relations that has emerged gradually through the work of

a series of analysts who have situated themselves within, and thus delimited, a

distinctive but still diverse style or tradition of analysis29

. Realism is shaped by

human nature and the absence of international government. "Human nature has not

changed since the days of classical antiquity" (Thompson, 1985). Realism is

described as dominant theory to analyze International Relations. It is called as

dominant because until the cold war, no other theory could compared and challenged

its assumptions. Even though liberal scholars believe that liberal theory aims to

establish peace and stability that will reduce escalation and conflict, this theory is

finally being questioned since the case of Brexit from European Union.

29

Jack Donnelly, "Realism and International Relations", United Kingdom: Cambridge University,

2000.

11

According to the founding father of Neorealism or structural realism, Kenneth

Waltz, structural realism emphasize that the structure of the system causes states to

compete for power but that states should not strive to maximize power, instead, they

should aim to control an “appropriate” amount of power30

. By means, State can apply

defensive realism in which they will react in order to respond other actions by other

State that threaten this particular State. He believes that the concept of human nature

is purely hypothetical. On his book – Theory of International Politics – human nature

can cause both war and peace at the same time. Waltz explains two conception of

structural realism that international system, which is anarchic, is inevitably. First,

there is no higher authority than the state itself and no world government. On the

other words, international system has shaped State to do self-help in order to protect

its state and power politics. According to Kenneth Waltz (1979), in his book “Theory

of International Politics” he assumes realism theory that:

“States who struggle for power are simply following the

dictates of the international system in order to survive in

an international order where there is no global leviathan

to offer them protection31

.”

Secondly, distribution of capabilities or power is varies, in which each State has

different function and it is differentiated according how much power the state

possess. By means, the importance of distribution of power emphasizing how the

State should behave in order to react such other actions that may harm the State itself.

Moreover, neorealism recognized two main State actors which are hegemony power

and great powers, while the weak states should bandwagoning or aligning with great

powers in order to survive in international system. It is quite different with classical

realism that does not believe in the power of international institution. Neorealism

believes the power of international institution could become the tool for a State to

30

John J. Mearsheimer (2006), Realism, The Real World And The Academy. Retrivied from

http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/StructuralRealism.pdf on September 1, 2016 31

Kenneth Waltz, 1979, The Theory of International Politics, chapter 1. Retrieved from:

https://www.press.umich.edu/pdf/9780472099818-ch1.pdf on September 10, 2016

12

gain more power, for instance the existence of the United Nations of Security Council

(UNSC).

Hence, Waltz believes that international system shaped by anarchic that leads

to self-help in order to protect the state itself. Contrary to the conventional wisdom

then Morgenthau‟s classical realism cannot be seen as a strict first image theory and

Waltzian neorealism is not a purely systemic theory32

.

1.6.2. Defense Policy

The first concept used in this thesis writing is Defense Policy. Defense Policy

is a formulation of strategies which provide a code of conduct, as defined by senior

executive leadership, with the intention to influence and determine, action, decision,

and other matters which relate to the military affairs and its actions. These strategies

are in line with the nation‟s security interest. To put it simply, it is a program which

consist of „ends‟ and „mean‟, formulated for the purpose of fulfilling the national

security concerns and its defense objectives (Tagarev, 2006).

Defense policy requires the establishment of the defense white paper to be

acknowledged as a guideline for the action, values, and principles of the states. States

release its defense white paper to create the guideline for the national defense policy

projection, and also to inform other states about its action plan, whether it is for

cooperation or threat.

Defense Policy aims to strengthen, secure, and defend a State's national

interests in order to respond sense of national identity and perception of threats that

might harm the State‟s interests. Defense policy is a political function; that is, a

choice to use state-sanctioned violence or the threat of violence to advance some

particular communal goal.

32

An Article Entitled "Comparing and Contrasting Classical Realism and Neorealism" by

ArashHeydarian P. (2009) retrieved from: http://www.e-ir.info/2009/07/23/comparing-and-

contrasting-classical-realism-and-neo-realism/ on September 11, 2016.

13

The term of defense policy applied to prevent any kind of threats such as but

not limited to threats from other nations, non-state groups, including force as an

instrument of policy abroad. The defense policy is a form of political concept, in

which it is the nature of State to prepare as well as develop armed forces in order to

achieve national objective. This kind of approach is derived as part of national

security policy to maintain peace and stability as well as the political entity of the

State, which reflects the state policy in the military domain. The trigger of the

concept of defense policy is as follow:

1. It can be analyzed by who trigger the conflict. For instance from the level of

government (national, state, local), functional role (political officials or military

commanders), internal actors (organizations, rebellions), and external actors (other

States)

2. Threat perception that drove by State's neighbors and vice versa that might

jeopardize a State‟s national interests one with another or there are unresolved

historical conflicts

3. Maintain an industrial base that might lead to military potential

4. Military development in order to uphold State‟s national interests

1.7. Scope and Limitation

Several areas are covered by this research is on Russian Federation Defense

Policy Implementation on Georgia as Responds to South Ossetia War 2008-2009

which is the military act that Engagement South Ossetia region. Moreover, this

analysis also talk about Russia defense policy and the national interest of Russian

Federation in South Ossetia to protect its citizen, fending off foreign influences and

keeping peace in South Ossetia.

Second area is about level of analysis of this research, the level of analysis of

this research is the scope of domestic which Russia defense policy and national

interest on South Ossetia war. This area would lead this analysis to the main point of

14

the research about the basic purpose of Russia involvement in South Ossetia War in

2008.

The third area of this analysis is about conflict and policy of Russia since

2008 - 2009. And there some brief history of relation between those three actors since

1922. Meanwhile, this research analysis does not cover areas, such as Georgia and

Russian Federation foreign policy after South Ossetia war 2008.

1.8. Structure of Thesis

1.8.1. Chapter I – Introduction

This chapter aims to introduce the whole content of the thesis briefly. This

chapter contains sub-chapter such as: Background of Study; Problem Identification;

Research Question; Significance of Study; Theoretical Framework; Literature

Review; Definition of Terms; Scope and Limitation and; Thesis Structure. By reading

this chapter, the readers are expected to have basic understand and knowledge on

what the thesis is all about. This chapter also intends to provoke the readers have

further reading on the thesis content.

1.8.2. Chapter II – South Ossetia War August 2008

This chapter will give a further analysis on the history of relation between

Russia – Georgia – South Ossetia, where the pattern of interaction between Russia

with South Ossetia and Georgia a lot of turmoil. A broad picture of Russia as the

largest and influential nation in Caucasus which has a long history with Georgia and

South Ossetia could be seen in this chapter two. The writer will analyze the historical

conflict that happened between those three countries. Then there is four sub-chapter,

which are Georgia in USSR era, history of Georgia – South Ossetia War, Georgia –

South Ossetia post USSR, and Rose revolution. . This chapter later on would

highlight this situation could turmoil conflict history between those three countries.

1.8.3. Chapter III – Russia Defense Policy

This chapter will give a brief explanation about Russian Federation defense

policy which called Russian Federation Defense Policy: Military Doctrine. And also

15

in this chapter 2 will discuss about Russia‟s national interest. One of the core interests

of Russia is the need to protect the citizen and maintaining world peace is the main

interest of Russian Federation, as stated in its defense policy. There also military

component of Russian Federation and the weapon and equipment.

1.8.4. Chapter IV – Russian Federation’s Defense Policy Implementation on

Conflict Resolution with Georgia

The fourth chapter contains Conflict analysis of the South Ossetia War. The

conflict analysis in this chapter is the main content of the entire thesis. The chapter

will be divided into two ways of discuss, the first way is elaborating by the time line

of Russia involvement in South Ossetia War 2008 and second way is by every policy

that Russia apply and implement when South Ossetia War 2008. By the time line of

Russia involvement will be divided into three section, and those all are, first of which

is the involvement of Russia before the South Ossetia war, the second about the

engagement of the Russian Federation during the South Ossetia war, and the third

about Russia's role after the Ossetia conflict. In the third section will also be

explained about NATO's view on the South Ossetia War. Then in second way by

Russia policy that implement will be divide into 2 section, first is from military

aspect, and second by politic and diplomatic aspect. There also elaborating of Russia

military defense budget.

1.8.5. Chapter V – Conclusion

This is the last chapter of the conclusion of this thesis writing. Any

recommendation or suggestion that may be useful for further research related to this

thesis topic; why Russian Federation Defense Policy Implementation on Georgia as

Responds to South Ossetia War 2008-2009 will be elaborated in this chapter.

16

CHAPTER II

SOUTH OSSETIA WAR AUGUST 2008

2.1. History between Russia – Georgia – and South Ossetia

Brief history of Georgia, Georgia is one of Transcaucasia region in east side

of Black Sea. In north side of Georgia there is Russia, Armenia and Turkey in

Georgia South side. Tbilisi is Georgia capital city and by geographic location Georgia

is one of Caucasus country which has 69.700 km2

territory. 84% of Georgia citizen

ethnic is Georgian in the number of 4.5 million. Georgia state history was come from

Colchis kingdom from 3rd

century, Georgia independent in 1918 but was part of

USSR since 1922 until 1991. Then Georgia be the one of state fraction of USSR that

independent in 9 April 1991. Georgia has 12 province, include South Ossetia, Ajaria,

and Abkhazia as the breakaway region. Georgia is a country that apply semi-

presidential republic in its government system. So that Georgia led by president and

also prime minister.33

Base on ethnic factor, South Ossetia and Georgia has different history and

language. South Ossetia descendant come from Indo-European which is Iran. The

similarity between Ossetian ethnic and Georgian just because they has long history of

interaction.34

Because of that south Ossetia want to secede from Georgia and South

Ossetian also want to merge with North Ossetian which mean South Ossetia must be

a part of Russia. By geographic location South Ossetia and North Ossetia separately

by Caucasus Mountains. Local historian claimed that Ossetian descendant been live

in that region since 5 century and make Ossetian nation. Then in 1774 that nation

joined and be one part of Russia kingdom. So from that statement be the fact that

south Ossetian has willingness and pro to join Russia than be a part of Georgia.

33

Georgia, https://www.cia.gov/library/publication/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html 34

Paula Grab, “The View from Abkhazia of South Ossetia Ablaze”, Central Asia Survey, Vol. 28 No 2,

June 2009, Routledge, p. 235-246.

17

USSR break away in 1991 and there is 15 successor states of it. Those 15 state

is Russia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Lithuania,

Latvia, and Estonia. Even though USSR been break away be 15 states, Russia as the

biggest power of them still call the 14 states as Near Aboard. Near Aboard states

mean Russia recognize the independent of those state, but in other side Russia believe

those state still depend of Russia as the center because of relation history for a

hundred years. So that even disintegration of USSR implement peacefully, but there

is a big potential of conflict happen from the successor states and other international

actor that try to influence and intervene those country.

Same like other communist country ex-Soviet Union Countries or state,

Georgia also sustained economic crisis in early independence. The most region that

felt those impact is South Ossetia. Rose revolution in 2003 reform Georgia, Mikhail

Saakashvili who replace Eduard Shevardnadze as president change Georgia way of

govern it state. Even the reformation happen to the democracy, many of foreign

investor won‟t investment in Georgia, so the impact is Georgian economic sector was

not grow.

After Mikhail Saakashvili elected in Georgia presidential election 2004,

Georgia government try to approach those three breakaway province. Saakashvili

succeed to approach Ajaria as one of Georgia territory, then he also try to approach

South Ossetia and Abkhazia to joint. Not only reconciliation of economic and the

reformation of democracy, Georgia government also has purpose to united Ajaria,

Abkhazia, and South Ossetia as their priority.

There at least been 3 conflict like in 1991-1992, 2004, and 2006 in South

Ossetia region between Ossetian separatist and Georgian government, And in

Abkhazia side there already 5 times in 1992, 1998, 2001, 2006, and 2008. Because of

same target as independent state, south Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria (located

18

in Moldova) agreed to recognize each other as independent state in 2006 November

17, even though there is no recognition from other independent state.

And in 7 august 2008 South Ossetia is in danger situation especially when

Clean Field operation begin35

. Georgia use its military power to eliminate South

Ossetia when the clean field operation. Basically Clean Field operation have purpose

to eliminate South Ossetia militant. 36

Georgia consider that the crisis in South Ossetia

happen because of militant act. By artillery and aircraft fighter Georgia open the

attack on South Ossetia and after that asymmetric warfare begin. Then the condition

take aside to Georgia and South Ossetia militant defeat easily.37

2.2. Georgia in USSR Era

One of conflict that happen in Near Board Russia region is between Russia

and Georgia. This region is located in Caucasus Mountain area is part of Russian

Empire territory in 1801. In 1917 after revolution in Russia Empire by Bolshevik this

region ever has its own freedom as state until 1921. In 1922 Soviet Union established

and claimed Georgia as part of it.38

At the first time those region stand as

Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic and in 1936 some part break

away and be Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. Georgia has special autonomy right

from USSR than other soviet state republic. Education level and living standard of

Georgian people has higher level than other state, and Georgia also looks more

independent than Moscow in term of country that can retained its identity and

35






Stolz, Vadim. “A TRAP FOR RUSSIA. U.S NEOLIBERALS AND UKRAINIAN FASCISTS

BEHIND OPERATION “CLEAN FIELD”.” Лефт.Ру,

http://left.ru/2008/10/stolz_en179.phtml 38

Svante E. Cornel, Autonomy and Conflict: Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism in the South Caucasus

– Cases in Georgia, Dissertation for Ph.D. Uppsala University, Sweidia, 2002, P. 142.



19

nationalism spirit in history of USSR.39

Special status be given to Georgia after

Lavrenty Beria step into government in Stalin era.

Figure 2: Soviet Annexationtoward Georgia 192140

Just like Stalin, Beria also come from Georgia and ever been the chairman of

Communist party of Georgiain 1931, his career continued to rise until he was

appointed as head of the NKVD (NarodnyyKomissariatVnutrennikh del)41

in 1938.

Beria used his position as one of the people closest to Stalin to make Georgia a power

base; the result is the position of Georgia that is relatively free from the repressive

39

Ibid 40

http://www.geoarmy.info/rus/1921.htm 41

Soviet Secret Agent which then turned into KBG (KomitetGosudarstvennoyBezopasnosti ) and is

changed again to the FSB (Federal'nayaSluzhbaBezopasnosti).

20

policies such as the Soviet collectivization of agriculture and "cleansing" of the

society bourgeois elements as well as counter revolutionary.42

After Stalin and Beria death, everything changed Georgia. There are negative

reactions by Georgian people in respond to the speech made by Khrushchev. This

reaction arises due to a very strong image of Stalin in Georgia so that Krushchev's

speech is not only regarded as an insult to Stalin, but also against the whole people

Georgia.43

One month after the speech, the people of Georgia commemorateStalin by

demonstration anti-Soviet massively in Tbilisi and other cities. This actionwas

successfully controlled by Moscow. Anti-riot troops Soviet consisting of non-

Georgian personnel. Soviet troops attack the protesters and causing hundreds of

deaths.44

This disastertriggered the rise of nationalism in Georgia. Anti-Russian

groups led by figures such nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Merab Kostava.

Gamsakhurdia will play a very important role in the process of Georgia's

independence from the United Soviet.45

Between 1960 and the end of 1970Georgian nationalist groups are increasing.

In April 1978, around 5,000 students in Tbilisi protest the government's plan to

amendment the constitution of Georgia. The amendment was about replace Georgian

language with Russian language and other languages as the official language of

Georgia. Faced with these protests, Minister Eduard Shevardnadze decided to cancel

the plan. For the first time in the history of the Soviet Union, government sets policy

by public opinion.46

This eventencouragethe nationalism of Georgian people. After

Moscow provide an opportunity for democratization in 1987, nationalist activists in

42

Ibid. P. 145 43

Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Power, P. 139 44

Ibid. P. 140. 45

Cornell, Autonomy and Conflict, P. 147. 46

Cornell. Small Nations and Great Powers. P. 142

21

Georgia establish organizations that prepare the independence of Georgia through a

promotional campaign culture, language and national identity Georgia.47

2.2.1. History of Georgia – South Ossetia War

1989 has actually been a conflict between Georgia and Ossetia ethnic because

of very high nationalism between them. When 1917 Revolution, Georgia was under

the rule of the Mensheviks who opposed the Bolshevik in Moscow. Because

Bolshevik weak position Menshevik declare the independence of the Democratic

Republic of Georgia on May 26, 1918. Georgia officially secede from the Soviet

Union and South Ossetia formal legally separated with North Ossetia. People of

South voiced his desire to join with North Ossetia, but it is interpreted by Tbilisi in

support of the Bolshevik group.48

Ethnic conflicts began to be seen in 1918 until 1921, many moment that seen

by ethnic Ossetian did independence movement. In 1920 the people of South Ossetia

who supported the Bolshevik troops from North Ossetia launched anactionand

brutally put down by the army of the government of Georgia.49

Menshevik sent

troops and regular troops into Tskhinvali to stop the violence. As a result of that,

about 5,000 ethnic Ossetia died and more than 13,000 civilians died from starvation

and disease. In 1921 the Soviet army attacked Georgia, then the autonomous region

of South Ossetia inserted into Georgia. This incident created distrust situation

between South Ossetia and Georgia until today.

Treaty by Soviet Union in 1922 stated, South Ossetia received status as an

autonomous region and still under the administration of Georgia. This decisionwas

not accepted by both parties. People of South Ossetia demanding equal treatment

with North Ossetia (which gained a higher status that is autonomous republic) while

47

Ibid. p. 146 48

International Crisis Group, Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia (Europe Report No. 159),

Tbilisi/Brussels: ICG, 26 November 2004. p. 3. 49

Op.cit. Cornell. P. 141.

22

the people of Georgia felt that South Ossetia is a foreign entity whose creation is

none other than the implementation of a political " Divide and rule" by Russia against

Georgia.50

Figure 3: Map of the Ethnic deployment in Caucasus51

During the Soviet era, the relationship between ethnic with Ossetian ethnic

Georgian less going well and always rivalry between the two. Ethnic Georgia

considers that the ethnic Ossetian who live in South Ossetia do not deserve the

50

Loc.cit. International Crisis Group. P. 3.

Divide and rule is a combination of political strategy, military, and economic aimed at gaining and

maintaining power by breaking the large group into smaller groups are more easily conquered. 51

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/ethnocaucasus.jpg

23

benefits gained in the field of the economy, but on the other they do not benefit in

politics when compared to their brothers who are in the territory of Russia (North

Ossetia) and people in Abkhazia.

A movement which calls itself Ademon Nykhas, formed in 1988 to foster

unity of the people in order to achieve the independence of South Ossetian. They tried

to raise the status of South Ossetia into the Autonomous Republic in the territory of

Georgia. On November 10, the city council SOAO (South Ossetian Autonomous

Oblast) filed a petition to change its status to become Autonomous Republic, but this

was rejected by Georgia.52

In addition, the language problem also creates new problems. In 1989 the

government established Georgian language as the official language of government in

all regions of Georgia, is no longer using the Russian language which then makes

Ossetian demonstrate for Ossetian ethnic language as their official language in South

Ossetia. Both sides had several times tried to defuse the conflict with organizing a

public forum attended by both parties, but in the end it was a cause of conflict

casualties.

During the Gorbachev leadership of the relationship between Georgia and

South Ossetia facing a serious problem. An incident that occurred on April 9, 1989,

that sparked the Georgian nationalist movement, it also sparked similar movements in

South Ossetian. During the spring and summer of 1989, Georgia and South Ossetia

engaged in a "war of laws" that when Tbilisi issued regulations specifying the

language of Georgia as the only official language throughout the country and South

Ossetia responded with issuing regulations specifying the language Ossetian as an

official language in the region.53

This “war of laws” resulted conflict in the ethnic

level which caused many casualties on both sides.

52

Ibid. p. 4 53

Cornell. Small Nations and Great Powers, p. 153

24

On November 10, South Ossetia unilaterally declared unite with North

Ossetia, which is in the territory of Russia. The next day Georgia state that does not

recognize the attitude of South Ossetia and stated that South Ossetia is part of

Georgia administration. The conflict between Georgia with South Ossetia began on

November 23, 1989. At that time along with Gumbaridze and Gamsakhurdia led

about 15,000 people to Tskhinvali for talks protect ethnic Georgia in South Ossetia.

This group successfully held in the Georgian-South Ossetian border by a combination

of the people and Ossetian militia and one regiment of the Soviet army, made

Gamsakhurdia and Gumbaridze did not enter the territory South Ossetia. This

detention incident eventually led to conflicting and caused 6 deaths, 24 minor injuries

and 140 others received serious treatment.54

These events encourage Ademon Nykhas

to send a petition to Moscow with the aim of reunification of South Ossetia with

North Ossetia, but the petition is not addressed, because Moscow is facing bigger

problems.55

During the early 1990s, the relationship between Georgia with South

Ossetia tend to be unstable because of the political elite of Georgia was involved in a

dispute about the country's future. But in August 1990 the tension in relations

between the two countries increased again after the Georgian parliament adopted a

new regulation that does not allow the participation of regional parties in the

legislative elections to be held in October 1990. This regulation effectively preclude

Ademon Nykhas or other local organizations to have a voice in parliament.56

In elections in October 1990 Gamaskhurdia elected as head of the Parliament

of Georgia, ethnic Georgia in South Ossetia was given more rights. Gamaskhurdia

voters also many from Abkhazia and South Ossetia.57

According to Georgia, South

Ossetia exploited by Russia to create an unstable situation in Georgia. South Ossetia

and Abkhazia is actually just wanted to secede from Georgia because they differ with

Georgia. To achieve its objectives the area asking for the support of Russia, where

54

Ibid. 55

Ibid. p. 154 56

Ibid. 57

Ibid.

25

they feel different ethnicities with Georgia. The Georgian government has always

suspected that the presence of separatists in South Ossetia have the support of Russia,

especially when the two regions are set Russian as the main language spoken.

On December 9, 1990 South Ossetia held its own elections. Two days later the

South Ossetian parliament chose to be under the authority of Moscow. South Ossetia

declared independence from Georgia and the action taken by Gamsakhurdia to annul

the election results on December 9, by removing the status of autonomous oblast of

South Ossetia and declared a state of emergency in the region. Gamsakhurdia then

ordered the blockade of the South Ossetia and formally launch a war Georgia-South

Ossetia when he ordered his troops to occupy Tskhinvali in January 1991. 58

The

Government of Georgia decreed a state of emergency in the region and raised the

army commander in the country of Georgia to serve as mayor of Tskhinvali,

2.2.2. Rose Revolution

For more than 10 years, since 1992, South Ossetia enjoy its de facto

independence by establishing a system of government like a sovereign state. The

conflict with Georgia can be ruled out in the era of Eduard Shevardnadze. At the time

Shevardnadze make Georgia closer to Europe and America and move away from

Russian influence. These efforts produced results, where the status of Georgia in the

late '90s as the biggest recipients of US aid. During the Shevardnadze administration,

Georgia received a total of US $ 1 billion to implement programs of democratization

and economic development.59

In the Presidential elections in 1995 and 2000 Shevardnadze and CUG alleged

election fraud in 1999. 76. The dissatisfaction with Shevardnadze's leadership led to

the strengthening of an opposition group led by Zurab Zhvania, Nino Burjanadze and

Mikhail Saakashvili. These three people are former high-ranking officials and

58

Loc.cit. International Crisis Group. p. 4 59

Cornell. Small Nations and Great Powers. p. 342

26

Georgia are clashed with each other.60

Zhvania is head of the Parliament of Georgia

in 1995-2001 and Burjanadze become members of parliament for two terms before

replace Zhvania as chairman. Meanwhile Saakashvili is a lawyer and former member

of the CUG appointed Shevardnadze as Minister of Justice in 2000.61

They then build

an alliance to fight the CUG as the National Democratic Movement (NDM) in the

next legislative elections are held in early November 2003.

In those elections, Shevardnadze committed fraud and manipulation. The

election results were announced by the government in contrast to the calculations

made by foreign and local independent observers. NDM denounced that fraud and

mobilize supporters to hold mass public protests. During two consecutive weeks the

streets of Tbilisi and the front page of the Georgian parliament was filled by the

people who demanded that the government recognize the victory of NDM. On

November 22, Saakashvili lead the masses to storm the parliament building and led to

Shevardnadze left the room Burjanadze.62

The next day Shevardnadze and leaders

NDM meeting initiated by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to seek a peaceful

solution to the crisis. The results of that meeting was the resignation of Shevardnadze

formally, which is then followed by the implementation of the Presidential elections

in January 2004. This election was won unanimously by Saakashvili to get 96 percent

of the vote. His victory strengthened after the legislative election rehearsal held in

April won NDM by winning the support of 67 percent of the total vote.63

Substitution of power from Shevardnadze to Saakashvili's Western media

called the Rose Revolution for the actions of the protesters were handing out roses to

the security forces guarding the parliament building. Saakashvili is seen as a reformer

and anti-corruption crusader who is able to bring change to Georgia after 11 years

60

Svante E. Cornell, Georgia after the Rose Revolution: Geopolitical Predicament and Implications for

U.S. Policy, the Strategic Studies Institute, February 2007, p. 7. 61

Loc.cit, International Crisis Group. p. 6-7. 62

Ibid. p. 9-11 63

International Crisis Group, Georgia: Sliding toward Authoritarianism? (Europe Report No. 189).

Tbilisi/Brussels: ICG. 19 December 2007. p. 1.

27

under the rule of Shevardnadze weak and corrupt. Mikhail Saakashvili who at that

time was 36 years old when he became president, filling his administration with

people who are relatively young, so that the impression of dynamic and active

governance to make change for the better in Georgia.64

After officially served as president of Georgia, Saakashvili is committed to

implement the reforms in economic and political fields, build Georgia into a strong

state and democratic, and establish closer ties with the West. One of the efforts to

forge closer relations among others to apply for membership of NATO and the

European Union, but without disturbing the good neighborly relations with Russia.65

In addition, he also stated his pledge to restore the territorial integrity of Georgia,

which returns to the Governments of Georgia South Ossetia.

In May 2004, Saakashvili began trying to take over the government of South

Ossetia by ordering the police and Special Forces (OMON, Otryad Militsii Osobogo

Naznacheniya/Special Police Unit) to carry out operations against smuggling in the

region of South Ossetia. Smuggling is a major problem for Georgia, but for South

Ossetia who do not have an established trading system, causing smuggling is the most

effective way to obtain needed items for daily living.66

The Georgian Special Forces

deployed in several areas of conflict and conduct raids on illegal goods and close the

"black market" in Ergneti.

With the presence of forces that are not included in the command of the JPKF,

the government and the people of South Ossetia regard this as preparation for Georgia

to "unfreeze" the conflict that has been "frozen" for 12 years. Georgian forces back

clashed with South Ossetian militia, and in July and August 2004, these clashes

64

Loc.cit. p. 2 65

Loc.cit. p. 3 66

Loc.cit. p. 10

28

became limited war after the two sides conduct small arms fire and mortars in the

conflict zone.67

The conflict this time was taken by the President of Georgia, Mikhail

Saakashvili to the international world by accusing Russia of being behind this

conflict. In front of supporters, Saakashvili said that the conflict in South Ossetia is

actually a problem between Georgia with Russia. Since then, relations between

Georgia and the Russian became much worse. The war in August 2008 is the end of

this worsening relationship. In August of this, precisely on the 8th morning, the

Government of Georgia decided to resolve the problems in South Ossetia with a

massive assault to the Tskhinvali region. Russia is already anticipating, directly into

South Ossetia through the Roki tunnel that connects between North Ossetia and South

Ossetia. This was the first military intervention carried out by Russia after the

collapse of the Soviet Union.

2.3. South Ossetia War

In this chapter conflict that happen between Russian Federation and Georgia

focusing on South Ossetia War, even at the time conflict also happen in Abkhazia.

South Ossetian Separatist been there to separate South Ossetia from Georgia since

1989.68

By de Facto South Ossetia been proclamation it‟s independent since January

19, 1992 and join North Ossetia under Russian Federation, but Georgia confront the

legality of South Ossetia independent.69

In 2006, South Ossetia ever been

Referendum with 90% of South Ossetian people choose to breakaway from Georgia,

but international system do not claim it.70

67

BertilNygren, The Rebuilding Greater Russia: Putin‟s Foreign Policy Toward the CIS Countries,

London: Rountledge, 2008, p. 145-147 68

Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR on the decisions of the

twelfth session of the Council of People's Deputies of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region of the

twentieth convocation 69

A Brief History of South Ossetia .Kommersant № 97 (2936) 70

Staging 'Alternative Choice' for S.Ossetia , Online Magazine - Civil Georgia, November 7 of 2006

29

The situation in South Ossetia is also deteriorating due to the conflict involving

Georgian, South Ossetian militia and Russian peacekeepers. This situation lasted until

Saakashvili decided to solve the problem of South Ossetia for good by ordering a

ground assault on Tskhinvali on August 8, 2008 in the morning.71

Russia certainly

has anticipated this action and sent troops to Georgia through the Roki tunnel that

connects North and South Ossetia. By this action then start the first military attack by

Russia after the Soviet era ended. The war between Georgia with Russia began on

August 8, 2008 when Georgian forces began to enter the city of Tskhinvali, the South

Ossetian capital with the aim of taking over the territory as part of the government of

Georgia in the South Ossetia region. According to OSCE, who was watching the

situation in Tskhinvali claimed that South Ossetian side did not make shots or

offensive.72

On August 9, 2008 Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili issued a decree

declared a state of war and state of emergency for 15 days in response to the

deployment of the Russian Federation to South Ossetia on August 8, 2008.73

Saakashvili also reiterated that Georgia will never take off one inch from its territory.

Whatever happens, Georgia will not approve the action of the separation of the

territory of Georgia, and any actions that could undermine the democratic system of

Georgia. Georgia at that time also had the support of the West in the act. One proof

of the involvement of the West was the discovery of a satellite constellation in

conflict areas abandoned by Georgian forces. Georgia does not have a constellation of

satellite equipment, so that the findings could prove the existence of Western aid to

provide data to Georgia via satellite constellation.

According to Russia, the entry of Russian forces into Georgian territory is

meant to protect the troops who served as peacekeepers (within the framework of

71

Georgians have already in Tskhinvali (Rus.) , «REGIONS.RU/Novosti Federation" (08.08.2008

11:36). 72

Champion, Marc (2008-12-19). "British Monitor Complicates Georgian Blame Game". The Wall

Street Journal. 73

http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/11/07/georgia.clashes/index.html?iref=mpstoryview

30

CIS) as well as local residents, the majority of the holders of Russian passports.

Russia accused the Georgian attack into South Ossetia on August 6, 2008 which

killed Russian peacekeepers and the civilian population of South Ossetia is a form of

genocide.

Georgia's first attack on the capital of the South Ossetia Republic launched on

August 7, 2008.74

This attack is the sign for South Ossetia, Russia and Georgia that

the bloody war in the Caucasus region will begin. Bounded on a 1992 peace treaty,

Russia dared to take steps in military interference to Southern Ossetia.75

Russian

military intervention in the South Ossetia War greatly changed the military position

of Georgia as the best military in the Caucasus region, a major downfall for the

Georgian military was seen on 11 August 2008.

After the rose revolution in 2003 Mikhail Saakashvili sought every means to

restore Abkhazia and South Ossetia back to Georgia.76

One of the ways that he

envisaged during the time in his administration was to strengthen the Georgian army

with the main objective against the separatists of those both countries. In its military

establishment Georgia seeks to cooperate on a large scale with the US and NATO in

advancing its military system. Because of this situation Georgia changed their

military style to be full of western characteristic. In addition, a huge US funding

injection also helped Georgia in raising its military budget. For the first time Georgia

is the first country in the world that can grow military spending up to 33 times from

the previous budget or about 1 billion US $ in 2007-2008.77

The increase in Georgia's

military budget is the one of the largest among Saudi Arabia, Oman and North Korea.

74




Cvetkovski, Nikola. "The Georgian – South Ossetian Conflict". Danish Association for Research on

the Caucasus. 76

Wolff, Stefan. Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia, University of Nottingham.

https://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/274 77

MilitaryBudget.org, Georgian Military Budget, MilitaryBudget.

http://militarybudget.org/georgia/

31

The Georgian military device is a device made by the Soviet Union, Ukraine, Eastern

Europe, western and Israel. While the experience of Georgia military troops is very

limited, Georgia military troops experience only reinforce troops in Iraq conflict it

also as supporting force on US troops.78

In the process of strengthening the Georgian military, Saakashvili also

campaigned for Georgia's military power to the world. In its military campaign,

Georgia shows their military strength, which is western and mainly US. In the

military parade it was clearly seen Georgia troops using US uniforms. Along the

streets of Tbilisi Georgian soldiers paraded with US weapons and ornaments, which

are the new face of Georgia that has reformed into a western group in the US outline.

After much development of the abilities experienced by the army of Georgia,

following advanced weapons and modern warfare equipment makes Saakashvili feel

confident. Feeling Georgia has been able to stand up against South Ossetia and

Abkhazia, Saakashvili is planning to launch a massive military offensive into these

two areas. Finally in August 2008 the bloody conflict erupted by Georgia party as the

side who started the war.79

The attack on South Ossetia is not spontaneous. For several days in early

August, Georgia appears to have secretly concentrated a large number of troops and

equipment (2nd, 3rd and 4th Infantry Brigades, Artillery Brigade, elements of

Infantry Brigade 1, at separate places in The tank town of Battalion Tank was

stationed with a total of nine light infantry and five tank battalions, up to eight

artillery battalions plus special forces and Interior Ministry troops all, up to 16,000

people) on the Georgian border in the South Ossetia conflict zone.80

On August 7, at

22:00, Georgian troops began the attack with artillery bombing at Tskhinvali, the

78

Kilner, James (8 August 2008). "Georgia says to withdraw 1,000 soldiers from Iraq". Reuters. 79


11:36). 80


1stjune, 2009

32

capital of South Ossetia, and the next day there were attacks to paralyze the towns of

Tskhinvali and other South Ossetia regions.81

At 8 am on 8 August, Georgia's

infantry and tanks entered Tskhinvali and there was a fierce battle between Georgia

troops with South Ossetia troops and Russian peacekeepers stationed in the city.82

After the Georgia attack on Southern Ossetia, the Russian government did not

remain silent. Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev decided to conduct military

intervention in the form of peacekeeping operations in the Southern region of Ossetia.

This military operation was aimed at preventing more destruction that could be done

by the Georgia troops in the Southern Ossetia region. Then on that day, three tactical

battalions from the 135th, 503th and 693th Motor Rifles Regiment of the 19th Rifle

Motorcycle Division of the Army 58th in the North Caucasus Military District was

placed in a ready-to-combat formation in the Southern Ossetia region. At the end of

the day, the Russian army managed to clear the area around the districts of Kverneti,

Tbeti and Dzari, and to the west of Tskhinvali.83

Direct military intervention of Russia made the army of Georgia have no

chance at all to win the battle at Tskhinvali. Before that the Russian army also had

difficulties in the mobility of their troops toward Southern Ossetia. Things like the

transportation routes of the Caucasus Mountains became a major obstacle for Russia.

Roki tunnels and narrow mountain lanes into the mainline of Russia to enter South

Ossetia are the main obstacles of the Russian army. On 9 August, fighting between

Georgia and Russia occurred, Georgia used counter-attack tactics as well as tactical

ambush.84

This attack is considered effective because the Russian side is quite fooled

81

REGIONS.RU/Novosti Federation (2008). Georgians have already in Tskhinvali, Russia. 82

Barabanov, Mikhail (2008). "The August War between Russia and Georgia". Moscow Defense Brief.

Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow. 83

Regions.ru/Novosti Federation (2008). Georgians have already in Tskhinvali, Russia. 84

Pukhov, Ruslan (2010) "The Tanks of August". Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies,

Moscow.

33

and injured. In this attack the army of Georgia succeeded in wounding the

commander of the 58th Army Lieutenant General A. Khrulyov.85

Early in the day of the 10th of August the military of georgia succeeded in

occupying the main city ossetia South of Tskhinvali. At that time the Southern ossetia

troop as well as the russia peacekeeping troop were hit back and out to the north of

South ossetia. But by midday it all turned, after the Russian aid troops came with an

accumulation of up to 16,000 personnel of georgia beaten back from Tskhinvali. At

night the georgia troops actually had departed from Tskhinvali and had fled South

South of ossetia, Tskhinvali had been completely occupied by russia and

Southern ossetia troops. In this battle the georgia artillery was completely destroyed

and many military posts of Georgia were abandoned.

On the night of August 10, Russia deployed six tactical regiment groups

(135th, 503th and 693th Motor Racing Regiments from the 19th Rifle Motor Division

of North Ossetia, 70th and 71st Energy Rifle Regiment of 42nd Rifle Motor Division

of Chechnya, And a mixture of the 104th and 234th Special Forces Regiment from

the 76th Air Force Pskov Division), 45th Squad Regiment and 10th and 22nd Special

Forces Brigades, as well as air and artillery forces significant. Two Chechen

companies from the Zapad and Vostok Battalions and the tactical group of the 98th

Ivanovo Air Division tactical, were sent to the battle area as well. The number of

Russian troops in South Ossetia reached about 10,000 men and 120 tanks.

The main target of the Russian air force is the military means throughout

Georgia. The air strikes that Russians do are in the form of bombing. All combat

equipment that Russia uses are the Su-24M Fighter bombers, and the F-25 Su-25

fighter, and the Tu-22M3 Backfire long-range bombers. In addition to political

considerations Russia has not deliberately attacked Georgian infrastructure, transport,

85

Части 58 армии полностью освободили Цхинвали от грузинских военных (in Russian). Russian

Ministry of Defence.

34

communications or industry, or other government buildings. The total loss for the

Russian Air Force is a Tu-22M3 long-range bomber, a Su-24M Fencer frontier

bomber, a Su-24MR Fencer E reconnaissance aircraft, and four Su-25 fighter aircraft.

In addition, the Russian Army launched a short-range ballistic missile 15 Tochka-U

(SS-21) against military targets and some new Iskander long-range ballistic missiles

(SS-26).

After losing control over much of South Ossetia, Georgian troops began to

regroup in Gori. Meanwhile, Georgian units and artillery continued to attack

Tskhinvali mildly in some areas of South Ossetia, and showed fierce opposition in

several places in Georgia. However, at the end of August 11, South Ossetia was

completely cleared of Georgian troops, and Russian units had moved to Georgia the

following morning, building a 25-km demilitarized support zone to prevent further

artillery attacks on South Ossetia.86

After fierce clashes with Russia, which lasted from August 8th Georgia

military defense finally collapsed. Since 12 August Georgia army began to retreat and

fled to the city Gori.87

And after being pressed by the Russian military, many of the

Georgia soldiers retreated to Tbilisi. Along the road to Tbilisi there are many artillery

and ammunition left behind by the army of Georgia.

At noon on August 12, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev decided to stop

the active phase of the peace enforcement operation.88

That night, Saakashvili signed

an early ceasefire agreement that French President Nikolas Sarkozi had just brought

from Moscow. The Russian formation is concentrated along the Southern border of

South Ossetia and Abkhazia, using partial control of the demilitarized zone.

Meanwhile, active attacks on Georgian territory to capture and destroy Georgian

86

Barabanov, Mikhail (2008). "The August War between Russia and Georgia". Moscow Defense

Brief. Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow. 87

Ibid 88

Kramer, Andrew E.; Barry, Ellen (2008). "Russia, in Accord With Georgians, Sets Withdrawal". The

New York Times.

35

weapons, and demilitarize the Georgian armed forces, he added. From August 13 to

15, Russian troops entered Gori and Senaki and began to seize Georgian military

base. Other Russian disarmament units are within 20 km of Tbilisi. This all happened

in the context of complete paralysis of the demoralized Georgian Army.89

Other than

the Georgian government and their military commander did not believe in a ceasefire

agreement with Russia. The remaining Armed Forces Army units (including the 1st

Infantry Brigade rushing back from Iraq) are preparing to protect the northern part of

Tbilisi, fearing that there will be a Russian attack on the capital.

At the end of August, the Russian armed forces clarified about their urgency

of the Southern Ossetia war, in its clarification the Russian military suffered official

losses of 71 dead, five POWs (including two pilots) and 356 others injured. However,

these figures do not include the loss of the Ossetia troops and the various volunteers

in the South Ossetia troop and volunteers are estimated to be up to 150 dead. Russian

and Ossetia troops lost several infantry tanks and combat vehicles. Losses to the

Georgian side are unclear, but it is estimated that over 500 people were killed and up

to 1,500 people injured, with more than 100 POW (although Russians have admitted

taking only 15).

Georgia has completely lost its naval power and air defense system.

According to his clarification, the Russians managed to capture and destroy most of

the army's arsenal. The Russians confiscated 150 units of Georgia's heavy weapons,

including 15 BMP infantry fighters, 65 T-72 tanks, several dozen personnel carriers,

vehicles, weapons and SAM systems. Russia seized large numbers of cars and light

weapons, including the American M4A3 carbines, as well as many Georgian tanks,

armored vehicles, and weapons have also been destroyed in the battle against Russia.

Saakashvili's decision to attack South Ossetia not only ended in total failure,

but Georgia suffered heavy military defeats and huge material losses. The

89


Brief. Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow.

36

sophisticated and modern armed Georgian army certainly did not meet the ambitious

expectations of its leaders. While Georgian army leaders who had adequate levels of

military training and persistence at the tactical level, at a higher command level, the

Georgian Army's performance did not produce satisfactory results. The persistence of

Georgians in South Ossetia can be explained by ethnic motivation. But once ethnic

motivation is lost, soldiers quickly lose their fighting spirit and this is clearly the

cause of defeat. The harsh mental pressure of the conflict has turned into panic and

demoralization when confronted with a clearly superior enemy. The Georgian Army

unit's orders cannot maintain discipline, and lose control when under pressure and

when its communications are attacked is the moral weakness of the army of Georgia.

The widespread sense of the futility of fighting against the mighty Russian Army

might also have caused a moral collapse.

Overall, the Saakashvili regime develops Georgian military capacity in a

reasonable way, showing a remarkable interest in the armed forces. From a technical

point of view, the focus on obtaining heavy artillery, self-propelled, multiple launch

rocket systems and air defense systems has proved entirely justifiable, and it is

precisely these weapons that inflict the greatest damage on Ossetia and Russian

forces, along with night vision, Modern, radio-technical reconnaissance and

electronic warfare equipment. In this category, the Georgian Army is even better

prepared than the Russian Army. The emphasis given by Western military instructors

on individual soldier training also seems to be paying off. But, overall, the Georgia

Army needs more time to mature. Saakashvili's hasty decision to throw this army into

a premature battle, which led to a confrontation with the Russian Armed Forces, led

to his decisive death.

About the performance of the Russian Armed Forces, the speed of Russia

response was clearly unexpected, not only by the Georgians, but by the West as well,

not to mention a few negative observers within Russia itself. Three tactical battalion

groups in stand by status entered South Ossetia in a matter of hours. Within three

37

days, a powerful alignment of forces and equipment was assembled under very

difficult natural circumstances, capable of effective action and inflicting quick defeat

on a numerically equivalent enemy. Russian forces may have shown deficient of

consistency at the tactical level, but their power over the forces of Georgia in terms of

capabilities and combat effectiveness cannot be denied. Russia has verified that

Russia military forces have ready units for combat operations, as well as an effective

military command.

The traditional habits of the Russian army are the weakness of the Russian

Army's way of warfare, such as night operations, reconnaissance, communications,

and back support, remain as before, despite the enemy's weakness. This does not

contribute much in the South Ossetia War. There is no doubt that these issues should

be examined as the first priority for the Russian military. The victory of Russian

military over the Georgian Army during the peace-enforcement operation of August

2008 should not be a cause for euphoria in Moscow, but this victory supposes to be a

motivation for Russia to accelerate its military transformation and the mass

procurement of modern armaments for the Russian Armed Forces.

2.4. Russia Military Forces

Since its independence after the Soviet Union collapse, Russia never did military

action. Freezing Russian military in less than one decade includes Russia need to re-

regenerate its military strength. During the administration of Dmitry Medvedev in

2008 there was war of Georgia, when it is the first time Russia fought a war and test

its military capabilities. Georgia war is divided into two regions, South Ossetia and

Abkhazia. But more centered on South Ossetia War for more serious offenses

occurred there.

38

In this conflict Russia mobilized a lot of their military regiments and corps:

1. 58th

Army

a. 19th

Motorized Rifle Division

135th

Motorized Rifle Regiment, 429th

Motorized Rifle Regiment,

503rd

Motorized Rifle Regiment, 693rd

Motorized Rifle Regiment,

481st Air-Defense Missile Regiment, 292

nd Self-propelled

Artillery Regiment, 141st Independent Tank Battalion,

239th

Reconnaissance Independent Battalion, 1493rd

Independent

Engineer Battalion, and 344th

Independent Maintenance Battalion

b. 42nd

Motorized Rifle Division

70th

Motorized Rifle Regiment, 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment

50th

Self-propelled Artillery Regimen, 417th

Reconnaissance

Independent Battalion, "Vostok" Battalion, and "Zapad" Battalion

2. 76th

Division Assault Air

a. 104th

Air Assault Regimen

b. 234th

Air Assault Regimen

3. 98th

Division Airborne

a. 217th

Airborne Regimen

4. 10th

Independent Spetsnaz Brigade

5. 22nd

Independent Spetsnaz Brigade 90

Russian Commander in charge in South Ossetia War was,

1. Colonel-General AleksanderZelin91

2. Lieutenant-Colonel SulimYamadayev92

3. Colonel-General Sergey Makarov93

90


1stjune, 2009

91Mladenov, Alexander “Su-25 'Frogfoot' Units In Combat”

92 “СулимаЯмадаевавидели в окрестностяхЦхинвали”, Lenta.Ru, 12.08.2008

39

1. Lieutenant-colonel Timerman Konstantin Anatolievich94

2. Lieutenant General A. Khrulyov95

The total number of Russian forces in South Ossetia reached about 10,000 men

and armed with 120 tanks T-72B (M), T-72B T-62M. Russian Aircraft and Helicopter

are, Su-24M Fencer frontal bombers, and Su-25 Frogfoot attack planes, and the Tu-

22M3 Backfire long-range bombers, Mi-8MTKO,0020Mi-24. Russian ground vehicle

are, BMP-1, BMP-2, BTR-80, BMD-2, BRDM-2A, MT-LB, AND 15 Tochka-U (SS-

21)and a few new Iskander (SS-26).

58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District is one of the largest combined

arms formations and combat-ready armed forces of Russia. The army was formed in

1995. To protect the southern borders of Russia. The army has extensive experience

in resolving complex crises. In particular, the army division provides carrying out

counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus, participated in the liberation of

hostages in Beslan. 70000th part of the 58th Army is more than twice the number of

the Georgian armed forces. The army's arsenal are 609 tanks, almost two thousand

infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 125 mortars and guns, 190

units Grad and 450 anti-aircraft systems, as well as 120 aircraft and 70 helicopters.

Not alone, others who assist Russia is South Ossetia with 3000 troops and armed

at least 20 tanks and 25 ACS, an unknown number of militia and volunteers. Soldiers

Abkhazia 5 thousand. Personnel and an unknown number of employees of internal

troops.

93

Presidential Decree of 18 August 2008 № 1244 "On awarding Russian servicemen of the Armed

Forces of the Russian Federation state awards" (УказПрезидентаРоссийскойФедерацииот 18

августа 2008 года № 1244 “О

награждениигосударственныминаградамиРоссийскойФедерациивоеннослужащихВооружѐнных

СилРоссийскойФедерации”) 94

http://www.warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=9877 95

Barabanov, Mikhail “The August War between Russia and Georgia”

40

2.5. Georgia Military Forces

After 4 years of leading georgia, on 8 August Mikhail Saakhasvili for the first

time made a declaration of war against Russia. In his confession Mikhail saakhasvili

states that Russia has attacked and wants to seize the south Ossetia from georgia by

military act through rocky tunnel on the border of the Russian-Georgian state. In this

war decision Mikhail Saakhasvili deployed his army consisting of many regiments

and military corps with up to 18,000 Troops.

In this conflict Georgia mobilized a lot of their military regiments and corps:

1. 1st Infantry Brigade

11th

Light Infantry Battalion, 12th

Light Infantry Battalion, 13th

Light Infantry

Battalion 14th

Armored Battalion, Artillery Battalion and, logistics Battalion

2. 2 nd Infantry Brigade

21st Light Infantry Battalion, 22

nd Light Infantry Battalion, 23

rd Light Infantry

Battalion, 24th


3. 3 rd Infantry Brigade



rd Light Infantry

Battalion, 34th


4. 4 th Infantry Brigade



rd Light Infantry

Battalion, 44th

Armored Battalion, Artillery Battalion and, Logistic Battalion

5. 5 th Infantry Brigade



rd Light Infantry

Battalion and, 54th

Armored Battalion

6. 1 st Artillery Brigade

Self-propelled Artillery Battalion, MRL Battalion and, MRL Battalion

7. Independent Armored Battalion

8. Independent Light Infantry

41

9. Battalion Independent Air-Defense Battalion

10. Independent Engineer Battalion

11. Independent Signals Battalion96

Georgian Commander in charge in South Ossetia War was,

1. Davit Kezerashvili97

2. Zaza Gogava Ivane98

3. Ivane Merabishvili 99

4. David Nairashvili 100

5. Mamuka Kurashvili101

In recent years, Georgia has steadily increased its military power for the last 5

years, Tbilisi, 30 times increased military spending. Officially, this was due to the

desire of Georgia to join NATO.

According to the Russian Defense Ministry official statistics, in recent years,

Georgia has purchased 206 tanks, 186 armored vehicles, 79 artillery shells, 25

helicopters, 70 mortars, 10 anti-aircraft missile systems, eight drones. Most of the

weapons the country has received from NATOIncluding four warplanes. Total of

georgian troops is 7 thousand men in South Ossetia. The number of armed forces is

29 thousand people (2000 of them were in Iraq at the beginning of the war) and an

unknown number of employees of internal troops. Earlier 2008, Georgia refused from

Kalashnikov assault rifles in favor of the automatic rifles of the American M-4

production.The composition of ground forces include tanks T-55, T-54 and T-72, as

well as BMP, BRDM, BTR-70 and 80. In addition, the ground forces is armed with a

96


1stjune, 2009

97 "Georgian defense, foreign ministers fired". The Associated Press.

98 New Army Chief of Staff Appointed. Civil Georgia. November 4, 2008

99 Interior Minister Briefs on IDP Housing Plans. Civil Georgia. September 13, 2008

100New Chief of Air Forces Appointed. Civil Georgia. March 22, 2007

101 Tbilisi: Georgia is not going to attack Tskhinvali - all misled contused general. NEWSru (28

October 2008)

42

variety of howitzers and mortars, mainly Czech production.On arms of the Air Forces

of Georgia are made Mi-24 "Iroquois", the Su-25T, Su-25, the Scorpion, the MiG-21,

L-159 ALCA, the An-2 and others. Georgia's air defense troops equipped with anti-

aircraft missile systems "Strela-10" of various modifications, self-propelled anti-

aircraft ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" anti-aircraft guns, anti-aircraft missile systems S-125 (

"Neva").

Time Event Explanation

August 1,

2008

There was an explosion in South

Ossetia102

Wounding 2 Georgian police

officer

August 2,

2008

Conflict between South Ossetia

Separatist and Georgia Armed

Forces103

Russia peacekeepers also engage in

this conflict, South Ossetia

President state ready to strike back

Georgia

August 7,

2008

Georgia attack South Ossetia104

Georgia accused South Ossetia

triggered Georgia army to attack

August 8,

2008

Mutual claim between Georgia

and South Ossetia about South

Ossetia region105

Georgia accuses Russia of

provoking Georgia to attack South

Ossetia. Russia has denied the

allegations and threatened to strike

back.

102

Интервьюфранцузскойгазете “Фигаро”.

http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/2072 103

Ibid 104

The West Begins to Doubt Georgian Leader,

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,578273-2,00.html 105

CBSNEWS,

http://www.cbsnews.com/elements/2008/08/12/in_depth_world/timeline4342593.shtml

43

August 8,

2008

Russian Armed forces entered

Georgia territory106

August 9,

2008

Declaration of war by Georgian

President107

President of Georgia declare a state

war

August 9,

2008

Georgia shooting of Russia

Aircraft108

Georgia claim has shooting 2 of

Russia Aircraft

August

10, 2008

An attack on Tbilisi109

Bomb attacks have occurred near

the military air base in Tbilisi

August

10, 2008

Criticism of US President and

Secretary of the British against the

Russian attacks in South

Ossetia110

The US president stated that Russia

should not respond to such attacks

with military aggression.

British Foreign Secretary

condemned the Russian attack far

beyond South Ossetia.

August

10, 2008

Georgia claimed that the Russian

attack had killed 130 people and

injured more than 1,000

civilians111

Russia denies attacking civilians in

the territory of Georgia.

106

Ibid 107

Ibid 108

Georgia declares 'state of war' over South Ossetia,

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/09/georgia.russia2 109

Day-by-day: Georgia-Russia crisis. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7551576.stm 110

Ibid 111

Ibid

44

August

10, 2008

Submission of a peace agreement

by Georgia112

Georgia filed a peace agreement on

Russia, and will withdraw all of its

troops.

Russia does not see any signs of

ceasefire by Georgia, so ask all

Georgian troops out of South

Ossetia.

August

11, 2008

French Foreign Minister came to

Georgia113

In a state of war, the French

Foreign Minister to come to

Georgia to mediate between Russia

and Georgia for a ceasefire.

August

11, 2008

disarmament Demand by Russia

114

Russia requested the Georgian army

which numbered 1500 people in

Zugdidi for disarmament. Georgia

refuses to disarm.

August

11, 2008

The European Commission called

on Russia to stop all military

action on Georgian territory115

August

12, 2008

President of France and the

French Foreign Minister visit

Moscow116

Sarkozy visited Moscow to seek

ceasefire between Russia and

Georgia

August Russia agree to ceasefire117

Russia agreed to carry weapons and

112

Loc. Cit. Timothy L. Thomas 113

Loc. Cit. Day by Day: Georgia-Russia Crisis 114

Ibid 115

Ibid 116

Ibid

45

16, 2008 to withdraw all of its troops to the

positions before the conflict.

August

17, 2008

Russia will start withdrawing all

of its troops on August 18,

according to the agreement that

was signed118

August

19, 2008

Placement of Russian

peacekeepers troops in conflict

area119

Russia will put peacekeepers in the

buffer zone area border of Georgia

and South Ossetia

August

19, 2008

Cessation of the NATO-Russia

relationship120

NATO states cannot make relations

with Russia as well. North Atlantic

Council (NAC) has expressed

concern for the territorial integrity

of Georgia.

August

20, 2008

Reprimand EU and the US to

Russia121

EU and USA strike against Russia

because it does not fully carry out

the peace agreement signed on 16

August 2008. They urged Russia to

withdraw all of its troops on

Georgian territory.

August

21, 2008

Cessation of the NATO-Russia

Military Cooperation122

Table 1: Chronology of the conflict in August 2008 in South Ossetia

117

Day by Day: Georgia-Russia Crisis, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7577150.stm 118

Ibid 119

Ibid 120

Ibid 121

Ibid 122

Day-by-Day: Georgia-Russia Conflict, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7577122.stm

46

CHAPTER III

RUSSIA DEFENSE POLICY

Defense Policy is a formulation of strategies which provide a code of conduct,

as defined by senior executive leadership, with the intention to influence and

determine, action, decision, and other matters which relate to the military affairs and

its actions. These strategies are in line with the nation‟s security interest. To put it

simply, it is a program which consist of „ends‟ and „mean‟, formulated for the

purpose of fulfilling the national security concerns and its defense objectives

(Tagarev, 2006).

Then according to Sarkesian, William and Cimbala, defense policy is part of

government policy especially with regard to the formulation and implementation of

national military strategies to create an environment favorable for the military and the

national interest.123

Moreover, defense policy by definition is a program for defending

a country against its enemies.124

Defense Policy aims to strengthen, secure, and defend a State's national

interests in order to respond sense of national identity and perception of threats that

might harm the State‟s interests. Defense policy is a political function; that is, a

choice to use state-sanctioned violence or the threat of violence to advance some

particular communal goal.

Defense policy require the establishment of the defense white paper or

military doctrine to be acknowledged as a guideline for the action, values, and

principles of the states. States release its defense white paper or military doctrine to

create the guideline for the national defense policy projection, and also to inform

other states about its action plan, whether it is for cooperation or threat.

123

Sarkesian, Sam C., William, John Allen & Cimbala, Stephen J. 2008 US National Security

Policymakers, Process & Politics, 4th

ed. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, p.5. 124

World Web Online, as retrieved from http://www.wordwebonline.com/search.pl?w=defense+policy

47

As successor to the power of the Soviet Union, until now Russia feels it is

important to be a leader in the Commonwealth Countries the former Soviet Union,

namely the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent State), Russia has always emphasize

mastery (control effect) against the former Soviet Union, both in the region eastern

Europe and central Asia. Eurasia is a geographical orientation (geopolitical)

important for Russia. Russia wants to regain the status of great power and became the

opposition of the US unilateralism and its allies in NATO. Great power will be

achieved when Russia run their foreign policy that wary of geopolitical rivalry and

also able to maintain the Eurasian region.

Many fact say that security of a country depends on the effectiveness of the

national defense policy and the security principles that adopt by the state system. The

importance of this policy is to ensure the independence, sovereignty, territorial

integrity, and prosperity, then stability of politic, economic, social, cultural, and also

military interests. Each country has their own national interests. The use of military

force is to determine the views that threaten the national interest.The national interest

which later became the basis for making the National Security Concept (NSC).

Russia's security strategy explained that the Russian Federation use elements of the

country such as the military, diplomacy, economics, international treaties, and other

tools in achieving its national interests. The security strategy to help prevent the

threat from the outside. The security strategy is then poured into a document and the

most important is military doctrine. Military policy realized in defense policy based

on military doctrine.

3.1. National Strategic Concept

About National Strategic Concept Russia, the Russian National Strategic

Concept which was unveiled on 10 January 2000 describes many of their military

concepts. At the National Strategic Concept Russia there are four chapters that cover

the state's behavior, how and why Russia to achieve the state's interest in military

48

matters. In the first part of Russia stated about how Russia behaves on the global

community. In the second part of Russia give info on what are the national interests

of Russia. In the third Russia told about anything that could threaten Russia, and the

fourth chapter Russia expressed about how where Russia ensure the security of his

country.

In this chapter the author will try to elaborate on all the National Strategic

Concept Russia relating to the protection of people, peacekeeping Russia, as well as

foreign threats to the state of Russia.

In chapter 2 of the national interest Russia, through the National Strategic

Concept is the Russian government stated that the national interests of Russia in the

military sphere is as a protection of the independence, sovereignty, and the country's

territorial integrity, to prevent military aggression against Russia and its allies, to

ensure peaceful conditions , democratic development of the country. As well as the

last paragraph National Strategic Concept also mentions the most important

component of the national interests of Russia are the protection of individuals, society

and the state from terrorism, including internationally, and emergency natural and

man-made disasters and their consequences, and in time of war from the dangers

arising from hostilities or because of war.

II. НациональныеинтересыРоссии

НациональныеинтересыРоссии в военнойсферезаключаются в

защитееенезависимости, суверенитета, государственной и

территориальнойцелостности, в

предотвращениивоеннойагрессиипротивРоссии и еесоюзников, в

обеспеченииусловийдлямирного,

демократическогоразвитиягосударства.

ВажнейшимисоставляющиминациональныхинтересовРоссииявляют

сязащиталичности, общества и государстваоттерроризма, в

томчислемеждународного, а

такжеотчрезвычайныхситуацийприродного и

техногенногохарактера и ихпоследствий, а в военноевремя -

отопасностей,

возникающихприведениивоенныхдействийиливследствиеэтихдейств

ий.

49

II. The national interests of Russia

Russia's national interests in the military sphere are to protect the

independence, sovereignty, state and territorial integrity, to prevent

military aggression against Russia and its allies, to ensure conditions for

a peaceful, democratic development of the state.

The most important components of the national interests of Russia are the

protection of the individual, society and the state from terrorism,

including international, as well as from emergency situations of natural

and man-made disasters and their consequences, as in war time - from

the dangers arising from hostilities or as a result of these actions125

. In this section, Russia feels that the protection of the integrity of a country is

very important especially from foreign intervention that capable to interrupting the

pattern of the people attitude of the state. In addition, in this paragraph also

mentioned that the protection of civilians is the main thing for the country because

civilians is one of the major components of the interests of the Russianstate.

IV.ОбеспечениенациональнойбезопасностиРоссийскойФедерации

Содействиеурегулированиюконфликтов,

включаямиротворческуюдеятельностьподэгидой ООН и

другихмеждународныхорганизаций.

IV. Ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation

Promoting conflict resolution, including peacekeeping operating under

the auspices of the UN and other international organizations.126

In another part of the NSC is the Russian government also stated that the

military will be involved in maintaining world peace. Russia will seek to promote any

resolution of the conflict in the global community anywhere in order to maintain

world peace. Additionally in order to maintain any peace, Russia will always conduct

military operations under the auspices of the United Nations and other international

organizations. It is listed in chapter four of Ensuring National Security Russian

Federation.

The defense policy of a country not only include National Strategic Concept,

it also contains a military doctrine. Military Doctrine is a picture of a country on the

125

National Security Concept of the Russian Federation(approved by Presidential Decree of 17

December 1997 № 1300/in the Decree of the President of Russian Federation amended on January 10,

2000 № 24/revised 11 April 2008 )

https://web.archive.org/web/20080411222235/http://www.scrf.gov.ru:80/documents/1.html 126

Ibid. Chapter 4

50

way of a perspective view of the state through the military. Through military doctrine

to be seen what can be termed as a threat, does a country take the threat, as well as the

way the country to overcome the threat.

As with other major powers Russia also has a military doctrine. Russian

military doctrine is the Russian military point of view on the threat that bothers their

independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and prosperity, then stability of

politic, economic, social, cultural, and also military interests like terror from outside

and inside.

3.2. Russia Defense Policy in 1990s

Russian Doctrine development began in 1990s. After the outbreak of the

Soviet Union, the Russian military organization seen in the formation of the

Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS), an organization that contains from

countries of the former Soviet Union which would be under Russian influence. CIS is

a combination of the armed forces of each of the 35 member states. Although Russia

has a very big role, but the organization still has a fleet of its own arsenal, separate

from the Russian armed forces. This then makes Russians feel the need to formulate a

military doctrine that legalized in 1992.127

The doctrine is at the beginning of the

Russian Security policy, which is different from the security and defense policy of the

Soviet Union period.

In the 1990s, the development of military policies contain about Russia's role

in conflict resolution and involvement in military cooperation with the CIS

(guarantees to Russian citizens in other CIS countries.) If required by the common

uses of nuclear power, the deployment of the army and other forces outside the

territory of Russia and the perceived threat of anti-Western.

127

Deputy of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). May 2007.

http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/cis.pdf.

51

On approval of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation

In accordance with paragraph "I" of Article 83 of the Constitution of

the Russian Federation and subparagraph 2 of paragraph 2 of Article 4

of the Federal Law "On Defense" paragraph of s t a n o I decree:

1. To approve the military doctrine of the Russian Federation.

2. To declare invalid the Decree of the President of the Russian

Federation of November 2, 1993 N 1833 "On Main Provisions Military

Doctrine of the Russian Federation "(Collected Acts of the President and

The Russian Federation, 1993, N 45, Art. 4329).

3. This Decree shall enter into force on the day of its official

publication.128

In the 90s Russia Military doctrine is based on the laws of Association

regarding the constitution and the legal defense of the Russian government. The Basic

Purpose of making the manufacture of Russian military doctrine is to validate the

presidential decree onNovember2, 1993 number 1833 about Russian military

objective. Where in military doctrine is explained clearly and openly what the

purpose and usefulness of the Russian military. Clarity Russian military functions

that global public question was answered through this Russian doctrine.

Specifically, the development of the doctrine in 1990 accompanied by

worsening relations with the West were represented by their interference in the west

of the interior of Russia, related to their military blocs and alliances, attempt to block

Russia's interests in the resolution of international security issues, as well as skeptical

about their enemies surrounding it. NATO is regarded as an enemy coming from

outside. Throughout 1990 Russian military realize that the ability of the armed forces

must be increased because the Russians are faced with domestic and regional armed

conflicts

3.3. Russia Military Doctrine 2000

Basically Military Doctrine serves binding policy makers at the strategic level

to the field operator implementers to ensure the attainment of the objectives of the

128

Abolished - Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 05.02.2010, N 146

http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&firstDoc=1&lastDoc=1&nd=102065541

52

military organization. So the military doctrine also a reference to the military of a

nation in order to achieve the main goal of the military. Such as wars and other

military operations, according to military doctrine it is one way for military

organizations to achieve objectives such as calming warring parties or even banish

the threat from other countries.

In any democratic country the military doctrine has a purpose, the purpose of

military doctrine is to keep the civilian government to remain in the right position in

order to maintain a national interest of a country. On the other hand for the civil,

military doctrine also binds the military to be in control. In this case the military

doctrine must not restrict the movement of the military in the context of protecting

the national interests of the country.

In the development of Russia has created a lot of the concepts and rules about

the military. One of them is a military doctrine that has been formed after the breakup

of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. In fact the draft military doctrine of Russia

was made in 1992, but not yet signed by President Yeltsin because they are still

characterized by the Soviet Union and does not match with the Russian nation. In

further developments in November 1993 Russia establish a new military doctrine.

There is no significant difference from the draft doctrine in 1992 with the doctrine

that established in 1993. There are two striking differences from both the military

doctrine. The first thing is about the Russian threat perception from the Western

block and the second about the dangers of internal war that may occur in the region of

Russia.

After the development of the military doctrine of Russia in the 2000s was

very unbelievable. In Russia's military doctrine tells the story of Russia's desire to

advance its military capabilities such as the modernization of weaponry and military

equipment. Apart from that there other striking thing in the Russian military doctrine

states that Russia disagrees and criticizes the United States as a country of residence

53

that dominates the world. According to Russia in its military doctrine, the role of the

unipolar superpower and dominant in international relations has violated the

principles of the United Nations about“all countries are equal or equivalent”.

In this subchapter will be told when the development of the Russian military

doctrine before South Ossetia War and after the South Ossetia War occurred.

3.3.1. Russian military doctrine before South Ossetia War

One of Russia's foreign policy there during the reign of Vladimir Putin is to

promote the interests of Russia as a great country and a country that has a great

influence in the international community to improve the country's defense, safeguard

the sovereignty and unity of the country and has a strong position, so as to support

domestic developments.129

In 2000, Putin started his policy by signing the new

document's security later published as a National Security Concept (NSC) in January

2000.130

When Vladimir Putin took over as president of Russia in 2000, he faced a

military vacuum conditions. Ships do not sail, planes do not fly, and the weapons are

not ready for immediate use. Putin then took the main task in stabilizing the Russian

military. Military modernization policy in terms of defense began the reign of

President Vladimir Putin that the Russian defense doctrine shaped the year 2000 up to

the latest in 2010. Military Doctrine in 2000 that contains the basic policy of the

Russian defense and the use of nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear

weapons or WMD (Missile Defense Weapon) on the critical condition of the Russian

national security situation.

During the reign of Putin, Russia has once again demonstrated its power

which had been lost during the breakup of the Soviet Union. He managed to reform in

various fields and promote economic growth in Russia very quickly and in a

129

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “KontseptsiyaVneshneiPolitikiRossiskoiFederatsii,” 2000,

http://lm.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nfs/ 130

Arms Control Association. 2000. Russia‟s National Strategy

Concepthttp://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_01-02/docjf00

54

relatively short time. This is done by performing the nationalization of oil and gas

companies in Russia. In addition, Russia also benefited from the soaring price of oil

at that time. In 2007, Russia has even managed to pay off all its foreign debt.131

The

rapid growth of the economy makes Russia can modernize the defense sector. The

results of the economic development of Russia is shown by the re-operation of

bomber aircraft patrolling around the border of Russia and the Russian attack to

South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Russia has a security doctrine that was first published in 2000. This doctrine

contains an emphasis on nuclear retaliation in case of nuclear attack. In April 2000,

Russia stipulates that security threats Russia take the form of intervention in the

internal affairs of the Russian Federation, An effort to disregard Russia's interests in

resolving international security issues, the expansion of military blocs and alliances,

the placement of foreign troops (without the UNSC sanctions) to territory that borders

Russia, and preparing for the Russian armed forces that can be used in strategic areas

outside the territory of Russia.

In the reign of Dmitry Medvedev, he added a few things in Russian Defense

policy, one of the policies is to create external conditions that allow the process of

modernization in Russia, transformation and innovation in the field of economy,

strengthen relations between peoples, strengthen the system of the constitution, rule

of law, democratization, human rights protection and ensure Russia's active role in

the international world.132

With the programs launched by the Medvedev, Russia is

predicted in the next few years may be one of the major players in the international

community, although they received various criticisms of human rights and democracy

in Russia.

Base on Russian Federation Military doctrine in Mar 31, 2008 that ratified by

Dmitry Medvedev. In Russian Federation military doctrine Chapter 1 Article 5,

131

Simon Saragih. BangkitnyaRusia. Jakarta: Kompas Group. 2008 132

Jeffery Mankoff. Russian Foreign Policy. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Inc. 2009. p. 33.

55

Chapter 1 Article 10 Point A, stated that Russian Federation protect its citizen

freedoms and lawful interests in foreign countries. If any foreign countries violence

that military doctrine Russian Federation assume the act as main external threat.

Besides the Russian Federation in its military doctrine states will participate in the

maintenance of peace in this world. The statements contained in Russia military

doctrine on Chapter 1 Article 1, Chapter 1 Article 7, Chapter 1 Article 10 Point A and

Chapter 2 Article 14, Chapter 2 Article 15, Chapter 2 Article 16, and Chapter 2

Article 17 point D133

(ВОЕННАЯ ДОКТРИНА РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

(утв. УказомПрезидента РФ от 21 апреля 2000 года N 706)/MILITARY

DOCTRINE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (App. Presidential Decree of 21

April 2000 N 706))

ВОЕННАЯ ДОКТРИНА РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

ВОЕННО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ

1. Состояние и перспективыразвитиясовременнойвоенно-

политическойобстановкиопределяютсякачественнымсовершенс

твованиемсредств, форм и способоввооруженнойборьбы,

увеличениемеепространственногоразмаха и

тяжестипоследствий, распространениемнановыесферы.

Возможностьдостижениявоенно-

политическихцелейнепрямыми,

неконтактнымидействиямипредопределяетособуюопасностьсо

временныхвойн и вооруженныхконфликтовдлянародов и

государств, длясохранениямеждународнойстабильности и

мира,

обусловливаетжизненнуюнеобходимостьпринятияисчерпывающ

ихмердляихпредотвращения,

мирногоурегулированияпротиворечийнараннихстадияхихвозникн

овения и развития.

MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

MILITARY AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS

1. Status and prospects of the development of modern military-political

situation are determined by a qualitative improvement in the means,

forms and methods of warfare, increasing its spatial extent and

severity of the impact, spread to new areas. The ability to achieve

military and political objectives indirect, non-contact operations

predetermines the particular danger of modern wars and armed

133

MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (App. Presidential Decree of 21 April

2000 N 706)

https://web.archive.org/web/20080331064729/http://www.scrf.gov.ru:80/documents/33.html

56

conflicts for peoples and nations, for the maintenance of international

peace and stability, and makes it vitally necessary to take exhaustive

measures to prevent them, the peaceful settlement of conflicts in the

early stages of their emergence and development.134

For Russia the impact of a war can be very disrupting the stability of a

country. Disturbed stability in a country could be very dangerous threat in every

sector. Whether political, economic, and social stability will be disrupted when a

disturbed state. Therefore, in the military doctrine Russia Chapter 1 Article 1 states

that the military should act for the purpose to maintain the stability of the Mother

landRussia. One of the things that can disrupt the stability of the state is unpeaceful

condition in neighbor countries. To avoid the bad things that can happen to the

Russian state, the Russian military can run the preemptive strategy for any threat in

order to maintain a peaceful condition of the neighboring country.

5. Основные внешние угрозы:

Дискриминация, подавление прав, свобод и

законныхинтересовгражданРоссийскойФедерации в

иностранныхгосударствах.

5. The main external threats:

Discrimination and the suppression of the rights, freedoms and lawful

interests of Russian citizens to foreign states.135

Protection of the citizens is the one of the duties of a state. Both inside and

outside the territory, the state is obligated to protect all the rights of its citizens. Like

Russian Federation, Russia argued that the rights and freedoms of its people are the

main ones that Russia will protect them even if they located outside the territory.

According to Russian military doctrine when the rights and freedoms of citizens

harassed by other countries when they located outside the region, it would be a threat

to Russia as set out in Chapter 1 Article 5.

7.ОбеспечениевоеннойбезопасностиРоссийскойФедерацииявляетсяв

ажнейшимнаправлениемдеятельностигосударства.

134

Ibid Chapter 1 Article 1 135

Ibid Chapter 1 Article 5

57

РоссийскаяФедерациярассматриваетобеспечениесвоейвоеннойбезоп

асности в

контекстестроительствадемократическогоправовогогосударства,

осуществлениясоциально-экономическихреформ,

утвержденияпринциповравноправногопартнерства,

взаимовыгодногосотрудничества и добрососедства в

международныхотношениях,

последовательногоформированияобщей и

всеобъемлющейсистемымеждународнойбезопасности, сохранения и

укреплениявсеобщегомира.

7. Ensuring military security of the Russian Federation is the most

important area of the state.

The Russian Federation considers ensuring its military security in the

context of building a democratic state of law, the implementation of

socio-economic reforms, establishing the principles of equal partnership,

mutual cooperation and good neighborliness in international relations,

consistently shaping an overall and comprehensive system of

international security, the preservation and strengthening of world

peace.136

In chapter 1 article 7, the state Russia stated that the military is a tool of the

state to make the state may have a democratic law, military help reform the social and

economic, military can establish the principles of equal partnership and mutual

cooperation in good neighborliness in international relations , Consistently military

could be a tool of the government to form a whole and comprehensive in relation to

the state, and military as the enforcement system of international security, the

preservation and strengthening of world peace. Because of this Russia found military

must have the capability of maintaining international security by establishing and

empowering of peacekeeping troops in the area of global conflict.

10. Основноесодержаниеобеспечениявоеннойбезопасности:

А) В мирноевремя:

Обеспечениебезопасности и

защитагражданРоссийскойФедерацииотвоенныхугроз.

Обеспечениеготовности к участию (участие) в

миротворческойдеятельности.

10. The main content of military security:

A) In peacetime:

Security and protection of Russian citizens from military threats.

136


58

Ensuring readiness to participate (participating) in peacekeeping

activities137

Russian Federation military doctrine describes the use of the military. In

chapter 1 article 10 point A, Russia explained that the military has uses in the two

conditions, the first is when the state in peace condition which the country does not

feel the threat and the second is when the state in war condition (threatened).

According to the Russian Federation military doctrinethere are several function of

military, First of all, the functions of the Russia Army in the peace condition is to

protect their citizens from the threat of foreign military.When peacetime danger does

not come from enemy states but rather from unexpected parties are like terrorists and

separatists. Therefore, the Russian military still has a duty to protect its citizens even

in a state in peace condition. Moreover Russia military is also prepared to maintain

world peace through peacekeeping troops.Peacekeepers Russia is a special unit in the

form of the Russian government adapted to the principles of the UN as well as

Russian federal law about safeguarding world peace.138

II. ВОЕННО-СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ

14. ЦелипримененияВооруженныхСилРоссийскойФедерации и

другихвойск:

Воперацияхпоподдержанию и восстановлениюмира -

разведениепротивоборствующихсторон, стабилизацияобстановки,

обеспечениеусловийдлясправедливогомирногоурегулирования.

II. Military-Strategic Foundations

14. The objectives of the use of the Russian Armed Forces and other

troops:

In peacekeeping and peace restoration operations - disengage the

warring factions, to stabilize the situation, providing the conditions for a

just and peaceful settlement.139

In chapter 2 Article 14, Russia military doctrine focuses on the basic of their

military strategy. Russia government believe that, Russia military has several

purposes. One of its aim is to maintain and restore peace in global sphere. In this

137

Ibid Chapter 1 Article 10 Point A 138

“United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” Part 3 Chapter 6 P. 63 139


59

strategy Russia will try to disengage from the factions in conflict, in addition to the

Russia military is also trying to stabilize the conflict. To stabilize the condition of the

conflict, Russia would be willing to participate as a mediator in the conflict by

providing the enabling conditions for the warring parties to resolve the problem. This

military strategy clearly in Russia military doctrine in chapter 2 article 14.

15. Основные

формыпримененияВооруженныхСилРоссийскойФедерации и


Миротворческиеоперации.

15. The main ways of utilizing the Russian Federation Armed Forces and

other troops:

Peacekeeping operations.140

Russia one of the world's major countries with strong military power. After

the Soviet Union ended Russia is a country that gets the greatest legacy of the Soviet

Union force. One form of visible strength of this country is its military power and

sophisticated weapons from the Soviet Union era. According to the Russian

federation in its military doctrine states that in order to maximize the Russian

military will use the Army to maintain world peace. Clearly in chapter 2 article 15,

the main ways of utilizing the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops is

by Peacekeeping operations.

16. ВооруженныеСилыРоссийскойФедерации и

другиевойскадолжныбытьготовы к отражениюнападения и

нанесениюпораженияагрессору, ведениюактивныхдействий

(какоборонительных, так и наступательных)

прилюбомвариантеразвязывания и ведениявойн и

вооруженныхконфликтов, в

условияхмассированногопримененияпротивникомсовременных и

перспективныхбоевыхсредствпоражения, в

томчислеоружиямассовогоуничтожениявсехразновидностей.

ОдновременноВооруженныеСилыРоссийскойФедерациидолжныобес

печитьосуществлениеРоссийскойФедерациеймиротворческойдеяте

140


60

льностикаксамостоятельно, так и в

составемеждународныхорганизаций.

16. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and other troops should

be ready to repel attacks and defeating the aggressor, and conduct active

operations (both defensive and offensive) under any scenario of starting

and waging of wars and armed conflicts in the conditions of massive use

by the enemy of modern and advanced combat weapons, including

weapons of mass destruction of all types.

At the same time the Russian Federation Armed Forces must ensure the

implementation of the Russian Federation peacekeeping operations both

independently and as part of international organizations.141

In chapter 2 article 16 of the Russian military doctrine believes that Russian

troops are always ready to deflect and counter to the enemy that threatens the

country's sovereignty. Armed Forces of Russia will mobilize all their weapons, and

using weapons of mass destruction if necessary. But this will be balanced with the

movement of world peacekeeping operations. The world's peace-keeping can be done

by unilaterally or independently and in cooperation with other international

organizations.

17. Основные задачиВооруженныхСилРоссийскойФедерации и


Г) Воперацияхпоподдержанию и восстановлениюмира:

Выполнениезадач в операцияхпоподдержанию и

восстановлениюмиравозлагаетсянаВооруженныеСилыРоссийскойФ

едерации. Дляподготовки к

выполнениюэтихзадачвыделяютсяспециальноназначенныесоединени

я и воинскиечасти. Наряду с подготовкой к

применениюпопрямомупредназначениюониобучаютсяпоспециальной

программе. РоссийскаяФедерацияосуществляеттыловое и

техническоеобеспечение, обучение,

подготовкуроссийскихконтингентов, планированиеихприменения и

оперативноеуправлениеими в соответствиисостандартами и

процедурами ООН, ОВСЕ и СодружестваНезависимыхГосударств.

17. The main tasks of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other

troops:

D) The maintenance operations and the restoration of peace:

Perform tasks in the maintenance and restoration of peace operations

rests with the Russian Federation Armed Forces. To prepare for these

tasks are allocated specifically designated units and formations. Along

with the preparation for the use for its intended purpose, they are trained

in a special program. The Russian Federation implements logistic and

141


61

technical support, training, preparation of Russian contingents, the

planning of their implementation and operational management in

accordance with the standards and procedures of the United Nations, the

CFE and the Commonwealth of Independent States.142

In maintaining world peace Russian troops have been prepared in various

ways, either in training, technical, and strategic military planning. All this readiness

adjusted to the rules and principles that apply in the standard UN procedures, CFE

and CIS. Therefore, Russia's peacekeepers must be able to carry out their

peacekeeping operations. The entire Russian military operations will go hand in hand

and in accordance with the programs of international organizations. Russia believes

the military program in accordance with international standards, casualties and losses

can be minimized.

3.3.2. Russian Federation military doctrine after South Ossetia War

Basically the Russian military doctrine that legalized on 21 November 2008 is

nearly the same as the military doctrine adopted on 20 April 2000. There is no

fundamental difference in this military doctrine. Military doctrine in 2008 also stated

that Russia fully protect Russian sovereignty. The difference in this military doctrine

is about how Russia viewed the threats that jeopardize its sovereignty.

Differences seen in the new military doctrine that NATO is about to give

military support to the countries of ex-CIS who recently joined NATO, such as

Georgia. In the South Ossetia War, the Russian government saw that the danger that

Russia come from CIS countries themselves. Many Russian citizens living in the CIS

countries, and when the CIS countries are switching from Russia and NATO support

would be an obstacle and a threat to Russia to protect the people who are in the

country.

As explained in any military doctrine of Russia during this time, Russian

military believes that all countries within international organizations are the same and

142

Ibid Chapter 2 Article 17 Point D

62

equal. This perspective makes Russia criticized the US as a country that dominates

the world and other international organizations, one of them NATO.Case on

articleRussian security engagement with NATO by Roy Allison, explained that

Russia believes that NATO itself is not characterized Europe again, the attitude of

most NATO member-states supposed to be Europe, and now NATO has been

dominated by the attitude of the US as the strongest.143

II. ВОЕННО-СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ

14. Цели применения Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации и

других войск:

в крупномасштабной (региональной) войне в случае ее развязывания

каким-либо государством (группой, коалицией государств) - защита

независимости и суверенитета, территориальной целостности

Российской Федерации и ее союзников, отражение агрессии,

нанесение поражения агрессору, принуждение его к прекращению

военных действий на условиях, отвечающих интересам Российской

Федерации и ее союзников;

II. Military-Strategic Foundations

14. The objectives of the use of the Russian Armed Forces and other

troops:

In large-scale (regional) war, if unleashed by a state (group or coalition

of states) - the protection of the independence and sovereignty, territorial

integrity of the Russian Federation and its allies, repel aggression,

defeating the aggressor, forcing him to cease hostilities on terms meet the

interests of Russia and its allies.144

In chapter 2 article 7 states that the Russian military doctrine, there was a

conflict within the scope of regional Russia unresolved and remains a threat to

Russian sovereignty. One conflict that is considered threatening is conflict areas

bordering with Russia such as neighboring Georgia. In this case the Russian

government would take the military path as problem solving. Russian government

will not hesitate to declare war if it is really dangerous Russian state. Conventional

weapons or nuclear weapon will be used when the condition of the conflict is very

threatening.

143

Allison, Roy. “Putin’s Russia and the enlargement Europe: Russian security engagement with

NATO” p.98 144

MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (App. Presidential Decree of 21 April

2000 N 706)

https://web.archive.org/web/20080331064729/http://www.scrf.gov.ru:80/documents/33.html

63

1. ВОЕННО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ

5. Основные внешние угрозы:

территориальные претензии к Российской Федерации;

вмешательство во внутренние дела Российской Федерации;

попытки игнорировать (ущемлять) интересы Российской

Федерации в решении проблем международной безопасности,

противодействовать ее укреплению как одного из влиятельных

центров многополярного мира;

наличие очагов вооруженных конфликтов, прежде всего вблизи

государственной границы Российской Федерации и границ ее

союзников;

создание (наращивание) группировок войск (сил), ведущее к

нарушению сложившегося баланса сил, вблизи государственной

границы Российской Федерации и границ ее союзников, а также на

прилегающих к их территориям морях;

расширение военных блоков и союзов в ущерб военной безопасности

Российской Федерации;

ввод иностранных войск в нарушение Устава ООН на территории

сопредельных с Российской Федерацией и дружественных ей

государств;

создание, оснащение и подготовка на территориях других

государств вооруженных формирований и групп в целях их

переброски для действий на территориях Российской Федерации и

ее союзников;

нападения (вооруженные провокации) на военные объекты

Российской Федерации, расположенные на территориях

иностранных государств, а также на объекты и сооружения на

государственной границе Российской Федерации, границах ее

союзников и в Мировом океане;

действия, направленные на подрыв глобальной и региональной

стабильности, в том числе путем воспрепятствования работе

российских систем государственного и военного управления, на

нарушение функционирования стратегических ядерных сил, систем

предупреждения о ракетном нападении, противоракетной обороны,

контроля космического пространства и обеспечения их боевой

устойчивости, объектов хранения ядерных боеприпасов, атомной

энергетики, атомной и химической промышленности, других

потенциально опасных объектов;

враждебные, наносящие ущерб военной безопасности Российской

Федерации и ее союзников информационные (информационно-

технические, информационно-психологические) действия;

дискриминация, подавление прав, свобод и законных интересов

граждан Российской Федерации в иностранных государствах;

международный терроризм

. 1. POLITICAL-MILITARY

5. The main external threats are:

64

territorial claims against the Russian Federation; interference in the

internal affairs of the Russian Federation; attempts to ignore (infringe)

the Russian Federation's interests in resolving international security

problems, to oppose its strengthening as one of the most influential

centers of a multipolar world;

the existence of seats of armed conflict, primarily close to the Russian

border and the borders of its allies;

the creation (buildup) of groups of troops (forces), leading to disruption

of the existing balance of forces near the state border of the Russian

Federation and those of its allies, as well as in areas adjacent to their

territories of the seas;

expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the Russian

Federation's military security;

the introduction of foreign troops in violation of the UN Charter on the

territory adjacent to the Russian Federation and friendly states;

creation, equipping, and training on the territories of other states of

armed groups with a view to transferring them for operations on the

territory of the Russian Federation and its allies;

attacks (armed provocations) in the Russian Federation military

installations located on the territory of foreign states, as well as the

objects and buildings at the state border of the Russian Federation, and

the borders of its allies in the World Ocean;

actions aimed at undermining global and regional stability, including by

hampering the work of Russian systems of state and military control, at

disrupting the functioning of strategic nuclear forces, warning systems for

missile attack, missile defense, space control and ensuring their combat

stability, storage facilities nuclear weapons, nuclear energy, nuclear and

chemical industries, and other potentially dangerous objects;

hostile and detrimental to the Russian Federation's military security and

its allies information (information-technical, information-psychological)

operations;

discrimination and the suppression of the rights, freedoms and legal

interests of Russian citizens to foreign states;

international terrorism.145

Then in chapter 2 article 8 Russia's military doctrine to explain about what is

known as external threats to the sovereignty of Russia. Russia clearly and publicly

stated that NATO is one of the major threats for Russia, as NATO been strengthen

themilitary of the countries that bordering with Russia. It becomes frightened for the

Russian government and can be described as the threat perception. In some passages

145


65

say their violations of international law from NATO to bring tools to combat and

military strengthen the countries bordering with Russia.

Besides the placement of foreign soldiers in the region bordering Russia and

its allies became a direct threat to Russia. As in the South Ossetia War that occurred

in 2008, Russia saw so many NATO intervened in the conflict. Described in Konflik

Georgia dan Rusia di Ossetia selatan pada bulan Agustus 2008 by Ali Wibowo

Laksono that NATO was convincing Georgia to attack people and Russian

peacekeepers in South Ossetia regions.146

Other forms that threaten Russia in this case also conveyed, such as the

placement of missiles on the border of Russia and its allies, claiming territory of

Russia and its allies, the provision of weapons technology warheads for the country

side by side with Russia and its allies, conflict regional armed Russia and its allies, a

violation of the UN charter and international law, the terrorists and armed extremists

in the world.

3.4. Russia Military Forces in 2008

Which we know, Russia is one of the world's strongest nations. Russia as state

has war capacity number 5 in the world. According to Defense Minister Anatoliy

Serdyukov after the war, Russian Federation has 1.2 million active frontline

personnel and 2.3 million active deserve personnel.147

Base on increase in Russia's

military budget data from SIPRI, shown that Russian Military Budget steadily

increased since 2001. Russia military budget will be elaborate more in chapter fourth.

This increase in defense budget Russia uses to renew and manufacture their defense

equipment. Previously this was a few branches of the Russian army in 2008.

The Ground Forces or Sukhoputnye voiska in Russia is the largest branch of the

Russian army. The main mission of the Russian army is to repel enemies who come

146

Laksono, Ali Wibowo. “Konflik Georgia dan Rusia di Ossetia selatan padabulanAgustus 2008”.

FISIPUI, Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta 2012p. 81 147

Moscow Defense Brief #4, 2008 p. 21-24

66

by land. In addition, the Russian army branch is also required to be able to protect the

territory of the Russian State from the coming attack. In a state of war the army of the

Russian army is certain to have combat readiness and be able to provide cover for

other branches for the victory of Russia. The Ground Forces has eight arms of

service: motor rifle, tanks, artillery and rocket troops, air defense forces, special

corps, military units, and company logistics.148

The Aerospace Forces and can also be referred to as Vozdushno-kosmicheskie sily.

The Aerospace Forces has the responsibility to protect the integrity of the State of

Russia from all threats and aggresions from airspace and outer space. In addition The

Russian Aerospace Forces is also equipped with conventional weapons and nuclear

weapons. In a state of war The Aerospace Forces Russia will have the role of support

forces that facilitate movement and assault in a military operation so that the Russian

army can reach the target. The army of The Aerospace Forces Russia has 2 branches

The Aerospace Forces, the branches are, Air Force and also Space Forces149

The Navy’s that called also VMF Rossii by Russian government has overall task is to

defend Russia territory especially in water territory, in other side Russian federation

Navy also have to able to wage combat on the oceans and the seas and in coastal

waters. Russian federation Navy also certainly can strike enemy objects and forces

with both nuclear and conventional weapons. And there also 2 branch of Russian

Navy, which are Naval Infantry and Naval Aviation. 150

The Strategic Missile Forces (Raketnye voiska strategicheskogo naznacheniia) are

an arm of service of the Armed Forces. Their mission is nuclear deterrence of

aggression and destruction of strategic enemy targets. In 2016, the Strategic Missile

Forces comprised a force command and three missile armies, with a total of 12

148

Thornton, Rod. (2011). MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND THE RUSSIAN GROUND FORCES. SSI Monograph 149

D. Boltenkov, A. Gayday, A. Karnaukhov, A. Lavrov, V. Tseluiko (2008). Russia's New Army, Center of Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow 150

Ibid

67

divisions (Ministry of Defence 2016k). They are equipped with both road-mobile and

silo-based strategic nuclear missiles. The composition of the warheads and

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the table below. Command and control

issues are discussed in the following section, together with the other nuclear forces.151

Types of Equipment Total

Thanks 23000

Armored Fighting Vehicles 805

Armored Personnel Carriers 9900

Towed Artillery 13585

Self-Propelled Guns 6010

Multiple Rocket Launch Systems 4350

Mortars 6100

Aircraft Carriers 1

Destroyers 15

Submarines 61

Frigates 19

Patrol & Coastal Craft 72

Mine Warfare Craft 41

Amphibious Craft 22

Major Combat Ships 120

Combat Aircraft 2,118

Helicopters 1520

Table 2: Russian Federation Military Equipment152

151

Ibid 152

(2008).Russia. Global Fire Power

68

Russian

designation

NATO

designation

Lau

nche

rs

Year

deployed

Warheads

x yield

(kilotons)

Total no.

of

warhead

s

ICBMs RS-20V

Voievoda

SS-18-M6

Satan

46 1988 10 x

500/800

(MIRVs)

460

RS-18 SS-19-M3

Stiletto

20 1980 6 x 400

(MIRVs)

120

RS-12M

Topol

SS-25

Sickle

90 1988 1 x 800 90

RS-12M1

Topol-M

SS-27-

Mod1

(mobile)

18 2006 1 x 800 18

RS-12M2

Topol-M

SS-27-

Mod1

(silobased)

60 1997 1 x 800 60

Total ICBMs 307

?

1 040

~600

SLBMs RSM-50 SS-N-18

M1

Stingray

2/32 1978 3 x 50

(MIRVs)

96

RSM-54

Sineva

SS-N-23

M1

6/96

5/80

2007 4 x 100

(MIRVs)

384 320

Total SLBMs 11/1

76

8/12

8

768

~560

Bomber Tu-95 MS6 Bear 27 1984 6 x AS-15A 162

69

H6 ALCMs or

bombs

Tu-95 MS16 Bear

H16

30 1984 16 x AS-

15A

ALCMs or

bombs

480

Tu-160 Blackjack 13 1987 12 x AS-

15B

ALCMs,

AS-16

SRAMs or

bombs

156

Total bombers ~70

~60

798

670

Total ~550

>49

5

~2600

~1800

Table 3: Estimated Russian nuclear weapon as of early 2008153

153

Kristensen & Norris 2016: 126, 130.

70

CHAPTER IV

RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S DEFENSE POLICY

IMPLEMENTATION ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION

WITH GEORGIA

Russian Federation must defend its sovereignty and national interest through

it defense policy. Russia stated that the one factor that is able to compromise the

Russia defense is external attacks from conflict neighbor‟s state. Therefore, in the

interest to protect Russia national territory will try to be active in maintaining world

peace, especially in the Caucasus region. This thesis also discusses about the

dynamics relations between those three actors who involved in the South Ossetia

War. They are Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia. It‟s all about the involvement and

role of Russian Federation in the South Ossetia War.

Therefore Russian Federation should implement its defend policy toward in

order to solve conflict that happen between Russian Federation and Georgia on South

Ossetia. There will be three part of time of Russia defense policy implementation

toward South Ossetia War. First is Russia defense policy implementation before the

conflict, second is when the conflict begins, and third is after the Ossetia conflict

happen.

Base on second chapter, South Ossetia Separatist been there to separate South

Ossetia from Georgia since 1989.154

History explained that South Ossetia been

proclamation it‟s independent since January 19, 1992 by de Facto and join North

Ossetia under Russian Federation, but Georgia confront the legality of South Ossetia

154

Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR on the decisions of the

twelfth session of the Council of People's Deputies of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region of the

twentieth convocation

71

independent.155

In 2006, South Ossetia ever been Referendum with 90% of South

Ossetian people choose to break away from Georgia, but international system do not

claim it.156

After a lot of conflict in South Ossetia for a long time, as a neighboring

country russia attempted to reconcile the atmosphere by implementing the regulations

there. Implementation of these regulations affect the interests of russia mainly in

protecting its people and also avoid the influence of the US through NATO

continuously entrance toward the CIS. One implementation of russia defense policy is

the most prominent is the placement of joint peacekeepers forces in the South

Ossetian region which is the main conflict area. The establishment of joint

peacekeepers forces is an agreement between Georgia, Russia and South Ossetia in

1992.157

Defense policy

implementation

Russian Federation Georgia

Before the war Active Active

During the war Active Active

After the war Active Not Active

Table 4: Defense implementation by Georgia and Russian Federation.

Table was edited by the writer.

Base on my analysis, this table will provide data about how active Russia and

Georgia in way to implement its defense policy in South Ossetia war. As we know

155

South Ossetia (1992), Independence from Georgia and connection to Russia Direct Democracy.

Georgia 156

"99% of South Ossetian voters approve independence". Regnum. November 13, 2006. Archived

from the original on September 30, 2007. Retrieved November 27, 2006. 157

Russia in Global Affairs, Vol.6 No.4, October–December 2008.

72

that Russia has more active, since before the war start Russia been prepared its

military base on its military doctrine. Beside that Georgia wouldn‟t implement its

defense policy after the war because Russia troops had been seizing its military base.

More analysis about the implementation of both Russia and Georgia defense policy

would discuss in this thesis.

4.1. Russia Involvement in South Ossetia War

4.1.1. Russia before South Ossetia War

After the proclamation of Kosovo's independence, when the process of

international recognition of the former Autonomous Territory of Yugoslavia was

under way, Putin and Saakashvili met for the last time as president. In the meeting,

Putin declared there will probably be upheavals in Georgia in the future.158

Putin also

said will make a good relationship with Georgia. Putin will strengthen the export and

import with Georgia, but exports and imports will be carried out with the disputed

region of Georgia which are Abkhazia and South Ossetia. after that president putin

also said that the right to give a statement about the disputed areas is russia, not the

US or NATO even Georgia itself. it will be the same as the independence of

Kosovo.159

March 1, 2008 the Russian General Vasily Lunev, a former deputy army

commander in the Siberian Military District and a former military commissioner of

the Perm region, was appointed Minister of Defense of South Ossetia.160

March 11,

Colonel-General Sergei Makarov was appointed chief of staff of the North Caucasian

158

meeting with President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia Bureau of MPs August 24, 2008,

http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=0&sm=1&st=0&id=2721 159

Address by Mikheil Saakashvili before the parliamentary commission of November 28, 2008

http://www.parliament.ge/print.php?gg=1&sec_id=1329&info_id=21678&lang_id=ENG ; Georgian

pundits comment on results of Putin- Saakashvili meeting, 24 Saati, 28 February 2008. 160

Herpen, Marcel H. Van, (2015). Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism, Rowman &

Littlefield, London.

73

Military District (SCWO), 31 May he became commander of the North Caucasus

Military District.161

The NATO summit in Bucharest on April 3-4, 2008, denied Georgia and

Ukraine to provide an action plan to prepare for membership. Putin sent a letter to

Bagapsh and Kokoity, promising to take "substantive steps" to lift the sanctions, and

the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and the two republics.162

April 8 Lavrov said that Russia "will do everything in its power to prevent the

admission of Georgia and Ukraine into NATO,”163

Chief of the Russian General Staff Yury Baluyevsky added that "we will do

all the (necessary) to prevent the entry of Georgia into NATO." Later, speaking to a

group of NATO forces, he bluntly warned them of the possibility of the invasion of

Georgia in 2008, his interlocutors that statement was not taken seriously "and is

regarded as a splurge".164

A radical decision was made April 16, 2004 Russian President instructed the

federal government and regional authorities to establish direct relations with the de

facto authorities in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. The Georgian government has indicated

that Putin's order is legally equivalent to a full Russian annexation of two Georgian

regions.165

EU, OSCE, NATO, the United States, Britain, France, Germany

denounced Putin's decision and called on him to abandon his.166

This call was ignored

by Russia.

April 20, 2008 the Russian MiG-29, rising from an air base in the Abkhazian

town of Gudauta, shot down a Georgian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and then

161

Federation, Russia. (2008). Russia: Biographies, Photos of RF Armed Forces Leadershi.

Moscow Rossiyskoye Voyennoye Obozreniye , Moscow.

https://fas.org/irp/dni/osc/RFarmedforces.html 162

Georgian Speaker slams Putin for liaising with separatist leaders, Mze TV, 4 April 2008, (BBC

Monitoring). 163

Moscow will not allow the entry of Ukraine and Georgia into NATO. - RIA "News", April 8, 2008,

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080408/104105506.html 164

John Vinocur, Georgia is a focal point in US-NATO Russian Tension, in New York Yimes, 4 May

2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/05/world/europe/05iht-politicus.html ? pagewanted = 2 165

Vladimir Socor, Russia Moves toward open annexation of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Eurasia Daily

Monitor, 18 April 2008. 166

Russia criticized over Abkhazia, BBC News, 24 April 2008.

74

went north into Russian airspace. A camera mounted on a Georgian drone, recorded

the attack and managed to send a video to the ground. Georgia accused Russia of

military aggression, Russia has rejected this accusation. But the investigation carried

out in Georgia (UNOMIG), the United Nations Observer Mission, confirmed that the

attack was made by a Russian fighter.167

According to the resolution number 3314 of the UN General Assembly on

December 14, 1974 took place the attack became clear, confirmed by international

observers act of aggression.168

From that moment we can say that Russia started the

war against Georgia. The Russian-Georgian war of low intensity continued until July

28.

During the week of May 4, Russian troops shot down several Georgian

drones. Head of the Main Directorate of Combat Training and Service of the Russian

Armed Forces troops, General Vladimir Shamanov said on May 6 that the Russian

army will no longer allow aircraft to fly over the Georgian conflict zones.169

In violation of the agreement on the CIS peace-keeping operations in April

2008, Moscow began to place in Abkhazia part of Novorossiysk Airborne Division.

In early May, they were further assigned to three anti-aircraft missile systems "Buk",

fourteen howitzer D-30, ten 122-mm multiple rocket launchers BM-21, 20 anti-tank

guns, 120 ATGM, two helicopters, and sent 180 Russian technicians professionals to

serve these weapons systems.170

Russian Black Sea Fleet in April and May spent

eight exercises in which worked out amphibious landings. May 1st Russian troops in

Abkhazia, established additional unauthorized roadblocks in Tkvarcheli and

Ochamchira districts. A week later, Moscow confirmed that the number of its forces

167

Vladimir Socor, UN mission confirms Georgia, rejects Russian version of air clash, Eurasia Daily

Monitor, 27 May 2008. 168

United Nations General Assembly (1974). Definition of Aggression, United Nations General

Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX). 169

Svante E. Cornell, S. Frederick Starr (2015). The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia,

Routledge, London. 170

Speech by David Kezerashvili in front of the parliamentary committee October 27, 2008

[http://www.parliament.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=1329&info_id=21926]

75

in Abkhazia has been increased from 1997 to 2542 soldiers.171

According to Georgian

sources, the number of Russian troops in Abkhazia has reached 4000. May 14, Sergei

Bagapsh appealed to Russia with a request to establish in Abkhazia permanent

military presence.172

His idea was immediately supported the commander in chief of

the Russian Air Force Alexander Zelin.173

In early May, the Russian Defense Ministry has called on the former military

training of pilots of military helicopters that had experience of flying in mountainous

terrain. May 14, 2008 began the 17-day exercise for the newly designed flyers in

Nalchik in the Air Force.174

Key Stage combat deployment began on May 26, when

Abkhazia was posted casing Russian railway troops numbering 400 people for the

restoration of 54-kilometer railway line linking the port of Sukhumi, Ochamchire in

the vicinity of the Abkhaz-Georgian demarcation line.175

Three new hangars for

airplanes and ammunition were hurriedly built on Bombora air base near Sukhumi.

By 6 June several new Russian combat aircraft Su-25 and Su-27 landed at the

base in Gudauta. At the same time Zelenchukskaya mountain infantry brigade SCWO

beginning of the 10-day exercise with the aim of "working off of actions in unfamiliar

territory and away from places of permanent deployment." Shortly afterwards, the

Georgian authorities detained a group of Russian peacekeepers in Zugdidi district on

the Georgian side of the Abkhaz-Georgian demarcation line and confiscated 20 anti-

tank missiles and other heavy weapons, prohibited to be deployed in the conflict

zone. In response, the Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Russian General

Alexander Burutin promised bloodshed if Georgia will confiscate Russian weapons

171

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation threatens to increase peacekeepers in the Georgian-

Abkhazian conflict - to the ultimate limit,

http://www.newsru.com/russia/08may2008/minobor_print.html 172

Sokhumi is ready to host the Russian military base,

http://www.regnum.ru/news/999755.html?forprint 173

Russian Air Force Commander: "The possible establishment of a Russian military base in Abkhazia

would help to improve the quality of protection of the state border»,

http://www.regnum.ru/news/1000830.html?forprint 174

Mountain training pilots of Army Aviation, http://mil.ru/info/1069/details/index.shtml?id=42837 ;

http://milkavkaz.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=135&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=15 175

http://palm.newsru.com/russia/03jun2008/medsaak.html

76

since, according to him, the Russian "peacekeepers" have the right to open fire.176

In

an interview with the newspaper "Resonance" Pavel Felgenhauer said the decision to

go to war against Georgia has been taken, and predicted that military action is likely

to begin in August,.177

On the last day of June the forces of the North Caucasus Military District,

together with the Federal Security Service troops began the seven-day "maneuvers in

a wooded mountainous area near the border with Georgia." On the same day Bagapsh

closed Abkhazian-Georgian border along the Inguri River and Russia's military

vehicles with 250 soldiers on board left from the Russian city of Sochi, and went to

the Abkhaz port Gagra.

In May 2008, Russia launched authorities intensified to South Ossetian. June

30, 2008, at the end of his 10-day trip to South Ossetia, known for its ties to the

Russian army and security services Aleksandr Dugin declared: "Russia decided to

recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia. For all this, you are perfectly prepared. If

Russia recognizes the independence of South Ossetia and to introduce its not

peacekeeping and border forces, the question of taking Georgia into NATO will be

removed from the agenda. Until December we have to recognize South Ossetia and

Abkhazia ".178

A few days later he explained the situation to the Russian public,

"Ossetians are waiting for war. The country is ready for war. All the male population

mobilized. All people who care about the fate of Russia, especially the young people

who want to show their patriotic qualities - that's where we should go, in Ossetia.

176

Russian General to Georgia: Russian peacekeepers' patience running out, International Herald

Tribune, 19 June 2008. 177

Russia starts a war against Georgia in August, presumably. - P. Felgenhauer,

http://www.apsny.ge/news/1213985330.php 178

Alexander Dugin: "We came as supporters of the independence of South Ossetia and will leave its

fanatics», http://sojcc.ru/rus/1148.html

77

There is the possibility to fight with arms against our global fundamental enemies -

against NATO, against the Americans'.179

2, 8 and 17 July Ossetian information agency "Osinform" published article

Zaur Alborov, in which he described in detail the parts of the part of the 58th Army in

the "future operations to compel Georgia to peace".180

July 2 the news agency

"Rosbalt" published an interview with the Minister of Defense of Abkhazia Merab

Kishmaria, in which he stated that "his troops enough weapons, anti-aircraft guns and

aircraft" and that "the Abkhazian army taught Russian instructors. This time I get to

the Kutaisi ".181

July 3, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia Sergey Shamba in an

interview with "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" has warned that Abkhazia "can not guarantee

that will not start a war." The very next day the site "Kavkaz-Center" confidently

predicted that the Russian attack on Georgia in August 2008 .: "Putin has made a

political decision on war with Georgia even before Medvedev was elected president

of Russia. Intensive preparation for war has been going on for several months ".182

On

the same day, July 4, Kokoity of South Ossetia announced a general mobilization, but

in the evening he was forced to reverse its decision. The next day, the chief editor of

Forum.msk.ru Anatoly Baranov, who was on a trip to the North Caucasus, said that

the war with Georgia has never been so close, and that "the army wants to fight".183

July 6 forces of the North Caucasus Military District began exercises

"Caucasus Frontier 2008". July 7, exactly a month before the start of the war, both the

179

Ossetians wait War: Alexander Dugin about the situation in South Ossetia

[http://geopolitica.ru/Video/7/] 180

http://osinform.ru/dijest/6785-gruzija-provodit-razvedku-boja-na.html ;

http://osinform.ru/dijest/6785-gruzija-provodit-razvedku-boja-na.html ;

http://osinform.ru/analitic/6994-juzhnaja-osetija-khronika.html 181

Abkhazians warn to capture Kutaisi, Kavkaz- Center, 4 May 2008,

http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2008/05/04/9551.shtml 182

Moscow to launch war operations against Georgia in late August Kavkaz Center, 5 July 2008,

http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2008/07/05/9984.shtml 183

"Russia is on the verge of the Great Caucasian War." - Anatoly Baranov

[http://forum.msk.ru/print.html?id=496351]

78

Russian peacekeeping battalion in South Ossetia and Abkhazia both began

fortification of their positions.184

On the same day in Abkhazia Additional Russian anti-aircraft missiles and

heavy weapons were deployed, and the four Russian warplanes violated Georgian

airspace over South Ossetia. It is noteworthy that the Russian Foreign Ministry for

the first time publicly acknowledged the invasion, explaining that this was done "in

order to cool the hot heads".185

July 10 Bagapsh and Kokoity were called to Moscow

for consultations with the Russian leadership. Commander in chief of the North

Caucasus Military District, General Sergei Makarov promised further military

support of Russian peacekeepers in the Georgian territory.

Throughout the summer, Georgia and the international community has

repeatedly made proposals to start and conduct of bilateral and multilateral

negotiations with a view to finding a peaceful solution to conflicts in both directions.

Among them were proposals made by the Georgian government (the whole of July

until 7 August), USA (July 8), Germany (July 14, July 18, July 25, July 30 and 31

July), the European Union (July 19, and 22-24 of July), the OSCE and Finland (July

25 and July 30). However, all these proposals were rejected by the leaders of Russia,

South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

While Georgia and the international community is ready to offer a peaceful,

July 15, 2008 troops of the North Caucasian Military District began large-scale

military exercises "Caucasus-2008" with the participation of more than 8,000 military

ground forces, internal troops and the FSB, including 700 pieces of equipment, with

the support of Air Force and the Black Sea fleet. Lieutenant-General Yuri Netkachev,

has long commanded the army in the North Caucasus, and later served as deputy

184

Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia enhance combat readiness, Itar-Tass, 7 July 2008 (BBC

Monitoring); Konstantin Timerman. Our guys did not die so that we gave up. - "Izvestia", October 2,

2008 [http://www.izvestia.ru/russia/article3121131/]. 185

Russia confirms its aircraft intruded into Georgia, Civil Georgia, 10 July 2008,

http://www.civilgeorgia.ge/eng/article.php?id=18748 .

79

commander of the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus, he said that the

number of troops on maneuvers officially understated so as not to invite them to a

large number of international observers ".186

The aim of the exercises holding

"operation to enforce peace" was announced.187

The exercise participants distributed

leaflets entitled "Warrior! Know a potential enemy! ", With a description of the main

characteristics of the Georgian armed forces.

July 18, air assault regiment of 76th Pskov Airborne Division took up

positions on the Roki and Mamison passes through the Main Caucasian ridge, and

airborne regiment Volgograd motorized infantry division was transferred to the

Krasnodar Territory.188

July 20th motorized infantry battalion with 14 armored

personnel carriers entered the lower part of the Kodori Gorge. Three days later, the

135th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 19th-Vladikav kazskoy motorized infantry

division replaced the Pskov paratroopers on the Roki Pass. July 25 special medical

detachment deployed a field hospital "Tarskoe" that can take a daily 300 wounded.

"At the request of local authorities," the hospital remained in place after the end of

the exercise to "render locals consultative and diagnostic aid", as stated in the official

press service of the Ministry of Defense.189

The next day, the construction Ugadangi

base was officially completed near Java.

It is a frank statement of intent were the words of the head of North Ossetia,

Teimuraz Mamsurov, who promised to July 26, readers of "Nezavisimaya Gazeta"

that the Russian troops' will to Georgia to protect Russian citizens and peacekeepers

help. At the northern portal of the Roki Tunnel worth armored vehicles, including

tanks. They are housed in demonstrative purposes, but they are not there just to be.190

186

http://www.ng.ru/regions/2008-07-18/1_peacemakers.html . 187

Caucasus 2008 site of the Russian Ministry of Defense, July 15, 2008,

http://www.mil.ru/eng/1866/12078/details/index.shtml?id=47629 188

Chang, Felix K. (August 2008). "Russia Resurgent: An Initial Look at Russian Military

Performance in Georgia". Foreign Policy Research Institute. 189

http://www.mil.ru/info/1069/details/index.shtml?id=48946 190

"Nezavisimaya Gazeta", July 26, 2008

80

Two days later, "Ogonyok" magazine reported that from 45 to 50 railway cars

and tanks were transported to the Gali district on the Abkhaz-Georgian border; trains

were night and day.191

An unnamed colonel "peacekeeping force" said that weapons

and ammunition were brought into Abkhazia as "that last for several years of

conflict." "What will it be, I feel that something is", - he added.192

Finally, on July 30,

six days ahead of schedule, the Russian military railway workers finished repairing

the railroad Sukhumi-Ochamchire.193

Preparations for war came to an end. It could

begin.

March 1, 2008 Russian appointed Minister of

Defense of South Ossetia.

Russian General Vasily Lunev, a

former deputy army commander

in the Siberian Military District

and a former military

commissioner of the Perm

region, was appointed Minister

of Defense of South Ossetia.

March 11, 2008 Russia Appointed chief of staff

of the North Caucasian

Military District

Colonel-General Sergei

Makarov was appointed chief of

staff of the North Caucasian

Military District (SCWO)

May 31, 2008

Colonel-General Sergei

Makarov became commander

of the North Caucasus Military

191

Russia deploys more military hardware in Abkhazia, Georgia says, Rustavi- 2 TV, 6 July 2008

(BBC Monitoring). 192

Pavel Sheremet. Abkhazia: no peace, no war, no rest ... - "Spark", # 31, 2008

[http://www.ogoniok.com/5057/18/] 193

Russia embarked on the conclusion railway troops from Abkhazia,

http://www.lenta.ru/news/2008/07/30/railroad/_Printed.htm

81

District

March 4, 2008 Parliament of South Ossetia

and Abkhazia establish

March 7, 2008 parliament of South Ossetia

and Abkhazia ask Russia,CIS

and the UN to recognize their

independence

March 6, 2008 Russia unilaterally finally

came out of the sanctions

regime in CIS summit

Russia unilaterally finally came

out of the sanctions regime

against Abkhazia entered the

CIS summit January 19, 1996

Russian authorities have begun

to resume economic, financial,

trade, transport contacts with the

de facto authorities of Abkhazia.

March 13, 2008 The State Duma of Russia in a

closed session discussed a

report prepared by the Russian

secret services and Ministry of

Foreign Affairs.

The report on the development

of strategies to achieve the

independence of Abkhazia and

South Ossetia.

March 21 2008 Russia adopted a special

resolution

The resolution is about

supporting the requests of the

two republics on the

International Recognition.

April 3-4, 2008 The NATO summit in NATO denied Georgia and

82

Bucharest Ukraine to provide an action

plan to prepare for membership.

April 16, 2008 Russian President give

instruction about South Ossetia

and Abkhazia

the federal government and

regional authorities to establish

direct relations with the de facto

authorities in Sukhumi and

Tskhinvali.

April 17, 2008 Russian soldiers with heavy

weapons arrived at the military

base

300 Russian soldiers deployed in

Ochamchire in Abkhazia.

May 14, 2008 Russian Soldier exercise for

war preparing

the 17-day exercise for the

newly designed flyers in Nalchik

in the Air Force

May 26, 2008 Railway worker and combatant

deployment

400 Russian soldiers deployed to

be worker and combatant

June 6, 2008 Russian Soldier exercise for

war preparing

Zelenchukskaya mountain

infantry brigade SCWO

beginning of the 10-day exercise

June 29, 2008 Soldier deployment The North Caucasus Military

District, the Federal Security

Service troops deployed in a

wooded mountainous area near

the border with Georgia."

2, 8 and 17 July, Ossetian information agency

report about Russian army

Osinform, published article Zaur

Alborov, in which he described

83

2008 operation target in detail the parts of the part of

the 58th Army in the "future

operations to compel Georgia to

peace".

July 2, 2008 The news agency "Rosbalt"

published an interview with the

Minister of Defense of

Abkhazia Merab Kishmaria

In the interview Merab stated

that "his troops enough weapons,

anti-aircraft guns and aircraft"

and that "the Abkhazian army

taught Russian instructors. This

time I get to the Kutaisi ".

July 6, 2008 Russian Soldier exercise for

war preparing

Forces of the North Caucasus

Military District began exercises

"Caucasus Frontier 2008"

July 7, 2008 Russian peacekeeping battalion

began fortification of their

positions.

A month before the start of the

war, both the Russian

peacekeeping battalion in South

Ossetia and Abkhazia both

began fortification of their

positions.

July 7, 2008 Russian anti-aircraft missiles

and heavy weapons were

deployed

Russian anti-aircraft missiles and

heavy weapons were deployed,

and the four Russian warplanes

violated Georgian airspace over

South Ossetia.

July 10, 2008 Russia called South Ossetia Bagapsh and Kokoity were

Called to Moscow for

84

and Abkhazia representative. consultations with the Russian

leadership. Commander in chief

of the North Caucasus Military

District, General Sergei

Makarov promised further

military support of Russian

peacekeepers in the Georgian

territory.

July, 2008 Georgia and the international

community has repeatedly

made proposals to start and

conduct of bilateral and

multilateral negotiations

These proposals were rejected

by the leaders of Russia, South

Ossetia and Abkhazia.

July 15, 2008 Russian Soldier exercise for

war preparing

North Caucasian Military

District began large-scale

military exercises "Caucasus-

2008" with total troops more

than 8,000, including 700 pieces

of equipment, with the support

of Air Force and the Black Sea

fleet. Lieutenant-General Yuri

Netkachev, has long commanded

the army in the North Caucasus,

July 18, 2008 Russia positioned its troops. Air assault regiment of 76th

Pskov Airborne Division took up

positions on the Roki and

Mamison passes through the

85

Main Caucasian ridge, and

airborne regiment Volgograd

motorized infantry division was

transferred to the Krasnodar

Territory.

July 20, 2008 Russia positioned its troops. 20th motorized infantry battalion

with 14 armored personnel

carriers entered the lower part of

the Kodori Gorge.

July 23, 2008

Russia positioned its troops. 135th Motorized Rifle Regiment

of the 19th-Vladikav kazskoy

motorized infantry division

replaced the Pskov paratroopers

on the Roki Pass.

July 25, 2008 Russia positioned its medical

troops.

Special medical detachment

deployed a field hospital

"Tarskoe"

July 30, 2008

Russia finished railroad

Sukhumi-Ochamchire.

six days ahead of schedule, the

Russian military railway workers

finished repairing the railroad

Sukhumi-Ochamchire. War

Preparation complete.

Table 5: Timeline before South Ossetia War

86

4.1.2. Russia during South Ossetia War

The situation in South Ossetia is also deteriorating due to the conflict involving

Georgian, South Ossetian militia and Russian peacekeepers. This situation lasted until

Saakashvili decided to solve the problem of South Ossetia for good by ordering a

ground assault on Tskhinvali on August 8, 2008 in the morning.194

Russia certainly

has anticipated this action and sent troops to Georgia through the Roki tunnel that

connects North and South Ossetia. By this action then start the first military attack by

Russia after the Soviet era ended. The war between Georgia with Russia began on

August 8, 2008 when Georgian forces began to enter the city of Tskhinvali, the South

Ossetian capital with the aim of taking over the territory as part of the government of

Georgia in the South Ossetia region. According to OSCE, who was watching the

situation in Tskhinvali claimed that South Ossetian side did not make shots or

offensive.195

On August 9, 2008 Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili issued a decree

declared a state of war and state of emergency for 15 days in response to the

deployment of the Russian Federation to South Ossetia on August 8, 2008.196

Saakashvili also reiterated that Georgia will never take off one inch from its territory.

Whatever happens, Georgia will not approve the action of the separation of the

territory of Georgia, and any actions that could undermine the democratic system of

Georgia. Georgia at that time also had the support of the West in the act. One proof

of the involvement of the West was the discovery of a satellite constellation in

conflict areas abandoned by Georgian forces. Georgia does not have a constellation of

satellite equipment, so that the findings could prove the existence of Western aid to

provide data to Georgia via satellite constellation.

194


11:36). 195

Champion, Marc (2008-12-19). "British Monitor Complicates Georgian Blame Game". The Wall

Street Journal. 196

http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/11/07/georgia.clashes/index.html?iref=mpstoryview

87

According to Russia, the entry of Russian forces into Georgian territory is

meant to protect the troops who served as peacekeepers as well as local residents, the

majority of the holders of Russian passports. Russia accused the Georgian attack into

South Ossetia on August 8, 2008 which killed Russian peacekeepers and the civilian

population of South Ossetia is a form of genocide.197

Georgia's first attack on the capital of the South Ossetia Republic launched on

August 7, 2008.198

This attack is the sign for South Ossetia, Russia and Georgia that

the bloody war in the Caucasus region will begin. Bounded on a 1992 peace treaty,

Russia dared to take steps in military interference to Southern Ossetia.199

Russian

military intervention in the South Ossetia War greatly changed the military position

of Georgia as the best military in the Caucasus region, a major downfall for the

Georgian military was seen on 11 August 2008.

After the rose revolution in 2003 Mikhail Saakashvili sought every means to

restore Abkhazia and South Ossetia back to Georgia.200

One of the ways that he

envisaged during the time in his administration was to strengthen the Georgian army

with the main objective against the separatists of those both countries. In its military

establishment Georgia seeks to cooperate on a large scale with the US and NATO in

advancing its military system. Because of this situation Georgia changed their

military style to be full of western characteristic. In addition, a huge US funding

injection also helped Georgia in raising its military budget. For the first time Georgia

is the first country in the world that can grow military spending up to 33 times from

the previous budget or about 1 billion US $ in 2007-2008.201

The increase in

197

Peter Roudik. "Russian Federation: Legal Aspects of War in Georgia". Library of Congress. 198




Cvetkovski, Nikola. "The Georgian – South Ossetian Conflict". Danish Association for Research on

the Caucasus. 200

Wolff, Stefan. Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia, University of Nottingham.

https://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/274 201

MilitaryBudget.org, Georgian Military Budget, MilitaryBudget.

88

Georgia's military budget is the one of the largest among Saudi Arabia, Oman and

North Korea. The Georgian military device is a device made by the Soviet Union,

Ukraine, Eastern Europe, western and Israel. While the experience of Georgia

military troops is very limited, Georgia military troops experience only reinforce

troops in Iraq conflict it also as supporting force on US troops.202

In the process of strengthening the Georgian military, Saakashvili also

campaigned for Georgia's military power to the world. In its military campaign,

Georgia shows their military strength, which is western and mainly US. In the

military parade it was clearly seen Georgia troops using US uniforms. Along the

streets of Tbilisi Georgian soldiers paraded with US weapons and ornaments, which

are the new face of Georgia that has reformed into a western group in the US outline.

After much development of the abilities experienced by the army of Georgia,

following advanced weapons and modern warfare equipment makes Saakashvili feel

confident. Feeling Georgia has been able to stand up against South Ossetia and

Abkhazia, Saakashvili is planning to launch a massive military offensive into these

two areas. Finally in August 2008 the bloody conflict erupted by Georgia party as the

side who started the war.203

The attack on South Ossetia is not spontaneous. For several days in early

August, Georgia appears to have secretly concentrated a large number of troops and

equipment (2nd, 3rd and 4th Infantry Brigades, Artillery Brigade, elements of

Infantry Brigade 1, at separate places in The tank town of Battalion Tank was

stationed with a total of nine light infantry and five tank battalions, up to eight

artillery battalions plus special forces and Interior Ministry troops all, up to 16,000

http://militarybudget.org/georgia/ 202

Kilner, James (8 August 2008). "Georgia says to withdraw 1,000 soldiers from Iraq". Reuters. 203


11:36).

89

people) on the Georgian border in the South Ossetia conflict zone.204

On August 7, at

22:00, Georgian troops began the attack with artillery bombing at Tskhinvali, the

capital of South Ossetia, and the next day there were attacks to paralyze the towns of

Tskhinvali and other South Ossetia regions.205

At 8 am on 8 August, Georgia's

infantry and tanks entered Tskhinvali and there was a fierce battle between Georgia

troops with South Ossetia troops and Russian peacekeepers stationed in the city.206

After the Georgia attack on Southern Ossetia, the Russian government did not

remain silent. Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev decided to conduct military

intervention in the form of peacekeeping operations in the Southern region of Ossetia.

This military operation was aimed at preventing more destruction that could be done

by the Georgia troops in the Southern Ossetia region. Then on that day, three tactical

battalions from the 135th, 503th and 693th Motor Rifles Regiment of the 19th Rifle

Motorcycle Division of the Army 58th in the North Caucasus Military District was

placed in a ready-to-combat formation in the Southern Ossetia region. At the end of

the day, the Russian army managed to clear the area around the districts of Kverneti,

Tbeti and Dzari, and to the west of Tskhinvali.207

Direct military intervention of Russia made the army of Georgia have no

chance at all to win the battle at Tskhinvali. Before that the Russian army also had

difficulties in the mobility of their troops toward Southern Ossetia. Things like the

transportation routes of the Caucasus Mountains became a major obstacle for Russia.

Roki tunnels and narrow mountain lanes into the mainline of Russia to enter South

Ossetia are the main obstacles of the Russian army. On 9 August, fighting between

Georgia and Russia occurred, Georgia used counter-attack tactics as well as tactical

204


1stjune, 2009

205 REGIONS.RU/Novosti Federation (2008). Georgians have already in Tskhinvali, Russia.

206Barabanov, Mikhail (2008). "The August War between Russia and Georgia". Moscow Defense


Regions.ru/Novosti Federation (2008). Georgians have already in Tskhinvali, Russia.

90

ambush.208

This attack is considered effective because the Russian side is quite fooled

and injured. In this attack the army of Georgia succeeded in wounding the

commander of the 58th Army Lieutenant General A. Khrulyov.209

Early in the day of the 10th of August the military of georgia succeeded in

occupying the main city ossetia South of Tskhinvali. At that time the Southern ossetia

troop as well as the russia peacekeeping troop were hit back and out to the north of

South ossetia. But by midday it all turned, after the Russian aid troops came with an

accumulation of up to 16,000 personnel of georgia beaten back from Tskhinvali. At

night the georgia troops actually had departed from Tskhinvali and had fled South

South of ossetia, Tskhinvali had been completely occupied by russia and

Southern ossetia troops. In this battle the georgia artillery was completely destroyed

and many military posts of Georgia were abandoned.

On the night of August 10, Russia deployed six tactical regiment groups

(135th, 503th and 693th Motor Racing Regiments from the 19th Rifle Motor Division

of North Ossetia, 70th and 71st Energy Rifle Regiment of 42nd Rifle Motor Division

of Chechnya, And a mixture of the 104th and 234th Special Forces Regiment from

the 76th Air Force Pskov Division), 45th Squad Regiment and 10th and 22nd Special

Forces Brigades, as well as air and artillery forces significant. Two Chechen

companies from the Zapad and Vostok Battalions and the tactical group of the 98th

Ivanovo Air Division tactical, were sent to the battle area as well. The number of

Russian troops in South Ossetia reached about 10,000 men and 120 tanks.

The main target of the Russian air force is the military means throughout

Georgia. The air strikes that Russians do are in the form of bombing. All combat

equipment that Russia uses are the Su-24M Fighter bombers, and the F-25 Su-25

208

Pukhov, Ruslan (2010) "The Tanks of August". Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies,

Moscow. 209

Части 58 армии полностью освободили Цхинвали от грузинских военных (in Russian).

Russian Ministry of Defence.

91

fighter, and the Tu-22M3 Backfire long-range bombers. In addition to political

considerations Russia has not deliberately attacked Georgian infrastructure, transport,

communications or industry, or other government buildings. The total loss for the

Russian Air Force is a Tu-22M3 long-range bomber, a Su-24M Fencer frontier

bomber, a Su-24MR Fencer E reconnaissance aircraft, and four Su-25 fighter aircraft.

In addition, the Russian Army launched a short-range ballistic missile 15 Tochka-U

(SS-21) against military targets and some new Iskander long-range ballistic missiles

(SS-26).

After losing control over much of South Ossetia, Georgian troops began to

regroup in Gori. Meanwhile, Georgian units and artillery continued to attack

Tskhinvali mildly in some areas of South Ossetia, and showed fierce opposition in

several places in Georgia. However, at the end of August 11, South Ossetia was

completely cleared of Georgian troops, and Russian units had moved to Georgia the

following morning, building a 25-km demilitarized support zone to prevent further

artillery attacks on South Ossetia.210

After fierce clashes with Russia, which lasted from August 8th Georgia

military defense finally collapsed. Since 12 August Georgia army began to retreat and

fled to the city Gori.211

And after being pressed by the Russian military, many of the

Georgia soldiers retreated to Tbilisi. Along the road to Tbilisi there are many artillery

and ammunition left behind by the army of Georgia.

At noon on August 12, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev decided to stop

the active phase of the peace enforcement operation.212

That night, Saakashvili signed

an early ceasefire agreement that French President Nikolas Sarkozi had just brought

from Moscow. The Russian formation is concentrated along the Southern border of

210



Ibid 212

Kramer, Andrew E.; Barry, Ellen (2008). "Russia, in Accord With Georgians, Sets Withdrawal".

The New York Times.

92

South Ossetia and Abkhazia, using partial control of the demilitarized zone.

Meanwhile, active attacks on Georgian territory to capture and destroy Georgian

weapons, and demilitarize the Georgian armed forces, he added. From August 13 to

15, Russian troops entered Gori and Senaki and began to seize Georgian military

base. Other Russian disarmament units are within 20 km of Tbilisi. This all happened

in the context of complete paralysis of the demoralized Georgian Army.213

Other than

the Georgian government and their military commander did not believe in a ceasefire

agreement with Russia. The remaining Armed Forces Army units (including the 1st

Infantry Brigade rushing back from Iraq) are preparing to protect the northern part of

Tbilisi, fearing that there will be a Russian attack on the capital.

At the end of August, the Russian armed forces clarified about their urgency

of the Southern Ossetia war, in its clarification the Russian military suffered official

losses of 71 dead, five POWs (including two pilots) and 356 others injured. However,

these figures do not include the loss of the Ossetia troops and the various volunteers

in the South Ossetia troop and volunteers are estimated to be up to 150 dead. Russian

and Ossetia troops lost several infantry tanks and combat vehicles. Losses to the

Georgian side are unclear, but it is estimated that over 500 people were killed and up

to 1,500 people injured, with more than 100 POW (although Russians have admitted

taking only 15).

Georgia has completely lost its naval power and air defense system.

According to his clarification, the Russians managed to capture and destroy most of

the army's arsenal. The Russians confiscated 150 units of Georgia's heavy weapons,

including 15 BMP infantry fighters, 65 T-72 tanks, several dozen personnel carriers,

vehicles, weapons and SAM systems. Russia seized large numbers of cars and light

weapons, including the American M4A3 carbines, as well as many Georgian tanks,

armored vehicles, and weapons have also been destroyed in the battle against Russia.

213


Brief. Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow.

93

Saakashvili's decision to attack South Ossetia not only ended in total failure,

but Georgia suffered heavy military defeats and huge material losses. The

sophisticated and modern armed Georgian army certainly did not meet the ambitious

expectations of its leaders. While Georgian army leaders who had adequate levels of

military training and persistence at the tactical level, at a higher command level, the

Georgian Army's performance did not produce satisfactory results. The persistence of

Georgians in South Ossetia can be explained by ethnic motivation. But once ethnic

motivation is lost, soldiers quickly lose their fighting spirit and this is clearly the

cause of defeat. The harsh mental pressure of the conflict has turned into panic and

demoralization when confronted with a clearly superior enemy. The Georgian Army

unit's orders cannot maintain discipline, and lose control when under pressure and

when its communications are attacked is the moral weakness of the army of Georgia.

The widespread sense of the futility of fighting against the mighty Russian Army

might also have caused a moral collapse.

Overall, the Saakashvili regime develops Georgian military capacity in a

reasonable way, showing a remarkable interest in the armed forces. From a technical

point of view, the focus on obtaining heavy artillery, self-propelled, multiple launch

rocket systems and air defense systems has proved entirely justifiable, and it is

precisely these weapons that inflict the greatest damage on Ossetia and Russian

forces, along with night vision, Modern, radio-technical reconnaissance and

electronic warfare equipment. In this category, the Georgian Army is even better

prepared than the Russian Army. The emphasis given by Western military instructors

on individual soldier training also seems to be paying off. But, overall, the Georgia

Army needs more time to mature. Saakashvili's hasty decision to throw this army into

a premature battle, which led to a confrontation with the Russian Armed Forces, led

to his decisive death.

About the performance of the Russian Armed Forces, the speed of Russia

response was clearly unexpected, not only by the Georgians, but by the West as well,

94

not to mention a few negative observers within Russia itself. Three tactical battalion

groups in stand by status entered South Ossetia in a matter of hours. Within three

days, a powerful alignment of forces and equipment was assembled under very

difficult natural circumstances, capable of effective action and inflicting quick defeat

on a numerically equivalent enemy. Russian forces may have shown deficient of

consistency at the tactical level, but their power over the forces of Georgia in terms of

capabilities and combat effectiveness cannot be denied. Russia has verified that

Russia military forces have ready units for combat operations, as well as an effective

military command.

The traditional habits of the Russian army are the weakness of the Russian

Army's way of warfare, such as night operations, reconnaissance, communications,

and back support, remain as before, despite the enemy's weakness. This does not

contribute much in the South Ossetia War. There is no doubt that these issues should

be examined as the first priority for the Russian military. The victory of Russian

military over the Georgian Army during the peace-enforcement operation of August

2008 should not be a cause for euphoria in Moscow, but this victory supposes to be a

motivation for Russia to accelerate its military transformation and the mass

procurement of modern armaments for the Russian Armed Forces.

August 8,

2008

Russia deployed its troops in

South Ossetia.

three tactical battalion groups from

the 135th, 503rd and 693rd Motor

Rifle Regiments of the 19th Motor

Rifle Division (based in

Vladikavkaz) of the 58th Army of

the North Caucasus Military

District were deployed.

August 8, Russian forces clear the zone Russian troops cleared the area as

95

2008 around Kverneti, Tbeti, and

Dzari districts

far as possible to the western edge

of Tskhinvali

August 9,

2008

First battle between Ossetian

forces with Russian forces

versus Georgian forces in the

region of Tskhinvali

August 10,

2008

Georgian Forces attack

Tskhinvali

Ossetian forces and Russian

peacekeeping battalion to retreat to

the northern Tskhinvali city

August 10,

2008

Ossetian forces and Russian

forces fight back

Georgian Forces retreat to the

Southern Tskhinvali city

August 10,

2008

Ossetian forces, with the support

of Russian divisions, took

Tamarasheni, Kekhvi, Kurta,

and Achabeti.

August 10,

2008

Russia deployed 10,000 men and

120 tanks to South Ossetia

August 10-

11, 2008

Russia's Air Force carried out

attacks on military targets all

across Georgian territory

sorties using Su-24M Fencer frontal

bombers, and Su-25 Frogfoot attack

planes, and the Tu-22M3 Backfire

long-range bombers

August 11,

2008

South Ossetia was completely

cleared of Georgian forces

August 12, Russian units had moved into Russian establishing a demilitarized

96

2008 Georgia buffer zone as much as 25 km wide

to prevent any further artillery

attacks on South Ossetia

August 12,

2008

Russian President Dmitry

Medvedev decided to cease the

active phase of the peace-

enforcement operation

August 13

to 15, 2008

Russian paratroops deployed to

Poti,

Russian paratroops destroying

almost all of the docked ships and

boats of the Georgian Navy, and

took away a quantity of valuable

military equipment

August 15,

2008

Russian forces entered Gori and

Senaki

Russia troops seize Georgia's

military bases.

Table 6: Timeline before South Ossetia War

4.1.3. Russia after South Ossetia War

"EU monitors working in areas adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been reporting

a buildup of Georgian military units and Special Forces near the borders with South Ossetia

and Abkhazia and our 'technical devices' have also recorded this.Provocations also occur

sporadically. We are concerned by this."

Sergey Lavrov - Russian Foreign Minister214

The South Ossetia War triggered many international responses to the Russian

Federation. Both the negative and positive responses from the international world are

responded by the Russian federation in accordance with Russian international policy.

The response came mostly from western countries such as the EU and NATO. Many

214

"Moscow worried by Georgian buildup near South Ossetia, Abkhazia". RIA Novosti. 23 January

2009.

97

meetings were held between the leaders of the nation attended by Russia to solve the

problems of the South Ossetia War. Some of the meetings were like the Russia-EU

meeting on August 15, 2008; Summit in Dushanbe on August 28, 2008; And Meeting

Russia-Abkhazia-South Ossetia on September 17, 2008.

4.1.3.1. NATO Engagement

Russia party had expected NATO would definitely interfere in the South

Ossetia War. The main cause of this NATO engagement is the Alliance's New

Strategic Concept approved since 1991 by Europe's Security Organization. The

Alliance's New Strategic Concept clearly states that there are two general

conclusions, that the first substitution of the region will not change the functionality

of the NATO security system but rather affirms the existence of NATO. Secondly,

not only for NATO itself, NATO also expressed an opportunity for NATO in its

strategy sheet to disseminate its influence in terms of defense and security.

“First, the new environment does not change the purpose of the security

function of the Alliance (NATO), but rather underlines their enduring

validity, and second, on the under hand, is that the changed environment

offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a

broad approach to security.”

Alliance’s New Strategic Concept215

In the first conclusion it is clear that changes in the environment in the

European region since the end of the cold war will not alter the function of the

defense of military security alliance, so that at the time of the South Ossetia War the

NATO party also felt it had the right to participate in maintaining security. But this

"security" statement may change after the second conclusion of the Alliance's New

Strategic Concept. In the second conclusion of the Alliance Party stated that the

changes that occurred after the cold war ended make NATO get a chance to spread its

influence in the form of another state military.

215

Tome, L. J. R. L. (2010), Russia and NATO’s Enlargement, NATO Research Fellowship

Programme Final Report.

98

There is also another basis for NATO to intervene in the South Ossetia war

case. At the November 1991 Rome Summit, NATO stated in its document about the

fundamental Security task, the main principle in the fundamental Security Tasks was

their reason for interfering in the South Ossetia war. It is creating a defensive

environment in Europe, especially in emerging democracies. With NATO protection,

no country can interfere with or threaten the developing country.

“To provide one of the indispensable foundation for a stable security

environment in Europe, base on the growth of democratic institution and

commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country

would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to improve

hegemony through the threat or use of force”

Fundamental Security Task of Alliance’s New Strategic Concept216

This is also evident in the actions of NATO in addressing the Russian Military

act in South Ossetia. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who at the time served as NATO's

Secretary-General, declared that Russia had "direct violation" on UNSC Resolution

on Georgia which about Russia recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In an

international community, the Georgian Saakashvili president appealed to the West

especially NATO to challenge "Russian aggression" in the strongest possible terms.

As the response to the Russia military act in South Ossetia, 27 August 2008,

NATO sent his warship towards the black sea. Although according to the US Navy

NATO warships only come to provide humanitarian assistance, as well as role

training with Romania and Bulgaria. Still, this really threatens the existence of Russia

because of the armed military ships that have the capacity to threaten Russian

sovereignty. The presence of NATO warships in the black sea became an alert for

Russia on the advice of Russian General Anatoliy Nogovitsyn.

216

Tome, L. J. R. L. (2010), Russia and NATO’s Enlargement, NATO Research Fellowship


99

4.1.3.2. Russia Action

Beside attend international conference with disputing State parties and the

mediating countries, Russia also declared statements to the international community

establish international treaties, mobilizes aid, and giving sanctions to the Disputing

parties. Here are some implementations of Russia's defense rules after the South

Ossetia War.

To resolve the conflict between Georgia and Russia, French President Nicolas

Sarkozy, who served as President of the EU met and held talks with Russian

President Dmitry Medvedev on August 15, 2008. From that meeting, it was agreed 6

(six) principles, which are:217

1. There will be the use of violence in any form;

2. Stop all disputes is happening;

3. Granting access to humanitarian aid;

4. Georgian forces must be withdrawn at the position before the previous

one;

5. The withdrawal of Russian troops from the conflict back to the level

before the conflict. Russian peacekeepers was to be placed in areas of

conflict to maintain peace in the region;

6. The future and measures to ensure security in South Ossetia and Abkhazia

will be discussed in an international discussion.

On August 21, 2008, Abkhazia parliament asked Russia government for

recognition of independence of Abkhazia.218

And because of international demand

Russia promised to withdraw the entire peacekeeping force in the territory of Georgia

on August 22, 2008.219

Then on August 26, 2008, Russian Federation recognized the

independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. By President Medvedev decision,

217

Loc.Cit. International Crisis Group 218

Day-by-Day: Georgia-Russia Conflict, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7577122.stm 219

Ibid

100

Russian Federation formally recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South

Ossetia. by the full support of Parliament of the Russian Federation at the request of

the Parliament of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, issued a decree stating the recognition

of the independence of South Ossetia as independent states.. Beside that President

Medvedev also accused Saakashvili has conducted genocide in South Ossetia.220

On September 9, 2008, diplomatic relations between Russia and South Ossetia

were established. At the time Foreign Minister of South Ossetia Murat Dzhioev and

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov exchanged letters to the Russian Foreign

Ministry in Moscow.221

After that President Dmitri Medvedev signed treaties with the

breakaway enclaves South Ossetia and Abkhazia on committed Moscow to defend

them from any Georgian attack On September 17, 2008.222

And then on September

25, 2008, President Medvedev signed a decree on appointing Russia's first

ambassador to South Ossetia, Elbrus Kargiev.223

The Russian government through President Dmitry Medvedev, made a formal

statement to the military attacks carried into the territory of Georgia, the content of

the statement are:224

1. The leaders of Georgia is responsible for acts of violence against citizens

of South Ossetia over the past 15 years;

2. Attacks against Russian citizens and military personnel stationed in South

Ossetia as peacekeepers must be repaid;

220

http://document.kremlin.ru/doc.asp?ID=47560 221

Solovyev, Vladimir (2008). "Freshly Recognized". Kommersant. 222

Kremlin (2008). Russia signed Treaties on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the

Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia today in the Kremlin. Kremlin.ru, Moscow.

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/1439 223

Kremlin (2008). Dmitry Medvedev appointed Russia's ambassadors to the Republics of South

Ossetia and Abkhazia. Kremlin.ru, Moscow.

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/1855 224

Hans-Henning Schröder, “„A Short, Victorious War? ‟Russian Perspectives on the Caucasus

Crisis”, in Hans-Henning Schröder (ed.), The Caucasus Crisis: International Perceptions and Policy

Implications for Germany and Europe, SWP-Berlin Research Paper No. 9, November 2008, p. 7.

101

3. The leaders of Georgia launched its attack on South Ossetia solve the

problem completely, and Russia has an obligation to prevent aggression

and genocide against the population of South Ossetia;

4. Russia act to defend its citizens who are attacked on the basis of Article 51

of the UN Charter on self-defense (self-defense).

The conflict between Georgia with Russia revived concerns about the

occurrence of a "new Cold War" between Russia and the West, especially NATO

members. This concern was denied among others by Richard Sakwa saying that

bipolarization and ideological confrontation that became hallmark of the Cold War

between the United States and the Soviet Union had become a thing of the past, and

that in fact the term "Cold War" is "a metaphor for a relationship that is basically

tinged tension that cannot be resolved through the framework worldview of each

party but through a process of rethinking by both."

In the Joint Declaration of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), August

28, 2008 Summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, SCO welcomed the six principles of

settlement of the conflict in South Ossetia and support Russia's active role in

promoting peace and cooperation in the region. SCO countries expressed concern

with regard to the tensions surrounding the South Ossetia issue and urge the relevant

parties to resolve the conflict through dialogue and peaceful negotiations. SCO

countries affirmed the principles of respect for the territorial integrity of a country

and efforts to protect the unity and territorial integrity of the country.225

In an interview after the conflict between Georgia and Russia in August 2008,

Medvedev said five things that become the main base of Russia's foreign policy, also

called Medvedev doctrine, among others:226

225

“Russia-Georgia tensions still high one year on from conflict”,

http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/08/07/goergia.background/index.html?iref=allsearch 226

Friedman, George. (2008). The Medvedev Doctrine and American Strategy, Strartfor Worldview.

102

1. Russia to run its foreign policy in accordance with international law is

now applicable in relations between countries.

2. This world must be multi-polar. Russia does not want the world is

governed by a certain force.

3. Russia does not want confrontation with any country, and Russia

intends to establish good relations with every country.

4. Russia's main priority is to protect its citizens wherever they are and

protect its interests abroad. Russia has threatened to act firmly against

anyone who threatens its citizens.

5. Russia has an interest in a particular area, where in the region there are

countries that are already established good relations with a country

that has historically special relations, in particular the CIS member

states.

Through the interview, President Medvedev reiterated that Russia in carrying

out its foreign policy is always appropriate and comply with applicable international

law. What if Russia violates it will be ready to be given sanctions, either by the

international community and the United Nations. Furthermore, Russia also does not

want any one strength that dominates the world. It can be interpreted that the United

States currently is one of the strengths or polar world, should have a balance so as not

to dominate the world. Russia is considered able to play some power or polar itself as

a counterweight to the United States.

The aftermath of the conflict left the Russia-Georgia relationship to distance

themselves. On 19 January 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a law

making it illegal to sell, supply, or transfer military production to Georgia, and

103

prohibiting the use of Russian railways, waters, and airspace for military co-operation

with Georgia.227

4.2. Russia Defense Policy Implementation

4.2.1. Military aspect

As I‟ve been explained in this chapter about Russian Federation Involvement

in South Ossetia War before that Russian federation done it‟s military act in Georgia

to prevent threat to Russian federation sovereignty. Base on Russian Federation

Military Doctrine, Russian Federation divided treat in some category, one of them is

Conflict external near Russian border. To repel all these threats Russia will do 3 ways

based on its military doctrine, those three things are

Combat Exercises or Preparation of combat, preparation of war prepared by

russia for Russian troops ready to face the opponent. With the preparation of russia

troops will provide more results in the most efficient way. Dengn so victory will be

achieved more easily. This is explained in the Russian federaton military doctrine on

chapter 2 article 17 which says that:

Perform tasks in the maintenance and restoration of peace operations

rests with the Russian Federation Armed Forces. To prepare for these

tasks are allocated specifically designated units and formations. Along

with the preparation for the use for its intended purpose, they are trained

in a special program. The Russian Federation implements logistic and

technical support, training, preparation of Russian contingents, the

planning of their implementation and operational management in

accordance with the standards and procedures of the United Nations, the

CFE and the Commonwealth of Independent States.228

This is also seen in the implementation of Defense Policy Russia at the time of South

Ossetia war, which are:

May 14, 2008, the 17-day exercise for the newly designed flyers in Nalchik in

the Air Force for war preparing,

227

Longari, Marco (2009), No more arms for Georgia – Medvedev. RT, Moscow 228

Ibid Chapter 2 Article 17 Point D

104

June 6, 2008, Zelenchukskaya mountain infantry brigade SCWO beginning of

the 10-day exercise for war preparing,

July 6, 2008, Forces of the North Caucasus Military District began exercises

"Caucasus Frontier 2008"

July 15, 2008 , North Caucasian Military District began large-scale military

exercises "Caucasus-2008" with total troops more than 8,000, including 700

pieces of equipment, with the support of Air Force and the Black Sea fleet.

Lieutenant-General Yuri Netkachev, has long commanded the army in the

North Caucasus,

Combating enemy, any dispute will surely leave the victim, this situation

will threaten the security and peace of the world. For that reason the Russian

government will repel the situation with its peacekeeping troops. The placement of

soldiers and military action that the Russian army carried out was based on military

doctrine chapter 2 article 16, which is:

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and other troops should be

ready to repel attacks and defeating the aggressor, and conduct active

operations (both defensive and offensive) under any scenario of starting

and waging of wars and armed conflicts in the conditions of massive use

by the enemy of modern and advanced combat weapons, including

weapons of mass destruction of all types.229



April 17, 2008, Russian soldiers with heavy weapons arrived at the military

base. 300 Russian soldiers deployed in Ochamchire in Abkhazia.

June 29, 2008, Soldier deployment. The North Caucasus Military District, the

Federal Security Service troops deployed in a wooded mountainous area near

the border with Georgia."

229


105

July 7, 2008, Russian anti-aircraft missiles and heavy weapons were deployed

Russian anti-aircraft missiles and heavy weapons were deployed, and the four

Russian warplanes violated Georgian airspace over South Ossetia.

July 18, 2008, Russia positioned its troops. Air assault regiment of 76th Pskov

Airborne Division took up positions on the Roki and Mamison passes through

the Main Caucasian ridge, and airborne regiment Volgograd motorized

infantry division was transferred to the Krasnodar Territory.

July 20, 2008, Russia positioned its troops. 20th motorized infantry battalion

with 14 armored personnel carriers entered the lower part of the Kodori

Gorge.

July 23, 2008, Russia positioned its troops. 135th Motorized Rifle Regiment

of the 19th-Vladikav kazskoy motorized infantry division replaced the Pskov

paratroopers on the Roki Pass.

July 25, 2008, Russia positioned its medical troops. Special medical

detachment deployed a field hospital "Tarskoe"

August 8, 2008, Russia deployed its troops in South Ossetia. three tactical

battalion groups from the 135th, 503rd and 693rd Motor Rifle Regiments of

the 19th Motor Rifle Division (based in Vladikavkaz) of the 58th Army of the

North Caucasus Military District were deployed.

August 8, 2008, Russian forces clear the zone around Kverneti, Tbeti, and

Dzari districts Russian troops cleared the area as far as possible to the western

edge of Tskhinvali

August 10, 2008, Ossetian forces and Russian forces fight back Georgian

Forces retreat to the Southern Tskhinvali city

August 10, 2008, Ossetian forces, with the support of Russian divisions, took

Tamarasheni, Kekhvi, Kurta, and Achabeti.

August 10, 2008, Russia deployed 10,000 men and 120 tanks to South Ossetia

August 10-11, 2008, Russia's Air Force carried out attacks on military targets

all across Georgian territory sorties using Su-24M Fencer frontal bombers,

106

and Su-25 Frogfoot attack planes, and the Tu-22M3 Backfire long-range

bombers

Disarmament of the enemy, after the war or conflict ends the Russian army

will disarm the enemy. Disarmament must be avoided in more disputes, as possession

of weapons and combat means will provide an opportunity for the enemy to attack.

This task is clearly written in the Russian military doctrine chapter 2 article 14,

namely:

In peacekeeping and peace restoration operations - disengage the

warring factions, to stabilize the situation, providing the conditions for a

just and peaceful settlement.230



August 12, 2008, Russian units had moved into Georgia. Russian establishing a

demilitarized buffer zone as much as 25 km wide to prevent any further artillery

attacks on South Ossetia

August 13 to 15, 2008, Russian paratroops deployed to Poti, Russian paratroops

destroying almost all of the docked ships and boats of the Georgian Navy, and took

away a quantity of valuable military equipment

August 15, 2008, Russian forces entered Gori and Senaki. Russia troops seize

Georgia's military bases.

4.2.1.1.Russia Defense Budget

Since the Soviet Union Collapse, Russia as a State that inherited most of the

Union's soviet forces also felt the crisis. But by the end of the 90s the Russian

economy had improved and got out of the turmoil after the crisis that hit the Soviet

Union to Collapse. The start of President Vladimir Putin served as Russian

government began to take into account their military situation that had long fallen

asleep and frozen since the outbreak of the Soviet Union. In 2000 the Russian army

received an additional budget of up to 141 billion rubles. The amount of budget

230


107

continued to increase in 2001. Reportedly in 2001 the Russian military budget

increased almost 200% or 219 billion rubles.231

Not only in the early 2000s, Russia also increased its military budget. In 2007

the Russian government imposed a new system based on the decision of Russia's new

defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov.232

In this new system, Russia is trying to

suppress the growth of its personnel and allocate their military funds to other sectors

in addition to high paying salaries and personnel allowances. Russian military funds

are more allocated for the renewal of military technology as well as their military

support facilities. Russia feels they need to further improve the quality of their

defense to be able to play in the international world. Until 2016 Russia will continue

to run this new system in order to maximize their military quality.

Russia's defense minister before Anatoly Serdyukov, Sergei Ivanov also

insists Russia is doing a lot of reforms in its military sector. The purchase of weapons

and the renewal of military defense means is the largest expenditure for the Russian

government. So the total expenditure of the Russian government in developing of its

military quality from 2007 until 2008 is 240 billion US dollars.233

Some military

equipment and equipment purchased and upgraded are:234

1. 31 ships for the Navy, including new aircraft carriers;

2. arms for 40 tanks, 97 infantry and 50 airborne battalions;

3. new TOPOL-M (SS-27) ICBMs;

4. the Yarts land-based ballistic missile;

5. the Bulava sea-launched ballistic missile;

231

International Institute for Strategic Studies (1959). The military balance : an annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics. Routledge. London. 231

. YEGÓROV, IVÁN (2008). Serdyukov's radical reform. RBTH. Moscow.

233

Global Security. Russian Military Budget. globalsecurity.org 234

Ibid

108

6. the X-102 airborne missile;

7. a new version of the Iskander-M ballistic missile, capable of carrying multiple

warheads;

8. a fourth Borey-class strategic nuclear submarine (the first was scheduled to go

into service after 2008);

9. a new TU-160 Blackjack bomber, and modernization of existing TU-160 and

TU-95 Bear bombers;

10. a full fleet of new generation fighters by 2012-2015 (the SU-34 Fullback

which was in production and scheduled to replace the SU-24 Fencer frontline

bombers).

11. deployment of a second S-400 air defense system near Moscow in 2008.

Figure 4: Russian Federation Military Expenditure235

From the data above that shown us a sharp increase in the Russia military

budget. In just 3 years, Russia added US $ 10 billion to military expenditure. And

there are many weapons that are updated and developed by the Russian government.

In addition, the program is considered capable of adding military quality Russia also

235

SIPRI, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Military Expenditure 22679 25123 26338 27536 31293 34633 37698 41423

22679 25123 26338 27536

31293 34633

37698 41423

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

40000

45000

US$

Mill

ion

Russian Federation Military Expenditure

109

felt effective. Due to the increasing of this defense budget, the effect was felt when

Russia implemented its defense policy toward Georgia to resolve south of Ossetia

war in 2008.

At the 2008 Ossetia south war, Russian troops with better capacity and quality

gained victory. Support by new war tools such as a new version of the Iskander-M

ballistic missile that is capable of carrying multiple warheads is the result of a 2007

military program launched by Russia's defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov.

4.2.2. Politic and Diplomatic Aspect

Russia considers each of their allies valuable and must be protected,

so one of its defense policy implementations is to engage in international

diplomatic relations in support of its allies. In its implementation, the

Russian government not only supports and protects its allies, but the Russian

government also promotes peaceful conditions, it is clearly written in the

Russian federation defense policy, which is:

The Russian Federation considers ensuring its military security in the

context of building a democratic state of law, the implementation of

socio-economic reforms, establishing the principles of equal partnership,

mutual cooperation and good neighborliness in international relations,

consistently shaping an overall and comprehensive system of

international security, the preservation and strengthening of world

peace.236



March 6, 2008, Russia unilaterally finally came out of the sanctions regime

against Abkhazia and South Ossetia entered the CIS summit January 19, 1996

March 21 2008, Russia adopted a special resolution , The resolution is about

supporting the requests of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the

International Recognition.

236


110

April 16, 2008, Russian President gives instruction to the federal government

about South Ossetia and Abkhazia the, so federal government and regional

authorities to establish direct relations with the de facto authorities in

Sukhumi and Tskhinvali.

July 10, 2008, Russia called South Ossetia and Abkhazia representative.

Bagapsh and Kokoity were Called to Moscow for consultations with the

Russian leadership.

August 15, 2008, To resolve the conflict between Georgia and Russia, French

President Nicolas Sarkozy, who served as President of the EU met and held

talks with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.

August 26, 2008, Russian Federation recognized the independence of

Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

August 28, 2008 Summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, SCO welcomed the six

principles of settlement of the conflict in South Ossetia and support Russia's

active role in promoting peace and cooperation in the region.

On September 9, 2008, diplomatic relations between Russia and South Ossetia

were established.

September 17, 2008, President Dmitri Medvedev signed treaties with the

breakaway enclaves South Ossetia and Abkhazia on committed Moscow to

defend them from any Georgian attack On.

September 25, 2008, President Medvedev signed a decree on appointing

Russia's first ambassador to South Ossetia, Elbrus Kargiev.

19 January 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a law making it

illegal to sell, supply, or transfer military production to Georgia, and

prohibiting the use of Russian railways, waters, and airspace for military co-

operation with Georgia.

111

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

For Russia's security of its citizens is very important. Protecting the rights and

obligations especially maintains the survival of its citizens from the threats that come

one of the main interests of the Russian federation. As we know Russia is the largest

and strongest Soviet Union fraction country. Great capability that Russia has makes

Russia to have a sense of great responsibility. Not only for itself but also for Russia

allies which mean ex-Soviet Union country. One of the main interests of Russia in the

Caucasus region is to maintain the political stability of western or US influence

which is considered bad or negative impact.

As a writer I really like this topic and chose it as my topic thesis because of

the many features in the unique characteristics of Russia. This unique character of

Russia shows in every implementation of its laws both inside and outside the state, in

the way it relates internationally and in the way Russia responds to foreign threats

such as armed conflict. Russia's stern and hard character that has been embedded

since the time of the Russian empire became an interesting thing for me in discussing

the issue of conflict in South Ossetia.

In this thesis I also explained about Russian defense policy. The defense

policy discussed in this thesis is the military doctrine federation of Russia which was

released on the decision of the president of Russia on 21 April 2000 number 706. The

main points of military doctrine included in this thesis are the views of Russia on the

interests of the State of Russia. Russia national interest was explained by the Russian

military doctrine. Base on Russia military doctrine, Russia's primary interest is

maintaining the security and order of the world both within and outside of its country.

One of the ways of Russia in achieve its national interest is by protecting its citizens

wherever they are even in other countries.

112

In Russian Federation military doctrine Russia also explains what so-called

threats to the Russian State. Russia includes every form of threat that the military and

the Russian government can more easily clarify incoming threats, whether in

disturbing, or very dangerous form, in terms of low priority or high priority.

Apart from the threat and the main interest of the State to protect the people,

the Russian federation also explain some of the military defense strategy they will use

in terms of dealing with the threat. For some dangerous threat, Russia state will use

its nuclear weapon.

The military doctrine that explains the protection of the people for the citizens

of Russia is on military doctrine of the russian federation about military and political

foundations chapter 1 article 5, it is clearly stated that Protection of the citizens is the

one of the duties of a state. Both inside and outside the territory, the state is obligated

to protect all the rights of its citizens. Like Russian Federation, Russia argued that the

rights and freedoms of its people are the main ones that Russia will protect them even

if they located outside the territory. According to Russian military doctrine when the

rights and freedoms of citizens harassed by other countries when they located outside

the region, it would be a threat to Russia as set out in Chapter 1 Article 5.

Moreover the form of threat that Russia categorizes in some form. On the

military doctrine on military doctrine of the Russian Federation about military and

political foundations chapter 1 article 5 that release on 2009. Then in chapter 1

article 5 Russia's military doctrine to explain about what is known as external threats

to the sovereignty of Russia. Russia clearly and publicly stated that NATO is one of

the major threats for Russia, as NATO been strengthen the military of the countries

that bordering with Russia. It becomes frightened for the Russian government and

can be described as the threat perception. In some passages say their violations of

international law from NATO to bring tools to combat and military strengthen the

countries bordering with Russia. \

113

Know the previous event where Kosovo out of Yugoslavia, even though

Russia denounced Kosovo, but NATO and US support so Yugoslavia obliged to

release Kosovo and also international recognition for such a small area. Same like US

statement to Kosovo, Russia will strongly recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a

sovereign nation in the international world. And finally on the 16th of April 2008

Russia establish direct relation with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. After Russia

recognition to south Ossetia there are some low level conflict broke out between

South Ossetia and Georgia government which did not approve the actions of the two

regions. And in the end of the small conflict between South Ossetia and the Georgian

government was the massive attack that Saakashvili government brought to south

Ossetia on the night of August 7, 2008, and this was a major trigger for the South

Ossetia war.

After the attack was launched by Georgia, Russia directly implements its

defense policy against Georgia. The main objective of Russia is to protect its citizens

who work and live in the South Ossetia region. The Georgian attack also killed

several Russian peacekeeping troops that stationed in southern Ossetia as an

agreement between Georgia, South Ossetia and Russia. In implementing its defense

policy Russia has deployed at least 10,000 personnel. In this war Georgia had

surpassed Russia by wounding one of the Russian combat commanders. But it is

because all the Russia troops has not gathered due to the difficult mobilization, the

transfer of personnel through the Roki tunnel And the steep mountain is Russia's

main obstacle. After all the soldiers arrived in the city of Tbilisi and the war situation

turned around. Until the 12th of August the southern region of Ossetia belonged to

the southern Ossetia government with the help of Russian troops aimed at

maintaining the peace of the region.

After the battle ended, NATO came as mediators tried to mediate the conflict

between Georgia and Russia. In the process of mediating many new agreements

signed by each side to resolve South Ossetia dispute. Russia as the main party

114

pledged not to continue the assault, as Russia's responsible State also gave aid to

southern Ossetia as the victim of a Georgian assault aiming to ground South Ossetia.

On the other side of Georgia as losing party and a country which started the war

sparked required paying damages to South Ossetia in the clarification of Russia after

the war.

When we examine according to the neo realism perspective that states that the

actor who can engage in the international world directly is the State, and the State as

the main actor has power over the way he takes action. The action referred to in this

case is the manner in which a State relates or attitudes to another State. For the

example, about what Russia do towards Georgia in response to Georgia's attack on

the region of South Ossetia. It is clear that Russia‟s desire to protect its country's

interests as protecting its citizens is one of the processes of self-defense. This form of

self-defense is not a spontaneous attitude, but an attitude that has been endorsed by

the State of Russia as stated in its defense policy or more specifically the military

doctrine of the Russian federation. Based on the military doctrine that Russia has he

will implement the laws he has on every issue that Russia encounters and this is

clearly illustrated through the defense policy theory.

115

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