â•œThese Navies and Armies and Kings and Thingsâ•š: Anglo ...

Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University UndergraduateJournal of History, Series II

Volume 18 Article 11

2013

“These Navies and Armies and Kings and Things”:Anglo American Cooperation in Anti-SubmarineWarfare in World War ISean Naumes

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Recommended CitationNaumes, Sean (2013) "“These Navies and Armies and Kings and Things”: Anglo American Cooperation in Anti-Submarine Warfare inWorld War I," Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II: Vol. 18 , Article 11.Available at: http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol18/iss1/11

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Environmental Disaster in Japan 103

governmental power, and the value of humanity in aworld that seemingly values technology and progressabove all. It also demonstrates the continual tensionbetween the government’s quest and constant push formodernity, and the forced adaptation of the citizenryto use the government’s own weapons against them.

Kathryn Karasek is a a double major in History andEconomics. Originally from Cary, North Carolina, shechose to branch out and study East Asian History atSCU. Her paper, "Environmental Destruction in Japan",was inspired by her participation in the Solar Decathlonproject and won the 2013 Redwood Prize for the bestessay on a historical subject.

104 Historical Perspectives June 2013

“These Navies and Armies and Kingsand Things”: Anglo AmericanCooperation in Anti-Submarine Warfarein World War I

Sean Naumes

The United States entered World War I, one of themost destructive conflicts in human history, on April6, 1917. The nation was almost completely unpreparedfor armed conflict, and this was especially true of theUnited States Navy which could not even fully man thecraft that it had available. America’s entry into the waralso coincided with a major allied crisis caused by theresumption of unrestricted submarine warfare by theGermans which saw, at that time, German submarinessinking one in every four ships that left Britain’sharbors.1 However, within a short period of time, theU.S. Navy was working closely with Britain’s RoyalNavy to protect convoys and maintain the blockade ofGermany that eventually help to bring about thearmistice of 1918.Cooperation between the UnitedStates Navy and its Royal counterpart was extremelyeffective because it allowed the two powers to maintainthe lines of communication between the Allies and theUnited States through the preservation of shippingtonnage which fueled the Allied economies and wareffort. This begs the question why the cooperationbetween the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy anti-submarine

1 Michael Simpson, ed., Anglo-American Naval Relations,1917-1918( Aldershot, Hants, England: Published by ScolarPress for the Navy Records Society, 1991), 23.

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Naumes: “These Navies and Armies and Kings and Things”

Published by Scholar Commons, 2013

Anglo American Cooperation 105

activities was so successful during the relatively briefperiod of U.S. belligerency during the First World War.The answer, like any historical analysis, is quitecomplicated and involves the investigation of therelationships of the commanders and cabinet membersand an examination of the material crisis facing theallies at the beginning of 1917. Despite thecomplicated nature of the eventual harmoniousinteractions exhibited by the British and Americans, itseems that the high levels of cooperation seen in theU.S. and British anti-submarine forces were primarilythe product of diplomatic relations, severe alliedlosses, and a distinct lack of viable non-convoy relatedstrategic options. This analysis of Anglo-Americancooperation in anti-submarine warfare ends inDecember of 1917 with the establishment of full Anglo-American naval cooperation.

This paper investigates the underlying causes ofthe harmonious relationship that existed among thejoint Anglo-American anti-submarine forces during thelast years of the Great War. Therefore, it includes anexamination of Anglo-American naval relations, beforeWWI, during American neutrality with the bulk ofanalysis concentrated on cooperation duringhostilities.

U.S. –U.K. Relations Up to 1914

Pre-war relations between the United States andGreat Britain would not necessarily have indicatedthat the two nations would cooperate well as allies oreven become allies in the event of a continental war.The United States and Britain had relatively cordialdiplomatic and naval relations during the latter part of


the nineteenth century and early twentieth century,but residual tensions over past conflicts such as theAmerican Revolution, the War of 1812 and theAmerican Civil War lingered, especially among certainsegments of the American public. The War of 1812 andthe American Civil War were especially important interms of naval and diplomatic relations during periodsof U.S. neutrality. That is, because the war of 1812was fought, officially, over the rights of neutralshipping and the Civil War almost saw Britain declarewar on the Union over the Trent incident, negativefeelings continued. With the opening of Japan in 1854,the United States joined other European nations, suchas Britain, in imperial activities.2 By the turn of thetwentieth century the United States had majorterritorial holdings in both the Caribbean and thePacific, such as Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Navalpolicy makers, such as Theodore Roosevelt and AlfredThayer Mahan, actually began to see the British RoyalNavy as a buffer against the relatively new and risingnaval power of Germany in the Atlantic and Japan inthe Pacific.3 The years immediately before the GreatWar saw a relative calm between the Unites States andBritain and 1914 marked the centennial of peacebetween the two nations.4 Meanwhile, the diplomaticdance that began in 1913 introduced some of the main

2 Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of Japan: From theTokugawa Times to the Present (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 2009), 50. 3 Richard W. Truk, The Ambiguous Relationship: TheodoreRoosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan (New York: GreenwoodPress, 1987), 2. 4 Burton J. Hendrick 1924, The Life and Letters of Walter H.Page. Vol. 1. (Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company), 274.

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Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 18 [2013], Art. 11

http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol18/iss1/11


activities was so successful during the relatively briefperiod of U.S. belligerency during the First World War.The answer, like any historical analysis, is quitecomplicated and involves the investigation of therelationships of the commanders and cabinet membersand an examination of the material crisis facing theallies at the beginning of 1917. Despite thecomplicated nature of the eventual harmoniousinteractions exhibited by the British and Americans, itseems that the high levels of cooperation seen in theU.S. and British anti-submarine forces were primarilythe product of diplomatic relations, severe alliedlosses, and a distinct lack of viable non-convoy relatedstrategic options. This analysis of Anglo-Americancooperation in anti-submarine warfare ends inDecember of 1917 with the establishment of full Anglo-American naval cooperation.

This paper investigates the underlying causes ofthe harmonious relationship that existed among thejoint Anglo-American anti-submarine forces during thelast years of the Great War. Therefore, it includes anexamination of Anglo-American naval relations, beforeWWI, during American neutrality with the bulk ofanalysis concentrated on cooperation duringhostilities.

U.S. –U.K. Relations Up to 1914

Pre-war relations between the United States andGreat Britain would not necessarily have indicatedthat the two nations would cooperate well as allies oreven become allies in the event of a continental war.The United States and Britain had relatively cordialdiplomatic and naval relations during the latter part of


the nineteenth century and early twentieth century,but residual tensions over past conflicts such as theAmerican Revolution, the War of 1812 and theAmerican Civil War lingered, especially among certainsegments of the American public. The War of 1812 andthe American Civil War were especially important interms of naval and diplomatic relations during periodsof U.S. neutrality. That is, because the war of 1812was fought, officially, over the rights of neutralshipping and the Civil War almost saw Britain declarewar on the Union over the Trent incident, negativefeelings continued. With the opening of Japan in 1854,the United States joined other European nations, suchas Britain, in imperial activities.2 By the turn of thetwentieth century the United States had majorterritorial holdings in both the Caribbean and thePacific, such as Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Navalpolicy makers, such as Theodore Roosevelt and AlfredThayer Mahan, actually began to see the British RoyalNavy as a buffer against the relatively new and risingnaval power of Germany in the Atlantic and Japan inthe Pacific.3 The years immediately before the GreatWar saw a relative calm between the Unites States andBritain and 1914 marked the centennial of peacebetween the two nations.4 Meanwhile, the diplomaticdance that began in 1913 introduced some of the main

2 Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of Japan: From theTokugawa Times to the Present (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 2009), 50. 3 Richard W. Truk, The Ambiguous Relationship: TheodoreRoosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan (New York: GreenwoodPress, 1987), 2. 4 Burton J. Hendrick 1924, The Life and Letters of Walter H.Page. Vol. 1. (Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company), 274.

3




players that would shape Anglo-American relationsand the two countries’ harmonious cooperation of theanti-submarine campaign.

Walter Hines Page became the ambassador to theCourt of St. James in March, 1913 and wasimmediately thrown into the whirlwind of Europeandiplomacy and politics. Page would prove to be a keyplayer in U.S. - Great Britain relations both before theU.S. entered the war and during the war. Page’sexperiences in Britain are a good example of how thetwo nations perceived each other before the war began.In his collected works, The Life and Letters of Walter H.Page, Burton J. Hendrick includes Page’scorrespondence from 1913 and one letter to thePresident noted that the British, “Do not think of ourpeople as foreigners.”5 However he also notes that theBritish, “think of our Government as foreign, and as afrontier sort of thing without good manners or goodfaith.”6 The British aristocracy did not seem to have avery high opinion of the Government of the U.S., andthe war seemed to exacerbate this negative opinion.On the other side of the Atlantic, Americans’perception of Britain differed substantially dependingon what group was queried. Page himself was ananglophile and believed that “Only the British landsand the United States have secure liberty. They alsohave the most treasure, the best fighters, the mostland, the most ships- the future in fact.”7 Given hisAnglo-centric leanings, Page wanted to create the bestpossible relationship between the United States and

5 Ibid., 145. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid., 283.


Britain. Other segments of the population, mostnotably a large number of Irish-Americans, weresuspicious of or outright hostile toward the British andPage went as far as to blame the Irish vote for the U.S.failure to establish a permanent embassy location inLondon.8

The most pressing issues that affected Anglo-American relations in the years leading up to the warwere the two nations’ interests in Central Americanand Mexico. The United States intensified itsenforcement of the Monroe doctrine, which was theU.S. policy of preventing European intervention in theAmericas, around the turn of the century, and manyEuropean nations were actively participating in Southand Central American politics and trade.9 Pagementions in a November 26, 1913 letter that he told aBritish aristocrat that “the only thing that had keptSouth America from being parceled out as Africa hasbeen is the Monroe Doctrine and the United Statesbehind it.”10 This concept of the British and Europeansin general did not bode well for cooperation on the partof the United States with any European nation, GreatBritain included.

For their part, the British had been attempting toimprove their foreign relations around the turn of thecentury. This was especially important for Anglo-American relations since, at that time, the UnitedStates was a growing power and the only Englishspeaking nation outside of the British dominion.

8 Burton J. Hendrick 1925, The Life and Letters of Walter H.Page. Vol. 3. (Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company), 72-73. 9 Truck, 50. 10 Hendrick, vol. 1, 217.

4




players that would shape Anglo-American relationsand the two countries’ harmonious cooperation of theanti-submarine campaign.

Walter Hines Page became the ambassador to theCourt of St. James in March, 1913 and wasimmediately thrown into the whirlwind of Europeandiplomacy and politics. Page would prove to be a keyplayer in U.S. - Great Britain relations both before theU.S. entered the war and during the war. Page’sexperiences in Britain are a good example of how thetwo nations perceived each other before the war began.In his collected works, The Life and Letters of Walter H.Page, Burton J. Hendrick includes Page’scorrespondence from 1913 and one letter to thePresident noted that the British, “Do not think of ourpeople as foreigners.”5 However he also notes that theBritish, “think of our Government as foreign, and as afrontier sort of thing without good manners or goodfaith.”6 The British aristocracy did not seem to have avery high opinion of the Government of the U.S., andthe war seemed to exacerbate this negative opinion.On the other side of the Atlantic, Americans’perception of Britain differed substantially dependingon what group was queried. Page himself was ananglophile and believed that “Only the British landsand the United States have secure liberty. They alsohave the most treasure, the best fighters, the mostland, the most ships- the future in fact.”7 Given hisAnglo-centric leanings, Page wanted to create the bestpossible relationship between the United States and

5 Ibid., 145. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid., 283.


Britain. Other segments of the population, mostnotably a large number of Irish-Americans, weresuspicious of or outright hostile toward the British andPage went as far as to blame the Irish vote for the U.S.failure to establish a permanent embassy location inLondon.8

The most pressing issues that affected Anglo-American relations in the years leading up to the warwere the two nations’ interests in Central Americanand Mexico. The United States intensified itsenforcement of the Monroe doctrine, which was theU.S. policy of preventing European intervention in theAmericas, around the turn of the century, and manyEuropean nations were actively participating in Southand Central American politics and trade.9 Pagementions in a November 26, 1913 letter that he told aBritish aristocrat that “the only thing that had keptSouth America from being parceled out as Africa hasbeen is the Monroe Doctrine and the United Statesbehind it.”10 This concept of the British and Europeansin general did not bode well for cooperation on the partof the United States with any European nation, GreatBritain included.

For their part, the British had been attempting toimprove their foreign relations around the turn of thecentury. This was especially important for Anglo-American relations since, at that time, the UnitedStates was a growing power and the only Englishspeaking nation outside of the British dominion.

8 Burton J. Hendrick 1925, The Life and Letters of Walter H.Page. Vol. 3. (Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company), 72-73. 9 Truck, 50. 10 Hendrick, vol. 1, 217.

5




Appeasing the United States was an important Britishdiplomatic goal. This involved favors such as givingconcessions to the U.S. when it came to Canadianborder disputes.11 Page recognized the Britishkeenness to maintain good relations during theMexican revolution dispute of 1913: he stated “theywill not risk losing our good-will.”12 Page wasbeginning to believe that power would eventually shifttoward the United States and that Britain would soonrank second to the U.S. This enhanced Page’scampaign to gain Britain’s cooperation and mutualsupport.

Aside from official diplomatic relations, there waslittle in the way of political or military cooperationbetween the United States and Great Britain leadingup to the war, or even during neutrality (1914-1917).One example of unofficial naval relations can be seenin the acquaintance of certain naval officers in bothservices due to common postings and in port visits. Inhis book, Anglo-America Naval Relations 1917-1918,Michael Simpson mentions the acquaintance ofAmerican Admiral William S. Sims and BritishAdmiral, and later Frist Sea Lord, Sir John Jellicoe asa good example of unofficial Anglo-American relations.Both men knew each other due to friendly interactionswhile they were both stationed in the Far East.13 Theseties would prove important in 1917 when Sims becamethe main U.S. flag officer in Britain. Official tiesbetween the British and American navies were slim to

11 A. E. Campbell, Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1974), 123. 12 Hendrick, vol. 1, 185.

13 Simpson, 8.


none in 1913 but there was a simmer of possible navalcooperation that existed right before the volatileEuropean continent exploded.

Anglo-American naval cooperation was never closerin the period before the war than in late 1913 andearly 1914 when a British-American-German pact wasbeing considered in order to vent pressure on thecontinent and redirect the arms race. Page noted in anAugust 28, 1913 letter to Edward M. House, WoodrowWilson’s trusted advisor, that, “If we could find somefriendly use for these navies and armies and king andthings- in the service of humanity – they’d follow us.”14

Winston Churchill, Sea Lord at the time, made aformal suggestion that the Germans and Britishengage in a “Naval Holiday” that would freeze capitalship building and foster cooperation between the twonations.15 After some meetings, this was rejected bythe Germans whose ship building program wasdictated by law. Nevertheless, Page and Wilsonbelieved in the “Naval Holiday” plan and “[b]y January4, 1914, the House-Wilson plan had thus grown intoan Anglo-American-German ‘pact’, to deal not onlywith “disarmament, but other matters of equalimportance to themselves and the world at large.”16 Allof this came to naught, however, with the beginning ofthe Great War, eight months later, on August 4, 1914.

The pre-war diplomatic stint of Walter H. Pageproved to be very eventful in that it saw thedevelopment of a greater understanding between theUnited States and Britain and it almost resulted in a

14 Hendrick, vol.1, 278. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., 280-281.

6




Appeasing the United States was an important Britishdiplomatic goal. This involved favors such as givingconcessions to the U.S. when it came to Canadianborder disputes.11 Page recognized the Britishkeenness to maintain good relations during theMexican revolution dispute of 1913: he stated “theywill not risk losing our good-will.”12 Page wasbeginning to believe that power would eventually shifttoward the United States and that Britain would soonrank second to the U.S. This enhanced Page’scampaign to gain Britain’s cooperation and mutualsupport.

Aside from official diplomatic relations, there waslittle in the way of political or military cooperationbetween the United States and Great Britain leadingup to the war, or even during neutrality (1914-1917).One example of unofficial naval relations can be seenin the acquaintance of certain naval officers in bothservices due to common postings and in port visits. Inhis book, Anglo-America Naval Relations 1917-1918,Michael Simpson mentions the acquaintance ofAmerican Admiral William S. Sims and BritishAdmiral, and later Frist Sea Lord, Sir John Jellicoe asa good example of unofficial Anglo-American relations.Both men knew each other due to friendly interactionswhile they were both stationed in the Far East.13 Theseties would prove important in 1917 when Sims becamethe main U.S. flag officer in Britain. Official tiesbetween the British and American navies were slim to

11 A. E. Campbell, Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1974), 123. 12 Hendrick, vol. 1, 185.

13 Simpson, 8.


none in 1913 but there was a simmer of possible navalcooperation that existed right before the volatileEuropean continent exploded.

Anglo-American naval cooperation was never closerin the period before the war than in late 1913 andearly 1914 when a British-American-German pact wasbeing considered in order to vent pressure on thecontinent and redirect the arms race. Page noted in anAugust 28, 1913 letter to Edward M. House, WoodrowWilson’s trusted advisor, that, “If we could find somefriendly use for these navies and armies and king andthings- in the service of humanity – they’d follow us.”14

Winston Churchill, Sea Lord at the time, made aformal suggestion that the Germans and Britishengage in a “Naval Holiday” that would freeze capitalship building and foster cooperation between the twonations.15 After some meetings, this was rejected bythe Germans whose ship building program wasdictated by law. Nevertheless, Page and Wilsonbelieved in the “Naval Holiday” plan and “[b]y January4, 1914, the House-Wilson plan had thus grown intoan Anglo-American-German ‘pact’, to deal not onlywith “disarmament, but other matters of equalimportance to themselves and the world at large.”16 Allof this came to naught, however, with the beginning ofthe Great War, eight months later, on August 4, 1914.

The pre-war diplomatic stint of Walter H. Pageproved to be very eventful in that it saw thedevelopment of a greater understanding between theUnited States and Britain and it almost resulted in a

14 Hendrick, vol.1, 278. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., 280-281.

7




triple alliance of the United States, Britain andGermany by the beginning of 1914. However, 1913also showed that the United States still viewed Britainwith suspicion and that many influential persons inBritain did not completely understand the UnitedStates. Finally, this period saw the development ofrelationships between Page and important Britishleaders such as Sir Edward Grey, the British ForeignSecretary, and Admiral Sir John Jellicoe which wouldhelp Page steer Anglo-American relations through theminefield of neutrality and later cooperation.

The Problem with Neutrality, 1914-1917

Diplomatic relations between Great Britain and theUnited States entered one of their rockiest periodssince the American Civil War with the outbreak of theFirst World War and the subsequent British long-rangeblockade of Germany, a strategy that involved Britishinterference with neutral shipping. Page summed upthe position of the United States well in an Augustsecond letter to his family which stated that “TheUnited States is the only great power wholly out of it.The United States most likely, therefore, will be able toplay a helpful and historic part at its end.”17 Thisremark obviously shows that the United States underWilson was more interested in being a neutral peacebroker than belligerent. The letter may also reveal thatPage realized early on that the U.S. could benefit fromearly neutrality in the Great War if it then joinedtoward the end of the conflict. Hendrick makes animportant note after this section and that was the fact

17 Ibid., 302.


that, “By this time Page and the Foreign Secretary hadestablished not only cordial official relations but awarm friendship.”18 This is an important developmentbecause Page’s friendship with Grey gave him a bettergrasp of the British situation and British perceptions.

The Allied blockade of the Central Powers, whichbegan in August of 1914 and lasted until the end ofthe war, caused a great deal of tension between theUnited States and Great Britain.19 The blockade wasseen as an infringement on the rights of neutralshipping by the Americans, whereas the Britishconsidered the blockade their main weapon againstGermany and the means by which they would eitherwin or lose the war. Advancements in navaltechnology, such as the mine, submarine and torpedo,rendered the old doctrines of close-in blockadesuntenable so the Royal Navy embarked on a long-rangeblockade which involved stopping ships before theycame anywhere near neutral or belligerent ports alongthe North Sea.20 In his book, The End of Neutrality,John W. Coogan explains that British administrationfaced a great dilemma because they “could see no wayto intercept such shipments without blatant violationsof international law.”21 In his article in the North

18 Ibid., 311. 19 The major Allies from 1914 to 1917 consisted of Britain,France, Russia, Japan and Italy. Encyclopædia BritannicaOnline, s. v. "World War I," accessed March 20, 2013, http://0-www.britannica.com.sculib.scu.edu/EBchecked/topic/648646/World-War-I. 20 John C. Coogan, The End of Neutrality: The United States,Britain, and Maritime Right, 1899-1915 (Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press, 1981), 156. 21 Ibid.

8




triple alliance of the United States, Britain andGermany by the beginning of 1914. However, 1913also showed that the United States still viewed Britainwith suspicion and that many influential persons inBritain did not completely understand the UnitedStates. Finally, this period saw the development ofrelationships between Page and important Britishleaders such as Sir Edward Grey, the British ForeignSecretary, and Admiral Sir John Jellicoe which wouldhelp Page steer Anglo-American relations through theminefield of neutrality and later cooperation.

The Problem with Neutrality, 1914-1917

Diplomatic relations between Great Britain and theUnited States entered one of their rockiest periodssince the American Civil War with the outbreak of theFirst World War and the subsequent British long-rangeblockade of Germany, a strategy that involved Britishinterference with neutral shipping. Page summed upthe position of the United States well in an Augustsecond letter to his family which stated that “TheUnited States is the only great power wholly out of it.The United States most likely, therefore, will be able toplay a helpful and historic part at its end.”17 Thisremark obviously shows that the United States underWilson was more interested in being a neutral peacebroker than belligerent. The letter may also reveal thatPage realized early on that the U.S. could benefit fromearly neutrality in the Great War if it then joinedtoward the end of the conflict. Hendrick makes animportant note after this section and that was the fact

17 Ibid., 302.


that, “By this time Page and the Foreign Secretary hadestablished not only cordial official relations but awarm friendship.”18 This is an important developmentbecause Page’s friendship with Grey gave him a bettergrasp of the British situation and British perceptions.

The Allied blockade of the Central Powers, whichbegan in August of 1914 and lasted until the end ofthe war, caused a great deal of tension between theUnited States and Great Britain.19 The blockade wasseen as an infringement on the rights of neutralshipping by the Americans, whereas the Britishconsidered the blockade their main weapon againstGermany and the means by which they would eitherwin or lose the war. Advancements in navaltechnology, such as the mine, submarine and torpedo,rendered the old doctrines of close-in blockadesuntenable so the Royal Navy embarked on a long-rangeblockade which involved stopping ships before theycame anywhere near neutral or belligerent ports alongthe North Sea.20 In his book, The End of Neutrality,John W. Coogan explains that British administrationfaced a great dilemma because they “could see no wayto intercept such shipments without blatant violationsof international law.”21 In his article in the North

18 Ibid., 311. 19 The major Allies from 1914 to 1917 consisted of Britain,France, Russia, Japan and Italy. Encyclopædia BritannicaOnline, s. v. "World War I," accessed March 20, 2013, http://0-www.britannica.com.sculib.scu.edu/EBchecked/topic/648646/World-War-I. 20 John C. Coogan, The End of Neutrality: The United States,Britain, and Maritime Right, 1899-1915 (Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press, 1981), 156. 21 Ibid.

9




American Review, “Sea Rights and Sea Power: TheBritish Embargo”, Edward S. Corwin, a contemporarylawyer, explained that an actual blockade requiredcontrol of the waters around an enemy port and theequal treatment of all neutral nations. Neutrality wasviolated by the British because they neither hadcontrol of the waters immediately around Germanports nor did they treat all neutrals equally, given thefact that they were unable to do anything about theBaltic trade.22 The British government tried to avoidthis issue by never actually declaring an effectiveblockade and by using the continuous voyage doctrine.

The main dispute revolved around theclassification of different cargoes. The HagueConference in 1907 and the Declaration of London in1909, which was a codification of the Conference’sguidelines, defined the materials that could beconsidered contraband and those items which couldnot be seized.23 The declaration separated cargoes intoabsolute contraband, which was condemned by itsmilitary utility, conditional contraband, which couldonly be condemned based on its final destination, andfree list items, which could not be prevented fromentering any territory.24 The Declaration of London waseventually signed by Austria-Hungary, France,Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, Spain, the UnitedStates and the Netherlands.25Due to pressure from theUnited States, Great Britain accepted some tenets of

22 Edward S. Corwin, “Sea Rights and Sea Power: The BritishEmbargo,” The North American Review 204 (Oct. 1916): 519. 23 Hendrick, vol. 1, 375. 24 Marion C. Siney, The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1914-1916 ( Westport: Greenwood Press, 1973), 9. 25 Coogan, 8.


the Declaration of London to maintain good relationswith neutral trading partners who feared tradedisruption. But, this acceptance came withmodifications that would eventually lead to a completeabandonment of the Declaration.26 The Britishmanaged to avoid a potentially catastrophic run-inwith the U.S. over trade by paying for all blockadedcargoes.27 Hendrick states that “Great Britain nowproposed to purchase cargoes of conditionalcontraband discovered on seized ships and return theships themselves to their owners and this soon becameestablished practice.”28 Eventually everything not inthe absolute contraband category was declaredconditional contraband by Great Britain. In her book,The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1914-1916, MarionSiney contends that “No particular attempt was nowmade to determine whether a consignment ofconditional contraband was destined to the armedforces or governmental department of the enemy:designation to hostile territory was enough to secureits condemnation.”29 The Wilson administration tookissue with this position at first, but the U.S. eventuallylet the issue fade away, on the advice of Page, andbecause of issues concerning submarine warfare suchas the sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915 and thetorpedoing of the S.S. Sussex on March 24, 1916.30

These events created a great deal of tension between

26 Hendrick, vol. 1, 384. 27 Siney, 129. 28 Burton J. Hendrick 1925, The Life and Letters of Walter H.Page. Vol. 2. (Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company), 63. 29 Siney, 132. 30 P.K. Kemp, ed., History of the Royal Navy (New York: G.P.Putnam’s Sons, 1969), 204.

10




American Review, “Sea Rights and Sea Power: TheBritish Embargo”, Edward S. Corwin, a contemporarylawyer, explained that an actual blockade requiredcontrol of the waters around an enemy port and theequal treatment of all neutral nations. Neutrality wasviolated by the British because they neither hadcontrol of the waters immediately around Germanports nor did they treat all neutrals equally, given thefact that they were unable to do anything about theBaltic trade.22 The British government tried to avoidthis issue by never actually declaring an effectiveblockade and by using the continuous voyage doctrine.

The main dispute revolved around theclassification of different cargoes. The HagueConference in 1907 and the Declaration of London in1909, which was a codification of the Conference’sguidelines, defined the materials that could beconsidered contraband and those items which couldnot be seized.23 The declaration separated cargoes intoabsolute contraband, which was condemned by itsmilitary utility, conditional contraband, which couldonly be condemned based on its final destination, andfree list items, which could not be prevented fromentering any territory.24 The Declaration of London waseventually signed by Austria-Hungary, France,Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, Spain, the UnitedStates and the Netherlands.25Due to pressure from theUnited States, Great Britain accepted some tenets of

22 Edward S. Corwin, “Sea Rights and Sea Power: The BritishEmbargo,” The North American Review 204 (Oct. 1916): 519. 23 Hendrick, vol. 1, 375. 24 Marion C. Siney, The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1914-1916 ( Westport: Greenwood Press, 1973), 9. 25 Coogan, 8.


the Declaration of London to maintain good relationswith neutral trading partners who feared tradedisruption. But, this acceptance came withmodifications that would eventually lead to a completeabandonment of the Declaration.26 The Britishmanaged to avoid a potentially catastrophic run-inwith the U.S. over trade by paying for all blockadedcargoes.27 Hendrick states that “Great Britain nowproposed to purchase cargoes of conditionalcontraband discovered on seized ships and return theships themselves to their owners and this soon becameestablished practice.”28 Eventually everything not inthe absolute contraband category was declaredconditional contraband by Great Britain. In her book,The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1914-1916, MarionSiney contends that “No particular attempt was nowmade to determine whether a consignment ofconditional contraband was destined to the armedforces or governmental department of the enemy:designation to hostile territory was enough to secureits condemnation.”29 The Wilson administration tookissue with this position at first, but the U.S. eventuallylet the issue fade away, on the advice of Page, andbecause of issues concerning submarine warfare suchas the sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915 and thetorpedoing of the S.S. Sussex on March 24, 1916.30

These events created a great deal of tension between

26 Hendrick, vol. 1, 384. 27 Siney, 129. 28 Burton J. Hendrick 1925, The Life and Letters of Walter H.Page. Vol. 2. (Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company), 63. 29 Siney, 132. 30 P.K. Kemp, ed., History of the Royal Navy (New York: G.P.Putnam’s Sons, 1969), 204.

11




the United States and Germany and led to the Germanclaim that it would abandon unlimited submarinewarfare until February 1, 1917, under the “SussexPledge”.31

One result of the early long range blockade ofGermany was the “Dacia incident” which was probablythe most dangerous incident for Anglo-American navalrelations during American neutrality in World War I.This crisis, brought on by an attempted breach of theAllied blockade by a ship under a United Statesregistry, was the type of event that could have broughtthe United States and Great Britain closest to war. InJanuary, 1915, the British long-range blockade wasthreatened by a group of German-American investorswho decided to take advantage of U.S. regulationsregarding registry and asylum-seeking ships in orderto purchase a former German merchant ship, theDacia, and send the vessel to Germany loaded withcotton.32 This was clearly an attempt by U.S. nationalsto push the Wilson administration to refuse torecognize Britain’s long-range blockading activities.Hendrick notes that “Above all the Dacia involved thegreat question of the use of British sea power.”33 And,Simpson notes that for the United States problemswith the blockade revolved around neutral rights andfreedom of the seas.34 These two positions almostcollided in the first months of the war and could havemade cooperation in any area extremely difficult.

The solution to this momentous issue came in the

31 Ibid. 32 Hendrick, vol. 3, 222. 33 Ibid., 223. 34 Simpson, 26.


form of the American Ambassador himself. Pageworked tirelessly to maintain the good relations thathad existed between the United States and Britainright before the war. Due to his relationship with Grey,Page was able to suggest that the French Navy pick upthe ship when it entered the English Channel since theUnited States still entertained strong sympathies forthe French.35 This was a stroke of genius since itpartially diffused the tension that had built upbetween the United States and Britain and the Allieswere able to prevent the blockade from being breached.However, the whole incident brought up manyconsiderations about sea power and international law.This was especially true when it came to the letter ofthe law and enforcement. Britain agreed to follow thetenets of the Declaration of London with modificationbut it very quickly began to violate this agreement. Noneutral government actively challenged this besidesthe odd call for its cancelation.

This incident also reveals that the possibility of anAnglo-American conflict or war in the early years ofWWI was very real and made all the more probable bythe fact that the U.S. was both the most powerfulneutral nation and heavily committed to freedom of theseas.36 The lack of major conflict may have been due tothe fact that Britain paid for most cargoes that weredetained, and the submarine campaign represented anew and legally challenging development in navalrelations and law. The dispute over the blockade andfreedom of the seas would have an important impacton the early strategic cooperation between the British

35 Hendrick, vol. 3, 236. 36 Simpson, xii.

12




the United States and Germany and led to the Germanclaim that it would abandon unlimited submarinewarfare until February 1, 1917, under the “SussexPledge”.31

One result of the early long range blockade ofGermany was the “Dacia incident” which was probablythe most dangerous incident for Anglo-American navalrelations during American neutrality in World War I.This crisis, brought on by an attempted breach of theAllied blockade by a ship under a United Statesregistry, was the type of event that could have broughtthe United States and Great Britain closest to war. InJanuary, 1915, the British long-range blockade wasthreatened by a group of German-American investorswho decided to take advantage of U.S. regulationsregarding registry and asylum-seeking ships in orderto purchase a former German merchant ship, theDacia, and send the vessel to Germany loaded withcotton.32 This was clearly an attempt by U.S. nationalsto push the Wilson administration to refuse torecognize Britain’s long-range blockading activities.Hendrick notes that “Above all the Dacia involved thegreat question of the use of British sea power.”33 And,Simpson notes that for the United States problemswith the blockade revolved around neutral rights andfreedom of the seas.34 These two positions almostcollided in the first months of the war and could havemade cooperation in any area extremely difficult.

The solution to this momentous issue came in the

31 Ibid. 32 Hendrick, vol. 3, 222. 33 Ibid., 223. 34 Simpson, 26.


form of the American Ambassador himself. Pageworked tirelessly to maintain the good relations thathad existed between the United States and Britainright before the war. Due to his relationship with Grey,Page was able to suggest that the French Navy pick upthe ship when it entered the English Channel since theUnited States still entertained strong sympathies forthe French.35 This was a stroke of genius since itpartially diffused the tension that had built upbetween the United States and Britain and the Allieswere able to prevent the blockade from being breached.However, the whole incident brought up manyconsiderations about sea power and international law.This was especially true when it came to the letter ofthe law and enforcement. Britain agreed to follow thetenets of the Declaration of London with modificationbut it very quickly began to violate this agreement. Noneutral government actively challenged this besidesthe odd call for its cancelation.

This incident also reveals that the possibility of anAnglo-American conflict or war in the early years ofWWI was very real and made all the more probable bythe fact that the U.S. was both the most powerfulneutral nation and heavily committed to freedom of theseas.36 The lack of major conflict may have been due tothe fact that Britain paid for most cargoes that weredetained, and the submarine campaign represented anew and legally challenging development in navalrelations and law. The dispute over the blockade andfreedom of the seas would have an important impacton the early strategic cooperation between the British

35 Hendrick, vol. 3, 236. 36 Simpson, xii.

13




and the United States once the latter joined the war.In 1916 Wilson led a campaign to bring about

peace in an exhausted Europe. After the Sussex Pledgeof May 4, 1916, he tried to secure some sort of peaceon the continent. Hendrick notes that “Mr. Wilson wasbent on keeping the United States out of the war; heknew that there was only one certain way of preservingpeace in this country, and that was to bring the waritself to an end.”37 However, he also knew that “thepledge was a temporary measure and that it would beviolated as soon as it became clear that the talkswould achieve results.”38 This perception proved true,and the German Government, convinced that it couldbring the war to a swift conclusion, announced that itwould resume unrestricted submarine warfare onFebruary 1, 1917.39 This ended the peace drive thatWilson had pursued during Germany’s adherence tothe Sussex Pledge. Despite the threat of Germanattack on merchant vessels after the first of February,the Wilson Administration moved slowly towardbelligerency. Sir Cecil Spring Rice, the BritishAmbassador in Washington, suspected that this was atactic to get the country, which was still grappling withisolationism, on board with the idea of war when hewrote in a January 1917 cable that “ ‘It is the evidentdesire of the President to avoid any appearance of awar conducted in cooperation with the Allies.’”40 UnitedStates diplomatic relations with Germany were broken

37 Hendrick, vol. 2, 148. 38 Ibid., 149. 39 David F. Trask, Captains and Cabinets: Anglo-AmericanNaval Relations 1917-1918 (Missouri: University of MissouriPress, 1979), 30. 40 Ibid., 40.


on February 3, 1917, “but he [Wilson] spent a numberof weeks exploring the possibility of armed neutrality.It was a step beyond strict neutrality but short of fullbelligerency.”41 As a last step before a declaration ofwar, Wilson signed an executive order on March 9,1917 to arm all merchantmen to see if armedneutrality would be possible.

The Navy Department slowly began preparing for apossible conflict with the Central Powers. The Britishdesperately sought to establish cooperation with theU.S. Navy. On March 23, 1917, Ambassador Pagewrote to the Secretary of State Robert Lansing toconvince the U.S. government of Britain’s willingnessto cooperate in both wartime strategy and the craftingof peace. Page mentioned the British willingness tocooperate when he stated that “The BritishGovernment will heartily fall in with any plan wepropose as soon as the cooperation can be formallyestablished.”42 Page also stated the need for anAmerican naval representative in London when hewrote that “Knowing their spirit and their methods, Icannot too strongly recommend that our Governmentsend here immediately an Admiral of our Navy who willbring our Navy’s plans and inquiries.”43 TheAmbassador also enticed the Secretary of State withone item the United States wanted from Britain, whichwas information, when he stated that “he [therepresentative] would have all doors opened to himand a sort of special staff appointed to give him theresults and methods of the whole British Naval work

41 Ibid., 44. 42 Simpson, 15. 43 Ibid., 16.

14




and the United States once the latter joined the war.In 1916 Wilson led a campaign to bring about

peace in an exhausted Europe. After the Sussex Pledgeof May 4, 1916, he tried to secure some sort of peaceon the continent. Hendrick notes that “Mr. Wilson wasbent on keeping the United States out of the war; heknew that there was only one certain way of preservingpeace in this country, and that was to bring the waritself to an end.”37 However, he also knew that “thepledge was a temporary measure and that it would beviolated as soon as it became clear that the talkswould achieve results.”38 This perception proved true,and the German Government, convinced that it couldbring the war to a swift conclusion, announced that itwould resume unrestricted submarine warfare onFebruary 1, 1917.39 This ended the peace drive thatWilson had pursued during Germany’s adherence tothe Sussex Pledge. Despite the threat of Germanattack on merchant vessels after the first of February,the Wilson Administration moved slowly towardbelligerency. Sir Cecil Spring Rice, the BritishAmbassador in Washington, suspected that this was atactic to get the country, which was still grappling withisolationism, on board with the idea of war when hewrote in a January 1917 cable that “ ‘It is the evidentdesire of the President to avoid any appearance of awar conducted in cooperation with the Allies.’”40 UnitedStates diplomatic relations with Germany were broken

37 Hendrick, vol. 2, 148. 38 Ibid., 149. 39 David F. Trask, Captains and Cabinets: Anglo-AmericanNaval Relations 1917-1918 (Missouri: University of MissouriPress, 1979), 30. 40 Ibid., 40.


on February 3, 1917, “but he [Wilson] spent a numberof weeks exploring the possibility of armed neutrality.It was a step beyond strict neutrality but short of fullbelligerency.”41 As a last step before a declaration ofwar, Wilson signed an executive order on March 9,1917 to arm all merchantmen to see if armedneutrality would be possible.

The Navy Department slowly began preparing for apossible conflict with the Central Powers. The Britishdesperately sought to establish cooperation with theU.S. Navy. On March 23, 1917, Ambassador Pagewrote to the Secretary of State Robert Lansing toconvince the U.S. government of Britain’s willingnessto cooperate in both wartime strategy and the craftingof peace. Page mentioned the British willingness tocooperate when he stated that “The BritishGovernment will heartily fall in with any plan wepropose as soon as the cooperation can be formallyestablished.”42 Page also stated the need for anAmerican naval representative in London when hewrote that “Knowing their spirit and their methods, Icannot too strongly recommend that our Governmentsend here immediately an Admiral of our Navy who willbring our Navy’s plans and inquiries.”43 TheAmbassador also enticed the Secretary of State withone item the United States wanted from Britain, whichwas information, when he stated that “he [therepresentative] would have all doors opened to himand a sort of special staff appointed to give him theresults and methods of the whole British Naval work

41 Ibid., 44. 42 Simpson, 15. 43 Ibid., 16.

15




since the War began.”44 This communication toWashington showed how willing the British were togain the confidence and cooperation of the UnitedStates. By this time the British were desperate fornaval reinforcement since their ships were spread thinand their trading lifeline was threatened.

A day after the Page letter, Wilson seemed to havemade up his mind to enter belligerency againstGermany and her Allies. On March 18, 1917 three U.S.ships were sunk without warning, and it seems thatthis major violation of contemporary naval codes andlaws was one of the main factors that pushed theUnited States toward war.45 The President wasapparently looking to the future when, on March 24,he wrote to the Secretary of the Navy, JosephusDaniels, and stated, “The main thing is no doubt to getinto immediate communication with the Admiralty onthe other side through confidential channels until thecongress has acted and work out a scheme forcooperation.”46 The Admiralty seemed to have sensedthe change in attitude in Washington, and on March29, 1917 informed the British Commander-in-ChiefNorth America and West Indies, Admiral Sir MontagueBrowning, that the U.S. would be provided withfacilities to operate against submarines on the Irishcoast.47 On the same day the naval attaché that Pageand the Admiralty had suggested be sent to GreatBritain departed for London. He was Admiral WilliamSowden Sims, who would play a major role in

44 Ibid.45 Ibid., 3.

46Ibid., 17. 47 Ibid., 18.


organizing and executing the anti-submarine war inEurope. In a March 29 communication one of theBritish officials in the United States reported that,“Sims who is detailed for London in strictest secrecyand sails incognito 31 March is I think a very goodman.”48 This was an extremely important momentbecause one of the most important players in Anglo-American cooperation in anti-submarine warfare hadjust been dispatched and his reputation preceded him.

The United States declaration of war on Germanycame on April 6, 1917 and the nation was immediatelyhurled into the heart of a world conflict that it neitherunderstood nor was prepared for. Secretary of StateRobert Lansing’s argument for belligerency may havebeen the most persuasive for the President since hesuggested that “continued neutrality would mean aloss of ‘future influence in world affairs.’”49 Throughoutthe conflict in Europe the U.S. administration andeven members of the U.S. naval command, such asAdmiral Benson, had dreamed of the United Statesbeing the arbitrator that would bring an end to themadness. By March of 1917 they had come to realizethat the only way to gain a spot at the negotiation ofthe peace was to bring about the end of the war.50

When it declared war, the administration devoted itselfcompletely to the prosecution of the conflict.

48 Simpson, 19. 49 Trask, 50. 50 Simpson, 9.

16




since the War began.”44 This communication toWashington showed how willing the British were togain the confidence and cooperation of the UnitedStates. By this time the British were desperate fornaval reinforcement since their ships were spread thinand their trading lifeline was threatened.

A day after the Page letter, Wilson seemed to havemade up his mind to enter belligerency againstGermany and her Allies. On March 18, 1917 three U.S.ships were sunk without warning, and it seems thatthis major violation of contemporary naval codes andlaws was one of the main factors that pushed theUnited States toward war.45 The President wasapparently looking to the future when, on March 24,he wrote to the Secretary of the Navy, JosephusDaniels, and stated, “The main thing is no doubt to getinto immediate communication with the Admiralty onthe other side through confidential channels until thecongress has acted and work out a scheme forcooperation.”46 The Admiralty seemed to have sensedthe change in attitude in Washington, and on March29, 1917 informed the British Commander-in-ChiefNorth America and West Indies, Admiral Sir MontagueBrowning, that the U.S. would be provided withfacilities to operate against submarines on the Irishcoast.47 On the same day the naval attaché that Pageand the Admiralty had suggested be sent to GreatBritain departed for London. He was Admiral WilliamSowden Sims, who would play a major role in

44 Ibid.45 Ibid., 3.

46Ibid., 17. 47 Ibid., 18.


organizing and executing the anti-submarine war inEurope. In a March 29 communication one of theBritish officials in the United States reported that,“Sims who is detailed for London in strictest secrecyand sails incognito 31 March is I think a very goodman.”48 This was an extremely important momentbecause one of the most important players in Anglo-American cooperation in anti-submarine warfare hadjust been dispatched and his reputation preceded him.

The United States declaration of war on Germanycame on April 6, 1917 and the nation was immediatelyhurled into the heart of a world conflict that it neitherunderstood nor was prepared for. Secretary of StateRobert Lansing’s argument for belligerency may havebeen the most persuasive for the President since hesuggested that “continued neutrality would mean aloss of ‘future influence in world affairs.’”49 Throughoutthe conflict in Europe the U.S. administration andeven members of the U.S. naval command, such asAdmiral Benson, had dreamed of the United Statesbeing the arbitrator that would bring an end to themadness. By March of 1917 they had come to realizethat the only way to gain a spot at the negotiation ofthe peace was to bring about the end of the war.50

When it declared war, the administration devoted itselfcompletely to the prosecution of the conflict.

48 Simpson, 19. 49 Trask, 50. 50 Simpson, 9.

17




Establishing Cooperation in Anti-SubmarineWarfare, April 1917-December 1917

The beginning stage of U.S. belligerency, whichlasted from April to July 1917, saw the entrance of theUnited States into the war and a massive push toshore up the Allies after the military hardships of 1916and against the possibly fatal threat of the Germansubmarine campaign to the war effort in Europe. TheAllies, and the British especially, were in rough shapedue to the heavy shipping losses caused primarily byGerman submarines. Allied shipping had lost 500,000tons in February, 500,000 tons in March and 200,000tons in the first ten days of April.51 This meant that theU-boats were sinking roughly a quarter of all shipsleaving Britain.52 The most disturbing fact for theAllies, however, was that only ten per cent of thetonnage was being replaced by production.53 TheUnited States’ preparedness was also a major concernfor its British ally. The British expected massivereinforcements from the United States, but the U.S.fleet was in no position for full mobilization. Near theeve of the U.S. entry into the war the Navy wasunprepared, with “only 10 per cent of its ships fullymanned and only one-third were ready for service.”54

The fleet contained an impressive 74 destroyers whichcould have been used for anti-submarine work, butonly 54 of them were actually modern and capable ofanti-submarine activities.55 Also, it was not until

51 Trask, 65. 52 Simpson, 23. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid., 10. 55 Ibid.


March 23 that Daniels was ordered to “add 87,000men to the Navy.”56 The fact that President Wilson wasstill hopeful for a peaceful solution to the conflict withGermany and his insistence on armed neutralityprevented the Navy from preparing until very close tothe actual declaration of war. However, the UnitedStates Department of the Navy had begun cooperationwith the Royal Navy on March 20, 1917, and by March24 a general plan of integration was drawn up whichemphasized the establishment of U.S. anti-submarineforces in Southern Ireland.57 It should beacknowledged, however, that “no mature plans wereconcreted nor consolation had taken place with theEuropean Allies before April 6.”58 The Germans weredoing well in this period, and they continued to growtheir submarine fleet to put pressure on the Allies.There were around 120 submarines in service with theGerman Fleet and this number was rising by aboutnine a month, given construction and casualties.59

This meant that submarine threat would only begrowing in the critical months ahead. Everything theBritish tried failed to have an impact on the rising tollof shipping.60

When Sims arrived in London on April 7, 1917, theAdmiralty, under First Sea Lord Jellicoe, immediatelybegan bringing their American naval representative upto speed on the situation in Europe. The British werevery eager to establish contacts with the U.S. Navy andmake it aware of the danger in the western approaches

56 Trask, 51. 57 Ibid., 56. 58 Ibid., 60. 59 Simpson, 6. 60 Ibid.

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Establishing Cooperation in Anti-SubmarineWarfare, April 1917-December 1917

The beginning stage of U.S. belligerency, whichlasted from April to July 1917, saw the entrance of theUnited States into the war and a massive push toshore up the Allies after the military hardships of 1916and against the possibly fatal threat of the Germansubmarine campaign to the war effort in Europe. TheAllies, and the British especially, were in rough shapedue to the heavy shipping losses caused primarily byGerman submarines. Allied shipping had lost 500,000tons in February, 500,000 tons in March and 200,000tons in the first ten days of April.51 This meant that theU-boats were sinking roughly a quarter of all shipsleaving Britain.52 The most disturbing fact for theAllies, however, was that only ten per cent of thetonnage was being replaced by production.53 TheUnited States’ preparedness was also a major concernfor its British ally. The British expected massivereinforcements from the United States, but the U.S.fleet was in no position for full mobilization. Near theeve of the U.S. entry into the war the Navy wasunprepared, with “only 10 per cent of its ships fullymanned and only one-third were ready for service.”54

The fleet contained an impressive 74 destroyers whichcould have been used for anti-submarine work, butonly 54 of them were actually modern and capable ofanti-submarine activities.55 Also, it was not until

51 Trask, 65. 52 Simpson, 23. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid., 10. 55 Ibid.


March 23 that Daniels was ordered to “add 87,000men to the Navy.”56 The fact that President Wilson wasstill hopeful for a peaceful solution to the conflict withGermany and his insistence on armed neutralityprevented the Navy from preparing until very close tothe actual declaration of war. However, the UnitedStates Department of the Navy had begun cooperationwith the Royal Navy on March 20, 1917, and by March24 a general plan of integration was drawn up whichemphasized the establishment of U.S. anti-submarineforces in Southern Ireland.57 It should beacknowledged, however, that “no mature plans wereconcreted nor consolation had taken place with theEuropean Allies before April 6.”58 The Germans weredoing well in this period, and they continued to growtheir submarine fleet to put pressure on the Allies.There were around 120 submarines in service with theGerman Fleet and this number was rising by aboutnine a month, given construction and casualties.59

This meant that submarine threat would only begrowing in the critical months ahead. Everything theBritish tried failed to have an impact on the rising tollof shipping.60

When Sims arrived in London on April 7, 1917, theAdmiralty, under First Sea Lord Jellicoe, immediatelybegan bringing their American naval representative upto speed on the situation in Europe. The British werevery eager to establish contacts with the U.S. Navy andmake it aware of the danger in the western approaches

56 Trask, 51. 57 Ibid., 56. 58 Ibid., 60. 59 Simpson, 6. 60 Ibid.

19




to the British Isles. In his first cable to Sims, Jellicoereveals how glad he was to be working with an officerwhom he knew; he stated that “I feel sure that we shallbe able to establish close co-operation between the twocountries so far as naval matters are concerned.”61

This first encounter boded well for Anglo-Americancooperation against submarines in Europe. Two daysafter receiving Sims, Jellicoe sent out a memorandumto the April 10 Hampton Roads conference in theUnited States which enumerated the necessary stepsfor defeating the submarines, including protectingmerchant vessels, sending anti-submarinereinforcements, and bringing captured Germanmerchant vessels unto the service of the Allies.62 TheHampton Roads conference was considered a success,and the United States agreed to send 6 destroyers tothe Irish coast, although it would take time for theU.S. Navy to get going.63 The early diplomatic missionthat Britain sent to the United States proved to be akey part in getting that nation on a war footing, butlater it would take U.S. missions to Europe to bringthe two nations into complete cooperation in anti-submarine activities.

Sims was quickly integrated into the Admiralty’sheadquarters in order to give the U.S. the best possiblefeel for the dire shipping situation. Sims’sunprecedented access to British information isreflected in his cable to Daniels on April 19, 1917.Sims told the Admiralty that he needed completeaccess to all the information pertaining to the naval

61 Ibid., 29. 62 Ibid., 30-31. 63 Trask, 63.


situation, and this was granted.64 Sims notes hisexclusive status in the Admiralty when he states that“I have daily conferences with the First Sea Lord, bothat his office and residence, and also have been givenentire freedom of the Admiralty and access to allGovernment Officials.”65 The fact that Sims wasprovided so much access and attention seems toindicate that the British may have been feelingsomewhat desperate and were willing to do whateverwas necessary to obtain the reinforcements needed intheir anti-submarine operations. This is a greatexample of how necessity, created by severe shippinglosses, was a major driving factor in the establishmentand growth of Anglo-American cooperation. Sims alsoemphasizes what would come to be one of the mostimportant concepts of the cooperation: “the criticalarea in which the war’s decision will be made is in theeastern Atlantic at the focus of all lines ofcommunication.”66 At this point Sims knew thateverything would hinge on keeping the sea lanes safeand preventing the Allies from being cut off by thesubmarines. Much of the coming months would bespent trying to convince the Navy Department inWashington of this vital requirement. This importantcable was preceded by others which raised the alarmin the United States, such as his April 14 cable whichstated that “To accelerate and insure defeat of thesubmarine campaign, immediate active cooperationabsolutely necessary” and that this required “Maximum number of destroyers be sent, accompanied

64 Simpson, 38. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid.

20




to the British Isles. In his first cable to Sims, Jellicoereveals how glad he was to be working with an officerwhom he knew; he stated that “I feel sure that we shallbe able to establish close co-operation between the twocountries so far as naval matters are concerned.”61

This first encounter boded well for Anglo-Americancooperation against submarines in Europe. Two daysafter receiving Sims, Jellicoe sent out a memorandumto the April 10 Hampton Roads conference in theUnited States which enumerated the necessary stepsfor defeating the submarines, including protectingmerchant vessels, sending anti-submarinereinforcements, and bringing captured Germanmerchant vessels unto the service of the Allies.62 TheHampton Roads conference was considered a success,and the United States agreed to send 6 destroyers tothe Irish coast, although it would take time for theU.S. Navy to get going.63 The early diplomatic missionthat Britain sent to the United States proved to be akey part in getting that nation on a war footing, butlater it would take U.S. missions to Europe to bringthe two nations into complete cooperation in anti-submarine activities.

Sims was quickly integrated into the Admiralty’sheadquarters in order to give the U.S. the best possiblefeel for the dire shipping situation. Sims’sunprecedented access to British information isreflected in his cable to Daniels on April 19, 1917.Sims told the Admiralty that he needed completeaccess to all the information pertaining to the naval

61 Ibid., 29. 62 Ibid., 30-31. 63 Trask, 63.


situation, and this was granted.64 Sims notes hisexclusive status in the Admiralty when he states that“I have daily conferences with the First Sea Lord, bothat his office and residence, and also have been givenentire freedom of the Admiralty and access to allGovernment Officials.”65 The fact that Sims wasprovided so much access and attention seems toindicate that the British may have been feelingsomewhat desperate and were willing to do whateverwas necessary to obtain the reinforcements needed intheir anti-submarine operations. This is a greatexample of how necessity, created by severe shippinglosses, was a major driving factor in the establishmentand growth of Anglo-American cooperation. Sims alsoemphasizes what would come to be one of the mostimportant concepts of the cooperation: “the criticalarea in which the war’s decision will be made is in theeastern Atlantic at the focus of all lines ofcommunication.”66 At this point Sims knew thateverything would hinge on keeping the sea lanes safeand preventing the Allies from being cut off by thesubmarines. Much of the coming months would bespent trying to convince the Navy Department inWashington of this vital requirement. This importantcable was preceded by others which raised the alarmin the United States, such as his April 14 cable whichstated that “To accelerate and insure defeat of thesubmarine campaign, immediate active cooperationabsolutely necessary” and that this required “Maximum number of destroyers be sent, accompanied

64 Simpson, 38. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid.

21




by small anti-submarine craft.”67 This cable alsoreveals how desperate the British were to bring theUnited States into the war which made them extremelyaccommodating and spurred cooperation.

In early May 1917, Admiral Sims was placed incommand of the contingent of Destroyers that hadarrived in Queenstown, Ireland on May 4.68 Therelationship that developed between the commander ofthe Queenstown base, Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, andSims would prove to be one of the most unique andconstructive of the naval war. Sims’ initial encounterwith Bayly did not bode well for their time together inSouthern Ireland and Sims remembered in an Augustletter to Captain Pratt, the Naval Department’s Chief ofStaff, that “when Bayly came to the Admiralty I wasinvited of course to meet him in Admiral Jellicoe’soffice. On that occasion he was as rude to me as oneman can well be to another.”69 Sims described howAdmiral Jellicoe had been horrified by Bayly’s behaviorand even noted that “when he had gone AdmiralJellicoe apologized to me, and said that he wouldremove the Admiral if I thought it was necessary.”70

Sims said that it would not be necessary but thisepisode reveals just how willing the British were toensure that the U.S. presence in the westernapproaches was established. This is a perfect exampleof necessity facilitating close cooperation.

On May 4, 1917 the first flotilla of U.S. destroyersarrived in Queenstown and Sims soon followed to take

67 Ibid., 207. 68 Trask, 77. 69 Simpson, 251. 70 Ibid.


command of the U.S. contingent. This trip provedextremely important because both the U.S.commander and the flotilla made a fine firstimpression. Sims reported on the arrival of the U.S.contingent in a May 11 cable to Daniels, when hestated that “speaking generally, the impression madeby our officers and our ships has caused very favorablecomment both at their base and in the Admiralty.”71

The warm reception that the Destroyer crews receivedand the state of their ships and fighting spirit did a lotto foster positive relations between Anglo-Americanforces in the most important sector of naval war. Simsmade sure that the flotilla under his commandconducted itself properly when he sent out orders onApril 29 that read, “Require all officers not only torefrain from all criticism of British methods, mannersand customs, and ask them to refrain from mentioningthem in their letters. Also give attention to bringingabout friendly relations between our enlisted men andthe British.”72 Sims’ relationship with Bayly improvedvery quickly. A little more than a week after theprevious cable to Daniels, May 26, 1917, he reportedthat “Vice-Admiral commanding at Queenstown, SirLewis Bayly, is one of the wisest, ablest men of myacquaintance, as well as one of the most admirablecharacters, and it is a positive pleasure to serve underhim.”73 And, more importantly, Sims also noted that “Iam aware that I have his complete confidence.”74 Theinteraction between Bayly, Sims and the U.S. and

71 Ibid., 221. 72 Ibid., 214. 73 Ibid., 224. 74 Ibid.

22




by small anti-submarine craft.”67 This cable alsoreveals how desperate the British were to bring theUnited States into the war which made them extremelyaccommodating and spurred cooperation.

In early May 1917, Admiral Sims was placed incommand of the contingent of Destroyers that hadarrived in Queenstown, Ireland on May 4.68 Therelationship that developed between the commander ofthe Queenstown base, Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, andSims would prove to be one of the most unique andconstructive of the naval war. Sims’ initial encounterwith Bayly did not bode well for their time together inSouthern Ireland and Sims remembered in an Augustletter to Captain Pratt, the Naval Department’s Chief ofStaff, that “when Bayly came to the Admiralty I wasinvited of course to meet him in Admiral Jellicoe’soffice. On that occasion he was as rude to me as oneman can well be to another.”69 Sims described howAdmiral Jellicoe had been horrified by Bayly’s behaviorand even noted that “when he had gone AdmiralJellicoe apologized to me, and said that he wouldremove the Admiral if I thought it was necessary.”70

Sims said that it would not be necessary but thisepisode reveals just how willing the British were toensure that the U.S. presence in the westernapproaches was established. This is a perfect exampleof necessity facilitating close cooperation.

On May 4, 1917 the first flotilla of U.S. destroyersarrived in Queenstown and Sims soon followed to take

67 Ibid., 207. 68 Trask, 77. 69 Simpson, 251. 70 Ibid.


command of the U.S. contingent. This trip provedextremely important because both the U.S.commander and the flotilla made a fine firstimpression. Sims reported on the arrival of the U.S.contingent in a May 11 cable to Daniels, when hestated that “speaking generally, the impression madeby our officers and our ships has caused very favorablecomment both at their base and in the Admiralty.”71

The warm reception that the Destroyer crews receivedand the state of their ships and fighting spirit did a lotto foster positive relations between Anglo-Americanforces in the most important sector of naval war. Simsmade sure that the flotilla under his commandconducted itself properly when he sent out orders onApril 29 that read, “Require all officers not only torefrain from all criticism of British methods, mannersand customs, and ask them to refrain from mentioningthem in their letters. Also give attention to bringingabout friendly relations between our enlisted men andthe British.”72 Sims’ relationship with Bayly improvedvery quickly. A little more than a week after theprevious cable to Daniels, May 26, 1917, he reportedthat “Vice-Admiral commanding at Queenstown, SirLewis Bayly, is one of the wisest, ablest men of myacquaintance, as well as one of the most admirablecharacters, and it is a positive pleasure to serve underhim.”73 And, more importantly, Sims also noted that “Iam aware that I have his complete confidence.”74 Theinteraction between Bayly, Sims and the U.S. and

71 Ibid., 221. 72 Ibid., 214. 73 Ibid., 224. 74 Ibid.

23




British crews formed the foundation of Anglo-Americanoperational cooperation for the rest of the conflict.Sims and Bayly eventually created a strange buteffective joint command system that Sims notes he wasunwilling to change in August 1917 due to theeffectiveness of the relationship. The diplomatic movespromoted by Sims and the officers under his commandcreated an atmosphere of brotherhood between theanti-submarine forces in Southern Ireland that wouldserve the Allies well when the convoy system waseventually implemented. Even before Sims’ May 11cable was sent the anti-submarine forces had anadvanced base established in Berehaven and werebeginning to utilize the newest anti-sub weapon, thedepth charge.75

Not long after the United States joined the waragainst Germany, the Admiralty began to realize thatit would have to employ a new anti-submarinestrategy. This led to the creation of the convoy systemwhich would prove key to defeating the submarine andwas the U.S. Navy’s largest contribution to the wareffort. The push for a convoy system began on April 26,1917 when Admiral Sir Alexander L. Duff, AdmiralBayly’s superior, recommended convoys as a countermeasure to unrestricted submarine warfare.76 All inthe Admiralty agreed that this would require theassistance of the United States since Britain’s fleet wasalready stretched to the limit. Both Bayly and Simswere proponents of the convoy system, and in a April30 cable to Daniels, Sims stated that the convoysystem was being examined by the Admiralty and that

75 Ibid., 221-222. 76 Trask, 26.


it would involve one escort to protect merchant vesselsin the open ocean crossing and then a destroyer escortwhen the vessels entered the danger zone aroundSouthern Ireland.77 The most important point thatSims made in this cable his statement stated that“This plan would require us to furnish some escortvessels and additional vessels on this side and wouldnecessitate abandonment of present patrol againstraiders.”78 Basically, this meant that the U.S. wouldhave to put an end to its East Coast patrols whichwere supposed to protect against possible, and highlyunlikely, U-boat attacks in the western hemisphere.The estimated need for this operation was put forwardin a May 1 Admiralty memorandum which noted thatthe experimental convoy would require 14 escortvessels and 18 destroyers.79

June proved to be a rocky month for the anti-submarine forces in European waters since thesubmarine campaign continued, but the convoy trialproved effective. By June 1 the United States had sent24 destroyers to Queenstown.80 The success of theconvoy experiment program laid the foundation forgreater implementation in the months to come.81 OnJune 14 Sims suggested that all Allied traffic movetoward being convoyed.82 In a June 14 cable he notedthat the “British are in process of changing fromprevious methods of handling shipping to the convoysystem” and that “Every indication points to the

77 Simpson, 215. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid., 216. 80 Trask, 77. 81 Ibid., 78. 82 Ibid.

24




British crews formed the foundation of Anglo-Americanoperational cooperation for the rest of the conflict.Sims and Bayly eventually created a strange buteffective joint command system that Sims notes he wasunwilling to change in August 1917 due to theeffectiveness of the relationship. The diplomatic movespromoted by Sims and the officers under his commandcreated an atmosphere of brotherhood between theanti-submarine forces in Southern Ireland that wouldserve the Allies well when the convoy system waseventually implemented. Even before Sims’ May 11cable was sent the anti-submarine forces had anadvanced base established in Berehaven and werebeginning to utilize the newest anti-sub weapon, thedepth charge.75

Not long after the United States joined the waragainst Germany, the Admiralty began to realize thatit would have to employ a new anti-submarinestrategy. This led to the creation of the convoy systemwhich would prove key to defeating the submarine andwas the U.S. Navy’s largest contribution to the wareffort. The push for a convoy system began on April 26,1917 when Admiral Sir Alexander L. Duff, AdmiralBayly’s superior, recommended convoys as a countermeasure to unrestricted submarine warfare.76 All inthe Admiralty agreed that this would require theassistance of the United States since Britain’s fleet wasalready stretched to the limit. Both Bayly and Simswere proponents of the convoy system, and in a April30 cable to Daniels, Sims stated that the convoysystem was being examined by the Admiralty and that

75 Ibid., 221-222. 76 Trask, 26.


it would involve one escort to protect merchant vesselsin the open ocean crossing and then a destroyer escortwhen the vessels entered the danger zone aroundSouthern Ireland.77 The most important point thatSims made in this cable his statement stated that“This plan would require us to furnish some escortvessels and additional vessels on this side and wouldnecessitate abandonment of present patrol againstraiders.”78 Basically, this meant that the U.S. wouldhave to put an end to its East Coast patrols whichwere supposed to protect against possible, and highlyunlikely, U-boat attacks in the western hemisphere.The estimated need for this operation was put forwardin a May 1 Admiralty memorandum which noted thatthe experimental convoy would require 14 escortvessels and 18 destroyers.79

June proved to be a rocky month for the anti-submarine forces in European waters since thesubmarine campaign continued, but the convoy trialproved effective. By June 1 the United States had sent24 destroyers to Queenstown.80 The success of theconvoy experiment program laid the foundation forgreater implementation in the months to come.81 OnJune 14 Sims suggested that all Allied traffic movetoward being convoyed.82 In a June 14 cable he notedthat the “British are in process of changing fromprevious methods of handling shipping to the convoysystem” and that “Every indication points to the

77 Simpson, 215. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid., 216. 80 Trask, 77. 81 Ibid., 78. 82 Ibid.

25




desirability of adopting the convoy system for all trafficand particularly from our North Atlantic ports.”83 Tothis he added “… I cannot lay too much stress uponthe urgent necessity of increasing the destroyer andother patrol forces here with utmost dispatch.”84 Simsemphasized the offensive potential of the convoyduring the month of June due to the fact that many inWashington either did not believe in the system orwanted to try bolder actions such as attacking welldefended submarine bases. Sims defended the convoywell in a June 16 cable to Daniels when he stated that“This convoy system is looked upon as an offensivemeasure.”85 He also explained the advantages of theconvoy by explaining that “If shipping were grouped inconvoys the enemy would be forced to seek us, therebyimposing upon him the necessity of dispersing hisforces, [so] as to locate us, while on the other hand, weobtain the benefit of the principle of counter attack onhis dispersed line.”86 Even after these explanations,Daniels and Admiral William S. Benson, Chief of NavalOperations, still viewed arming merchant vessels as aviable solution to the submarine. The presence of U.S.vessels and introduction of the convoy system seem tohave had some effect on the submarine campaignsince sinking statistics began a downward trend. InMay 600,000 tons were lost and in June 700,000 tonsof shipping were lost.87 This was down from thehighest month of losses of April which had over900,000 tons lost. The trend seemed to be reversing to

83 Simpson, 228. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid., 229. 86 Ibid. 87 Trask, 81.


a certain degree but it would be some time beforelosses would fall below the monthly Allied productionof new tonnage.

The months of July through September wouldprove to be some of the most important months in thewhole naval conflict due to the fact that the Alliesbegan an implementation of the convoy system and thesubmarine campaign came to its climax with the longdays and good weather of late summer. By the end ofJuly there were 37 U.S. destroyers in the Europeantheatre.88 However, the U.S. Department of the Navyand British Admiralty continued to disagree on whatconstituted the best anti-submarine strategy, andSims constantly complained that bettercommunications needed to be established. The mainproblem in the summer was getting the NavyDepartment in Washington on board with theAdmiralty’s plan for a complete convoy system in andout of the warzone around Great Britain. In a June 29cable, Jellicoe stated that “I am convinced convoysystem is a necessity and only method left to us.”89 Healso noted that full implementation of the systemwould require 50 cruisers and 80 destroyers whichmeant that the United States would have to pitch in.90

However, Admiral Benson, the U.S. Chief of NavalOperations, was still not sold on the convoy system. Ina July 1 cable, Commodore Sir Guy Gaunt, the BritishNaval liaison officer in Washington, informed Jellicoethat he “Just discussed your and Sims’ cable of thelast three days with Admiral Benson. He is still

88 Simpson, 201. 89 Ibid., 233. 90 Ibid.

26




desirability of adopting the convoy system for all trafficand particularly from our North Atlantic ports.”83 Tothis he added “… I cannot lay too much stress uponthe urgent necessity of increasing the destroyer andother patrol forces here with utmost dispatch.”84 Simsemphasized the offensive potential of the convoyduring the month of June due to the fact that many inWashington either did not believe in the system orwanted to try bolder actions such as attacking welldefended submarine bases. Sims defended the convoywell in a June 16 cable to Daniels when he stated that“This convoy system is looked upon as an offensivemeasure.”85 He also explained the advantages of theconvoy by explaining that “If shipping were grouped inconvoys the enemy would be forced to seek us, therebyimposing upon him the necessity of dispersing hisforces, [so] as to locate us, while on the other hand, weobtain the benefit of the principle of counter attack onhis dispersed line.”86 Even after these explanations,Daniels and Admiral William S. Benson, Chief of NavalOperations, still viewed arming merchant vessels as aviable solution to the submarine. The presence of U.S.vessels and introduction of the convoy system seem tohave had some effect on the submarine campaignsince sinking statistics began a downward trend. InMay 600,000 tons were lost and in June 700,000 tonsof shipping were lost.87 This was down from thehighest month of losses of April which had over900,000 tons lost. The trend seemed to be reversing to

83 Simpson, 228. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid., 229. 86 Ibid. 87 Trask, 81.


a certain degree but it would be some time beforelosses would fall below the monthly Allied productionof new tonnage.

The months of July through September wouldprove to be some of the most important months in thewhole naval conflict due to the fact that the Alliesbegan an implementation of the convoy system and thesubmarine campaign came to its climax with the longdays and good weather of late summer. By the end ofJuly there were 37 U.S. destroyers in the Europeantheatre.88 However, the U.S. Department of the Navyand British Admiralty continued to disagree on whatconstituted the best anti-submarine strategy, andSims constantly complained that bettercommunications needed to be established. The mainproblem in the summer was getting the NavyDepartment in Washington on board with theAdmiralty’s plan for a complete convoy system in andout of the warzone around Great Britain. In a June 29cable, Jellicoe stated that “I am convinced convoysystem is a necessity and only method left to us.”89 Healso noted that full implementation of the systemwould require 50 cruisers and 80 destroyers whichmeant that the United States would have to pitch in.90

However, Admiral Benson, the U.S. Chief of NavalOperations, was still not sold on the convoy system. Ina July 1 cable, Commodore Sir Guy Gaunt, the BritishNaval liaison officer in Washington, informed Jellicoethat he “Just discussed your and Sims’ cable of thelast three days with Admiral Benson. He is still

88 Simpson, 201. 89 Ibid., 233. 90 Ibid.

27




opposed to convoys and strongly in favor of armedmerchant vessels.”91 The divide between the NavyDepartment and the naval forces in Europe wasprimarily the result of distance and communicationsproblems but it also stemmed from the fact that manyin Washington were still suspicious of Britishintentions in the naval arena.92 Much of this stemmedfrom anger over the blockade during U.S. neutralitywere it was perceived that Britain was using the war togain trade advantages.93

From the Allied vantage point in Europe the wareffort was in a very dangerous place due to the factthat continued heavy losses from the submarineswould eventually take them below the tonnage neededto supply the fronts and their economies. Simsunderstood this situation well and endlessly proddedthe Navy Department for a more rapid response. In aJuly 3 cable to the sympathetic Captain Pratt at theNavy Department Sims noted that the Allies required32,000,000 tons of shipping per year to supply theirneeds and that “when it falls below [that], it will bewholly impossible to maintain this population and tomaintain the armies in the front.”94 In plain languageSims confided that “The truth of the matter is that theenemy is winning the war.”95 One of the main reasonsthat the Navy Department was not acting quickly onthese concerns was the conviction that Sims and Pagewere pawns of the British and not to be takenseriously. Sims tried to remedy the situation by asking

91 Ibid., 234. 92Hendrick, vol. 2, 284. 93 Ibid. 94 Simpson, 37. 95 Ibid., 238.


in a September cable for a naval officer fromWashington to come and assess the situation.96 In hisbook, Captains and Cabinets: Anglo-American NavalRelation 1917-1918, David Trask notes that “TheBritish Government shared Sims’ desire to enhanceWashington’s grasp of the European situation, everyday realizing more clearly that before that the outcomeof the war would probably depend upon theeffectiveness of the American reinforcement.”97

After practically a whole month of Sims, Page, andJellicoe calling for greater cooperation, the Wilsonadministration decided to send Admiral Henry T.Mayo, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, to aconference with the Allies.98 The conversation betweenthe British and Americans focused around the anti-submarine campaign and different operations thatwere being considered such as the North Sea barrage,attacks on sub bases, and a possible close-inblockade. Meeting with Admiral Sir Eric Geddes, whowas now the First Sea Lord, convinced Mayo of theimpracticality of attacks on sub bases and close-inblockading action and, more importantly, it convincedthe Admiral of the need to use patrol craft in theconvoys. The meeting was not a complete gamechanger, but Trask makes a keen observation that it“was a useful step toward fuller coordination of theinter-Allied naval effort, and stimulated more activityin the United States.”99 The meeting really moved theNavy Department and Admiralty toward complete

96 Trask, 138. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid., 149. 99 Ibid., 153.

28




opposed to convoys and strongly in favor of armedmerchant vessels.”91 The divide between the NavyDepartment and the naval forces in Europe wasprimarily the result of distance and communicationsproblems but it also stemmed from the fact that manyin Washington were still suspicious of Britishintentions in the naval arena.92 Much of this stemmedfrom anger over the blockade during U.S. neutralitywere it was perceived that Britain was using the war togain trade advantages.93

From the Allied vantage point in Europe the wareffort was in a very dangerous place due to the factthat continued heavy losses from the submarineswould eventually take them below the tonnage neededto supply the fronts and their economies. Simsunderstood this situation well and endlessly proddedthe Navy Department for a more rapid response. In aJuly 3 cable to the sympathetic Captain Pratt at theNavy Department Sims noted that the Allies required32,000,000 tons of shipping per year to supply theirneeds and that “when it falls below [that], it will bewholly impossible to maintain this population and tomaintain the armies in the front.”94 In plain languageSims confided that “The truth of the matter is that theenemy is winning the war.”95 One of the main reasonsthat the Navy Department was not acting quickly onthese concerns was the conviction that Sims and Pagewere pawns of the British and not to be takenseriously. Sims tried to remedy the situation by asking

91 Ibid., 234. 92Hendrick, vol. 2, 284. 93 Ibid. 94 Simpson, 37. 95 Ibid., 238.


in a September cable for a naval officer fromWashington to come and assess the situation.96 In hisbook, Captains and Cabinets: Anglo-American NavalRelation 1917-1918, David Trask notes that “TheBritish Government shared Sims’ desire to enhanceWashington’s grasp of the European situation, everyday realizing more clearly that before that the outcomeof the war would probably depend upon theeffectiveness of the American reinforcement.”97

After practically a whole month of Sims, Page, andJellicoe calling for greater cooperation, the Wilsonadministration decided to send Admiral Henry T.Mayo, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, to aconference with the Allies.98 The conversation betweenthe British and Americans focused around the anti-submarine campaign and different operations thatwere being considered such as the North Sea barrage,attacks on sub bases, and a possible close-inblockade. Meeting with Admiral Sir Eric Geddes, whowas now the First Sea Lord, convinced Mayo of theimpracticality of attacks on sub bases and close-inblockading action and, more importantly, it convincedthe Admiral of the need to use patrol craft in theconvoys. The meeting was not a complete gamechanger, but Trask makes a keen observation that it“was a useful step toward fuller coordination of theinter-Allied naval effort, and stimulated more activityin the United States.”99 The meeting really moved theNavy Department and Admiralty toward complete

96 Trask, 138. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid., 149. 99 Ibid., 153.

29




cooperation, “as far as the undersea war, theAdmiralty was committed to the convoy system.”100 TheMayo Mission and its conclusions is a great example ofhow a lack of other viable strategic options allowed theBritish and American forces to focus their attention onthe most important aspect of their joint operationswhich was protecting the lifelines of the allies byexpanding and reinforcing the convoy system. TheAllied losses during these months were quite high, butthey were also always lower than April, which wasremarkable given that the days were so much longerand sailing conditions were better. The losses at thattime were 558,000 tons in July, 812,000 tons inAugust and 352,000 tons in September.101 Oneimportant note about these casualties was that mostof this tonnage was replaced by production now thatthe U.S. economy was moving into full mobilization.102

Full Anglo-American cooperation in anti-submarinewarfare should probably not be considered completebefore the last three months of 1917. From Octoberthrough December 1917, the process of buildingcooperation between the two navies reached a levelwhere it would remain for the rest of the conflict. Thefinal organization of cooperation was a diplomaticdance that resulted in the foundation of the SupremeAllied War Council and, more importantly for anti-submarine warfare, the Allied Naval Council. AnOctober 28 memorandum summed up the situationwell when it implied that the “will to cooperate waspresent, but not the way” between the Navy

100 Ibid., 156. 101 Ibid., 134. 102 Ibid.


Department and the Admiralty.103 By October theAdmiralty and the Navy Department were still havingtrouble understanding one another. The situation wasimproved by the establishment of the Planning Sectionin London in November which “would allow Americanofficers to improve communication with theAdmiralty.”104 This council was a joint U.S. and Britishundertaking where officers would critically examinecurrent strategies and policies to insure effectiveness.Trask notes that the group “did exactly as desired,working in tandem with Admiralty planners, and madesignificant contributions to the Anglo-American effortduring the decisive stages of the war.”105 However,back in Washington, members of the administrationand Department of the Navy still harbored suspicionsof British activities.106

Page probably said it best when he stated that he“believed that ‘misunderstanding had arisen becausepersonal acquaintance and contact are lackingbetween naval authorities in Washington andLondon.’”107 This led Sims to request senioradministration and Naval Department officials to makea visit in an October 15 cable. The result was thatWilson sent Colonel House and Admiral Benson, bothof whom arrived on November 7, 1917. The Alliedconference that House and Benson had arrived toparticipate in was postponed until the end ofNovember due to the Bolshevik revolution and serious

103 Ibid., 165. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid., 166. 106 Ibid., 166-168. 107 Ibid., 168.

30




cooperation, “as far as the undersea war, theAdmiralty was committed to the convoy system.”100 TheMayo Mission and its conclusions is a great example ofhow a lack of other viable strategic options allowed theBritish and American forces to focus their attention onthe most important aspect of their joint operationswhich was protecting the lifelines of the allies byexpanding and reinforcing the convoy system. TheAllied losses during these months were quite high, butthey were also always lower than April, which wasremarkable given that the days were so much longerand sailing conditions were better. The losses at thattime were 558,000 tons in July, 812,000 tons inAugust and 352,000 tons in September.101 Oneimportant note about these casualties was that mostof this tonnage was replaced by production now thatthe U.S. economy was moving into full mobilization.102

Full Anglo-American cooperation in anti-submarinewarfare should probably not be considered completebefore the last three months of 1917. From Octoberthrough December 1917, the process of buildingcooperation between the two navies reached a levelwhere it would remain for the rest of the conflict. Thefinal organization of cooperation was a diplomaticdance that resulted in the foundation of the SupremeAllied War Council and, more importantly for anti-submarine warfare, the Allied Naval Council. AnOctober 28 memorandum summed up the situationwell when it implied that the “will to cooperate waspresent, but not the way” between the Navy

100 Ibid., 156. 101 Ibid., 134. 102 Ibid.


Department and the Admiralty.103 By October theAdmiralty and the Navy Department were still havingtrouble understanding one another. The situation wasimproved by the establishment of the Planning Sectionin London in November which “would allow Americanofficers to improve communication with theAdmiralty.”104 This council was a joint U.S. and Britishundertaking where officers would critically examinecurrent strategies and policies to insure effectiveness.Trask notes that the group “did exactly as desired,working in tandem with Admiralty planners, and madesignificant contributions to the Anglo-American effortduring the decisive stages of the war.”105 However,back in Washington, members of the administrationand Department of the Navy still harbored suspicionsof British activities.106

Page probably said it best when he stated that he“believed that ‘misunderstanding had arisen becausepersonal acquaintance and contact are lackingbetween naval authorities in Washington andLondon.’”107 This led Sims to request senioradministration and Naval Department officials to makea visit in an October 15 cable. The result was thatWilson sent Colonel House and Admiral Benson, bothof whom arrived on November 7, 1917. The Alliedconference that House and Benson had arrived toparticipate in was postponed until the end ofNovember due to the Bolshevik revolution and serious

103 Ibid., 165. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid., 166. 106 Ibid., 166-168. 107 Ibid., 168.

31




Italian defeats at Caporetto.108 This lull allowed theCommander of Naval Operations, Benson, to observethe situation from the European point of view, and“Three days after the mission reached Britain, AdmiralBenson took the first step toward general acceptanceof the naval viewpoint expressed by the BritishAdmiralty and Admiral Sims.”109 Benson’s visit toEurope may have been one of the most importantdevelopments of the House mission because hisunderstanding and assistance was required for theU.S. forces in Europe gain the full support of theDepartment of the Navy. The real clearing up ofmisunderstandings came about with the establishmentof the Supreme Allied War Council in late November.The Council consisted of the heads of government andsecondary representatives from Britain, France, Italy,and the United States.110 This move went a long waytoward clearing up the disconnection between manypolitical leaders and the militaries that served them.More importantly, however, was the creation of theAllied Naval Council which required all naval staffs toreport their general policies. The Allied Naval Councilhelped to get all the Allies on the same page in termsof naval operations and facilitated the extension of theconvoy system which would eventually defeat thesubmarine campaign. The Allied Naval Council wasofficially announced on December 14, 1917, and Simswas appointed as the U.S. representative on January8, 1918.111 The House Mission which culminated in the

108 Ibid., 175. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid., 176. 111 Ibid., 180.


creation of the Allied Naval Council was really the laststep taken into full cooperation. With the creation ofthe Allied Naval Council, all naval staffs begancoordinating policies and moved to a common strategyof anti-submarine convoys that would stave off defeatand ensure victory in the coming year.

Conclusion

The full cooperation and coordination thatcharacterized Anglo-American operations in anti-submarine warfare at the beginning of 1918 was notimmediately established with the entrance of theUnited States into World War I, but was developed overtime. The high level of cooperation was primarily theresult of diplomatic relations, severe Allied shippinglosses, and the lack of viable strategic alternatives tothe convoy system. Diplomatic movements had helpedto facilitate the cooperation as early as 1913, whenWalter Hines Page became the U.S. ambassador toBritain. Page helped the British government steerthrough the dangers of the blockade of Germany andAmerican neutrality. After the U.S. entered the war,Page continued to support the British and AdmiralSims in their campaign to convince the U.S. NavyDepartment of the need for a fully functional convoysystem. Admiral Sims’ arrival in April, 1917, and hisdiplomatic efforts with the Admiralty and theQueenstown anti-submarine forces, created a closeworking relationship between the British andAmerican anti-submarine forces. This relationshipallowed the two to call for the adoption of the convoysystem. Cooperation was finally completed inSeptember and November of 1917 when the Mayo and

32




Italian defeats at Caporetto.108 This lull allowed theCommander of Naval Operations, Benson, to observethe situation from the European point of view, and“Three days after the mission reached Britain, AdmiralBenson took the first step toward general acceptanceof the naval viewpoint expressed by the BritishAdmiralty and Admiral Sims.”109 Benson’s visit toEurope may have been one of the most importantdevelopments of the House mission because hisunderstanding and assistance was required for theU.S. forces in Europe gain the full support of theDepartment of the Navy. The real clearing up ofmisunderstandings came about with the establishmentof the Supreme Allied War Council in late November.The Council consisted of the heads of government andsecondary representatives from Britain, France, Italy,and the United States.110 This move went a long waytoward clearing up the disconnection between manypolitical leaders and the militaries that served them.More importantly, however, was the creation of theAllied Naval Council which required all naval staffs toreport their general policies. The Allied Naval Councilhelped to get all the Allies on the same page in termsof naval operations and facilitated the extension of theconvoy system which would eventually defeat thesubmarine campaign. The Allied Naval Council wasofficially announced on December 14, 1917, and Simswas appointed as the U.S. representative on January8, 1918.111 The House Mission which culminated in the

108 Ibid., 175. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid., 176. 111 Ibid., 180.


creation of the Allied Naval Council was really the laststep taken into full cooperation. With the creation ofthe Allied Naval Council, all naval staffs begancoordinating policies and moved to a common strategyof anti-submarine convoys that would stave off defeatand ensure victory in the coming year.

Conclusion

The full cooperation and coordination thatcharacterized Anglo-American operations in anti-submarine warfare at the beginning of 1918 was notimmediately established with the entrance of theUnited States into World War I, but was developed overtime. The high level of cooperation was primarily theresult of diplomatic relations, severe Allied shippinglosses, and the lack of viable strategic alternatives tothe convoy system. Diplomatic movements had helpedto facilitate the cooperation as early as 1913, whenWalter Hines Page became the U.S. ambassador toBritain. Page helped the British government steerthrough the dangers of the blockade of Germany andAmerican neutrality. After the U.S. entered the war,Page continued to support the British and AdmiralSims in their campaign to convince the U.S. NavyDepartment of the need for a fully functional convoysystem. Admiral Sims’ arrival in April, 1917, and hisdiplomatic efforts with the Admiralty and theQueenstown anti-submarine forces, created a closeworking relationship between the British andAmerican anti-submarine forces. This relationshipallowed the two to call for the adoption of the convoysystem. Cooperation was finally completed inSeptember and November of 1917 when the Mayo and

33




House missions established both military and, to acertain degree, political cohesion in the whole Alliednaval war effort. The resulting Supreme Allied WarCouncil and Allied Naval Council garnered Anglo-American cooperation in anti-submarine warfare thefull support it required from Washington. The loss ofmillions of tons of shipping between February andDecember, 1917, pushed the commanders in Europeto demand cooperation in the face of losing the war.Finally, the lack of immediately viable strategiesbesides the convoy system, which was revealed duringthe Mayo mission of September, 1917, enabled navalleaders to focus on the essential maintenance of theAllies’ lines of communication to the United States andthe rest of the world. Anglo-American cooperation inanti-submarine warfare in World War I, which wasunprecedented at the European operations level fromearly on, took almost nine months of diplomacy, severeshipping losses, and the exhaustion of most non-convoy related strategies to become the clearlyessential naval policy. In the end, once Anglo-American strategies were set, they maintained the vitalcommunications lines around the western approachesof Ireland and assured eventual victory for the Allies.

Sean Naumes graduated from Santa ClaraUniversity in the spring of 2013 with a Bachelors of Artsin History and a Bachelors of Science in Commerce inEconomics. He is also a Leavey Scholar and member ofPhi Alpha Theta and Eta Sigma Phi. This essay is acondensed version of his senior thesis, which wasawarded the Mehl Prize for best senior thesis of 2013 inthe History Department. He has been interested innaval history for quite some time and this analysis


developed out of research conducted on the Britishblockade of Germany during World War I for his HIST101 paper.

34




House missions established both military and, to acertain degree, political cohesion in the whole Alliednaval war effort. The resulting Supreme Allied WarCouncil and Allied Naval Council garnered Anglo-American cooperation in anti-submarine warfare thefull support it required from Washington. The loss ofmillions of tons of shipping between February andDecember, 1917, pushed the commanders in Europeto demand cooperation in the face of losing the war.Finally, the lack of immediately viable strategiesbesides the convoy system, which was revealed duringthe Mayo mission of September, 1917, enabled navalleaders to focus on the essential maintenance of theAllies’ lines of communication to the United States andthe rest of the world. Anglo-American cooperation inanti-submarine warfare in World War I, which wasunprecedented at the European operations level fromearly on, took almost nine months of diplomacy, severeshipping losses, and the exhaustion of most non-convoy related strategies to become the clearlyessential naval policy. In the end, once Anglo-American strategies were set, they maintained the vitalcommunications lines around the western approachesof Ireland and assured eventual victory for the Allies.

Sean Naumes graduated from Santa ClaraUniversity in the spring of 2013 with a Bachelors of Artsin History and a Bachelors of Science in Commerce inEconomics. He is also a Leavey Scholar and member ofPhi Alpha Theta and Eta Sigma Phi. This essay is acondensed version of his senior thesis, which wasawarded the Mehl Prize for best senior thesis of 2013 inthe History Department. He has been interested innaval history for quite some time and this analysis


developed out of research conducted on the Britishblockade of Germany during World War I for his HIST101 paper.

35



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