Themes and Variations of the Complex of Reality

8/3/2019 Themes and Variations of the Complex of Reality

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ONTHE FOURTHEMESAND VARIATIONSOFTHE COMPLEXOF REALITY

For the man who has tasted the serious will no longerrelish the comic, especially when it is of a tedious nature.

(WWv2xxvi)

Contemporary philosophers pay little or no attention to many problems that once puzzled

the greatest of scholars. Uncontested, science has grown so expansive that scholars no longer

rack their minds over good old-fashioned philosophical problems. Perhaps that is why interest in

questions of space and time has fizzled out in the philosophical world, to such an extent that

students of philosophy are more likely to find stimulating advanced discourse on such topics at

physics forums rather than in philosophy classrooms. The advances made in quantum physics

overshadow the great philosophical systems that dealt with the questions of space, time, and

causality, notwithstanding that many philosophical issues are still open to debate. After all,

metaphysics takes up where physics ends.

The philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer is arguably the most noteworthy of all classical

treatments of space, time, and causality, due to its systematic completeness, clarity, and wealth

of ideas. In his earliest studies, Schopenhauer introduced a wildly interesting idea: the complex

of reality. Time, space, and causality, form a matrix governed by the universal and necessary

formulas creating the empirical world. Schopenhauer states:

The empirical representations, belonging to the ordered and regulated

complex of reality appear in both forms simultaneously; in fact, an

intimate union of the two is the condition of reality. To a certain extent,

reality grows out of them as a product out of its factors. What produces

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this union is the understanding which, by means of its own peculiar

function, combines those heterogeneous forms of sensibility so that from

their mutual interpenetration, although only for the understanding itself,

there arises empirical reality as a general and comprehensive

representation. This creates a COMPLEX, held together by the forms of

the principle of sufficient reason, yet with problematic limitsThus in a

word, this entire, objective, real world exists for us in this complex.

Although, the objective real world exists for us in this complex, the complex, as such, is

not a single representation; it is a matrix within which there emerge the possible representations

of space, time, causality and will, that constitute our various real world experiences. There are

four different categories of experience, each of which grows out of a uniquely defined form of

the complex of reality: empirical reality, abstract knowledge and self-consciousness, mystical

experience, and aesthetic experience. Any sort of experience must fall within one of the four

categories. There are no exceptions: that is to say; any alleged experience outside of the four

categories is unjustifiable.

Through participation in each of the categories, the individual enters a different stage of

knowledge, starting with knowledge under the service of the will and ending in pure will-less

knowledge. Knowledge under the service of will is limited by the particular will and belongs to

it; pure will-less knowledge, although it exists only momentarily, is free from the particularities

of the will; consequently it captures complete objectivity. The knowledge that exists in relation

to the particularities of will is motive-orientated, making it subjective and ego dominated.

Empirical reality is the category furthest from pure will-less knowledge; aesthetic experience is

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the closest to pure will-less knowledge. Therefore, as when scaling any ladder, this exposition

must start at the bottom rung.

FIRSTCATEGORY: EMPIRICALREALITY

Schopenhauer begins his magnum opus, The World as Will and Representation with the

following sentence: The world is my representation: this a truth valid with reference to every

living and knowing being, although man alone can bring it into reflective, abstract

consciousness. (WWv1p3) This sentence sums up half of Schopenhauers system and represents

the starting point at which to begin deconstructing the category empirical reality. Following

this lead, one must first ask the question: what is knowledge? Knowledge is mainly

representation. What is representation? Schopenhauer describes representation as a complex

physiological occurrence within an animals brain, creating a mental picture thereof.

(wwv2p191)

Knowledge divides into inner and outer sensibility. Outer sensibility is empirical reality,

the outside world of phenomena, and the material, physical realm. Outer experience or empirical

reality must operate under the three forms: time, space, and causality. The complex must be

present in order to create the proper environment for bringing outer experience to fruition. If

time were the only form of the phenomenal world there would be no coexistence. There is no

coexistence in time because time is linear and one-dimensional. Proof of this is the fact that our

thoughts occur one at a time, linearly and as if pushed along a straight line, rather than

simultaneously with other thoughts. Schopenhauer explains:

Only one distinct representation can be present to the subject at any one time,

although such a representation may be very complex. Representations are

immediately present implies that they not only become the complete and

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comprehensive representations of empirical reality in the union of time and space

effected by the understanding, but are known as representations of the inner sense

in mere time, and indeed at the neutral point between the two diverging directions

of these, which is called the present.

For Schopenhauer, cognition is necessarily linear, in that it is subject to the form of time and

consequently only one representation at a time is possible. In space, there is coexistence without

succession and in time, there is succession without coexistence. Linear modes of thought are

therefore chainlike in structure, in that each representation links back to previous representations.

The empirical world is therefore a slideshow, in which, the pictures change at such a fast rate as

to form a continuum.

The world as we know it becomes possible only with the union of space; the primary

form of the outer sense, and time; the primary form of the inner sense. If space were the only

form of the phenomenal world there would be coexistence, but no succession. Time is

inextricably linked to succession. This is why arithmetic is a science of pure time, while

geometry is a science of pure space. Schopenhauer makes this point clear in chapter six of The

Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. He states:

All counting depends on this nexus of parts of time, and its words serve

merely to mark the single stages of succession; consequently the whole of

arithmetic depends on it, a science that teaches nothing but methodical

abbreviations of countingThe whole of geometry also rests on the nexus of

the position of the parts of space. (p197-198)

For Schopenhauer, as with most idealists, the empirical world is merely a picture or

reflection of the thing-in-itself, the ideal and not the real. Therefore, Schopenhauer claims that

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we know an eye that sees a sun and not the sun itself. This applies to all representations

without any exception. Representations do not exist independently from the individual; in fact,

representations are wholly dependent on the conscious mind for which they appear.

Schopenhauer examines one of the more popular arguments against the idealist

standpoint. Does an individuals existence depend on their representation in anothers

consciousness? One can imagine total isolation and absence from any other persons

consciousness, but this does not entail ones non-existence. Ones existence is independent of

consciousness, or at least the consciousness of others. Schopenhauer objects to this claim by

introducing the concept of subject object division:

That other being, whose object I am now considering my person to be, is not

absolutely the subject, but is in the first instance a knowing individual. Therefore,

if he too did not exist, in fact, even if there existed in general no other being

except myself, this would still by no means be the elimination of the subject in

whose representation alone all objects exist. (WW v2. P6)

He states that the individual is not only an object filling space, but also primarily knowing

subject. The individual does not cease to exist when absent from the conscious mind of another

person. The individual is both knower and known, subject and object wrapped up into one

complete package. Why would an individual need the conscious mind of another when they

have a mind of their own? Like any other object, the human form is an object suspended in

space; except, that the latter has the distinctive capacity to function as both knower and known.

In other words, the complex of reality is part of each object independent of any other object.

Existence depends on the individuals consciousness, not on the consciousness of another

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individual. In fact, it is a phenomenon of the brain, no matter whether the brain in which it

exhibits itself belongs to my own person or to anothers. (WWv2 p.6)

Considering this approach it might seem difficult to imagine any sort of empirical reality.

However, the external world maintains its objectivity due to the law of causality and the faculty

of understanding. Following Kant, Schopenhauer makes it clear that the individual can never

reach knowledge of the thing-in-itself by using the causal law because the causal law deals

exclusively with changes in the physical world. The causal law is responsible for making

objectivity possible, and without it the empirical world would lose all objectivity. For

Schopenhauer, the empirical world is completely intellectual, which is why Schopenhauer

claims that the world of representation as it appears to the conscious mind is product of

perception and not of the senses.

Schopenhauer distinguishes between sensation and perception. The senses supply only

the raw material and not the finished product. In this sense, the faculty of understanding

orchestrates with assistance from the law of causality the shift from raw sensation to refined

perception. Schopenhauer outlines this Kantian epistemological conclusion in a long but

powerful paragraph:

One must be forsaken by all the gods to imagine that the world of intuitive

perception outside, filling space in its three dimensions, moving on in the

inexorably strict course of time, governed at each step by the law of causality that

is without exception that such a world outside had an entirely real and

objective existence without our participation, but then found its way into our

heads through mere sensation, where it now had a second existence like the one

outside even in the noblest organs of sense it is nothing more than a local

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specific feeling, capable in its way of some variation, yet in itself always

subjective sensation remains an event within the organism but as such it is

restricted to the region beneath the skin; and so, in itself, it can never contain

anything lying outside the skin and thus outside ourselves yet it remains

sensation, like every other within our body; consequently it is something

essentially subjective whose changes directly reach our consciousness only in the

form of the inner sense and hence of time alone, that is to say successively

Sensations are to perceptions as the individual notes are to symphonies. This conclusion further

proves the ideality of empirical reality and the many changes it undergoes before it comes to

fruition in consciousness. Schopenhauer repeatedly states that the senses merely supply the

data, immediately handed over to the faculty of understanding, and only then converted into

intuitive perception.

The understanding gathers the data passed on from the senses, designates every change as

an effect and links it together with its cause. Schopenhauer says that physiologically the brain

creates perception, but actually it is the faculty of the understanding employing the a priori

complex (space, time, and causality) that puts together empirical reality. Without the faculty of

understanding and the law of causality, the empirical world would be little more than what

Nietzsche called an anarchy of atoms. Take for example the sense of sight. Schopenhauer

claims the understanding has a fourfold purpose in organizing the sense of sight. Firstly, the

understanding flips the reversed image upright. Secondly, the understanding transposes the

doubled image into one single and seamless image. Thirdly, the understanding creates bodies

from their surfaces. Fourthly, the understanding recognizes distance.

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Outer perception, otherwise known as the world of representation, is completely

intellectual, but does the will make its way into the world of representation?

Perhaps this is an appropriate time to introduce the role of the will and its relationship to the

world of representation.

All matter is will, or rather, all matter whether organic or inorganic is the objectification

of will. Schopenhauer means by objectification that all matter, from the smallest particle to the

largest galaxy, from a bacterium to a man, is manifestation of one and the same will. That is

because matter, in addition to being for others, must also be being-in-itself, which Schopenhauer

designates as will. If matter were simply being-for-others, then the empirical world would lose

any sense of reality and fade away into phantasmagoria. Following this line of thought, one

easily slips headlong into a solipsistic trap.

Yet the perceived object must be something in itself, and not merely

something for others; for otherwise it would be positively only

representation, and we should have an absolute idealism that in the end

would become theoretical egoism, in which all reality disappears, and the

world becomes a mere subjective phantasm. (WWv1. Pg 193)

In other words, the will (being-in-itself) is the root of all phenomena and the underlying element

of all matter. The will is real and the phenomenal world is ideal; without the real, everything

remains ideal. At bottom, Schopenhauer characterizes the will as mainly will-to-live, in as

much as, all matter or phenomena spring naturally towards life and existence.

Empirical reality is the category furthest from pure will-less knowledge, because the

representation, which makes up empirical reality, is totally subjective. Schopenhauer states, the

world is my representation not the world is our representation, because each individual paints

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their own picture of existence. This is not to say, that each experience is so totally different as to

be incapable of cohering with others. It is rather that no two individuals experiences are exactly

alike or homogenous.

In addition, that which the individual perceives is merely phenomenal and therefore only

the objectification of will. If the thing-in-itself were completely empirical then it would no

longer be in-itself. Instead, it would be a being for others. This poses a problem through

empirical knowledge, the three forms, and the will, the individual can never reach the thing-in-

itself. It merely skates across the surface of existence.

SECOND

CATEGORY

: ABSTRACT

KNOWLEDGE

AND

SELF

- CONSCIOUSNESS

1

Self-consciousness, or the inward observation of our will, is different from empirical

reality in that it is free from the forms of space and causality and government by the will and

only subject to the form of time. Proof of this is apparent in that the monologue of our self-

conscious reverie is not physically extended in space. However, the inner sense is not totally

separated from empirical reality. Concepts the main tool of the inner sense, borrow their content

from the world of representation. This leads us to the question as to how representations lead of

concepts.

The faculty of reason organizes the content supplied by empirical reality, just as the

faculty of understanding shapes the world of phenomena. However, when and how does

knowledge change from perception into abstract knowledge? Or put it differently, how does

knowledge pass over from immediate representations to abstract concepts? Cognition seems too

fluid and seamless to contain so many dead ends and reversals of direction. Even Schopenhauer

recognizes the peculiarity of this shift and on numerous occasions even refers to it as

mysterious. In a beautiful passage, he describes the shift thusly:

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As from the direct light of the sun to the borrowed reflected light of the moon, so

do we pass from the immediate representation of perception, which stands by

itself and is its own warrant, to reflection, to the abstract, discursive concepts of

reason, which have their whole content only from that knowledge of perception,

and in relation to it. (WWv1. P35)

By concept, Schopenhauer refers to a special class of representations. Concepts do not

just emerge immediately in the conscious mind; rather concepts are merely, representations of

representations. Their content derives from representations belonging to the first class of the

principle of sufficient reason: intuitive, perceptive, complete, empirical representations. As

Schopenhauer says; The abstract representation has its whole nature simply and solely in its

relation to another representation that is its ground of knowledge. The individuals mind would

undergo sensory overload were it to retain every minute detail of experience. Instead, the faculty

of reason changes the form of knowledge from the empirical to the abstract. Much is lost in the

abstractification process and ultimately for very good reason. Schopenhauer describes the

abstractification process as getting rid of unnecessary baggage, or even to working with extracts

instead of the plant species themselves, with quinine instead of bark. (PSR p151) One would

never be able to link concepts together if one were to retain every detail of every experience. In

effect, the faculty of reason screens and locates the major elements of intuitive perceptions.

This is why we remember only the crucial elements of our childhood and not the meaningless

events.

Concepts borrow material from empirical reality and in essence are empty until filled

with empirical residue. Schopenhauer describes this as reasons femininity. He claims the

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faculty of understanding is masculine and the faculty of reason is feminine. The former supplies

data rather than receiving data. The latter (reason) can only supply data until it has received

data. The faculty of reason is wholly empty in itself, until the understanding passes over the

intuitive perception.

Once the faculty of understanding passes intuitive perception over into the faculty of

reason, it begins the shift from the empirical to the abstract. In other words, reason allocates

concepts that symbolize experience and then designates words to describe the concepts.

Language plays an important role in Schopenhauers philosophy because language helps the

faculty of reason complete the abstractification process. Hence, animals lacking the capacity for

language also lack the capacity for reason, because concepts rely on words to describe their

meaning. It is hard to imagine building concepts out of anything other than words.

Schopenhauer describes language as inadequate, in the sense that words and hence concepts can

never supply the real meaning of the empirical perceptions they represent.

Words and concepts will always be barren and dry, for this is their nature. It

would be foolish to hope and expect that words and the abstract idea could

become and fulfil that which the living intuitive perception was and fulfilled, a

perception which evoked the idea. The thought itself is only the mummy of the

perception and the words are the lid of the sarcophagus. Here we have the limit

of mental communication; it excludes the best. But words and concepts, dry as

their communication was, help us to understandthat which we subsequently

perceive just as the botanists tin box for plants is itself of lifeless metal, but

enables him to take home and preserve the flowers that he finds. (MR v3 p24)

Language serves its purpose and no more. It can only preserve an experience.

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As I previously stated, concepts do not exist independently. They refer back to the

intuitive perceptions that make up empirical reality; in the case of reflection, they refer back to

other concepts as their ground of knowledge. A certain class of concepts relates directly to

intuitive perceptions and another class relates indirectly.

Concepts connected with perceptions through other concepts are called abstracta.

Concepts connected directly to intuitive perception are called concreta. The former class of

concepts links indirectly to intuitive perception and consequently they come to fruition through

the medium of other concepts. Schopenhauer describes the concepts of relation, virtue,

investigation, beginning as abstracta. It is apparent that the concept of relation remains empty

unless thought through another concept. However, concepts in concreta link directly to intuitive

perception. The concepts man, stone, horse are examples of concepts in concreta.

Schopenhauer notes that the class of concepts called concreta is only figurative, in that, as

concepts they are necessarily abstract. This last name, however, fits the concepts denoted by it

only in quite a figurative way, for even these too are always abstracta, and in no way

representations of perception. Therefore, these concepts are never completely direct.

That a concept includes abstract representations or representations of perceptions is a

secondary quality and not inherent to the concepts themselves. Schopenhauer describes this

quality as accidental, but yet necessary, in that the possibility of multiple relations must remain

open. The concept- sphere may include other concepts because of their connection with intuitive

perception. One representation may bring to fruition several concepts.

Thus a concept has generality, not because it is abstracted from several objects,

but conversely because generality that is to say, non-determination of the

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particular, is essential to the concept as abstract representation of reason; different

things can be thought through the same concept. Pg 42 wwv1

Schopenhauer describes this as the concepts range. He states that the concepts outermost

sphere relates back to the sphere of other concepts. The sphere of these other concepts relates

back to the spheres of others. Schopenhauer defines judging as the ability to demonstrate the

relations between different concepts.

However, our thinking process is not solely concept juggling, and for Schopenhauer there

are many levels of thinking. The concept gains substance from intuitive perception. Our thought

patterns, however, do not crystallize in the form of concepts. In forming conclusions, we can

compare concepts, but this is not practical. Schopenhauer claims that judging consists of

comparing two concepts, and inference consists of comparing two judgments. Judgments are

more complete than concepts, in that no conclusion can be drawn from concepts. It is only with

the judgment that conclusions can be drawn. The chain of conclusions and inferences revolve

around the sphere of judgments. Schopenhauer designates the syllogism as the model for our

conclusion-making ability. He dedicates a whole chapter on the science of syllogisms, thereby

proving the great importance he places on this aspect of his philosophy. He states that when

forming conclusions we primarily compare two judgments with a third judgment formed

independent from any outside information. There are certain conditions through which we form

these syllogisms: the two judgments must have at least one concept in common, or else, there is

no apparent link to join them together. Then by the power inherent in the faculty of reason, and

performed by its judging capacity, one combines two separate concepts into a conclusion.

Therefore, one foresees the conclusion when forming premises leading to the conclusion. This is

beneficial because one comes to closer terms with ones conclusion making and inferential

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capability. One gains a more intimate knowledge of their thinking pattern by realizing that the

conclusion one is trying to prove influences the premises that lead to the conclusion.

Schopenhauer says:

The nature of the inference or conclusion consists in our bringing to distinct

consciousness the fact of having thought already in the premises the statement of

the conclusion. Accordingly it is a means of becoming more distinctly conscious

of our own knowledge, of getting to know more fully, or becoming aware of what

we know. (wwr v2 p108)

This realization is not immediate and Schopenhauer claims that two premises can reside in a

mans head for many years without leading to a conclusion. Then out of the blue, when the

right major hits the right minor a conclusion is born. The possibility of forming such

conclusions remains latent within the individual until the right circumstances bring the concepts

together. The individual and their pursuit in finding a solution to a problem direct the form of

thinking discussed previously. However, there is another level from which we can examine

thinking and therefore another question that needs attention. What directs the association of

ideas?

Schopenhauer admits that mankind only knows a shallow layer of consciousness, and that

beyond this shallow layer there resides a mystical and illusive core. He claims every idea that

comes to consciousness links back to empirical data and explains that the cases which seem as

though they arise out of thin air are delusions, in that the occasions that spawn such ideas get

overshadowed by the idea itself.

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Self-consciousness, the means through which the individual comes to know the inner

stirrings of the will, is different from abstract knowledge in that it is closer to the mystical and

illusive core. Schopenhauer says:

Through the preponderating intellect that here appears, not only are the

comprehension of the motives, their multiplicity and variety, and generally

the horizon of the aims infinitely increased, but the distinctness with

which the will is conscious of itself is also enhanced in the highest degree,

in consequence of the clearness of the whole consciousness which has

come about. This clearness, supported by the capacity for abstract

knowledge, now reaches complete reflectiveness. (pg 280 ww v2)

Through the intellect, plus self-consciousness, our passions and urges take on a deeper meaning,

in that the individual comes to gain the ability to reflect upon them. However, the passions and

urges themselves are more direct, whereas reflection and introspection are indirect. Passions are

direct because they represent merely whether the circumstance is in agreement with the will, or

whether or not it goes against the will. The will is the primary element of self-consciousness and

therefore, any sort of impression on the will appears directly to self-consciousness. Therefore,

various feelings, i.e., love, hatred, fear, etc; seem so much closer to the individuals inner being.

In addition, once feelings are cognized and the individual begins reflecting upon them,

they lose all immediacy and directness. Language is always cumbersome and many times the

most sublime feeling loses all greatness while the individual tries formulating an expression of it.

Due to these factors, abstract knowledge and self-consciousness remain far from

representing pure will-less knowledge and, in effect, this form of knowledge remains under

service of the will. As I have repeatedly said, the will is the primary element in self-

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consciousness and therefore every inner reflection is motive-oriented for the sake of the will, and

therefore remains intractably subjective. The game we are hunting is pure will-less knowledge,

in other words, objectivity.

THIRD CATEGORY: MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE2

In man there is to be found a cognitive faculty which as a rule remains hidden

and is different from the ordinary cerebral faculty, and to this extent there

accrues to it a kind of omniscience, when it is not impeded by restrictions of

time and space, but knows what a very remote, long past, or in the future, just

as we know what is real and present. We first become acquainted with it from

experiments which clairvoyant somnambulists give of it, and also from

prophetic dreams and the like. [for the rest of the passage refer to mr v4 pg

336]

The third category is one of the more interesting and least explored categories. However,

in the past its interestingness is commonly lost in its complexity. In thefirst category we find

the complex of reality in the form of space, time, causality, and will. In thesecond category

we find it in the form of time, and will. In the third category we find the complex of reality in

the form of causality and will. Experiences of this sort last shortly and have their own unique

qualities.

For Schopenhauer, instances such as clairvoyant and deuteroscopic experiences originate

out of a secret or hidden cognitive faculty, not the ordinary faculty described in the first

category. The hidden cognitive faculty conveys into the brain those items that the will is

specifically interested in having appear there. Why does the will want the brain to have these

particular items of knowledge? The intellect is in servitude to the will and therefore the will

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controls the direction of our thoughts. At bottom, the individual knows the will as the basic

feelings, weal and woe. Knowledge supplied by the hidden category is in the interest of the will

because as with all knowledge, it refers back to the individuals well being.

Knowledge of this sort is free from the forms of space and time, and consequently it can

refer back into the past and forward into the future. Knowledge of the past made visible usually

takes the form of spirit apparitions and other related phenomena, and knowledge of the future is

emblemised in the cases of clairvoyant somnambulism and deuteroscopy. The combination of

the hidden cognitive faculty with knowledge free of time and space gives privileged intellects

the chance to foresee future events. However, knowledge of this sort does not merely appear to

the individual rather, the will uses an object of intuition or perception as a symbol calling to

mind the particular thought.

By this point, the reader probably feels deserted, completely helpless, and left asking

himself -How does the individual cognize future events? The answer to this question actually

takes us back to the first category. For Schopenhauer, our existence is completely determined;

our entire life is mapped out prior to our existence. This is so because the physical world is

governed by the principle of sufficient reason and the law of causality. Every event links

together and refers back to a previous cause; thus creating a chain of events. This chain extends

infinitely into the past and future, making existence in this respect not cyclical, but linear. The

linearity of existence and its deterministic nature makes possible the ability to foreshadow events

and recall long past experiences. Knowledge free from the limitations of space and time makes it

possible for the individual to travel back and forth on the timeline of reality. Certain people have

an enhanced ability to transcend cognitively into the distant future, i.e., somnambulists and

clairvoyants. Consider these rare cases as flipping ahead several pages through the book of

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reality. Of course, the time traveler has to return to the present moment, and in so doing, the

complex of reality takes on an altogether different form.

If existence were not determined, any knowledge of the future would be completely

impossible, and as we have seen special cases that fall under the third category validate this

supposition. As special as this class might be, the knowledge it supplies still does not represent

pure will-less knowledge, although it reaches closer to objectivity than either the first or second

category. True, this variation of the complex of reality is free from both time and space.

However, all cases of this special knowledge refer directly back to the will.

FOURTH

CATEGORY

: AESTHETIC

EXPERIENCE

Having finally arrived at the ladders last rung, we realize the fourth category is different

from the previous ones, in that knowledge breaks away from will rather than the forms of space,

time, and causality. Schopenhauer outlines two forms of knowledge: knowledge under servitude

of the will and knowledge free of such servitude.

Knowledge under servitude of the will is subjective, motive-oriented, and totally

dependent upon its relationship to the will. All knowledge of this sort refers back to the

individuals personal aims and well being.

The brain, together with the nerves and the spinal cord attached to it, is a

mere fruit, a product, in fact a parasite, of the rest of the organism, in so far

as it is not directly geared to the organisms inner working, but serves the

purpose of self-preservation by regulating its relations to the external world.

(wwv2p201)

The will is concerned with nothing other than the individual and therefore any knowledge related

to the will is thwarted and inaccurate. As I argued, knowledge of this sort never reflects the

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being-in-itself, only the phenomenal appearance. In addition, knowledge under servitude of the

will apprehends mainly relations between not only the individuals will and the external world,

but also various and different objects that make up the external world. Through each of these

relations, the individual perceives the empirical world against the backdrop of the will and since

the will is involved, knowledge of this kind remains irremediably subjective. In this respect,

Schopenhauer calls the will the antagonist of knowledge. Why does he say this? Listen to his

answer: The will is the root of the intellect and is opposed to every activity of the intellect

which is directed to anything other than its own aims. (wwv2p381) Egoistic motives spring

forth from the will creating a diaphanous haze clouding the path to objectivity. In effect, the

more conscious we are of ourselves the less conscious we are of other things. The brilliance of

this claim grows increasingly apparent when turned on its head The less conscious we are of

our selves the more conscious we are of other things. This brings us to knowledge free from

servitude of the will.

On the other side of the spectrum, knowledge free from servitude of the will epitomizes

pure objective knowledge without any reference to the will and hence to the individuals; well

being. Schopenhauer considers such experiences to be aesthetic, meaning brief moments of

freedom from the will. Brief, that is, until the intellect surrenders and the nefarious will regains

controls.

However, during this brief moment of freedom the knowledge that spills forth captures

the essential and universal aspect of existence. Schopenhauer designates the Platonic Ideas 3as

the paradigmatic of such epistemic spillage. He describes the Ideas as the permanent,

unchangeable forms, independent of the temporal existence of individual beings. (wwv2idea)

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Such works are usually the product of genius and any genuine work of art must encapsulate the

Platonic Ideas.

Confirming his reputation as the father of pessimism, Schopenhauer concludes that

even the aesthetic experience does not represent the thing-in-itself, viz., they represent their

objective character, and thus always only the phenomenon. The aesthetic moment is not only

brief , but also inadequate and therefore the thing-in-itself still remains hidden.

Nevertheless, how does the process ofideification extract the universal and essential

aspects of experience? For Schopenhauer and myself, the change that occurs during aesthetic

experience is both metaphysical and physiological. Metaphysical, because, such experience

results result from an act of self-denial, one in which the intellect, which is usually the lesser,

overpowers the will. Schopenhauer states:

To this extent it consists in knowledge turning away entirely from

our own will, and thus leaving entirely out of sight the precious

pledge entrusted to it, and considering things as though they could

never in any way concern the will. For only thus does knowledge

become pure mirror of the objective inner nature of things.

By Physiologically, Schopenhauer includes such experiences that result from a strong

excitation of the brains perceptive power without any inclination or motive. Schopenhauer

weeds out such cases as those induced by mind-altering substances, such as opium or alcohol.

Let us not think here of alcoholic drinks or of opium, on the

contrary, what is required is a peaceful nights sleep, a cold bath 4,

and everything that furnishes brain-activity with an unforced

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ascendancy by a calming down of the blood circulation and of the

passionate nature.

Perhaps, if Schopenhauer tried opium or drank alcohol he would have thought differently. I

firmly believe consciousness expansion allows for a heightened sense of awareness and

ultimately the chance to perceive in depth objective reality.

An experience minus inclinations or motives requires along with a heightened sense of

awareness the complete separation of will from knowledge. The I or ego must withdraw in

order for the intellect to capture the objective element of existence. For Schopenhauer, examples

of pure will-less knowledge are apparent in genuine and true works of art, music being the best

example of what Schopenhauer means.

Such works produce an aesthetic feeling brought about through the quieting of the will,

which is the root cause of all suffering. The will is the source of all desire and sorrow and with

its withdrawal follows the temporary cessation of suffering. This accounts for the euphoric

feelings inspired by the great works of art, such as the Indian Upanishads the reading of which

had this quieting effect on Schopenhauer.

The aesthetic experience is the closest the individual gets to objective knowledge. Such

experiences are inaccessible to the normal mind and instead are primarily arrogated to

geniuses. Ultimately, some people exist without ever perceiving the objective side of nature. It is

not unreasonable to believe that such people do not even think twice about their deficiency. As

is well known, Schopenhauer considered himself such a genius a title he richly deserved.

Through the four categories, we have come to realize that the world and all its different

experiences are merely different forms of the complex of reality. The first category is different

from the second and the second is different from the third, yet each category relates back to the

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empirical and therefore the first category. Although this is merely a snippet of Schopenhauers

system, I think the four variations on the complex of reality enable us to understand his system

and also explain it. This vision of Schopenhauers is unique and as far as I know there has never

been a systematic exposition of Schopenhauers philosophy organized in such a manner.

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1 Abstract knowledge and self-consciousness fall under the second category because they both are part of the inner sense

and are subject to the form of time and free from causality and space. In addition, through concepts and the faculty of

reason, self-consciousness takes on a deeper meaning, in that, the individual can reflect upon their desires and strivings.The only difference is that self-consciousness is knowledge of the self while abstract knowledge deals primarily with

external knowledge.2 Disclaimer: It is not necessary for my purposes in this paper that the reader actually believe the ideas under this section. It

is sufficient to show that if these phenomena actually did occur, they would not (in spite of being mystical) lead to pure

will-less knowledge.3 For this very reason any translation of Schopenhauers, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung that is translated into TheWorld as Will and Idea is automatically, from the outset rendered, not only incorrect but charged with flagrant

misunderstanding of the whole meaning of Schopenhauers system. Schopenhauer states in numerous passages that hereserves the concept of Idea to primarily the Platonic eidos.4 The cold bath signifies a slowing down of the blood circulation, in turn limiting the chance of sexual arousal.

Schopenhauer considers sexual arousal as one of the most powerful means through which the will objectifies itself.

Schopenhauer characterizes the will as the will-to-live. The will-to-live is expressed through the sexual impulse and

therefore the path to objective knowledge is impossible during any type of sexual excitation. The cold bath is intended to

render the man impotent, or at least unable to perform.

Themes and Variations of the Complex of Reality

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