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THE USE OF NATIONAL POWER AS A STRATEGY IN COUNTERING ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE

Dr. Dini Dewi Heniarti Lecturer at Faculty of Law

Bandung Islamic University Indonesia

Abstract Strategic asymmetry uses some sort of difference to gain an advantage over an

adversary. Many of history greatest generals had an instinct for it. Like the US military in the Gulf War, Mongols under Genghis Khan and his successors often used superior mobility, operational speed, intelligence, synchronization, training and morale to crush enemies in lightning campaigns.There is more to precision than simply hitting the right target. Military strategists and commanders must think in terms of psychological precision as ell—structuring a military operation to shape the attitudes, beliefs and perceptions among the enemy and other observers, whether local noncombatants or global audiences.[Asymmetric approaches] generally seek a major psychological impact, such as shock or confusion, that affects an opponent.s initiative, freedom of action or will. Asymmetric methods require an appreciation of an opponent.s vulnerabilities. Asymmetric approaches often employ innovative, nontraditional tactics, weapons or technologies and can be applied at all levels of warfare strategic, operational and tactical and across the spectrum of military operations.

1 In

Indonesia there are various media used by these groups to take advantage of technology and information to be issues that could shake the dominance of the state and governance. This resistance was systemically in order to gain the hearts and minds of the people and can eventually destroy the country from within. It is convenient to organize the study of national power by distinguishing between natural and social determinants of power. The natural determinants (geography, resources, and population) are concerned with the number of people in a nation and with their physical environment. Social determinants (economic, political, military, psychological, and, more recently, informational) concern the ways in which the people of a nation organize themselves and the manner in which they alter their environment. In practice, it is impossible to make a clear distinction between natural and social elements. For instance, resources are a natural factor, but the degree to which they are used is socially determined. Population factors, in particular, cut across the dividing line between both categories. The number of people of working age in the population affects the degree of industrialization of a nation, but the process of industrialization, in turn, can greatly alter the composition of the population.

Keywords: national power; strategy; asymmetric warfare.

1Joint Strategy Review (Washington, DC: CJCS, 1999), 2.

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A. Back Ground Asymmetrical warfare is as old as

recorded history, and lessons have inevitably been learned at each stage of its evolution. Modern asymmetrical warfare has evolved primarily since thebeginning of the Cold War in the wake of World War II. The first major post-war insurgency ofnote occurred in Malaya where the British waged a twelve year counter-insurgency campaign (1948-1960). The British finally succeeded in putting down the insurgency by adopting of a joint civilian-military strategy that combined regaining and maintaining civil order with winning hearts and minds of non-combatant supporters of the insurgents.

2

Strategic asymmetry uses some sort of difference to gain an advantage over an ad- versary. Many of history’s greatest generals had an instinct for it. Like the US military in the Gulf War, Mongols under Genghis Khan and his successors often used superior mobility, operational speed, in- telligence, synchronization, training and morale to crush enemies in lightning campaigns. When necessary, the Mongols used superior Chinese engineer- ing for successful sieges. Other conquerors, such as the Romans, Europeans, Aztecs and Zulus, brought superior technology, discipline, training and leader- ship to the battlefield. Rebels in anticolonial wars also relied on asymmetry by weaving guerrilla operations, protracted warfare, political warfare and a willingness to sacrifice into Maoist People’s War, the Intifada and the troubles of Northern Ireland. Throughout the Cold War, asymmetry was important to US strategic thinking but was not labeled as such. Matching Soviet quantitative advantages in Europe with US and NATO qualitative superiority was integral to US strategy. Other concepts such as Massive Retaliation in the 1950s or the maritime strategy in the 1980s elevated asymmetry to an even higher plane.

3

A more general, complete definition of

2See Richard Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War:

The Emergency in Malaya, 1948-1960, 2nd ed.

(Cassell, 1967). 3 John Foster Dulles, “The Evolution of Foreign

Policy,” Department of State Bulletin, 25 January

1962, 107-10.

strategic asymmetry would be: In military affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, organizing and think- ing differently from opponents to maximize relative strengths, exploit opponents’ weaknesses or gain greater freedom of action. It can be political strategic, military strategic, operational or a com- bination, and entail different methods, technologies, values, organizations or time perspectives. It can be short term, long term, deliberate or by default. It also can be discrete or pursued in conjunction with symmetric approaches and have both psychologi- cal and physical dimensions. While the key idea is that significant differences exist, there are several elements of this definition that warrant elaboration. Dimensions of asymmetry. Strategic asymmetry can be positive or negative. Positive asymmetry uses differences to gain an advantage. Strategic asymmetry can be discrete or integratedwith symmetric techniques. Generally, only the most desperate antagonists would rely solely on asymmetric methods.

A. The Concept of Asymmetric Strategies Asymmetric strategy has been a

crucial concept in the decade follow- ing 9/11, yet it remains devilishly difficult to define.

Numerous attempts to define the concept are so broad that they approach the definition of strategy itself, severely limiting any practical utility.

4

Other commonly used definitions are narrower, but conflate large dif- ferences in the relative strength of the parties to a conflict and the strategies that those parties employ. In other words, these definitions seem to suggest that asymmetric strategy is almost anything that a weak actor might do when faced with a much stronger opponent, especially if that action is somehow surprising or creative: “Asymmetric warfare is violent

4 Richard Norton-Taylor, “Asymmetric Warfare,”

The Guardian, 3 October 2001, http://www.

guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/03/afghanistan.soci

alsciences (accessed June 16, 2011),

23

action undertaken by the ‘have-nots’ against the ‘haves’ whereby the have-nots, be they state or sub-state actors, seek to generate profound effects . . . by employing their own specific relative advan- tages against the vulnerabilities of much stronger opponents.

5

Asymmetric strategies are roughly akin to the Japanese martial art of jujutsu, which is based on the idea that an opponent’s strength and energy may be used against him rather than directly opposed with strength of one’s own. When facing a taller or stronger opponent, for example, a jujutsu practitioner is encouraged to view the opponent’s advantages in height and muscle mass as exploitable weaknesses, as they tend to produce a high center of gravity. Similarly, jujutsu practitioners use the very force that an opponent is able to put behind a punch in order to throw him to the ground, rather than blocking the blow and attempting to respond in kind. When properly defined and understood, asymmetric strategy is quite similar. In light of this understanding, we offer a definition of the concept: asymmetric strategies transform an adversary’s perceived strength into a vulnerability, often by revealing one’s own perceived vulnerability as a strength. Asymmetric strategy is an inherently relational art form one that often exploits an opponent’s mistaken perceptions about both the asymmetric actor and himself.

6 While commentators focus on

asymmetric strategies as the province of the weak, increasingly strong actors have begun deploying and employing these strategies, often to impressive effect. The next section examines how strong states such as China and Russia, or robust nonstate entities such as Hezbollah, have attempted to transform

5 Rod Thornton, Asymmetric Warfare: Threat and

Response in the 21st Century (Cambridge: Polity

Press, 2007), 1 6 Rod Thornton, , Ibid., 55.

their adversary’s perceived strengths into vulnerabilities by drawing on latent strengths of their own.The uncertainty that asymmetric strategies tend to produce make them deeply unsettling to their targets, leading to confusion about the relative strengths of adversaries, the viability of existing defenses, the utility of existing response options, and even the validity of the foundation of one’s own power. This power to unsettle and confuse a target may explain asymmetric strategies’ frequent association with terrorism, as the effects just described are precisely those terrorists seek when they launch their attacks. As we have seen, there is nothing about the motivations or relative weaknesses of terrorists that make them the exclusive or even most effective users of asymmetric strategy.

B. Dimensions of Asymmetry.

Organizations to act on a global scale. The negative effects of globalization have continued to create a large disenfranchised population primarily centered in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. This disenfranchised population has become the recruitment pool and their countries have become training bases for the networked terrorist and criminal who take advantage of the tools of globalization.

The same tools being used to advance world societies and economies can also be used to help destroy them. Benjamin Barber describes a world that is both coming together and falling apart in his book Jihad Against McWorld. He describes a world where the nation state is losing its influence and where the world is returning to tribalism, regionalism, and the ethnocentric warfare that characterized much of the earlier human history.

7 While some dispute Barber’s

assessment, it is clear that globalization may be contributing to as many problems as it is solving. While the world is becoming more

7 Barber, Benjamin, R, Jihad Vs. McWorld, Time

Books, New York, 1995,3-6.

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connected, it is not necessarily becoming better.

This problem is most apparent in the developing world where we continue to see the spread of disease, continuing humanitarian crisis, political and economic instability, and ethnic, tribal, civil, and drug related war. Global Trends 2015 believes globalization will have a negative impact because of “the adverse affects of globalization and insufficient attention to reform.

8 In Jihad Against McWorld, Benjamin

Barber describes globalization as “McWorld”, an environment “where by the onrush of economic and ecological forces that demand integration and uniformity and that mesmerize the world with fast music, fast computers, and fast food with MTV, Macintosh, and McDonald's, pressing nations into one commercially homogenous global network: one McWorld tied together by technology, ecology, communications, and commerce.

9 In Unrestricted Warfare the

authors state, “The general fusion of technology is irreversibly guiding the rising globalization trend, while the lobalization trend in turn is accelerating the process of the general fusion of technology, and this isthe basic characteristic of our age.

10

Globalization and technological advances have opened up a new era in warfare involving multiple actors. Indonesia as a sovereign state faces various threats

8 Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the

Future With Nongovernment Experts, National

Intelligence Council NIC 2002-02, December

2000, 5.

9 Th Dark Side of Globalization: United States Naval Institute Proceedings:

Annapolis, NOV 2001, 1. 10

Liang Qiao and Wang Xiangsui, Unresticted Warfare, PLA Litelature and Arts

Publishing House, Feb 1999.6119

Phing House, Feb 1999. 6119

from outside or from within the country, Globalization and technological advances have opened up a new era in warfare involving multiple actors. Indonesia as a sovereign state faces various threats from outside or from within the country, consciously or unconsciously from domestic threats continue to increase along with the rise of non-actors in the country that aims to narrow the space for the government, spreading the teachings of radical , the existence of the group, and aim to change the political ideology of the state with a particular ideology.

There are two major schools of thought on globalization. The first is that globalization is a progressive movement that will only increase opportunities and raise the standard of living worldwide---or more simply that globalization is inherently good. As nations, cultures, and people interact with each other, they are bound to become more culturally aware, and more apt to cooperate and solve problems in a way that is more mutually beneficial to all. The second school of thought is that globalization has further widened the gap between the have and have-nots of the world and that the information revolution simply allows the developed powers to flaunt this superiority on a global scale. The developed nations are not getting richer by helping the rest of the world develop through globalization, but rather by exploiting the developing world for their own benefit. We will examine these schools of thought in more detail below in order to analyze their effects on the rise of the global asymmetrical threat.The emergence of terrorist acts in Indonesia, indicating the presence of non-state actors who want aparticular purpose and against the state. Terrorism in Indonesia was almost as old as the founding of the republic later and became the international spotlight after the Bali bombings. There are also various separatist groups such as in Aceh by the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) and Papua by the Free Papua Movement

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(Organisasi Papua Merdeka). Indonesia face of threats from the

non- state actors in the country who have a desire to separate them form the Indonesian satate. Indonesia as a sovereign nation is also facing threats from state actors who are in the Asia Pacific region, although the prediction of future Indonesian nation will not experience aggression or military invasion massively from a country. But to watch is the emergence of the influences of the countries that can influence policy and governance from local to global level and did not perform the functions of government and the country as well.

Strategic asymmetry can be positive or negative. Positive asymmetry uses differences to gain an advantage. Negative asymmetry involves an opponents threat to ones vulnerabilities. Most Department of Defence (DOD) thinking about asymmetry focuses on its negative form Strategic asymmetry can also be short-term or long-term. Military history shows that sooner or later the enemy adjusts to many types of short-term strategic asymmetry. During World War II, for instance, blitzkrieg succeeded for a year or two until the Soviets found ways to counter it. It took longer, but Third World governments and their militaries eventually found counters to the Maoist Peoples War. China’s generating a second Cold War in the Asia Pacific. The pertinent observations that were made were: “China perceives the United States as the Number One Threat Projection and has been doing this for some time. ‘’Further that “This has led to US-China relations now bordering on volatility and uncertainty and do we see the beginning of a Cold War? The suspicions, the rhetoric and the brinkmanship resorted to by China in actions against the United States are reminiscent of the approaching stages of the First Cold War.” In most anticolonial wars or insurgencies, the less-advanced forces preferred to emulate the advanced ones. Mao Zedong held that guerrilla warfare was

seldom decisive but should be used as a preface for large-scale mobile war.

11

Strategic asymmetry can be low-risk or high-risk. Some forms of asymmetry such as superior training or leadership are time-tested. They may be costly to develop and maintain but seldom increase strategic or operational risk. The high cost of having a fully trained, equipped, ready force reduces risk even though it may not fully protect against all asymmetric actions such as the attack in Aden, Yemen. Just as most mutations in nature are dysfunctional or insignificant, many forms of strategic asymmetry are acts of desperation that do not work or only work temporarily.

Asymmetric strategies are typically conceptualized as weapons of the weak. Rod Thornton, for example, defines “the ‘asymmetric adversary’” as “the smaller, weaker protagonist.

12 Thornton’s voice is not

alone in this regard: while asymmetric strategies have received attention since at least 1995.

13 inter- est in the concept has

quite clearly surged since the attacks of 11 September 2001 and focused American attention on adversaries whose limited capabilities make them appear weak, at least in a traditional sense. It is not the inherent weakness of nonstate adversaries that qualifies them as asymmetric actors. Consider Thornton’s description of the “three major characteristics of the ‘new’ terrorists that need to be considered: their increased degree of fervor, their increased ability to implement attacks, and their increased ability to cause mass casualties.”

14

11

Mao Tse-Tung, .On Protracted War,. in Selected

Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Vol II (Peking: Foreign

Languages Press, 1967), 172. 12

Rod Thornton, Op.Cit.,1. 13

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the

Armed Forces of the United States (Washington,

D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), IV-10. 14

Rod Thornton, Asymmetric Warfare, Op.Cit.,27.

26

Strategic asymmetry can be discrete or integrated with symmetric techniques. Generally, only the most desperate antagonists would rely solely on asymmetric methods. Those who are capable integrate asymmetric and symmetric methods. Commonly, such integrated approaches are more powerful than strategies that rely solely on either symmetric or asymmetric methods.

Finally, asymmetry can be material or psychological. The two concepts are interrelated: a material asymmetric advantage often generates psychological advantages. But there have been states and militaries throughout history that were particularly adept at manipulating psychological asymmetry, often by propagating an image of fierceness. The Mongols, Assyrians, Aztecs and Zulus are examples of great conquerors who effectively combined material and psychological asymmetry. Their fierce image augmented advantages in training, leadership and doctrine. Often psychological asymmetry is cheaper than the material variant but is harder to sustain.asymmetry resides at the operational level of war.Historical examples include the Germans. use of submarine warfare to counterbalance the British advantage in capital ships; urban operations to counterbalance a military force with superior mobility; long-range fires in the battles for Stalingrad or Hue; guerrilla operations in an enemy.s rear area as an adjunct to conventional operations; Operation Bodyguard,the operational-level deception plan to support the Normandy invasion; and antiaccess or counterdeployment techniques using missiles, mines, terrorism and other weapons. Military-strategic asymmetry is an integrated military strategy based on asymmetry rather than using it as an adjunct to symmetric methods.

C. The Nature of Asymmetrical Warfare

Asymmetries in warfare include asymmetries of power, means, methods,

organization, values and time.15

Asymmetry can be participatory, technological, normative,doctrinal or moral.

16 Some of the

past efforts to define asymmetric warfare have not been very helpful in identifying the underlying problems. For instance, asymmetric warfare used to resources.

17

"War," wrote Carl Von Clausewitz, "is the continuation of politics by other means." Asymmetrical warfare refers to armed conflicts to achieve political objectives, and as the name implies, involves a disproportionate distribution of power. Unlike most conventional warfare, it is usually (though not always) initiated by the weaker side. Perhaps the first question that needs to be addressed, therefore, is why rational persons who are overwhelmingly outclassed militarily would resort to armed conflict. One popular explanation commonly heard is that asymmetrical combatants are either mentally deranged, morally depraved, or a combination of both. That notion has been rejected by social science research on asymmetrical behavior. Simply stated, the psychology behind unsanctioned lethal violence "is normal psychology, abnormal only in the intensity of the group dynamics that link causes with comrades.

18

As for moral depravity, a case can be made that asymmetrical combatants tend to be among the most fanatically moralistic people on earth. Asymmetrical warfare is generally a strategy of last resort, and those

15

Toni Pfanner, Asymmetrical Warfare from the

Perspective of Humanitarian Law and

Humanitarian Action International Review Of

The Red Cross. 16

Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and

International Humanitarian Law, in International

Humanitarian Law Facingnew Challenges 11, 16

(Wolff Heintschel vonHeinegg et al. eds., 2007). 17

Thaza V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War

Initiation By Weaker Powers 20 (1994). 18

. Clark R. McCauley, "The Psychology of

Terrorism," in Social Science Research

Council/After September 11 Essays.

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who engage in it are convinced that their political ends are so morally imperative that they justify whatever means are necessary to achieve them Another explanation, often applied to Islamic Jihadism, is that the extremist ideology espoused by asymmetrical organizations is itself a primary motivating factor in convincing people to commit evil, immoral lethal acts by imbuing them with hatred toward the perceived enemy. The fallacy here is that hostility (hatred) is rarely if ever created by indoctrination of an extremist ideology unless there is a predisposition to want to believe it. According to social psychology, fear and grievance, not dogma, are the two root causes of anger which for some can lead over time to hostility. In seeking an outlet for that hostility, some people ultimately resort to committing lethalviolent acts. The role of ideology, therefore, is more often to justify rather than to motivate people to commit otherwise criminal and anti-social behavior. In addition, virtually all major political ideologies, sectarian as well as secular, present a wide array of peaceful as well as violent alternatives.

19

Thus, one cannot adequately understand why people engage in lethal asymmetrical acts by analyzing asymmetrical ideologies since the factors that motivate people to embrace this or that ideology lie outside as well as inside the parameters of ideological precepts. In sum, one does not normally "learn" hostility from exposure to extremist dogmas. The initial stage is developing a predisposition to commit violence in response to the fears and grievances, regardless of their source. A major source of fear and grievance is future shock, particularly in traditional societies. The rapid pace of modernization in recent years, accelerated by unprecedented advances in

19

Marc Gopin, From Eden to Armageddon: The

Future of World Religions, Violence, and

Peacemaking (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2000).

communications and information technology and by economic and social globalization is universal. It has been particularly disorienting and stressful to members of traditional societies. The spread of secular western cultural values that inevitably accompany rapid modernization is particularly threatening to people whose cultural norms are based on religious values that have remained unchanged for centuries.

Those who harbor a high degree of fear, grievance and hostility as a result of future shock constitute a major pool of potential recruits and supporters for asymmetrical organizations. And once they are convinced that outside powers are the underlying source of all their grievances, the indiscriminate use of counter force by those powers is more likely to strengthen rather than undermine participation and support, even among those not personally prone to violence themselves. Identifying and reaching out to members of this group, therefore, is a major priority for asymmetrical organizations seeking to gain recruits as and supporters without whom they cannot long survive.

Group psychology can also play an important role in motivating people to join asymmetrical organizations. Many combatants have already bonded before joining an asymmetrical organization. In addition, as Clark McCauley notes, "Group identification makes sense of sacrifice by people who are not frustrated or insulted.

20

Moreover, asymmetrical organizations often tend to develop fanatical countercultures with their own codes of behavior that tend to be on the fringe of what is normally acceptable, and into which all new recruits are indoctrinated.

D. Asymmetrical Strategic Objectives

20

Clark McCauley, "Psychological Issues in

Understanding Terrorism and Response to

Terrorism," in Bruce Bongar, et al., Psychology of

Terrorism (Oxford, 2007), 17.

28

Although all armed political conflicts have much in common, their strategic objectives can differ widely. The primary strategic objective of asymmetrical warfare is psychological, not military. It is to intimidate the adversary psychologically by directly or indirectly inflicting fear and terror in order to achieve its political agenda. In more descriptive terms, it is, "the combined use and threat of violence that is directed at one set a targets the victims to compel compliance or allegiance from another set of targets (targets of demands) or to impress a wider audience that is not directly involved in a specific conflict (the mass media, the general public, world opinion, other governments, etc.)"

21

Asymmetrical combatants generally use covert terrorist and unconventional guerrilla warfaretactics and seek to avoid direct military encounters with the adversaries' vastly superior armed forces. This is in sharp contrast to conventional military warfare strategies that involve direct military-on-military confrontations with the strategic objective being to erode the enemy forces' will to fight, and thereby to produce decisive military victories that can force the defeated side to accept the victors' terms. The second but vital strategic objective in asymmetrical warfare is to win the hearts and minds of potential sympathizers and supporters, thereby gaining financial and logistic support, safe haven, and the ability to recruit new combatants. No asymmetrical organization or movement can long survive much less achieve its political objectives without a significant outside support system.

E. Organizational and Operational Scope

Asymmetrical warfare organizations come in all sizes, from small independent

21

Ronald D. Crelinsten, "Terrorism,

Counterterrorism and Democracy: The Assessment

of National Security Threats," in Terrorism and

Political Violence I, No. 2 (April 1989): 242-269.

local groups to large multi-national operational organizations and support networks, terrorist and insurgency support groups. All asymmetrical organizations share the same basic psychological strategic objectives and the same predilection for the use of covert, unconventional military tactics. Where they might differ is in the scope of operations.

There are two general types of organizational structures: individual terrorist attacks and broader insurgencies. Although the latter are generally carried out by larger dissident national or subnational organizations, asymmetrical organizations can be involved in both terrorist and insurgent operations. For example, al-Qaeda is a large multi-national terrorist organization that has undertaken individual terrorist attacks in the United States, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, but has also been active in insurgency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan where the principal political objective is regime change. If successful to the degree that asymmetrical combatants can challenge a regime militarily, the nature of the conflict changes from asymmetrical warfare to conventional military warfare. It might still involve unconventional military tactics, but the combatants will have adopted conventional strategic military objective of destroying the enemy forces' will to fight.

Insurgency is perhaps the iconic asymmetric strategy and has proven highly effective at inverting the strengths of even the world’s most powerful militaries. States have long used insurgency by proxy as a means to harass an adversary; such tactics were common during the Cold War and currently are employed in a number of locations. As a strategy to be utilized directly by a state in a military confrontation with another, insurgency is typically far less attrac- tive. An emerging but still quite nascent cocktail of tactics, techniques, and technologies is combining some of insurgency’s key asymmetric advantages with

29

more conventional approaches to holding and controlling territory.

22

Insurgency undoubtedly presents a serious asymmetric challenge to even strong conventional military powers such as the United States. The strat- egy is asymmetric, according to our definition, in that it seeks to transform military advantages in mass and firepower into disadvantages by exhausting the foe in a protracted campaign while goading or misleading him into mis- directing force against the civilian population. Conventional military forces tend to orient on seizing and holding key terrain, and to focus their destructive energies on the dispatch of the opposing military force; meanwhile, insurgents orient on the population and their conventional opponents, routinely yield key terrain, and tend to focus their efforts on symbolic acts of violence that shift the balance of political power in their favor. In most formulations, the insurgency then capitalizes on favorable shifts in the political balance to alter the balance of military power to its advantage. If it is unable to accomplish such a shift, the insurgency simply continues to survive while draining its opponent’s will to fight, until the bloodied and dispirited conventional military withdraws from the conflict.

23

When we think about terrorism, the first thing that usually comes to mind is al Qaeda or similar types of groups. Yet the individual terrorist has proven to be among

22

Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century:

The Rise of Hybrid Wars” (Arlington, VA:

Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007); Erin

M. Simpson, “Thinking about Modern Conflict:

Hybrid Wars, Strategy, and War Aims” Paper

presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest

Political Science Association, Palmer House

Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, April 7, 2005, 3.

http://www.allaca-

demic.com/meta/p84945_index.html (accessed

June 16, 2011). 23

Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone:

On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN:

Zenith, 2004);

the most innovative, creative, and dangerous in terrorism history.For example, it was lone wolves who were responsible for the first major midair plane bombing, vehicle bombing, hijackings, product contamination, and anthrax attacks in the United States. Lone wolves think “outside the box” because that is where they always are; namely, outside the box. They are loners who have to operate by themselves. That means there is no group decision-making process or group pressure that might stifle creativity.This allows lone wolves to act upon any scenario they might think up. Furthermore, lone wolves have little or no constraints on their level of violence. They are not concerned with alienating supporters (as would some terrorist groups), nor are they concerned with a potential government crackdown following an attack.And since they work alone, they are much harder to identify than groups or even cells since there are no group members to arrest and learn about potential.

In the past, asymmetrical organizations were primarily concerned with sub-national, national an regional political issues. That began to change in the 1980s. Due largely to great advances in and easy access to communications, transportation and weapons technology, asymmetrical warfare has become multinational in scope, with networks and affiliate organizations in many countries. And as a result of globalization and the breakdown of national border security, it has also become transnational in operational reach, with the capability to strike across national boundaries.

Despite the globalization of asymmetrical warfare, however, even the largest organizations are not monolithic in scope with unified chain of command and span of control structures comparable to effective national military and/or security services. Primary personal loyalty of individual terrorist members in large organizations and networks still generally remains within local small units or groups of

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individuals who joined and bonded together and who share many local fears and grievances not shared by affiliate groups elsewhere.

Nevertheless, globalization of the threat has increasingly made asymmetrical warfare the strategy of choice in the 21st century for many sub-national and multinational dissident groups that are hopelessly outmatched militarily by their chosen adversaries. Having no national territory or population to defend, they can engage in violent activities with far less risk of being totally overwhelmed by reprisals that a nation-state might face. In addition, those killed in action can be portrayed as martyrs and used to recruit more converts to the cause.

Asymmetrical tactics are many faceted and constantly changing. The choice of attack as well as the target depends on the element of surprise and the greatest psychological impact for the least amount downside risk of failure. Both are therefore subject to change. The element of surprise is crucial, creating a constant "cat and mouse" relationship between attackers and defenders. Attackers constantly seek the most unanticipated attacks on targets with the greatest amount of vulnerability. Defenders must not only reduce vulnerability of likely targets but must also anticipate new tactics and new target choices. For example, although there has yet to have been a catastrophic WMD or cyber attack, a future such attack to create massive social, political and economic costs casualties cannot be ruled out.

F. Elements of National Power in

Countering the Asymmetrical Threat National power may, therefore, be

regarded as a mix of elements such as population, size, territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability, etc. Nevertheless, the presence of one or few elements alone cannot guarantee national power. Similarly, the absence of an

element does not necessarily mean a decline in national power. For example, the huge size of India, Brazil or Saudi Arabia; the large populations of India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh, the industrial makeup of Belgium; and the first-class army of Switzerland do not make them big powers. Morgenthau calls the mistaken attempt to define national power in terms of one element of that power the “fallacy of the single factor.

24

The elements of national power have been divided into different categories by different scholars. For example, Organski 25

describe these elements in terms of natural (geography, resources, and population) and social (economic, political, military, psychological, informational, etc). Morgenthau breaks the elements into two groups, those which are relatively stable (geography and natural resources) and those which are subject to constant change (industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, quality of diplomacy, quality of government).

26

Asymmetrical warfare is as old as recorded history, and lessons have inevitably been learned at each stage of its evolution. Modern asymmetrical warfare has evolved primarily since thebeginning of the Cold War in the wake of World War II. The first major post-war insurgency ofnote occurred in Malaya where the British waged a twelve year counter-insurgency campaign (1948-1960). The British finally succeeded in putting down the insurgency by adopting of a joint civilian-military strategy that combined regaining and maintaining civil order with winning hearts and minds of non-combatant supporters of the insurgents.

27

24

David Joblonsky, “National Power” Parameters

(Spring 1997): 35. 25

A F K Organsky, World Politics (New York:

Knopf Inc. 1958), 124-15 26

Hans J Morgenthau, Op. Cit., 117.

27See Richard Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War:

The Emergency in Malaya, 1948-1960, 2nd ed.

(Cassell, 1967).

31

The strategic components for how effectively to counter asymmetrical threats are well known and understood by most professionals. The absence of a new, comprehensive and integrated grand strategic vision, therefore, is not due to the lack of lessons learned. It is due more to thereluctance to change entrenched, outdated national security policy mindsets and also toinefficiencies created by internal bureaucratic politics.

G. Key Strategic Elements

The strategic capabilities, responsibilities and operations required in countering the threat are tasked differently from country to country. Moreover, tasking is often shared or overlaps among multiple agencies and services. Regardless of whatever government organizational are in place or created to counter asymmetrical threats, however, all counter strategies must contain some key elements.

1. Geography.

The geography of a country (for example, a continent, an island nation, a land-locked country or a peninsula) and the size of its territory have considerable importance as a source of national power. Another geographical factor is the presence of high mountains, rivers, marshes, deserts, forests and so on, which constitute a weakness or an asset for the international position of a state. For example, the vastness of the erstwhile Soviet State has been a major factor in military strategy. It resulted in the defeat of Napoleon and Hitler. In case of Israel, its small size gives them a feeling of vulnerability and insecurity, which drives their national strategy.

2. Natural Resources a) Food. Self-sufficiency in food has

always been a source of great

strength. The countries which are not self-sufficient in food cannot feel secure. For example, the UK and Germany have always been deficient in food, while the US and Russia have traditionally enjoyed self-sufficiency. In India, there is no shortage of food, yet large segments of population suffer from malnutrition. It has a direct bearing on national security.

b) Raw Materials. These are important for industrial production and more particularly, for waging war. Also, the importance of raw materials has further increased with mechanisation and development of technologies. For example, the US and Russia are self-sufficient in oil and China controls the production of rare earths. The availability of Uranium has become a major factor in the potential power of nations.The availability of natural resources, in the form of food, minerals, energy, etc, plays an extremely important role in the relative power structure of nations. Large amounts of natural resources are essential for a modern nation to wage war, to operate an industrial base, and to reward other international actors through trade and aid. Moreover, as in the case of the geopolitical ownership of strategic places, the physical possession of natural resources is not necessarily a source of power unless a nation can also develop those resources and maintain political control over their disposition.

All humans depend on food, the most basic of these resources, for their existence. Therefore, the importance of having access to sufficient food for the population cannot be over-emphasized. A country that is self-sufficient (or nearly self-sufficient) in food supply has a clear advantage over one which has to import its foods from others. The deficiency of

32

this important factor may havecontributed to Britain‟s becoming a major colonial power, since it was forced to reach out for food and maintain a strong navy to protect its food (among other valuables) supplies from interruption. It is said that Great Britain only grew 30 per cent of the food consumed in the British Isles, before the Second World War. Furthermore, the defeat of Germany in the First World War is also attributed to the Allied blockade, imposing privations upon the German people which sapped their will to resist.

28

3. Economy

The economic factor is becoming more and more relevant to the modern world and ma be considered one of the most important elements, especially since it is related closely with a has influence over most other elements of power: natural or social, stable or unstable, tangible or intangible. Economy is a more comprehensive term that encompasses other factors such as industrial capacity and technology, etc., which were referred to as independent elements of power by writers in the past. A strong economy is a must to sustain and exploit other elements of national power. It is gradually taking over from the military element as the chief means to influence another nation or state. No country can maintain a viable military without putting in a lot of money which comes from a strong economy. Even if a country enjoys an ideal geography and abundance of natural resources, it has to have a strong viable economy to exploit its resources, feed its people and run its military establishment, and in turn, maintain the sanctity of its territorial integrity. Without a viable, sustainable economy, a country is at the mercy of others, like Pakistan and many

28

Hans J Morgenthau, Op. Cit., 120.

other poorer countries are. In the past, the role of economy was limited to provision of livelihood to the people and maintenance of a country‟s war machine. Its relations with other countries were dependent more on the military might of the country itself and the combined might of its friends and allies. However, economy has become an important tool that creates non-military national power. Economically strong countries can exercise their power through trade, aid, loans and grants and hence can influence the poorer countries using both carrot and stick, without employing military means. Not only the countries, but some multinational corporations and money lending institutions have become even more powerful than the countries.

In today‟s globalized world, variations in a country‟s economy can have a ripple effect on countries which are neither physically close nor directly trading with that country. Hence, the strength of a nation‟s economy has a direct effect on the variety, resilience, and credibility of its international economic options. Increasing interdependence has caused major changes in the economic element of national power. National economies have become more dependent on international trade and on financial markets that have become truly global in scope. A nation‟s economic policy is now influenced by a host of factors which include the policies of international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the influence of multinational corporations (it is said that multinationals play a major role in shaping the policies of the U.S. since they fund election campaigns of the candidates), and, of course, the policies and state of economy of other countries. So, while it is important for a potential great power to

33

have a reasonably large population, the availability and readiness of these numbers to undertake the various tasks that make a nation great, is even more important. These tasks may range from providing food and security (military) to economic and industrial development, from research and academics to other social activities. It is, therefore, important to understand why the United States is the sole super power despite countries like China and India having larger populations. Even countries like Japan and Singapore with much smaller populations may rate a lot higher on the national power index than countries with much larger populations

4. Population A country cannot become a first-

rate power unless it has a sizeable population. Suffice to say that the size and quality of population have a profound effect on ational power. Population in this context does not refer only to the number of people in a ountry; it also includes the demographics as well as the nature and quality of the inhabitants of a particular state or country. That can be described through the useThe current shifting of power from west to east owes, besides other factors, to the opulation trends in the eastern countries, as well, which have substantial work force available at their disposal.of parameters such as size, age distribution, geographic distribution, ethnic/religious makeup, quality of individuals, etc. The dynamics of population growth, settlement patterns and movement across the borders will have a major impact on the power potential of a state. Therefore, demographic factors need to be viewed as a potentially important contributor to the power of states. A large population is a key prerequisite, but not an absolute guarantee for national strength. Quality, quantity, morale, will of people,

demographic shifts and population pressures are all important determinants of national power subject to varying contexts of geopolitics .

29 So, while it is

important for a potential great power to have a reasonably large population, the availability and readiness of these numbers to undertake the various tasks that make a nation great, is even more important. These tasks may range from providing food and security (military) to economic and industrial development, from research and academics to other social activities. It is, therefore, important to understand why the United States is the sole super power despite countries like China and India having larger populations. Even countries like Japan and Singapore with much smaller populations may rate a lot higher on the national power index than countries with much larger populations.

5. Psychological Programs

Because the strategic objective of asymmetrical combatants is psychological, the strategic objective of a counter strategy must also be psychological, to undermine and if possible reverse the will of the enemy to continue the conflict. Given the fanaticism of most asymmetrical groups and individual combatants, the focus of psychological programs should be primarily on denying them support and participation of those among the general predisposed to have common cause with them. No asymmetrical group can long exist without some degree of public sympathy and support. In what is essentially a battle for gaining and intimidating hearts and minds, the comparative advantage lies with the asymmetrical groups, which is why

29

Sunil D Tennakoon Maj Gen, “Demography as

an Element of National Power,” NDC Journal

(Winter 2003), 57

34

asymmetrical warfare has become increasingly popular as a strategy of last resort against far more powerful adversaries. Efforts of asymmetrical of such psychological programs is credibility. This is an extremely difficult goal to achieve. Winning hearts and minds from the enemy and gaining political support for waging a counter asymmetrical threat are often at cross purposes due to incompatible domestic and foreign policy interests.For those reasons, three basic elements are vital for a successful psychological counter strategy. First, they must be conducted by all the other strategic elements. The most formal are public diplomacy programs, but all the other elements must include public relations programs to win and maintain public support for their activities. Second, all these efforts must be coordinated to maintain credibility. Third, all programs must be proactive as much if not more than reactive. Winning hearts and minds away from an adversary is far more difficult than winning them in the first place, and once lost, the chances of a peaceful resolution of the conflict can be next to nothing. And words must be matched by deeds. Otherwise, words are likely to be counterproductive.

6. Diplomacy It is an important determinant of

national power and is its most visible face. Diplomacy has to be supported by military power. However, there is a dividing line between diplomacy and military power, though this line becomes wider or overlaps depending on different situations. The prominent place of diplomacy as a component of national power has been described by Professor Hans J. Morgenthan as under:Diplomacy, one might say, is the brain of national power, as national morale is its soul. Due to the international scope and transnational reach of asymmetrical

warfare, no single country can meet a major asymmetrical threat unilaterally. Diplomacy therefore must play a leading role in seeking, maintaining and participating in multinational and bilateral cooperation at the senior political levels of foreign governments and in facilitating cooperation and cooperation with counterpart agencies and companies. In countering asymmetrical warfare, a major goal is to create and maintain an international consensus that asymmetrical warfare is not just the concern of countries facing a specific threat; it is a global concern of all countries.

7. Intelligence

The half-way point, the bridge between understanding the threat and structuring the force, lies in the formulation and validation of a national grand strategy that clearly specifies our long-term security objectives, our plans for achieving those objectives, the capabilities needed for fulfilling our plans, and the steps that we must take in the near- and mid-term to create and maintain those capabilities. At least half of what we must do will be defensive, but not military, in character—we must in some ways militarize how we manage soft power.

30 Intelligence is the vital

underpinning for strategic policy, strategic acquisition, and strategic operational decisions.

The reality is that our national security intelligence “system” has isolated itself from 90 percent of the information stakeholders around the world—and especially so from the foreign stakeholders that originate, filter, and

30

Douglas T. Stuart, ed., Organizing for National

Security, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies

Institute, November 2000, provides an excellent

collection of articles from the Army War

College’ s 10th Annual Strategy Conference.

Chapter 12. “

35

validate multilingual information in science and technology, politics, economics, culture, religion. Every topic important to our survival in the 21st century is being pushed away by our current business practices.

31

Because asymmetrical operations are covert, good, timely intelligence collection analysis and dissemination and sharing is absolutely necessary. To defeat the enemy, it is vital to identify asymmetrical adversaries, their locations, assets, capabilities, intentions, and targets. Intelligence collection, analysis are the shared responsibility of civilian and military, law enforcement and security and intelligence services. Not only is cooperation and sharing amongall domestic elements crucial, but liaison with foreign intelligence services is also of major importance against multinational adversaries.

The new craft of intelligence elevates the all source intelligence analyst into service as a manager. Unlike the traditional craft of intelligence where analysts are hired right out of school and “grown” over time, the new craft of intelligence hires analysts at mid-career, after they have achieved a personal standing and complete fluency at the expense of the private sector. To handle secrets, the analyst must be one of America’ s top ten cited authorities in their given area of expertise. In this context, all analysts become personal branch chiefs, responsible for managing relations with a senior set of consumers; for managing a network of external counterpart authorities; for managing a substantial open source support fund; and for managing the tasking and evaluation of classified assets. The new craft of intelligence, as a natural outcome of

31

Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Future,.

First Monday, Vol. 6, No. 1, October 1, 2001. The entire

issue is at http://firstmonday.org/

issues/issue6_10/index.html.

applying the new rules of engagement consistent with state and federal law, will empower all-source analysts with a great deal more control over a great deal more sources and services. Improvements will be seen in four areas: First, every analyst-manager (that is to say, every analyst) will have a substantial sum to invest in external open sources and services. No analysts should be expected to do their own open source collection, processing, filtering, and exploitation.

8. Military Force

Military strength does not only mean possession of weapons and sensors to fight a war. It is dependent on a whole lot of factors which include material factors such as economy, industrial development, technology, resources, number of men available to fight, etc., as well as non-material factors such as leadership, quality of the fighting force and their training, the morale of both the armed forces as well as the entire nation, and also the willingness of the nation to support the armed forces. Because of the overwhelming influence of military on national policies, countries tend to lose balance and spend disproportionately on their military establishment, causing harm to other sectors.

The primary role in the use of military force has traditionally been to combat counter-military force.Over the past half century, however, it has increasingly become involved in counter insurgencyoperations when national security is threatened, including restoring and maintaining public orderand assisting in public relief programs. Although strategic objectives differ greatly, there is no sharp line of distinction between operational tactics used in asymmetrical and conventional or unconventional warfare. And although there is as yet no precedent, there is also a possibility of a terrorist WMD attack at some time in the

36

future. A second role of the military is maintaining civil order and public safety in conditions beyond the capability of law enforcement to manage, and pacification in insurgency situations. If insurgencies are sufficiently successful to challenge the enemy militarily, it is no longer asymmetrical warfare. The use of armed force in countering asymmetrical warfare, therefore, is not simply to defeat an enemy militarily on the battlefield. The broader objective is to neutralize the enemy's ability to achieve its political agenda through a psychological campaign of fear and intimidation.Covert action and special operations are important elements in countering covert asymmetrical warfare. They include rapid response to incidents and attacks, hostage rescue, and proactive and preemptive strikes against asymmetrical combatants and materiel. Special operations units are generally military, but in some cases they can be tasked to or shared with intelligence, law enforcement, and protective security services.

Another vital element of military strength is the quality and quantity of its fighting force. In the words of Morgenthau

32 : A nation may have a good

grasp of technological innovations in warfare. Its military leaders may excel in the strategy and tactics appropriate to the new techniques of war. Yet, such a nation may be militarily and, in consequence, also politically weak if it does not possess a military establishment that in its over-all strength and in the strength of its component parts is neither too large nor too small in view of the tasks it may be called upon to perform. Must a nation, in order to be strong, possess a large army or is its power not impaired by having, at least in peacetime, only small land forces,

32

Hans J Morgenthau, Op. Cit., 129.

composed of highly trained, heavily armed specialized units? Have battle-ready forces-in-being become more important than trained reserves? Have large surface navies become obsolete, or do aircraft carriers still fulfill a useful purpose? How large a military establishment can a nation afford in view of its resources and commitments? Does concern for national power require large-scale peacetime production of aircraft and other mechanized weapons, or should a nation, in view of rapid changes in technology, spend its resources on research and on the production of limited quantities of improved types of weapons?

9. Law Enforcement

Demands for a reform of the law of armed conflict are often justified by claiming that the “novel” phenomenon of asymmetric warfare has proven the inadequacy of that body of law. Allegedly, the law of armed conflict is characterizedby a post-Westphalian approach, that is, its underlying concept is one of symmetric warfare between belligerents that will abide by its rules only because they expect their opponent to also abide (the principle of reciprocity). In asymmetric warfare reciprocity is said to have become obsolete and the allegedly “new”threats brought about by that “novel” phenomenon call for an adaptation of thelaw of armed conflict.

Asymmetric actors in armed conflict either intentionally violate the principle of distinction or endeavor to incite their opponent to act in violation of that “intransgressible principle of the law of armed conflict.The law of armed conflict provides a rather clear response to any form of asymmetricwarfare that aims at blurring the principle of distinction, whether by way of disguising as civilians, by abusing civilian objects for military purposes or by direct attacks against the civilian population or

37

individual civilians. Still, the problems in practice persist. If it is not feasible to identify enemy combatants or members of enemy organized armed groups because they appear to be civilians, a decision not to attack may result either in suicide or, even worse, in prohibited direct attacks against the civilian population. Of course, combatants who do not distinguish themselves properly when engaged in hostilities do not enjoy combatant immunity or prisoner of war status when captured. While they may be prosecuted for their conduct, this is considered by many military commanders to be an insufficient response to their practical problems.

33

Because virtually all asymmetrical warfare involves criminal activity, law enforcement services play a crucial role in countering asymmetrical threats. They have responsibility for a wide range of activities, including police, public safety and public security, forensics, criminal investigations, riot control and crisis and emergency management of civil disobedience. Responsibility for maintaining normal public safety and security is generally shared by several national and local civilian law enforcement and public security services and agencies. In crisis situations including an outbreak of terrorist activity and/or a major insurgency, these responsibilities must often be shared with military services, including special operations and counter-insurgency units. In meeting the law enforcement and public security needs in countering asymmetrical threats, therefore, a counter strategy must integrate and coordinate the efforts and responsibilities of all law enforcement and public security services, and where

33

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear

Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,79

(July 8) .

called for, include appropriate military units as required. If the threat is international in scope, it must also achieve international cooperation and coordination with Interpol and among states and with counterpart agencies abroad.Protective security is defined here as providing security from criminal activities including asymmetrical attacks against persons and facilities, installations and equipment, including transportation, electronic and cyber equipment. Given the international scope and multifaceted scope of asymmetrical warfare, it is virtually impossible to achieve total protective security. Targets requiring significant public access or provide significant public services are particularly attractive for terrorist organizations as they provide an opportunity for broad mass media coverage. Public access and security comprise a zero-sum game; the more there is of one, the less there is of the other. Where public access is necessary, protective security requires seeking and optimum balance between the two.

H. Conclusions

From the above discussion, it should be clear that the strategic vision proposed here is not intended to be an all-purpose formula for countering all specific asymmetrical threats. Each country must create a strategy tailored to meet its specific domestic capabilities and political costs and benefits, and be flexible enough to address the specific requirements for successfully countering the specific threats facing it. With the advances in technology and the effects of continued future shock due to rapid modernization, particularly those facing but not limited to traditional societies, strategic plans must constantly be modified to meet evolving challenges. The intention here has been to identify the broad elements of modern asymmetrical warfare that all countries must face, and the strategic framework required to address them successfully. It is hoped however,

38

that this grand strategic vision can provide an efficient and workable framework for how best national security strategy for meeting what is likely to be an ongoing, evolving international national security threat. Power is the ability of an individual or state to influence or control the behaviour of others. Power occupies an important place in international relations and, therefore, has been defined and explained by various writers according to prevailing understanding of international environment. Power can be used in different ways ranging from persuasion to punishment. The concept and tools of power keep on evolving over time, and a skilled player knows how and when to use the right power tools to achieve desired objectives. It must be kept in mind that power is not absolute and may vary in time and space and in relation to others. National power is depended on various elements, and while dealing with other states a comprehensive understanding of their elements of power, both tangible and intangible, is essential. It must also be borne in mind that the presence or absence of an element of power does not guarantee power or otherwise. A state must continue to revisit its strengths and weaknesses in terms of known elements of power and strive to achieve a realistic balance between its resources and capabilities. Regardless of the material and physical strength of a state, ultimate victory will largely depend on the intangible factors such as the morale, character of people and government, and nationalism. It is, therefore, important for the leaders to pay due attention to this very important element of national power.

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