The United States PSYOP Organization in Europe During World War II

8/2/2019 The United States PSYOP Organization in Europe During World War II

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The United States PSYOP Organization

in Europe During World War II

by Herbert A. Friedman& Franklin Prosser

This article in an attempt to explore and study the psychological operations (PSYOP) organizations that were formed

during World War II. It is a story in progress. As new organizations and connections between such organizations are

found, the article will be updated. This article is mostly concerned with the war in Europe. A separate article will

discuss US PSYOP in the Pacific. Many of the numbers of leaflets and newspaper printed are estimated. The numberof printed products produced during World War II are in the billions, so it is difficult to be accurate. All the number

mentioned in this article are from published references, but they do sometimes conflict.

Civilian Organization of Propaganda

On 16 August 1940, Nelson Rockefeller was named Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), with responsibility for

disseminating news, films, and radio to Latin America. CIAA retained its independent existence throughout World War II,

despite the formation of several other information organizations.

General William Donovan

On 11 July 1941, the Coordinator of Information (COI) was formed, headed by Colonel (later General) William ("Wild Bill"

Donovan. COIs responsibilities included the gathering of intelligence and the analysis and dissemination of information

abroad, outside Latin America. COI was a predecessor of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The Foreign InformationService (FIS), with Robert Sherwood as director, was formed within COI. It dealt with news and white propaganda outside

Latin America, and quickly behaved almost as an autonomous unit.

Elmer Davis Robert Sherwood

On 13 June 1942, the Office of War Information (OWI) was created with Elmer Davis as director, subsuming several other

agencies including FIS (but not CIAA). FIS, under Sherwood, became the Overseas Branch of OWI, dealing in white

propaganda. In this June 1942 reorganization, COI became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), with Donovan, operating a

code number 109, as director.
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We will not discuss the OWI in any great depth because most of the items we will depict in this article were both printed and

disseminated by the OSS or military PSYOP units. However an example of the importance of the OWI is discussed in a 13

December 1943LIFEMagazine article entitled, Psychological Warfare; OWI runs school for propagandists.

Hanging fire in the Senate last week was a $5,000,000 appropriation for the overseas branch of OWI. On its fate depends theexpanding operations of a score of foreign outposts through which OWI, in collaboration with the Army, wages psychologicalwarfare on the enemy. To fit men for this the OWI maintains a training center on Long Island from which more than 300

newsmen, radio and printing technicians, and public relations experts have been graduated to date.

The Davidson Press

Workhorse of field operations, the Davidson Dual Duplicator, about 725 lbs., in weight and not much bigger than some office

duplicating machines, can turn out both letterpress and color offset. These machines print newspapers, leaflets and posters o

the spot in captured territories.

The three-week course (for 30 to 40 students at a time) is intensive and ranges from study of the nature of the enemy to command

techniques. In the field these propagandists operate in combat teams of two to 10 men each. Mobile equipment for frontline

operations includes trucks carrying printing and broadcasting units, photographic dark rooms, and electrical generators andsupplies. Four men have already been killed in line of duty.

Of the value of psychological warfare there can be little doubt. Approximately 80% of Italian prisoners questioned in Sicily hadPWB (Psychological Warfare Branch) leaflets in their possession or had read them. When the Italian fleet surrendered inresponse to a radio appeal transmitted by PWB over international distress-signal frequency, British Admiral Cunningham said:Tell General McClure theyve accomplished in one day with propaganda what I've been trying to do for three years with theNavy.

OSS OWI

Responsibilities between OWI and OSS were but vaguely defined, and disputes within and among CIAA, OWI, and OSS

became disruptive. At this early stage of the war, few officials knew what their organizations should be doing, but many knew


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what other organizations should be prevented from doing. Donovans ambitious plans for OSS were fought doggedly by

Sherwood and Davis. The squabbling led to presidential Executive Order 9312 of 9 March 1943, which, in attempting to

clarify the responsibilities of OWI and OSS, gave white propaganda (white propaganda is issued from an acknowledged

source. This type of propaganda is associated with overt psychological operations) to OWI but left black propagandas (black

propaganda purports to emanate from a source other than the true one. This type of propaganda is associated with covert

psychological operations) status unclear. As the war progressed, OSS became the de facto owner of black propaganda and

OWI of white, and this arrangement was formalized by an agreement between Donovan and Davis in June 1944. Early in the

war, the U.S. had little expertise in subversive warfare. Donovan borrowed heavily from the British for experience in black

propaganda; the British, after going through their own period of high-level resistance to unconventional methods of warfare

had borrowed from the Germans.

By mid-1943, OSS command (under the director and assistant director) consisted of two principal deputy directors: the

Deputy Director of Intelligence, who controlled such branches as Secret Intelligence (SI) and Counter-Espionage (X-2), and

the Deputy Director of Psychological Warfare Operations (later Deputy Director of Operations), controlling branches such a

Special Operations (SO), Operational Groups (OG), Maritime Units (MU), and Morale Operations (MO). MO was the sourc

of black printed propaganda.

In summer of 1943, OSS theatre officers were appointed for each of the major military theatres in which OSS was operating

ETO (European Theatre of Operations), METO (Middle Eastern), NATO (North African), and FETO (Far Eastern). NATO

was later renamed MEDTO (Mediterranean Theatre of Operations), which through its MO branch was responsible for much

of the black propaganda emitted by the OSS. In addition to serving in the chain of command to OSS headquarters in

Washington, the theatre officers were the liaisons between OSS and the military theatre commanders, who had approval

authority over all OSS and OWI projects in their theatres. The theatre officers served through December 1944, when anotheOSS reorganization eliminated this structure.

SHAEF Insignia

OSS established many missions overseas during the course of the war. The MO units themselves are described later. The OS

had an important headquarters in London, with Donovan arranging its first beginnings in August 1941. OSS London reache

its final form in 1943 and early 1944; the MO unit in London was established in May 1943, where, operating under direct

allied military control, it produced subversive propaganda for the Psychological Warfare Division of the Supreme

Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF).

In neutral Switzerland, OSS maintained a headquarters in Bern beginning in May 1942, using the diplomatic cover provided

by the OWI. There, the OSS (headed by Allen Dulles, who arrived in November 1942 and operated as code number 110, with

cover name "Mr. Burns") and the OWI (under Gerald Mayer, whose code number was 678) cooperated extensively on

production of propaganda, and official correspondence on this subject seems to make little distinction between the offices. Th

Bern OSS unit operated from Herrengasse 23. The OSS established five sub-units in Switzerland: in Geneva, Zurich, LuganoAscona, and Basel. OSS operations were conducted with great caution to avoid exposure and arrest by the rigorously neutral

Swiss. The contributions of OSS Switzerland were deemed highly effective.

In neutral Sweden, the OSS established a small base of three men in Stockholm in 1942; by late 1944 it had grown to 35

members. A small two-man MO unit arrived in Stockholm in April 1944.

In the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, OSS-MEDTO was originally (in 1943) designated the 2677th Headquarters

Company (Provisional) G-3. To increase its autonomy, in May 1944 the unit was designated a regiment, officially the 2677th

Regiment OSS (Provisional). The regiment was activated in July 1944 with headquarters near Caserta, Italy, when North

African Theatre of Operations military headquarters (NATOUSA) moved from Algiers to Caserta. The regimental

commander was Colonel Edward Glavin, a Strategic Services Officer of MEDTO. Most of the black propaganda produced b

the OSS originated with MO Rome, which was organized in mid-1944.


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The OSS was disbanded on 1 October 1945.

OSS Morale Operations (MO)

The Morale Operations Branch of the OSS was created in early January 1943, and by March was ready for action. Its

primary function was to attack "the morale and the political unity of the enemy through...psychological means operating or

purporting to operate within the enemy or occupied territories." Chiefs of MO include Frederick Oechsner (began in early

1943), COL Kenneth D. Mann (replaced Oechsner in May 1944), Charles Healy, Patrick Dolan, Morton Bodfish, Howard

Baldwin (active in late 1944), LTC J. Roller (chief in February 1945), and LTC Herbert S. Little (chief on 30 November 1945

after the dissolution of OSS). (The names are not necessarily all in order of service).

Nachrichten fr Die Truppe, 20 April 1945

Throughout most of the period of our main interest 1944 and 1945 MO and other branches of the OSS reported through

their OSS theatre officers. The various field MO units did not work together on a regular basis, nor did they have closetactical connections with higher authority in Washington or London. This reinforced the natural secrecy and turf protection

always present in intelligence and PSYOP work, and led to considerable local independence of action of the field units, despit

continual interference from OWI and the military. MO-ETO maintained missions in Paris, Stockholm, Bern, and London.

MO-Bern forged German postage stamps. The London MO unit (cover name MOTTA) was under direct military control,

producing subversive propaganda for PWD/SHAEF and assisting the British in the production of the highly successful grey

(propaganda that does not specifically identify any source)Nachrichten fr Die Truppe (Message for the troops) newspaper.

Other MO units, under OSS leadership, had more autonomy. MO-MEDTO began with a 3-man mission to Algiers in March

1943. By 1945, MO-MEDTO maintained bases in Cairo, Algiers, and in the Italian towns of Rome, Bari, Caserta, Siena,

Naples, and Brindisi. MO-Rome produced significant philatelic black propaganda. MO-Rome maintained contact with MO-

Bern in the European Theatre of Operations, and on occasion shared ideas and materials.

The MO Unit in Stockholm

A two-man MO mission (code name Sioux) arrived in Stockholm in March 1944. One of the original personnel, LTJG Willia

Casey, USN, quickly undertook production of the Harvard Project newsletter,Handel und Wandel, (Trade and Change) aweekly business and financial publication aimed at German industrialists. Using OWI equipment, the unit produced some

250,000 pamphlets, leaflets, stickers, posters, letters, and postcards. In 1944, Casey was named Chief of Secret Intelligence,

ETO, and would serve in the 1980s as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. As CSI-ETO, Casey operated without

code number, unlike Donovan (code 109), Dulles (code 110), Gerald Meyer (head of OWI in Switzerland, code number 678),

and Whitney Shepardson (Chief of Secret Intelligence in Washington, code 154).

The MO Unit in Switzerland
http://www.psywarrior.com/Cornflakes2.htmlhttp://www.psywarrior.com/Cornflakes2.html


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The Chief of MO Switzerland and its principal forger was Raymond Arthur Schuhl, a French propagandist who had served

the 6th Section of the 2nd Bureau (the Deuxieme Bureau military intelligence) of the French Secret Service until the fall of

France. Schuhl relocated to Switzerland and operated for the OSS under the cover name Robert Salembier (code name

"Mutt"). Schuhl oversaw a prolific print shop in Geneva shared by the OSS and OWI. Schuhls group produced millions of

white and black pamphlets, leaflets, cards, postage stamps, and other forms of printed propaganda. Around Christmas 1944

Schuhl received 10,000 forged German Hitler head stamps from MO Rome to assist in a proposed project to insert

propaganda letters into Germany from Switzerland. This would suggest that MO Rome originated the forgery of the Germa

stamps. Other clues suggest that MO Switzerland was producing forged German postage stamps in the early fall of 1944

(prior to the end of October).

The papers of Allen Dulles shows that during the war Schuhl was considered for a U.S. military decoration for his outstandin

work, but it was a political impossibility to give a formal award to a foreign civilian doing "black" propaganda. A letter to

Dulles from "G.M.M." (presumably Gerry Mayer) states that Schuhls phone number was 2.61.74 at the Hotel Regina in

Geneva.

The MO Units in Italy MO Rome

Morale Operations Rome Printing Press

Much of the OSS printed propaganda was produced by the Morale Operations unit in Rome during the period mid-1944 to

mid-1945. Within the 2677th Regiment OSS (Provisional), Morale Operations (MO-MEDTO) bore the designation "2677thHeadquarters Detachment OSS (Provisional)", with headquarters in Rome on Viale Regina Margherita. MO-MEDTO is oft

referred to as MO Rome. (The "2677" was the subject of an inside joke at MO Rome, since the Pantone color code for the in

used in the forgery of the 6 pfennig Hitler head stamp was 2677.) MO Rome was headed by Eugene P. Warner, a civilian,

formerly of the Associated Press, and postwar public relations director of TWA. Warners title was MO Chief. His executive

officer was Captain William T. Dewart Jr. (scion of the New York Sun publishing family; later promoted to major after COL

Glavin (commander of OSS-MEDTO) personally interceded in Dewarts behalf with General Donovan).

MO Romes activities centered on the editorial and planning group, which developed the propaganda ideas, texts, and

production methods. Under this group were the operation and implementation planners who created such operations as

Sauerkraut, Cornflakes, and Pig Iron. Finally, helpers and field operatives carried out the activities, including distribution o

the propaganda documents. In many instances, an individual would be a participant in all three areas.

MO Rome used an existing Italian printing house, Stabilimento Aristide Staderini, located at Via Baccina 45 in Rome, where

many of the leaflets, posters, and forged postage stamps were printed. This shop was run by CPL Egidio Clemente, who later

became a close associate of Senator Joe McCarthy. Assisting Clemente with the printing were SGT Alfio DUrso and civilian

Helmuth Gruchol.


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Das Neue Deutschland

MO Rome produced forged postage stamps, stickers, leaflets, newspapers, postcards, and envelopes, often in huge quantities

The propaganda was distributed by a variety of means including airdrops, mailings by allied agents within the Third Reich,

hand delivery by the German underground, and use of friendly German prisoners of war (Operation Sauerkraut, begun 1

July 1944). Before the end of October 1944, Clementes print shop was forging 6- and 12-pfennig German Hitler Head postag

stamps for use in sending propaganda through the German Reichspost. MO Rome produced an extensive series of "black"

propaganda postcards. An early venture by MO Rome into the field of leaflet airdrops (Operation Pig Iron) included droppi

more than 10 million miniature copies of the black propaganda newspaperDas Neue Deutschland(The New Germany). Arelated effort, Operation Sheet Iron, assisted Italian Partisans in the production and distribution of their underground

newspaper,La Riscossa Italiana. However, by late 1944 efforts to distribute anti-German propaganda inside Germany hadmet with only limited success, and hopes were tied to Operation Cornflakes, described below.

Forgeries such as postal cancels and German military documents were done by a civilian, codename Eddie Zinder, who

frequently operated near the location of across-the-line infiltration. (In official reports, names were often disguised with

aliases; in this discussion, we include the real names where known.) Famed New Yorker cartoonist Saul Steinberg, then a

LTJG, did much of the propaganda artwork. CPT Temple Fielding, who after the war became a noted travel author, was in

the planning group. MSG Richard Lee, subsequently with the New York Daily News, provided valuable support. Neither Lee

nor Fielding could speak or write German; however, Womans Army Corps CPL Barbara Suzka Lauwers, a writer, spoke

fluent German and participated in the interrogation of prisoners in Operation Sauerkraut. Writers Jan Liebig (alias Jan

Libich) and H. F. "Pitz" Broch de Rotherman (alias Hermann de Rothermann) planned and directed the Cornflakes and Pig

Iron operations.


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2LT Robert Allen, who arrived in Rome on 3 August 1944 with Broch de Rotherman, and who was initially assigned as an

assistant in production and in charge of shipping, saved instances of much of the MO Rome propaganda in several

scrapbooks, in order to provide documentation for congressional leaders who would determine support for MO activities.

These scrapbooks, each different but containing overlapping selections of materials, have provided invaluable firm evidence

the products produced by OSS Rome. At least four of Allens scrapbooks survived the war. CPL Clemente, the chief printer,

collected two specimen copies of all printed MO Rome propaganda. In the 1960s he donated one set to Guilio Polotti, current

president of the Anna Kuliscioff Foundation in Milan, Italy.

Other personnel of the 2677th MO Rome, known from a unit commendation from General Donovan dated 3 November 1944,

were 1LT Jack Daniels (later associated with the Cornflakes Operation), 1LT Arthur Mathieu, SSG Walter Weisbecker, SGT

Marcel Robich, SGT Arthur Hammond, SGT Laird Ogle, T/5 Larry Bruzzese, and civilians Roland Dulin and William Laas

(Some of these names may be aliases.)

The MO Units in Italy MO Bari

OSS Agent in the Rome Printing Plant inspects propaganda material

MO Bari frequently participated in the distribution of black propaganda designed and produced by MO Rome. Bari is on

Italys Adriatic (eastern) coast, about 250 miles southeast of Rome. In the summer of 1944, the chief of MO Bari was Mr. Joh

Fistere. That summer, Fistere had experimented with air-dropping Hungarian mailbags filled with propaganda leaflets, and

this notion was adopted and refined in 1945 in MO Romes Operation Cornflakes. Fistere was probably succeeded as chief b

Capt. Temple Fielding. 1LT Jack Daniels of Company B in Bari was liaison with MO Rome and operations officer at MO

Bari; by March 1945 he was chief of MO Bari. 2LT Marcel Robich was an "assistant" (probably second in command) at MO

Bari when Daniels was chief.

MO in Washington:

Little is known of MO propaganda and forgery activities that originated in Washington. I did interview an OSS forger severayears ago by the name of W.C. Reddick. He told me that he had established a forgery plant in Washington D.C. and was in

charge of an operation that forged large quantities of Japanese occupation banknotes. We also know that LTC Carl F. Eifler

requested OSS Washington to develop and produce counterfeits of the Japanese invasion money (JIM) for Malaya. Official

documents indicate that Washington sent at least 50,000 ten dollar banknotes to anti-Japanese guerillas in Malaya. It appear

that OSS Washington was very involved with counterfeiting the currency of enemy nations during WWII.

According toSisterhood of Spies - the Women of the OSS, Elizabeth P. McIntosh, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1998,William Reddick later was transferred to the OSS London Cover and Documentation Office, behind the Headquarters

building at 72 Grosvenor Street. His job was to establish a print shop in London to produce forged documents.

The OSS Combat Propaganda Companies


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How did the OSS produce "black" propaganda in the field? Much of the story is told in a declassified "secret" memorandum

From Director William J. Donovan to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 3 February 1943. Some of the pertinent

portions of the memorandum are:

In accordance with the Directive of the Joint United States Chief of Staff to the Office of Strategic Services, dated 23 December1942 under which this office is charged with the planning, development, coordination, and execution of the military program ofpsychological warfare, a transfer of certain combat propaganda units, formerly a part of the Military Intelligence Service, to the

Office of Strategic Services has been accomplished.

These units represent partial activation of the Combat Propaganda Companies, which, when completely activated and trained, wibe available to Task Force Commanders as fully mobile combat units to:

a. Demoralize, deceive and otherwise hamper the tactical activity of enemy troops opposite our lines.

b. Break the will to win or resist of the enemy inhabitants of enemy territory.

c. Inform, assure, inspire and guide friendly inhabitants of occupied territory in their cooperation with our objectives andforces.

Upon completion of training, the companies will be transferred to the Theater of Operations Commander and will thereforeoperate under his command. Through his liaison officer, The Theater Commander may obtain from the Office of Strategic

Services and special psychological warfare studies or data desired by him.

What kind of PSYOP did these combat propaganda teams produce? One example is given in a 1943 secret OSS

document.

SAMPLE CAMPAIGN THAT MAY BE USED BY A COMBAT PROPAGANDA COMPANY

Devices designed to undermine an enemy's will to resist by developing in him feelings of fear, distrust of his motives forcombat, war weariness, futility of further struggle, and willingness to surrender, (Though each of these aims may be pursue

separately, far more effective results may be achieved by saturating the enemy with the greatest amount of material possiblepreferably in the order suggested below).

Fear. A continual series of pictures should be dropped over enemy lines. each showing the horrible fashion in which their soldiermet death. One batch of pictures a day should be dropped on them. Each picture might be entitled as follows; "Why?," "The NewOrder," "His children will miss him," and "More than he bargained for."

The same might be done with pictures of horribly mutilated soldiers who have been removed from the front and sent home. Theymay also be entitled as follows; "He escaped death," "An Iron Cross and a wooden crutch," and a picture of a blinded soldier

entitled, "He never saw the fatherland again."

U.S. Military Organization of PSYOP Government Level

For the most part, the U.S. military was not enthusiastic about PSYOP. The Navy Department had the most consistent intere

in the subject, and during the war the Navy established the Special Warfare Branch (OP-16W) within its Office of Naval

Intelligence.

The War Department engaged in only inconsistent and tepid support of PSYOP. Before World War II, a Special Studies

Group (SSG) was formed to coordinate activities with COI and CIAA. Following a proposal by SSG, a military Joint

Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC) was formed on 18 March 1942, in part to coordinate activities of other U.S.

government organizations. After OWI was formed in mid-1942, OWI refused to cooperate with JPWC; thereafter JPWC

became swamped with dealing with OSS administrative problems, and by the end of 1942 JPWC was disbanded. No further

central military control of PSYOP was attempted during the war.

However, Executive Order 9312 of 9 March 1943 provided that all PSYOP projects were subject to the approval of the

appropriate military theatre commanders. This stipulation was strictly observed thereafter, and led to closer interactions


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between the military and the two civilian organizations. On the other hand, PSYOP activities became balkanized, with little

exchange of information or personnel across major military commands.

Allied Military PSYOP in the European Theatre

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

Beginning in October 1942, as the joint North African Operation Torch was about to begin, General Dwight Eisenhower, at

the time one of the few military leaders sympathetic to psychological warfare, became concerned with the problems of

coordinating the activities of the U.S. OWI and OSS, the British Political Warfare Executive and Ministry of Information, an

the British and American Army and Navy intelligence services. Eisenhower established the Psychological Warfare Branch

(PWB) of the Allied Forces Headquarters (PWB/AFHQ) as a joint U.S. and British operation in the North African theatre.

This set a precedent for other Allied joint ventures. Colonel Charles B. Hazeltine organized PWB in three sections: combat

propaganda units attached to front-line forces, occupation units that worked in newly captured territory, and base units that

coordinated propaganda efforts of the Allied Forces Headquarters with those of London and Washington. Following the

North African operation, PWB coordination of propaganda was extended to the invasions of Sicily and mainland Italy and

other actions in the Mediterranean theatre.

General Eisenhower and Brigadier General McClure


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PWD-Allied Information

Service (AIS) CommanderLTC Lance Lazonby (seated

with his staff.

The official PWD/SHAEF history, says in part:

PWD/SHAEF was nominally charged with two main functions in addition to psychological warfare against the enemy.

1. Consolidation propaganda in liberated friendly countries.

2. Control of the information services in occupied Germany.

David Lerner says about the AIS in Sykewar:

Actually, the first was handled by a subsidiary organization known as the AIS (Allied Information Services), later USIS (UnitedStates Information service), and staffed mainly by OWI personnel.

The PWD/SHAEF history continues:

To fulfil the need for consolidation operations among friendly populations, a subsidiary of PWD, called Allied InformationServices, was established. The elimination of the phrase Psychological Warfare from the title was done simply because it did notappear to be diplomatic to speak in terms of "waging psychological warfare" against our friends. AIS was made up of a GroupHeadquarters, designated the 6805th AIS Group Headquarters (Provisional), and, at the beginning, three field teams each with a

commanding officer.

AIS Group Headquarters, together with certain personnel designated as Advance PWD/SHAEF and the personnel of the first fieconsolidation team, landed on the Normandy beaches 5 July 1944 and reached Cherbourg the following day.

PWB was a model for the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD or PWD/SHAEF), established in 1943 by Eisenhower at Suprem

Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) in London during the preparations for the cross-Channel invasion ofmainland Europe in June 1944. PWD had an important role in the production and dissemination of white propaganda in thenorthwestern European theatre until the end of the war. The head of PWD/SHAEF was Brigadier General Robert A. McClure. Innorthwestern Europe, PWD incorporated the activities of PWB (with PWB units attached to each of the armies). Elsewhere, PWBcontinued its operations under a less complex structure.

Both PWB and PWD reported to American generals, and in this study the productions of these two PSYOP organizations areshown under the United States.


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(Note on U.S. Army unit structure: The hierarchy is Army, Corps, Division, Regiment/Brigade, Battalion, Company, Platoon, and

Squad. The "rule of threes" expresses a tendency to have three units within its parent unit. For instance, typically there are threeCorps in an Army, three Divisions in a Corps, etc. This allows two units to be on the line, with one unit in reserve.)

Allied Military Operations in the Mediterranean North Africa and Italy

Military units in North Africa. With the outbreak of war, a small force of the British 8th Army found itself opposed in Cyrenaicaby the Italian 10th Army, which the British quickly routed. This British success led Hitler in early 1941 to send to North Africa aexpeditionary force under General (later Field Marshal) Erwin Rommel. Rommel reported to the senior German commander in

the Mediterranean, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, Commander-in-Chief, South, and Luftwaffe commander in theMediterranean, who would serve with distinction in Italy. The dramatic successes of Rommels Afrika Korps in 1941 and early1942 led to the controversial Allied Operation Torch the invasion of North Africa in November 1942. Until that time, there habeen no significant U.S. forces in the North African theatre. The British military had undergone several changes in command: In1941 General Sir Archibald Wavell was replaced as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, by General Sir Claude Auchinleck, who iturn was replaced in August 1942 by General Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander. To command the British 8th Army in North Africa,

Churchill appointed General Bernard Montgomery, who quickly resurrected British fortunes by routing Rommels PanzerarmeeAfrika (which included the Afrika Corps) first at Alam Halfa in August and then at El Alamein in October.

Leaflet G21

I added British leaflet G21 to this article because we are talking about war in the desert and the Afrika Corps. The leaflet shows ainteresting use of both internal and external PSYOP. The Germans used their peoples car as a form of internal PSYOP toconvince the people that things were getting better and even the young and the working class could afford a car under Nazi rule.The original pamphlet describing the car said in part:

Each German Folk-companion has the opportunity to obtain a KdF car. Two types will be delivered in the first years ofproduction:

1. Limousine

2. Cabriolet/Limousine


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Cost for the Limousine is RM 990. The Cabriolet/Limousine costs an additional RM 60 because it is more expensive to produce.

The purchase request for the KdF car has to be made through the offices of the National Socialist Fellowship Strength throughJoy. Once the saver has accepted the savings card, he is obliged to purchase RM 5 in saving stamps each week

German KdF car savings stamps

The RM 5 was deducted from the paycheck of the German worker who signed up to receive what would eventually become thePeople's Car (Volkswagen). Ferdinand Porsche was commissioned to design a car for the Nazi Kraft Durch Freudeorganization - the slogan meaning strength (or power) through joy. Of course, the cars were never delivered and I assume the

collected monies all went to the German war effort.

The British looked at the KdF campaign and saw an opportunity to attack the German Government. British leaflet G21 was

dropped from 20 April 1943 to 5 May 1943. A photograph at the top of the leaflet depicts Hitler being shown a model of the KdFcar that was to be eventually owned by every German. The text is Hitler sees the model, Berlin 1938.

Below the photograph of Hitler and the miniature model of the car is a second photograph showing two dead German soldierscontorted in the North African desert heat with the military version of the automobile. They seem to have been stripped of theiruniforms, so perhaps the Arabs got to them before the British. The text is, The finished vehicle in Africa 1943.

(Note) The KdF-Wagen was produced in military versions such as the Type 82 and amphibious Type 166, but it wasn't until after

the Second World War that it became available to civilians as the Volkswagen.

The leaflet title is, Strength through Joy! Directly beneath the title is a Hitler quote from 30 January 1941. I allowed for eachpossibility ahead of time. The back of the leaflet is all text and entitled Hitler Strategy. The text mentions German military

disasters in the Soviet Union and North Africa, and ends, After Stalingrad and Tunis?

Operation Torch, which began 8 November 1942, was the first combined Allied military operation of the war. Torch was under thcommand of General Dwight David Eisenhower. In addition to the British 8th Army under Montgomery, which was already on thscene, the forces were comprised of a Western Task Force (U.S.) under Lt. General George S. Patton, Jr.; a Center Task Force(U.S.) that included the U.S. II Corps, under the command of Major General Lloyd R. Fredendall (and later under Patton); anEastern Task Force (U.S. and British) led by Major General Charles Ryder; and the British 1st Army, commanded by Lt. GeneralKenneth N. Anderson. In reaction to this assault, that same month Hitler created the 5th Panzerarmee in Tunisia under General

Jrgen von Arnim to augment Rommels Panzerarmee Afrika. In February 1943, Alexander was placed in charge of the newlycreated 18th Army Group, which incorporated the British 1st and 8th Armies and the U.S. II Corps in Tunisia. The Germanforces, together with remains of the Italian 1st Army, were forced to surrender North Africa in mid-May 1943.

Military units in Italy. For Operation Husky the invasion of Sicily in June 1943 overall ground command went to GeneralAlexander, who commanded the 15th Army Group. This group consisted of the British 8th Army under General Montgomery and

the U.S. 7th Army under General Patton. The occupation of Sicily was completed in September 1943.

The invasion of mainland Italy commenced on 3 September 1943, with the British 8th Army under Montgomery attacking at thetoe of Italy and on the Adriatic (eastern) shore; beginning 9 September, the U.S. 5th Army under Lt. General Mark W. Clarkattacked the western shore at Salerno (Operation Avalanche). German defenses were under the command of Field MarshalKesselring. The Allies occupied southern Italy during late 1943, but, thwarted by Kesselrings skillful defense, the Allied advance

bogged down in the winter of 1943-1944 at Cassino on the Gustav Line in south-central Italy.

In an attempt to break the stalemate and outflank Kesselrings troops, on 22 January 1944 the Allies launched Operation Shinglethe invasion of Anzio. The result was deadlock on two fronts, at Cassino and Anzio. The stalemate dragged on with heavy losses


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on both sides into the spring of 1944, until in May the Allies broke through the Gustav Line and, following a breakout from Anzi

converged on Rome. Rome was captured on 4 June 1944, two days before the invasion of Normandy.

Following the capture of Rome, advances by the Allies continued at a crawl, with Kesselring fighting an effective delaying actionthroughout the remainder of 1944 and into 1945. British and American efforts were hindered by the withdrawal of substantialportions of the British 8th Army and the U.S. 5th Army to participate in Operation Anvil (renamed Dragoon), an attack onsouthern France in mid-August 1944 to divert German forces from the Normandy front. In Italy, the Allies stalled at the Gothic

Line in late August and the Winter Line for the long winter of 1944-1945. Fighting continued until the end of the war on 2 May1945.

Allied Military PSYOP Activities in North Africa

Prior to the joint Allied Operation Torch in November 1942, British units produced a small amount of white printed propagandaaimed at Italian and German troops and indigenous Arab civilians in North Africa. These activities were based in Cairo, Egypt.Some 30 leaflets in Italian are known to have been directed to Italian troops in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (both now in Libya).

Leaflets in German and in both German and Italian are known. A few leaflets in Arabic are known from this period.

In October 1942, with the approach of Operation Torch, control of propaganda was assigned to the newly created PsychologicalWarfare Branch of Allied Forces Headquarters (PWB/AFHQ). The PWB operated out of Algiers under the command of BrigadieGeneral Robert A McClure. He was accustomed to working with British military and civilian groups. He was to serve as chief of

military propaganda for more than a decade, and was influential in establishing the propaganda warfare school at Fort Bragg,North Carolina in 1952.

Brigadier General Robert A. McClure (later promoted to Major General while assigned as Chief, MAAG, Iran, 1953-1956) is aninteresting individual. Alfred H. Paddock Jr. called him the "Forgotten Father of U.S. Army Special Warfare" in an article inPerspectives, the Journal of the Psychological Operations Association, Volume 13, Number 3, 1990. In January 2001 the Army

formally recognized McClure's contributions as the father of Army special warfare by naming the US Army Special OperationsCommand headquarters building in his honor at Fort Bragg, NC.

He had no special training in PSYOP and yet was able to successfully teach himself to become an expert in the field. He wasmilitary attach to the London embassy during 1941-1942, following which he became chief of intelligence, AFHQ for a fewmonths. Eisenhower then selected him to head up the Information and Censorship Section (INC) in AFHQ. In this capacity he

planned and commanded INC, with responsibility for radio, leaflets, signal, propaganda, censorship, and related duties. By theend of the North African campaign the section grew to over 1500 personnel.

In 1944 he was named Director of PWD with the responsibility of coordinating all PSYOP in the ETO. He was able to mergemembers of the OWI, OSS, the British PWE and MOI into a smooth-running and efficient machine. By the end of the war,General McClure's organization was made up of over 2300 personnel. After the war he was quoted, "Modern war has become a

struggle for men's minds as well as their bodies."

For some of its work, the Allies used the SIPA press in Algiers. Although the meaning of SIPA is not known, it appears to havebeen a local printing job shop that published newspapers. The Free French in North Africa also made use of SIPAs press. Thepropaganda output was almost exclusively white. Allied leaflets in Italian were airdropped on Italian troops in Tripolitania andTunisia. German-language leaflets and bilingual German/Italian leaflets were airdropped on Axis troops. Leaflets in Arabic and

leaflets in French were airdropped for civilians in North Africa. Some leaflets produced in Algiers were dropped in southernFrance and Northern Italy.

Code designations for white leaflets for this theatre are, as is not surprising in wartime, largely inconsistent, missing, repetitive,and confusing. The best compilation of these leaflets is R.G. Auckland, Catalogue of Allied Leaflets Dropped in North Africa toGerman and Italian Troops and Civilians, 1940-1943, PSYOP Society Blatter Catalogue No. 17, 1990.

Allied Military PSYOP Activities in Italy

From 1943 to 1945, the U.S. 5th Army in Italy produced numerous white propaganda newspapers and leaflets. The 5th Army also

assisted the British 8th Army in leaflet production. Klaus Mann, with the U.S. 5th Army, probably designed leaflets for bothArmies. The numbering and labeling systems used in this theatre are confusing, and it is often difficult or impossible to determinthe origin of the leaflets. However, there is little doubt that the bulk of Allied military printed propaganda for Italy originated withthe Americans.


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In Italy, the U.S. 5th Army produced the "G-" and "GL-" series of leaflets. The 5th Army probably also produced various series

leaflets coded "AU/" (for Austria), "C/GN/", "G/" (for the Balkans), "G.A." through "G.Z.", "GC/", "GN", "Gn/", "GS","GT/", "GIG/", "GTC/", "LN" ("Letzte Nachrichten"), and "NN" ("Neueste Nachrichten"), and numerous other one-shotleaflets either uncoded or with codes not belonging to a series. From late 1943 until the German surrender, the 5th Army produceseveral long-running series of leaflet newspapers, including Frontpost / Wochenblatt fr deutsche Soldaten; Frontpost AusgabeSd / Nachrichtenblatt fr deutsche Soldaten; Frontpost Ausgabe Sd / Wochenausgabe; Frontpost / Ausgabe der Adriafront;Adriafront / Wochenblatt fr deutsche Truppen; Nachrichten aus der Heimat / Frontpost Beilage; Luftpost / Ausgabe Sd; and

Luftpost und Soldaten-Nachrichten / Ausgabe Sd. Fifth Armys main Frontpost series began 4 November 1943 with Issue No. 1and ran through No. 126 (20 April 1945).

Compilations of Allied leaflets for Italy are found in Hans Dsel, Catalogue of Allied Aerial Leaflets for German and AustrianTroops in Mediterranean Countries and Islands, 1943-1945, PSYOP Society Blatter Catalogue No. 21, 1994; and Hans Dusel,Catalogue Listings of U.S. "Luftpost" and "Frontpost" Newspapers Disseminated by Air to German Troops and Civilians in

Europe and to German Troops in Italy, 1944-1945, PSYOP Society Blatter Catalogue No. 19, 1991. The Italian-language bookPropaganda Politica e Mezzi di Comunicazione di Massa: Tra Fascismo e Democrazia, Istituto Storico Della Resistenza inProvincia di Novarr "P. Fornara", 1995, gives an extensive discussion of the propaganda to and from Italy; in a chapter entitled"Moral Operations" (pages 150-164), Egidio Clemente, the chief printer at MO Rome, describes the Allied black propagandaproduced by his old unit.

Allied Military PSYOP on the European Western Front

Northwestern European theatre: military organization of SHAEF. Under Eisenhower, SHAEF was organized in three Army

Groups (AGs): the 6th AG, commanded by U.S. General Jacob L. Devers; the 12th AG, commanded by U.S. General OmarBradley; and the 21st AG, commanded British Field Marshal Bernard F. Montgomery. The 6th AG comprised the French 1stArmy, commanded by General Lasse de Tassigny; and the U.S. 7th Army, commanded by General Alexander Patch. The 12th AGcomprised the U.S. 1st Army, commanded by General Courtney Hodges; the U.S. 3rd Army, commanded by General George

Patton; and the U.S. 9th Army, commanded by General William H. Simpson. The 21st AG comprised the Canadian 1st Army,commanded by General D. G. Crerar; and the British 2nd Army, commanded by General Miles Dempsey.

Military PSYOP Structure Under PWD/SHAEF

Brigadier General Robert A. McClure

The Chief of PWD/SHAEF wasBrigadier General Robert A. McClure. At the Army Group level, PWD was combined with PublicRelations to form a special Publicity and Psychological Warfare (P & PW) section. Nominally, an AGs PWD officer reportedthrough the AGs P & PW officer. At the Army level, Psychological Warfare Branches (PWBs) were formed within the General

Staff section G2 (Intelligence) of each Army.

Officers in charge of PWD activities in the Army Groups and the Armies were:

6th AG: James Clark

12th AG: Colonel Clifford R. Powell

21st AG: Brigadier Neville. The 21st British Army Group produced approximately 81 different leaflets coded AgG.

U.S. 1st Army: LTC Sheperd Stone, then CPT Albert H. Salvatori, then CPT Jacob Tenenbaum. The First Army producedapproximately 63 different combat team leaflets coded "CT."
http://www.psywarrior.com/mcclure.htmlhttp://www.psywarrior.com/mcclure.html


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U.S. 3rd Army: LTC Louis Huot. The 3rd U.S. Army produced approximately 56 different Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB)

leaflets.

U.S. 7th Army: CPT Roos, then Hans Wallenberg. The 7th Army produced tactical leaflets coded with the numeral seven. Anexample is "7 A-D 8," which has a propaganda text that starts, "To the Mayor. Mr. Mayor. American troops are approachingyour city..." and goes on to explain that there is no need to fear because American troops will not attack civilians. We have no daton the number of leaflets prepared in this "7" series.

U.S. 9th Army: MAJ Edward Caskey, then CPT Peter Hart. The 9th U.S. Army produced approximately 40 different CPH leaflets

The Psychological Warfare Division Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force An Account of its operations in theWestern European Campaign 1944 1945 explains some of the inner workings of PWD/SHAEF. In regard to the use of leaflets isays:

The largest single operation of PWD/SHAEF against the enemy was in the field of leaflets. Largest, that is, in terms of continuingday-by-day tasks and in day-by-day production of materials. The first step toward PWD coordination in the British and Americanleaflet efforts was the establishment of a joint layout, printing, and production section to serve PID and OWI. By May of 1945when Germany surrendered, and leaflets operations as such came to an end, the Anglo-American leaflet operation was utilizingexclusively more than 80% of the total offset printing capacity of the United Kingdom.

PWD also published three newspapers on a regular basis:

Nachrichten fr die Truppe (Messages for the Troops) was a daily leaflet newspaper, at first of two, and then four sides, whichwas dropped continuously on or behind the German Western front from 25 April 1944 until the German capitulation.

Frontpost (Front Postal Service) was a weekly semi-tactical newspaper produced by the Twelfth Army group for dissemination byfighter-bomber and medium bomber.

Frontbrief (Front Letter) was a weekly newspaper published by the Seventh U.S. Army team under field conditions.

In regard to dissemination and special operations the final report says:

Through the agency of the Special leaflet squadron, approximately 80% of all leaflets disseminated in the areas of the Anglo-

American armies were by the 8th Air Force. Approximately 10% was done by the Royal Air Force, approximately 5% by thefighter-bombers of the Tactical Air Force, and approximately 5% by artillery. A total of approximately 5,997,000,000 leaflets weredistributed over the Continent by aircraft based in the United Kingdom during the leaflet operation in the European Theater.

There were a number of special PSYOP operations performed by the PWD. Some of the more notable were:

Operation Huguenot: An attempt to convince the German High Command that Luftwaffe pilots were deserting to the Allies withtheir aircraft.

Operation Nest Egg: The use of psychological warfare to cause the German garrisons on the British Channel Islands tosurrender.

Operation Braddock II: The airdropping of small incendiaries to be used for sabotage by foreign workers in Germany.

Operation Clarion: The use of propaganda along with raids on the German transportation system to frighten repair workers and

demoralize civilian and military personnel.

Operation Capricorn: A mixture of black radio and white propaganda leaflets stating the Germany had already lost the war andwas fighting on needlessly.

Operation Aspidistra: Propaganda radio on German frequencies giving false orders and news reports to cause chaos among the

people and government.


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Another interesting Allied PSYOP campaign asked Where is the Luftwaffe. Colonel Robert L. Gleason discusses this operation

in Psychological Operations and Air Power: Its Hits and Misses, Air University Review, March-April 1971:

In Europea psychological warfare campaign enabled air power to achieve an objective that for a while appeared unattainable.This was in conjunction with Operation POINTBLANK, an operation intended to neutralize the combat potential of the LuftwaffThe problem was to destroy sufficient German aircraft in the months prior to OVERLORD to assure Allied supremacy of the airover the beachhead. It was obvious that the German Air Force was closely husbanding its fighter resources in the spring of

1944The psychological warfare people from the Office of War Information were called upon to assist in initiating a campaign tforce the Luftwaffe into launching more intensive attacks so that their aircraft could be destroyed by the Allied bomberformations, which at the same time adopted new tactics to provide maximum protection against fighters. The theme of thiscampaign was Where is the Luftwaffe? The subtlety with which it was done made it a classic. After initiation of the campaign,the number of fighter intercepts rose from 1800 in March to 2500 in April to 3200 in May. At the same time the Luftwaffe began tabandon its conservative tactics. In May alone, 1315 enemy aircraft were destroyed in battle. This figure represented 25 percent of

the German first-line fighters.

Leaflet GE-233

The leaflet shown above was produced by the American 5th Army for German troops in the Balkans during 1943-1944. Coded GE233, the leaflet asked, Wo bleibt die Luftwaffe? (Where is the Air Force?). The front shows a group of infantry troops at the frontand the text:

Where is the Air Force?

Even the best infantry fights in vain without air superiority. As experienced soldiers of the front you know what the lack of aircover means:Every advance is impossible. Positions, reinforcements and transport are smashed by enemy aircraft. Bogged down at all front

lines, the German Air Force is insufficient everywhere because production of aircraft goes down while that of the enemy isconstantly increasing. The soldier is still fighting courageously and with exemplary endurance. But a judgment has already beerendered for the air force. You know best what this defeat means to you.The back depicts a photograph of a bombed aircraft factory. The caption is:

Focke-Wolf plants, Mardenburg, East Prussia

The text follows:In the course of a week (20 to 28 February) the following plants were destroyed or damaged:Aircraft works Regensburg-Prfening (Messerschmidt fighter bombers). Aircraft works Regensburg. ObertraublingMesserschmidt aircraft works. Gotha Robert Bosch AG Stuttgart-Feuerbach (spark plugs). Daimler-Benz works, Untertrkheim

(air engines and weapons). United ball bearing works Bad Cannstadt Naxos Union, Frankfurt. Focke-Wolf plant, Berlin-


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Treptow. Siemens machine-building works, Berlin-Lichtenberg (air devices). Henschel aircraft works AG Berlin-Johannisthal

Klettner Ltd. Berlin-Johannishof (production and repair works). Focke-Wolf aircraft construction Ltd. Berlin-JohannisthalM.I.A.G., Brunswick (Me 110 components). General transport facilities Ltd, Lepsic-Mockau (production of Ju 88). Junkersaircraft engine works Leipsic-Mockau Erla machines Ltd. Leipsic-Mockau (Me 109).

We should note that not everyone was so enamored with the leaflet operations.

The Operations Research Office (ORO) of the Johns Hopkins University published a 1950 booklet entitled The Value ofPropaganda Leaflets Disseminated by Aircraft. Authors Kenneth W. Yarnold and Jean Marie Dady attempted to evaluate the

leaflets dropped by aircraft in northwest Europe from 1944 - 1945 compared with other propaganda media. Since this is clearlyimpossible, and there is no way to evaluate the number of leaflets with the specific results, the authors state:

The techniques used did not demonstrate that airdropped leaflets had any positive value.

Flugbltter aus den USA 1943-1944, Klaus Kirchner, Verlag D+C, Erlangen, 1977 depicts all of the American USG leaflets(approximately 53) and all of the XG leaflets (approximately 26) for the years 1943-1944.

USG 8

USG 8 is an example of the full-color American strategic propaganda leaflets produced for dissemination over Germany. It wasdropped in late 1943 and depicts an American B-17 with bomb-bay doors open. It tells the German people that the Americans haventered the war in strength and reminds them that it was the Germans who declared war on the United States. The text on thefront is, "Now the American Flying Fortresses are in action." The text on the back is, "This leaflet was dropped by an Americanbomber." Around the four sides of the back of the leaflet is the message, "Adolf Hitler declared war on the United States

December 11, 1941."


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Three FuhrersNo Reich - CT-36(Leaflet courtesy of Rod Oakland)

Tactical leaflet CT-36 depicts a cartoon of Reichsfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler with one hand covering a portrait of Adolf Hitler,and the other hand pressing on the head of Reichsmarschall Air Marshall Hermann Goering. Himmler's foot smashes a reliefmap of Germany. Text on the front is "Three Fuhrers" and "No Reich." This is a parody of the German slogan, "One leade one Reich."

Like the CPH leaflets, the CT series were disseminated by artillery. They were produced and distributed by the United States First

Army in Western Europe from D-Day+6 to the end of the war. A complete list of the CT series is illustrated by Rod Oakland inLeaflets Disseminated by Artillery Shell, PsyWar Society Blatter No. 23, 1996.

The German-language text on the back is over a large question mark. It is obviously meant to cause division within the Germanpeople, implying that Himmler is stealing power in the Third Reich from their beloved Fuhrer. The text is:

The large question mark.

In the last weeks, hundreds of your comrades and numerous German officers, who found safety and protection in our prisoner-ofwar have camps asked us:

"Where is Hitler?"

It does not interest us where Hitler is.

We only know only that on 9 November, not Hitler but Himmler delivered the "celebration speech".

We only know that not Hitler but Himmler issued the proclamation for the formation of the "People's Army."

We only know only that not Hitler but Himmler has taken the oath of allegiance of the "People's Army."

Perhaps that your officers can answer the question whether you are still bound by your oath of allegiance to Hitler in spite of thefact that nobody answers your question:

Where is Hitler?


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CPH-16 - Florian Geyer (Front)

We mentioned the CPH leaflets above. They seem to have been first printed about October 1944. The CPH leaflets were tacticalleaflets. They were used in limited local operations against the Wehrmacht for a specific operation or campaign. As you can seefrom the address below, this leaflet was prepared for use against a specific German division. Initially, the leaflets were printed in

shop in the Dutch town of Maastricht. Later, the CPH leaflets were produced by mobile printing presses in the field. They weredisseminated by artillery or grenade.

CPH-16 is in the form of a German field postcard addressed "To the 957th People's Grenadier Regiment of the 363rd People'sGrenadier Division near Broich at the Rur." The alleged sender is the "3rd company of the 957th People's Grenadier Regiment ian American collective camp." The text is:

Dear Comrades! When the Americans threw up a smoke screen, we knew that an attack was imminent. The whole bridgeheadobviously made no sense anymore. The Americans came across every night and captured a few of us. On December 8, they tookthe whole company. Because of that idiotic bridgehead the whole company was sacrificed. But at least we made a virtue ofnecessity. For three days we had nothing to eat at Hasenfeld. Here in the collection (P.O.W.) camp we eat three meals a day. TheAmericans immediately treated our casualties. We are allowed to write four letters and four cards home each month. Our relative

will be very happy to see us again after the war.

CPH-16 - Florian Geyer Card - (Back)


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The back of the card depicts a knight in medieval clothes holding a banner. The lines "Florian Geyer" and "just seems to be

dead!" are above and below the knight. The flag is inscribed "Colonel baron Florian von Gall." Near the picture is a typed textheadline, "The men of the 3/957 People's Grenadier Regiment accuse you, Colonel." The message is:

Why did we have to push our bicycles on the march from Ede to Titz? Why were the officers allowed to ride their bicycles whileyou sat in your automobile?

Why could we not hold on to the Hasenfeld farm? Because you had taken no precautions if it had been necessary to blow up theRur bridge. Do you seriously think that a foolish motto like 'Florian Geyer only seems to be dead' can replace shot-up pneumatic

boats?

You, Mr. Colonel, are guilty of the fact that the last German bridgehead between Linnich and Jlich west of the Rur near theHasenfeld farm was taken by the Americans. You wanted to sacrifice us pointlessly to save the bridgehead. But we saved ourselve

The accused colonel of the 957th People's Grenadier Regiment was apparently named Florian Freiherr von Gall (Freiherr =baron). In Leaflets from the U.S. Armies for German Soldiers in Western Europe 1944-1945, author Klaus Kirchner adds thatColonel von Gall was captured by U.S. troops and interviewed on 7 March 1945. He stated that he had seen the leaflet and wasamused by it.He thought that the leaflet text was a joke. The motto Florian Geyer only seems to be dead was designed to raisethe morale of his men who were trapped in the Falaise Gap. In addition, He felt that no German soldier would expect his

commanding officer to walk on foot with the infantry rather than ride in an automobile. He was sure that his men considered theAmerican propaganda text foolish.

The 363rd Volks Grenadier Division was reorganized on 17 September 1944 from the 566th People's Grenadier Division and thesurvivors of the 363rd Infantry Division that escaped the defeat in the "Kessel von Falaise" in France. It fought the U.S. 101stAirborne Division near Nijmegen and, later, the British in the Arnhem area of Holland. It opposed the U.S. 9th Army in the Rur

River area from November of 1944. As told in the text on the card, the Division was unable to hold the lines and lost the lastbridgehead of this front sector on 8 December 1944 to the American troops. It was during this time that the CPH leaflet wasprepared.

In Geschichte der 363 Infanterie Division, (History of the 363rd Infantry Division, Selbstverlag: Lubeck, 1977), author Helmut

Gohlke illustrated CPH16 and stated that it was fired by artillery on and around the night of 10 December 1944. Being a tacticalleaflet, the undated CPH-16 postcard was produced one or two days after the defeat. Kirchner mentions that 50 artillery roundsloaded with CPH16 were forwarded to the front on 17 December 1944.

Florian Geyer (1490-1525) was a Franconian knight. His fight for a better Reich was used as propaganda by the Nazis, since the8th SS Cavalry Division was called "Florian Geyer."

The 363rd People's Grenadier Division faced the American 9th Army at the banks of the river in November 1944. It lost the lastbridgehead of this front on December 8, 1944. German author Helmut Gohlke who published the story of the 363rd InfantryDivision in 1977, says that the Florian Geyer leaflet was shelled to the German troops on December 10, 1944.

Flugbltter aus den England aus USA 1944-1945, Klaus Kirchner, Verlag D+C, Erlangen, 1977 depicts all of the

American/British ZG leaflets to the German Wehrmacht (approximately 139), the WG (workers) leaflets (approximately 56) andall of the VG SHAEF Newspaper leaflets (approximately 27) for the years 1944-1945.


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Some Samples of ZG Leaflets

ZG 79K

2,160,000 copies of Leaflet ZG 79K were dropped in November and December 1944. The leaflet poses this question andexplanation to the enemy:

Enemy Propaganda? BOMBS could have fallen from the plane that dropped this leaflet. Why does the enemy send you leafletsinstead of bombs? Does he perhaps have to economize with bombs?

NO: This leaflet has a message for YOU. It is supposed to save YOUR life. Examine carefully therefore what it has to say.

1. Germany has lost the war. If there had been anything which might have staved off defeat. it would have been committednow, in order to prevent the invasion of Germany in the East and West. And since no wonders occur in the machine age,even the utmost bravery and willingness to sacrifice can only have one result: your own death.

2. You may be able to save yourself. Sometimes in attacks or counterattacks there is an opportunity to stay behind and letoneself be captured. The enemy is able to break down all resistance ruthlessly. It is up to you to give a sign, when in ahopeless situation, that you do not wish to commit suicide. You do this by raising your arms and waiving something whit


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ZG 80 K

Leaflet ZG 80 K reports "11,000 Casualties in one Division." 240,000 copies of this leaflet were dropped during November 1944.The text of the leaflet reads:

That is the history of the 710th Infantry Division since June 6, 1944.

First the 716th Infantry Division was simply crushed by the overpowering material superiority of the Allies. In the first onslaughtof the invasion in the West. More than 2,000 were captured in the course of the unequal battle (among them Colonel King, theCommanding Officer of the 736th Infantry Regiment). Thousands upon thousands of other soldiers of the division have been

buried in the soil of Normandy.

But that was not enough!

The survivors together with a few thousand newcomers, were sent from one catastrophe into the other; They are to try theimpossible also against the enemy who landed in overwhelming force in Southern France - and to try it from Nimes to Poix along

the Rhone and the Saone, up to the farefield of the West Wall, which meanwhile has been broken in the North. Again thousandsof casualties (and among them Colonel Hafner. the successor of the captured Colonel Krug).

The 718th Infantry Division has fought well - but the unequal fight has so far cost no less than 11,000 casualties in one division -and what for? That is the question which the survivors of the twice desolated regiments are asking. And the enemy's superiority ameanwhile not become smaller, but bigger.

After hard fighting and bitter disappointments the last soldier of the 716th Infantry Division must realize today: They comes a timwhen the sacrifice of human lives simply no longer benefits one's country and that time which had been reached before bythousands of comrades who have been taken prisoner - that time has now arrived for all.

FLASH: Major General Richter, the former Division Commanding General of the 716th Infantry Division is well, and is safe andsound in allied captivity.


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ZG 100

Leaflet ZG 100 is titled Lost! 9,161,860 copies of this leaflet were dropped between 1-11 January 1945. The text of the leaflet is asfollows:

The last attempt to avoid defeat has failed. The surprise offensive in which Himmler and Rundstedt have staked everything is

collapsing. Neither Liege nor Verdun were attained. Around the long neck which Rundstedt has driven into the Allied lines, is anoose that is tightening.

In order to prevail against the Allies one needs an unlimited flow of replacements, of tanks, planes, men and artillery. That such flow of replacements is needed, was well known to Rundstedt and Himmler. That they were not available, they also knew. Still thestaked everything on one last card - and lost the game.

What are the consequences?

1. Thousands upon thousands have already perished in this campaign. Further thousands will still have to die - but with ondifference: before, it may have had some meaning, but now you know that everything is lost.

2. The war may still be continued by the fanatics. But after the last attempt every soldier must realize (if he is a soldier andnot a party politician) that the outcome can no longer be influenced by fighting.

3. Again among the soldiers who were "lost", there are now tens of thousands who await the peace as prisoners-of-war.They have swelled the number of comrades who were taken prisoner in the West to 850,000.

Those comrades are the ones who won.


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ZG 115

Leaflet ZG 115 is titled: ONE MINUTE which may save your life. 3,928,544 copies were dropped between 12 March and 2 April1945. The remainder of the text on the leaflet is:

Read the following six points carefully and thoroughly. They may mean for you the difference between life and death.

1. In the battle of material, valor alone cannot offset the inferiority in tanks, planes and artillery.

2. With the smashing of the West Wall and the collapse in the East, the decision has been reached: Germany has lost thewar.

3. You are not facing barbarians who delight in killing, but soldiers who would spare your life if possible.

4. But we can only spare those who do not force us by senseless resistance, to use our weapons against them.

5. It is up to you to show us your intention by raising your arms, waiving a handkerchief, etc., in an unmistakable manner.6. Prisoners-of-war are treated decently, in a fair manner, as becomes soldiers who have fought bravely.

You must decide for yourself. But in the event that you should find yourself in a desperate situation, remember what you haveread.


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ZG 116

The bold red letters at the top of leaflet ZG 116 announces: Two words that saved 950,000 Lives. 6,980,000 copies of this leafletwere dropped between 10 March and 9 April 1945. The remainder of the text is:

"I SURRENDER" said 950,000 of your comrades in the West alone, because they realized their position was hopeless.

"I SURRENDER" meant that 950,000 of your comrades got out of the hell of the battle of material, into safety.

"I SURRENDER" meant that 950,000 of your comrades will see home again, healthy and well, after the end of the war.

For you two words show the road home TWO WORDS: "I SURRENDER".

ZG 118 K

Leaflet ZG 118 K lists the German prisoner of war totals as of certain dates in the West alone since the invasion. The leafletspoints out that as of March 7, 1945, the number of German prisoners had reached one million. The leaflet notes at the bottomthat: These soldiers are in safety. 8,500,000 copies of this leaflet were dropped between 12 February and 17 March 1945.

WG (workers) leaflets

These WG (workers) leaflets were created to scare away the German Civil (working) population away from the war plants. Similaleaflets were disseminated targeting the slave labor force brought to Germany from France, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Italy.Shown below is the front of leaflet WG48 with the English translation and the Italian version back to the leaflet.


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WG 48

1,308,978 copies of leaflet WG 48 were dropped between 19 March and 24 March 1945. The text of the leaflet reads:

To The CIVIL POPULATIONof Frankfurt on Main and Mannheim - Ludwigshafen

You live in one of Germany's most important areas of war industry. The whole armament industry of Frankfurt and MannheimLudwigshafen from now on will be subjected to a merciless bombardment. But the allies are determined to destroy not the Germa

people, nut the German war machine. For this reason the Supreme Commander has issued the following warning.

1. The warning applies to all parts of Frankfurt and Main including the following suburbs: Niederusel, Heddernheim,Eschersheim, Eckenheim, Ginnheim, Preungsheim, Seckbach, Fechenheim, Burgel, Offenbach, Oberrad, Niederrad,

Griesheim, Rodelheim, Hausen, Praunheim.

2. The warning applies to the town of Mannheim-Ludwigshafen including the following suburbs: Sandhofen, Waldhof,Kaftertal, Wallstadt, Feudenheim, Seckenheim, Neckarau, Mundenheim, Rheingonheim, Mutterstadt, Friesenheim,

Oggersheim, Oppau, Esheim, Frankental.

3. These districts are now combat areas. Every inhabitant of the above name districts is hereby warned to remove himselfand his family immediately to a safe place outside the battle area.

4. You are specifically advised that from now on, no shelter or refuge within the above named districts can be consideredsafe. Your life depends upon the immediate execution of these orders. Act now! out of the battle areas! Out of the war!

March 17th, 1945 Dwight D. EisenhowerGeneral,

Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force

To the Italian Workers


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One of four backs on leaflet WG48. The version shown above is the Italian version. Versions were also prepared in French,

Polish, and Czechoslovakian.

The PWD in Britain produced the "T", "V", "W", "Y", and "Z" series of white leaflets.

Working under PWD, the OWI produced the several "US" series of white leaflets destined for various countries: "USB" leafletswere for Belgium; "USC" leaflets were for Czechoslovakia, etc. Other "US" leaflet codes are: "USD" (Denmark), "USF"

(France), "USG" (Germany), "USH" (Holland), "USI" (Italy), "USJ" (Channel Islands), "USL" (Luxembourg), "USN"(Norway), and "USP" (Poland). OWI and the British PWE (Political Warfare Executive), apparently outside the PWD umbrella,

produced the "X" series of white leaflets, which employed a country code similar to the "US" series.

Tactical Military PSYOP on the Western Front

Twelfth Army Group. In the northwestern European theatre following D-Day, the 12th Army Groups Psychological WarfareDetachment (PWD 12th AG) was particularly industrious in producing (mostly) white propaganda. Within the 12th Army Group,PWDs tactical PWB attached to the U.S. 9th Army in the field produced the "CPH" series of leaflets. Another PWD tactical unthe PWB attached to the U.S. 3rd Army, produced the "PWB" series of leaflets.

Open Letter - PWB-33 (Front)

This United States PWB propaganda leaflet is entitled "Open letter" and depicts an envelope addressed in the old so-called

"Stterlin" type that was preferred by the Nazis, "To Major Voss / Commander / Fort Empress." The envelope shows a hand-drawn "stamp" and cancel with purposely illegible text except for the cancel date of 12 December 1944.

Open Letter - PWB-33 (Back)

The message on the back is:


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Major!

You know that Fort Mannstein, Fort Alvensleben, Fort Kronprinz, and all the other forts around Metz have fallen except yourfort.

You know that we will now concentrate all our artillery that was directed against these forts, on your fort.

You know that your fort is far away from the HKL since our troops are already fighting east of Saarlautern.

You know that your resistance in this hopeless situation will not have any influence on the end of war, and that your leaders havealready given up you and your subordinates.

You know that every day you hold out will cost the life of further casualties which could be saved in American hospitals.

You know that uninterrupted fire on your fort means further victims of dead and wounded men.

You know that the men you send out every night to secretly cross our lines for Germany will not achieve their goal.

They will be killed or taken prisoner.

You know that all the stories you are disseminating about the treatment of German prisoners-of-war are untrue. All POWs are

treated well according to the regulations of the Geneva Treaty.

Colonel STOESSEL and lieutenant colonel RICHTER knew that we will treat their subordinates fairly.

We agreed to the requests of the German medical orderlies, and they carried their casualties to the waiting American ambulances

German officers disarmed their crews and led them to the waiting trucks.

One glance at their faces convinced us that the German soldiers were glad to have escaped the war.

How long will your subordinates have to suffer?

Note: Metz is a town in Northern France, about 40 km south of the Luxembourg border. There were about 22 defensive forts inthe Metz area. "HKL" can be translated as "Hauptkampflinie," the "Main Line of Resistance" or "Main Fighting Line,"probably similar to the United States Army acronym "FEBA" or "Forward Edge of the Battle Area."

PWB-47

The front of leaflet PWB-47 depicts a map of Germany surrounded by the Allies. Part of the map is checkered and there are smalbombs drawn all over Germany. Text at the top and bottom of the leaflet is:


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Retreat on all Fronts

German-held areas on February 11, 1945Targets most frequently bombed in the last fortnight.

The back of the leaflet is all text and bear a long propaganda message. Some of the message is:

To All German Soldiers!

It must be evident to all German soldiers that this war, instigated by the Nazis, is hopelessly lost.

The result was inevitable, because, like the Nazi Party, the war was based on evil and unholy precepts. The Nazi Party dominatesthe German people through the rule of the gangster. That rule is; either agree with us and conform to our orders, or you will dieor go to a concentration camp. The Nazi Party has maintained domination over the German people and the German Army throug

its violation of the noblest impulse of the Human heart, which is the love of a man for his family and his blood relatives. The Nazihave intimidated every German through the persecution of his helpless and innocent family. The whole German people permitsitself to be dominated and ruthlessly controlled by one-quarter million SS gangsters under Nazi rule. No cause predicated on thesprincipals has ever succeeded in a world of righteous men, nor ever will

SURRENDER NOW AND LIVE

Rather than die in a hopeless cause.

12th Army Group

Leaflet 12 AG-20 - My Name is Joe Jones

The 12th Army Group after-action report mentions some special leaflet operations. "As occasion demanded, Group asked for andsometimes produced leaflets for special occasions. On the request of the field commander a leaflet was written and produced bygroup to serve as an advance calling card for the imminent arrival of American troops. This was printed in color (The American

flag) and with the picture of a typical American combat soldier. It was just called, "My Name is Joe Jones" and presented the


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thoughts of Joe Jones in the first person. Joe told the Germans that Americans had not changed since occupying Germany in the

last war; that Americans were out after a lasting peace and were smashing the German Army for that purpose; that Germans whobehaved themselves and had clear records had nothing to fear, but that Nazi criminals and those who resisted would be crushed.Some of the Joe Jones leaflets bear no code, others are coded 12 AG-20

Frontpost, 11 December 1944

We will examine 12th AGs progress through France and Germany by following the production and distribution of Frontpost,their successful newspaper for German troops in the Western Front (France, the Low Countries, and Germany). The productionof Frontpost and its offspring is a useful illustration of the frenzied pace of activities during the campaign in Western Europe.

While not forsaking its propaganda goals, Frontpost contained mostly straight news, and is therefore "white". The first issue,dated 14 August 1944, was prepared in the operations tent in a field near St. Sauveur in Normandy. The printing of the first issue

(Nos. 1 through 5) was done at Rennes, in Brittany. Single-sheet (two-page) issues were produced thrice weekly.

With the advance through France, the publication site for Frontpost and tactical leaflets was moved to Paris soon after the fall ofthe city. The first Paris-printed issue was dated 31 August 1944. Nine issues (Nos. 6-14) were printed in Paris.

Beginning with issue No. 15 (dated 22 September 1944), printing was moved to the plant of the Luxemburger Wort in the city of

Luxembourg. Beginning with No. 33, dated 13 November 1944, the newspaper became a four-page weekly. Since Frontpost wasbeing airdropped inside Germany, its content began to include news of interest to German civilians in addition to soldiers.Frontpost continued publication through issue No. 48, dated 20 April 1945.

The classified confidential Psychological Warfare Branch Combat Team booklet says in the Frontpost chapter:

One of the most important undertakings of the PWB Combat Team in the field is the editing, printing, and distribution ofFrontpost, a miniature but complete weekly newspaper delivered to German troops in the immediate operational zone. Thisnewspaper, written in German, is delivered regularly once a week to the opposing troops in shells fired by Allied artillery.

Although strictly an informative newspaper edited in a neutral manner, it fulfills major propaganda aims by providing Germantroops with an impartial, objective presentation of world news which is not available through any German medium.

The PWB Team booklet states that they were packed into shells that could carry 400 copies of the newspaper.


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Feldpost, 18 November 1944

In order to reach areas close to the battle lines not being serviced by Allied airdrops, in early November 1944 PWD 12th AG beganan abridged version of Frontpost, called Feldpost, in single-sheet leaflet size, to be released from artillery shells fired by front-lineartillery units. The first issue appeared 5 November 1944. Feldpost was initially issued once a week; later twice weekly.

The book Publicity and Psychological Warfare 1943-1945 by the 12th U.S. Army Group European Theater of Operations,

mentions the newspapers in greater detail:

"Early in November it was decided that the airdrop of Frontpost did not entirely fill the demand for getting news to the Germantroops facing us, since areas where a newspaper might be effective were sometimes not being reached by airdrop. To remedy thissituation, it was decided to produce a leaflet-sized newspaper to be fired from artillery shells. The first issue of this leaflet-newspaper, called Feldpost, ("Field Post") appeared under the date of 5 November 1944. Feldpost employed the same methods

and had the same objectives as its bigger brother Frontpost. Many of the same features were included, but in condensed, strippeddown form.


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This civilian newspaper was distributed by land, not airdropped. Die Mitteilungen was of standard newspaper size, a single sheet

printed on both sides.

Installing loudspeakers

Before we leave the subject of the newspapers Frontpost and Feldpost we should briefly mention the Ritchie Boys. In 2004Christian Bauer directed and produced a movie entitled Ritchie Boys which told the story of Europeans and German nationalsand Jews who fled the European Continent only to return as U.S. soldiers. They knew the psychology and the language of the

German military and people. In Camp Ritchie, Maryland, they were trained in PSYOP and intelligence. They advanced with theU.S. Army after D-Day and interrogated German prisoners, defectors and civilians. They drafted leaflets, produced radiobroadcasts and helped to publish Frontpost and Feldpost. They also went to the front lines in trucks equipped with loudspeakers,

and tried to persuade their German opponents to surrender.

The movie is based on the book Die Ritchie Boys - Deutsche Emigranten beim US-Geheimdienst, (The Ritchie Boys - GermanEmigrants in the US Secret Service), Christian Bauer and Rebekka Goepfert, Hoffmann and Campe, 2005. The author says:

We are at Colombires Castle, which the Americans just occupied. This is the Ritchie boys' first French headquarters. Hans Habe

played the leading role in Colombires. He had a staff of Ritchie boys with him. He had chosen the best people from the specialtraining course in Camp Sharpe.* They were writing for him - for the Frontpost - a newspaper in German which was dropped ovethe German lines. They edit reports and conceive leaflets. The production of the leaflets and newspapers was difficult under war

conditions. There was a lack of paperWhen they moved westwards, they had a mobile printing unit with them which made itpossible to print the leaflets and newspapers on the spot...The Ritchie boys found out that the German soldiers at the front lackedimportant information. The Nachrichten fr die Truppe newspaper was conceived for them. Stefan Heym came up with the idea t

print the Frontpost which appeared regularly after 14 August 1944. This newspaper was later published under the name ofFeldpost, and precisely described the situation on the front lines, together with maps and reports of the fates of soldiers andcivilians. The Frontpost, like the leaflets, was first edited at Colombires Castle.

*Intelligence personnel proceeded from Camp Ritchie to a staging area at Camp Sharpe, Pennsylvania, where they receivedadditional combat training, were formed into teams, and assigned directly to theater control.

The History of the 2nd Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company details the history of the unit from Camp Ritchie to the end of thewar. From the time the unit arrived in Normandy in the last week of June to the end of July, the printing section turned outapproximately 2,015,000 copies of about 15 different leaflets.

Charles de Maupeou wrote to me from France in January 2007 to say that he had created a free exhibition in the castle to

commemorate the time that the Second Radio Mobile Broadcasting Company was stationed there. The name of the exhibition is,The Ritchie boys at Chteau de Colombires in June 1944.

Before we leave the subject of loudspeakers we should briefly mention their introduction on tanks. Arthur T. Hadley talks aboutthe first use of American loudspeaker tanks in an article entitled Firing Potent Words from a Tank, The New York Times, 25September 2006. He says in part:

We soon discovered that reminding Germans that they would be treated according to the Geneva Conventions was one of the moseffective ways to persuade them to surrender. We would first outline the German position; then describe the weight of artillery an


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air power that was about to fall on them; then end with assurances that those troops who surrendered would be well treated unde

the Geneva Conventions.

After the Battle of the Bulge, we mounted a loudspeaker on a light tank of the Second Armored Division. The jury-rigged tankworked remarkably well. The loudspeaker itself was mounted on the forward slope of the turret and partly covered by a metalcasing that resisted light machine-gun fire. Some of the ammunition racks inside the tank were removed and the amplifiers for thloudspeaker fastened to the steel insides. The broadcasters were in the turret, the tank driver was forward in the drivers

compartment and the electrician who maintained the loudspeaker and electronic equipment occupied the assistant drivers seat. Ithree weeks fighting beyond the Rhine in 1945, the Second Armored Division credited the talking tank for the surrender of 5,000prisoners.

With the deeper advance of Allied forces into Germany following the crossing of the Rhine, even Die Mitteilungen could not servethe entire Allied-occupied area, and beginning 2 April 1944, 12th AG began production of its first local newspaper, Klnischer

Kurier. The Cologne Courier was highly successful, and led to a chain of local newspapers as the 12th AG advanced.

References for 12thAG activities: "News sheets as weapons of war," in William Daugherty, Psychological Warfare Casebook,Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1958, pages 556-562; this article was taken from History: Publicity and Psychological Warfare,12th Army Group, January 1943-August 1945, pages 116-126. Additional information is in Clayton D. Laurie, The PropagandaWarriors Americas Crusade Against Nazi Germany, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1996.

Canadian PSYOP

A Royal United Services Institute for Defense Study paper written by Oliver Ryan Clow dated April 2006 discusses Canadianpsychological operations during WWII.

Clow says that the Germans had broadcast French short-wave broadcasts to French-speaking Canadians starting about 1941. Th

The United States PSYOP Organization in Europe During World War II

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