The United States in Iraq

8/2/2019 The United States in Iraq

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Unitd Stats Institut of Pac www.usip.og Tl. 202.457.1700 Fax. 202.429.6063

UNITED STaTES INSTITUTE of pEacE

USIP 2011 All rights reserved.

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May 16, 2011

The United States in Iraq:Options for 2012

SummaryWith U.S. military orces scheduled to depart Iraq in December o this year, the State

Department and other civilian agencies are being asked to assume a scale o operational and

programmatic responsibilities ar beyond any other embassy in recent memory.

The capacity o the U.S. civilian agencies to assume these responsibilities does not now ully

exist. Notably, securing and moving U.S. civilians will require more than 5,000 security con-

tractors. A limited U.S. military contingent post-2011 may well be more cost-eective than

private security guards and could also relieve State and other civilian agencies o logistical an

security responsibilities. This would enable them to ocus on their comparative advantages:

diplomacy and development assistance.

Planning or the post-2011 U.S. mission in Iraq, however, remains hampered by uncertainty a

to whether the Iraqi government will request an extension o the American military presence

in the country. A small ollow-on U.S. military orce would appear to saeguard Iraqi stabil-

ity and make the achievement o U.S. strategic objectives in Iraq more likely, but cannot be

counted on. Should such a request not be received rom the Iraqi government, the U.S. may

need to reduce the planned scale and scope o its operations and goals in Iraq.

The U.S. in Iraq TodayThe U.S. role in Iraq is transitioning rom military-led to civilian-led with ambitious goals that embo

the once unthinkable hope or positive outcomes rom a domestically polarizing conict: an Iraq

that is sovereign, stable, sel-reliant and can contribute to peace and security in a region o the wor

vital to U.S. interests. With a December 2011 deadline looming or the withdrawal o U.S. troops, th

United States and the new Iraqi government are attempting to dene how a long-term strategic

partnership across the diplomatic, economic, security and cultural elds can urther these goals.

This military-to-civilian transition in Iraq involves the State Department and a plethora o civili

agencies taking on tasks ranging rom traditional diplomacy and development assistance to pol

mentoring, military modernization, and managing and providing protection to an estimated

17,000 employees and contractors in an improving but still lethal environment. Adding to an

already challenging situation on the ground, the unique nature o the current scal cycle has

urther increased the degree o difculty by creating uncertainty as to what resources will be ma

available to the State Department to accomplish its new multiaceted mission.

Sean Kane

E-mail: [email protected]

Phone: 202.429.3891

William Taylor

E-mail: [email protected]

Phone: 202.429.3871

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USIP 2011 All rights rese

The United States in Iraq: Options for 2012

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In a time o unparalleled nancial and economic pressures at home, there are no easy ways to

escape this conundrum. Yet the stakes are high. The success or ailure o the military-to-civilian

transition will determine not just whether the U.S. achieves some return on its costly eight-year

investment in Iraq, but also represents a testing ground or the U.S.s ability or war termination o

the asymmetrical conicts that dened the rst decade o the 21st century. The lessons learned

rom winding down the Iraq war could help to inorm the scheduled transition in Aghanistan by2014, as well as uture cases where civilian agencies take over rom the military in post-conict o

post-disaster settings.

The New Diplomatic MissionState Department ofcials1 have described their complex new mission in Iraq as based on our pillar

Broader Diplomatic Presence: Faced with the daunting task o replacing the 126 military bas-

es and 16 Provincial Reconstruction Teams when U.S. combat operations ended in August

2010, the new diplomatic mission will be the largest in the world. The plan publicly outlined

in February by U.S. Ambassador to Iraq James Jerey included 15 sites around the country,

including two consulates, two temporary Embassy Branch ofces, three air hubs, threepolice training centers and ve Ofce o Security Cooperation sites. This broad diplomatic

presencestill much less than the U.S. military presence even nowwas described as

necessary to give the U.S. government situational awareness around the country, manage

political crises in potential hotspots such as Kirkuk, and provide a platorm or delivering

economic, development and security assistance. In the years to come, the State Depart-

ment will likely ace a similar operational challenge as the U.S. military in Aghanistan hand

o security responsibility.

Development Assistance: USAID development programs, USDA agricultural advice and the

provision o American technical know-how to help Iraqis more eectively use their human

and natural resources are symbolic o the new relationship Iraq seeks with the United State

and the rest o the world. The Strategic Framework Agreement signed between the U.S. and

Iraq in 2008 provides an aspirational roadmap or the delivery o American assistance unde

the new mission and is in many ways the bedrock o the uture relationship between the

two countries. A similar ramework document to provide basic guidance on shared Ameri-

can-Aghan priorities on the civilian side could be helpul in organizing a uture military-

to-civilian transition in Aghanistan.

Police Development: In October 2011, responsibility or training Iraqs police will shit rom

the Department o Deense to the State Departments Bureau o International Narcotics

and Law Enorcement Aairs (INL). INL, the Department o Justice and others will work

on proessionalizing police management and shiting the police rom counterinsurgency

operations to community policing and rule o law reorm. The goal is a police orce that, un

like in Egypt or Tunisia, protects the population rather than the state. Police development

is thereore key to building a stable Iraqi democracy and is planned to include some 190

advisers around the country.

Modernization of the Iraqi Security Forces: Later this year an estimated 200-person Ofce

o Security CooperationIraq (OSC-I) in the U.S. Embassy will take over rom USF-I as the

mechanism or providing assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The 650,000-strong

ISF is judged as largely capable o maintaining internal security but as possessing key gaps

in external deense, including an inability to maintain air sovereignty or to conduct the

combined arms operations that would be necessary to deend Iraqs borders rom an externa

attack.2 The danger is not that Iraq will actually be invaded, but that its well-known external


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vulnerabilities will leave it open to coercive diplomacy and intererence in its internal aairs

by the region. The OSC-I will help ll these gaps by managing a $13 billion Foreign Military

Sales program, training the ISF on weapons systems, carrying out joint U.S.-Iraqi military

exercises, and implementing military exchange and proessionalization programs. Some

analogue to the OSC-I will likely be considered in Aghanistan in the coming years (a similar

ofce already exists in the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan).Even this short sketch illustrates why the State Departments top management ofcial ac-

curately describes the scale o the transition challenge in Iraq as a major endeavorwithout

precedent.3 In this context, it is important to constantly evaluate current plans and whether the

represent the optimal alignment o American strategic interests in Iraq, the planned scope o the

new diplomatic mission, and whether the resources are available to carry it out. Similarly, this

challenging calculus will likely be repeated in Aghanistan ater 2014, particularly i the current

economic conditions persist at home.

Prior to perorming this evaluation, it is worthwhile to briey recall the signicant tasks still bei

perormed by the approximately 47,000 U.S. orces remaining in Iraq. Under Operation New Daw

which began ollowing the ormal end o U.S. combat operations in August 2010, U.S. orces are:

Training, equipping, advising and supporting the ISF;

Conducting partnered counterterrorism operations with Iraqi orces; and

Protecting and enabling U.S. and international civilian partners in their continued capacity

building eorts.4

While the U.S. military is no longer engaged in conventional war ghting in Iraq, it is also not

limited to the purely advisory security and deense cooperation role seen in other embassies

around the world. Rather, under Operation New Dawn, the U.S. military is playing an operational

role as enablers or the ISF and other parts o the U.S. government and international community

U.S. Iraq Scenarios Post-2011The central external uncertainty hanging over planning the military-to-civilian transition in Iraq

is whether the Iraqi government will request a ollow-on U.S. military presence ater the current

Security Agreement expires in December 2011. Such a request or a continued U.S. troop presen

could have substantial implications or the scope o mission that the State Department is require

to take on. Given Congresss greater propensity to und Deense appropriation requests, it could

also aect the total envelope o resources made available or U.S. government operations in Iraq

These basic uncertainties necessitate scenario planning or the two eventualities o either U.S.

orces going to zero in December 2011 or a new Security Agreement being negotiated.

Scenario INo New Security Agreement

The U.S. strategic objective o an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, sel-reliant and able to contribute t

peace and security in the region is potentially at risk i the USF-I reduces to zero in December. Rya

Crocker, ormer U.S. ambassador to Iraq, has stated that the civilian capacity does not exist to tak

on the vast array o roles and missions that the military has so ar perormed.5 Notwithstanding

this, it remains important or the United States to demonstrate its respect or Iraqi sovereignty by

continuing to honor commitments made in the Security Agreement to ully withdraw its troops

schedule unless otherwise requested.

In this scenario, additional steps are required to ameliorate risks to U.S. strategic objectives

in Iraq. First, the under-resourcing o the U.S. Embassy, including OSC-I, USAID and the army


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o private security contractors needed to protect embassy personnel, must be addressed. No

diplomatic mission in recent memory has been asked to undertake the range o tasks the U.S.

Embassy is expected to take on ater December 2011 and the resources provided do not match t

requirements.6 Second, a reduction in scope o the planned mission may be required as is report

edly already being considered with respect to the INL Police Development Program and the two

proposed Embassy Branch Ofces in Kirkuk and Mosul.7

The State Departments comparative advantage is in politics, diplomacy and development. Its

management, contracting and logistics capability to operate 15 sites in an active war zone has

already come under heavy scrutiny.8 Despite the potential loss to U.S. situational awareness, a le

ambitious operational ootprint around the country may enable the department to better conce

trate on what it does best. Finally, the current American military presence in Iraq provides not ju

crucial air and intelligence assets to the ISF, but also promotes ISF proessionalization and helps t

moderate political ault lines, such as Arab-Kurd tensions in northern Iraq.

Contingency plans should be developed to mitigate the loss o these benets such as expanding

the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, substantially increasing the size o OSC-I, reviewing the theater

reserve, and prepositioning equipment in Iraq to acilitate crisis management during the transition.

Scenario IINew Security Agreement

While Iraqis understandably do not want oreign troops on their soil any longer than necessary,

a limited ollow-on U.S. military presence in Iraq ater December 2011 would appear to benet

Iraqi stability and U.S. strategic objectives. However, it is not yet clear politically whether the Iraq

government will request a new Security Agreement on a basis that meets minimal U.S. require-

ments. In considering the terms o any Iraqi request, U.S. decision makers should be open to a

time-bound agreement. U.S. commanders in Iraq have indicated that while the deadlines in the

current Security Agreement presented uncomortable tactical challenges, they also had strategi

cally benecial eects by driving better planning, orcing improved partnering with the ISF and

civilian agencies, and sending a strong message regarding respect or Iraq sovereignty.

Under Scenario II, a limited U.S. military presence could take the lead on ISF modernization

activities and continue to temporarily play an enabling role in ISF operations and lling external

deense gaps. As it does under Operation New Dawn, USF-I could also provide orce protection t

the expanded American diplomatic mission. Given limitations in the State Departments budget

ing and contract oversight capabilities, it is assumed that this option would prove more cost

eective and accountable than the estimated 5,500 security guards that the State Department w

require to protect and move its diplomats ater December 2011.9

At present it is difcult to quantiy the magnitude o any savings to the State Departments $3.7

billion FY 2012 request or operations in Iraq that would result rom the USF-I continuing to provi

orce protection. In order to better inorm lawmakers and planning eorts, the State and DeenseDepartments should consider developing such an estimate. In addition to any direct cost savings

USF-I security platorm could better justiy the remaining expenses associated with the 15-site pla

by acilitating greater reedom o movement by American diplomats. Most importantly, reed rom

activities such as operating mortar deense systems and driving advanced mine-protection vehic

State could better concentrate on its core diplomatic and development competencies.

ConclusionEven while Iraqi leaders have expressed complicated views on security cooperation with the

United States and clear reservations on requesting a continued American military presence in


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the country, they have unambiguously called or deepening civilian ties as the oundation o a

longterm partnership between the two countries.

The post-2011 U.S. mission in Iraq thereore needs to be structured around giving the State

Department the best chance o delivering on the diplomatic, economic and development coope

ation called or in the Strategic Framework Agreement. I Iraqis request a new Security Agreemen

this could best be achieved through the U.S. military continuing to provide orce protection andtransport or the U.S. diplomatic mission in Iraq. I no new Agreement is negotiated, the least ba

option may be or America to reduce the scale and scope o both its goals and operations in this

strategically important country.

Endnotes1. See Testimony o Ambassador James F. Jerey and General Lloyd Austin Beore the Commi

tee on Foreign Relations United States Senate. February 1, 2011. Available at: http://oreign.sena

gov/imo/media/doc/Jerey-Austin_Testimony.pd.

2. See Testimony o Ambassador James F. Jerey and General Lloyd Austin Beore the Commi

tee on Foreign Relations United States Senate.

3. Undersecretary o State or Management, Patrick Kennedy, as quoted in Warren Strobel, Sta

Dept. planning to eld a small army in Iraq, McClatchy Newspapers. July 21, 2010.

4. See Deputy Assistant Secretary o Deense or the Middle East, Colin H. Kahl, Breaking Daw

Building a long-term strategic partnership with Iraq, Foreign Policy Online. August 31, 2010.

5. As quoted in Viola Gienger and Flavia Krause-Jackson, U.S. Diplomats Take on New Iraq

Security Role in Aghan Preview, Bloomberg News. November 10, 2010.

6. This is despite repeated entreaties by Secretary o Deense Robert Gates and Secretary o

State Hillary Rodham Clinton or Congress to take a whole o government approach towards

unding Iraq appropriations. Lawmakers have been reluctant to ully und the State Department

operational and oreign assistance requests or Iraq despite substantial savings in the Pentagons

Iraq budget as the troop withdrawal proceeds. States Iraq unding request o $6.2 billion or FY

2012 represents a substantial increase rom its FY 2011 request o $2.6 billion, but the Pentagon

budget or Operation Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn has allen rom $94 billion in FY 2009 to an $11

billion request or FY 2012. See Anthony Cordesmann, Winning the War in Iraq: Creating and

Funding a Strategic Partnership, Center or Strategic and International Studies. February 23, 201

7. INL reported to the Special Inspector General or Iraq that it is reducing the number o polic

advisors and scope o its training due to unding concerns. Likewise, while the State Departmen

has received allocations or the approximately $700 million in start-up costs related to the Kirkuk

and Mosul Branch ofces, it is uncertain o uture unding streams or their expected hundreds o

millions o dollars in annual operating costs. The Kirkuk ofce could be olded into the OSC-I sitebe located at the Iraqi Airorce Base in Kirkuk and the Mosul ofce may not be opened.

8. See or example Commission on Wartime Contracting In Iraq and Aghanistan, IraqA

Forgotten Mission? March 1, 2011. Available at http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_

SpecialReport4.pd; and Special Inspector General or Iraq Stuart Bowen, U.S. Military Leaving Ir

Is the State Department Ready? March 2, 2011. Available at: http://www.sigir.mil/les/testimony

SIGIR_Testimony_11-001T.pd#view=t.

9. See or example Iraq: The Transition rom a military mission to a civilian-led eort, Senate

Foreign Relations Committee, S. PRT. 2011 1123. January 31, 2011. During an ensuing hearing,


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SIP provides the analysis, training andools that prevent and end conicts,romotes stability and professionalizeshe eld of peacebuilding.

or media inquiries, contact the ofcef Public Affairs and Communications,02.429.4725

2301 constitution Av., NWWashington, D.c. 20037

abouT ThiS Peace brief

This Peace Brie draws on the

authors experiences in Iraq and a

wo-day, o-the-record meeting

co-hosted by USIP in February

2011. The meeting included nine

government agenciesrom the

National Security Council to State

o Deense to Justice and Com-

merce and othersand ocused

on progress made and challenges

n the ongoing military-to-civilian

ransition in Iraq and how these

emerging lessons could inorm

ransition eorts in Aghanistan

and beyond.

Senator John Kerry also directly inquired as to whether military-provided orce protection would

more cost-eective option or the expanded diplomatic mission.

10. For example, in a December 29, 2010 Wall Street Journalinterview where he expressed a bel

that there was not a need or U.S. troops in Iraq ater 2011, Prime Minister Maliki strongly endors

the Strategic Framework Agreement, saying: We have actually asked or this...It is scientic,

commercial, economic, expertise, and trainingwere insisting that it be activated because its inIraqs interest. America is a superpower with expertise and huge capabilities in science, trade and

economy and Iraq needs such expertise.


page 6 PB 88 May 16,

The United States in Iraq

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