The United States and Humanitarian Intervention...

Jeffrey McMaster(POL 3DA)

The United States and HumanitarianIntervention after the Cold War

Iraq-Kuwait, Somalia, and Haiti

SPOL 3854 Séminaire de science politique et relationsinternationales

Professeur M. Schmiegelow

Année académique 1996-1997

Jeffrey McMaster

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

Humanitarian Intervention after the Cold War 1Introduction 1The U.S. and the End of the Cold War 3

CHAPTER TWO

The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Aftermath 9The Gulf Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance 9U.S.-Iraqi Relations before the Gulf War 9The American Decision to Intervene 15The Nature of the American Response 18The Post-Desert Storm Crises in Northern and Southern Iraq 22

CHAPTER THREE

Responding to Crisis in Somalia 26Introduction 26Roots of the Somali Conflict 26Interests and Policies of Key Actors 32Events Leading to Intervention 38U.S. Involvement in Somalia: From Euphoria to Despair 52

CHAPTER FOUR

Restoring Order in Haiti 60The September 1991 Coup and International Reaction 60U.S. Policy under Clinton 66Operation Restore Democracy 72Conclusion 76

CONCLUSION 77

BIBLIOGRAPHY 78

CHAPTER ONE

Humanitarian Intervention after the Cold War

INTRODUCTION

Since the Cold War began to wind down in the late 1980s, a change has takenplace in the character of the actions placed under the rubric of humanitarianintervention1. The institution that had been created in the wake of the SecondWorld War to prevent future conflicts, the United Nations, was severelyrestrained in its actions during the first four decades of its existence due to East-West rivalry. One innovation that did occur during the Cold-War period,however, was the technique of peacekeeping, which consisted of operations setup by the UN Security Council to separate parties in a conflict or to monitor orimplement cease-fires. Traditional peacekeeping operations were limited in thatthey could take place only with the consent of the parties to the conflict and thatthe lightly-armed military forces involved could only use their weapons in self-defense. Peace-keepers were also supposed to observe strict impartiality in theirdealings with the parties in conflict.2 Humanitarian assistance, by contrast, wasprovided by UN agencies such as UNICEF, UNHCR, and the World FoodProgram in response to natural disasters. Such relief efforts were thereforeconsidered to be apolitical in nature.3

In more recent operations under the aegis of the UN, dealing with whathave been termed “complex emergencies,” both political and humanitarianaspects are present. This new form of humanitarian intervention aims to assist

1 For this study, we have adopted the definition of intervention proposed by Peter J. Shraeder, i.e., “the

calculated use of political, economic, and military instruments by one country to influence the domestic or foreignpolicies of another country.” See Peter J. Schraeder, “Studying U.S. Intervention in the Third World,” in Peter J.Schraeder, ed., Intervention into the 1990s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner,1992), 3.

2 Thomas G. Weiss and Cindy Collins, Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention (Boulder: WestviewPress, 1996), 10, 29-30; A. LeRoy Bennett, International Organizations: Principle & Issues, (Englewood Cliffs:Prentice Hall, 1991), 142-3; United Nations. Department of Public Information. Basic Facts About the UnitedNations (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section, 1995), 27.

3 Edward Marks and William Lewis, Triage for Failing States (Washington, D.C.: National DefenseUniversity, 1994), 10.

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civilian populations in areas disrupted by war or internecine conflict by deliveringrelief supplies as well as to protect their basic human rights. Indeed, humanitarianconsiderations are often advanced in promoting the establishment ofpeacekeeping operations, as was the case in Somalia.

Like traditional peacekeeping operations, Cold-War humanitarian effortswere also subject to considerations of state sovereignty. Aid could not bedelivered without the consent of the receiving state.4 However, as peacekeepingand humanitarian aspects became ever more closely entwined with the growingnumber of crises in the media spotlight, attitudes toward the respect of states’rights evolved. Many humanitarian disasters were occurring within states, ratherthan between them, or in the vacuum created when political and economicstructures disintegrated. When violence breaks out in these so called “failedstates,” civilians are often targeted by the warring parties, and in any event areless capable of defending their rights and access to food than armed bands andmilitias. According to the authors of a study on recent humanitarian efforts,“civilians are often now the explicit objects of military operations. […] Civiliansnow constitute about 95 percent of the casualties in places such as Somalia andBosnia.”5

Faced with crises involving starving populations and heinous crimesincluding ethnic cleansing and genocide, the images of which were relayed by themedia, military intervention, with or without the consent of the ruling authorities,was viewed as the only way to ensure that humanitarian workers could carry outtheir mission, even if the option was not always adopted.

Both the rise in the number of situations demanding outside interventionand the possibility of such action are related to the reduction of tensions betweenthe U.S. and the Soviet Union. After having characterized the Soviet Union asthe “evil empire,” the Reagan administration began to seek better relations withthe Soviet Union following Mikhail Gorbachev’s accession to the post ofSecretary General of the CPSU. The new Soviet leader’s statements, thoughinitially received with caution in the U.S., nevertheless hinted that he might beseeking to abandon the confrontational attitude of his predecessors. Theimproved relations manifested themselves within the Security Council as early asthe spring of 1987, when the representatives of the five permanent members of

4 Strategic Survey 1992-1993 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993), 28.5 Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community

(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 3.

Humanitarian Intervention and the End of the Cold War

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the Security Council began to meet informally extra muros.6 Later the same year,in an article entitled “Reality and Safeguards for a Secure World” that appearedin Pravda, Gorbachev iterated his support for a greater role for the UN inpeacekeeping. Though this statement was met by skepticism in the West, the late1980s saw increased cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in theSecurity Council.7 The impact of improved relations between the twosuperpowers is best illustrated by the increase in the number of UN missionscreated over the last decade. Between 1956 and 1978, just 13 UN peacekeepingmissions were established, compared with 21 missions since 1988.8

THE U.S. AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Just as the end of the Cold War meant change for the UN and the concept ofhumanitarian aid, it also signified the loss of the underpinnings that had supportedAmerican foreign policy for four decades. Both the Bush and Clintonadministrations inherited various difficulties related to the disappearance of whathad justified so many sacrifices on the part of the American public. As early asReagan’s second term, the public’s lassitude with bearing the burden of the ColdWar became apparent. Within Congress appeals were made to lower defensespending and achieve a more equitable balance between America’s defenseefforts and those of its allies9. As the U.S. economy experienced slow growth atthe end of the 1980s, before slipping into recession in the second half of 199010,public attention became even more focused on domestic problems, to thedetriment of foreign policy concerns.

This pessimism was reflected in the debate over American decline in thelate 1980s. In Beyond American Hegemony, David Calleo argued for a reducedU.S. role in NATO and fewer overseas commitments in general. For him,“America’s oversized commitments, of which NATO is the biggest single

6 Marie-Claude Smouts, Les organisations internationales (Paris: Armand Colin, 1995), 139.7 Ibid. Dick A. Leurdijk, The United Nations and NATO in Former Yugoslavia: Partners in International

Cooperation (The Hague: Netherlands Atlantic Commission, 1994), 3; A. LeRoy Bennett, InternationalOrganizations: Principle & Issues, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1991), 128-9.

8 United Nations. Department of Public Information. Basic Facts About the United Nations (New York:United Nations Reproduction Section, 1995), 27.

9 David Gergen, “America’s Missed Opportunities,” Foreign Affairs 71(1) (1991/92), 2.10 U.S. President, Economic Report of the President (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing

Office, 1992), 21.

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Real GDP Growth, 1980-1991

-0.2 -0.1

-1.1

6.7

4.5

3.3

2.2

4.5

3.3

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0.2

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

component, have pressed the United States into fiscal and financial practicesdestructive to American, European, and global prosperity.”11 Another widelyquoted author in the declinist debate, Paul Kennedy, attributed what he perceivedas America’s problems to “imperial overstretch” in his work on The Rise andFall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500to 2000.12 Later authors such as Lester Thurow of MIT and Laura D’AndreaTyson, future Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors under the ClintonAdministration, highlighted the confrontation between the U.S. economy andthose of its allies. The subtitle of one of these volumes heralded “the comingeconomic battle among Japan, Europe, and America,” a struggle which the authorcontended the United States was ill-equipped to win.13

However, pessimism was not just the reserve of academe. Both the publicand political elites had a diminished view of their nation’s place in the world, afact not without consequences for the possibilities of humanitarian intervention.The 1992 presidential election campaign is illustrative of the context in whichgovernmental action operated during this period of change. Several isolationistcandidates ran in the primaries, including Patrick Buchanan and David Duke onthe Republican side, though they remained a marginal phenomenon despite

11 David Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony:The Future of the Western Alliance (New York: Basic Books,

1987), 215.12 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from

1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1987).13 Lester Thurow, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America (New

York: William Morrow and Company, 1992).


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echoing some of the voters’ concerns. More rich in insight is President Bush’sloss to Bill Clinton despite the former’s enormous popularity immediatelyfollowing the liberation of Kuwait. The keyword of the 1992 election waschange. Bush led a weak campaign effort based on his foreign policyachievements while voters were demanding that attention be turned to America’sdomestic ills. In response, Clinton and his team of campaign advisors pennedthe slogan “it’s the economy, stupid,” sensing the downgraded status accordedto international questions.

Several authors have described the public’s mood as the Cold War wounddown. Their assessments are generally in agreement with that of David Gergen,who wrote:

Will the United States during the 1990s still seek to build a newinternational regime, or will it slink away into a new isolationism?[T]here were enough clues in the months leading up to the Persian Gulfcrisis and afterwards to suggest that with the Cold War’s end, domesticpolitics will become a much more significant factor in the formation offoreign policy and will increasingly drive the United States toward anew world role that fits neither extreme.14

This prediction proved to be true, though the manner in which the Clintonadministration defined its foreign and security policy during the president’s firstterm was perhaps not as orderly as the previous quote might suggest. In theinstances where Clinton had criticized his predecessor’s handling of foreignpolicy during the election campaign, he quickly reversed himself, and for themost part followed the previous administration’s policy. The sense ofaimlessness in international affairs caused by these vacillations was compoundedby the lack of any clearly stated principles and goals guiding U.S. action in thisarea.15

Responsibility for the Clinton administration’s lackluster performance inthe foreign policy arena lies in part with the president himself, and in part with hisleading advisers for international matters. Clinton’s inconsistencies are notlimited to his handling of world events, rather they are present in all aspects of

14 David Gergen, “America’s Missed Opportunities,” Foreign Affairs 71(1) (1991/92), 2.15 Linda B. Miller, “The Clinton years: reinventing US foreign policy,” International Affairs 70(4) (October

1994), 626.

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his policy, including several of his much cherished domestic priorities. In theparlance of international relations scholar James Rosenau, we can see thepredominance of the individual variable in post-Cold-War American politics, orat least until the 1992 mid-term elections herald a new Republican majority inboth houses of Congress. Two main elements of Clinton’s character played akey part in defining the foreign policy process under his administration, hisdesire to be liked by all and his penchant for free-wheeling and rather chaoticpolicy discussions with top advisers.

President Clinton’s earnestness to meet with everyone’s approval workedat two levels to prevent the elaboration of coherent policy. At a more superficiallevel, Clinton often demonstrated that he could be easily influenced to change hisposition on foreign policy issues, which, as he stated during the 1992 electioncampaign, he did not wish to be the major focus of his presidency. A concreteexample which illustrates this point can be found in Clinton’s handling of thecrisis in Haiti in the spring and early summer of 1994. At the time, Clinton firstyielded to the pressures of the Congressional Black Congress, not the mostpowerful force on Capitol Hill, and that of activist Randall Robinson, who wasstaging a hunger strike to protest the White House’s policy toward Haitianrefugees. Shortly thereafter, Clinton, faced angry Floridians fearing anotherwave of refugees, effected another policy shift. As one analyst has describedthe president’s approach to foreign policy, “a skillful politician, his ear clampedto the ground, Clinton has proceeded accordingly.”16

Perhaps more serious however is the president’s tendency, as was alsodemonstrated in the case of Haiti, to use foreign policy as a means to deflectattention from his domestic woes, be they scandals or policy debacles. Ofcourse, such a charge is not true of Clinton alone. Similar allegations wereleveled at President Bush within the context of the Gulf War, in which he wasseen by some to be gesturing in order to appear more virile. But in a post-Cold-War world in which the United States is no longer constrained by theimperatives of containment and bipolar confrontation, and where Washington nolonger has familiar bearings, the situation has abetted the president’s tendencyfor frequent shifts in policy.

Finally the president, as well as his two top advisers in foreign affairs,Secretary of State Warren Christopher and National Security Adviser W.

16 Barry Schweid, “Dateline Washington: Warren’s World,” Foreign Policy 94 (Spring 1994), 138.


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Anthony Kirsopp Lake, were torn between their ideals and the possibilities thatwere open to them in light of both the domestic and international environments.17

Both advisers harbored hopes of including such “soft” issues as human rights aswell as greater support for multinational humanitarian intervention—on thecampaign trail, Clinton indicated he was favorable toward the idea of a standingUN army for just such tasks—in the administration’s foreign policy objectives,but they faced a public opinion that was largely opposed to an largeinterpretation of U.S. responsibilities overseas.

This popular sentiment was reflected in the 1992 congressional electionresults, which brought a more introspective Republican majority to power. LikeClinton, they been elected to accomplish a range of domestic chores fromlowering taxes to reducing the federal deficit, goals they saw best served byreducing the size of government. As former secretary of state LawrenceEagleburger said of the new Republican members of Congress, “They have noreal knowledge [of foreign affairs]. They don’t care about it. They’re focusedon domestic problems.”18 When they did preoccupy themselves with mattersrelating to foreign policy, it was usually either to lower federal spending or toattack the Democratic occupant of the White House.

17 Ibid., 146; Jason DeParle, “Inside Mr. Inside,” The New York Times Magazine, August 20, 1995, 33-9, 46,

55, 57.18 Robert S. Greenberger, “Dateline Capitol Hill: The New Majority’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy 101

(Winter 1995-96), 162.

CHAPTER TWO

The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Aftermath

THE GULF CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

It has been said that the Gulf conflict consisted of not one, but three humanitariancrises.19 The first arose when a huge influx of refugees arrived in Jordan infollowing Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, which, on August 23, led to a call forinternational assistance.20 This, however, was more of a traditional relief effort, atthe express demand of the country receiving the displaced populations, and willnot be discussed here. The second crisis, that provoked in Kuwait by theinvading Iraqi forces, was mainly used in the fall of 1990 to maintain attention onthe issue, as we shall see below. U.S. reactions to the Iraqi invasion and to thethird crisis, that which led to the creation of Operation Provide Comfort, will bethe main topics of this chapter.

U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS BEFORE THE GULF WAR

On October 15, 1990, speaking before an audience in Dallas, Texas, PresidentGeorge Bush limned the horrors committed by Iraq in Kuwait during the two anda half months since it had invaded its tiny neighbor. After evoking images of“newborn babies thrown off incubators” and “dialysis patients ripped from theirmachines,” he concluded by stating that the Iraqi president was “Hitlerrevisited.”21 In February 1992, almost a year after the cease-fire that endedhostilities between coalition and Iraqi forces, Bush administration officialscriticized Saddam Hussein and “the totalitarian government of Iraq” for“diverting humanitarian shipments for the personal benefit for his friends and

19 Thomas G. Weiss and Cindy Collins, Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention: World Politics and the

Dilemmas of Help (Boulder: Westview, 1996), 74.20 United Nations, Department of Public Information, The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict,

1990-1996 (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section,1996), 18-9.21 Murray Waas, “What Washington Gave Saddam for Christmas,” in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf,

eds. The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1991), 95.

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family […] while his people suffer.”22 These statements contrast sharply with theBush administration’s stance in the months preceding the invasion of Kuwait, andwith previous American policy toward Saddam Hussein’s regime. As late asApril 26, 1990, John H. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern andSouth Asian Affairs defended the administration’s policy of “develop[ing]gradually a mutually beneficial relationship with Iraq in order to strengthenpositive trends in Iraq’s foreign and domestic policies,” and argued againstimposing sanctions.23

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Bahrain

ArmeniaAzerbaidjan

Sudan

Iran

Uzbekistan

Oman

U.A.E.

Qatar

Turkmenistan

Kuwait

Georgia

IsraelLebanon

Syria

Jordan

Egypt

Turkey

Saudi Arabia

Iraq

Map 1

The United States first began to support Saddam Hussein’s regime duringthe Iraq-Iran war. Before the conflict broke out24, Iraq elicited little sympathyfrom the West25, and had turned instead to the Soviet Union for support and

22 Remarks made on February 14, 1992, by David Mack, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Easternand South Asian Affairs, and reproduced by the United States Information Service.

23 Transcript of House Subcommittee Hearings on U.S.-Iraqi Relations, in James Ridgeway, ed., The Marchto War (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1991), 43.

24 The war began on September 22, 1980, following a decision by Saddam Hussein to launch an attackagainst Iran to win back a parcel of land that had been ceded to Iran in 1975. The war came to a close on August20, 1988 following a cease-fire announced by UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar. See Jean-BaptisteDuroselle, Histoire diplomatique de 1919 à nos jours, 10th edition (Paris: Dalloz, 1990), 868-9.

25 According to an article in The Economist, “Before invading Iran in 1980, Iraq was a pro-Soviet Middle East‘radical.’ In 1978, it had taken the lead in punishing Egypt for seeking peace with Israel. It was a sanctuary for thedeadliest Palestinian terror gangs. And it made no secret of its wish to challenge both Iran and the weaker Arab


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arms.26 By the 1980s, however, the situation in the Middle East had changed.The shah of Iran had been deposed and in his place an anti-Westernfundamentalist movement taken the reins of power. To prevent the spread ofIslamic fundamentalism throughout the region, the United States, while officiallyremaining neutral, shifted its policy toward Iraq. In 1983 the ReaganAdministration removed Iraq from its list of states that sponsored terrorism,reversing a 1979 action by President Carter. This decision made Iraq eligible forU.S.-government guaranteed food purchases. Further U.S. aid came in 1987 inthe form of $200 million in short-term insurance coverage for U.S. manufacturingexports to Iraq. The Reagan administration furnished this support for thedictatorial Iraqi regime despite its poor human rights record, which included theuse of chemical weapons the war with Iran and, in 1988, against its ownpopulation. On the contrary, budding U.S. business interests prevented theReagan and Bush administrations from taking action to sanction such ruthlessbehavior. Although the State Department issued a statement condemning the useof chemical weapons by Iraq against its Kurdish population in late August 1988,the executive branch opposed a Senate bill that would have enacted severe tradesanctions against Iraq.27 Later, following other incidents, President Bush and histop advisers also argued before legislators against imposing sanctions.

Indeed, the Bush administration ignored a series of pronouncements by theIraqi president that, in retrospect, clearly show his hostile attitude toward the U.S.and its allies in the region, and toward certain oil-producing states. The firstwarning signal came in February 1990, at the first anniversary meeting of the ArabCooperation Council in Amman, Jordan. The meeting came to an early closefollowing a speech delivered by Saddam Hussein28, in which he warned his fellow

states to the south for the mastery of the Gulf.” “Kuwait: How the West Blundered,” The Economist, September29, 1990, reprinted in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents,Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1991), 101.

26 In 1972, Iraq signed a fifteen year treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. That same year, the U.S.began to encourage the Iranian government to support Iraqi Kurdish insurgents in their struggle againstBaghdad. See Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, “Iraq and the New World Order,” in Tareq Y. Ismael andJacqueline S. Ismael, eds., The Gulf War and the New World Order (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994),274; James Ridgeway, ed., The March to War (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1991), 12; Joe Stork andMartha Wenger, “From Rapid Deployment to Massive Deployment,” in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds.The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1991), 33-4.

27 Murray Waas, “What Washington Gave Saddam for Christmas,” in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf,eds., The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1991), 92-93.

28 The Iraqi president’s remarks were reported ill received by Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, whosecountry is the recipient of large amounts of American aid. See “Kuwait: How the West Blundered,” TheEconomist, September 29, 1990, reprinted in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader:History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1991), 100.

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Arabs of the danger posed by the United States. According to his analysis, theend of the Cold War and the decline of Soviet power meant that the U.S. woulddispose of greater leeway to exert its influence in the Middle East. He warned, “ifthe Gulf people, along with all Arabs, are not careful, the Arab Gulf region will begoverned by the wishes of the United States.… [Oil] prices would be fixed inline with a special perspective benefiting American interests, and ignoring theinterests of others.” Saddam Hussein’s concern for the price of oil, which in1990 accounted for 99.5% of all of Iraq’s exports, became a recurrent theme inthe months leading to the August 2 invasion. The source of this concern was the$75 billion in debt that the country had run up in its eight-year war with Iran.Therefore, as we shall see below, while publicly attacking the United States andIsrael—always favorite targets bound to rouse support from the Arab masses—Iraq’s president privately lambasted the rich oil emirates for overproducing oil.

The conclusion that Iraq drew, however, was not as menacing as thecontent of later statements. Saddam called on the Arab oil states to use theirpetrodollars as an arm with which to defend themselves, remarking, “Just asIsrael controls interests to put pressure on the U.S. administration, hundreds ofbillions invested by Arabs in the United States and the West may be similarlydeployed. Indeed, for instance, some of these investments may be diverted tothe USSR and East European countries.”29

President Hussein continued his anti-American rhetoric over the nextmonths by demanding the withdrawal of the U.S. Navy from the Gulf. A muchmore serious incident, however, occurred in late March and early April 1990. OnMarch 28, U.S. and British customs officials seized a shipment of 40capacitors—devices used for triggering nuclear weapons—en route to Baghdadfrom London’s Heathrow airport. A few days later, on April 2, Saddam Husseinissued a menacing statement in which he claimed that Iraq did not need todevelop nuclear weapons, as it already had binary chemical weapons at itsdisposal. He added a warning that, “we will let our fire eat half of Israel if it triesto wage anything against Iraq,” an allusion to the Israeli air raid that destroyed anuclear reactor under construction in the Iraqi city of Osirak.30 The Bushadministration however, limited its response to verbal admonishment that called

29 Speech to the Arab Cooperation Council (FBIS-NES-90-039, 27 February 1990: 5), in Shibley Telhami,

“Explaining U.S. Behavior in the Gulf Crisis, ” in Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, eds., The Gulf War andthe New World Order (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), 160.

30 Jill Smolowe, “Turning Up the Heat,” Time International, April 16, 1990, 20.


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the remarks “inflammatory, outrageous, and irresponsible.”31 Indeed, intestimony delivered before various congressional subcommittees a few weekslater, officials argued against imposing sanctions against Iraq. Secretary of StateJames Baker best summed up the administration’s rationale when, speakingbefore a Senate appropriations subcommittee on May 1, he said, “I think weought to at least be conscious of the fact that if we take that action with respectto [the Commodity Credit Corporation] or other economic measures [againstIraq], in all probability our allies will be very quick to move in there and pick upour market share. There will be some people in the United States that will be lessthan enthusiastic about that.”32

Saddam Hussein had already generated ill will in the West in March, whenan Iranian-born British-based journalist Farzad Bazoft was hanged for espionage.Later in April and May 1990, in addition to the attempt to smuggle nucleartriggering devices into Iraq, another secret weapons procurement scheme, whichbecame known as the “supergun” affair, received media attention in Europe.

At the Arab League summit held in Baghdad in May, once again SaddamHussein had harsh words for Israel and the United States. Challenging the U.S.,he attempted, unsuccessfully, to rally his fellow Arabs around a proposal toimpose oil sanctions against the American “imperialists.”33 Behind closed doors,however, the objects of Saddam’s attacks were Gulf states he accused ofoverproducing oil, thereby lowering its price. He claimed that for every dollarthat the price of the barrel fell, Iraq lost $1 billion in annual revenues.34

The lack of response by the United States to these repeated attacks surelyemboldened Saddam Hussein. One explanation of American behavior contendsthat policy makers and analysts were misled by a certain reading of the situationthat prevailed in administration circles in the early months of 1990. According tothis view, Saddam Hussein’s remarks merely reflected his unease with his

31 “Kuwait: How the West Blundered,” The Economist, September 29, 1990, reprinted in Micah L. Sifry and

Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/RandomHouse, 1991), 102.

32 James Ridgeway, ed., The March to War (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1991), 49. The Bushadministration remained determined to grant $500 million in credits that year to Iraq under the Commodity CreditCorporation program, even though an investigation into loans made by the Atlanta branch of the Italian BancaNazionale del Lavoro had shown that some CCC funds may have been used for arms procurement rather than theimport of American agricultural goods. See Richard Hornik, “With a Little Help from Friends,” Time International,June 11, 1990, 32.

33 Jill Smolowe, “The Sword of the Arabs,” Time International, June 11, 1990, 31.34 “Kuwait: How the West Blundered,” The Economist, September 29, 1990, reprinted in Micah L. Sifry and

Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/RandomHouse, 1991), 102-3.

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diminished power in the wake of the war with Iran. Articles critical of Iraq wereappearing frequently in the Western press, the U.S. Congress debated measuresto take in light of the human rights abuses committed by the regime, andmembers of the State Department met with Kurdish dissidents.35 Another reasonfor this lack of confidence was that Iraq’s economy was closely tied to those inthe West. The leading markets for Iraqi goods in 1990 were respectively theUnited States, Brazil, Turkey, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Jordan, France, andItaly. Together, exports these countries represented 78 percent of sales of Iraqioil to other nations.36 Iraq was also dependent on the West for its imports. TheUnited States alone accounted for 10.7 percent of Iraqi imports, surpassed onlyby Germany (13.3 percent), and ahead of Turkey (9.2 percent).37 Furthermore,Iraq’s relations with its Arab neighbors had benefited from the support the latterhad provided during the Iran-Iraq War. The U.S. was comforted in this analysisby its allies in the region, Israel excepted.

The United States was also constrained in its policy options when dealingwith Arab states, a major factor throughout the conflict. Before the invasion ofKuwait, Arab nations made clear to the United States that the quarrel betweenIraq and Kuwait over the Rumaila oil field was a matter to be dealt with amongArabs38. Arab governments were loath to ask publicly for U.S. assistance. Thiswas evidenced by the fact that, despite the buildup of Republican Guard forceson its border, Kuwait did non voice any desire to receive American forces tocounter that threat. Gaining Arab support therefore was a major concern for theBush administration before deploying forces in Saudi Arabia. Saddam Husseinattempted to block these efforts by appealing to an often sympathetic publicopinion in the Arab countries. When twelve members of the Arab League votedon August 10 to dispatch forces to Saudi Arabia, the Iraqi president respondedby delivering a speech in which he exhorted “Moslems and believers everywhere[…] to rise an defend Mecca, which is captured by the spears of the Americansand the Zionists.”39

THE AMERICAN DECISION TO INTERVENE

35 Ibid., 101.36 Encyclopedia Britannica.37 Ibid.38 Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine, 1996), 446; Bob Woodward, The Commanders

(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 194-5.39 James Ridgeway, ed., The March to War (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1991), 61.


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Much of how the decision was taken to send U.S. forces to Saudi Arabiaremains unknown. Few of Bush’s advisors took part in the actual decision-making process, and because of both the nature of the American political systemand the president’s own personal character—it has been said of him that he is“secretive and likes to rely on a upon a closed circle”—the ultimate decision laywith George Bush.40 However, once the decision to deploy had been made, theadministration was unanimous in its desire to avoid a repetition of Vietnam. Thememory of the United States’ involvement in Lebanon was also present in theminds of policy-makers, having already left its mark on policy under Reagan.41

In light of this, Washington strove to adhere to a series of principles to preventanother debacle: only commit forces when vital American interests are at stake;clear objectives and the means to achieve those objectives should be elaborated;obtain and maintain support for the effort at home and abroad.42

The requirements for the first guideline—using the military only when vitalinterests are threatened—were met, as a multiplicity of stated U.S. objectives inthe region were menaced when Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait. Chief amongthese was to prevent one state in the region from becoming inordinately powerfulin relation to its neighbors, thereby creating an unstable environment in an areathat contained slightly over 65 percent of the world’s known oil reserves in1989.43 Indeed, preventing a hostile country from gaining disproportionateinfluence in the Gulf had led the United States to support Iraq during its war withIran in the 1980s. It was not so much Kuwaiti oil or Iraqi oil that required a U.S.intervention—of the 63.3 million barrels of oil produced daily in 1989, less than 3million were supplied by Iraq, and fewer than 2 million by Kuwait44—but thenecessity to maintain a balance in the region and to prevent a rapacious andunpredictable dictator from dominating it.

The United States was also obliged to defend its non-Arab ally in theMiddle East, Israel. In the months before the August 2 invasion, SaddamHussein had made repeated verbal attacks not only against the United States, butagainst Israel as well, and the Israelis were clearly anxious. The U.S. goal of

40 David Gergen, “America’s Missed Opportunities,” Foreign Affairs 71(1) (1991/92), 7.41 Shibley Telhami, “Explaining U.S. Behavior in the Gulf Crisis, ” in Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael,

eds., The Gulf War and the New World Order (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), 163.42 Ibid.43 The figure was cited in The Economist, August 4, 1990, 54.44 Ibid.

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defending the existence of the Jewish state was, however, ancillary to the largerissues of preventing Saddam from advancing into Saudi Arabia and liberatingKuwait. One analyst has even gone so far as to note that the American Jewishlobby had little impact on the decision to deploy, as it would have had moreinfluence on the Democratic majority in Congress, which was reticent about theuse of U.S. troops, than on the Republican Bush administration.45

Having defined its interest in reversing the Iraqi aggression, the Bushadministration needed to drum up support both with the American public thatwould spending tax dollars and sending its sons and daughters for the effort, andwith the other members of the international community to make the operationmore palatable both domestically and abroad. In the passing months between thedecision to deploy and the beginning of the allied assault to free Kuwait, U.S.officials presented various explanations to the American public to justify thecountry’s policy. In a year in which the U.S. was already experiencing negativeeconomic growth46, the administration attempted to play on people’s fears byhighlighting the danger of loosing American jobs in a recession made worse byincreased fuel prices. If the Iraqi army moved into Kuwait, it was argued,Saddam Hussein would control over forty percent of the world’s known oilreserves.47 This approach apparently worked well in August 1990. Publicopinion in the U.S., as evidenced by polls taken at the time, was highlysupportive of the sending of forces to prevent an Iraqi advance into SaudiArabia. 75 percent of respondents to a Gallup poll were in favor of theintervention, the most positive response to a decision to use force in the post-World War II era. However, when asked for their opinion on the possibility ofan offensive strike to force the Iraqi army from Kuwait, a significant majority—59percent—were opposed to such action.48

45 Shibley Telhami, “Explaining U.S. Behavior in the Gulf Crisis, ” in Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael,

eds., The Gulf War and the New World Order (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), 155-7.46 According to the 1992 Economic Report of the President, “[t]he American economy, which was already

experiencing slow growth, fell into recession in the second half of 1990. Between the third quarter of 1990 and thefirst quarter of 1991, output fell 1.6 percent and 1.7 million jobs were lost.” See U.S. President, Economic Report ofthe President (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), 21. The convergence of thesavings and loan crisis, high consumer debt, demographic trends, and the impact of increased defense spendingin the 1980s brought about the recession, which was aggravated by speculation on oil prices and generaluncertainty in the business sector before the beginning of the operation to free Kuwait.

47 David Gergen, “America’s Missed Opportunities,” Foreign Affairs 71(1) (1991/92), 5-6; see also figures inThe Economist, August 4, 1990, 54.

48 Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, “Arms and the People,” Foreign Affairs 73(6) (November/December1994), 48-50. According to James Bennet, a Washington Post poll on August 10 had found that 68 percent ofrespondents were against an offensive to liberate Kuwait. See James Bennet, “How the Media Missed the Story,”


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In his speeches, the president likened Saddam Hussein to a bully whothreatened the nascent “new world order” by invading Kuwait and through hisprograms for acquiring nuclear and chemical weapons. Before the crisis, thegovernment had estimated that it would take between five and ten years todevelop a nuclear weapon. It revised its estimates after the takeover of Kuwait,lowering the amount of time Iraq needed to build a nuclear device to between sixmonths and one year, thus adding a sense of urgency to the mission.49

To ensure popular support, however, the Bush administration did not limitits appeal to reasons of national interest and security. It was also deemednecessary to emphasize the moral grounds upon which America’s role wasfounded. The plight of the foreign hostages, used as “human shields,” and thatof the staff of the American embassy of Kuwait, where “people inside are beingstarved by a brutal dictator,”50 were used to bring the conflict closer to home forthe American people.

President Bush skillfully managed opinion not only at home, but overseasas well. Gaining international support was critical for the success of the missionin several respects. First, by rallying the international community around U.S.policy, the administration made it much more difficult for Congress to object.The resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council gave a certainlegitimacy to the actions taken by the United States. This was reflected inopinion polls taken before and after the November 29 Security Council voteadopting resolution 678.51 Prior to the Security Council decision, a majority ofAmericans were against a war with Iraq; after resolution 678 was adopted,however, a majority was favorable to the use of force to free Kuwait.52 Inaddition, pledges by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to pay for part of the cost of theAmerican deployment, as well as financial contributions from Japan and

in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York:Times Books/Random House, 1991), 362.

49 Gary Milhollin, “How Close is Iraq to the Bomb?” (Testimony Before the Senate Armed ServicesCommittee, November 30, 1990) in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader: History,Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1991), 243.

50 Remarks by President George Bush on October 31, 1990, quoted in James Ridgeway, ed., The March toWar (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1991), 134.

51 Resolution 678 set the January 15, 1991 deadline for the withdrawal Iraq from Kuwait and theimplementation of all other Security Council resolutions related to the Iraq-Kuwait crisis. In the event of non-compliance, resolution 678 authorized the use of “all means necessary,” including military force to implement theresolutions. See the text of S/RES/678 (1990) in the United Nations Department of Public Information, The UnitedNations and the Iraq-Kuwait Crisis, 1990-1996 (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section, 1996), 178.

52 Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, “Arms and the People,” Foreign Affairs 73(6) (November/December1994), 50.

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Germany, which, for constitutional reasons, could not send military forces to theGulf, prevented the operation from becoming the subject of partisan debates overthe spending of tax dollars. 53 Furthermore, the participation of Arab states in thecoalition defused somewhat the sensitive issue of the presence of Americantroops in the country in which the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina werelocated.

Another way in which Bush and his advisers sought to prevent anotherVietnam was through the control of the press. A prevailing view was that it wasnecessary to control information that could potentially undermine public support.This was evident in the early days of the crisis, when the administration was lessthan forthright about the number of troops to be sent to Saudi Arabia.54 The lackof candor was often justified by the need to protect the safety of the troopsstationed in the Gulf, especially in the early days of the deployment, when theU.S. was numerically at a disadvantage.

THE NATURE OF THE AMERICAN RESPONSE

When the decision was made to send troops to the Middle East, it was presentedto the public as a defensive measure in response to a request by the SaudiArabian government55. Three months later, George Bush announced an increasein the number of troops in Saudi Arabia “to ensure that the coalition has anadequate offensive option should that be necessary to achieve our commongoals.”56 There has been some debate about whether the president planned toorder offensive operations from the outset, but it is clear that events elsewhere inthe Middle East created a sense of urgency.

The international community responded quickly to Iraq’s attack on Kuwait.Just hours after Iraqi troops had crossed the border into Kuwait, the SecurityCouncil adopted resolution 660 condemning the invasion. All five permanentmembers voted for the resolution and expressed their opposition to the act of

53 David Gergen, “America’s Missed Opportunities,” Foreign Affairs 71(1) (1991/92), 6.54 James Bennet, “How the Media Missed the Story,” in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf

War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1991), 356-359.55 In response to a question after the delivery of his August 8, 1990 speech announcing the deployment,

President Bush said unequivocally, “that is not the mission, to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait.” See George Bush,“In Defense of Saudi Arabia,” (Speech of August 8, 1990) in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The GulfWar Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1991), 199.

56 George Bush, “The Need for an Offensive Military Option,” (Speech of November 8, 1990) in Micah L.Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: TimesBooks/Random House, 1991), 199. Emphasis added.


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Iraqi aggression. In the United States, France, and Britain, officials movedswiftly to freeze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, while the Soviet Union agreed tosuspend all arms sales to Iraq57.

Despite calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqitroops from Kuwait, however, the Bush administration did not seem to becontemplating the dispatch of American forces to the area in the first days of thecrisis, an attitude which was in line with previous policy. This changed onAugust 5, when Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney was sent to Riyadh toconvince King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to allow U.S. forces to be stationed in hiskingdom. Nevertheless, the stated objective of the deployment was to defendSaudi Arabia against possible Iraqi aggression. A comprehensive embargoagainst Iraq imposed by Security Council resolution 661 was the sole meanspublicly envisaged at the time to force the Iraqi army out of Kuwait.

Part of the difficulty that faced decision-makers in the U.S. was that theywere torn by two opposing goals. They ardently desired to disarm Iraq and, ifpossible, topple Saddam Hussein’s regime, thereby reducing the country’scapacity to be a nuisance to its neighbors. At the same time, they wanted toprevent the destruction of the unitary Iraqi state, fearing the power vacuum thatwould result. At no point during the crisis did officials meet with Kurdishdissidents, who were viewed as separatists, or with Shi’ite Muslims, who wereconsidered to be fundamentalists. The goal finally adopted was, in the words ofa senior administration official, not “to alienate the Iraqi people—just deal withtheir leader, who has taken them down this dangerous path.”58 Even after theoffensive option was adopted, the goal was only to liberate Kuwait. U.S. forcesdid not continue on to Baghdad despite the fact they were practically unopposed.

During the first months of the crisis, the U.S. forces assembled in SaudiArabia were touted as a purely defensive deployment, and officials maintainedthat they would let sanctions run their course. The situation changed in Octoberas another crisis in the Middle East threatened to destroy the cohesion of theU.S.-led coalition against Iraq. On October 8, 17 Palestinians were killed andmore than 100 injured by Israeli police during a protest on the Temple Mount.59

The incident immediately captured the headlines, and was widely condemned.

57 James Ridgeway, ed., The March to War (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1991), 59.58 Elizabeth Drew, “Washington Prepares for War,” in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf

War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1991), 181.59 The Temple Mount is a site that is holy to both Moslems and Jews. The Arab protest had been called in

attempt to prevent Jewish extremists from laying the foundation for a new temple.

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The PLO Central Council demanded that the UN take action as it had in the Gulfcrisis, and laid blame for the incident with the United States, which it accused ofbeing favorably biased toward Israel. Saddam Hussein seized upon theopportunity to reiterate his proposal to link negotiations concerning Iraq’swithdrawal from Kuwait with discussions on the Palestinian question. Thissuggestion found currency in the public opinion of many Arab states participatingin the anti-Iraqi coalition, where rapid UN action in the case of Kuwait wasconsidered hypocritical when compared with the lack of progress in the enduringoccupation of Palestinian territories by Israel. At first, the United Statesattempted to defuse the issue by proposing to send a UN fact-finding mission toIsrael. The lack of enthusiasm among Arabs for this idea and Israeli obstructionkept the issue in the forefront of the news in the ensuing weeks. As the problemrefused to fade away, the Bush administration changed tacks and hardened itsstance toward Iraq in an effort to refocus attention on the situation in the Gulf.Although President Bush had seemingly adopted a more conciliatory stancetoward Iraq in a speech delivered before the UN General Assembly on October1, by the end of the he hinted at the possibility of a U.S.-led offensive. Duringthis period, the UK adopted a similar tone. It was against this backdrop that onOctober 29 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 674, which condemned“the actions taken by the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces to take third-State nationals hostage and to mistreat and oppress Kuwaiti and third-Statenationals.”60

The tensions in the coalition forced a reappraisal of the efficacy ofsanctions. Speaking before the House Armed Services Committee on December5, CIA director William Webster said that despite the apparent effectiveness ofthe sanctions, Saddam Hussein and his army would probably not be affected, atleast in the near term. According to his assessment, the army was lesssusceptible to feel the effect of sanctions as the Iraqis disposed of importantinventories of basic military supplies. But the key factor remained SaddamHussein, whom Webster felt “almost certainly assumes that he is copingeffectively with the sanctions. He appears confident in the ability of his securityforces to contain potential discontent, and we do not believe he is troubled by the

60 See the text of S/RES/674 (1990) in the United Nations Department of Public Information, The United

Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Crisis, 1990-1996 (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section, 1996), 176-7.


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hardships the Iraqis will be forced to endure.”61 Secretary of Defense RichardCheney expressed the administration’s view when he stated, “It’s far better todeal with [Saddam] now while the coalition is intact, while we have the UnitedNations behind us, while we have 26 other nations assembled with military forcesin the Gulf.”62

As already noted, President Bush was also eager to disarm Iraq, havingsent a large military force to the region at great expense. This explains the U.S.reaction to a last minute Soviet effort to resolve the conflict by offering an end toall UN imposed sanctions in conjunction with an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.63

Washington hesitatingly accepted, but established a deadline such that Iraqicompliance appeared unlikely.64 This fits in with a larger pattern of intransigenceon the part of the administration throughout the crisis that left Iraq little room formaneuver. Indeed, according to one writer, officials had dubbed the possibilityof a partial Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, though not from the oil fields or theislands of Warba and Bubiyan, as the “nightmare scenario.”65

Beyond strategic considerations, Operation Desert Storm enabledPresident Bush to appear strong and determined in foreign policy at a time whenhe was bogged down in domestic politics. In October, a budget agreement theWhite House had negotiated with Congress was defeated by a mixture ofDemocrats, who opposed deficit-reducing cuts in services and transfers, andRepublicans determined to prevent tax increases. Eventual a bill that leaned infavor of the Democrats proposals was passed in both houses, and was signed bythe president Two other bills passed by the Democratic-controlled Congress inOctober—one reinforcing existing civil rights protection, the other limitingimports on textiles and clothing—were not able to garner enough support tooverride the presidential veto. The president may have looked to foreign policyas a means to divert attention from his troubles with the legislature.

61 CIA Director William Webster’s Statement to the House Armed Services Committee on Sanctions Against

Iraq, in James Ridgeway, ed., The March to War (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1991), 154-157.62 Washington Post, December 4, 1990, A-34, cited in Shibley Telhami, “Explaining U.S. Behavior in the Gulf

Crisis, ” in Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, eds., The Gulf War and the New World Order (Gainesville:University Press of Florida, 1994), 168.

63 The United Nations Department of Public Information, The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Crisis,1990-1996 (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section, 1996), 27.

64 Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), 502-3.65 Elizabeth Drew, “Washington Prepares for War,” in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf

War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1991), 185. She states that

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THE POST-DESERT STORM CRISES IN NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN IRAQ

George Bush and his advisers never intended to intervene militarily in Iraqbeyond the region adjoining Kuwait where elements of the Iraqi army had beenmassed. And although in the wake of the success of Desert Storm the presidentenjoined the people of Iraq to rise up and eject Saddam Hussein from power, hismain objectives—the liberation of Kuwait and the destruction of the Iraqi warmachine—had already been achieved.

The Bush administration based its position on a series of considerationsthat militated against a more active U.S. role in toppling Saddam Hussein’sregime. Perhaps foremost among them was the fear of being drawn into a messy,long-term involvement in internal Iraqi affairs. As one expert stated, reflecting thegeneral sentiment at the time, “We all want Saddam gone. But unless Americansare prepared for unlimited occupation of Iraq, we’d do better letting the Iraqis getrid of him.”66 A major U.S. military operation to oust Saddam appearedparticularly unlikely one year before the U.S. presidential election, especially sinceWashington’s Gulf War allies refused to take part in such an intervention.67 Asthe election campaign wore on, and under mounting criticism that President Bushdevoted too much attention to foreign policy and too little to domestic issues,campaign advisers cautioned against any major foreign-policy initiatives.

Without the possibility of playing a more active role in the Iraqi president’sremoval, United States could only hope for an Iraqi solution to the problem.However, the forces that most likely would have opposed the regime—thecountry’s Kurdish population in the north and Shi‘ites in the south—bothpresented serious drawbacks. The Kurds had long sought autonomy not only inIraq, but in adjoining areas in Turkey, Iran, and Syria, making these countrieshostile to the creation of any sort of entity with in Iraq that resembled anindependent Kurdish state. They shared a common fear that granting self-rule toIraqi Kurds would give rise to similar aspirations among separatist elementswithin their own borders. Such concerns, especially coming from Turkey, aNATO ally and faithful Gulf War coalition partner, certainly played a part in

the “nightmare” dread by Washington was “less Hussein’s acquisition of territory than his remaining well armedand in power.”

66 Daniel Pipes, Director of the Philadelphia-based Foreign Policy Research Institute, quoted by ChristopherOgden, “Realism, Saddam and the Kurds,” Time, March 2, 1992, 28.

67 George C. Church, “Are Saddam’s Days Numbered?” Time, February 3, 1992, 14.


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Washington’s calculus.68 The other possible source of opposition to the Iraqidictator, the Shi‘ite majority in southern Iraq, was viewed by Saudi Arabia andthe oil emirates as being under the control of Iran’s fundamentalists, andtherefore constituted an equally unpalatable solution.

Furthermore, the intense hatred the Kurds and Shi‘ites shared for eachother, as well as deep factional divisions within the two populations, led analyststo believe that any attempt by either or both groups to overthrow SaddamHussein would end in a civil war for predominance in which Iraq’s SunniMuslims would also pay a heavy toll.69 Indeed, in the summer of 1996, oneKurdish faction called on the Iraqi army to intervene in a dispute with a rival,undermining U.S. and allied efforts in the area. One outcome that the Bushadministration wanted to avoid at any cost was the partitioning of Iraq and theattendant creation of a power vacuum in the region.

Hence, when President Bush called on “the Iraqi military and the Iraqipeople” to “force Saddam to step aside,” what he in fact desired was a militarycoup to eliminate the Iraqi dictator while maintaining a strong control oversociety. However, in the weeks following the end of hostilities in the Gulf War, itwas the Kurds and Shi‘ites, groups that had been precluded from playing apolitical role in a system dominated by Sunni Muslims, who were spurred toaction by U.S. rhetoric. The Iraqi army responded to the insurrections withunexpected vigor—Saddam Hussein had kept his best units out of the fighting inthe Gulf War for just such a contingency—first crushing the uprising in the south,then turning north, causing nearly two million Kurds to flee into neighbor Turkeyand Iran.70

The massive influx threatened to overwhelm the capacities of the hostcountries, and some saw the phenomenon as Saddam Hussein’s revenge againstTurkey for supporting the U.S.-led coalition. With almost 500,000 Kurdishrefugees along the Turkish border with Iraq, Turkish President Turgut Ozalissued a plea to the international community for a show of the same kind ofsolidarity that had been demonstrated during the Gulf conflict.

68 Ibid.; Bruce W. Nelan, “A Land of Stones,” Time, March 2, 1992, 27.69 George C. Church, “Are Saddam’s Days Numbered?” Time, February 3, 1992, 14-5.70 The United Nations Department of Public Information, The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Crisis,

1990-1996 (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section, 1996), 56-7; Chapour Haghighat, Histoire de lacrise du Golfe (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1992), 268; Michael M. Gunter, “The Kurdish Peacekeeping Operation inNorthern Iraq, 1991,” in David A. Charters, ed., Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution(University of New Brunswick, 1994), 97.

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After initial hesitation, President Bush finally ceded to allied pressure andagreed to commit U.S. resources to the humanitarian efforts underway,establishing Operation Provide Comfort on April 5, 1991 in conjunction with UNSecurity Council Resolution 688. Although twice as many Kurds had soughtrefuge in Iran, the United States ignored its appeals and concentrated its effortsnear the Turkish border.71 From the outset, the Bush administration haddetermined to limit its involvement to humanitarian assistance and theestablishment of “safe havens” under cover of U.S. air power to permit the returnof Iraqi Kurds to their homes. To this end, the United States imposed a “no-flyzone” over Iraqi territory above the 36th parallel and prohibited Iraqi militarypersonnel from entering the area. On the ground, 8,000 U.S. and Europeantroops occupied the zone. By early June 1991, the mission’s limited objectiveshad been met and authority over relief efforts was given to the UNHCR. In mid-July the last allied ground forces withdrew, but the ban on Iraqi military forces inKurd-populated areas remained in effect and was to be enforced by U.S. andEuropean air power operating out of Turkey in Operation Poised Hammer.72

The U.S. efforts in favor of the Kurds who had fled to Turkey contrastedsharply with its lack of action on behalf of repressed populations elsewhere inIraq. The difference in the rate at which Kurdish refugees returned from theTurkish border and Iran is significant in this regard. Those who crossed overinto Iran to escape repression were much slower to go back to their homes thanrefugees prodded by Turkish authorities and protected by allied troops. But theU.S. policy toward Iraqi Kurds in general was fraught with ambivalence. Whenthe Turkish military launched attacks in Kurdish-populated areas in northern Iraqto root out forces loyal to the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), the U.S.condoned the move.

In the case of the Shi‘ite Muslims, the United States initially refused to takeany action. Later a no-fly zone was also established in southern Iraq, but this didnot prevent the Iraqi army from continuing its reprisals, and the so-called “MarshArabs” were decimated as a result of the shelling of their villages.

In the absence of a successful military coup, U.S. policy toward Iraq hasbasically remained unchanged. As mentioned briefly above, rivalries between thePatriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party have generated

71 Michael M. Gunter, “The Kurdish Peacekeeping Operation in Northern Iraq, 1991,” in David A. Charters,ed., Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution (University of New Brunswick, 1994), 97-8.


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problems for the U.S. in Iraq, particularly in the summer of 1996, when the lattergroup invited Iraqi army divisions into the protected zone. Meanwhile, U.N.-imposed sanctions have remained in place, but have yet to have produced anypositive effect. On the contrary, the Iraqi regime has employed shortages offood and medical supplies and American missile attacks to stoke anti-Americansentiment among the population. The sole U.S. response has been to accuseSaddam Hussein of lavishing money on the construction of palaces whilerefusing to comply with UN resolutions that would allow him to sell oil inexchange for food and other badly need supplies.73

Following the election of Bill Clinton in 1992, little has changed in the U.S.attitude toward Iraq. Recently, the current administration’s policy, which hasendured under the label of “dual containment”—referring to the two potentialsources of instability in the region, according to the official U.S. outlook—hascome under attack by former foreign policy advisers.74 While conceding thenecessity of continuing the military containment of Saddam Hussein, the formerofficials they argue that “the United States and others should try to mitigate thesanctions’ effects on ordinary Iraqis.”75 Nevertheless, for the most part theirrecommendations remain within the bounds of the conventional wisdom,including “reassur[ing] Iraqis and their neighbors that [the United States] iscommitted to the integrity of the Iraqi state,” and “send[ing] a clear signal that itis prepared to work with a post-Saddam Iraqi regime.”76 Indeed, given the lackof priority that the issue constitutes for the present occupant of the White House,and provided that Saddam Hussein does not provoke U.S. action, the status quowill most likely persist into the foreseeable future.

72 Michael M. Gunter, “The Kurdish Peacekeeping Operation in Northern Iraq, 1991,” in David A. Charters,

ed., Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution (University of New Brunswick, 1994), 103.73 “Saddam Causes Iraqi Pain—Not U.N.,” (VOA Editorial), The Washington File, January 3, 1995.74 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Murphy, “Differentiated Containment,” Foreign Affairs

76(3) (May/June 1997), 20-30.75 Ibid., 25.76 Ibid.

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CHAPTER THREE

Responding to Crisis in Somalia

INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1992, American television screens were filled with graphicimages of human suffering, first of emaciated Bosnians behind the barbed wirefences of concentration camps, then of starving Somalis gathered in camps setup by international relief organizations. Yet, despite the simultaneity of theappeals, the United States chose to respond only in Somalia. Its choice wasmotivated by the belief that addressing the problem of the African tragedy was“doable,” while the specter of Vietnam prevented the U.S. from taking decisiveaction in the Balkans.

ROOTS OF THE SOMALI CONFLICT

Founded in July 1960 by the union of two former British and Italian colonies, theSomali Republic was a rarity among the sub-Saharan nations in that its peoplewere almost entirely of the same ethnic group, spoke a common language, andshared the same religious beliefs. Nevertheless, in the early 1990s a majorhumanitarian crisis erupted in this country which eventually led to theestablishment of a relief effort by the international community. A fractured socialstructure prone to strife and the political maneuvering of Siad Barre, a Somaligeneral who had seized power in a military coup in 1969, lay at the roots of thecountry’s breakdown of civil society.

The difficulty of creating a viable civil society at the national level stems inpart from the social institutions that evolved from the predominant economicactivity, nomadic pastoralism. I.M. Lewis, in his classic study on the Somalipeople, A Pastoral Democracy, describes the situation he saw while conductingfield research in the late 1950s in the following manner:


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Like many pastoral nomads who range far and wide with their herds ofcamels and flocks, the Somali have no indigenous centralizedgovernment. And this lack of formal government and of institutedauthority is strongly reflected in their extreme independence andindividualism. Few writers have failed to notice the formidable prideof the Somali nomad, his extraordinary sense of superiority as anindividual, and his firm conviction that he is sole master of his actionsand subject to no authority except that of God. If they have perceivedit, however, they have been for the most part baffled by the shiftingcharacter of the nomad’s political allegiance and puzzled by the factthat the political and jural unit with which he acts on one occasion heopposes on another.77

The traditionally pastoral economy of Somalia gave rise to a clan-basedsociety in which kinship considerations permeated all aspects—economic, social,and political—of life. The Somali people are divided among three main familygroups—the Saab, the Irir, and the Darod—which are subdivided into morerestrictive clans, these also being subject to further subdivisions (figure 1).Cohesion in the clans was assured by the diya, or “blood payments,” in whichfamily members were morally obligated to seek restitution for offenses committedagainst persons belonging to their group. As a result, traditional Somali societywas marked by recurrent internal inter-group feuding, especially over resourcessuch as potable water and grazing areas,78 or for reasons of prestige or honor,79

presaging the situation in the early 1990s.80 In this Hobbesian society lacking acentral authority, fighting ability was the main determinant of resource allocationand political status.81

77 I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of

the Horn of Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 1.78 Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, International

Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 18.79 I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of

the Horn of Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 242. Lewis characterizes the Somali as “essentially awarlike people who readily engage in battle or raiding to redress wrongs and injuries, to release pent-up enmities,to acquire or maintain honour, and to gain access to natural resources or to conserve their rights to them.”

80 Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, andStrategies for Political Reconstruction, Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C.: The BrookingsInstitution, 1995), 8-10.

81 I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali ofthe Horn of Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 242.

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In the political system that grew up during the transition from colonial toindependent status, nepotism was rampant as politicians and others used claninterests to further their personal gain. Working for the state as either an electedofficial or civil servant became the goal of many who wished to receive a share ofthe financial aid flowing into government coffers. A multitude of mainly clan-based parties sprung up before each parliamentary election,82 with most winnerseventually joining the dominant Somali Youth League (SYL). The scramble forself enrichment led to the neglect of national and local concerns, while therecourse to clan-based cleavages sometimes led to violence.

In October 1969, following the assassination of President Abdirashiid AliShermaarke, a military coup brought Mohammed Siad Barre to power. At firstthe coup leaders were greeted with enthusiasm as they acted to resolve manyissues that the parliament had ignored. Siad Barre adopted a policy of “scientificsocialism” and vowed to put an end to rivalries based on clan interests.83 Thisinitial euphoria was short-lived, however, as Barre soon adopted a tactic ofmanipulating clan interests and rivals to reinforce the power of his own lineage.

82 The 1969 election, in which more than 60 parties fielded candidates for 122 parliamentary seats, is

illustrative of the problems the political system faced. Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia: StateCollapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction, Brookings Occasional Papers(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 13; United Nations, Department of Public Information, TheUnited Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section,1996), 9.

83 Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, andStrategies for Political Reconstruction, Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C.: The BrookingsInstitution, 1995), 14; Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia,International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 19.

Figure 1 Major Somali Clans

IRIRSAAB DAROD

Digil RahanweinDolbahante

MijerteenWarsangali

OgadenMarehanDir Isaq Hawiye

Source: Adapted from Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, MultilateralIntervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction, Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C.:The Brookings Institution, 1995), 9.


29

Map 2

Somalia’s defeat in the 1978-1979 Ogaden war represented a watershed inthe central government’s efforts to assert its legitimacy. Siad Barre had usedpan-Somali nationalism to garner support for his rule among the people,proclaiming his desire to unite all Somalis, including those of neighboringEthiopia, in a Greater Somalia.84 Shortly after the country’s defeat, a group ofofficers belonging to the Mijerteen clan plotted to unseat President Barre. Whentheir coup failed, Barre’s government sought to punish the Mijerteen clancollectively by arming rival clans, employing violence against civilian clanmembers, and destroying their property. Large numbers of Mijerteen fled intoexile, where they joined various armed opposition groups that were eventuallyconsolidated into a single movement, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front(SSDF).85 This marked the beginning of the phenomenon of clan-based

84 Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, International

Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 20.85 Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and

Strategies for Political Reconstruction, Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C.: The BrookingsInstitution, 1995), 17; Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia,International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 20; United Nations,

SOMALIAETHIOPIA

SUDAN

KENYA

DJIBOUTI

ZAIRE

CENTRALAFRICAN REP:

CHAD

RWANDA

BURUNDI

Muqdisho(Mogadishu)

Kismaayo(Chisimayu)

Baidoa

SAUDI ARABIA

YEMEN

OMAN

.«.

. Hargeisa

Jeffrey McMaster

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insurgencies that would oppose the regime throughout the 1980s in a context ofincreasing violence and weakening state control.

Many of the rebel groups operated out of Ethiopia, which had strainedrelations with Barre’s government. They lost this safe haven in April 1988, whenthe two countries signed a treaty of non-aggression and noninterference.Insurgencies in both Ethiopia and Somalia had made the agreement possible, aseach side wished to reaffect troops along their mutual border to the task ofrepressing rebel movements.86 Under the accord, the Ethiopian government hadpledged to drive the Somali rebels out of its territory. These developmentsspurred the preponderantly Isaq Somali National Movement (SNM) to launch alast-ditch effort to conquered lands in northwestern Somalia in which their clanwas predominant. The army responded by attacking not only the SNM’s forces,but also the Isaq civilian population in the area. Hargeisa, the largest city in theregion, was reduced to ruins by government artillery and aircraft sent to expel theSNM.87

By using the armed forces ruthlessly against civilians, the government waslaying the foundation for the chaos that broke out in the late 1980s and early1990s. The army, which had become an instrument to mete out punishments tothe civil population, grew ever more unruly. At the same time, the firearms thegovernment had furnished to rival clans to punish the family members of rebelscirculated widely. According to 1993 figures compiled by the United NationsDevelopment Program, Somalia spent five times more on defense than it did oneducation and health, making it one of the world’s most militarized states.88 Thelack of spending on schools and infrastructure and the climate of civil warcreated a generation of young men with little skills or education that turned toviolence to survive. Faced with dim prospects for their future, they joined theranks of the mooryaan, gangs of khat-chewing bandits89 that created additionalinsecurity in a country torn by inter-clan strife.

Department of Public Information, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: United NationsReproduction Section,1996), 11.

86 Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia : State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, andStrategies for Political Reconstruction, Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C. : The BrookingsInstitution, 1995), 18.

87 Peter Biles, “Anarchy Rules,” Africa Report 37(4) (July-August 1992), 32; United Nations, Department ofPublic Information, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: United Nations ReproductionSection,1996), 11.

88 United Nations, Department of Public Information, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (NewYork: United Nations Reproduction Section,1996), 11.

89 Leaves of khat are chewed for their stimulating effect.


31

This explosive situation was aggravated by recruiting methods adoptedduring the 1980s that had transformed the army into a hotchpotch of clan-basedunits. Those units that remained faithful to Barre sought to stem the rising tide ofpolitical opposition by violently quelling anti-government protests. They alsoincreasingly availed themselves to various criminal activities—theft, rape, andmurder—as Somalia descended into chaos.

In their desire to topple Barre’s government, the various Somali factionswere briefly united in their goal. However, as the designs of the clans were thesame—seizing power for their members as Siad Barre had for his own90—therenewal of antagonism among the different groups was inevitable. Thus, whenPresident Barre finally fled Mogadishu in January 1991, the alliance between theHawiye clan’s United Somali Congress (USC), the Ogadeni Somali PatrioticMovement (SPM), and the Isaq-based SNM crumbled, inaugurating a period oftotal absence of an even nominal central authority that has continued to this day.

INTERESTS AND POLICIES OF KEY ACTORS

Cold War superpower rivalry extended to sub-Saharan Africa, though usuallynot, at least for the United States, with the intensity that marked relations withother parts of the globe. Nevertheless, the U.S. and the Soviet Union contributedconsiderable amounts of financial and military aid to countries that were willing toalign themselves. With the decline in East-West tensions, however, the attentionof the major powers has been diverted from Africa to other regions, mainly as theresult of two factors.

First, with the end of the Cold War, climatic changes were taking place inEurope. The threat of war receded on the continent that had come to symbolizethe tension between ideological blocs, as Communist regimes fell and Soviettroops withdrew. NATO, long one of the United States’ principal overseascommitments, first saw its adversary retreat, then collapse. Relations with theemerging democracies had to be defined and financial aid to rebuild economiesdevastated by nearly a half-century of Communist rule had to be found, while theAtlantic Alliance, deprived of its traditional adversary, needed to find a newraison d’être. A series of crises that sprung up elsewhere, most notably in the

90 Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar, “The Lessons of Famine,” Africa Report 37(6) (November-December

1992), 64.

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Persian Gulf and the former Yugoslavia, further absorbed the attention of the keyactors in the international system.

Second, as the Cold War abated, most African states lost whateverpolitical or strategic interest they held in the past.91 They are for the most partpoor countries saddled with foreign debt and constrained by multipleimpediments to economic development too numerous to go into here.92 Thewhole of the continent of Africa has a combined GNP dwarfed by that of GreatBritain. The Third World accounts for less than 20 percent of world economicproduction.93 At the beginning of the 1990s, with the exception of oil, littleconcern was voiced about access to strategic raw materials produced by ThirdWorld countries. From a U.S. standpoint, there existed alternative sources formost raw materials, though at a greater expense.94 More importantly, however,with the end of superpower rivalry it was less likely that resources and strategicsites would fall into unfriendly hands.

Of the sub-Saharan African nations, Somalia was one of the poorest andleast well-endowed. Barely two percent of the land is arable, and the lack ofcultivable land combined with recurrent droughts were responsible for thecountry’s chronic food deficit.95 Nevertheless, agriculture formed the backboneof the economy before fighting and drought drove villagers to the cities in searchof food being distributed by nongovernmental organizations. In 1987, 72 percentof the labor market was employed in traditional farming activities—approximatelyone quarter of the population were sedentary farmers, while nearly twice thatnumber were nomadic herdsmen.96 Despite the unfavorable environment,Somalia did produce enough of some commodities, mainly live animals and

91 Michael Chege, “Remembering Africa,” Foreign Affairs 71(1) (1991/92), 156.92 Among the many problems African nations have to face are poor infrastructure and services, including

health and education, with the implications these carry for the workforce, and dependence on few or singleproducts that form the basis of the economy.

93 Stephen M. Walt, “U.S. Grand Strategy for the 1990s: The Case for Finite Containment,” in Daniel J.Kaufman, David S. Clark, and Kevin P. Sheehan, eds., U.S. National Security Strategy for the 1990s (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 146. See also Thierry de Montbrial, ed., RAMSES 96 (Paris:Dunod/Institut français des relations internationales, 1995), 386.

94 Stephen M. Walt, “U.S. Grand Strategy for the 1990s: The Case for Finite Containment,” in Daniel J.Kaufman, David S. Clark, and Kevin P. Sheehan, eds., U.S. National Security Strategy for the 1990s (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 147.

95 A large influx of ethnic Somali refugees from Ethiopia in the wake of the Ogaden War taxed Somalia’sscarce food resources, leading to a major humanitarian crisis in the late 1970s. See United Nations, Department ofPublic Information, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: United Nations ReproductionSection,1996), 13.

96 The Economist Book of Vital Statistics (London: The Economist Books Ltd, 1990), 57; “Somalia,”Encyclopedia Britannica 1992 World Data, 700; United Nations, Department of Public Information, The UnitedNations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section,1996), 13.


33

bananas, for export. The main markets for Somali livestock, which accountedfor more than half of the country’s exports, were its neighbors on the Arabianpeninsula, led by Saudi Arabia, the destination of 51 percent of Somalia’sexports.97 Notwithstanding these commercial ties, the Arab states, as well asmost African nations, were conspicuously absent from efforts to remedy thesituation in Somalia.

Although UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his report AnAgenda for Peace, called for a greater involvement of regional organizations inthe resolution of post-Cold War crises, regional and intergovernmentalorganizations of which Somalia was a member—the Arab League, theOrganization of Islamic Conference, and the Organization of African Unity(OAU)—largely failed to heed his call. Somalia’s Arab neighbors were absorbedin dealing with the Gulf conflict and its aftermath when the crisis was still in itsearly stages, while the OAU consisted of members whose economic situationprohibited them from intervening effectively.98 Even UN Secretary-GeneralBoutros-Boutros Ghali was unable to rally his fellow Arabs to the cause. As oneobserver described the situation, “the Arab League and the Organization ofAfrican Unity largely ignored Somalia. Sub-Saharan Africa essentially deserted it.[No sub-Saharan] country, other than Sudan, has sent a single grain of food.Neighborly help consisted primarily of Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s passiveacceptance of Somali refugees.”99 Figures compiled by the UN on donationsshow just how little the wealthy oil-producing states across the Gulf of Aden didfor their fellow Muslims suffering in Somalia. By mid-January 1993, SaudiArabia contributed a mere $10 million to a trust fund, set up under SecurityCouncil Resolution 794 of December 3, 1992, whereas Japan had given ten timesthat amount. As for relief contributions, Saudi Arabia provided slightly over $1.2million, with OPEC as a group offering $1 million, out of a total of $335 millionreceived from various donor countries.100 As another of critic of the regionalorganizations’ inefficacy in the Somali crisis has pointed out, most regional

97 The Economist Book of Vital Statistics (London: The Economist Books Ltd, 1990), 160.98 Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, International

Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 14.99 Jonathan Stevenson, “Hope Restored in Somalia?” Foreign Policy 91 (Summer 1993), 145.100 Figures from UN Africa Recovery Briefing Paper, No. 7, 15 January 1993, 2, cited in Samuel M. Makinda,

Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, International Peace Academy OccasionalPaper Series (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 44-5.

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organizations lack the resources to handle humanitarian emergencies because theywere not created with this contingency in mind.101

The role of one Arab state that did actively participate in efforts to reach adiplomatic solution, Egypt, deserves further mention. Of course, Egyptiandiplomat Boutros Boutros-Ghali played an important role as secretary-general ofthe United Nations, using the pulpit of his office Secretariat to shame themembers of the Security Council into action in 1992. But Egypt’s, and Boutros-Ghali’s, involvement go back much further, as Cairo had historical and regionalinterests in Somalia. Both Egypt and Italy tried unsuccessfully in late 1990 tobring Siad Barre’s government and opposition groups to the negotiating table towork toward a smooth transition of power. Boutros-Ghali himself, during histenure in the Egyptian foreign ministry, was involved both in the talks aimed atdefusing the situation in Somalia and, earlier, in handling the military and financialassistance that Egypt had provided Barre over the years.102 He was thus a figureof suspicion to many Somalis, a burden he carried with him to his post at theUN. According to one rumor, the aid that Boutros-Ghali had overseen was partof an agreement by which Egyptians would be given rights to Somalia’s scarcearable land, taking it away from native Somalis.103 Regardless of the rumor’sveracity, it nevertheless tainted the secretary-general’s image, and added to theUnited Nations problems as well. The fact that the Egyptian government wasseen as leaning in favor of Aidid’s rival within the United Somali Congress, AliMahdi, did little to facilitate either Boutros-Ghali’s or Cairo’s roles innegotiations.

Other African states involved in the numerous talks aimed at reaching adiplomatic solution to the conflict were neighboring Djibouti, which has its ownpopulation of ethnic Somalis, as well as Ethiopia and Eritrea. The latter two wereparticularly active in late 1993, following the deaths of U.S. Rangers and thesubsequent decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia. They wereencouraged to do so by the United States, which, after the debacle in October1993, had adopted a policy of seeking “African solutions to African

101 Thomas G. Weiss, “Rekindling Hope in UN Humanitarian Intervention,” in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey

Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention (Boulder: WestviewPress, 1997), 219.

102 Gérard Prunier, “The Experience of European Armies in Operation Restore Hope,” in Walter Clarke andJeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention (Boulder:Westview Press, 1997), 146, note 11.

103 Jonathan Stevenson, “Hope Restored in Somalia?” Foreign Policy 91 (Summer 1993), 149.


35

problems.”104 Nevertheless, they too suffered, as did most actors whointervened, from a perception of siding with one party, to the detriment of others.

Somalia’s other major trading partner, Italy, has a long history in theSomali banana industry dating back to the colonial days. Italian investments inthe banana production placed Italy as the country’s second leading export marketand procured it a quasi-monopoly in that sector.105 The Italian government wasactive in Somalia as well, providing funds designated as development and militaryaid. Political scandals that erupted in the early 1990s brought to light variousshady government dealings with the Barre government and kickback schemesinvolving development projects to establish a Somali fishing industry.106 Thus,while Italy, on both economic and historical grounds, had an interest in therestoration of some semblance of order in Somalia, the “clean hands”government was constrained in the actions it could take, lest it appear to befollowing in the footsteps of its disavowed predecessors.

The United States, like Egypt and Italy, had long provided military andfinancial aid to Somalia. Although Siad Barre had chosen in 1974 to align hiscountry with the Soviet Union, the relationship was not an easy one, and shortlythereafter, discrete overtures were made, via the Saudis, seeking U.S. aid in returnfor breaking with the Soviets. At the time, however, such propositions weremade to no avail. The administration feared that without the Soviet naval base inBarbera, it would be unable to justify the planned expansion of facilities at DiegoGarcia. After the Soviets and Cubans sided with Ethiopia in the 1977-1978Ogaden War, Somalia turned once again to the United States to ask for arms anddevelopment assistance in return for cutting their ties with the Soviet Union. Butit was only after the Shah of Iran was deposed in 1979 that the United Statesaccorded a presence in the region any strategic importance. As Chester Croker,former assistant secretary of state for African affairs, stated in 1983 whiletestifying before a House of Representatives subcommittee, “Our strategicinterests in the Horn of Africa are strictly corollary to our broader interests in

104 Ken Menkhaus, “International Peacebuilding and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation in

Somalia,” in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed HumanitarianIntervention (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 47.

105 Ibid. See also Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia : State Collapse, MultilateralIntervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction, Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C. : TheBrookings Institution, 1995), 16.

106 Gérard Prunier, “The Experience of European Armies in Operation Restore Hope,” in Walter Clarke andJeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention (Boulder:Westview Press, 1997), 142-3.

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Southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean, and our military activity in the Horn,including our acquisition of access rights in Kenya and Somalia, is directed atprotecting these larger interests.”107

In the early to mid-1980s, the American government had provided sizableamounts of financial and military aid to the Barre regime. Much of this U.S.support was halted in 1988 as Congress and the State Department learned of thebrutal attacks on Isaq civilians committed by the Somali army in their efforts tocrush the Somali National Movement. Nevertheless, when U.S. soldiers arrivedin the war-torn country four years later, many Somalis still had bitter memories ofthe planeloads of American-supplied arms that the government received as itrepressed the rebellion in Hargeisa. This Cold War legacy came back to hauntthe United States in another fashion as well. Shortly before the Marines began toland in December 1992, it was estimated that some 100,000 weapons—rangingfrom AK-47 assault rifles to rocket-launched grenades—were held by both gangsand the clan militias. In a prescient report prepared in 1989, Colonel Al Girardi, amilitary attaché who had recently completed his assignment in Mogadishu,opined, “Sooner or later, the country will be thrown into prolonged and violenttribal conflict and no amount of U.S. assistance will change this.”108

After Siad Barre fled Mogadishu in January 1991, some governmentagencies in Washington were monitoring what was happening in the Somalia, butthe issue was not accorded top priority. The deadline for the Iraqi withdrawal ofKuwait was approaching and the Cold War was drawing to a close.Furthermore, the evacuation of the embassy in Mogadishu when the Barregovernment collapsed meant that the U.S. was no longer present in the countryand had few direct sources of information. Only the Egyptian embassy hadremained open after Barre’s fall, and most of the information the StateDepartment and other agencies were receiving came from NGOs.109 Even mostjournalists steered clear of Somalia in the early days of the crisis.

107 Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1984, Hearings Before the Subcommittee

on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 304, quoted in Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peacefrom Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 56.

108 Jane Perlez, “Expectations in Somalia,” New York Times, Friday, December 4, 1992, A14.109 James L. Woods, “U.S. Government Decisionmaking Processes During Humanitarian Operations in



37

EVENTS LEADING TO INTERVENTION

The famine that led to foreign intervention resulted from the conjunction of anumber of man-made and natural causes. A major factor was the fighting thattook place in the anarchy after Siad Barre was forced out of Mogadishu.Members of the former president’s clan fled with him as he crossed the Jubariver into the territory of his larger clan, the Darod, located in southern Somalianear the Kenyan and Ethiopian borders. Shortly thereafter, clashes broke outbetween Darod forces loyal to Barre and fighters of the United Somali Congress(USC), which had taken over Mogadishu after Barre had escaped from thecapital. A constantly fluctuating battle line between Barre loyalists and the USCspread destruction in the area between Kismayu and Mogadishu. This land,situated between the Juba and Shabelle rivers, was Somalia’s breadbasket—theregion in which the country’s modest areas of arable land were concentrated.The sedentary farmers who lived in the region, including groups that did not haveclan structures like other Somalis, were looked down upon by most of theirfellow countrymen as lacking the fighting prowess and proud and noble characterof the nomadic herdsmen. Because of their military weakness, they were unableto defend themselves as Siad Barre’s army resorted to a scorched earth policy,burning crops, killing livestock, polluting wells, and destroying homes andirrigation systems before abandoning their positions to the enemy. As a result,the farmers represented a disproportionately large share of the famine victims.Furthermore, farmers who hid their dwindling food stores to stave off starvationwere brutalized by the warring clans for whom food had become a strategicasset. Among both clan militias and bandits alike, payments were made in foodrather than in worthless Somali shillings. 110

In addition to the ravages caused by fighting, food production washindered by a drought in late 1991. The drought’s effects were aggravated,however, by the anarchy and violence that ruled in southern Somalia.

110 Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia : State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, andStrategies for Political Reconstruction, Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C. : The BrookingsInstitution, 1995), 22; Andrew S. Natsios, “Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos,”in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed HumanitarianIntervention (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 79; United Nations, Department of Public Information, The UnitedNations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: United Nations Reproduction Section,1996), 14; JonathanStevenson, “Hope Restored in Somalia?” Foreign Policy 91 (Summer 1993), 143; Peter Biles, “Anarchy Rules,”Africa Report 37(4) (July-August 1992), 31-32; Ramesh Thakur, 338; Roland Marchal, “Somalie : les dégâts d’uneimprovisation,” in Marie-Claude Smouts, L’ONU et la guerre. La diplomatie en kaki (Paris: Editions Complexe,1994), 80.

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Neighboring regions in southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya suffered from thesame drought, but there relief supplies reached those in need and the death tollwas much lower. By contrast, the situation in Somalia made delivery of food aidwell nigh impossible.111

The food shortage was made even worse as farmers left their villages insearch of food and safety and flooded into the cities and refugee camps. A UNstudy states that “The civil war that preceded and followed the fall of the SiadBarre Government uprooted an estimated 1.7 million people, about one fifth ofthe total population. Well over 700,000 fled to Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, andYemen. More than 250,000 displaced persons poured into Mogadishu from ruraltowns and villages, and there were large influxes into other southern cities,including Kismayo and Baidoa.”112 As a result, those farmers that had not fallenvictim to hunger or violence nevertheless did not plant their fields to renew thefood supply. Humanitarian aid unwittingly, as it had after the Ogaden War,created a vicious cycle of dependence on the food aid of the NGOs. Aidworkers were unable to coax the farmers who had flocked to distribution sites toreturn home to cultivate their fields.113

Agriculture was not the only segment of society that was disrupted by thechaos. All of Somalia’s infrastructure and services were affected. Governmentservices at all levels stopped functioning, including schools and the criminaljustice system. The health situation degraded seriously, adding to the problemsposed by famine. Most hospitals and clinics ceased to operate, while those thatdid remain open lacked medical supplies and equipment. Problems of hygienearose as sanitary and water services also came to a halt. Electrical service wascut as well when looters stripped cables to recover the aluminum and copper theycontained.114

At the time, U.S. involvement was limited to food and money offered bygovernment agencies to NGOs working to help the victims of the violence andfamine. Yet without a media presence and with more pressing problems

111 Andrew S. Natsios, “Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos,” in WalterClarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention(Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 79.


113 Brigette Doppler and Frédéric Vigneau, “Vols américains au-dessus d’un pays affamé,” Le Monde, jeudi,12 novembre 1992, 2; Thomas G. Weiss and Cindy Collins, Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention (Boulder:Westview Press, 1996), 3-4.



39

elsewhere, the crisis in Somalia was not accorded top priority by either theUnited States or most other nations. Throughout 1991, only Italy and Egypt,both nations with historic interests in Somalia, and the adjacent state of Djiboutiwere involved in mediation to reach a political settlement. These talks failed toyield results due to a series of stumbling-blocks that find their roots in the verynature of the post-Barre Somali society. First, there was intense competitionamong the various clans and their leaders for recognition by other members ofsociety and the international community. Discussions became hostage toconsiderations of prestige and legitimacy, with both factions and their leaderstrying to inflate their own importance and advance their own agendas, to thedetriment of their rivals. Fixing the size of delegations representing the factions atpeace talks was a considerable point of contention, since the number ofrepresentatives was seen to be indicative of the relative importance of the clans inthe absence of a decision arbitrated by an impartial central government.Negotiations were also hostage to the maneuvering of individuals who sought toparticipate in the conferences not to advance the cause of peace, but to acquire acertain legitimacy conferred by the international community that could be used athome to bolster their own personal position against potential political rivals.Faction leaders often faced challenges from a myriad of other members withintheir own movement, including clan elders, ambitious military officers, and theheads of the various subclans that had been grouped together in fragilealliances.115

A further obstacle to serious discussions came from what one author hastermed the “conflict constituency.” With the disappearance of functioning stategovernment and the ensuing violence, well-armed groups had taken advantage ofthe situation, often reaping substantial benefits for themselves. Flush with theirnew-found power, clan militias and mooryaan undoubtedly were reluctant toaccept the establishment of a new civil society in which their role would bediminished,116 especially considering that most Somalis, having known SiadBarre’s rule for most of their lives, had a negative view of government. Anotherproblem, one which is not often mentioned in case studies of the Somalia crisis,is that of illiteracy, which was a major impediment to development. UN figuresplace the illiteracy rate in Somalia in1990 at nearly 76 percent, one of the highest

115 Ken Menkhaus, “International Peacebuilding and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation inSomalia,” in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed HumanitarianIntervention (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 57-8.

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percentages in Africa.117 Given that the teenage members of the mooryaan hadgrown up in a climate of violence and repression and had little or no schoolingand no prospects for the future, they had little incentive to give up their arms andreturn to a “normal” lifestyle that they may never have known.

There were, nevertheless, a few prospects for peace in 1991, but theyproved to be shorted lived and soon rivalries had sparked renewed violence inMogadishu. A May 1991 reconciliation conference organized in Djibouti by theHassan Gouled government together with Egypt and Italy ended in failure, but onJune 5, an agreement was reached between the two principal warlords inMogadishu, Mohammed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohammed, both heads ofrival factions of the USC. During the summer, the truce, which placed Aidid atthe head of the USC in return for granting Mahdi the title of interim president,seemed to hold. However, it was supposed to be understood that the tworemained equals, and when foreign governments began to recognized thegovernment Mahdi had formed, Aidid withdrew his support from the accord.118

1991 ended with renewed hostilities in Mogadishu in which tens of thousands ofcivilians were killed. The scale of the bloodshed was such that, in December1991, the UN was finally jolted into action.

It was the conjunction of the heavy casualties in Mogadishu and the arrivalof a new secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, that resulted in the adoptionof a more active approach by the universal organization to dealing with the crisis.On January 23, 1992, following a plea from Somalia’s interim prime minister—and member of Mahdi’s government—the UN Security Council convened andadopted Resolution 733, calling on all parties to halt the fighting and to assisthumanitarian workers in accomplishing their tasks. The council members alsoinvoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter and placed an embargo on all armsdestined for Somalia. But despite urging by Boutros-Ghali, the Security Councildid not adopt more stringent measures. Herman Cohen, assistant secretary ofState at the time, has noted that the United States and Russia were particularlyreluctant to engage in any activities beyond relief aid: “A dozen peacekeepingoperations had been authorized in the previous twenty-four months, and costs

116 Ibid.117 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, Statistical Division,

Statistical Yearbook 1990/91 Thirty-eighth issue (New York: United Nations Publishing Division, 1993), 140.118 John Drysdale, “Foreign Military Intervention in Somalia: The Root Cause of the Shift from UN

Peacekeeping to Peacemaking and Its Consequences,” in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning fromSomalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 119.


41

were mounting at extraordinary rates. The Cambodia operation alone wasbudgeted for $2 billion.… Both the United States and Russia were runningconsiderable arrears in their peacekeeping accounts even before Somalia’s crisisappeared on the council’s agenda. Hence, both governments insisted that UNinvolvement in Somalia be limited to humanitarian operations, which are financedwithin the regular UN budget.”119

The main problem from the U.S. point of view was, and would remain, thesecuring of unimpeded access to the needy to distribute food aid. At ahumanitarian conference held in Addis Ababa in January 1992, USAID and StateDepartment officials delivered an ultimatum to the Somali factions. If the Somaliscontinued to prevent aid workers from carrying out their mission, they warned,the resources that the government had allocated to the Somali crisis would bediverted to other regions which were just as much in need—southern Africa,Sudan, Angola, or even the Soviet Union.120

In late January 1992, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali invited Ali Mahdiand Aidid to New York for a series of consultations to take place during theweek of February 10. The goals of the discussions were twofold: establish acease-fire in Mogadishu and prepare the way for possible future peacemakingactivities. During the course of the meetings, Boutros-Ghali held individualdiscussions with representatives of the two rival USC factions in which he issueda warning, stating that if they remained intractable about halting the violence, theinternational community would abandon its humanitarian efforts and leaveSomalia. On February 14, the two groups did consent to a cease-fire, and onMarch 3, a UN delegation to Mogadishu led by Undersecretary James Jonahsucceeded in getting Aidid and Ali Mahdi to sign an accord.121

Although this agreement brought an end to most of the fighting between thetwo USC leaders, it ignored the other sources of disorder both in Mogadishu andthroughout the country. The UN concentrated its attention exclusively on thesituation in the capital in the early stages of its involvement in the crisis, leaving

119 Herman Cohen, “Intervention in Somalia,” in Allan E. Goodman, ed., The Diplomatic Record, 1992-1993(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 54, quoted in James L. Woods, “U.S. Government Decisionmaking ProcessesDuring Humanitarian Operations in Somalia,” in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia:The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 152.

120 Andrew S. Natsios, “Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos,” in WalterClarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention(Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 81.

121 The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, p. 18; Judy Aita, “Somalia Peace Talks Set for U.N.,” TheWashington File, February 11, 1992; Judy Aita, “U.N. Sends Observers to Somalia,” The Washington File, April27, 1992; Makinda, p. 62.

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aside the problems that prevented humanitarian aid from reaching famine victimsin other areas. Even in Mogadishu, the cease-fire, which only concerned theforces of Aidid and Ali Mahdi, did not deal with the racketeering and banditry ofother clans. Shortly after the cease-fire had been signed, the Marco Polo, aWorld Food Program ship containing food aid, was fired upon as it attempted toenter Mogadishu harbor and was forced to change course and leave withoutunloading. Clans at the airport and the port extorted large sums of money and aportion of relief supplies from aid organizations,122 while deliveries in transit oftenfell prey to armed youths in “technicals,” jeeps and trucks mounted with artilleryand which received their name from the practice of demanding payment for“technical assistance” the gangs allegedly provided aid workers.123 Among theestimates of relief supplies lost in this manner, one specialist involved in thehumanitarian efforts placed the share appropriated by clan militias atapproximately 20 percent, with another 30 percent winding up in the hands ofarmed gangs.124

Further difficulties to effective outside intervention were posed by theinterminable negotiations that preceded each new step taken by the UN. GeneralAidid proved most recalcitrant in this regard. The strong opposition UNencountered from Aidid stemmed in part from his perception of peacekeepers asbeing favorable to Ali Mahdi. Ali Mahdi had in fact advocated a deployment of aUN force, stating to the technical team sent by the Boutros-Ghali in March thatthe future of the cease-fire hinged upon the presence of peacekeepers.125 UNSecurity Council Resolution 751, which was adopted unanimously on April 24,1992, acted on this proposal, requesting that “the Secretary-General immediately[deploy] a unit of 50 United Nations Observers.”126 Long and arduousnegotiations—which included the issue, raised by Aidid, of whether or not theUN personnel could wear uniforms—finally resulted in the sending of fiftyunarmed military observers along a so-called “green line” that separate thesections of Mogadishu controlled by Aidid from those held by Ali Mahdi’sforces.

122 “Airlift for Humanity—or ‘Other Means’,” Time, August 10, 1992, 11; Bertrand Le Gendre, “Les enfants

de moins de cinq ans sont menacés de disparition avant la fin de l’année,” Le Monde, mardi, 3 novembre 1992, 7.123 Jonathan Stevenson, “Hope Restored in Somalia?” Foreign Policy 91 (Summer 1993), 138.124 Mohamed Abdi, “Quelle aide?” Le Monde, jeudi, 12 novembre 1992, p. 2.125 The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, p. 19.126 Excerpted from the text of Resolution 751 (1992), Adopted by the Security Council at its 3069th meeting,

on 24 April 1992.


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However, UNSCR 751, also included a provision concerning a 500-strongpeacekeeping force to accompany relief supplies in transit between the port, theairport, and the various storage site in Mogadishu. Despite U.S. reluctance toengage in expensive peacekeeping missions, the text of the resolutionnevertheless specified that council members agreed, in principle, that a largersecurity force should be sent as soon as possible. Once again, Aidid resistedUN involvement, and was particularly adamant that no peacekeepingresponsibilities be contained in the security force’s mandate. An agreement wasreached only in mid-August, and the first 40 troops from the Pakistani battaliondesignated for the mission arrived one month later, on September 14. Beforelong, it became evident that the lightly armed force, authorized to use force solelyin self-defense, was insufficient to fulfill its mission.

Another reason for the protracted chaos was the disrespect the Somalishad for the cease-fire agreements they entered. Thus, while the UN, through thework of its indefatigable special representative for Somalia, the Algerian diplomatMohammed Sahnoun, did conclude several understandings with various factions,they were inevitable broken and the violence continued. Furthermore, themooryaan, which constituted a major hindrance for the humanitarian aidoperations, were beyond the control of the major clans that vied for power. Inlight of this fact, the UN Secretary-General became increasingly convinced of thenecessity of a large-scale military intervention to impose some semblance oforder.

Throughout the spring of 1992, Boutros-Ghali had sought enlargedinvolvement by Security Council members in resolving the crisis, but theirattention was retained by the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The media hadfocused on the suffering and atrocities inflicted by Serb, Croat, and Muslimsoldiers on innocent civilians, and stories appeared in which internment campsfor men were likened to the German concentration camps of World War II.Television screens and front pages were filled with images of haggard, emaciatedmen behind barbed wire fences. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General grewincreasingly incensed by what he considered to be undue attention to what he haddubbed “the rich man’s war,” while no progress was being made in Somalia.

A turning point was reached in late July 1992, when the Security Council’sgave its approval to a European Community plan that authorized the deploymentof a contingent of 1,100 UN peacekeepers to Sarajevo airport to ensure thedelivery of humanitarian aid, despite a series of objections to the proposal that

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Boutros-Ghali had raised earlier. At a July 22 meeting to discuss the his reporton the EC plan—which basically met the same objectives that needed to beaddressed in Somalia—the UN chief expressed his displeasure. He criticized thecouncil for accepting an expensive operation at a time when peacekeepingmissions elsewhere had already created strains on the UN budget. He was alsoincensed by the fact that the Security Council had acted under pressure from theEC, a regional institution. This ran counter to his suggestion, laid out in hisAgenda for Peace, that a heavily burdened UN have greater recourse to theassistance of regional and other intergovernmental organizations in carrying outits missions.

During the July 22 meeting, Boutros-Ghali also presented his latest reporton the situation in Somalia (S/24343), which highlighted the fact that “withoutadequate protection for relief personnel and supplies, the implementation of aneffective relief program is not possible.”127 Five days later, the Security Counciladopted resolution 767, which authorized the secretary-general to organize an“urgent airlift operation” to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance inareas outside Mogadishu. An airlift was viewed as a means for aid shipments toavoid the dangerous port facilities in the capital. The resolution also includedtougher wording that aimed to obtain greater cooperation from the warringfactions, with an admonition that “in the absence of such cooperation, theSecurity Council does not exclude other measure to deliver humanitarianassistance to Somalia.”128 Finally, consent was given to a recommendationincluded in the July 22 report for a greater UN presence, to be based in fouroperational zones.129 This additional force had already received prior approval inresolution 751 of April 24, 1992.

This more aggressive stance resulted in part from the increasingimportance accorded to the issue within both the legislative and executivebranches of the U.S. government. Congressional interest in the Somalia tragedycan be traced back rather early due to the actions of subcommittee memberspreoccupied with questions of hunger and humanitarian aid. In late April 1991,while the Gulf War still occupied the centerstage of U.S. foreign relations, SenateNancy Kassebaum (R.-Kans.) submitted a resolution appealing for presidential

127 Quote in Russell Geekie, “While the UN Fights Itself, Somalis Struggle for Survival,” Africa Report 37(5)(September-October 1992), 6.

128 See the text of Resolution 767 (1992), Adopted by the Security Council at its 3101st meeting on 27 July1992.

129 “Boutros-Ghali Suggests Food-For-Guns Swap in Somalia,” The Washington File, July 24, 1992.


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leadership and a more active U.S. role in resolving the Somali crisis.130 However,congressional interest and influence were marginal at that early stage.

American involvement during the period spanning from Siad Barre’s falland the evacuation of the U.S. embassy in January 1991 up to July 1992 waslimited to attempts to improve the efficacy of its humanitarian efforts. It was amedia campaign beginning in the summer of 1992 that finally served as a catalystfor greater U.S. implication. Coverage of the starvation sarted with an article inthe New York Times, and quickly spread to other media. The interest sparked bythe tales of suffering led to visits by members of Congress, including SenatorsNancy Kassebaum and Paul Simon, thus providing a “news event” that futheramplified the issue’s resonance in the media.

The news coverage occured at a time when members of nongovernmentalorganizations working in Somalia were demanding more forceful action on thepart of the international community and a growing number of reports condemnedpast efforts as ineffectual. In addition, campaigning Democratic presidentialcandidate William Clinton and others in his party harshly criticized the Bushadministration for failing to adopt adequate measures.131 This deluge of criticismtogether with Boutros-Ghali’s lobbying for greater involvement by the Westernnations and the realization of the inadequacy of the UN’s efforts to dateapparently brought about a change in the administration’s thinking. The WhiteHouse signaled its new commitment by making it clear that President Bush hadtaken a personal interest in the problem.132

A White House statement on August 14 outlined the new steps theadministration had decided to take. It also affirmed that “the U.S. will take aleading role with other nations and international organizations to overcome theobstacles and ensure that food reaches those who so desperately need it.”133

Specifically, the Department of Defense was to execute emergency airliftoperations to suppy food to the Somali hinterland, and an additional 145,000

130 H. Johnston and Ted Dagne, p. 192.131 “Clinton Promises Strong Defense,” The Washington File, August 26, 1992. See also Bill Clinton, “The

Democratic Agenda,” Africa Report 37(5) (September-October 1992), 18. Fellow Democrat Jesse Jackson wasparticularly acerbic in his denunciation of Bush’s policy toward Somalia. When asked by a reporter whether hewas satisfied with American efforts, he replied, “Absolutely not. […] Somalia has been under distress for morethan two years now. But it’s Somalia, it’s the Sudan, it’s Mozambique, it’s Angola, it’s South Africa—our policytoward African peoples, whether in Africa, or in Haiti, or in urban America, is racist. It’s beneath the dignity ofour country.” See “Jesse Jackson Comments on U.S. Policy Toward Somalia,” The Washington File, August 31,1992.

132 James L. Woods, p. 155.

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tons of food was donated. The Bush administration had further decided toinstruct the U.S. Ambassador to the UN to consult with other members of theSecurity Council to reach an agreement on the use of additional measures toensure the delivery of humanitarian aid.134

The airlift operation was dubbed Operation Provide Relief, and wasenvisaged from the start as a temporary measure. However, as with the Pakistanipeacekeepers, it proved to be another case of “too little, too late.” Much toutedin official administration declarations, the actual results in the field were far lessimpressive. Much of the time the C-130s were grounded, either for maintenanceor for reasons of safety. For those flights that did get off the ground, safetyregulations prevented the aircraft from flying with a full load of supplies, reducingthe efficacy of the aid deliveries. The threat of violence at landing strips furtherhindered the operation, as pilots often refused to land in an area where opengunfire had been reported.135

Despite all the efforts of the international community, there was noevidence of an amelioration of the situation in Somalia. In September, onequarter of all Somalis still faced starvation, and hundreds of thousands ofrefugees had not yet returned to their homes. Furthermore, a statement by theUN Secretary-General had created a new row with Aidid, who had begun toprove receptive to Sahnoun’s negotiating. The incident was provoked in lateAugust 1992, when Boutros-Ghali, commenting on the authorization contained inSecurity Council Resolution 775 to increase troop strength in Somalia from 500to 3,500, that the deployment would take place regardless of the wishes of thefactional militias. Thenceforth, relations between the UN and Aidid soured,destroying any hopes that the UNOSOM mission might prove effectual. ThePakinstani soldiers remained confined to their quarters at the airport, and eventhere they were unable to establish a secure environment.136 Aidid supportersdemonstrated against the proposed increase in front of the UN’s headquarters in

133 “U.S. to Airlift Emergency Food for Somalia,” The Washington File, August 14, 1992; Charles W. Corey,

“Natsios Named Special Coordinator for U.S. Relief,” The Washington File, August 17, 1992.134 Ibid.135 Brigitte Doppler and Frédéric Vigneau, “Vols américains au-dessus d’un pays affamé,” Le Monde, jeudi,

12 novembre 1992, 2.136 James L. Woods, p. 156; Jonathan Stevenson, “Hope Restored in Somalia?” Foreign Policy 91 (Summer

1993), 147; Brigitte Doppler and Frédéric Vigneau, “Vols américains au-dessus d’un pays affamé,” Le Monde,jeudi, 12 novembre 1992, 2.


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Mogadishu, threatening retaliation that would result in “an unprecedentedbloodbath.”137

Conscious of the UN’s failures and the insufficency of the U.S. airlift, theU.S. Central Command began to draw up possible plans of action in the eventthat the Bush administration wish to be presented a list of options. Militaryplanners quickly recognized that positive results hinged upon a large militaryforce backed up by the kind of political leadership that the United States alonecould provide. They spent the fall of 1992 dressing an inventory of viableoptions. By Thanksgiving week, the National Security Council DeputiesCommittee had prepared for the president a choice among three feasible coursesof action.138 On the day before Thanksgiving, the alternatives—increasing thenumber of UN peacekeepers to 3,500, the maximum number authorized, offeringair and sea support for a major UN deployment, or sending a sizable U.S. forceinto the country—were presented to President Bush.139 He immediately chosethe third, most radical option, Operation Restore Hope. In a December 4address explaining his decision to the American people, he outlined the mission’slimited objectives:

First, we will create a secure environment in the hardest-hit parts ofSomalia so that food can move from ships overland to the people inthe countryside now devastated by starvation. And second, oncewe have created that secure environment, we will withdraw ourtroops, handing the security mission back to a regular UNpeacekeeping force. Our mission has a limited objective, to openthe supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the wayfor a UN peacekeeping force to keep it moving. This operation isnot open-ended. We will not stay one day longer than isnecessary.”140

137 “Plus de deux mille “ boat people ” ont été secourus au Yemen,” Le Monde, mercredi, 18 novembre 1992,

6.138 James L. Woods, p. 157.139 Bruce W. Nelan, “Taking On the Thugs,” Time, December 14, 1992, 25; see also James L. Woods, “U.S.

Government Decisionmaking Processes During Humanitarian Operations in Somalia,” in Walter Clarke and JeffreyHerbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention (Boulder: WestviewPress, 1997), 157.

140 “Transcript of President Bush’s Address on Somalia,” New York Times, Saturday, December 5, 1992, 4.

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From the start, the White House viewed the action as a short-term effort limitedin its objectives to getting food to the starving. White House spokesman MarlinFitzwater made it known that President Bush hoped to terminate the mission byClinton’s Inauguration Day, January 20. This assessment was not shared by theDepartment of Defense, which had drawn up the plans for Operation RestoreHope, nor by the Central Intelligence Agency. The plan that General Hoar,Commander in Chief of CENTCOM, had prepared involved a deployment over aperiod of 30 to 60 days. One senior Pentagon official quoted by the press wentso far as to call the timetable suggested by Fitzwater “utterly ridiculous.”141

Bush’s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, told thepress that most of the U.S. troops were to arrive in Somalia by early January, andthat he planned to “see our way clear of this operation in a few months.”142

Powell and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney also stated that even afterOperation Restore Hope was completed, the U.S. would maintain a residualforce, and perhaps some Marines on board ships off the Somali coast as well, toact as a deterrent to renewed violence.143

However, the military did share the administration’s desire of avoidinglong-term participation in policing the country. The United States hadresponsibilities around the globe and was further constrained by a diminishingdefense budget that prevented it from taking anything but a limited approach in anarea in which it had no vital interests.144 This short-term outlook would createtensions between the United States and the UN, and ultimately proved to be arecipe for disaster, as we shall see in the next section.

Because of Bush’s secretive nature, which we have already seen in thesection on the Gulf Crisis, it is impossible to say with any certainty what motiveswere underlying his decision. Of course, there was pressure from manyquarters—Capitol Hill, the media, and presidential candidate Bill Clinton—forgreater action. Two people active on the periphery of events have proposed theirown views on the factors that may have been at work. According Andrew

141 Michael R. Gordon, “U.N. Backs a Somalia Force as Bush Vows a Swift Exit; Pentagon Sees Longer Stay,”

New York Times, Friday, December 4, 1992, A14.142 Michael Wines, “Bush Declares Goal in Somalia Is to ‘Save Thousands’,” New York Times, Saturday,

December 5, 1992, 4.143 Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Is Sending Large Force As Warning to Somali Clans,” New York Times,

Saturday, December 5, 1992, 5.144 Jonathan T. Howe, “Relations Between the United States and the United Nations in Dealing with



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Natsios, assistant administrator during the Somalia operations, memories of avisit to feeding center in famine-stricken Sudan in the mid-1980s were thecatalyst.145 For James L. Woods, deputy assistant secretary of defense forAfrican affairs at the time of the Somali crisis, the answer lay in affirmations madeby key military officials conveying their attitude that the mission was executable ifdeemed necessary by the political authorities.146 Undoubtedly, a combination ofthe circumstances mentioned above, as well as others, all played a role in theoutcome.

It is clear that this marked a major transformation in Bush’s attitude towardhis duties in the wake of his defeat in the presidential election just weeks earlier.On November 17, Bush declared that he was “referring all calls” to Clinton.147

Yet, having committed the United States to intervening in Somalia, the Presidentbecame highly active once again in the conduct of foreign policy. A Bush familyfriend explained the shift as being due to the realization that “he’s still the onlyperson that can make these decisions, and that the wisdom and experience hebrings to these problems is important to the nation.”148

Having taken this decision, the Bush administration had to address thequestion of coordination both with the President-elect and the United Nations.Clinton’s criticism of Bush’s Somalia policy during the election campaign leftlittle doubt of how he would receive news of the operation.149 Speaking in LittleRock, Clinton called the initiative “an historic and welcome step,” adding, “Icommend President Bush for taking the lead in this important humanitarianeffort.”150 Nevertheless, Clinton aides voiced their hopes that the mission would

145 Andrew S. Natsios, “Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos,” in Walter

Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention(Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 78.

146 James L. Woods, “U.S. Government Decisionmaking Processes During Humanitarian Operations inSomalia,” in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed HumanitarianIntervention (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 158.

147 Michael Wines, “Bush Rebounds to Center of the World Stage,” New York Times, Friday, December 4,1992, A14.

148 Ibid.149 In an article outlining what U.S. policy toward Africa would resemble under a Clinton administration, the

Democratic candidate wrote, “In Africa, as elsewhere, the Bush administration has been tepid—when it shouldhave been decisive—[…] in responding to the humanitarian tragedy in Somalia. I believe we can do better.” SeeBill Clinton, “The Democratic Agenda,” Africa Report 37(5) (September-October 1992), 19.

150 Michael R. Gordon, “U.N. Backs a Somalia Force as Bush Vows a Swift Exit; Pentagon Sees Longer Stay,”New York Times, Friday, December 4, 1992, A1. See also “Clinton Backs Bush on Somalia Decision,” TheWashington File, December 4, 1992.

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reach a successful conclusion as rapidly as possible. And although White Housekept the President-elect’s advisers informed, no input was sought from them.151

To proceed with the initiative, the Bush administration needed to secureapprobation from the United Nations. The matter was complicated by the factthat the U.S. insisted that its military retain command of the force. It thereforefaced possible opposition from certain members of the Security Council, mostnotably China, which, as a permanent member, could veto a resolutionauthorizing the action. A main issue was the degree of control the UN wouldexercise over the operation. There was a consensus among most Councilmembers that they be granted greater authority than had been the case duringGulf War operations. The United States was able to overcome possibleobjections by allowing a provision to be included in the resolution that foresawthe creation of a UN liaison staff working alongside the U.S. commander.Security Council Resolution 794 was thus adopted on December 3, 1992. Thefinal text, invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorized those memberstates taking part in the operation “to use all necessary means to establish assoon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations inSomalia.”152

151 “Why Clinton Can’t Say No,” Time, December 14, 1992, 24.152 Paul Lewis, “U.N. Council Essentially Agrees to U.S. Command in Somalia,” New York Times,

Wednesday, December 2, 1992, A18; Paul Lewis, “First U.N. Goal is Security; Political Outlook is Murky,” NewYork Times, Friday, December 4, 1992, A14; “Excerpts From a Resolution On Delivering Somalia Aid,” New YorkTimes, Friday, December 4, 1992, A14.


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U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SOMALIA: FROM EUPHORIA TO DESPAIR

The decision to establish the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), as the large-scale deployment of U.S. forces was called, initially received widespread publicsupport. Surveys conducted shortly after the announcement showed that 66percent of the American public approved the mission. This high level of positiveresponse undoubted resulted from the extensive media coverage of the sufferingthroughout the summer and fall. Images of U.S. soldiers carrying out theirhumanitarian mission further bolstered support, which reached a favorable ratingof 84 percent in opinion polls.153

This euphoria was shared by many policymakers as well, though a fewdissenting voices were inevitably heard.154 Upon learning of the decision—Congress was in recess at the time—leaders on Capitol Hill expressed theirsupport. One legislator, Representative David R. Obey (D-Wis.), stated during aWhite House meeting with the president that he hoped the experience in Somaliawould serve as a model for a UN peacekeeping force to restore order in Haiti.155

On January 8, 1993, Representative Tony Hall, a member of congressionaldelegation conducting a five-day tour of the U.S. deployment in Somalia said thathe believed “current allied troop involvement in Somalia provides an idealexample of how such a quick response force could function in a world-classhumanitarian disaster. […] We could be witnessing the army of the future—post-Cold-War allies hard at work on such goals as world peace and the end ofhunger.” Hall also said that when he returned to Washington, he wantedCongress to consider establishing a permanent U.S. humanitarian force toprevent “future Somalias.”156

This initial enthusiasm eventually receded as fundamental flaws in policy,notably a lack of will to address the root causes of the crisis, manifestedthemselves in a slow descent into renewed fighting which ultimately resulted in thecomplete withdraw of the United States from Somalia. The idea that the U.S.

153 Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, “Arms and the People,” Foreign Affairs 73(6) (November-December1994), 51-2.

154 At the outset, there was concern both about the mission’s objectives and compatibility with the 1973 WarPowers Act. Later members of Congress expressed dismay at the potential cost of the operation for U.S.taxpayers. See Harry Johnston and Ted Dagne, “Congress and the Somalia Crisis,” in Walter Clarke and JeffreyHerbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention (Boulder: WestviewPress, 1997), 196-7.

155 Clifford Krauss, “A Few in Congress Advising Caution, or Vote, on Somalia,” New York Times, Monday,December 7, 1992, A13. U.S. intervention in Haiti will be discussed in the following chapter.

156 “Congress Members Assess Somalia’s Needs,” The Washington File, January 8, 1993.

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could provide a short-term fix to a complex emergency that was years in themaking ran counter to expectations both among Somalis and the United Nations.Somali civilians greeted U.S. troops with open arms, but they saw the militarypresence as having a task that went far beyond the protection of humanitarianrelief. They felt that only the Americans were capable of stopping the violenceand nurturing a long process of political and economic reconstruction, a processwhich would necessarily entail the disarmament of clan militias and gangs, as wellas the creation of a new police force.157

UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali too shared this desire to see theUnited States engaged in the endeavor of nation building, which was generallyseen as the only lasting solution to Somalia’s troubles. He believed that thepresence of a powerful U.S. force would serve as an incentive to bring opposingfactions to the negotiating table and increase the probability of obtaining results.But shifting the goal from ensuring favorable conditions for the delivery of reliefsupplies to effective peacemaking would involve the pacification anddisarmament of the clan militias, an eventuality the Bush administration hadexcluded. Indeed, in a December 19 report to the Security Council, Boutros-Ghali recommended that the hand over from UNITAF to a conventional UNpeacekeeping force should be contingent upon “the establishment of a cease-fire,the control of heavy weapons, the disarming of lawless gangs and the creation ofa new police force.”158

Those were exactly the kinds of missions that the United States hadopposed during discussions prior to the adoption of Resolution 794. Rather, ithad favored the terminology contained in the final text that defined the goal rathernebulously as achieving “a securing environment.”159 Department of Defenseofficials were equally vague about disarmament policy, stating merely that militarypersonnel were authorized to take any measures necessary to ensure their safety,including preemptive attacks.160 But weapons seizures were not conducted in asystematic manner, and occasionally arms caches that were discovered could not

157 Jane Perlez, “Expectations in Somalia,” New York Times, Friday, December 4, 1992, A1; Jill Smolowe,

“Great Expectations,” Time, December 21, 1992, 23.158 Quoted in Jonathan T. Howe, “Relations Between the United States and the United Nations in Dealing

with Somalia,” in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of ArmedHumanitarian Intervention (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 175-6.

159 Paul Lewis, “U.N. Says Somalis Must Disarm Before Peace,” New York Times, Sunday, December 6, 1992,15.

160 Jill Smolowe, “Great Expectations,” Time, December 21, 1992, 23; Jane Perlez, “U.S. Role Is Not to Disarm,Aide to a Top Somali Insists,” New York Times, Sunday, December 6, 1992, 14.


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be impounded. The U.S. Special Envoy to Somalia, Robert Oakley, took greatpains to prevent incidents from occurring between clan militias and U.S. soldiers.He discouraged disarmament, a position which was based on an understandingof Somali culture acquired previously in his tenure as U.S. Ambassador inMogadishu. Knowing the importance of weapons to the nomadic Somalis, heesteemed that by confiscating weapons the U.S. would come to be seen as anenemy, and he feared a repetition of the same sort of incident that had occurredin Beirut in 1983, when a bomb blast left 241 Marines dead. It wasconsiderations of this nature—ensuring the safety of the lives of Americanservicemen and -women—that motivated the Bush administration’s insistencethat the operation be organized by and remain under the chain of command of theUnited States.161

Nonetheless, Pentagon officials were aware that weapons would remain aproblem after UNITAF had completed its mission. As one senior Pentagonofficial described the problem, “If the armed clans fade away in the night becausewe have deployed overwhelming force and we go for a month without snipingattacks, you could say that the country is pacified. Then after we get up to leave,the clans could come back out of the woodwork again.”162 Indeed, as UNITAFforces advanced, weapons and their owners vanished. Some factions placedtheir weapons stores in areas not covered by the deployment, while others movedthem to neighboring countries.163 But the U.S. refused to deal with the issue,leaving the task to lesser armed UN peacekeepers.

In addition to the problems posed by the caches of arms, future UNpeacekeepers would have to contend with the warlords, whose position wasundiminished as the U.S. prepared to depart from Somalia. In fact, U.S.negotiations led by Robert Oakley to prepare the way for the deployment ofAmerican forces had inadvertently conferred an aura of legitimacy on the militiasand their leaders,164 a phenomenon that was reinforced by the UN in its peacetalks held in Addis Ababa in January and March 1993. Although clan elders and

161 Raymond Bonner, “The Dilemma of Disarmament,” Time, December 28, 1992, 28. According to one report,the policy proved effective: “eight U.S. servicemen have been killed in Somalia in five months, no more thanwould have lost their lives in training accidents if they had stayed at home.” See George J. Church, “Mission HalfAccomplished,” Time, May 17, 1993, 31.

162 Michael R. Gordon, “U.N. Backs a Somalia Force as Bush Vows a Swift Exit; Pentagon Sees Longer Stay,”New York Times, Friday, December 4, 1992, A14.

163 United Nations, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: 1996), 34.164 Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia : State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and

Strategies for Political Reconstruction, Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C. : The BrookingsInstitution, 1995), 40-1.

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other political actors were invited to the reconciliation conferences held in theEthiopian capital, the representatives of the armed factions remained theprivileged interlocutors of the UN as it attempted to conclude a durable cease-fire.

Moreover, as an American-led effort, UNITAF inspired a competitionamong faction leaders to establish special relations, and with it, ascendancy overrivals. This explains why Aidid, who had always been critical of UN involvementin the past, publicly welcomed the deployment. His attitude changed, however,when the U.S. refused to take sides and attempted to adhere to a minimalistdefinition of its role in Somalia.

For Boutros-Ghali, who had been assigned by the council the task ofpreparing the follow-up mission, UNITAF needed to accomplish two objectivesbefore a successful transition could take place. First, he insisted that withoutdisarming both factions and gangs, both political reconciliation and traditionalpeacekeeping activities were doomed to failure. Second, he wanted UNITAF toextend its deployment throughout the country, thus eliminating areas whereweapons could be stored unmolested. He informed President Bush of his viewsin a letter dated December 8, 1992, but to his dismay UNITAF did not act on hissuggestions. We have already seen the attitude of the United States towarddisarmament. It also refused to countenance expanding the geographicalcoverage of the operation. As of March 1993, 60 percent of Somali territory wasoutside the control of the task force.165

Because the secretary-general had been unable to convince the U.S. tocarry out action necessary to achieve these goals, and with the situation remainingunstable due to the rivalry among factions and their leaders, he concluded that themandate of the follow-up mission, UNOSOM II, would need to be one of peaceenforcement. The unprecedented nature of the UN mission, authorized underChapter VII of the UN Charter, had in fact been proposed by U.S. officials asearly as December 1992.166 In a March 3 report on the future UNOSOM II force,Boutros-Ghali set out an ambitious program covering a wide range of militarytasks, including:

monitor[ing] that all factions respected the cessation of hostilities andthe Addis Ababa agreements of January 1993; prevent[ing] any

165 United Nations, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: 1996), 40-1.166 United Nations, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: 1996), 42.


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resumption of violence and, if necessary, tak[ing] appropriate actionagainst any faction violating the cease-fire; maintain[ing] control of theheavy weapons of the organized factions pending their destruction ortheir transfer to a unified national army; seiz[ing] the small arms of allunauthorized armed elements; secur[ing] or maintain[ing] security at allports, airports and lines of communication needed for the deliveries ofhumanitarian assistance […].167

Drawing upon past experience in Somalia, the secretary-general requested aforce of 28,000. The Security Council acquiesced, passing Security CouncilResolution 814 on March 26, 1993. At the time, the U.S. PermanentRepresentative to the Council said of the decision, “Thus is an historicundertaking. We are excited to join it and we will vigorously support it.”168 Themain U.S. contributions, however, a joint task force of the Somali coast and1,300 troops of a rapid deployment unit, were to remain under Americancommand. Of the 4,000 military personnel the U.S. planned to have stationed inthe country, the remaining 2,700 were in charge of logistics.169

The formal transition of command from UNITAF to UNOSOM IIoccurred on May 4, 1993, following a period of relative calm after the signing ofthe Addis Ababa agreements in March. One month later, however, an attack onPakistani peacekeepers would plunge the country into a period of renewedviolence.

The attack, in which 23 peacekeepers will killed, was carried out by forcesloyal to General Aidid. U.S. forces left behind as part of UNOSOM II wereparticularly outraged by the vicious assault. The attackers used innocent civiliansas human shields and mutilated the bodies of the dead soldiers. In response, theUnited States pressed the UN to allow UNOSOM II forces to retaliate againstAidid. Given the flagrant violation of the Addis Ababa agreement and thechallenge to the mandate of UNOSOM II, the Security Council unanimouslyadopted Resolution 837, in which the UN’s capacity to employ “all necessarymeasures against all those responsible for the armed attacks” was reaffirmed.170

167 Ibid., 42-3.168 Ibid., 44.169 George J. Church, “Mission Half Accomplished,” Time, May 17, 1993, 30.170 United Nations, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996 (New York: 1996), 50.

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One week later, Clinton, for the first time in his presidency, authorized a militaryoperation against key locations held by Aidid.171

Thus the second UN peacekeeping mission began to take a personal twistthat would ultimately undermine its internal cohesion and poison relationsbetween Somalis and the outside world. A manhunt for Aidid was undertaken,and several attacks were launched in June and July 1993. UNOSOM II forcesalso began to forcible disarm members of Aidid’s United Somali Congress,leading to more military engagements. Civilian casualties rose as militia gunmenresorted to a tactic of using bystanders as a screens against enemy fire.172 As aresult, anger became focused on the UN mission, and more specifically on theU.S. The assets used were mainly American, and although the commander of theUN forces was Turkish General Cevik Bir, a significant proportion of his staffwas American, including his second in command. And it was an American,retired Admiral Jonathan Howe, who, as U.N. Special Representative to Somalia,had demanded the arrest of Aidid.173

The wrath of the Somalis was not confined to the United States, however.It extended to all UN peacekeepers and foreigners, making it once againextremely dangerous for humanitarian aid workers. The director of CARE’srelief operations in Somalia described the situation in July as, “more dangerous[…] than at any time during the civil war.”174

As the situation worsened, dissension grew within the UN operation.Promises to contribute forces by countries such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, andIndia remained unfulfilled, while nations with forces already present, among themItaly and Germany, threatened to review their commitments. The United States,however, backed by Pakistan, refused to renounce in its hunt for Aidid. 175

Late August marked an important moment in the Clinton administrationshandling of the Somalia crisis. Under increasing pressure from Congress toabandon the military effort to capture Aidid, the White House apparently changedits stance. In an August 30 speech, the president announced the new emphasisof American policy, declaring, “There needs to be a lot of nation-building inSomalia from the ground up, a lot of institution-building. We did go there tostop the starvation and the violence and the bloodshed, but it’s also true that the

171 Jill Smolowe, “Counterpunch,” Time, June 21, 1993, 46.172 Ibid., 52; J.F.O. McAllister, “Pity the Peacemakers,” Time, June 28, 1993, 22-23.173 Marguerite Michaels, “Peacemaking War,” Time, July 26, 1993, 24.174 Ibid.175 Ibid., 24-5.


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absence of order gave rise to all those problems, and we’re still trying to fulfillour original mission in Somalia.”176 In September, Secretary of State WarrenChristopher presented a U.S. proposal to Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali thatrefocused the mission on political reconciliation.177

U.S. participation came to an abrupt end following an attack on October 3,1993, in which 12 American soldiers were killed. One hundred Rangers had beensent to capture top military aides to General Aidid that were reportedly hidingnear the Olympia Hotel in southern Mogadishu. The anger aroused by the loss ofAmerican lives was aggravated by scenes of Somalis mutilating the bodies of thedead soldiers as they were dragged through the streets. The situation was furthercomplicated by concerns for the safety of a U.S. helicopter pilot who had beentaken hostage. Senate minority leader Robert Dole (R.-Kans.) said at the time,“If we had a vote today, we’d be out today.”178 Another senator, DemocratErnest F. Hollings of South Carolina, said, “It’s Vietnam all over again.”179

Congressional anger was fueled by the apparent lack of coordinationamong the different members of the Clinton administration charged with policytoward Somalia, and the apparent contradiction between the executive’s recentlystated aims of reaching a political solution and the recourse to military operationsagainst Aidid and his followers.180 The debacle occurred as the public wasreceiving mixed signals about the future of the American military presence inSomalia. Just a week before, President Clinton had asked for a specific date forthe withdrawal of troops, while other pronouncements from Department ofDefense officials gave the impression that the U.S. was planning for a long-termcommitment.181

The incident sparked congressional demands for a clear exit strategy.Although initially hesitating, Clinton finally opted for a temporary increase introop strength from 4,700 to about 20,000 to ensure the safety of U.S. forces,with a planned withdrawal scheduled for March 31, 1994. He was thus able tomeet the demands of Congress, which clamored for a precise timetable for the

176 “American Presidents on Somalia,” New York Times, Friday, October 8, 1993, A15.177 Elaine Sciolino, “Puzzle in Somalia: the U.S. Goal,” New York Times, Tuesday October 5, 1993, A8.178 Thomas L. Friedman, “Congress Turning Hostile After Hostage-Taking and Heavy Losses,” New York

Times, Wednesday, October 6, 1993, A1.179 Clifford Krauss, “White House Tries to Calm Congress,” New York Times, Wednesday, October 6, 1993,

A16.180 Elaine Sciolino, “Puzzle in Somalia: the U.S. Goal,” New York Times, Tuesday October 5, 1993, A8; R.W.

Apple, Jr., “Clinton Sending Reinforcements After Heavy Losses in Somalia,” New York Times, Tuesday October5, 1993, A1, A8.

181 Elaine Sciolino, “Puzzle in Somalia: the U.S. Goal,” New York Times, Tuesday October 5, 1993, A8.

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winding down of the U.S. participation, as well as those of his military advisers,who worried about the vulnerability of the U.S. forces in Somalia.182 He madethis decision despite objections from Kofi Annan, the chief of the UN’speacekeeping operations. Annan contended that without U.S. support, thepeacekeeping mission would “unravel altogether.”183

182 Douglas Jehl, “Clinton Doubling U.S. Force in Somalia, Vowing Troops Will Come Home in 6 Months,”

New York Times, Friday, October 8, 1993, A1.183 “U.N. Opposes a G.I. Pullout From Somalia,” New York Times, Thursday, October 7, 1993, A10.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Restoring Order in Haiti

THE SEPTEMBER 1991 COUP AND INTERNATIONAL REACTION

Since the fall of the Duvalier regime in 1986, Haiti had gradually progressedtoward democratic government, aided by the United States. Although itsadvancement toward truly representative government was marred by coups andother setbacks, on December 16, 1990 fair elections were held for the office ofpresident. The surprise winner was Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a Catholic priest,who garnered 67 percent of the vote, placing him well above the thirteen othercandidates.184 Nine months later, however, a disgruntled military staged a coup,forcing the popular president out of office.

The army’s discontent was caused by a series of faux pas in Aristide’shandling of the military after the election. Among the instances that generated illwill in the ranks of the Haitian army were several promotions decided by thepresident, thereby circumventing the normal system of military promotion. Fargraver, however, was his decision to create a 300-member elite militia that wouldoperate outside the military chain of command and report directly to him. Angrytroops dubbed the members of the force “attachés,” a reference to the reviledTontons Macoutes that had operated under the Duvalier dictatorship and hadmarginalized the military.185

The army, however, was not alone in its distrust of Aristide. The CatholicChurch and political and economic elites with ties to the Duvalier regime werealso fearful of the president’s rhetoric and his popularity with Haiti’simpoverished masses. His speeches drew their inspiration from liberationtheology and incited listeners to seek revenge upon their enemies, exacerbatingthe already profound cleavages in society. In a speech delivered just two daysbefore the coup, President Aristide encouraged his supporters to punish

184 Département de l’information publique de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, Les Nations Unies et lasituation en Haïti (New York, Section de reproduction des documents, 1995), 1; Pamela Constable, “DatelineHaiti: Caribbean Stalemate,” Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992-93), 177-8.

185 Howard W. French, “Army Strikes Back,” New York Times, Wednesday, October 2, 1991, A12.

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suspected opponents by means of a form of torture known as “Père LeBrun,” inwhich the victim was burned to death by means of tire placed around the neck.186

With tense relations prevailing between the army and the president since hisinauguration in February 1991, soldiers felt targeted by the remarks.

Map 3

The takeover began on the night of September 29, 1991. Early the nextmorning, mutinous soldiers fired upon Aristide’s home and an armored personnelcarrier that transported him the National Palace, where the president was finallycaptured. Only diplomatic efforts by Venezuelan, French, and American officialswere able to save the ousted leader’s life and arrange his flight into exile. Havingdeposed the civilian government, the newly installed military junta, headed byBrigadier General Raul Cédras, Commander-in-Chief of the army since July 3,1991, set about consolidating its control over the Caribbean nation.187

186 Pamela Constable, “Dateline Haiti: Caribbean Stalemate,” Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992-93), 178-9; John

Sweeney, “Stuck in Haiti,” Foreign Policy 102 (Spring 1996), 143-4. Aristide said of the technique in his speech,“What a beautiful tool. What a beautiful instrument, what a beautiful device. It smells good and everywhere yougo you want to breathe it.” See Howard W. French, “Envoys Arrive in Haiti to Seek An End to Coup,” The NewYork Times, Saturday, October 5, 1991, 4. Later, Aristide argued that his remarks had been taken out of context:“The coup had started. I was using words to answer the bullets.” See Joelle Attinger and Michael Kramer’sinterview with Aristide, “‘It’s Not If I Go Back, but When,’ Time, November 1, 1993, 16.

187 Associated Press, “Haiti’s Military Assumes Power After Troops Arrest the President,” New York Times,Tuesday, October 1, 1991, A1.

HAITI PUERTO RICO

CUBA

FLORIDA

DOMINICAN REPUBLICGuantánamo

BAHAMAS


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Upon learning of the events, the international community denounced themilitary move and established a set of diplomatic and economic designed topressure the coup leaders into allowing Aristide’s return. On October 2, theOrganization of American States convened a meeting of foreign ministers inWashington to discuss an appropriate course of action. The meeting resulted inthe adoption of a resolution of all economic, commercial, diplomatic, and militaryassistance to Haiti to remain in place until President Aristide was restored topower. OAS members also agreed to consider additional, unspecified action ifthese measures did not prove sufficient, though military intervention seemedimprobable as the organization traditionally opposed such actions.188

For its part, the Bush administration stated its determination to reverse thecoup, but from the beginning it ruled out the use of American military force.189 Injustification of his decision, President Bush said, “We’ve got a big history ofAmerican force in this hemisphere, and so we’ve got to be very careful aboutthat. But I will see how others feel at the O.A.S.” Furthermore, PresidentAristide himself made clear that he did not wish to be reinstated by force,American or otherwise. Thus, in the absence of a vital interest and confronted bythe trepidation of both the Haitian leader and the OAS, a military option was notconsidered.190

Instead, the U.S. halted all economic, food, and military aid to Haiti thathad previously been approved but had not yet been given, a total of $66 million,and the State Department canceled its planned request to Congress for $88.6million in economic assistance and $2.2 million in military aid for fiscal year1992.191 President Bush also signed an executive order freezing the assets of theHaitian government in the U.S. Yet he expressed his reluctance to resort toeconomic sanctions, which he considered would hurt the Haitian people.192

188 Thomas L. Friedman, “The O.A.S. Agrees to Isolate Chiefs of Haitian Junta,” New York Times, Thursday,

October 3, 1991, A1; Thomas L. Friedman, “U.S. Suspends Assistance to Haiti And Refuses to Recognize Junta,”New York Times, Wednesday, October 2, 1991, A1, A12.

189 A few hundred marines were sent to Guantanamo Bay Naval Station in the event that an evacuation ofthe 8,000 U.S. citizens living in Haiti became necessary. See Thomas L. Friedman, “The O.A.S. Agrees to IsolateChiefs of Haitian Junta,” New York Times, Thursday, October 3, 1991, A8; Karen de Witt, : ”Bush ReassuresHaiti’s Ousted Chief,” The New York Times, Saturday, October 5, 1991, 4.

190 Thomas L. Friedman, “Haiti’s Coup: Test Case for Bush’s New World Order,” New York Times, Friday,October 4, 1991, A8.

191 Thomas L. Friedman, “U.S. Suspends Assistance to Haiti And Refuses to Recognize Junta,” New YorkTimes, Wednesday, October 2, 1991, A12; Thomas L. Friedman, “The O.A.S. Agrees to Isolate Chiefs of HaitianJunta,” New York Times, Thursday, October 3, 1991, A8.

192 Thomas L. Friedman, “The O.A.S. Agrees to Isolate Chiefs of Haitian Junta,” New York Times, Thursday,October 3, 1991, A1, A8.

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Washington was forced to revise its position on the matter, however, followingthe expulsion on October 7, 1991, of an OAS delegation that had been sent toHaiti to negotiate the coup leaders. On October 8, the OAS decreed a tradeembargo against Haiti and recommended a freeze of all assets belonging to theHaitian government by those members that had not yet done so.193

Contrary to the OAS, action at the UN’s Security Council had beenblocked, notwithstanding the support of the United States, France, other Westernnations, and the Soviet Union. China, encouraged by non-aligned countriestemporarily sitting on the Council, prevented the passage of a resolution,contending that the UN should not involve itself in a state’s internal affairs. Thegroup of developing countries expressed its concern that the organization wasincreasingly being asked to do just that at the bidding of Western states. TheCouncil’s president, Indian representative Chinmaya Gharekhan, therefore simplyissued a statement condemning the junta’s seizure of power and supporting theefforts already underway by the OAS.194

Despite pronouncements of American resolve to see Aristide returned topower, no further action was taken. Though community of Haitian immigrantsliving in the United States naturally took an interest in the issue, no powerfullobby or strategic interest militated for decisive action beyond letting sanctionsexert their effect on the junta. Not even tales of flagrant human rights abusescommitted by members of the military and police against suspected Aristidesupporters mobilized significant action. Rather, the United States left the matterin the hands of the OAS, which first designated former Colombian ForeignMinister Ramirez Ocampo and later former Argentinean Foreign Minister DanteCaputo as mediators in its efforts to convince the military regime to step downand accept Aristide’s return.

Washington’s passivity in the first few months was the expression of alack of strategic interest in the small island nation.195 Although located a mere565 miles from the U.S. mainland, Haiti, a backward, densely populated countryburdened with a variety of ills that impeded its development, did not represent amajor threat, especially in the post-Cold War world. With a per capital grossdomestic product of approximately $250, Haiti was the poorest country in the

193 Département de l’information publique de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, Les Nations Unies et la

situation en Haïti (New York, Section de reproduction des documents, 1995), 1.194 Paul Lewis, “U.N. Stops Short of Haiti Resolution,” New York Times, Friday, October 4, 1991, A8.195 The Republic of Haiti covers only about one third of the island of Hispaniola.


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Western Hemisphere, and indeed among the poorest nations worldwide.196

Unemployment was excessively high, and the illiteracy rate, according to U.N.figures, was 65.2 percent.197 With poor or inexistent water and sanitationinfrastructure, Haiti was also last among its hemispheric neighbors in a battery ofhealth indicators, including infant mortality, which was high, and life expectancy,which was low.198 And although some American companies had businessinterests in Haiti, the Caribbean nation was more dependent on the U.S. than theU.S. was on Haiti.199

The OAS-brokered talks, however, saw little progress for much of the firstyear after the coup. Both Aristide and the military junta bore their share ofresponsibility in the impasse. The most significant obstacle was the mutualdistrust the two sides shared and which unraveled any agreements that werereached. Aristide’s personality, his often inflammatory off-the-cuff remarks, andhis insistence that those responsible for the takeover be prosecuted did little toallay the fears of the military and the police that had been the cause of thepresident’s ouster in the first place. For their part, Cédras and other army andpolice officials, while proclaiming their allegiance to civilian authorities and theirsincerity in proceeding with negotiations, nevertheless remained hostile to thedeposed president’s return. They also refused to countenance an OAS proposalto mount a major peacekeeping operation to guarantee order in the transitionperiod to a new Aristide government.

Furthermore, weakly enforced economic sanctions gave little impetus toHaiti’s military rulers to alter their position. As the measures had been adoptedsolely by the Organization of American States, countries outside the regionalorganization were not bound to respect them. Indeed, many European nationsinsisted upon upholding bilateral trade agreements previously signed with Haiti,while ships bearing goods continued to arrive in Haiti’s ports from around theglobe, including OAS member states. The effort was further undermined by the

196 Robert I. Rotberg, “Clinton was right,” Foreign Policy 102 (Spring 1992), 140-1; Joseph G. Sullivan,Special Haiti Coordinator, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, Statement before theSubcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, House International Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., May 14,1997.

197 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, Statistical Division,Statistical Yearbook 1990/91, Thirty-eighth issue (New York: United Nations Publishing Division, 1993), 140.

198 Joseph G. Sullivan, Special Haiti Coordinator, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State,Statement before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, House International Relations Committee,Washington, D.C., May 14, 1997; Robert I. Rotberg, “Clinton was right,” Foreign Policy 102 (Spring 1992), 140-1.

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blatant disregard toward its enforcement by Dominican President JoaquinBalaguer, who disliked Aristide and whose country shared a border with Haiti.200

The main effect of the porous embargo had in fact been to increase thesuffering of the poor, i.e., those who constituted the backbone of Aristide’ssupport. Haiti’s elites, the key instigators of the coup, were relatively untouchedby shortages, though they were forced to pay higher prices. Some even profitedfrom the embargo by engaging in smuggling.201

In light of this, OAS countries wavered in their determination to continuethe embargo. In the United States, the Bush administration succumbed topressure from American investors and, in February 1991, granted a partialexception from the embargo to export assembly plants located in Haiti andowned by U.S. companies.202 Nevertheless, Aristide and his supporters arguedfor maintaining sanctions, and in May 1992, some steps were taken by the OASto tighten the embargo. At the same time, the United States attempted to gainEuropean compliance, both to increase the efficacy of the measures and to calmprotests by American firms that their market share was simply being taken byforeigners not restricted by the regional organization’s decisions.203

However, conditions in the Caribbean nation continued to worsen as theeconomic effects of the embargo aggravated a situation of political turmoil.Haitians responded by setting out by boat for the long and arduous voyage toFlorida on overcrowded and often unseaworthy craft. Tens of thousands wouldattempt the crossing—10,514 in the month of May 1992 alone.204 Refugeecamps established at the naval station in Guantánamo Bay in Cuba were soon fullbeyond capacity. At first, President Bush instructed the Coast Guard to limit itsrescue operations to only those who were in imminent danger of sinking orstarving. Others were warned to turn back, but no efforts were made to stop therefugees. One week later, however, the Bush administration took a muchstronger stance, announcing that the Coast Guard would forcibly return all

199 In 1987-88, Haiti was ranked fourth among nations most dependent upon a single market. At the time, theUnited States served as a market for 84.8 percent of Haitian exports. See The Economist Book of Vital Statistics(London: The Economist Books Ltd, 1990), 161.

200 Jill Smolowe, “With Friends Like These,” Time, November 8, 1993, 26.201 André Linard, “Démocratie à Haïti: comment s’est joué le retour d’Aristide,” L’ONU dans tous ses états

(Brussels: GRIP, 1995), 92; Pamela Constable, “Dateline Haiti: Caribbean Stalemate,” Foreign Policy 89 (Winter1992-93), 182-4.

202 André Linard, “Démocratie à Haïti: comment s’est joué le retour d’Aristide,” L’ONU dans tous ses états(Brussels: GRIP, 1995), 92; Pamela Constable, “Dateline Haiti: Caribbean Stalemate,” Foreign Policy 89 (Winter1992-93), 184.

203 “Against All Odds,” Time, June 1, 1992, 34-5.


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refugees it intercepted at sea, and that the camp at Guantánamo Bay would beclosed and the majority of asylum-seekers there repatriated.205

Speaking in Atlanta, Georgia, President Bush justified the decision byclaiming, “Yes, the Statue of Liberty still stands, and we still open our arms,under the law, to people that are politically oppressed. I will not … open thedoors to economic refugees all over the world.”206 However, the true reasonbehind the shift in policy lay in the fact that 1992 was an election year, andFlorida was a key conservative state. With a poorly performing economy,several candidates on the right were promoting an isolationist and, in someinstances, even xenophobic agenda. They hoped to garner the support of thoseAmericans who favored a halt to new immigration—55 percent of the population,according to one survey.207 These considerations, as well as the experience offormer President Jimmy Carter, whose reelection bid in 1980 was undermined bythe arrival of more than one hundred thousand Cuban refugees on Florida’sshores in the Mariel boatlift, led Bush to adopt more stringent measures.

U.S. POLICY UNDER CLINTON

During the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign, Clinton criticized his Republicanopponent’s handling of the Haitian refugee problem. If elected president, hepledged to reverse the Bush administration policy of forcibly repatriating thoseinterdicted at sea, a treatment he decried as “a blow to the moral authority indefending the rights of refugees” and said that a Clinton government would notturn back fleeing Haitians “until some shred of democracy is restored there.”208

Yet beyond this rhetoric asserting the rights of refugees to make their claims forasylums, the Democratic candidate did not address the sensitive issue of actuallyaccepting the mass of potential refugees.

Upon his election, however, the vagueness dissipated as Clinton decidedto continue the policy of his predecessor, stating, “We believe that we shouldprocess the Haitians who are asking for asylum in Haiti, and that that is the safestthing for them.” In fact, the prospect of hundreds of boats overflowing with

204 Ibid., 34.205 “Closed-Door Policy,” Time, June 8, 1992, 14; Cathy Booth, “Send ‘Em Back!” Time, June 8, 1992, 32.206 Cathy Booth, “Send ‘Em Back!” Time, June 8, 1992, 32.207 Ibid.208 J.F.O. McAllister, “Lives on Hold,” Time, February 1, 1993, 32; Michael Kramer, “Putting People Second,”

Time, November 1, 1993, 17.

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refugees making the dangerous crossing, at a time when the newly-electedpresident had ambitious plans for his first hundred days in office, motivated theshift.

Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts conducted by the UN and the OAS toresolve the crisis continued. In June 1992, Marc Bazin, a former World Bankofficial with reportedly good relations with Washington, was named primeminister, an appointment that was widely seen as a conciliatory gesture by thejunta toward the United States. Nonetheless, the United States remained firmlycommitted, in word if not in deed, to its objective of restoring of Haiti’sdemocratically elected president to power.

A concession granted by the military leaders in late January 1993, and thereaction it caused in the ranks of the army and police, demonstrated the delicateposition from which the junta negotiated and underlined the difficulties toreaching a lasting solution to the problem. In a letter to Special Envoy DanteCaputo, General Cédras and Prime Minister Bazin had agreed to a jointdeployment by the UN and the OAS of approximately 400 human rightsobservers to monitor the situation in Haiti, the International Civilian Mission(MICIVIH).209 Upon learning of the decision, however, members of the lowerechelons of the army and police forces mutinied, with some soldiers evenattempting to mount a coup. They feared that top officers were planning tonegotiate a comfortable retirement for themselves in exile while the rank-and-filewould be left behind to face reprisals from an angry population.210 Nevertheless,the junta succeeded in maintaining order, and the international observers wereallowed into the country. The episode does serve to highlight, though, themilitary leaders’ tenuous position.

The United States faced difficulties as well, most notably due to Aristide’sstubborn and controversial character, that prevented it from acting morevigorously in negotiating a solution. The Bush administration had never beenenthusiastic about the Haitian president following his election in December 1990,but it nevertheless stood by its policy of seeking Aristide’s reinstatement. Thedifficulty of its task, as well as that of its successor, was increased by chargesthat the exiled leader was mentally ill and had ordered the murders of political

209 Le Départment de l’information de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, Les Nations Unies et la situation en

Haïti (New York: Section de reproduction des documents, 1995), 3-4.210 J.F.O. McAllister, “Lives on Hold,” Time, February 1, 1993, 33.


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opponents.211 Aristide himself undermined his position in Washington byasserting claims that the CIA had been involved in the coup in which he wasoverthrown.212

Against this backdrop, ongoing diplomatic efforts failed to yield substantialresults. In addition, the international observers stationed throughout Haiti underMICIVIH witnessed the rampant violence and corruption. Given the lack ofprogress, the UN Security Council acted in June 1993 to take more stringentmeasures against the military regime. On June 16, the Council passed Resolution841 which, invoking Chapter VII of the Charter, instated an embargo on allpetroleum products and arms destined for Haiti. As the action had been taken atthe level of the UN, rather than by the regional OAS, the embargo had a muchgreater impact. It was accompanied by an innovative decision by the Clintonadministration to freeze the assets of 83 members of Haiti’s economic elite, thuspunishing those who had benefited from the military takeover.213 The UnitedStates employed this opportunity to apply pressure on both Aristide and the juntato reach a settlement. U.S. nudging—which included a proposed $1 billion aidpackage—apparently proved successful, and on July 3, after one week of talksheld on Governor’s Island, New York, an accord was reached that foresawGeneral Cédras’s retirement and Aristide’s return by October 30, 1993. Theagreement was considered by the State Department to constitute an appreciablevictory for American diplomacy, and Secretary of State Warren Christophertrumpeted the achievement in a letter sent to American ambassadors around theglobe.214 The optimism with which news of the agreement had been receivedproved to be short-lived, however, as subsequent events demonstrated thatHaiti’s military leaders did not intend to respect the commitments contained in thedocument.

Following the designation of Robert Malval as prime minister of antransitional government in application of the Governor’s Island agreement, onAugust 27, 1993 the Security Council voted resolution 861. The text of theresolution called for an immediate suspension of the economic sanctionsestablished under resolution 841, while reaffirming the readiness of the UN toreinstate the embargo in the event that the accord was not carried out in good

211 Bruce W. Nelan, “Is Haiti Worth It?” Time, November 1, 1993, 17.212 Pamela Constable, “Dateline Haiti: Caribbean Stalemate,” Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992-93), 184-5.213 Steven A. Holmes, “Clinton and Aristide Move To Affirm Policy on Haiti,” New York Times, Thursday,

October, 14, 1993, A8.214 George J. Church, “In and Out With the Tide,” Time, October 25, 1993, 20.

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faith. Included in the agreement was a UN plan that envisaged the creation of1,300-strong international force of training officers to assist in the reeducationand modernization of Haiti’s military and police forces in view of their new role ina democratic society.215 Once again, these two segments of society feltthreatened and sought to prevent action. A staged protest was organized to greetthe U.S.S. Harlan County, a amphibious landing craft carrying a first detachmentof American and Canadian military engineers and instructors, as it arrived Port-au-Prince on October 11, 1993. A few hundred police auxiliaries, or “attachés,”and other armed civilians entered the port area and began to riot, causing panicamong diplomats and journalists present to witness the arrival. The lightly armedsoldiers—only selected members had been authorized to carry pistols—had beenprepared for this sort of scenario and had been instructed to “run the other way”in the event that they encountered any resistance.216 The incident occurred at adifficult moment for the Clinton, which was already confronted congressionaldemands for a speedy withdrawal of U.S. forces in Somalia following the deathsof 18 Rangers in an ill-fated assault on General Aidid’s key military advisers.217

Indeed, the protesters were well aware of the United States’ problems andshouted, “We are going to turn this into another Somalia.”218

In reaction to the incident, President Clinton stated that unless securityguarantees for both foreign troops and President Aristide were forthcoming, U.S.military advisers would not be sent. Instead, he said, “What I plan to do now ispress for sanctions.”219 Public and congressional outcry over the deaths ofAmerican soldiers serving in Somalia was acknowledged as the leading force inshaping Clinton’s decision.220 Indeed, opinion polls in late October showed thattwo-thirds of the American public was firmly against the idea of militaryintervention in Haiti.221

215 American and Canadian soldiers were to retrain the Haitian military, while police forces from several

French-speaking countries were sending officers to establish an independent police force. Elaine Sciolino,“Pentagon and State Dept. at Odds Over Sending of Soldiers to Haiti,” New York Times, Friday, October 8, 1993,A1.

216 Howard W. French, “Envoys Flee Port as Their Cars Are Struck,” New York Times, October 12, 1993, A1.217 On the day the Harlan County was prevented from landing, Senate leaders were demanding that a vote

be held to repatriate U.S. forces in Somalia at the latest by the end of 1993, rather than by March 31, 1994, asproposed by President Clinton. See Clifford Krauss, “Senators Seek Early Pullout Of U.S. Troops From Somalia,”New York Times, Tuesday, October 12, 1993, A1.

218 Howard W. French, “Envoys Flee Port as Their Cars Are Struck,” New York Times, October 12, 1993, A1.219 Steven A. Holmes, “U.S. Withdraws Ship and Asks Sanctions,” New York Times, Wednesday, October

13, 1993, A1.220 Ibid.221 Bruce W. Nelan, “Is Haiti Worth It?” Time, November 1, 1993, 16.


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But Clinton’s difficulties in the foreign policy arena were merelysymptomatic of more profound troubles that plagued his administration in allareas. The tensions between the White House and Congress had been created inpart by the apparent lack of coordination between the activities of the differentexecutive agencies, and the sense of confusion that often appeared to reign. U.S.policy toward Somalia in early October 1993 was exemplary in that regard, as theState Department was publicly stating one policy, that of greater emphasis ondiplomatic means, while the Pentagon was pursuing in the field a policydiametrically opposed. The two departments were equally at odds concerningaction in Haiti immediately before the Harlan County mishap. In this instance,the State Department was pressing for intervention while top military officials didnot wish to become embroiled in yet another messy conflict.

These sources of distrust were exacerbated by President’s failure toconvey his foreign policy goals to legislators on Capitol Hill. Indeed, the WhiteHouse’s inconsistencies in matters of foreign policy led detractors to claim thatno clear set of priorities guided U.S. action other than Bill Clinton’s desire to beliked, with its attendant shifts in line with the changing opinion of the Americanpublic.

In the months that followed, the situation in Haiti continued to worsen.The United States asked that the UN impose once again the embargo on oil andmilitary equipment destined for Haiti. The human rights observers who had beensent to Haiti under MICIVIH were pulled out of the country, inaugurating aperiod of increased violence committed mainly against Aristide supporters by themilitary, “attachés,” and members of a group known as Front révolutionnairepour l’avancement et le progrès (FRAPH).222 Meanwhile, the junta and its alliesin Haitian society adopted a much harder line toward the U.S. as was evidencedby the murder of Haitian Justice Minister Guy Malary shortly after the HarlanCountry was prevented from docking in Port-au-Prince. Just hours before,President Clinton had made an appeal for the safety of those who were to haveparticipated in Aristide’s new government upon his return.223

Over the course of the following months, little progress was made. InFebruary 1994, a group of Haitian legislators proposed a new plan to put an endto the enduring crisis, but Aristide obstinately refused, demanding the


Haïti (New York: Section de reproduction des documents, 1995), 10.223 George J. Church, “In and Out With the Tide,” Time, October 25, 1993, 20.

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deployment of the UNMIH force as foreseen by the Governor’s IslandAgreement. The exiled president’s obduracy and the mounting toll of police-inflicted deaths, as reported by MICIVIH observers who had begun to return tothe country in early 1994, had begun to wear down the patience of theinternational community. Furthermore, economic sanction proved to be less thanadequate, as they had in the past. On April 29, UN Secretary-General BoutrosBoutros-Ghali presented a report on the situation to the General Assembly inwhich he recommended that the best course of action would be to find a Haitiansolution to the problem.224

In the U.S., Clinton was coming under pressure from members of theCongressional Black Caucus to take a more active role in finding a solution to thecontinuing drama in Haiti, while the executive director of the TransAfrica Forum,Randall Robinson, staged a hunger strike to protest against the White House’scontinuation of the Bush administration policy of turning back refugees.225 TheClinton administration eventually yielded to the activist’s demands, sparking anew wave of asylum-seekers. Floridians began to protest the cost that the influxof immigrants required them to bear, while other Caribbean countries that mighthave aided the U.S. in supporting the refugees burden began to close their doorsto Haitians.

At the same time, a new policy directive on peacekeeping, PresidentialDecision Directive 25 (PPD 25), seemingly signaled a reluctance, based on pastexperiences in Somalia and Haiti, to become involved in future UN operations.The document, which was signed by President Clinton on May 3, 1994, afterextensive consultations with members of Congress, listed a series of strictconditions—including the advancement of American interests, congressionalsupport, and clearly defined objectives—to be met before the United Stateswould commit forces to peacekeeping missions. In the directive, Clintonrecanted on statements made during the presidential campaign in favor of astanding, multinational UN army. According to the new policy, “The U.S. doesnot support a standing U.N. army, nor will we earmark specific U.S. military unitsfor participation in U.N. operations. It is not U.S. policy to seek to expand either


Haïti (New York: Section de reproduction des documents, 1995), 11.225 Michael Mandlebaum, “Foreign Policy as Social Work,” Foreign Affairs 75(1) (January/February 1996),

21.


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the number of U.N. peace operations or U.S. involvement in such operations.”226

The document also made clear that the U.S. did not intend to place its troopsunder foreign command in the event that they did participate in a UN operation.These concerns shaped the U.S. approach to resolving the Haitian crisis that wasfinally set into motion, as we will see in the following section.

OPERATION RESTORE DEMOCRACY

Throughout the spring and early summer, tensions continued to mount betweenHaiti’s military leaders and the international community. On May 6, 1994, the UNSecurity Council imposed yet stricter sanctions against Haiti, passing resolution917. The junta responded by appointing a new interim president, HaitianSupreme Court justice Emile Jonassaint, who soon announced that newpresidential elections would be held in January 1995, a development that wouldhave further complicated the situation. Meanwhile, the United States sent twoadditional warships to join the six that it had already stationed off the Haitiancoast to enforce the economic sanctions against Haiti.227

As the summer wore on, observers on both in Haiti and in the U.S. beganto see a confrontation between the United States and Haiti’s de facto governmentas becoming more and more inevitable. Only General Cédras seemed todiscount such a possibility, which he viewed as highly unlikely givencongressional resistance.228 Following the expulsion of the internationalobservers of MICIVIH n July 11, 1994, the UN Security Council was forced toadopt an even sterner tone. In resolution 940, voted on July 31, the councilmembers approved a report prepared by the Secretary-General which called forthe creation of a multinational force under unified, i.e. American, command torestore President Aristide to power by force. Once this task was accomplished,a follow-up force under UN command was to be deployed to retrain Haiti’s armyand police forces.229 In the meantime, the United States had begun to work withHaiti’s neighbor, the Dominican Republic, to prevent oil smuggling along the

226 From the declassified version of the directive quoted in Elaine Sciolino, “New U.S. Peacekeeping Policy

De-emphasizes Rôle of the U.N.,” The New York Times, Friday, May 6, 1994, A7.227 Le Départment de l’information de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, Les Nations Unies et la situation en

Haïti (New York: Section de reproduction des documents, 1995), 12.228 “Tightening the stranglehold,” The Economist, August 6, 1994, 39.229 Ibid.; “Ready, steady, steady, oh,” The Economist, August 6, 1994, 45.

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border between the two countries. Six U.S. military helicopters and 88international observers on the ground were involved in the effort.230

Upon adoption of resolution 940, the UN Secretariat and military plannersfrom the U.S. Atlantic command immediately set about organizing the U.S.-ledMultinational Force and the follow UNMIH. Both operations would in fact beunder U.S. command, UNMIH’s commander being a U.S. major general, thusrespecting an important guideline set out in Presidential Decision Directive 25.Furthermore, the concept of operations employed overwhelming force and thepossibility to use that force, in the hopes of preventing another Somalia-likedebacle.231

The political decision, however, ultimately lay with President Clinton,notwithstanding the homage paid to the notion of congressional consultationcontained in PPD 25, as events will show. But first let us examine the differencebetween the avowed motives of the White House approving the use of force toresolve the crisis and those which can be drawn from the domestic politicalcontext at the time of the decision.

In presenting his decision to the American public, President Clinton’sattempted to sway opinion by invoking several converging arguments. First, hehighlighted the fact that the crisis was occurring on America’s doorstep, and thatthe U.S. had a tradition of playing a leading role in the Western Hemisphere.Second, he justified the intervention in light of the violence and human rightsabuses suffered by the civilian population, notwithstanding an absence of U.S.response in other regions also afflicted with the same evils, whether in Bosnia orRwanda. Furthermore, the president invoked the specter of new waves ofrefugees trying to reach American shores, a rather disingenuous contention, giventhat Clinton had ordered all refugees to be taken to camps in Guantánamo Bay,from which they had little chance to gain entry to the U.S. Finally, Clintonemployed an argument that had in fact had currency in some quarters from thevery beginning, i.e., that by allowing a group of army and police officers seizepower by force, the U.S. was setting a bad precedent both for its credibility,which had been engaged by former President Bush when he had vowed to returnAristide to power, and for the other new democracies throughout the Americas,

230 “Tightening the stranglehold,” The Economist, August 6, 1994, 39.231 Robert Oakley and David Bentley, “Peace Operations: A Comparison of Somalia and Haiti,” National

Defense University Strategic Forum, 30 (May 1995), 2.


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many of which were still fragile and ad a long heritage of military rule. Amongthose reasons advanced by the White House, the last was the most plausible.232

However, examining the U.S. political scene in August 1994, sheds a ratherdifferent light on the President’s possible motivations. At the time, a series oflegislative setbacks together with the Whitewater scandal and low-opinion pollratings led some pundits to draw comparisons between the Clinton presidencyand that of former President Jimmy Carter. President Clinton’s difficulties ingetting legislation passed by the Democratically-controlled Congress was perhapsmost damaging for him. His election in 1992 had been trumpeted as the end ofgridlock, as both the White House and Capitol Hill were controlled by theDemocrats. This view did not take into consideration, however, the divisionsthat split congressional Democrats and that became apparent a crime billproposed by President Clinton was unable to muster sufficient support to pass.This failure to pass legislation that was mainly designed to provide legislatorswith something to present to their constituencies just before the upcominglegislative elections did not bode well for a much more important piece oflegislation, the Clinton health care package that had long been proclaimed as thecenterpiece of his presidency.233 Some have posited that Clinton turned toforeign policy to turn attention away from his domestic problems and providehim with a positive achievement in the weeks ahead of the November elections, inwhich it had already become evident that the Republicans might be capable ofwresting the majority from the Democrats.234

The president, rather uncharacteristically, made his decision despite alargely unfavorable public opinion. An ABC poll from September 8-11, 1994,had shown that 73% of those surveyed were against the notion of a U.S.-ledinvasion.235 Faced with possible Republican opposition and division among theDemocrats, he also chose to exclude Congress from the decision-makingprocess. Many in Congress voiced their opinion that any use of force in Haitishould be submitted to prior congressional approval, as had been the case in theGulf War. Fearing such a scenario, which could have constrained the president

232 “The nightmare next door,” The Economist, September 24, 1994, 21-2.233 “Raging Bill,” The Economist, August 20, 1994, 9; “Things fall apart,” The Economist, August 20, 1994,

39.234 “To Haiti’s rescue?” The Economist, September 17, 1994, 13; “William Jefferson Bonaparte,” The

Economist, September 17, 1994, 53.235 “William Jefferson Bonaparte,” The Economist, September 17, 1994, 54.

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in an unprecedented manner, the White House countered that no such approvalhad been sought before interventions in Panama and Grenada.236

Ultimately Clinton acted without consulting Congress. A last-ditchdiplomatic effort by former President Carter, who traveled to Port-au-Prince onSeptember 17 to convince the military leaders to step down, was successful, andU.S. troops were able to deploy on September 19 without encounteringresistance.237 Attachés continued to intimidate civilians, despite the U.S.military’s assertion that it was collaborating with he Haitian army to ensure asecure environment.238 Nevertheless, the imposing U.S. force, which peaked at21,000, compared with about 7,000 for the Haitian army, did create somesemblance of order, and even initiated a “weapons control and reductionprogram,” removing thousands of weapons from circulation.239 On October 10,Cédras and other military leaders stepped down, and shortly thereafter anarrangement was reached with the Panamanian government which granted themasylum in exile. President Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15. The transitionfrom the U.S.-led Multinational Force to the UN-controlled UNMIH was able totake place in March 1995, and in January 1996, President Clinton decided towithdraw the last U.S. troops from the country.

CONCLUSION

The results of the intervention have draw mixed appraisals. Republicans, whoreceived a majority of seats in both houses of Congress in the 1994 elections,have been critical of the operation’s effectiveness, and have complained aboutthe costs of the multinational and the UN mission, as well as that of the aidgranted to Haiti. On the left, Clinton’s handling of the crisis is generally seen asone of his foreign-policy victories.240 As evidence of the intervention’s success,Clinton supporters point to the peaceful transition of power on February 7, 1996from Aristide to his democratically-elected successor, René Préval.

236 Ibid.237 Le Départment de l’information de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, Les Nations Unies et la situation en

Haïti (New York: Section de reproduction des documents, 1995), 15.238 “Haiti faces the morning after,” The Economist, September 24, 1994, 45.239 Department of Defense News Briefing, General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman, JCS, Tuesday, October 4,

1994, 1:00 p.m., the text of which is provided by the Navy Public Affairs Library (NAVPALIB),http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/intl/haiti/shal1004.txt.

240 For views from both sides see the debate published in the Spring 1996 issue of Foreign Policy: Robert I.Rotberg, “Clinton Was Right,” Foreign Policy 102 (Spring 1996), 135-41; and John Sweeney, “Stuck in Haiti,”Foreign Policy 102 (Spring 1996), 143-51.


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However, in light of the current situation in Haiti, the effort does not appearto be an unalloyed success. Violence marred senatorial and local elections heldon April 6, 1997, a symptom of the country’s dire economic predicament. Asone Haitian recently said of the elections, “At the beginning I thought thingswould change. I was full of hope. But nothing has changed with democracy.Every day life is harder.241 There is nothing left to hope for.” The country’spoor economic prospects have given rise to fears that renewed violence mightdestabilize the Préval government.

241 Douglas Farah, “Life Keeps Getting Harder for Haitians,” Guardian Weekly, April 13, 1997, 15.

CONCLUSION

Since the end of the Cold War, and despite a certain amount of resistance, theUnited States has on occasion abandoned its traditional calculus of nationalinterest and committed its armed forces to intervene for a variety of humanitarianpurposes. Although some have heralded this as the basis of a new “Clintondoctrine,”242 it is more of a limited ad hoc approach. The president hasunderlined these limits himself, stating, “The United States cannot and should nottry to solve every problem in the world,”243 and indeed as recent crises inRwanda and Zaire have shown, the U.S. will remain selective in the areas in whichit wishes to intervene.

The criteria which have guided American action since the fall of the BerlinWall are made up of an admixture of old and new concerns. The loss ofAmerican servicemen’s lives, no matter how few, is still a decisive factor indetermining whether or not to intervene. In addition, both the public andCongress continue to demand a well-defined exit strategy to avoid Vietnam-likemission creep.

At the same time, Americans, weary of Cold-War burdens, have electedfirst a president, then a new Republican majority, that pledged to bring domesticissues to the fore. Thus, while Americans have occasionally displayedhumanitarian impulses, mainly in the case of Somalia, they have been increasinglyreluctant to bear the costs of such missions. Furthermore, the failure in Somaliahas even led members of Congress to propose new legislation, the United StatesArmed Forces Protection Act of 1996, which would severely restrict the abilityof the president to place U.S. troops under UN command. Past experience hasmade Americans even more wary of relinquishing command over their armedforces, especially to the UN.

242 Michael Dobbs, “The ‘Clinton Doctrine’ Of Scaled-Down Force,” International Herald Tribune,

Monday, November 18, 1996, 10.243 Ibid.

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