The Unimaginable

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The UnimaginableAuthor(s): Jakob SteinbrennerSource: History and Theory, Vol. 37, No. 4, Theme Issue 37: Danto and His Critics: ArtHistory, Historiography and After the End of Art (Dec., 1998), pp. 115-126Published by: Blackwell Publishing for Wesleyan UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2505399

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THE UNIMAGINABLE

JAKOBSTEINBRENNER

ABSTRACT

ArthurDanto advocatesthe thesis that we cannot imagine the artor artworkof the future.

This thesis is motivatedprimarilyby his Hegelian conceptionof history and secondarily

by his holistic conceptionof art,whichis informedby Wittgenstein.At firstglance thethe-

sis seems to conflict with Danto'ssecond thesis thatanything(any object)can be a work

of art. Danto's solution to this problem is not very convincing. A more promising

approachcan be foundin Kant's aestheticsandespecially in his concept of genius.

In many places Arthur Danto defends the thesis that we cannot imagine the art or

artworkof the future,or at least thatwe can only do so with difficulty.1 Danto

supports his view by citing science-fiction works, among others, which he claims

are at best avant-garde works of the time at which they were created. These and

other examples seem in fact to support the thesis:

(Ti) The artworkof the future s unimaginable.

In the following discussion, in order to strengthen the thesis, I shall assume the

following. First,we should take "future" o mean not the immediate future,but

rather he time after the year 2005. Second, the expression"artwork" houldbe

understoodas referring o worksof visual art.

Even this modified thesis admits of the following interpretations, among oth-

ers:

(a) Necessarily,we cannotimagineany artworkof the future.

(b) Necessarily,we cannotimagineany artworkwhich will be produced n the future.

(c) We cannot imagine what will be called "theartworkof the future,"whateverthis

mightmean.

(d) We cannot imaginethe artworkof the future which is typicalfor its period.

(e) We cannotimaginethe avant-gardeworks of the future.

(f) We can imaginenew technicalmediaof representation utnot whatis expressedby

them,or new subjectmatter.

(g) We cannotimagine the artworkof the future in the sense of a more or less well-

founded forecast.

It is not completely clear which interpretation Danto favors. The strongest is

surely (a), but insofar as I understand him, he has (b) in mind. I shall assume this

1. The most illuminatingpassages in this regardare to be foundin the essays, "TheEnd of Art,"

in The PhilosophicalDisenfranchisement fArt (New York, 1986), and"Modalitiesof History,"here-

after MH) in After the End of Art: ContemporaryArtand the Pale of History (Princeton,1997).



116 JAKOBSTEINBRENNER

interpretationn the following discussion.This interpretationeems to me strong

enough to entail statements c) through(g).

In Danto's work, (Ti) is motivatedprimarilyby his Hegelian conception of

history and secondarilyby his holistic conceptionof art, which is informedbyWittgenstein.These two conceptions, togetherwith Warhol's "discovery" hat

works of art cannot be differentiated rom their non-artisticcounterparts y per-

ceptible properties,lead Danto to divide the history of Westernart since the

Renaissanceinto threephases. The firstphase of art consists in the problem of

accuratelydepictingthe world;this phasebeganwith the earlyRenaissance and

endedin the second thirdof the nineteenthcentury.The second phase began with

the paintingsof Gauguin,Manet,and others; it takes, as subjectmatter, ts own

medium of representation.One high point, or perhapsthe high point, of this

phase is Greenberg'sreflections about art. Today,finally, we live in the third

phase, the phase of pluralism, nitiatedby AndyWarhol'sBrillo Box.

Numerous facts have been cited against Danto's theory of phases; this has

takenup many pages, to which I would not like to add here.2WhatI findmuch

more interesting s the fourthphase,even if it is not so called by Danto, specifi-

cally, theunimaginableart of the future.In whatfollows I shallrely primarilyon

what Danto says in his "Modalitiesof History."3

I. ART AND ESSENCE

The startingpoint of my examinationof Danto's claim of unimaginability s

whetherandin whatsense Danto'spositioncan be calledessentialist.That Danto

is not an essentialist is supported,accordingto David Carrier,by Danto's dis-

coverythatBrilloBox cannot,withrespectto any property,be differentiatedrom

its non-artisticcounterpart.Brillo Box, Carrierclaims, is evidence that any

attempt o determine he essence of artmust fail.

Danto objects to Carrier'sclaim and distinguishestwo concepts of essence,

one of them extensional,the other intensional.It is difficult,however,to apply

2. As mentionedabove,Danto bases his theoryof phaseson Warhol'sdiscovery.Against this the-

sis and the pluralism with which it is connected one can raise historical(the discovery was made

almost fiftyyearsearlierby M. Duchamp)and philosophical Danto startswith a naiveconcept of per-

ception-objects, as opposedto worksof art, are "simply"perceived)objections.See J. Steinbrenner,

"MisterWarhol'sDiscoveryand MisterDanto's PhilosophicalTransfiguration,"orthcoming.

3. Danto's furtherattempts o arguefor (Ti) may be foundin "TheEnd of Art."Therehe tries to

support(Ti) by recourse to Hegel's philosophyof history and the concept of incommensurability.

find both attempts,however,ratherunconvincing,the first because it relies on Hegel's metaphysics

and the secondbecause it hinges on an illegitimate applicationof the conceptof incommensurability.

The following remarksmight make the latterpoint clearer: i) At theircore, the "hard ciences"have

mathematics,which, despiteall the "incommensurable"hanges in science, is retained,but the arts

possess no such rigorouscore. (ii) Newtonian physics is still today,unlike any artisticmovement of

the seventeenth century,appliedand taught, completelyregardlessof whetherit is commensurable

with relativitytheory.In addition, t is (iii) virtuallya characteristic eatureof works of artthat they

refer to their predecessors(pastiche, mannerism,allusion,copy, variation,and so on) and aretherein

comparable "commensurable").iv) Scientific theories, in contrast,refer primarilyandcentrallyto

the worldandin a very distantway, if at all, to previoustheories.



THE UNIMAGINABLE 117

even one of the two to art,since it is neitherclear which objectsshould fall under

it, nor whetherone can give a set of necessarycharacteristicswhich all worksof

artpossess.4Nevertheless,Danto attempts, n Transfiguration,o give what arein

certain respects necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept "art" MH195). This attemptat definition,however,seems at first glance to conflict with

Wdlfflin's thesis, sharedby Danto,that:

(TW) Not everything s possible at all times, and certainthoughtscan only be thought

at certainstagesof development.(MH 196)

Danto clarifies W6lfflin's ideas wonderfully with an example of a necktie

painted by Cezanne, which in Cezanne's time could not be a work of art, but

became one unproblematicallyn the 1950s.5 But can Wblfflin's thesis (TW) be

reconciledwith essentialism,andif so, can this essentialism n turnbe reconciled

with the following pluralismdefended by Danto?

(TP) Anything(any object)can be a work of art.(MH 47)

(TW) seems to say thatnot everythingcan be a work of art at any particular

time, whereas(TP) seems to deny this. Indeed, (TP) "means n particularhatit

is altogetherpossible for artists to appropriatehe forms of past art, anduse to

their own expressiveends the cave painting,the altarpiece . . ." (MH 198).

The pointhere, however, s that althoughtoday's artistsmay paint in the style

of their predecessors,what remains impossible for them is "to relate to these

worksas those did in whose form of life these worksplayedthe role they played:

we are not cavemen,norare we devout medievals.... Of course, no periodcan

relateto the art of earlierlife-formsin the way those who lived those life-forms

did. But neithercould they,as can we, make those formsours"(MH 198).

The solution of the apparent ontradictionsbetweenW6lfflin'sthesis and plu-ralism consists, accordingto Danto, in the idea that, althoughtoday any object

can be made intoa work of art,how the work of artis relatedto the life-formof

its time dependson the time. "Thesense in which everything s possible is that

in which all forms are ours. The sense in which not everything s possible is that

we must still relateto themin our own way.The way we relate to those forms is

partof what definesourperiod"(MH 198).

In my opinion,these last remarksof Danto's do not containanythingoverand

above a Wittgensteinian,holistic conception of art. The understandingof art

always requires he understanding f a life-form,andwe can only understandn

a qualifiedsense those works of artwhich, insofar as they may still be called

worksof art,havetheiroriginsin a life-form distant romus. Whatin Danto sur-

passes Wittgenstein s his pluralismthesis and its inherent commitmentto the

plasticityof form.As evidence for thelatter,Danto turnsour attention o the 1995

Biennalein Istanbuland writes:

4. The distinctionbetween extensionaland intensionalessence is especiallyobscurebecause Danto

confuses the terms in this passage (MH, 194).

5. Danto, TheTransfigurationf the CommonplcaceCambridge,Mass., 1981), 46.




(Tia) There is a sense in which the works express our times, and this will almostcer-

tainly continue to be true: the Istanbul Biennale of 2005 will almost certainlycontain

workswe cannottoday imagine. That is a consequence of the pressureson artistscon-

stantlyto come up with somethingnew, which the open extension of the term"work of

art" acilitates.(MH 199)

But how (andhere we encounterthe real difficulty) is the pluralismthesis to

be made compatiblewith the claim that we cannot imagine the artworkof the

future?For,if each thing can be a work of art, why shouldwe not imagine that

it be a futurework of art?

Danto'sresponse, as alreadymentioned, ies in his Hegelian theoryof the his-

toryof art (we findourselvesin the finalphase of art) andin his holism (we can

understand nly our art).His response,however, s unsatisfactorybecause,on the

one hand, t relieson a metaphysicsof history which is difficultto accept, and on

the other hand, because it does not follow, from a necessarily inadequateor lim-

ited understanding f the artworkof distantcultures,that we cannot imaginethe

art of the future.

Danto weakens his claim, however, a few lines down the page, in the follow-

ing way:

(T2) [We] know almost certainlythat there will be things in them [the works of the2005 Biennale] different n ways we cannot imagine in any interestingdetail from what

we could have seen in 1995. But we also know thatour definitionof art is already suffi-

ciently in place thatwe will haveno hesitation n acceptingit all as art.(MH 198, italics

mine)

The decisive factor for the artworkof the future, ust as for the artworkof the

past, is thatwe cannotrelateto it in the same way as its contemporaries an.We

remain,with regardto such past periods,6"lonely outsiders":"Butit [the life-

form]is no longeravailableto us as somethingwe can live. Or,in a way, we can

live it only in the mode of a pastiche and pretense, and that is not really living it

since no one lives it with us" (MH 202).

Accordingto Danto,this is also one reasonwhy it is impossibleto imaginethe

artof the future:Eitherwe cannotrelate to thecorrespondinguture ife-form,or

we commit the errorof projectingourown life-forminto the future.Does it not

"however" ollow from this analogythat our insight into the art of the futureis

in principle the same as our vision into the art of the past?Dantodenies this:

Still, thereis a deep difference n the way the future s impossiblefor us and the way the

past, which we can know about,is impossiblefor us. This asymmetry s the structureof

historical being. If it were possible for someone to know the future,it would be useless

knowledge,for thatpersoncould not live the form of life which defines the futuresince

no one else does. If otherpeople lived it, it would be present,afterall. (MH 202)

I must confess that it is not completely clear to me in what this asymmetry

consists. Am I not entitledto the same claim aboutmy knowledgeof the past?

May I notjust as legitimatelyclaim either(a) thatI cannotrelateto ancient art

6. "Periods,"n this context,means no morefor Dantothan "life-forms."



THEUNIMAGINABLE 119

and its corresponding ife-form,if it is still not sharedby others,or (b) that at the

moment when the life-form is shared, t becomes a life-form of the present and

not one of the past?

According to Danto, life-forms of the past, unlike those of the future, can atleast be reconstituted,n that we can makethe system of meanings such that we

may once again relate to it (though only partly):

A formof life is somethingivedandnotmerelyknownabout.Forart o playa role n aformof life, theremustbe a fairlycomplex ystemof meaningsn which t does so, andbelongingo anotherormof life means hatone cangrasp hemeaning f worksof artfromanearlierormonlyby reconstitutingsmuchof therelevantystemof meanings swe areable.One canwithoutquestion mitate heworkandthe style of the workof an

earlier eriod.Whatone cannotdo is live thesystemof meanings ponwhich he workdrew n its original ormof life. Ourrelationshipo it is altogetherxternal, nlessanduntilwe canfinda way of fitting t intoour ormof life. (MH203)

In my opinion Danto owes us an explanationhere for why we cannot in the

same way imaginea fictitiouspast art or the art of the future.Why,for example,

should a novel in which theprotagonist ravels nto the futureand there becomes

familiarwith the artof the futurebe unthinkable?7

Our considerations hus seem to lead to the following claims:

(1) If pluralisms true,we canapparentlynproblematicallymaginepastandfutureobjectsof art.

(2)Ifholism s true,we cannotmaginehepastand utureife-formsorrespondingoartistic eriods.

Neither thesis (1) nor (2) warrantsany asymmetrybetween the imaginability

of works of art createdin the past and the imaginabilityof future works of art.

Somethingmore is needed if such an asymmetry s to be credible. This Danto

hopes to providewith the aid of the terms "mention"and "use."

II. MENTIONAND USE

Dantoborrowsboth terms from the philosophyof language,in which they have

thepurpose, among others,of distinguishing he two uses of the word "word"n

the following sentence: The word "word"has four letters.

In the firstposition I use the word"word,"n the secondposition I mention t.In writtenlanguagethe distinction would be made evidentby quotationmarks,

italics, indentation,and so on. Forpictureswe possess no suchconventional,reg-

ular means of distinguishingbetween mention anduse. Despite this and certain

7. A centralproblem n this context is surelyto be foundin the conceptof a life-form.It is rather

unclearhow we can individuate ife-forms, or more specifically,which works of art, for example,

belong to our life-form, and whether it has historicaland geographicalboundaries(which in turn

would carryover to our understanding f art).This problemalso arises for Danto when he tries to

identify different art-historicaldevelopmentswith life-forms and to integratehis concept of a life-form,in turn, nto his Hegelianmodel of history (MH203). I shalltryto explainmoreclearly,by rely-

ing on Kant'sterminology, n whatexactly the structureof our artistic ife-form consists andwhy we

cannotimagine others,or can do so only with difficulty.




otherdifferencesbetweenpicturesand written anguage (to be mentioned ater),

Danto claims thatthese termscan be applied to pictures.He sees typical cases of

pictorial mentioningin pictures contained in other pictures, and also in cases

where a particular tyle is "mentioned": The mainuse of pictorialmention is in

paintings about painters,but of course also in paintings of interiors in which

paintingshang as objectsof interiordecoration" MH 205).

Danto's examples of the second type are the picture-representationsn the

paintings of Vermeer, n which the "mentioned"paintings are in the same style

as thewhole painting,and are thereforealso used in thepainting.In the forgeries

of HanVanMeegerens,on the otherhand,Vermeer's tyle is only mentioned,but

not in fact used. Accordingto Danto, painterscontemporary o a style can use

that style, but future painterswill only be able to mention it.8 Forthe art of thefuture,this means,accordingto Danto:

(T3) If we could represent he art of the future,we could at best mention it pictorially,

since the form of life to which it belongs is not availableto us to live. (MH 206)

And, Danto might continue, how can someone mention what does not yet

exist? At this point an asymmetry between past and future art arises: We can

mention a past period butnot a future period. Thus to summarize:use, which is

guaranteedby the relationto a life-form,is unavailable o us for futureas well aspast works of art; but mention is, in the case of future art, and in contrast to that

of past art,also unavailable o us. This might be a reasonwhy we can only imag-

ine the artworkof the futurewith difficulty.

Has Danto herebyexplainedthe difficulties of imaginingthe artworkof the

future?I think not. The main assumptionbehind Danto'sexplanation s thatthe

terms "use"and "mention"are applicableto pictures.As Danto himself points

out, mention "typically [requires] quotationmarks"(MH 205). But these and

othersyntacticmeans of indicatingquotationarepreciselywhat we lack for pic-

tures.9However,even if we had suchtools, we wouldthen face anotherproblem.

The startingpointof almostevery theoryof quotationsis the assumption hatthe

expression indicatedby quotationmarks or otherwise is of the same syntactic

type as the occurrence,and is referred o by it. But such syntactic identityis not

given in pictures (since neithera universallyvalid picture-alphabet, or syntax,

exists). These arethentwo reasons for rejectingthe idea thatthe terms"use"and

"mention" an be appliedas meaningfullyto paintings as they are to language.

8. Sometimes Dantospeaksof mannerismn suchcases rather han of a "mentioned" tyle. Tome

it seems moreplausible to speakof mannerism.

9. I do nothere mean to deny thatpaintingscan depictpaintings,butratherwant to stressthat such

depictions bear very weak similarities to quotations,for one thing because of deep syntactic and

semantic differencesbetween paintingsand language.(On the conventionsof picture-picture-repre-

sentation, see Sixten Ringboom, "Direkteund IndirekteRede im Bild," Zeitschrift ur Semiotik14

[1992], 29-40.)

10. The only exception to be takenseriously is Davidson'sdemonstrativeheory of quotation.Butthis theoryis for the mostpart napplicable o pictures;see J. Steinbrenner, Zitatzeit-oder Fisschen

der Gdnse Oberall-oder worauf Zitate Bezug Nehmen," in Bildgrammatik: Interdiziplinate

Forschung zur Syntax Bildlicher Darstellungsform,ed. K. Rehkdmperand K. Sachs-Hombach

(Magdeburg,1998).



THEUNIMAGINABLE 121

Do I mean to deny that an asymmetry exists between future and past art? No,

of course not. We can allude to past art and depict it, and we can paint a picture

in a manner which amounts, among other things, to using a previous style; we

can solve problems in position (for example, spatial representation), reject solu-tions, and much more. We can perform these activities only with regard to the art

of the past. But an interesting question arises at this point: Are the aforemen-

tioned activities (allusion, using a style, referring with a work of art to a past

work of art, and so on) essential also to works of art themselves, and are they

based on a common structure? In order to answer this question I again invoke one

of Danto's remarks:

(TIa) This will almost certainlycontinue to be true:the IstanbulBiennale of 2005 willalmost certainly contain works we cannot today imagine. Thatis a consequence of the

pressureson artistsconstantlyto come up with something new, which the open extension

of the term "workof art" acilitates(MH 199).

The decisive point, if Danto's remark is true, seems to be that we cannot imag-

ine a particular new thing. But how can we characterize this new thing more

exactly? Obviously not in the same way as we might imagine a new pair of shoes,

a football match, or a new apple from the tree next year. The new thing of which

we speak here is supposed to be, first of all, unimaginable or imaginable only

with difficulty, and second, bound up with the pressure under which the artist cre-

ated it. Admittedly, I do not find this remark of Danto's easy to interpret. But I

believe that the puzzle can be solved, and that (Ti) can be grounded, with the

assistance of Kant's reflections on the concept of genius.11

III.THEPRODUCEROF THENEW,THE GENIUS

The idea that the newness of works of art is one of their essential properties is to

my knowledge first formulated by Kant, specifically in his exposition of the con-

cept of genius.

What this shows is thefollowing: (1) Geniusis a talent forproducing omethingfor which

no determinate ule can be given, not a predispositionconsistingof a skill for something

thatcan be learnedby following somerule orother;hence the foremostpropertyof genius

must be originality. (2) Since nonsense too can be original,the productsof genius must

also be models, i.e., they mustbe exemplary;hence, though they do not themselves arisethrough mitation,still they must serve othersfor this, i.e., as a standardor ruleby which

tojudge. (3) Geniusitself cannot describe or indicatescientificallyhow it bringsabout ts

products,and it is ratheras nature that it gives the rule. That is why, if an authorowes a

product o his genius, he himself does not know how he came by the ideas for it; noris it

in his powerto devise such productsat his pleasure,or by following a plan,andto com-

municate[his procedure] o othersin preceptsthat would enable them to bringaboutlike

products.2

11. In what follows I do not claim to give a rigorous exegesis of Kant, but intendrather o intro-

duce certain deas that arecentralto my discussion.

12. ImmanuelKant, Critique of Judgment[1790], transl.WernerS. Pluhar(Indianapolis,1987),

?46. Hereafterreferred o as CJ.




My firstsuggestion s that n theoriginalityrequiredof geniuswe see whatDanto

defines as the pressure to create something new. Danto's claim that "the artist

must create something new" then means as much as Kant's "he must possess

originality."The originality s manifest n production.This production ollows no

rule and is not based on a particulardisposition which can be achieved in accor-

dance with rules. An unlearnabledisposition of this sort is what Kant calls "tal-

ent."

A work of art not only has to be originalbut also exemplary.With this condi-

tion Kant hopes to distinguish worksof genius from original nonsense.The fol-

lowing question naturallyarises here: Exemplary n what sense? The difficulty

for Kant is to view these works asmodels

whilesimultaneously

notsubjectingthem to anyrules.Does he not involuntarily ontradicthimself here?Is a model

anythingother thana guide for creatingthe same thingin a rule-governedway?

Kant attempts o avoid this contradictionby distinguishingcopying from imita-

tion:

Since, hen, theartist's] aturalndowmentmustgivetherule oart,whatkindof rule s

this? t cannot ecouchedn a formula ndserveas aprecept,13orthenajudgmentboutthebeautifulouldbedeterminedccordingoconcepts.Rather,herulemustbeabstract-

ed fromwhat he artist asdone, .e.,from heproduct,whichothersmayuse to testtheirowntalent, ettingt serve hemas theirmodel,notto becopied [Nachmachung]but o beimitated[Nachahmung].Howthat s possibles difficulto explain. CJ?49)14

Kant explains furtherhow he understands his pairof concepts at the end of sec-

tion 49. Imitation as opposed to copying takes place, accordingto Kant, in a

school that is inspired by a genius: "his [the genius'] example gives rise to a

school for othergood minds, i.e., a methodical nstructionby meansof whatev-

errules could be extracted romthoseproductsof spiritand their peculiarity;and

for these [followers]fine art is to thatextent imitation,for whichnature, hrough

a genius, gave the rule"(CJ ?49).

Imitation, as I interpretKant here, means producing artwork n accordance

with rulesgiven by a genius.Thecontents of therules, however,are not sufficient

forthe creationof art.Alone, theycouldonly producea copy ormimicry.In addi-

tion, a strokeof genius is required. n this connectionKant writes of the courage

thata genius mustpossess:"

13. Unlike science, accordingto Kant.

14. Wittgensteinmakes a similarremarkon our use of aesthetic anguage:"Whatone acquireshere

is not a technique;one learns correct udgments. There are also rules, but they do not form a system,

and only experienced people can apply them right. Unlike calculating-rules.What is most difficult

here is to put this indefiniteness,correctlyand unfalsified, nto words.... There are certainlyconse-

quences,but a diffusekind. Experience hat s variedobservation,can inform us of them,andtheytoo

are incapableof generalformulation; nly in scattered ases canone arriveatcorrectandfruitfuludg-

ment,establish a fruitfulconnection.And the most generalremarksyield at best what looks like the

fragmentof a system."Philosophical Investigations Oxford 1963), 227-228. Hereafterreferred o asPI.

15. Here is anotherparallelwith Wittgenstein:"Onemight say: 'Genius is talent exercised with

courage."' Cultureand Value Chicago 1980), 38e.




This courage [to retain deformities] has merit only in a genius. A certain boldness of

expression, and in general some deviation from the common rule, is entirely fitting for a

genius; it is however not at all worthy of imitation, but in itself always remains a defect

thatanyonee must try to eliminate, though the genius has, as it were, a privilege to allow

the defect to remain[anyway],because the inimitable[element]in the momentumof his

spirit would be impairedby timorouscaution. (CJ ?49)

Let us assume that a work of art is produced in accordance with rules given by

a genius, and also with a stroke of genius. Assume further that genius consists in

an inimitable "momentum of spirit" or courage, which in turn consists in the dis-

regard of existing rules. Cannot then anybody create artwork that meets the fol-

lowing conditions: first, that production occur in accordance to the rules Ri-Rn

given by the genius; second, that the artist violate a rule with spirit and courage?

For Kant, someone who met both conditions would still fall far short of creating

works of art. The reason for this is that a mere aping (in this case called "man-

nerism" by Kant) of spirit and courage do not suffice. In addition the product, the

new thing, must be exemplary, a third condition. If I understand Kant correctly

here, "exemplary" can only mean that the work can serve as a rule for a school.

A strongly institutional streak shows up here in Kant. If a necessary condition

of artwork is genius, and the exemplary is a necessary condition of genius (the

exemplary itself being grounded in its being a model for later schools or "mem-

bers of the art world"), then works of art are what they are only in virtue of their

historical entrenchment.

Let me summarize: In his first requirement for genius, Kant describes the

artist's ability which is necessary for the production of works of art. In his sec-

ond requirement he refers to the exemplary, which must be particular to each

work of art. Beside the rule-giving genius, the exemplary rests on a school, or

more generally, on the qualified public. In his third requirement Kant portrays thework itself with respect to its production:

(3) Genius itself cannotdescribeor indicatescientificallyhow it bringsabout its products,

and it is ratheras nature thatit gives the rule. That is why, if an authorowes a product o

his genius,he does not know himself how he cameby the ideas for it;nor is it in his power

to devise such productsat his pleasure,or by following a plan, andto communicate[his

procedure] o othersin preceptsthat would enable them to bringaboutlike products.(CJ

?46)

Therefore the artist, according to Kant, can neither describe the production of his

work, nor demonstrate it scientifically, nor does he know how he came upon the

idea of the work, nor can he plan it or even give instructions for it. One could

almost claim that the only thing the genius can do is create works and nothing

else. 16

But do not countless works of the modern period contradict this thesis? One

might think, for example, of Marcel Proust's Recherche. Does he not there make

16. This strongclaim is false, since this is impossiblefor an artist n isolation. The reason is to be

found in Kant's second requirement: nly when a work is used as a model, thatis, when it is used

withina school, can one speakat all of a work of art.




artistic creation a theme of the work and describe, through the character of

Marcel,the emergenceof the novel? But surely it doesn't follow from this that

someone else could,with the aid of Proust'sdescription,create a work of art.The

criticalpoint is thatthe artistcannotdescribe, scientificallycommunicate,or giveinstructionson how he creates a work, namely because he would need to have

grasped he future-and thereforenew, and up to now not present-functions of

the work he creates. This is impossible for the genius and so too for the artist

becauseof the historicalcomponent which is essential to the exemplary.He can

sense the way in which his work might become exemplary but cannot know it.

Hence, he can give no instructions or the creationof a work. For the essence of

the work,the exemplary, irst shows itself in futurehistory.

The root of the incommunicabilityor the indescribability n art is to be found

in thehistoricalnatureof art.The artistcannot know how his work will function

in the future. He does not know the exemplary characteristicsof his work,

because they are first given only in futurehistory.

What relevance do Kant's reflections have for our original question? Or in

other words, could the "Diet-Kant" have herepresented maginethe artworkof

our time? In my understanding,his question,so long as it is not furtherspeci-

fied, can be answered with a "yes"and a "no."WhatKantin fact imaginedarecertainnecessaryfeaturespossessed by every piece of art.But what he could not

imagine was a future work of art for which concrete rules of production and

reception could be given."7 n this sense, the artworkof the future is unimagin-

able, because what we imagine cannotbe characterized n enoughdetail.

It is remarkable,however,that Kant's view is quite compatiblewith W6lfflin's

thesis (TW), which is based on the following ideas, amongothers:"Everyartist

finds certainvisual possibilities beforehim, to which he is bound"so that "even

the most originaltalent cannotproceed beyondcertain imits which are fixed for

it by the date of its birth.""8n this passageW6lfflin uses Kant'snotion of "orig-

inal talent"which is synonymouswith "genius."Accordingto Kant,the genius

cannot exist without a historicalframework, or any changeof artisticrulespre-

supposesa given systemof such rules.Theworkof a genius is notonly,as Danto

claims, a "reactionagainsthis ... predecessors" MH 8); it also sets an example

for his followers, thatis, a school. Accordingto Kant,a genius withouta school

isimpossible, because

theproducts

ofgenius

areartworksonly

ifthey provokethe appropriate esponse in their audience.This sort of institutionalismwith a

Kantian lavor s a morepromisingcandidate or the essence of art than a teleo-

logical narrativea a Hegel.

Kant's concept of genius also accommodates an explanation of Danto's

emphasison "thepressureson artists to come up with something new" without

therebyrequiringa doubtfulhistorical inearity.With Kant'sconceptof a school,

17. Here we witness a late victory of Locke's abstract deasover Berkeley's concrete ones. Only

in the rarestof cases does our imagining a tiger involve an idea of an exact numberof stripes.What

we imagine at best is a tiger with stripes, or in the same way, a future work of art, but not how it will

be producedand received.

18. Heinrich Wblfflin, Kunstgeschichtliche Gi-undbegfirfe (Basel, 1991), 24.




an understandingof the structureof art-historicalchange is immediate. This

structureshows up in the concepts of "allusion,""appropriation," manner,"

"style,"and so on. Concepts of this sort are essential to the interpretation f art,

not least because historical circumstances and therefore also the "essence" of

works is partlydeterminedby them.

But does Danto's pluralism not tell againstthis Kantiansolution, because it

makes clear from the start hatI can imagine of each thing that it could be a work

of art?As I havealready ndicated,I take Danto's thesis of pluralism o be false.

Forthis thesis itself conflicts with Danto's Wittgensteinianholism. I shall try to

sketch some reasonswhy I think so.

IV. STONES, POSSIBILITIES,AND "IMAGEMONGERY"

Recall the following remarkof Wittgenstein's:

Could ne magine stone'shaving onsciousness? nd f anyone andoso-why shouldthatnotmerelyprove hat uch magemongerys of nointeresto us?(PI ?390)

ForWittgenstein his sort of "imagemongery" as no meaning becausewhen we

ascribe consciousnessto stones ourconceptof consciousness loses its meaning.The same thing happenswhen we try to imagine a number with feelings (PI

?284). A stone can be heavy and a numbercan be even, but it makes no sense,

given our concept "feeling," o say they have feelings. In imagininga thinking

stone one commitsa categoryerrorsimilarto that involvedin imagininga round

square.But whereas roundsquaresarelogically impossible, thinkingstones are

only conceptually mpossible. If we were to ascribeconsciousnessto stones, we

would in effect enormouslychangeour use of language (formof life).

What does this mean for imaginingthe art of the future?I startwith the fol-

lowing analogy:

(i)To magine omethings a thinking eing s not to imaginet asa bareobject. t israthermuchmore,namely,oimaginet as alivingorganism ith eelings,wishes,pains,andsoon.Thissortof imaginings notcompatible ith magining bareobject.

(ii)Toimagine omething s a workof art s not to imaginet as a bareobject. t israthermuchmore,namely,oimaginetas anexemplarymodel orfuturechools,and oimagine ts receptionn the artworld.But the latter ortof imaginings not compatible

with magining bareobject.

With this analogy I mean to bring out the following: When someone con-

sciously and voluntarily magines something, then what is imagined must fall

undersome concept, description,or otherspecification.I imaginean X that falls

undera conceptin such and such a way. Oralternatively, imaginean X which

falls underthe description"painting,"'n such and such a way. But characteris-

tic featuresalways belong to the concepts or descriptionsunder which what I

imaginefalls. AlthoughI can imagine a hairlessandtransparent orse, I cannot

imagine one with no body. I do not mean to claim, however,that wheneverI

imagine an object I necessarily imagine all of the essential features of that




object,19but ratheronly that some, perhaps typical, ones must be imagined.20

Imagine the following conversation:

A:Please magine tree.

B: I now magine tree.A: Pleasedescribet.B:Well, t's simplya tree.A:Please ryto describet in moredetail.B: I'm sorry, can'tdescribet in anymoredetail;t is just a tree.A:Thenpleasedraw t.B: Itcan'tbe drawn.A: Is the tree argeor small?B: Neither.

A: Does it haveanyextension t all?B: None.

Does B consciously imagine a tree?Hardly.Now replace "tree" n this exam-

ple with "actual uturework of visual art." f B answered n the same way,can it

be said thatB imaginesan actualfuturework of visual art?Hardly.

Does it follow that B could not imagine one? Herearesome possible answers:

(1) The Kantianreply: To imagine a certainfuturework of art is to imaginea

certain object which 1) possesses originality,2) is exemplary,and 3) is not cre-

atedonly accordingto rules.To imagine such a thingis, as Danto rightlypointsout, surelyno easy undertaking.

(2) B's reply:It just occurredto me what I was imagining: an insanely wild

cyberspacesculpture.But here one can respond, with Danto, that what B has

done is not to imaginethe future,but rather o "merelyrepresentourown time's

vision of the future" MH 202). Orin other words, B's pictureof the future is a

picturefromtodayand not one from the future.

(3) B imaginesthe following:We assume that time begins runningbackwards

at the year 2000. Around 2039 a certain "Andy-2000"produces a Brillo Box

which is coincidentally discovered-thanks to incredible advances in medi-

cine-by none other than the 115-year-oldmember of the art world, Arthur

Danto, in a New Yorkgallery.... How did Wittgensteinput it? "And f anyone

can do so-why should thatnot merely provethat such imagemongery s of no

interestto us?"

Ludwig-Maximilians- niversitdtMunich

19. Inconsiderationof thefact thatI canimaginetheories whichpossess many necessaryfeatures,

all of which are difficult to imagine, yet I still can remain unawareof these features,this weakening

of the thesis seems required.

20. I am awarethatmy suggestionwill notconvinceeveryone.It is sufficientthat it shedlight on

where certain ntuitionsandassumptionscome into play.

21. This sortof answer concernsourabilityto imaginenot only the artof the future,but also the

future n general.Onemight object,however, hat this answer rulesoutany imaginationof the future.

In my opinion,this objectionis not unjustified,andso (2) seems to be the weakestresponseof those

offered.

The Unimaginable

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