The Turkish Brigade in the Korean War

8/3/2019 The Turkish Brigade in the Korean War

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The Turkish Brigade in the Korean War

The Korean War, described by many, including then President Harry S. Truman, as a

police action, marked the first time that the United States and the fledgling United

Nations organization entered into a partnership to halt the advance of the Cold War intothe Far East.

A total of 22 nations agreed to send either troops or medical units. Sixteen countries

responded to the U.N. resolution by sending troops to halt the invasion of South Korea by

the North Koreans. One of the first of the major participants to send a brigade wasTurkey. The first Turkish contingent arrived on October 19, 1950, and in varying

strengths remained until midsummer 1954.


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Initially, Turkey sent the 1st Turkish Brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Tahsin Yazici.

The brigade consisted of three battalions commanded by Major Imadettin Kuranel, Major

Mithat Ulunu, and Major Lutfu Bilgon. The Turkish Armed Forces Command (TAFC)was a regimental combat team with three infantry battalions, along with supporting

artillery and engineers. It was the only brigade-sized UN unit attached permanently to a

U.S. division throughout the Korean War.

More than 5,000 men of the 1st Turkish Brigade, including liaison and the advance party,arrived in Pusan, South Korea, on October 17 from the eastern Mediterranean port of

Iskenderun, Turkey. The brigade unloaded from their ship and proceeded to the newly

opened U.N. reception center located just outside of Taegu. The bulk of the enlisted menwere from small towns and villages in the mountains of eastern Turkey. For these

volunteer officers and volunteer enlisted men who were just completing their compulsory

two year service, it was not only the first time that they had left their native country--itwas the first time they had been out of the villages of their birth. It was, at least for the

enlisted men, the first time that they had encountered non-Muslims. Vast cultural and

religious differences existed between the Turks and the Americans.

Their commander, General Yazici, was an aging brigadier who had been a divisioncommander fighting the British at Gallipoli in 1916. He was highly regarded in the

Turkish military establishment and willingly stepped down a rank in order to command

the first contingent of Turks in Korea. He had only one drawback--no real command ofEnglish--yet he was attached to an American division. Later, that lack of language

proficiency would prove to be a major hindrance to his understanding of orders and troop

deployments.

The U.S. Army command was unaware of the difficulties in coordination, logistics and,

above all, basic communication in a common language that would complicate orders andtroop movements, especially in the crucial early months of their joint exercises.

Unfamiliar food, clothing requirements and transportation would come to create more

problems than the American high command had counted on. The dietary requirements ofthe Turks forbade pork products, and the American rations definitely contained pork

products forbidden to all Muslims. A Japanese food processor was hired to provide

rations that met the Turkish requirements. Bread and coffee presented other problems.The Turks favored a heavy, substantial bread containing nonbleached flour along with

thick, strong, heavily sweetened coffee. The U.S. Army found a way to satisfy these

needs along with those of the other Allied forces.

Few American liaison officers were attached to the Turkish companies, thereby adding tothe problems the Turks faced in their initial combat operations. Misinterpretation of

orders resulted from the lack of communication between Allies. The problem, at first

overlooked and judged to be only minor, only became exacerbated in the heat of battle.

The Turks' arrival in Korea garnered a considerable amount of publicity. The Turkishsoldiers' fierce appearance, flowing mustaches and great knives were a war

correspondent's dream come true. Although they had not fought in a major conflict since


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World War I, the Turkish soldiers had the reputation of being rough, hard fighters who

preferred the offensive position and gave no quarter in battle. Most of the enlisted men

were young and carried a sidearm sword that, to Americans and the other U.N. troops,appeared to be a long knife. No other U.N. troops were armed with that kind of knife, or

indeed any other weapon out of the ordinary. The Turks had a dangerous proficiency in

close combat with their long knives that made all other Allied forces want to stay clear ofthem.

Turkish Brigade's Baptism of Fire Part 2: Flawed Offensives

Most of the enlisted men were from the eastern steppe region of Turkey near the Russian

border and had little more than three or four years of basic schooling. In the conscription

process, they were given uniforms, plus some training by the Turkish military and theirU.S. military advisers. Life in their native villages had been largely unchanged for

hundreds of years. A central village well still provided water, and news of the outside

world seldom penetrated village daily life.

It was to that patchwork U.N. army, composed mainly of Americans but having diverse

units from 16 other countries, that the orders suddenly came to General Walton "Johnnie"

Walker's Eighth Army headquarters to mount a massive offensive and push for an early

end to the war. General Douglas MacArthur's promise to relieve two divisions and have"the boys home for Christmas" gave the impetus to an ill-conceived move to the Yalu

River. There were some expressed misgivings, especially by the Eighth Army

commander, General Walker. Those objections, however, were quickly pushed aside bythe clique that surrounded MacArthur. Pressure to conclude the war in one massive

offensive became too difficult to contain. The generals and commanders in the field who

would actually commit their men to one of the bloodiest campaigns of the war were

protesting voices that were either never acknowledged or ignored.

Intelligence reports given to MacArthur indicated the presence and capture of Chinese

troops in late October and early November. Major General Willoughby, MacArthur's

intelligence chief, kept him abreast of all incoming reports of larger numbers of Chinesetroop movements. Nonetheless, the die was cast for Walker's Eighth Army. Walker tried

several times to delay the inevitable by protesting the lack of logistical support and

supplies that were en route from Japan and the United States, but all he accomplished wasto increase MacArthur's ire toward him and impatience at the delay.

Bitter winds from Manchuria churned over the steep, granitic mountains and treacherous

valleys of North Korea. The coldest weather in at least 40 years gripped the land.

Numbed and miserable soldiers tried to keep warm around makeshift fires made in empty50-gallon drums. Medical units began treating their first cases of frostbite. More and

more, Korea became the proverbial "Hell froze over." It was necessary to mix alcohol

with the gasoline to prevent gas lines from freezing in the vehicles and equipment. Blood

plasma had to be heated for 90 minutes before it could be used. Medicines that werewater-soluble froze, and sweat that accumulated in the soldiers' boots froze during the

night. The terrain of northern Korea, with its long v-shaped valleys, high craggy


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mountain ridges and the lack of any real discernible roads, along with the incredible

numbing cold sweeping across the forward-moving army, contributed the elements of

tragedy that shaped the battle to come.

The U.S. Army's 7th Division and other units were not prepared for arctic warfare. Few

of the fighting units had arctic parkas. Yet they were ordered forward. On November 21,they were ordered to move across a riverbed containing what they had been told would be

only ankle-deep water that would present no problem. The night before, however,upstream dams had been opened and the water released. The soldiers waded into frigid,

waist-deep water with chunks of ice floating in it. After several unsuccessful attempts,

the crossing was called off. Eighteen men suffered severe frostbite and had to have theirfrozen uniforms cut off.

During the dogged advance, Walker's army became more thinly stretched as the Korean

Peninsula widened and forced the army to cover more territory as it moved steadily

northward. His order of battle was comprised of the U.S. I Corps, consisting of the U.S.

24th Division, the British 27th Brigade, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) 1st Division;the U.S. IX Corps including the U.S. 2nd and 25th Divisions and the 1st Turkish Brigade;

the ROK 6th, 7th, and 8th divisions; and the 1st Cavalry Division in Army reserve.

Walker was cautious about committing his troops. Intelligence tried to get some realisticestimates about the Chinese troop strength and their movements. Daily briefings in early

November indicated a dramatic increase in Chinese and North Korean troop strength

from 40,100 to 98,400 men. These estimates still were woefully inadequate.

Part 3: Under Pressure

Assembled in front of Walker's IX Corps in the west was the XIII Army Group of theChinese Fourth Field Army, consisting of 18 infantry divisions totaling at least 180,000

men. Opposing the U.S. I Corps in the east was the IX Army Group of the Chinese ThirdField Army with 12 infantry divisions of about 120,000 men. The total Chinese strength

was about 300,000 men; 12 divisions of the North Korean Peoples Army added

approximately 65,000 men to the enemy strength. The North Korean soldiers had

recovered sufficiently from their earlier reverses at the hands of the Americans to bejudged by their commanders to be battle worthy. Added to that array were about 40,000

guerrillas operating behind the U.N. lines. Enemy strength was more than slightly

underestimated.

The Chinese army had managed to move a vast number of troops by the most primitivemeans. Using animals and their own backs to transport supplies, they were not restricted

to the primitive roads. They moved overland without the benefit of trucks or other

mechanized equipment and therefore had the advantage of greater mobility. The UnitedNations, on the other hand, stuck with basic roads and improving existing roads to move

men and equipment. Engineering companies moved ahead, trying to make roads passable

for tanks and trucks.


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Another difference that was to count very highly against the United Nations and the

United States was adherence to routine, World War II thinking and tactics. Chinese used

soldiers were expected to carry on their backs all the food each soldier required for atleast six days. The food was cooked rice and soybean curds in concentrated form as well

as similar items that required no cooking or heating in order to be eaten. Recovered

diaries of the Chinese soldiers recount their pangs of hunger from these severelyrestricted rations, but they achieved their objective in the same bitter cold and biting

winds and over the same terrain that handicapped their U.N. opponents.

The Chinese generally marched at night and averaged at least 18 miles per day for

approximately 18 days. In the daylight hours, they concealed themselves in the rough,mountainous terrain. The only daylight movement allowed was by scouting parties.

Restrictions were so onerous that officers were authorized to shoot to kill any soldier who

violated the order for concealment. Many of the Chinese movement tactics were similarto those used by Napoleon Bonaparte a century and a half earlier.

On November 19, the U.S. 25th Division left Kaesong at 6 a.m. and bedded down at themining town of Kunu-ri around 2 o'clock that night. The next day, the Turkish Brigade,

which was largely an infantry unit without trucks for troop transport, was detached andreassigned to the IX Corps reserve at Kunu-ri. Walker's Eighth Army command was split

down the middle by the Chongchon River.

As part of the IX Corps' general northward advance, the Turks were ordered on

November 21 to move north with the 25th Division. By November 22, 1950, the Turkshad completed their assignment of neutralizing North Korean patrols in their assigned

area. The steady movement to Kunu-ri had begun in earnest. Kunu-ri, much like all the

other small villages in the northern sector, was mainly mud-and-stick houses. It was a

totally unremarkable place, little different from any of the other villages perched on themountainsides and in the deep valleys cut by swift-moving mountain rivers and streams.

Advancing along with their American counterparts, the Turks were ordered to establish

contact with the U.S. 2nd Division on the right flank of the IX Corps and also to coverthe right flank and rear of their division. The brigade had received information

concerning a Chinese regiment known to be northwest of Tokchon. General Yazici

described the situation that confronted him in these words:

"This was what the order was. Further intelligence was asked about the enemy and theROK Corps, but none was available or more information was not supplied lest it lower

the morale of the Turkish Brigade....The situation was serious, and demanded prompt

action."

On November 26, the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) launched strong counterattacksagainst the U.S. I Corps and IX Corps. The main Chinese force moved down the central

mountain ranges against the ROK II Corps at Tokchon. The South Koreans could not

withstand the attack and their defenses collapsed.


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Part 4: Mixed Fortunes

Members of the Turkish Brigade move into position in December, 1950,

shortly after suffering severe casualties attempting to block

encirclement of the U.S. 2nd Division at the Chongchon river inNorth Korea.

The Chinese onslaught assumed alarming proportions, and the Turks were ordered to

protect the U.N. right flank. Trucks were assigned to transport the Turks' 1st Battalion to

Wawon, 15 miles east of Kunu-ri, about halfway to Takchon, unload and return for the2nd Battalion. After insufficient trucks arrived, some of the brigade set out on foot.

Orders, counterorders and garbled transmissions made the situation an unintelligible

mess. The Turks were ordered to close the road and secure Unsong-ni. Trying later toexplain the confusion of that time, General Yazici wrote:

"There was no time to move the brigade to Unsong-ni and deploy it there before dark.Besides, the enemy, which was supposed to be at Chongsong-ni, was in fact too close to

the line which the Corps wanted us to hold. That the Brigade might be subjected to asurprise attack before reaching its position was highly probable. Even more important

was the fact that the civilian population had not been moved out of the area. If the

peasants and the guerrillas that might have been infiltrated among them attempted toblock the mountain crossing or the Wawon Pass in the rear, the Brigade might suffer

heavily. As a matter of fact, the 2nd Division, of which we were supposed to defend the

right flank, was withdrawing. It was impossible to fulfill the task from Karil L'yong,where the Brigade was, because the terrain was very rugged and thickly wooded. In order

to protect the Kunu-riTokchon road and the other roads to the north and the south, a 12-

mile-wide front had to be held. This was impossible against a numerically superiorenemy who knew the region well. Further, the terrain restricted the effective use ofartillery and heavy infantry weapons."

As Yazici clearly outlined, the Turks were in an unenviable situation. They had to

withdraw to the southeast. That withdrawal compounded the exposure of the Turks' own

east flank as well as the 2nd Division's east flank. Yazici ordered his men to move in thedirection of Wawon northeast of Kunu-ri. The brigade had lost contact with corps.


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Therefore, Yazici assumed responsibility and ordered his men to position themselves at

Wawon. When they reached Wawon, they attacked toward Tokchon, on foot and without

tank support. The terrain was upstream along the Tongjukkyo River into the mountaindivide that separated the Chongchon River from the Taedong drainage. Here, the

headwaters of the Tongjukkyo River fan out into numerous small streams.

When he received intelligence that air observers had seen hundreds of Chinese moving

toward Tokchon, Maj. Gen. Laurence Kaiser, commanding the U.S. 2nd Division,remarked, "That's where they are going to hit." The Chinese counteroffensive actually

struck all along the front. Two platoons of the Turkish Brigade assigned reconnaissance

duty were now given rear-guard duty. The Chinese followed the brigade closely. Thereconnaissance unit engaged the oncoming Chinese at the Karil L'yong Pass, was unable

to break contact. Only a few men survived.

The Turks had achieved one objective--they had tied down the enemy. The Chinese

suffered heavy casualties trying repeatedly to take the Turkish position, and all their

attacks were repelled. Finally, Yazici, understanding that the brigade was being encircledby the numerically superior Chinese, ordered withdrawal.

The Turks were isolated in the subzero temperatures, their orders not fully understood.

And during the night, the Chinese kept up a steady barrage of sudden noises using drums,bugles, whistles, flutes, shepherds' pipes and cymbals, along with the shouting, laughing

and chattering of human voices.

The offensive had changed and now became a rout of the U.N. forces. The engulfing

enemy constantly changed tactics and directions.. Communications resumed with theTurkish Brigade. Some orders were understood, but most were not. The brigade was

ordered to merge with the U.S. 38th Regiment, cover the 38th's flank and secure a retreatroute westward. In the confusion of the retreat and the garbled, misdirected and delayedmessages, that crucial directive was two hours late in delivery. The column got turned

about in the mass confusion and congestion of the road.

Once again, as the Turks approached Wawon, they encountered heavy enemy fire. The

CCF had arrived before the Turks were able to reassemble and assume defensivepositions. The Chinese ripped into the ragged column and the soldiers were ordered to

turn about once again. The Turkish 9th Company took the brunt of the attack as it

covered for the retreating main body. The 10th Company of the brigade's 3rd Battalionreceived orders to form the brigade's general outpost line.

Major Lutfu Bilgin, commander of the 3rd Battalion, sent his 9th Company to defend the

10th and 11th companies' flank. The Chinese eased off on the 10th but continued to

besiege the 9th and the 11th. Midmorning on November 28, the Chinese broke throughand attacked the 9th's position in force. The company was overrun, and Major Bilgin and

many of his men were killed.


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Enemy reinforcements tried to encircle the entire brigade. General Yazici, however,

assessed the situation and took steps to protect his flank and avoid encirclement. The

CCF poured forward, and the Turks were caught in the trap that the Chinese were laying.Suddenly, the Chinese broke off after encountering strong resistance of the 3rd Battalion.

During the withdrawal, the Chinese had attacked the Turks with overwhelming force andthe brigade took such high casualties that by November 30 it was destroyed as a

battleworthy unit. The only support the Turks received from IX Corps was a tank platoonand truck transportation. That was added to the brigade's artillery and enabled some of

the brigade to survive.

Part 5: Aftermath

The flow of messages and changed orders to the Turks on the road to Tokchon onNovember 27 reflected the lack of precise information and the high level of uncertainty

that IX Corps and the Eighth Army experienced as they struggled to interpret the rapidly

enfolding events. One certainty was that, during the day, the Chinese attacked the leading1st Battalion at Wawon and this ambush inflicted the devastating blow to the Turks. The

battalion was surrounded, and a hand-to-hand battle between Chinese bayonets and

Turkish long knives took place. It was reported that the two companies of Turks were still

fighting east of Wawaon and had about 400 men wounded. General Yazici was at hisheadquarters in Taechon, a larger village southeast of Kunu-ri. The Turks held out at

Wawon until the afternoon and then withdrew to another position southwest of Wawon.

Again, the Chinese outflanked those Turks, who then withdrew toward Kunu-ri. TheTurkish battalion lost most of its vehicles. The survivors scrambled into the hills when all

other means of escape was denied them. By that time, the Chinese held all the roads. The

Turks continued to fight delaying actions to gain time for the rest of their troops to re-

form and establish some semblance of an orderly defense, but they were not successful inany of those efforts.

At the 2nd Division Headquarters, information about the Turks and their actual

movements was more and more difficult to obtain. The tanks sent toward the Turks'position were repeatedly turned back. Confusion led to startling events, such as American

soldiers simply abandoning their positions and equipment, including their weapons. The

Chinese appeared to be everywhere and nowhere at the same time. Confirmation ofChinese movements was sparse and often erroneous. The Chinese, reported to be just

ahead, turned out to be advancing on the soldiers from behind. The Turks decided to

evacuate the command post. A new and yet ancient style of warfare had begun.

The Chinese and North Koreans used a multiple of tactics in a mountainous terrain thatleft little, if any, mobility. The weather had become an enemy as cruel as the terrain. The

Turks and Americans, unable to communicate and coordinate, fought valiantly, but

without much direction and without knowing what their fellow soldiers and units were

doing.


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The U.N. response to the Chinese offensive in November 1950 has been described as a

"bugout," a massive retreat that should not have happened. Very little has been written

about the conditions that contributed to the failure of MacArthur's November offensive,an offensive that began with high expectations of bringing the soldiers home for

Christmas. Afterward, the words "home for Christmas" rang hollow in the ears of both

the military and the politicians. The terrain, the weather, the lack of adequate languageskills by the Americans and the Turks, and the lack of options for that massive an

operation preordained the bloody, tragic outcome.

In the course of the U.N. offensive and the Chinese counteroffensive, the 1st Turkish

Brigade suffered 3,514 casualties, of which 741 were killed in action, 2,068 wounded,163 missing and 244 taken prisoner, as well as 298 noncombatant casualties.

The Turks, armed and trained by American military advisers, did better than even they

had hoped or expected in this, their first real combat since World War I. The American

units to which they were attached respected their skills and tenacity in combat. Some

comments by American officers give insight into the Turks and their abilities. "Theyreally prefer to be on the offensive and handle it quite well," went one appraisal. "They

are not as good at defensive positions, and certainly never retreat." Another report told oftheir patrol skills: "Certain Turkish patrols always reported high body counts when they

returned from patrols. Headquarters always scoffed at the high numbers, much higher in

fact than any other unit, until the Turks decided to bring the enemy bodies back anddump them at headquarters for the body count."

The Turks acquitted themselves in a brave and noble fashion in some of the worst

conditions experienced in the Korean War. Very little else could have been required or

expected of them. Their heavy casualties speak of their honor and commitment. Their

bravery requires no embellishment. It stands on its own.

This article was written by A.K. Dawson and originally published in Military History Magazine December

1997. A.K. Dawson teaches history in Darwin, Australia.

THE TURKISH BRIGADE


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Turkish postage stamp printed during the Korean War (30 Kurus)

The advance party of the Turkish Brigade or Turkish Armed Forces command, arrived in

Pusan on 12 October 1950. The main body numbering 5190 troops arrived five days

later, on 17 October. Brigadier General Tahzin Yazici commanded the brigade. ColonelCelal Dora was assistant Brigade Commander. When the main body arrived the brigade

went into bivouac near Taegu where it underwent training and received U.S. equipment.

The brigade was attached to the U.S. 25 th infantry division so after limited training the

brigade moved north to the Kaesong area to join the division.

The Turks in the Korean War

(The Turkish perspective from "The Korean War -- a short history by the Turkish War

Veterans Association.)

The Turkish Brigade has been the subject of the world's praise, by showing a very

superior combat capability which provided our state with honor through the successes it

won one after another during the three year period of blood and fire starting from the

hardest and most critical moment it entered the battlefield until the signing of the

"Ceasefire" agreement. Because addressing all the battles of the Turkish Brigades,however briefly, will extend the subject, we will just suffice to list the battles fought and

briefly address the most important ones.

The Turkish brigades, between the dates of November 1950 and July 1953, have foughtthe following battles the Kunuri diversion; the Kumyangjangni-Illi-431-639 -Imjin

attacks; 22/23 April 1951; the Chorwon-Seoul diversion; the Taegyewonni defense; the

Barhar-Kumhwa-701 attacks; and the Wegas defense battles. We will not just talk here


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about the battles accomplished by our Brigades--for the Turkish brigades have

accomplished all their war tasks without default but about four important battles which

affected the course of the war. And these are the battles of Kunuri, Kumjangjangni,Taegyewonni and Wegas.

The Kunuri Battle

The United Nations Forces started to attack on the morning of 24 November 1950, under

the command of Five Star General Douglas MacArthur with the objective being the YaluRiver (Border Line). At this time the Turkish Brigade was constituting the reserve force

of the IXth Army Corps, 3.5 km. west southwest of the town of Kunuri. The attacks of

the United Nations Forces had easily developed until the evening of 25 November.

However the attacks of the Chinese which started as raids on the night of 25/26November 1950, created great surprise and confusion at the fronts.

When morning came on 26 November it was understood that the Chinese Forces had

penetrated the front of the II'nd South Korean Army Corps situated in the CentralSegment of the front and that they had stalked behind the U.S. Divisions situated on the

western segment of the front. Especially the Chinese Forces, advancing towards Tokchon

from the area of the II (Second) South Korean Army Corps had started to threaten the

Eighth Army and specifically the IXth (U.S.) Army Corps.

Therefore upon the IX Army Corps advance the Turkish Brigade on reserve against the

forces threatening its eastern side and back. After dusk on 26 November the Turkish

Brigade began to march by way of the Kunuri-Kaechon-Sinnimni-Wawon-Tokchon. The

Brigade was given the task of capturing the town of Tokchon. The Turkish Brigade hadstarted to advance towards the battlefield having undertaken a very rare and heavy war

task which reserves could ever meet against disproportional enemy forces and undernegative conditions.

Having spent the night in Wawon the Brigade restarted to march at 0530 in the morning

(27 November). As the units were crossing the steep Karill Yon Mountain and as the

Advance Guard were descending on the Tokchon Valley (1430 hrs) the Army Corps gave

the order "Do not advance any further and get on the defensive on the line which youhave reached." General Tahsin RAZICI having read in the order the seemingly innocent

and unimportant news "If you do not have troops in Changsangni, our aircraft have

identified a force about the size of a regiment whose nationality is unknown" perceived adanger and ordered the Turkish Brigade to get on the defensive not where the Army

Corps ordered, but on the Wawon line 15 km, back west. General Yazici's decision would

take the Turkish Brigade back from the point of destruction and bring it to a point whichwould prevent the destruction of the allied forces.

Let us briefly dwell here. We have to show the degree of validity of the claim that "the

U.S. general spent the Brigade by using it as a pawn" which had been tried to be imposed

on our public. When our accounts are looked at it is obvious how General Tahsin Yazicitook responsibility whenever required to protect the existence of the Brigade and to


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successfully implement the tasks of war. General Yazici never gave in to the short and

dark orders of the U.S. generals such as Stop-Go.The reinforced Reconnaisance Unit

which was the rear guard of the Brigade prevented the enemy from striking the Brigade atnight, by distracting the enemy raid which started on the night of 27/28

November at 2400 until dawn on 28 November. At 0800 hours on 28 November theWawon Battle of the Brigade began. That day all of the attacks of the numerically

superior enemy forces first against the Pass Axis and then against the Pass' Points ofShoulder were broken. In the fore-noon the close enveloping operations were defeated

with our counter offensives. In the afternoon upon the efforts of the enemy to cut the

Kunuri-Wawon road by transferring forces to the back beyond the effective area of theBrigade, General Yazici ordered preparations to be made for the withdrawal of the

Brigade to the Sinnimni segment. It was understood that both sides of the Brigade were

open and that friendly forces had withdrawn. We would want to strongly emphasize thispoint.

During the Korean War the enemy always found the opportunity to surround the Brigadeby penetrating neighboring friendly unit fronts. But no enemy attack ever succeeded in

penetrating the front of the Turkish Brigade. The Brigade started to withdraw to theSinnimni segment from Wawon after dusk at 1830 hours. The units which withdrew to

Sinnimni hastily started to occupy defensive positions. At 2400 hours the attack of the

enemy started in the form of a raid. While the units which were situated in favorableterrain continued to defend, the other units of the Brigade failing to hold started to

withdraw towards Kunuri. Part of the units which had withdrawn were stopped west of

Sinnimni through the tough and resolved stance of the Brigade Command and put in a

new defensive position.

Fore-noon on 29 November an attack was undertaken with an Infantry Company to savethe II'nd Battalion and the 2nd Company which were under enemy encirclement in

Sinnimni. The enemy circle was broken and the safe withdrawal of the units to Kaechon

was provided for. The attacks undertaken by the enemy in the afternoon against theKaechon position were destroyed to their last soldiers. However the forces which the

enemy sent beyond the effective area of the Brigade to the back could not be stopped.

Faced with this situation, at 1530 hours General Tahsin Yazici ordered the II'nd and III'rdBattalions to withdraw to the west of Kaechon. Before the battalions could get 2 km.

away from Kaechon, they were divided into small groups by the effective fires they

received from three directions. As the Brigade was entering the night of 29/30 November,

the Hacham-Kunuri road was cut and the enemy circle was complete. At 1715 hours theI'st Battalion which had withdrawn from Kaechon engaged in combat in the Hacham

circle. Although the units were dispersed and liaison and management was non existent,

the small groups managed by the young officers started to break the enemy circle. TheBrigade succeeded in getting out of the Hacham circle through attack and infiltration

actions which continued all night long.


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On 30 November 1950 the various groups advancing to Sunchon from the south of

Tunuri met with a new enemy circle here. The Sunchon Pass had been under enemy

control for the past two days. The attacks which the 2nd US Division undertook from thenorth and the British Brigade from the south had not produced results. After a short rest,

our infantry started to attack the enemy which had dug in on the Sunchon Pass. With this

attack in which US Infantry and tanks also participated the pass was opened.

The bayonet of the Turkish Infantry had once again asserted its rule, and had opened theSunchon Pass where the 2nd Division had come up against a stone wall. Thus the battles

of the Brigade which were given the name Kunuri came to an end in a successful

conclusion. The Turkish Brigade had succeeded to provide the necessary time and spacefor the withdrawal by preventing the encirclement of the Eighth Army and the IXth Army

Corps and the destruction of the 2nd US Division, through the battles it fought on the

dates of 27-30 November. The Turkish Brigade, which had no war experience, wasaffecting a great battle from its roots, was saving the friendly Army, which was starting

to roll down a dangerous cliff, by stopping the superior numbers of enemy forces. Thus

the Brigade was achieving fame in the world by playing an important role in the course ofthe war in its first battle.

Echoes of the Kunuri Battle

"4500 soldiers in the middle of the firing line have known how to create miracle. The

sacrifices of the Turks will eternally remain in our minds." - Washington Tribune

"The courageous battles of the Turkish Brigade have created a favorable effect on thewhole United Nations Forces." - Time

"The surprise of the Korean battles were not the Chinese but the Turks. It is impossible at

this moment to find a word to describe the heroism which the Turks have shown in thebattles." - Abent Post

"The Turks have shown in Kunuri a heroism worthy of their glorious history. The Turks

have gained the admiration of the whole world through their glorious fighting in the

battles." - Figaro

"The Turks who have been known throughout history by their courage and decency, haveproved that they have kept these characteristics, in the war which the United Nations

undertook in Korea." - Burner - U.S. Congressman

"There is no one left who does not know that the Turks, our valuable allies, are hard

warriors and that they have accomplished very great feats at the front." - Claude Pepper,U.S. Senator

"I now understand that the vote I gave in favor of assistance to Turkey was the most

fitting vote I gave in my life. Courage, bravery and heroism are the greatest virtues which


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will sooner or later conquer. In this matter, I know no nation superior to the Turks." -

Rose - U.S. Senator

"While the Turks were for a long time fighting against the enemy and dying, the Britishand Americans were withdrawing. The Turks, who were out of ammunition, affixed their

bayonets and attacked the enemy and there ensued a terrible hand to hand combat. TheTurks succeeded in withdrawing by continuous combat and by carrying their injured

comrades on their backs. They paraded at Pyongyang with their heads held high." - G.G.Martin - British Lieutenant General

"The Turkish forces have shown success above that expected in the battles they gave in

Korea." - General Collings - Commander US Army

"We owe the escape of thousands of United Nations troops out of a certain encirclementto the heroism of the Turkish soldiers. The Turkish soldiers in Korea have added a new

and unforgettable page of honor to the customs and legends of heroism of the Turkish

nation." - Emanuel Shinwell - U.K. Minister of Defense

"The heroic soldiers of a heroic nation, you have saved the Eighth Army and the IX'thArmy Crops from encirclement and the 2nd Division from destruction. I came here today

to thank you on behalf of the United Nations Army." - General Walton H. Walker,

Commander, Eighth Army

"The Turks are the hero of heroes. There is no impossibility for the Turkish Brigade." -General Douglas MacArthur - United Nations Forces Commander in Chief

"The military situation in Korea is being followed with concern by the whole American

public. But in these concerned days, the heroism shown by the Turks has given hope tothe American nation. It has inculeated them with courage. The American public fullyappreciates the value of the services rendered by the Turkish Brigade and knows that

because of them the Eighth American Army could withdraw without disarray. The

American public understands that the United Nations Forces in Korea were saved fromencirclement and from falling in to the hands of the communists by the heroism shown by

the Turks." - 2

December 1950, from the commentary of a US radio commentator The Turkish Brigade,

as can be understood from the summary of the Kunuri battles and the echoes it producedin the world, had successfully accomplished its mission. The Brigade was proud to have

informed the country of the news of success which the state and nation expected, at thehighest level. A handful of soldiers had provided the state with power, great opportunitiesand esteem.

Kumyangjangni Battle

The United Nations Forces had been morally and materially very shaken at the end of the

enemy attacks which had started on the night of 25/26 November 1951. The efforts to


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stop the enemy were not producing any results. The Chinese who had gained the

initiative were advancing and were striking the United Nations Forces blows one after the

other.

Winter, snow, battles lost one after the other and the losses suffered had left nothing

resembling morale in the United Nations soldiers. The atmosphere was one of totaldefeat. The Chinese had become something which could not be stood up against or dealt

with. From private to general the Army was engulfed in an air of subversive, dissolving,and collapsing panic. The various reconnaissance units were returning in panic and

giving exaggerated hope breaking reports. Thus under these conditions plans had been

started to be prepared for the evacuation of Korea and the units were ordered toreconnoiter secretly the avenues of withdrawal and places to board transport.

In these hopeless and dark days in which the soldiers had completely lost their will to

fight and the Chinese had advanced just waving their arms, according to rumors General

MacArthur said "Try for once the Turkish Brigade, wait for the news which will come

from them. Do not make a decision before letting the Turkish Brigade reconnoiter."

Whatever the case was, the Brigade this time was being sent to the fire at a critical stage,

just as it was at Kunuri. The Brigade was being given a new and important war task,

which would play an important role on the testing of the battles.

On 25 January 1951 the Turkish Brigade started to advance towards enemy lines by

starting from two columns. After advancing 1.5 km. the enemy was engaged. The

companies started to attack enemy positions like arrows out of bows. At 100 hours the

fortified positions of the enemy were entered and enemy resistance was crushed. Thecompanies did not wait long to open and spread again and started to look for the enemy.

After advancing north about 2.5 km. the defensive positions of the enemy were

encountered at the 185 altitude Hill line. The 10th Company succeeded in entering theenemy defense position at 1500 hours in this segment where intensive fire battles took

place. A relentless and close combat had started all along the front. The enemy was

defending its position literally to "its last breath". Darkness had fallen but decisive results

could not be obtained. The enemy was resisting and our soldiers were attacking. A verycomplex and dangerous situation had occurred with the enemy and friendly forces mixed

within each other.

The Army Corps gave the order for "Turks to fix their bayonets where they reach and not

withdraw even one step".

The companies thought attacking and finishing the job of the enemy more logical than

waiting nose to nose with the enemy under the maddening cold and as if on cue started

attack all together. At 0500 hours on the morning of 25 January the defensive positions ofthe enemy were wholly captured. The Infantry who did not want to let the enemy take a

breather continued to advance at 0700 hours on 26 January. After 5 km. a new defensive


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line of the enemy was encountered. The Brigade was attacking with all its capabilities in

this segment which the enemy was defending with all its power and insistence.

In this battle in which the Brigade emerged with honor, the attack which the enemyundertook against Seoul produced no results. The command which did not want to miss

the opportunity formed by the Brigade breaking the attack power and morale of theenemy did not delay the decision to replace defense with attack. The enemy which could

not find the opportunity to change its battle formation from attack to defense started towithdraw towards the 38th parallel suffering a heavy defeat.

As the Brigade was taken back after this famous new battle it was met with the

enthusiastic show of sympathy and appreciation by the friendly soldiers along the way.

The friendly soldiers were running along the road and shouting, "The First Returns". Thelocation where the Brigade gave the night battle on 17/18 May was given the name "The

Turkish Fortress".

The commander in chief of the United Nations Forces, General Matthew B. Ridgway,said, "I had heard of the fame of the Turkish soldiers before I came to Korea. The truth is

I had not really believed what I had heard. But I now understand that in fact you are the

best, and most trustworthy soldiers of the world" and thus explained the emotions he felt

and the assessments he reached from the Teagyewonni Battle.

Now let us briefly and last address the Wegas [Vegas] Battle of the Brigade.

The Turkish Brigade Provides "Cease Fire"

In June 1951 the United Nations Forces had advanced up to the Imjin River-Chorwon-Kumhwa line. The trials at 1950 and 1951 could not obtain decisive results and theparties mutually went on the defensive and stopped the attack operations. This meant that

the Korean War had remained where it started and that the war had not reached the

established objective. Now no other operations could be made except ambush,reconnaissance and battle front line conflicts. The great military operation had stopped.

The parties who understood that they could not solve the Korean problem with arms had

started "cease fire" discussions.

The discussions held at Panmunjon were protracting and were not reaching a result. Thefact that the discussions were often being out and reconciliation could not be provided

was increasing the chances of the big military operation restarting. For this reason theparties were strengthening their defense lines, and were waiting ready to meet possibleattacks. The enemy had started to prepare in order to once more try its luck with arms.

The attack which had been undertaken not much later with large forces against the front

of the Turkish Brigade had two aims. Either they would have their demands accepted atthe Panmunjomn "cease fire" discussions or they would reach the conclusion by

penetrating allied lines.


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Thus this attack which the enemy had much previously planned in a detailed manner and

put into implementation by using all its experience had started on 28 May 1953 at 1948

hours. The techniques employed and the will to fight shown by the enemy in this attackhad been of a commendable level. In this attack, which continued for thirty hours, all the

echelons of the enemy from private to general fought with all their strength in the

recognition of the importance of the aim pursued.

For this battle would be the last one to establish the result in Korea. In case of defeat theywould have to accept the consequence, but if success would be achieved the military

operation would develop and at least political advantages would be gained. Thus the

Turkish Brigade had to again meet an enemy attack which had a decisive aim and whichwas well prepared and resolute. In the front the positions were very close to each other.

Such a situation had serious tactical disadvantages. Besides, having to wait in tight,

humid and dark positions was tiring and irritating the soldiers. As the days passed in sucha manner on 28 May at 1948 hours the war again became bloody with the attack of the

enemy supported by intense fire. The enemy attacks which intensified on the front of the

II'nd Battalion of the Brigade led to very bloody and sometimes crisis-like battles on thehills of Garson [Carson], Big Wegas [Vegas], Elko and Little Wegas [Vegas] whichcontinued for thirty hours.

The aforementioned hills changed hands frequently during the bloody battles which

continued in big savagery from 1948 hours on 28 May 1953 to 2400 hours on 29 Maynight and day without stopping. The enemy started the attack at 1948 by smokebombing

the Little Wegas Hill. It entered positions at 2000 hours. As the enemy was reinforcing

Little Wegas, our Infantry counter attacked at 2115 with fire support. At 2119 the enemy

started to run having failed to hold. The enemy which managed to capture a bunker wasdestroyed at 2151 with bombs and bayonet charges. At 2152 hours, Garson and Elko

were completely smoked. The enemy is turning Big Wegas into hell with artillery andmortar fire. The enemy which entered Big Wegas was thrown back at 2158 with bayonetcharges.

Ammunition began to run low at the battle front lines. At 2208 the enemy re-entered Big

Wegas. At 2220 hours enemy reinforcements reached Big Wegas. At 2220 hours enemy

reinforcements reached Big Wegas. The enemy was subjected to intense artillery fire. At2240 a counter attack was undertaken against Big Wegas. The enemy attacked Garson at

2245 hours. At 1315 hours our Infantry re-capture Big Wegas. The enemy who had

entered Elko was thrown back at 2315 hours. No opportunity was given to the enemy,which had entered Little Wegas, to hold and as a result of a counter attack the Hill was

re-captured at 2334 hours. At 2330 the enemy entered Big Wegas. At 2353 the enemy

attack against Elko and Garson began. Wired and wireless communications were cut.

The situation started to present a full scale crisis. Hand to hand combat is continuing atbattle front lines. At 0040 hours the enemy started to attack Little Wegas. The enemy is

trying to capture the battle front lines before daylight. At 0120 the enemy enters Garson.


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At 0150 fighting continues with the enemy who has entered some of the bunkers on Little

Wegas and Big Wegas. Communications cannot be established with Garson. At 0323

those enemy soldiers entering Little Wegas and those approaching in order to reinforcesurrender to our soldiers.

At 0347 the Brigade gives the order to attack Big Wegas. Garson is in the hands of theenemy. At 0427 the enemy reinforces Big Wegas. At 0505 Garson is being shelled. Little

Wegas in holding but the wounded can not be evacuated. With the attack at 1050 we takeBig Wegas. The enemy is running. Everywhere there are dead and wounded. At 1115 the

American company attacked Garson from Elko, however, upon being surrounded by the

Chinese, started to withdraw at 1600 hours. At 1543 the Chinese entered Elko. Handgrenade combat started in Elko. The enemy occupied a bunker. After this it entered Big

Wegas at 1615. Our infantry immediately counter attacked and threw the enemy back.

The battle is continuing high tension.

At 1933 hours the enemy started to attack Little Wegas from Big Wegas.

At 2005 our 2'nd Artillery Battery started to burn. At 2021 it had completely burned. At

2050 the Division decided to evacuate Wegas.

The enemy can not enter Wegas. But at 2109 our infantry withdraw upon orders. At 2020

Wegas is completely evacuated. The command who fought the enemy had been given therequired lesson decided to stop the bloody battle. At the end of the bloody battles which

continued for thirty hours the enemy, with the withdrawal of our battalion, had captured

Big Wegas, Elko and Garson. But because it had used up all its attack strength it could

not undertake another attack against the main battle line.

The attacks of the enemy which it undertook with the large forces it had concentrated andwith strong artillery and mortar groups, for thirty hours was caught up in the battle front

lines. During these battles, according to the report of our artillery advance surveillanceofficer, we suffered 300 and the enemy around 2000 casualties. On the other hand

General Ridgway explains the casualties suffered in the battles with the following figures

"The Turkish Brigade suffered 104 dead and 376 wounded. The enemy losses were

established to be 2200 dead and 1075 wounded" (*).

(*) Refer to "The Korean War" written by the General Matthew Ridgway - p. 220.

The enemy understood after this battle that there was no option but to "cease fire" and to

restart the laying-down-of-arms negotiations in a lively and willing manner. In factbefore long the "cease fire" was signed. The Turkish Brigade affected the "cease fire"which was signed in Korea, through the battles it fought on 28 and 29 May 1953. As can

be seen, the Turkish Brigade had often demonstrated successes during the Korean battles,

which affected the course of the war. Finally, the Turkish Brigade also fought the lastbattle leading to the "cease fire". Of course all these battles were not easy and without

loss.


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Turkish Brigade in Korean War ( 25th June - 26 Nov. 1950 )

Dr. M. Galip Baysal

The Korean War is one of the most comprehensive and significant wars that took place

within almost the 60 odd years following World War II. It began on the morning of 25 th June

1950 with a surprise assault initiated by the North Korean Armed Forces who had beenpreparing for an offensive for a long time, without any apparent

pretext or provocation. Consequently, it continued to expand, with

the United Nation Forces, formed for the first time in history comprising about 20 free

nations including Turkey, fighting on the side of South Korea and Communist Chinese

Forces fighting on the side of North Korea until 27 July 1953 on which date the war came toan end through an interim truce

Due to the political conditions prevailing at that time, Turkey was the first nation

following the U.S. to respond positively to the United Nations call assigning a 5000 men

strong Brigade to the United Nation Armed Forces. The Brigade; which came to be known as

The Turkish Brigade entered the war in late Nov 1950, at almost the same time as

Communist Chinese Forces started fighting on the side of North Korea.The Brigade took an

active part in numerous battles of various size until the signing of the truce. The 27-30 Nov

2006 is the 56th anniversary of Kunuri Battles. We have prepared this article in two parts,

on the anniversary of this unfortunate episode to commemorate the soldiers who fought andshed blood for a sacred cause, thousand of miles from their homes, and to briefly review the

operations conducted by the Turkish Brigade, which was renowned for its exploits during

this war. We think that for all military and even civilian personnel, of what country they are

from, there are great benefits to be obtained from recognizing and being informed about both

the positive and negative aspects of operations conducted by a unit of such a small scale.

Thus, it will be possible to have a better idea about the degree of impact a unit may have,

regardless of his size, on the outcome of combat and indirectly, even the outcome of the war


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itself.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:

The Koreans have a 4000 years old history, they are a people bound to the infertile

land of the Korean Peninsula, and are different from the Chinese, the Manchurians and

Japanese. They had passed the civilization of Ancient China to Japan, and although they are

very peaceful people, their geographical location caused the country to be used as a natural

bridge and buffer zone, never allowing the Koreans to find the peace they sought. The history

of Korea, much like that of Anatolia, which also constitutes a natural bridge between Asia,

Europe and Africa, abounds with foreign invasions. Korean Peninsula is regarded both as a

bridgehead for those who want to cross to Asia and as a stepping stone for those who want to

cross to the Japanese Islands. For these reasons any power whose intention has been or would

be to control the Far East for its national interests, must always have and want to have Koreaunder its control. The region of Korea has been a source of political conflict, confrontation

and armed combat, initially between her close neighbors China and Japan; and later, upon

Tsarist Russia gaining a foothold in the Far East in the second half of the 19th Century,

between China, Japan and Russia. The original reason for conflicts could not have been only

Korea; the real objective of the scramble was the reach and widespread lands of Manchuria.

China had maintained control over Korea since the reign of the Manchus. In the 19th

Century, The Japanese Empire as early as its founding years tried to intervene economically

in Manchuria. As a result, Japanese and Chinese Empires started fighting in Korea in 1894.

The Japanese defeated Chinese Forces near Pyongyang and with the Shimoneski Treaty,signed on seventeen April 1895; The Manchu Empire resigned its rights over Korea and

abandoned Taiwan to Japan. Although Korea came under Japanese control later, the

expansionist policies of the Tsarist Russia to the north influenced Russian- Japanese

relations. Russia tried to carve out a peace from Manchuria without any regard for the

Japanese Empire and Seized bases and fortresses and started approaching the River Yalu in

order to gain control over Northern Korea. It is interesting to note that; the idea to divide

Korea along 38th Parallel between Japan and Russia first emerged in 1896, during this

conflicts. When Japanese Army and Navy defeated Russians in 1904 they gained control

over the entire Area.

The Koreans could not make use of Wilsons Principles at the end of World War-I, since

Japan was then in the ranks of Entente Powers. In spite of this, Korean nationalists formed

two provisional governments outside Korean territory. One of these was under Dr. Syngman

Ree, the other formed by Kim Kao. During World War II, the Korean issue was for the first

time dealt with at 1943 Cairo Conference. The portion of the conference communiqu


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pertaining to Korea and signed by Chiang-Kai-Shek, Churchill and Roosevelt is as follows:

The three major states, U.S., Britain and China, who are well aware of the captivity of the

Korean People, have decided that Korea will be granted her independence due course. At

that time, Soviet Russia had not yet taken part in a war in the Far East and it was decided that

Korea would be occupied only by U.S. troops at the appropriate time. Later, when it was

understood at the Yalta Conference in Feb 1945 that the USSR would take part in the war in

the Far East, the commanders agreed to confer the duty of ousting the Japanese from Korea

jointly to Soviet and U.S. troops. As is known, in May 1945, Japan received from the Allies a

call to surrender in early August. When Japan refused to oblige, Atom Bombs were dropped

for the first time in history on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on 6 and 9 Aug 1945 respectively.

Meanwhile, the USSR declared war against Japan on 8 August and Japanese stated they

would surrender to the U.S. on August 10 th.

Soviet Troops started entering Northern Korea through Manchuria on 12th August.

While these troops were rapidly moving through Korea, U.S. forces were hundreds of miles

away. Soviet Forces had to be stopped somewhere. Thus 38th Parallel was suggested as aborder. Upon adoption of this proposal, there were suddenly two Koreas. These incidents,

which took place immediately following World War-II, closely resemble incidents, which

took place at the beginning of the war, during the same months six years before when the

Soviets invaded Eastern Poland in much the same way they occupied Korea, while the

Germans were invading Western Poland.

The developments that took place between Sep 1945 and June 1950 may be

summarized as follows:

A. While the U.S. and the Free Nations were striving to settle the dispute bysetting up Military Government in South Korea through democratic means and

in compliance with U.N. resolutions, the Soviets were not favoring any

solution short of uniting Korea under communist rule as they had intended

from the outset.

B. Although the Committee, which was set up to work on a solution, was

allowed to work freely in South Korea, it was not allowed to cross the 38th

parallel. The Committee decided to hold elections in South Korea on 10th May

1948. The elections were held and the Republic of Korea was formed five

days after a constitution was accepted on 12th

July. The first president electedwas one of the early freedom fighters, Dr. Syngman Ree.

C. Three and a half months after the elections in the South, North Korea, which

had been under the control of the Peoples Council since 1945, held

elections on 25th August 1948 for 572 members of Parliament, supposedly

representing the whole of Korea and The Peoples Democratic Republic of

Korea was formed. Thus, in 1948, two separate governments were established


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both claiming to be the sole representative of all of Korea.

D. In accordance with a United Nations resolution, U.S. and Soviet occupation

Forces left Korea after these governments were formed.

GENERAL SITUATION BEFORE THE WAR:

The political situation in Korea at the beginning of 1950 can be summarized as

follows:

Following the withdrawal of Soviet and U.S. troops, the dispute between the two Korean

Republics had turned into bitter hostility due to the incompatibility of the regimes. The

Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea backed and encouraged by Communist China andUSSR was aiming at uniting North and South Korea under a communist regime. It had

prepared a large offensive army in order to realize this aim by force. The Armed Forces

of South Korean Republic, on the other hand, was far from being able to defend its own

country. Two-aid and security agreement were signed between the U.S. and the Republic

of South Korea on 31 Dec 1948 and 26 Jan 1950 respectively. Meanwhile, the Soviets

had signed a ten-year aid agreement with the Peoples Democratic Republic on 20 March

1949.

In 1950 the World witnessed to raise another great power that was to have a

considerable influence on the Communist Block. The Communists, who increased theiractivities after World War-II, succeeded in ousting the nationalists, headed by Chiang-

Kai-Shek, from the Continent by a victory they won on 8 Dec 1949, thus initiating a new

epoch in the history of Asia. The Soviets withdrew their claims on Manchuria to resolve

their dispute with Communist China and a 30-year Friendship and Mutual Defense

Agreement was signed between Mao-Tse-Tung and Vichinsky, Russian Foreign

Minister, on 14th Feb 1950. The Chinese now had their eyes on the islands after they

consolidated their hold on the mainland on 23rd April 1950, they captured Hainan and on

16th May 1950 (almost 40 days before the beginning of the Korean War) they captured

Chushan Island. Euphoric with victory, and adopting an expansionist policy they now

look towards Formosa and some other islands on which Chian-Kai_Shek was confined.In view of the prevailing circumstances prior to the outbreak of war, it was obvious that

North Korea would be supported by the Soviet Union and China and that the U.S. in the

event of the hostilities would support the South.

OUTBREAK OF WAR:


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The war broke out on the morning of June 25th 1950 at 0400 (local time), with

North Korean artillery fire directed at Kumpo Peninsula to the west of Seoul and

followed at 0800 by the crossing of the border at various points by North Korean Forces

which seemed to be extremely well prepared for the operation. At 1100, North Korea

declared war against South Korea claiming that the South Korean units had crossed the

border along the 38th parallel. The objective of North Korea was to rapidly destroy weak

South Korean forces and capture the peninsula as fast as they could, before the U.S. could

intervene, and thus create a Fait Accompli. The U.N. Security Council in emergency

session same day at 1400 (the USSR boycotted the Council and therefore lost its veto

ability), passed a resolution, which said: The North Korean attack has disrupted

international peace. The fighting should be stopped immediately and North Korean

Forces should withdraw beyond the 38 parallel. The North Korean Forces disregarded

the resolution completely and continued their rapid operations. From that moment on, arelentless race against time began between North Korea and U.N. Community. This

initial phase of the operation can be summarized as a rapid advance of North Korean

Forces; continuous withdrawal by the South Korean Forces and U.N. Forces trying to

defend the Pusan Bridgehead, thus attempting to gain time for the deployment of

contingencies from several U.N. countries (including Turkey). Towards the end of July

1950, the remaining South Korean Forces, and three U.S. divisions, which had deployed

piecemeal had to withdraw all the way to Taegu due to the quantitative superiority and

intense pressure by the North Korean Army. Thus Pusan Bridgehead was formed.

During the defense of the Pusan Bridgehead, which was an achievement the U.N.could be proud of, the attacking power of the North Korean Forces was diminished and

the U.N. Forces assigned to the Korean Theater had started arriving. The U.N. Command

gaining land, naval and air superiority, initiated a general offensive on September 15

upon orders by Gen Mc Arthur who had been commander-in-Chief since July 24 th, by a

landing operation conducted at Inchon, west of Seul. This may be referred to as the

beginning of the second phase of the war. The U.N. attack developed rapidly. During the

initial stage 6 North Korean divisions were enveloped and destroyed. The U.N. forces

went beyond Seoul and advance up to the 38th Parallel. When Gen Mc Arthur was

authorized to continue past the 38th Parallel after negotiation held at the U.N., the U.N.

Forces crossed the 38th

Parallel on 9 Oct 1950, occupied the North Korean capital ofPyongyang on 24 Oct and reached the Sinuiju- Hungnam line by the end of Oct.

In November 1950, while the U.N. Forces were getting ready to deal the final

blow to North Korea, activities intensified in Communist China. In early October,

Communist Chinese Prime Minister Chou-en-Lai said in a radio broadcast that: The

Chinese nation can not remain silent while her neighbors was being invaded. And that

The Chinese Nation has always been on the side of the Korean Nation. The propaganda


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that followed harped on the theme that: The U.S., in much the same way as Japan did in

the past, was intending to invade China and Asia via Korea. As an initial step, Chinese

forces in Manchuria were increased. It is estimated that these forces were increased to

850.000 at the beginning of Oct 1950.

Until 15 November U.N. Forces continued north and some Communist Chinese

forces were detected. The U.N. advance stopped and only minor actions took place along

the entire Front between 15-24 Nov 1950. Regardless of Communist Chinas stance at

this stage, the U.N. Command was determined to occupy the whole of North Korea up to

the River Yalu. The general belief of the command was that China did not have as many

units in the north as has been reported, that China would not go to war unless her own

territory and Manchuria came under attack, and that even if she did, she could not

achieve much in the face of the much more superior U.N. Air Power. The previously

planned offensive was launched on 24th Nov 1950 upon Gen Mc Arthurs orders, with

participation by the Turkish Brigade for the first time.

The Turkish Brigade in the Korean War

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Transcript of The Turkish Brigade in the Korean War