The Tribal Factor in the ʿAbbāsid Revolution: The Betrayal of the Imam Ibrāhīm b.MuḥammadAuthor(s): Khalid Yahya BlankinshipReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 108, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1988), pp. 589-603Published by: American Oriental SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/603147 .Accessed: 10/12/2011 18:07

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THE TRIBAL FACTOR IN THE CABBASID REVOLUTION: THE BETRAYAL OF THE IMAM IBRAHIM B. MUHAMMAD

KHALID YAHYA BLANKINSHIP

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

Prevailing scholarly opinion holds that the cAbbasid Revolution, enjoying broad support among the Arab tribes in Khurasan from both the Mudar and Yaman factions, mostly succeeded in eliminating intertribal hostility from its ranks. But in fact the cAbbasids were very hostile to the Mudar, even in Khurasan, despite the presence there at first of certain MudarTs among their supporters. However, these represented only limited, marginal elements among the Mudar and became fewer after Aba Muslim arrived and displayed a violent hostility to them, especially after his execution of one of the main MudarT leaders for treason. This led to the desertion and betrayal of the revolution by many other MudarTs, and even to the denunciation of the cAbbasids' hidden imam. to the Umayyad caliph by a previously loyal revolutionary. This spectacular development shows the inability of the revolution to cooperate with the Mudar, and hence would imply that the cAbbasid movement was more a continuation of earlier Yamani discontent than has been thought.

CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION HAS BEEN DEVOTED by scholars in recent times to the cAbbasid revolution, resulting in much progress toward an understanding of this epoch-making development. Nevertheless, care- ful study of certain neglected questions in the history of the revolution can lead to the disclosure of hitherto unsuspected facts about its character and its course. One such question never before adequately dealt with is precisely how the beleaguered Umayyad government of Marwan b. Muhammad managed to arrest the cAbbasids' hidden imam, IbrahTm b. Muhammad, at almost the last moment before the cAbbasids' final triumph over the Umayyads. Modern works tend to give this matter little more than a passing glance, thinking it unsurprising that the secret somehow finally leaked out,' especially as the KhurasanT revolution gained in strength and numbers. But now a relatively new source, Akhbdr ad-Dawla al-cAbbasiyya, enables us, by combining its information with that of the sources earlier available, to establish more definitely the sequence of events that led to Ibrahim's arrest. More important, understanding the circumstances of the arrest sheds new light on the nature of the KhurasanT revolutionary movement itself. Specifically, the tribal connections of the imam's betrayer, when

combined with other evidence, reveal a pattern show- ing that the 'Abbasid revolution relied heavily on a tribal bias in favor of the Yaman grouping even among the 'Abbasid leadership itself, so that the Mudar tribes found it almost impossible to participate in the revolution at all, contrary to claims that the 'Abbasid movement enjoyed broad tribal support from all groups.

The sources show that the 'Abbasid revolution was carefully planned. Since earlier revolts by 'Alids and their supporters in al-Kiifa, ever the crucible of early Shicism, had always failed and since the Umayyads had demilitarized Iraq, it was decided by the 'Abbasid leadership that a successful revolt would have to begin where the armies were, in a frontier province, but in one with a large resident Kiifan population politically primed with Shl'c ideas and ready to serve and spread them.2 In fact, this severely limited the 'Abbasids' choice to Jurjan and Khurasan, both of which had been heavily settled by KUfans under the governorship of Yazild b. al-Muhallab around 98/717.3 Khurasan

' M. A. Shaban, The Abbasid Revolution (Cambridge, 1970), 164; F. Omar, The Abbasid Caliphate 132/750-170/ 786 (Baghdad, 1969), 118.

2 M. Sharon, Black Banners from the East (Jerusalem, 1983), 148.

3 Muhammad b. Jarir at-Tabari, Ta'rTkh ar-Rusul wa-i- Mulu)k, ed. M. J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1879-1901), 2:1318; Ahmad b. Yahya al-Baladhurd, Futih al-Buldan, ed. M. J. de G6eje (Leiden, 1863-1866), 335; Akhbar ad-Dawla al- Abbasiyya, ed. 'A. 'A. ad-DafT and 'A. J. al-Muttalibi (Bayrut, 1971), 191, 198-202.

589

590 Journal of the American Oriental Society 108.4 (1988)

had also received Kuifan settlers at other times,4 though they were outnumbered by the Basrans, as Khurasan properly belonged to al-Basra, having been first con- quered from there in 31/651. Thus, the first innova- tion of the 'Abbasid movement was to start its revolt not in al-Kuifa, but rather in Khurasdn and Jurjan.

The second problem was the swiftness with which other revolts had been extinguished once their candi- dates for imam were taken and slain. This was true, for example, of the rebellions of al-Husayn b. 'All and Zayd b. 'All. A revolutionary imam needed to protect himself and keep his identity a secret. Thus the concept of the "hidden imam" first arose with the 'Abbasids. Rather than tell their followers the identity of the imam to whom they were to pay allegiance, the 'Abbasids would make them swear loyalty only to an unspecified candidate from the house of the Prophet (PBUH).5 This anonymity served the interests of the 'Abbasids by putting off the issue of their rather flimsy hereditary claims to leadership until the revolu- tion had actually succeeded, and, at the same time, gained them the support that would normally have gone to other Shl' claimants, especially the 'Alids. In order to stay in touch with their followers in Jurjan and Khurasan, the 'Abbasid imams used certain trusted individuals from their small revolutionary fol- lowing in al-Kuifa who could travel to Jurjan and Khurasan, and then return via al-Kuifa to report to the imam at al-Humayma, where he resided on the pilgrimage route in what is now Jordan. As the roads they traveled were great trade routes, they easily posed as merchants or artisans. Unlike many of their later Khurasani followers, these intermediaries were nearly always non-Arab mawdli of Shl'T-influenced Yamani tribes of al-Kuifa and had been loyal sectaries of the 'Abbasid imams for years.6 They could be trusted to keep their secret. Thus, the second innova- tion of the 'Abbasid revolution was to keep their imam secret from the main mass of their followers in a hidden location, from which he maintained contact with them by means of his loyal mawalT via al-Ktifa.'

Eventually, however, the imam began in person to meet certain Khurasani leaders. This may have hap- pened because, while Khidash was leader of the revo- lutionaries in Khurasan about 11 1-1 18/729-736, their

ties with the 'Abbasids had weakened or broken down, possibly owing to Khiddsh's favoritism for the 'Alids over the 'Abbasids.8 The Khurasanm revolutionary leaders may have demanded such face-to-face meetings in exchange for renewing their relationship with the latter after Khiddsh's arrest and execution. These meetings took place not at al-Humayma, however, but rather at Makka during the pilgrimage. This was done possibly by both the 'Abbasid Muhammad b. 'All and his son Ibrahlim b. Muhammad, or, at least, by the latter.9 Those chosen to meet him must have been carefully screened and involved in the movement for some time. Those named in the sources include Sulayman b. Kath-r al-Khuzac', Malik b. al-Haytham al-Khuzac', Lahiz b. Qurayz (or Qurayt) al-Mar'! and Qahtaba b. Shablb at-Ta'i,'0 all of whom were naqrbs, the highest rank among Khurasan-s in the movement. Of the four, three had proven their loyalty by suffering arrest and persecution as early as circa 117/735 under Asad b. 'Abd Allah al-Qasri. Of these, Lahiz b. Qurayz, the sole Mudarli of the group, is said to have undergone 300 lashes, which must have seemed adequate proof of his willingness to suffer martyrdom for the imam. This is important, for the Mudar were always suspected by the 'Abbasid movement, as we shall see, despite their making up almost half the Arab tribes and specifically half of those in Khurasan. Lahiz was eventually freed from imprisonment in Marw on the intervention of al-Hasan b. Zayd (or Yazild) al-'AnbarT, the chief of the Tam-imi army division," but even this display of solidarity by his tribal brethren was insufficient to lead him to betray the movement, thereby further demonstrating his reliability.

The fourth of the Khurasani naqrbs said to have visited the imam was Qahtaba. Unlike the others, he does not seem to have been arrested by Asad al-Qasri; in fact, he receives little mention at all before 130/748,

4 TabarT, 2:1257, 1290, 1545. 5 Akhbdr, 194. 6 Ahkbdr, 183-84, 191-92. 7 Sharon, Black Banners, 151, 158 J. Lassner, Islamic

Revolution and Historical Memory (American Oriental

Series, v. 66) (New Haven, 1986), 81.

8 Sharon, Black Banners, 173-74; Lassner, 76. Sharon, Black Banners, 208-10. Also, Sulayman b. Kathir

had come uninvited to the imam once before. Tabari, 2:1639-

40. On the dating of these meetings, see Lassner, 82, 90-91. 10 Tabari, 2:1726-27, 1916, 1951, 1953, 1962, 1964; Akhbar,

255. Ahmad b. Dad'id ad-DInawarli, al-Akhbar at- Tiwal, ed. Vladimir Guirgass (Leiden, 1888), 343; al-'Uyun wa-l- Hada'iq

fT Akhbdr al- Haqd'iq, ed. M. J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1871), 3:182, 186, 190; Ahmad b. Wadih al-Ya'qubi, Ta'rTkh, ed.

M. Houtsma (Leiden, 1883) 2:392-93, 398.

Tabari, 2:1586-88. Here his nisba is given wrongly as al- AzdT; for his correct nisba and name, see Akhbar, 276;

Tabari, 2:1771.

BLANKINSHIP: The Tribal Factor in the "Abbasid Revolution 591

except as an emissary. At this point he is given command of the Khurasani armies, which he leads to victory after victory over the Umayyads, until he is slain before al-Kilfa at the beginning of 132/749. It is probable that the Imam IbrahIm himself chose him for this command.'2 His grandfather, Khalid b. Ma'dan, is attested as a prominent KUfan ShT'T."3 Qahtaba himself is shown in at least one report attending a lecture at the mosque in al-Kilfa before the revolu- tion.'4 Though he is not mentioned by Akhbdr ad- Dawla as one of the early Kilfan supporters of the 'Abbasid movement, it would seem fair to call him a Kifan rather than an early KhurasanT. Even if he had moved to Khurasan at some point, it must have been late, as his TayyiP tribe were YamanT Kufans who were probably first settled around Tiis15 by Ibn al- Muhallab about 98/717. This is supported by the lack of any mention of Ta'Ts in Khurdsan by the sources until 102/721, when they make a dramatic appearance in strength. 16 Qahtaba may have come much later than this as an emissary from the KUfan revolutionary office, dwelt in Khurasan only intermittently and main- tained a residence in al-Kuifa as well. Thus Qahtaba, who became the second-highest ranking revolutionary in Khurasan after Abii Muslim, also may not have been originally from that province, but rather from al-Kiifa, from the group which had long been in contact with the imam. Indeed, it is interesting that all the major leaders of the revolution above the naqfbs seem to have been Kuifans. Among these, Bukayr b. Mahan, despite his Khurasani birth, appears to have spent most of his time in al-Kuifa as the mawid of a Kuifan Yamani tribe.'7 KathIr b. Sa'd, the leader of the movement c. 108-111/727-730, is described as a KUfan. Abui Muslim himself, whatever his true ori- gins, makes his first appearance at al-Kiifa.'9 Abui Salama, the wazTr in al-Kufa, was also a mawld of a Kilfan YamanT tribe, and now Qahtaba, is seen to be possibly a Kiffan.

Besides the four naqTbs who met the imam in Makka, five other Khurasanis are alleged by a lone

report in Akhbar ad-Dawla to have visited him there.2" These are Abii Humayd Muhammad b. Ibrahim al- Himyari,22 al-Azhar b. Shu'ayb and Abii Sayf, all from Marw, and Abii 'Awn 'Abd al-Malik b. Yazld, the mawid of the Huna'a,23 and Abil Nusayr al- JurjanT,24 both from Jurjan. Of these, two are clearly Yamanis by tribe. Abu Nusayr, being from Jurjan, which was settled as we have seen by Ibn al-Muhallab, was probably a Yamani as well. Al-Azhar is men- tioned elsewhere as an emissary of the imam and thus may not be a Khurisani at all, while his reported arrest at Nasa also suggests a Yamani connection.25 Abii Sayf is unattributable to any group. Therefore, of the total nine named visitors to Ibrahim at Makka, at least five belong to YamanT tribes and two more have a probable Yamani background, while only one, Lahiz b. Qurayz, clearly belongs to the Mudar, despite the Mudar making up almost half of the KhurasanT tribes. This is strong evidence of a reticence on the part of Imam Ibrahim toward the Mudar.

The story of the revolution from its outbreak in Khurasan in 129/747 to its crowning success in 132/ 750 has been adequately told elsewhere and need not detain us. But the story of what became of the Imam IbrahTm in this period is anything but clear, owing to the plentiful but contradictory versions of his fate. What is agreed on by virtually all the sources is that at some point when the 'Abbasid armies were already sweeping forward toward his residence in Syria, the Umayyad caliph Marwan somehow found out about Ibrahim's role as the revolutionaries' hidden imam. Most versions agree that this took place when Marwan was at Harran, his Jaziran capital, though one source puts Marwan at Hims.26 Upon receipt of this impor- tant intelligence, he sent it at once to his governor of Damascus, who then sent it to the governor of al- Balqa' district in which al-Humayma fell, and the

Tabari, 2:2000; Ya'qbli, 2:410; Omar, 107. 13 EI2, s.v. Kahtaba. 14 Ya'qibT, 2:411; EI2, s.v. Kahtaba. 1 Tabari, 2:1422. 16 Tabari, 2:1422, 1521-22. 17 Akhbar, 191-94; Sharon, Black Banners, 136. 18Tabari, 2:1503; Sharon, Black Banners, 166-67. '9 Tabari, 2:1726-27; EI2, s.v. Abi Muslim; Sharon, Black

Banners, 204-05, 207; Lassner, 122, 125-26. 20 Ahkbar, 191; EI2, s.v. Aba Salama al-Khallal.

2! Akhbdr, 240-41. Although this list also includes Malik b. al-Haytham and Qahtaba, it curiously omits Sulayman b. KathIr and Lahiz b. Qurayz, both of whom were subsequently executed by Abui Muslim and were probably excised from this report by 'Abbasid partisans seeking to consign them to oblivion.

22 P. Crone, Slaves on Horses (Cambridge, 1980), 175. 23 Crone, 174.

24 BasTr in the text of Akhbdr ad-Dawla is a mistake for Nusayr. See Akhbar 224, 240, 271.

25 TabarT, 2:1950-51. Nasa suggests a Yarani connection

owing to the heavy concentration there of Yamanis, probably settled by Yazid b. al-Muhallab. See Akhbdr, 218.

26 Dinawari, 357.

592 Journal of the American Oriental Society 108.4 (1988)

latter had Ibrahilm arrested and sent to Marwan at Harran. There he perished in prison. The date of his death is most often said to be Safar 132/Sept.-Oct. 749,27 but other possibilities exist even for this,28 while the date of his arrest is variously given. This is all that can be regarded as agreed upon. However, it can be shown that the confusion in dating Ibrahlim's arrest partly owes to a later tendentious development of reports which tried to make it as late as possible to avoid any long interval between the arrest and the beginning of the rule of the 'Abbasid Abui-l-Abbas in Rab-c 11 132/Nov. 749. Such an interval would only cast further doubt on the 'Abbasids' already flimsy claim to legitimacy. Thus IbrahIm's arrest probably took place in 130/747-8 or early 131/748 at the latest. Detailed arguments supporting this dating are found in the appendix to this article.

How then did the imam finally come to be captured? Modern opinion has often been that the imam's name must have already been widely known among the revolutionaries by the time they were making their victorious march westward. M. Shaban states, "The currency of the name led the Umayyad authorities to the discovery of the connection between Ibrahlm and the revolutionaries."29 F. Omar concurs, saying, "It seems unbelievable that the name of the Imam could still have remained secret after the series of victories of the early summer of 749/131."3O However, it is actually very doubtful that Ibrahim's name was widely known or even suspected to be that of the hidden imam up to the time of his arrest. The revolutionaries called on all to swear allegiance only to a secret but acceptable imam from the Prophet's family (ar-ricdk min Al Muhammad). Since the movement's success had hitherto depended on secrecy, when the revolt broke out openly it was even more necessary to keep the imam's identity a secret. The imam was still in territory under Umayyad control, so that any dis- closure of his name could mean instant capture. Since his name was known only to a very small group of supporters who had not before betrayed their trust,3

there is no reason to suppose they would do so now. There was even the threat of blackmail.32 Besides the threat to the imam's person, any disclosure of his name might also alienate many supporters of the dacwa who were quite reasonably expecting the imam to be an 'Alid. Thus, the 'Abbasids' supporters were not about to jeopardize their struggle by a premature showing of their hand. The sources also point to this secrecy having been maintained. Abui Salama al- Khallal, the wazTr Al Muhammad in al-Kifa, could hardly have played with installing an 'Alid instead of an 'Abbasid had the 'Abbasids' role already come into the open before the rank and file.33

Other than the tale of Ibrahim too openly exposing himself at the pilgrimage of 131/749,34 reports giving the cause of his capture attribute it either to a spy sent by the Umayyads or a betrayer who knew about his cause. BaladhurT alleges that the spy was sent by Nasr b. Sayyar, the Umayyad governor of Khurasan, after the revolution had been proclaimed and become dan- gerous. When he found out, he informed Marwan, who had the imam arrested.35 The weakness of this account is that the secret was exceedingly well kept and would not easily have been discovered by anyone new to the movement.

A differing version is given by Akhbdr ad-Dawla, which says that a spy, sent by Marwan himself, reached the forces of Qahtaba while the latter was at Jurjan. After insinuating himself into the revolutionary army, he challenged Qahtaba before the troops to say in whose name they were fighting, menacing him with their wrath if he refused. Under this pressure, Qahtaba revealed the secret, upon which the spy informed Marwan, leading to the imam's arrest.36 This report only strengthens the belief that the imam's identity was still a closely-held secret as late as the end of 130/748, for it is extremely unlikely that Qahtaba would reveal the imam's identity in such circum- stances, since that would certainly have led to the latter's arrest, as we have seen. Also, it is improbable that the troops would have become disgruntled at this secrecy while they were in the midst of a victorious campaign, nor is there the least hint of any problems

27 Khalil b. Aybak as-SafadT, al- WdfT bi-l- Wafayat, ed. S. Dedering (Wiesbaden) 6:106; AbO-I-Fidad' Ismd' 1 b. Kathir, al-Bidaya wa-r-Nihaya (Cairo, 1351-1358/1932-1939), 9:39; Abui-1-Qdsim 'All Ibn 'Asakir, TahdhTb Ta'rTkh Dimashq, ed. 'A. Q. Badran and A. 'Ubayd (Damascus, 1911-1932), 2:292.

28 Akhbar, 396. 29 Shaban, 164. 30 Omar, 118. 3 Akhbar, 194.

32 Akhbdr, 241.

33 Shaban, 164; Omar, 139, 143-44. 34 Discussed and rejected in the appendix at the end of this

article. 35 Ahmad b. Yahya al-BalddhurT, Ansab al-Ashraf, ed. 'A.

'A. ad-DUrT (Wiesbaden, 1978), 3:121. 36 Akhbdr, 391.

BLANKINSHIP: The Tribal Factor in the 'Abbasid Revolution 593

with the troops in any of the other information in our hands.

Reports asserting betrayal as the cause of Imam Ibrahim's arrest blame either the 'Alid 'Abd Allah b. al-Hasan b. al-Hasan b. 'All b. Abi Talib or else a messenger sent from Abti Muslim to the imam. Akhbdr ad-Dawla especially favors the former, re- citing it in various versions.37 These versions assert that Ibrahlm met with a number of prominent 'Alids during the pilgrimage of 129/747 and distributed among them some of the money that he had received from Khurasan. From this, we see that the original story of Ibrahim showing his hand too openly at the pilgrimage refers to 129/747, not 131/749, since the earlier date is explicitly stated. Of Ibrahim's bene- ficiaries, 'Abd Allah b. al-Hasan, the father of the future anti-'Abbasid mahdT Muhammad an-Nafs az- Zakiyya, became angry with IbrahTm, either because he considered his gift to be too small or because IbrahTm refused to acknowledge his son Muhammad as the mahdT or both. Thereupon, according to these versions, 'Abd Allah wrote to Marwan from al- Madina, denouncing Ibrahim's connection with the KhurasanT rebels, about which he had either been overtly told or had deduced for himself from his knowledge of Ibrahlm's meetings with Khurasanis. At this, Marwan sent out orders for Ibrahim's arrest.

The accusations against 'Abd Allah would have more plausibility were it not for the 'Abbasids' desire to denigrate the memory of 'Abd Allah's son Mu- hammad an-Nafs az-Zakiyya, the rebel who threat- ened their rule in the reign of al-Manstir. This alone, particularly in view of the 'Abbasids' need to counter the 'Alid agitation that greeted the announcement of their rule, is enough to impugn the reliability of this report. While a certain squabble over property had occurred between this 'Abd Allah and Zayd b. 'Ali,38 with whom the 'Abbasids were associated through their connection with Abti Hashim b. Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya,39 it is not likely that 'Abd Allah would commit the supreme treachery of denouncing his rival to the hated Umayyads. It is even less likely that Ibrahim, after his and his father's careful maintenance of secrecy, would let others, and in particular possible rivals, get wind of his connection with Khurasan, especially after the outbreak of the revolt, by openly fraternizing with Khurasanis. The accusations of be-

trayal levelled at 'Abd Allah thus look like typical retrospective political propaganda.

This leaves the final version of the imam's betrayal, that a messenger sent to him by Abti Muslim de- nounced him to Marwan. As this is the most widely quoted version in the sources, presumably it was held to be the best authenticated in classical Islamic times, despite probable 'Abbasid pressures to circulate another version revised in their favor. In Tabari,40 AzdT,4' and Ibn Kathir, it occurs in a simplified form, merely stating that a letter from IbrahTm to Abti Muslim, containing the infamous order to kill all Arabs, fell somehow into Marwan's hands. More detailed versions of this tradition are found in Tabari,'3 Mas'UdT,4 Ibn 'Asakir,45 Dhahabl, and especially Akhbdr ad-Dawla,47 which has by far the most detailed rendering. Ibn 'Asakir and Dhahabl give as the cause for the messenger's treachery that IbrahTm was out- raged that Abti Muslim had sent him a full-blooded Arab and commanded Abti Muslim to kill the mes- senger upon his arrival in Khurasan. The messenger, discovering the contents of the letter, went straight to Marwan with it.48

These versions seem plausible to a large degree, but once again Akhbdr ad-Dawla leads the way with its version49 of this report. It is introduced with a non- committal "it is said" (yuqdl), the author apparently

37 Akhbar, 386-89, 393-94. 38 Late in Hisham's reign c. 121/739. Tabari, 2:1668,

1671-75. 39 Sharon, Black Banners, 124-32, 138.

40 Tabarl, 3:25. 41 Yaz2d b. Muhammad al-AzdT, Ta'rTkh al-Mawsil, ed.

'A. Habiba (Cairo, 1387/ 1967), 107. 42 Ibn Kathir, 9:39. 43 TabarT, 2:1974. 44 'ATl b. al-Husayn al-Mas'iidT, Muraj adh-Dhahab, ed.

B. de Meynard and P. de Courteille, new ed. C. Pellat (Bayrut, 1973), 4:83.

45 Ibn 'Asdkir, 2:292. 46 Muhammad b. Ahmad adh-Dhahabi, Ta'rikh al-Islam

(Cairo, 1367/1948), 5:222-23; idem, Siyar A'ldm an-Nubald', ed. Shu'ayb al-Arna'uit (Bayrut, 1981), 5:379.

47 Akhbdr, 389-90. 48 Mas'JdT's version is slightly different, claiming that the

messenger came first to Marwan who sent him on to the imam, whence he came back again to Marwan with Ibrahim's letter. This is clearly secondary, as the point of the emissary's discovery of what the imam's letter contained is lost and no other motivation for the betrayal is cited. See note 44.

49 Akhbdr, 389-90. M. Sharon ("''AlTyat ha-'Abbas-m la- Shilton," Ph.D. thesis, Hebrew University, 1970, 237-38), doubts it, considering it shows a TamTmT origin, while Omar (p. 118) considers it 'Abbasid propaganda.

594 Journal of the American Oriental Society 108.4 (1988)

preferring the reports accusing 'Abd Allah b. al- Hasan, which are vouched for by authorities close to the 'Abbasid house. The report states that a certain Qurayz b. Mujaj b. al-Mustawrid at-Tamlml, having slain someone in al-Basra, fled to Khurasan, where he changed his name to 'Abd al-Karim Abti-l-'Awjad' and became close and devoted himself exclusively to (lazima wa-nqatsaa ill) Lahiz b. Qurayz al-Mar'T and al-Qasim b. Mujashi' al-Mar' , both also of the Tamim. Both of these men were naqibs in the revolu- tionary movement, and they introduced him to the movement, which he zestfully joined, becoming known for his sincerity and wisdom. Later, at a date un- known, he was sent by Abti Muslim to Imam Ibrahim at al-Humayma along with Abti Humayd Muhammad b. Ibrahim b. Munqidh al-Himyari al-MarwarruidhT, a prominent Yamanl commander in the movement, whom we have already met on an earlier mission to Ibrahim.50 On their way back from the imam, Qurayz either fell ill or pretended to fall ill at Palmyra in the Syrian desert. After telling his companion to go on and that he would catch up with him later, he went straight to Harran, Marwan's capital. There he met Sa'cd b. 'Amr b. Hayda as-Sulami, Marwan's foster brother and one of his companions. He said to Sa'cd, "I am one of your people (qawmika) and have knowl- edge of the movement which has arisen in Khurasan." Sa'Id introduced him to Marwan, who excitedly called in his secretary 'Abd al-Ham-id b. Yahya to share the good news with him. The latter's comment was, "There is nothing after this!" That may equally well be said of this whole report in relation to the others on this subject. It goes on to say that Marwan amply rewarded Qurayz and then sent him back to Khurasan to spy on Abui Muslim, who made him commander of a detach- ment of troops. Qurayz remained with the 'Abbasid forces, eventually becoming governor of Dara for Abui Ja'far when the latter was governor of al-Jazira for Abui-l-'Abbas. The truth finally reached Abui-l- 'Abbas, who told his brother, who in turn had Qurayz executed.

Regarding the authenticity of this report, F. Omar has said that both this report and the one blaming 'Abd Allah b. al-Hasan are probably retrospective and false, as they both seek to impugn later enemies of the 'Abbasids.5' We have already seen that is the case with the report on 'Abd Allah; regarding the re- port about Qurayz, Omar bases his claim on the fact that 'Abd al-Karfm b. Abi-l-'Awjad' was a notorious

zindTq who was executed by the 'Abbasids in 153/770 or 155/772.52 Since Qurayz is reported to have changed his name to 'Abd al-Karim Abti-l-'Awjad', it would appear that the report is an attempt to blame the zindTq for the betrayal of IbrahTm, permitting us to dismiss the whole report as propaganda. However, this interpretation cannot be accepted. The report is far too detailed and contains too much authentic matter to be rejected only because Ibn AbT-l-'Awjad's name appears in it, especially when the betrayer's true name has also been preserved. It would appear rather that the name of Ibn AbTl--'Awjad' is a later addition, put there in a slightly garbled form with a view to further discrediting the infamous betrayer of the imam and thereby muddy- ing the perpetrator's true motives. In any event, the report clearly states that the betrayer, whose name then really was Qurayz, was executed in the time of Abti-l-'Abbas. Hence it cannot be said that the be- trayer was the notorious Ibn Abl-l-'Awjad', who died later.

Another possible weakness in this report is its omis- sion of any clear motive for the betrayal. This gap could be filled by the motive suggested in the more abridged reports discussed above, that the emissary Qurayz was incensed by orders the imam sent with him to have him killed on arrival in Khurasan. How- ever, while keeping that in mind, we find a far more dramatic cause if we juxtapose with this report another seemingly unconnected episode reported in Tabari. Looking at Abti Muslim's conquest of Marw, we find its circumstances somewhat murky.53 For our pur- poses, however, the following facts, which are well established, will suffice.54 Abti Muslim's entry into the city and the sudden collapse of resistance to him took Nasr b. Sayyar's pro-Umayyad Mudar faction by surprise. Nevertheless, Abti Muslim, hoping to take the whole Mudar leadership alive and thereby prevent their further resistance, posed as a forgiving moderate. Many apparently were deceived as he did indeed take them. But the big prize was Nasr, the governor and crafty old warrior of Khurasan. To entice him to swear allegiance, Abti Muslim sent a delegation to him

50 See note 22 above. 5 Omar, 118.

52 For him see EJ 2, s.v. Ibn Abi'l-'Awdi'a; Muhammad b.

Ahmad adh-Dhahabl, Mkzdn al-l'tiddl, ed. CA. M. al-Bajawi

(Cairo, 1325/1907-8), 2:644; Ahmad b. 'AlT b. Hajar al-

cAsqalanT, Lisdn al-M~zan (Haydarabad, 1330), 4:51-52.

5 E. Daniel, The Political and Social History of Khurasan

under Abbasid Rule 747-820 (Minneapolis, 1979), 57-58.

54 TabarT, 2:1990-95; Akhbdr, 310-16; cIzz ad-Din Ibn al-

Athlir, al-Kdmilfi-t-Ta'rlkh, ed. C. Tornberg (Bayrut, reissue

1385-87/1965-67), 5:378-80.

BLANKINSHIP: The Tribal Factor in the cAbbasid Revolution 595

composed of revolutionaries from the Mudar tribes, Nasr's tribal compatriots. Included in the delegation was Lahiz b. Qurayz al-Mar'T, one of the three Mudari naqibs. While the delegation undoubtedly tried to persuade Nasr to go forth to pay allegiance to Abti Muslim, Lahiz recited among other verses from the Qur'an, "The chiefs are plotting against you to kill you; therefore go forth. I am certainly of those who give you sincere advice."55

On hearing this, Nasr went out of the room, saying he only wanted to make his ablution for the afternoon worship. But after smashing a hole in the wall of his house, which was on the edge of the city by the Sarakhs gate,56 he fled on horseback at breakneck speed, as is graphically and amusingly described in the traditions. His chief wife, a couple of his sons, and most of his companions were captured by Abti Muslim, who executed the men. Upon hearing that Lahiz had read the verse which caused Nasr to flee, Abti Muslim declared, "O Lahiz, would you corrupt religion?" and had him executed as well, the first person inside the movement to fall foul of the leadership and be done away with. Significantly, Baladhuri reports that Abti Muslim said rather, "O Lahiz, is there tribal favoritism ('asabiyya) in religion?"57 revealing that such fac- tionalism may not have been put to rest among the Khurasani rebels as much as they wished the public to believe. The episode is corroborated by many authori- ties,58 but interestingly not by Akhbdr ad-Dawla which, though mentioning Lahiz's presence in the delegation to Nasr, omits the story of his betrayal of the cause and instead gives Nasr sole credit for his own escape.59 This gives a needed reminder that this source, though usually more detailed and apparently accurate than other sources, also paints an idealized picture of the revolution.

This episode becomes truly impressive when exam- ined in the context of Abti Muslim's relations with the

different tribal groups inside the 'Abbasid movement. It is widely accepted among modern historians that the 'Abbasid movement's fundamental accomplish- ment and pillar was its elimination of the tribal con- flicts and the group feeling that fed them, which increasingly had characterized the Umayyad period.60 While it can hardly be doubted that this was its publicly-stated goal,6' it fell far short of it in the realms of both true intention and actual practice. In Khurasan, nearly half the Arab tribes were of the Mudar, who had contributed most of the governors of the province and were opposed to the Yaman and the Rab-ca. The Mudar were divided into two major groupings expressed as army divisions (akhmds): the Ahl al-'Aliya, which included the Qays, and the Tamlm.62 The former were usually closely associated with the groups in power, the governors normally coming from them, though mostly from outside the province. On the other hand the Tamlm, actually the largest single tribal grouping in Khurasan, had been consistently denied access to real power and its spoils,63 being rather bought off with the sop that since they too belonged to the Mudar, they really were part of the ruling group. It seemed to the early 'Abbasid revolu- tionaries that their movement could gain strength if only it could use TamimT resentment at their second- class status within the ruling group to drive a wedge between the Tamlm and the Ahl al-'Aliya. Then the latter group, having been isolated, would no longer constitute a major threat to the revolution's success.

To bring over the Tamlm, considerable effort was expended by the revolutionaries in the strongly TamimT center of Marw ar-RUdh, as evidenced by the great number of MarwarrUdhTs in the movement,64 while heavily QaysT areas such as Naysabtir and much of eastern Khurasan were ignored.65 The importance of Marw ar-RUdh is obvious from the fact that most

Tabari, 2:1990. 56 Akhbdr, 317.

57 BalddhurT, Ansdb, 3:130-31; Ahmad b. 'AlT al-MaqrfzT, an-Nizd' wa-t- Takhdsum f-md bayn Banr Umayya wa Bani Hdshim, ed. G. Vos (Leiden, 1888), 52.

58 Besides those mentioned already: Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 5:381-82; Ya'qiibT, Ta'rTkh 2:409-10; Hisham b. Muhammad al-Kalbi, Oamharat an-Nasab, ed. and rearranged by W. Caskel (Leiden, 1966), 2:375; 'All b. Ahmad b. Hazm, Jam- harat Ansab al-Arab, ed. 'A. M. Haruin (Cairo, 1962), 214, indicating Lahiz was tortured. Daniel (p. 58), mentions the incident and gives sources, but makes no direct comment.

59 Akhbdr, 317-18.

60 Shaban, 168; Sharon, Black Banners, 197-98; Daniel, 59. 61 Akhbdr, 283.

62 For these tribal divisions see Sharon, Black Banners, 54- 61, but the map on p. 59 is inaccurate.

63 Less than three years of TamimT governors in almost a century of Muslim rule. See Shaban, 44-45, 75, who does not much emphasize Tamimi resentment.

64 As shown by their 8,000-man army division in 138/755- 56. Tabari, 3:123; Ibn al-Athir, Kdmil, 5:485.

65 Sharon, Black Banners, 194-95. Their lack of support in eastern Khurasan is shown by the lack of revolutionary leaders deriving from there, the length of time it took Abui Muslim to conquer it, and the many revolts he soon had to face there. Daniel, 86-90.

596 Journal of the American Oriental Society 108.4 (19881

major Tammlis in the 'Abbasid movement were asso- ciated with it, including Lahiz b. Qurayz, who, as E. Daniel has noted, probably favored proclaiming the revolution there first, owing to his ties with the cen-

66 Absi all ter. On the other hand, no pro-cAbbasid Tamlmls seem to have derived from any other area of TamimT settlement, except possibly Marw and Herat, both also in the early-settled zone. This would appear to support Shaban's contention that the daawa drew strength from some of the oldest Arab elements in Khurasan,67 for Marw ar-RUdh was one of the earliest places conquered and was even associated with the Tamlm as early as 31/650.68

Despite the revolutionaries' wish to draw into their ranks men from all the sundry tribal and ethnic groupings in Khurasan, a most singular fact about the revolution was its inability to attract much support from the Mudar, especially the Tamim, and also to keep hold of such support as existed. This has been almost wholly overlooked by modern works, which cite the numbers of Mudarfs, especially Tamlmls, in the higher ranks of the revolutionaries as evidence to the contrary.69 This viewpoint is held mainly because the Tamimis named in the sources have been taken as proof of the movement's popularity throughout the Tamim. However, the larger, official tribal divisions (akhmds) such as the Tamim were always more arti- ficial than the smaller battalions of the subtribes (butn), which often went back to distinct, original tribal groups in Arabia, unlike the akhmds, which usually were made up of diverse elements.70 It is to these smaller, more intimate groups that we must turn

in seeking to judge opinion about the 'Abbasid revo- lution among the tribes.

In the case of the Tamim, when we examine the names of those cited whose subtribes are also given, the picture is suddenly strangely reversed. Supporters of the revolution in Khurasan are confined entirely to only four TamimT subtribes out of a total of at least thirty attested in Umayyad Khurasan.7' While some of these may earlier have been practically wiped out in the wars with Turks and others may have supported neither side during the revolution,72 several are known to have fought for Nasr against Abti Muslim, includ- ing the Sarim,73 Mujashi',74 'Abd Allah b. Darim (which included the Hajar75 and Barajim76), Riyah,77 Hanzala,78 Mazin,79 cAd! ar-Ribab80 and Dabba.8 Except for the last two named, all of these belonged to the three main branches of the Tamim: the Sacd, Malik, and cAmr, 82 which had already been a grouping in the Jahiliyya, as is reflected in the tribal genealogy. On the other hand, though we may reasonably expect our sources to record the cAbbasids' supporters in more detail, we find only the Nahshal,83 Mazin,84

66 Daniel, 49.

67 Shaban, 157-58. Shaban's view is also supported by the outstanding prominence in the revolution of the tribe Khu- za'a, whose early importance in Khurasan he has demon- strated (Shaban, 25, 47-49, 55, 58, 60). Being powerless and disenfranchised despite their numbers (Daniel, 35), it would not be surprising if a desire to eliminate the tribal differences that had always left them with a low place motivated the Khuza'a. But one should not underestimate the force of the desire to wreak revenge on their ancient Arabian enemies, the Quraysh, as embodied in the Umayyad caliphate (Omar, 133; EI2, s.v. Khuza'), or on their more recent opponents in Khurasan, the Mudar (Tabari, 2:1032, 1078, 1080, 1145- 51, 1155, 1157-58).

68 Tabari, 1:2887-90; Baldhurli, Futuzh, 405; Shaban, 21-22. 69 Daniel, 35, 54; Sharon, Black Banners, 198n; Omar,

83, 89. 70 S al-'AlI, at- TanzTmdt al-Ijtimdciyya wa-l-Iqtisddiyyaft-

I-Basraf -l- Qarn al-A wwal al-Hijri (Baghdad, 1953), 42-43.

71 Khalid Yahya Blankinship, "al-'Arab f! Khurasan 31- 132/651-750," MA Thesis, Cairo University, 1983, 115-200.

72 Ibn al-AthTr, Kamil, 5:361. 73 TabarT, 2:2000-1; 3:6-8; Akhbdr, 275, 300, 316-17, 324,

328, 331; al-'Uyan wa-l-IHadd'iq, 194, all naming 'Asim b. 'Umayr.

74 TabarT, 3:7; Akhbar, 331; al-'Uyuin wa-l-Ijadd'iq, 194, all naming Hatim b. al-Harith b. Surayj.

7 Akhbar, 286, naming 'Abd Allah b. Habib. 76 Tabarli, 2:1991; 3:5, naming Bishr b. Bistam. 77 Tabari, 2:1970, naming Bishr b. Unayf. 78 Akhbdr, 317, naming Qays b. Yazfd. 79 Tabari, 2:1967, 1970-71, 1989, 1995; Akhbdr, 286-87,

295, both naming Salm b. Ahwaz. Tabari, 3:15-16, naming Harb b. Salm. Tabari, 3:5, naming 'Abd al-'Az2z b. Shammas.

80 Tabari, 2:1990-91, naming Iyas b. Talha, his father Talha b. Talha, and his uncle al-Muhallab b. Iyas. Tabari, 3:15, naming 'Isa b. Iyas.

81 Tabarl, 2:1991, naming 'Abd Allah b. 'Ar'ara. 82 On the relevance of these branches to this period, see

Tabari, 2:1935, citing them in a poem by Nasr b. Sayyar. 83 Akhbdr, 223, 297, naming 'Abd Allah b. Shu'ba. TabarT,

3:68-69, naming 'Abd Allah's brother al-Haytham b. Shu'ba. Crone, 180-81, for some of the many sources naming Khazim b. Khuzayma. Tabari, 3:78-79, naming Nadla b. Nu'aym. Ibn Hazm, 230, naming ath-Thawla' b. Nu'aym. Tabari, 3:496-97, 956, naming al-Waddah b. Habib.

84 Tabari, 3:46, 48-49, naming Shu'ba b. KathTr. Ahmad b. A'tham al-Ktifi, Futuzh (Haydarabad, 1968-1975), 8:188,

BLANKINSHIP: The Tribal Factor in the Abbdsid Revolution 597

Imru' al-Qays,85 and Dabba86 represented in the forces of Abi Muslim. While it is true that several KhurdsanT Tam-mls are identified only as belonging to the Tamlm,87 a number of these, if not all, probably belong to the same four groups mentioned above, while alternatively some may be mawdli.

Of these four groups, the Dabba were not genea- logically part of the Tamlm at all, showing they may

have been marginal like the Khuzaca among the Yaman, despite the tribe's frequent prominence in the sources. Possibly, they nursed a grievance for having been elbowed out of the command of the Tamlm division by more mainline Tamimi groups after 96/ 715.88 Also, they had evinced an early interest in the struggle for the rights of the mawdlT in conjunction with some of the Azd in 110/729.89 The Mazin were significantly the only subtribe to have several members in both camps, which shows that, with this one excep- tion, tribal group feeling was very much alive in Khurasan even among the revolutionaries, in practice if not in theory. Interestingly, no cAbbasid adherents from the Mazin held any important post.90 The Nahshal, based in Marw ar-Radh, were the sole main- line Tamlmls to play a major role in the cAbbasid revolution, their chief figure being Khazim b. Khu- zayma, whose mother was a non-Arab concubine.9' Their early role in politics, in opposition to the general policy of the Umayyad dynasty after cUmar II has been noted by Shaban,92 so presumably their commit- ment as a group to the revolution was an old one. What is impressive is their inability over the years to draw any other mainline Tamlmls with them.

Those groups discussed so far all appeared in Khurasan quite early, but not all cAbbasid support was drawn from such early settlers. We do not know when the Imru' al-Qays first settled in Khurasan, but none of them are attested there until 102/721.93 Though such a late appearance might be taken as suggesting a Kafan origin,94 the group was mainly concentrated at al-Basra.95 One report suggests that they may have had in their ranks a significant propor- tion of descendants of formerly Christian inhabitants

naming Muhammad b. Shihab. Ibn Hazm, 211, naming Khaffaf b. Hubayra.

85 Ibn Hazm, 214, naming Lahiz b. Qurayz, al-Qasim b. Mujashi', and Misa b. Kacb, the three Mar'T naqrbs. Lahiz and al-Qdsim are mentioned elsewhere in this article. For Musa and his son cUyayna, see Crone, 186. See also Tabari, 2:1953, 1959, 1964, 1999; Akhbdr, 217, 220, 278; Ibn al-KalbT 1:80, 2:441, all naming an-Nadr b. Subh. Tabari, 3:4-5, 9, 37; Akhbdr, 218, 377; Ibn al-Kalbi, 1:80, 2:395, all naming Malik b. at-Tawwaf. Akhbdr, 217, 221, 275, 284; Ibn al- Kalbi, 1:80, 2:293, both naming Hayya b. cAbd Allah. Tabari, 3:128, 380, 461; Akhbar, 217, 221, both naming Macbad b. KhalTl, whose true nisba can be deduced from his being named a Tamim! and a Murri, the latter being an obvious and frequent mistake for Mar'T. Tabari, 2:1993-94; Akhbdr, 217, 221, both naming 'Abd Allah b. al-Bakhtari.

86 Crone, 186-87, covering al-Musayyab b. Zuhayr and his sons, but for his brother 'Amr, see TabarT, 3:375, 377- 78, 384, 458. See also TabarT, 2:1958; Akhbar, 221, both naming $alih b. Sulayman. Tabari, 2:1968; Akhbar, 221, both naming Bahdal b. lyas. Tabari, 3:59-60, Akhbdr, 218, 221, both naming Marrar b. Anas. TabarT, 2:1966, naming an-Nadr b. Nu'aym. TabarT, 2:1589, naming Hazawwar, the mawla of al-Muhajir b. Dara adI-DabbT, an early 'Abbasid martyr of 118/736, which shows that the participation of the Dabba in the revolution may have begun quite early.

8713, bt Tabari, 3:128; Akhbdr, 135, 218, 220, both naming Khalid

b. KathTr. TabarT, 2:1953, 1964; Akhbar, 218, 222, both naming Shanfk b. GhadT (b. 'Isa is probably a mistake). Akhbdr, 221 naming Shu'ba b. 'Uthman al-Marwarriidhl. Akhbar, 218, 222, naming al-KhalIl b. Kirsha. Akhbdr, 218, 221, naming Sariya b. Nuwayb. Akhbdr, 232, 347, naming Tamim b. 'Amr. These six are the only certain Tam-m-s among the Khurasani revolutionaries who are not attributable to subtribes. Based on the text of Tabari, 2:1988, Shaban (p. 151) counts Aslam b. Sallam Abiu Sallam as a Tamiml, but this is a misreading, for he is clearly the same as the Aslam b. AbM Sallam named in Akhbdr, 282, 288, 291, who is plainly identified as of the YamanT Bajila. This latter identification seems accurate, as he was AbN Muslim's envoy to the Yamanm 'AlT b. al-Kirmamn, which task no MudarT would have been chosen for. Omar (p. 72) gives his tribe correctly.

Tabarl, 2:1290-91; Ibn A'tham, 7:246; Naqdaid JarTr wa- I-Farazdaq (Bayrut, n.d.), 359; Ibn Hazm, 203, 204.

TabarT, 2:1507-9. 90 See note 79 above. 9' CAbd Allah b. Muslim b. Qutayba, al-Madrif, ed.

Tharwat cUkkasha (Cairo, 1960), 417. 92 Shaban, 61, 100. The two sons of Shucba mentioned in

note 83 above are direct descendents of the Shucba b. Zuhayr and his father cited by Shaban.

93 TabarT, 2:1424. 94 Especially because of the presence of many warriors of

the Kiffan TayyiP fighting alongside him according to the same report. See note 15 above.

95 cIzz ad-Din Ibn al-Ath-r, al-Lubdbft TahdhTb al-Ansab (Cairo, 1356-69), 3:121; cAbd al-KarTm b. Muhammad as- Samcan1, al-Ansdb (Haydarabad, 1382-1402/1962-82), 12: 177-79.

598 Journal of the American Oriental Society 108.4 (1988)

of al-Hira.96 Ibn Durayd considered the tribe un- important.97 In any case, their origin was doubtful and their entry into the TamIm late and probably post-Islamic, as shown by their not belonging to any of the three major groups in the genealogy. In fact, Sam'anT even gives their nasab as Imru' al-Qays b. Mudar,98 showing their lack of affiliation with any other Arab groups by sticking them in an arbitrary and unlikely place far back on the tribal tree. What- ever their true origins may have been, they were a tribal group of low status in the Umayyad scheme of things.

However lowly and insignificant they may have been in both the Umayyad and 'Abbasid periods, the Imru' al-Qays played a brilliant role in the revolution in Khurasan. Akhbdr ad-Dawla names at least nine high-ranking leaders among them between ddcys and naqTbs,99 more than any other single group except the Khuza'a and more than all other Tamlmis who are mentioned by subtribe put together. This is in spite of their marginality and insignificance among the Tamlm. Especially interesting is the fact that three out of the twelve Khurasani naqTbs were from this tribe: Muisa b. Ka'b, al-Qasim b. Mujashi', and the ill-fated Lahiz b. Qurayz. Not only were these a quarter of the naqrbs, but they were also the only Mudarfs among them and hence the only Tamlmls as well. This cer- tainly does not testify to a broadly-based movement in Khurasan, but rather to the opposite; it also per- haps shows that the groups who participated in the movement from its earliest stages retained much influ- ence over it, at least until Lahiz's execution. Above all, it and the other Tamlml evidence show that the attempt to recruit the Tamlm by the revolutionaries, whether sincere or half-hearted, was not extremely successful. And even the members of this one most revolutionary subtribe seem often to have been luke- warm, judging not only by the betrayal by Lahiz, but also by the temporary desertion of Hayya b. 'Abd Allah to Nasr's forces.'00 Thus, out of nine named high-ranking Mar'Ts in the movement, two betrayed it, which seems significant, especially considering the fact that this was the most devoted to it of all the subtribes of the Mudar.

Now, let us recall that Qurayz b. Mujaj, the Imam Ibrahim's betrayer, was described as a constant companion of Lahiz b. Qurayz and al-Qasim b. Mujashic.l~l Right after the execution of Ldhiz, AbU Muslim recalled both al-Qasim b. Mujashic and MUsa b. Kacb, the other two MudarT naqrbs, who were both, like Lahiz, of the rather small Imru' al-Qays b. Zayd Manat, and were both away with different forces. These two were later reinstated,'02 but al- Qasim held no important offices in the cAbbasid state later on, dying at Marw in comparative obscurity in the time of al-Mahdi,'03 a very odd end for one with such exalted beginnings. Thus, the repercussions of AbU Muslim's execution of Lahiz went-in the tribally- organized society of the times-far beyond the one man who died.

From all this, there is a strong assumption that

Quray?'s betrayal of the imam too was motivated by tribal feelings, in particular by the desire to take blood revenge for AbU Muslim's execution of Lahiz, a motive often portrayed in early Arabic literature. It would also seem likely that Lahiz and Qurayz might be closely related, since Lahiz's father also bore the rare name Quray?, and we do not know the name of

Quray?'s subtribe, only that he was of the Tamlm like Lahiz. If they were related, that would support the idea that Quray?'s betrayal of the imam was motivated by the need for revenge. There is still more. Lahiz was the son-in-law of Sulayman b. Kathlr al-KhuzacT,l04

who was the head of the KhurasanT revolutionaries until AbU Muslim appeared on the scene. The latter did not establish his authority without a struggle. Sulayman b. Kathlr not only played no further impor- tant role in the revolution, but was executed by Abu Muslim in 131/749.105 Perhaps Lahiz and Sulayman

then represented a faction opposed to Abu Muslim's dictates.

Abu Muslim's execution of Lahiz was only one of the signs of the mutual distrust and antipathy that developed between the Mudar and the revolutionary movement. Despite its overt call for equality, it proved hard for many Mudarfs to stay in the movement. Aside from the betrayals by the TamlmTs Lahiz and Qurayz b. Mujaj, the lack of welcome for Mudarfs within the cause is shown by the fact that few other KhurdsdnT Mudaris seem ever after to have risen to

96 Ibn al-Athir, Lubab, 2:11 1. 9 Muhammad b. al-Husayn b. Durayd, al-Ishtiqdq (Cairo,

1378/1958), 217. 98 Samcani, 12:177-79, 179-80n. Sam'ani's weakness re-

garding this subtribe is discussed by Ibn al-Athir, Lubab,

3:121. 9 All those named in note 85 above. 100 For Hayya, see note 85.

'0' Akhbdr, 389. 02 Tabari, 2:2001-2, 2004; Akhbdr, 323, 327-28.

103 Tabari, 3:532. 104 Akhbdr, 220. 105 BaladhurT, Ansab, 3:168; Daniel, 81-83.

BLANKINSHIP: The Tribal Factor in the 'Abbdsid Revolution 599

high positions, with three important exceptions,106 and these were mere window dressing. Certainly there is no MudarT prominence like that of the Khuzd'Ts and especially of the originally Kiifan Yamanf tribes among the 'Abbasid abnd'. There are no abnJd from the Khurasanf Layth, Asad,'07 Sulaym,'08 or Bahila (though these last could claim to be Yamanf),'09 and none from the three main branches of the TamTm with the single exception of the Nahshal.

Those few who joined the revolution from the Ahl al-'Aliya khums of the Mudar had an especially diffi- cult time staying in it. This was natural, as they were the group formerly closest to power. Thus one Abii Kamil, persuaded by Abii Muslim personally to join in 129/747 at ad-Dandanqan, nevertheless deserted the revolution and returned to fighting it in 131/749, even though by then its victorious progress was mani- fest."0 A similar case was that of Ziyad b. Zurara al- Qushayrf, of the preeminent family of Naysabir, whom Abil Muslim had appointed governor there in

130/748, but who fled with his forces from Qahtaba in 131/749."' Even the mawdlT were affected by the prevailing spirit of tribal feeling. Thus Ahlam b. Ibrdhim b. Bassam, the mawid of the Layth, of a family that had long supported the revolution,"2 claimed he slew the general for whom he was fighting, none other than the great Qahtaba himself, because he feared for his brother Bassam and also because he wanted to take revenge for Abfi Muslim's slaying of the sons of Nasr b. Sayyar," 3 to whom his family owed allegiance. And it comes as no surprise that Abfi Muslim executed his only MudarT companion, Aflah b. Malik al-Fazari, out of fear that he was plotting a revolt." 14 These many cases of disloyal Mudaris inevitably invite comparison with those of Lahiz and Qurayz

How can we explain this long history of apparent betrayal: Lahiz, Qurayz b. Mujaj, Ijayya b. 'Abd Allah, Abi Kamil, Ziyad b. Zurara, Ahlam b. Ibrah-m and Aflah b. Malik? The list of Mudari deserters of the movement far surpasses the list of Yamanis, of whom none are known, despite the relatively small numbers of MudarTs in the revolution. It would seem we must turn to the nature of the 'Abbasid dawa itself. Some of the reports cited earlier which seek a reason for the anonymous messenger's betrayal of the imam mention the latter's order to Abui Muslim to kill the messenger upon his return to Khurasan. These same reports say that the imam was furious that Abui Muslim had sent him an Arab as an emissary. These are connected with other versions which relate the imam's infamous order to kill all the Arabs in Khurasdn."5 On the surface of it this is improbable, since the imam himself was of pure Arab blood on his father's side and since his success in Khurdsan de- pended on attracting at least some of the Arabs there. And the report which names Qurayz b. Mujdj at- TamimT as the betrayer also mentions his companion, an Arab of the Himyar, Abii Humayd, who did not

106 These are the Tamrmis already mentioned: Khdzim b. Khuzayma an-Nahshali, al-Musayyab b. Zuhayr ad-Dabbi, and Miisa b. Ka'b al-Mar'l. See Crone, 180, 186-87.

107 Despite Daniel (p. 35), none of the Asad can be shown to have participated in the revolution. Akhbar (p. 223) mentions an 'Abd al-A'ld b. Hakim al-Asadi as a relatively lowly assistant daCT (daciyat ducat), but he is named only once by this one source, his nisba is probably a corruption of al-Azdi, and in any case neither he nor any other Asadi ever reached an influential position afterwards, which is our point here.

108 To be sure, three Sulamlis, two of them brothers, appear in the ranks of the revolutionaries. But their main purpose seems to have been to represent the revolution to the Mudar and, often, pour out their vitriolic hostility against them. TabarT, 2:1986; Akhbar, 217, 221, 291, both naming Mazyad (or Marthad) b. ShaqTq. TabarT, 2:1993-94; Akhbar, 217, 220, both naming Quraysh b. Shaqiq. The third of them may have only opportunistically joined after Nasr's flight and Tamim b. Nasr's rout. Tabari, 2:1951. None of them is ever mentioned subsequently either in or out of office.

'09 Despite their presumed membership in the Mudar, the Bahila often considered themselves Yamanis and acted accordingly. This is even reflected in the various versions of their genealogy. Ibn Hazm, 244-45; Ibn Durayd, 271; Ibn al-Athir, Lubdb 1:93-94. Most tellingly, 'Amr b. Muslim said to the Azdi Banui Ma'n in 106/725, "If we aren't from you, then we aren't Arabs." Tabari, 2:1474. The same goes for the Tufawa. Ibn Hazm, 244, 403, 451. This eliminates two more of the "Mudar" examples used by Daniel, 35.

110 He was later killed. Tabari, 2:1950, 3:1, 7; Akhbar 327, 331-32, 354.

"' Tabari, 2:2016, 3:2-3; Ibn al-Kalbi 1:105, 2:608. For his brother 'Amr, an earlier governor of Naysabir, see TabarT 2:1771, 1773; Akhbar, 243; Ibn A'tham, 8:131; Yacqiibl, 2:398; Ibn al-Kalbi, 2:187. For their father, Zurara b. 'Uqba, who was allegedly a governor of Khurasan and whose descendents were at Naysabtir, see Ibn Hazm, 290.

112 Ahlam's uncle 'Ubayd Allah b. Bassam, as early as 124/742. Akhbar, 233.

13 Tabari, 3:18. 114 MaqrizT, 52-53. 115 Daniel, 46-47, discusses this, pointing out its unlike-

lihood.

600 Journal of the American Oriental Society 108.4 (1988)

betray the imam but was later instrumental in bringing out Abti-l-`Abbas to be caliph.116

Elsewhere, the sources claim the imam told his sectaries in Khurasan to keep with the Yaman and avoid the Mudar.117 Other versions say the order was to kill the Mudar."8 The 'Abbasid imams had con- siderable Yamani blood in them"9 and surrounded themselves with mawdlr of Yamani tribes who had little reason to be sympathetic to anyone in the Mudar group. From this it seems likely that the imam's original order concerned the Mudar, not the Arabs generally. In view of the fact that mostly only the irreconcilable MudarTs or suspected plotters were actually killed and that some Mudaris remained in the movement, it is possible that the imam's command was rather to eliminate the Mudar from all positions of authority, retaining a few only for the sake of appearances, and to kill only those who resisted. In light of all this, the 'Abbasid revolution seems first to have been a continuation of the struggle of the dis- enfranchised Yaman for power, a struggle that had been going on for decades.120 And the Yaman had always been the party favorable to the mawdll. In the revolution, it was only the hated Syrians who were thrust aside regardless of whether they were of the Qays or Yaman. But that was natural enough, as this was a revolution in which power was seized by the hitherto most disadvantaged groups in al-KUfa and Khurasan. Nevertheless, even among the Syrians, the Yamanis did better than the Qaysis."'

To recapitulate: the 'Abbasid movement in Khurasan began with an alignment of a very few disgruntled and disenfranchised Arab subtribes which were quickly attracted to the Shlcizing 'Abbasid doctrine brought to them by missionaries who were Ktifan mawlas of Yamani tribes. This helped make the movement un- balanced in favor of the Yaman, whose many KUfan settlers in western Khurasan after 98/719 were easily attracted to a ShVTC movement; hence, the movement became even more unbalanced. This possibly con- tributed to a general failure of the movement to spread widely among the Mudar, including the Tamim, beyond the few original groups that had contributed to it, such as the Dabba, Nahshal and, of course, Imru' al-Qays. These few original groups of Mudari adherents to the movement were not unduly alarmed at the tribal imbalance in the earlier stages, owing to their willingness to try to forget tribal differences. But they became increasingly worried when they saw Ab6 Muslim's displacement of them in the widening move- ment, and especially when they saw his rough treat- ment of the Mudar, which they correctly surmised revealed a violent hostility underneath. Their growing reservations culminated in the betrayal of Lahiz b. Qurayz, who could not bring himself to deceitfully entice Nasr b. Sayyar, the old Mudari leader, to a certain death, even though it meant his head and in spite of the fact that it undid his whole life's work and rendered his sufferings meaningless. Such a sacrifice was an epoch-making event for the Khurasani Mudar and was not cheaply spent, but led to larger results. These included an increasing distrust of the Mudar and especially the Imru' al-Qays in the revolutionary ranks, leading to a failure of some prominently-placed persons to obtain military commands, the elimination of Sulayman b. Kathir, and ever greater reliance on more trustworthy Kfifan and other YamanT elements. Possibly a persecution of MudarTs associated with the old regime followed, as seen in the fate of Nasr's staff in Marw. This further frightened or enraged other Mudarls such as Abi Kamil and Ziydd b. Zurara, as well as even mawdli of the Mudar like Ahlam b. Ibrdhim, so that they found it impossible to remain within the movement, even though its hour of victory had arrived. Those who stayed in the revolution had to shut their eyes to these outrages, believe Abii Muslim's justifications, and concentrate on the worldly gains of position and wealth they could expect on the revolution's success. But for the rest, it was the destruction of whatever power they may have had, forever.

But perhaps the most shocking result of the execu- tion of Lahiz was the betrayal of the imam by Qurayz b. Mujaj. Whether this alone motivated the latter, or

116 Tabari, 3:27-28. 117 Tabari, 2:1986; Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 5:379; for a milder

version, Akhbar, 285; Sharon, Black Banners, 159. 118 Tabari, 2:1937; Omar 81-83. For the actual execution of

the Mudar leaders at the fall of Marw, see Tabari, 2:1989,

1995. Especially noteworthy is a boastful anti-Mudar frag-

ment of a poem celebrating Qahtaba's massacre of still more

Mudar leaders at Nihawand. Tabari, 3:6. 119 al-Mus'ab b. 'Abd Allah az-Zubayrl, Nasab Quraysh,

ed. E. Levi-Provenqal (Cairo, 1948), 26-3 1. 120 This view was attributed to al-Mansiir himself. AzdY,

222. It is corroborated by Theophanes, The Chronicle of

Theophanes, ed. and trans. H. Turtledove (Philadelphia,

1982), 114. More recently, it has been expressed by C.

Cahen, "Points de vue sur la 'Revolution 'abbaside', " Revue

historique, 230, (1963): 320. 121 Thus Ja'far b. Hanzala al-Bahrani escaped the massacre

of Umayyad commanders at Wasit because he was a Yamani,

while the Mudar were slaughtered. Tabari, 3:68-69. Likewise,

the HarithTs Ziyad b. 'Ubayd Allah and Ziyad b. Salih had

been able to flee to the 'Abbasid forces before the fall only

because their being YamanT protected them. TabarT, 3:66.

BLANKINSHIP: The Tribal Factor in the Abbasid Revolution 601

whether it was the contents of the imam's letter against him or the Mudar, or whether it was owing to some other event, we shall probably never be sure. But it strongly looks as though Qurayz's motive-if not exactly the killing of Lahiz-at least had something to do with AbU Muslim's increasing persecution of the Mudar. Since Qurayz was a TamTmli and likely Lahiz's relative, his being motivated by Lahiz's execution still seems most probable. This also would fit with the most likely chronology for the event, as we have seen, putting the betrayal of the imam probably in the latter half of 130/748. Why the supposedly wise AbU Muslim would have committed the grand error of sending a Tamimi to the imam remains a problem, but it could have been as a sop to the Tamim after Lahiz's execu- tion, especially as both emissaries came from the Tamimi center of Marw ar-RUdh. Perhaps he was overconfident owing to the recent victories as well. In any case, the execution of Lahiz b. Qurayz and the subsequent betrayal of Imam IbrahTm by Qurayz b. Mujaj were not isolated, unconnected incidents in the otherwise smooth progress of the 'Abbasid revolution, but major events central to the revolution's history and indicative of its hitherto little-noticed anti-Mudar tendency.

APPENDIX

THE DATE OF IBRAHIM'S ARREST

Fixing the date of Ibrahim's arrest is important in assessing how it came about. Basically two versions can be discerned within a constellation of reports of luxuriant variety. One tendency places his arrest early, connecting it variously with the pilgrimage of 129/ 747,122 the return of Qahtaba in early 130/747,123 AbU Muslim's dramatic victories over Nasr beginning with the capture of Marw on 7 RabC 11 130/15 Dec. 747, 9Rabl' 11 130/17 Dec. 747 or 9 Jumada 1 130/15 Jan. 748,124 Nasr's subsequent flight toward ar-Rayy,'25 or Qahtaba's victory in Jurjan on 1 DhU-l-Hijjah 130/1 Aug. 748.126 This group of reports nowhere specifies the date of Ibrahim's arrest, but at the latest would still put it more than a year before the most commonly-given date of his demise in prison.

The second group of reports is much more specific, almost all agreeing on al-Muharram 132/Aug.-Sept. 749 for the arrest. One report even states that he spent

exactly twenty days in prison before dying.'2 Several of these reports are attributed to members of the 'Abbasid family or its servants.'28 The reports also tend to link the arrival of the 'Abbasids in al-Kiffa with Ibrahlm's death, for they assert that the family, after accompanying IbrahTm part way to Harran, fled to al-Kilfa immediately afterwards. According to these reports, since the family remained hidden by AbM Salama in al-Kiffa for forty days or so until the proclamation of Abii-l-'Abbas on 12 Rabi' 11 132/ 28 Nov. 749,129 IbrahTm's captivity must have begun in al-Muharram of that year,'30 but not earlier. This chronology is further supported by a report found in several sources asserting that the reason for his arrest was that he showed his hand too openly at the pil- grimage of 131/749 and thus was arrested on his return to al-Humayma shortly afterwards.'3'

The discrepancy between these early and late datings for Ibrahim's arrest was perhaps already noticed by medieval Islamic historians, for Azdi states explicitly that he was arrested twice.'32 However that may be, all the extant versions of his arrest seem to relate only to the final instance. All the reports where various details exist are the same: the unexpected discovery of his treason; the orders going forth from Harran to the same governor of Damascus, the Umayyad al-Walid b. Mu'awiya b. 'Abd al-Malik, who then relays them to the governor of al-Balqa'; and his being carried in chains to Harran. As for the accounts of IbrahTm's two pilgrimages in 129/747 and 131/749, they too seem derived from a single original tradition. Though the versions of Ibn 'Asakir and Dhahabi only say that Ibrahim appeared too prominently with his relatives at the pilgrimage of 131/749, AzdT specifies four important 'Alid personalities to whom Ibrahim gave largesse on that occasion.'33 Azdi's version probably

122 Akhbdr, 385, 387-89. 123 al-cUyan wa-l-Hada-iq, 190. 124 al-'Uyan wa-l-Hada-iq, 189; DinawarT, 357. 125 MascUdT, 4:83. 126 Akhbdr, 391.

127 Akhbar, 395. 128 Akhbar, 394, 401. 129 Akhbdr, 400-402; TabarT, 3:27, 33-34, 37; BalddhurT,

Ansdb, 3:141; Ibn Kathir, 9:39; Omar, 121; J. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and Its Fall, tr. M. Weir (Calcutta, 1927), 543-44. However, the preceding and following months are also possible, though less likely. See Ibn al-Athir, Kamil, 5:408.

130 Indeed, Ibn 'Asakir dates it to this month. Ibn 'Asakir, 2:292.

131 AzdT, 118, 120; Ibn 'Asakir, 2:292; DhahabT, Ta'rTkh, 5:223.

132 AzdT, 120.

133 AzdT, 122. The 'Alids named are 'Abd Allah b. al- Hasan, IbrdhTm b. al-Hasan, Muhammad b. 'Umar and Ja'far b. Muhammad.

602 Journal of the American Oriental Society 108.4 (1988)

represents an earlier form which Ibn 'Asakir and DhahabT later abridged. The same tradition is quoted at greater length by Akhbar ad-Dawla, whose version must be still earlier, because it includes a story about al-Husayn b. Zayd whose point has been lost in AzdT's shortened rendition.'34 Though this specific tradition in Akhbar ad-Dawla does not give a date for the event, it is clearly associated in the text with another tradition describing the pilgrimage of 129/747 in which two of the same 'Alid recipients of Ibrahim's largesse figure in other roles.'35 Thus, it would appear that we have two layers of versions: one earlier and less specific about dates, and a second showing a tendentious overlay in the interests of 'Abbasid legitimacy.

From this, it seems that a considerable interval actually passed between the imam's arrest and the proclamation of Abii-l-Abbas as caliph and that the 'Abbasids, with only the shakiest claims to legitimacy, spared no efforts in establishing an official version of their ascent to power that would leave no doubt- raising gaps. This is obvious in the care with which Ibrahim's designation of Abii-l-'Abbas as his successor is recorded in numerous reports which litter most of the sources,' a story at once so ubiquitous and so tendentious that one is compelled almost immediately to question its truth. Despite Ibrahim's being carried off in chains in the middle of a war to the death between the Umayyads and 'Abbasids, his brothers, cousins, and favorite concubine accompany him al- most to Harran, '37 while he suffers no impediments to carrying on his political business, even to the extent of appointing his successor. The same goes for the late chronology: the 'Abbasid imamate is continuous, with an interregnum of perhaps less than two months. One should not underestimate the importance of such con- tinuity to the 'Abbasid regime in establishing its legiti- macy, especially at the outset.

However, enough contrary material exists to enable us to establish what really happened with a fair degree of probability. The first group of reports, as we have already noted, are vaguer about the timing of the imam's arrest but are unanimous in requiring it to be put much earlier than the second group of versions which share a pro-'Abbasid tendency. This first group

must be earlier than the second because no motive for falsely making Ibrahim's arrest earlier can easily be imagined. The lack of detail found in the first group in no way impairs their probable truthfulness, as greater detail is more frequently a sign of tendentious development. Also, if Ibrahim was held incommuni- cado, his exact fate might not easily have become known, and the truest reports would necessarily be vague.

Fortunately, more precise information exists. The anonymous al-'Uyin wa-l-Hada'iq tells us that it was Qahtaba, not the 'Abbasids, to whom IbrahTm pro- nounced Abii-l-'Abbas to be his legitimate successor. This is said to have happened when Qahtaba, return- ing via Syria from the pilgrimage of 129/747, heard that the imam had been arrested and taken to Harran. Qahtaba followed him there and rather brazenly in- sinuated himself into the prison in disguise in order to find out who the successor was.'38 This report must represent an earlier stage in the legitimizing tradition about Abii-l-'Abbas's succession, because Qahtaba's word would not be as good an authority as that of the 'Abbasids themselves; thus, the report showing him as guarantor of the succession would likely be earlier than the other pro-cAbbasid reports on it. However, as he was dead by the outset of 132/749, Qahtaba would make a more convenient guarantor of the claimed succession of Abii-l-'Abbas to the imamate than any living person, precisely because any state- ments attributed to him could no longer be checked, even by the inner circle of revolutionary leaders. This would imply the report containing Qahtaba was put into circulation quite soon after the establishment of 'Abbasid rule. Further, the report shows a greater degree of improbability but less detail than the later reports, implying a lesser level of sophistication, also making it more likely to be early.

Other interesting information exists in DInawarT, who curiously puts Marwan at Hims at the time of the arrest. D-nawari states that Abi-l-cAbbas and Abti Ja'far heard of IbrahTm's death in prison while they were at al-Humayma, which would mean they did not proceed directly to al-Ktifa from near Harran, to where they had accompanied him upon his arrest, but had returned to al-Humayma, staying there an undetermined length of time.'39 More probably, they never left al-Humayma at all after Ibrahim's arrest, the details of their setting out with him being a tendentious attempt at legitimizing the 'Abbasid suc-

314 Akhbdr, 383-84. "' Akhbdr, 385-86; also see 387-89. 136 Akhbdr, 393-94, 402, 409-10; TabarT, 3:27, 35; Bala-

dhuri, Ansdb, 3:123-24; al-'Uyan wa-l-Haddaiq, 191; Ibn al- Athir, Kdmil, 5:409; Omar, 120; Sharon, "''AlTyat,'' 241-60.

137 Akhbdr, 401-2; Tabarli, 3:26. 139 al-D'Uyin wail 3 Had57q. 139 D-inawaff, 357.

BLANKINSHIP: The Tribal Factor in the SAbbdsid Revolution 603

cession. Later, fearing for their lives and possibly supposing that Ibrahim had been murdered, the 'Abbasids fled to al-Ktifa, where they are stated to have arrived before the KhurasanT armies. 140 They stayed an undetermined length of time before their forces arrived and Abii-l-'Abbas was proclaimed imam, but in any case it had to be at least three months, not a biblical interval of forty days, as in the pro-'Abbasid traditions. This more modest but by no means shameful account of their activities would ap- pear to be anterior to the versions we have described

as later, as it requires a longer if vaguer interregnum following IbrahIlm's death.

From the preceding and the other reports we have cited, it seems that those which require that Ibrahim's arrest be earlier, perhaps during 130/747-8, are older than those placing it at the start of 132/749 and hence more likely to be correct. Those making his arrest later appear to have been informed by the needs of the 'Abbasids to make the interregnum as short as possible to help establish their own legitimacy. From these conclusions, we can reject Ibrahlm's appearance at the pilgrimage of 131/749, as well as his designation of Abii-l-'Abbas as his successor, as apocryphal. 140 DinawarT, 358.