The Transferability of the East Asian Development Experience · Indonesia Philippines % [ASEAN4]...
Transcript of The Transferability of the East Asian Development Experience · Indonesia Philippines % [ASEAN4]...
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Kenichi OhnoNational Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
The Transferability ofthe East Asian Development
Experience
Photo by Saizou Uchida (location: Sakai-gun, Fukui Prefecture, Japan)
Three Levels of Transferability
(1) Blindly copying East Asian policies to different soil (main banks, postal saving, priority production system...) NOT ADVISABLE
(2) Selective transfer of theories and policies (distinguish common features from specific, international comparison studies...)
(3) General philosophy and methodology: East Asian approach to development and its problems
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A lot of confusion occurs if we mix these levels...
--This presentation focuses on the third (general transferability)
--No need to adopt East Asian policies exclusively (most suitable international experience for each country should be adopted)
The Menu for Discussion
East Asian experience (as viewed by Japan’s aid ministries & aid executing agencies)
--Economics--Political economy and leadership--New selectivity?
Development as Japan perceivesOur advice for VietnamSub Saharan Africa?
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East Asian Development
Growth driven by trade and investmentCollective growth, not isolated or randomStaggered participation in regional production networkRegion as an enabling environment for catching up (model and pressure)Authoritarian developmentalism
“Asian Dynamism”(Also known as the Flying Geese Pattern)
Geographic diffusion of industrializationWithin each country, industrialization proceeds from low-tech to high-techClear order and structure (with a possibility of re-formation)<Warning> Not all success--crises, failures, instabilities also often occur
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Graph: GDP in EA vs AfricaPer Capita GDP
(In 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars)
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1998
Africa
East Asia
Source: Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, OECD Development Centre, 2001
Graph: growth over time
Real Growth 1960-2001
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
TaiwanKoreaHong KongSingapore
[Newly Industrializing Economies]%
Source: Economic Planning Agency, Asian Economic 1997 . For the data of 1997-2001, IMF, The World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database , April 2002.
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Real Growth 1960-2001
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
1519
60
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
MalaysiaThailandIndonesiaPhilippines
[ASEAN4]%
Source: Economic Planning Agency, Asian Economic 1997 . For the data of 1997-2001, IMF, The World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database , April 2002.
Graph: wars and conflicts
1949 Independence 1979 Policy of Reform and Opening Up begins
1958-60 Great Leap Forward 1976 Death of Mao Tse-tung 1997 Hon Dea
1966-76 Cultural Revolution 1989 Tiananmen Square Inc
China-Taiwan Problem
1947 Riots against Government [Taiwan] 1979 Assassination of President Park [Korea]
1961 Coup d'etat [Korea] 1973-74 1979-80 1997-98
1950-53 Korean War
Korean Peninsula Problem
1946-54 Indochina War [Vietnam] 1986 Doi Moi (Renovation) Policy begins
1954 Division of Vietnam into South & North1979-89 Vietnam invades Cambodia
1965-75 Vietnam War [Vietnam]
1976 Reunification of Vietnam
1958 Coup d'etat by Sarit [Thailand] 1971 Military coup d'etat [Thailand]
1960-61 Coup d'etat [Laos]1975-78 Khmer Rouge - Pol Pot Regime [Cambodia]
1962 Coup d'etat by Revolutionary Council [Myanmar] 1988 Military coup d'etat by SLOR
1957 Independence as Malaya [Malaysia] 1985-86
1963 Federation of Malaysia [Malaysia/Singapore]
1965 Coup d'etat - End of Sukarno years [Indonesia]
1965 Independence from Malaysia [Singapore]
1969 Riots [Malaysia, Singapore]
1965-86 Marcos Dictatorship [Philippines]
20001990
Asia
n Cris
is
19751960 19951965 1970 1980 198519551950
Oil
Pric
e Dec
line
North-EastAsia
Oil
Shoc
k
End
of W
orld
War
II
Oil
Shoc
k
South-EastAsia:
MaritimeCountries
South-EastAsia:
Indochina
China
Wars, Crisis and Internal Troubles
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Graph: size comparison
SIZE (2000)
15%
65%
Japan65%
7%
Korea & Taiwan4%
Korea & Taiwan
10%10%
ASEAN24%
[Total $7,013 billion]
[Total 1,935 million]
at Actual Exchange Rate
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2002; For Taiwan, ADB, Key Indicators 2001 .
East AsianPopulation
East Asian GNP
(32% of World Total)
(22% of World Total)
China
China
Graph: per capita income
Per Capita Income (2000)
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
Japa
n
Hong
Kon
g
Sing
apor
e
Kor
ea
Mal
aysi
a
Thai
land
Phili
ppin
es
Chi
na
Indo
nesi
a
Viet
nam
Lao
PDR
Cam
bodi
a
US$
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2002 .
at Actual Exchange Rate
at PPP
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S ADB K I di t f D l i A i d P ifi C t i 2001/1993 IMF I t ti l Fi i l St ti ti Y b k 1990 F J J
Graph: manufactured exports
Manufactured Exports(% of total exports)
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%19
7519
7619
7719
7819
7919
8019
8119
8219
8319
8419
8519
8619
8719
8819
8919
9019
9119
9219
9319
9419
9519
9619
9719
9819
9920
00
Japan
Taiwan
Korea
Singapore
Malaysia
Thailand
Philippines
Indonesia
China
Vietnam
Myanmar
Source: ADB, Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries , 2001/1993; IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1990 . ForJapan, Japan Statistical Yearbook 2002/1999 , Statistics Bureau/Statistical Research and Training Institute, Ministry of Public Management,Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, Japan.
Structural Transformation in East Asia
Japan
NIEs
ASEAN4
Latecomers
Latestcomers
Country
Time
Garment Steel Popular TV VideoDigital
Camera
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3 2
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1 Japan
Garment SteelPopular
TV Video HDTVCom
petit
iven
ess
Time
Com
petit
iven
ess
Time
Com
petit
iven
ess
2 Garment
JapanNIEs
ASEAN4
LatecomersLatest comers
International Division of Labor3
Garment SteelPopular
TV VideoDigital camera
JapanNIEs
ASEAN4
LatecomersLatest comers
East Asia's Trading Partners
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1980 1985 1990 1995 1996
Others
Europe
N. America
Japan
East Asia
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Foreign Direct Investment Flows(Billions of USD / year)
[1st Half of 1990s] [2nd Half of 1990s]
Japan
NIEs
ASEAN4
China
1.3
2.4
2.24.8
7.8
9.8
Japan
NIEs
ASEAN4
China
1.3
2.4
4.3
8.78.5
11.5
2.6
Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, White Paper on International Trade 2002, p12.Note: Flows less than $1 billion are not shown. The “NIEs to China” flow excludes Hong Kong.
Japan
NIEs
ASEAN4
China
18.6
7.25.0
Trade in Machine Parts(Billions of USD / year)
[1990] [1998]
Japan
NIEs
ASEAN4
China
6.9
29.9
6.8
15.3
21.7
5.5
19.2
7.6
8.5
Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, White Paper on International Trade 2001, p12.Note: Flows less than $5 billion are not shown.
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Factors often cited: not true causes
High level of educationExport promotionHigh savings and investmentIncome equality and shared growthGood government-business relationship“Selective intervention”
These are tools for participating in the regional network which each country must prepare
How to escape the vicious circle and start the growth process?
Authoritarian developmentalism as a temporary regime to realize high growthA strong state with economic capability--National obsession with industrialization and export
competitiveness--Powerful and economically literate leader--Elite team to support the leader--Top down and agile: not necessarily “democratic” by
Western standards
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Basic Roles of East Asian States
Political stability and social integration(precondition for development)
Task 1: Create a market economy with competitivenessTask 2: Initiate and manage global integrationTask 3: Cope with negative aspects of growth(emerging income gaps, congestion, pollution, corruption, etc.)
“Technocratic Model” and its failure
Samuel P.Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries, Harvard Univ. Press, 1976.
Economic growth
Rising inequality
Political instability
Political suppression
Social explosion!!!
START
END
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“Populist Model” and its failure
Equalization
Economic stagnation
Political instability
Increased participation
Political suppression!!!
START
END
Samuel P.Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries, Harvard Univ. Press, 1976.
East Asia’s Developmentalism
Economic growth
New social problems (inequality, crime, pollution...)
Political stability
Developmental state
Exit to a richer & more democratic society (examples: Korea, Taiwan)
START
END
Supplementing policies
(checked)
A few decades later
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1945 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 200060 61 79 87 88 92 97
Korea49 75 78 88 Kim Young-sam
TaiwanChenShui-bian
46 48 53 57 61 65 86 92 98
PhilippinesMagsaysay Macapagal 99
Indonesia55 59 65 90 Habibie
Singapore57 70 76 81
Malaysia46 48 57 58 63 73 75 77 80 88 91 97
Thailand51 76 Kriangsak Chatichai
Vietnam48 62 88
Myanmar
Source: Akira Suehiro, Catch-up Type Industrialization , Nagoya University Press, 2000, p115.
Kim Dae-jung
Nationalist Party Chiang Kai-shek Chiang Ching-kuo Lee Teng-hui
Rhee Syngman Park Chung-hee Chun Doo-hwan Noh Tae-woo
Ramos Estrada
Skarno Suharto Wahid
Quirino Garcia Marcos Aquino
LaborParty
People'sAction Party Lee Kuan-yew Goh Chok-tong
Vietnamese Communist Party
Authoritarian Developmentalism in East Asia
Phibun Sarit Thanom
UMNO / Rahman Razak Hussein Mahathir
U Nu Burma Socialist Programme Party / Ne Win SLORC
IndochinaCommunist Party Labor Party
Prem Chuan
Rise & Fall of Auth. Developmentalism
Established under severe threat to national security or unityOften by military coupReplaces a previous weak governmentEconomic growth legitimizes the regimeOver time, its own success undermines legitimacy and leads to democratic transition (Korea, Taiwan)
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Transferability?Direct replication is impossible--Weak domestic capability (both state and market)--Regional production networks don’t exist elsewhere
Growth policy formulation can be taught --Demonstration effect of excellence--By long-term commitment to work together--Not by imposing conditionality or policy matrix
Leadership quality is key--We (donors) can’t change governments but can choose
good ones to work with
Redefining Selectivity and Good Governance
To initiate trade-driven growth, different and narrower conditions are needed--Strong leadership with ownership & commitment--Administrative mechanisms for policy consistency and
effective implementation
High-performing East Asia did not have--Transparency, accountability, participatory process, clean
government, privatization, free trade(maybe not necessary for initiating growth?)
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Development as Japan Sees It<Experiential & relational, not conceptual>Long-term, comprehensive, self-help, respect for local uniquenessReal sector and ingredients orientedUltimate goal: social pride & dynamism via industrial growth & competitivenessAid is not charityPoverty reduction as an ultimate goal???
--Set framework only--Don’t intervene individ-ually; let market decide
--Must intervene in individual industries under weak markets
Sectoral intervent-ion
--Competent state, not laissez-faire, is needed--Good governance: clean & transparent administra-tionis required
--Initiator/manager of development & integration--Hard, strong state for promoting growth
Role of state
--Generally desirable--Free trade, privatization--Level playing field for all
--Step by step--Competitiveness, not ownership, matters
Integration& liberaliz-ation
Dominant ViewJapanese View
Different Visions on Trade & Growth
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--Primary educ. & health--Training trade officials
--Engineers, managers--Factory OJTHRD
--Small rural infra. esp. feeder roads, water etc.
--Large-scale infra. esp. power & transportation
Infrastructure
--Trade impacts on poverty & employment--Supply chain mgt.
--In-depth studies of individual industries--FDI attraction policy
Typical research
--Poverty reduction--WTO accession--Open export markets for LDCs
--National dev. plan--Concrete strategies for each key industry--Factory checkups
Typical policy supports
Dominant ViewJapanese View
Contd.
“Pro-Poor Growth”?
Too small for a national devel. goalDesirability?--is more equality always good? Should we not balance equality and incentive?
Channels and linkages--many ways to cut poverty, direct and indirect. Strategy should be geared to each country.
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Three Channels of Pro-Poor Growth
(1) Direct channel (impacting the poor directly)
--Health, education, gender, rural jobs & development, etc.
(2) Market channel (growth helps poor via economic linkages)--Inter-sectoral and inter-regional labor migration (cf.
Chinese TVEs) --Increasing demand (cf. proto-industrialization, multiplier
effect)--Capital accumulation & improved productivity--Reinvestment
(3) Policy channel (supplementing the market channel)
--Price support, taxes, subsidies--Fiscal transfer, public works, infrastructure--Micro & SME credit, other financial measures--Proper design of trade & investment policies--Coping with social/market divisions--Pro-poor legal framework
Need to broaden the scope of pro-poor growth (not just direct channel)
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Some Key WordsBest-mix approach – multi aid modality (grants, TA, loans), not uniformity or convergence
Non-fungibility -- some ideas & methods are not fungible; which donor does it matters
Self-help effort -- for a long time, the key idea in Japanese ODA; broader than ownership
Japan in Vietnam, 2002-03Vietnam in E Asia: potential not fully realized due to bad business environmentInfrastructure + HRD + policy adviceRegaining leadership as top donor (from LMDG); linking with GoV; WB, AsDB, DfIDAdding “large-scale infrastructure” to PRSP (called CPRGS)
Projecting Japan’s ideas (we were too quiet previously)
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Japan’s Growth Support Package
Large infrastructure projects (e.g. 40% of new power capacity, 1992-2001)
Ishikawa Joint Research Project (1995-2001); other research projects
New Miyazawa Initiative (1999: PSD, SOE audits, tariffication of NTBs)
Japan-Vietnam Investment Working Group for regular government-business dialogue
Scholarship for studying in Japan
Contd.
TA & training for market economics, factory operation, telecom, construction, agriculture...
Building 200 primary schools & upgrading 2 central hospitalsJapan-Vietnam Joint Initiative for improving business environment for competitiveness (April 2003, agreed by prime ministers)
Launching “Growth Initiative” (Interim CG, June 2003)
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Silicon Valley
AgglomerationInitial concentration has an accelerating effect
FragmentationInternational division of labor in parts production & assembly
PB
PB
PB PBPB
SL
SL
SL
SL
SL: service linkPB: production block
SL
Vietnam’s Industrial Dualism
Local firms(SOEs & private)
FDI firms
FDI assemblers(located mainly in
EPZs and industrial zones)
Domestic Sector(Protected & weak)
Export Sector(Competitive under free
trade)
Missing link
Global Production N
etwork
Materials& parts
Assembledproducts
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Japanese E lectron ics FD I in ASEANCumulative number of manufacturing establishments
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Singapore Philippines Vietnam
Parts & devices
Telecom & computers
Audio & visual
Source: Electronic Industries Association of Japan (2000), quoted by Yumiko Okamoto, "Electronics
and Electrical Industries,"in K. Ohno & N. Kawabata, eds, Industrialization Strategy of Vietnam ,
Nihon Hyoronsha (2003).
Japan e s e E le c tro n ic s F D I in AS EANNumber o f new manufacturing establishments by period
0
20
40
60
80
100
Before
1970
1970-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000
Malaysia
Thailand
Indonesia
Singapore
Ph ilippines
Vie tnam
Source: E lectronic Industries Association of Japan (2000), quoted by Yum iko Okamoto,
"E lectronics and E lectrica l Industries ,"in K. Ohno & N . Kawabata , eds , Industria lization Strategyof V ietnam , N ihon Hyoronsha (2003).
No FDI in to Vie tnambefore the 1990s
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Our Policy ProposalAttract critical mass of FDI; don’t be selective; remove localization requirementHelp local firms link with FDI’s networkFor protected IS-type industries,
(1) Pre-announce tariff reduction schedule(2) Let market ultimately decide(3) Offer tentative help to eligible firms only
Intensive policy for creating parts industries (before WTO bites)
Contd.Improve business-government dialogueCreate elite team under prime ministerConcrete analyses and proposals for:
--Textile & garment --Electronics--Steel --Motorbike --Software
Many workshops with officials directly in charge
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Tariff Reduction Scenario for Long Products
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Year
Tarif
f Rat
e
Bar and Wire Rod LA
Bar and Wire Rod LB
Billet
Tariff Reduction Scenario for Flat Products (FA)
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Year
Tar
iff Rat
e
Galvanized Sheet FA
Cold Rolled Sheet FA
Hot Rolled Coil FA
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Tariff Reduction Scenario for Flat Products (FB)
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Year
Tarif
f Rat
e
Galvanized Sheet FB
Cold Rolled Sheet FB
Hot Rolled Coil FB
Japan in Sub Saharan Africa
Domestic support for aid to Africa needs to be secured (under severe fiscal crisis)
HIPCs/PRSP/MDGs/aid coordination: too much attention on poverty & modality, less on growth content (now agreed by many)
East Asian emphasis on growth & trade is also valid in Africa, but sectors and goals must be adapted to local reality
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Our Effort to Move the Japanese Government into Action
JICA, JBIC, scholars interested in AfricaOur two goals:(1) Adjust Japan’s aid system to fully participate in new
aid modality (soon!)(2) Launch growth initiative in a small number of
countries (medium to long-term endeavor)--Preliminary selection of candidate sectors & countries started--Offer growth package, not isolated projects--Jointly with Gov, NEPAD, other donors
Selection and Prioritization
Selectivity criteria--Social and political stability--Strong will & solid understanding by leader(ship)--Policy mechanism for consistent design & effective
implementation--Japan’s existing local knowledge & policy capacity
Other Considerations--HIPC completion point (CP) countries?--ODA yen loans can’t be used in HIPCs countries--TICAD3 Conference (Oct. 2003)
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THE END
Photo by Saizou Uchida (location: Sakai-gun, Fukui Prefecture, Japan)