The Transcendental Computer (English)

8/8/2019 The Transcendental Computer (English)

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The Transcendental ComputerA Non-Philosophical Utopia

By

Franois LARUELLE

The unified theory of thought and calculation, unification in-the-last-identity, is atask facing every encyclopedic spirit (Morin, Serres). It is also the theme of thetranscendental computer (TC), of a machine that would have a transcendental link tophilosophy in its entirety, thus capable of thinking-calculating the mixtures of thoughtand calculation according to a unified mode such as a transcendental arithmetic likePlatonism, or any other combination of these terms regnant in philosophy and calculation.In advance, it is necessary to determine a prejudicial question that concerns the degree of non- philosophys automaticity. What follows is, in this sense, an attempt a t the

limitations of the theme of the transcendental computer.

Automaton and Unimaton

If the non-philosophical practice finds its bearings via, or measures itself against,an effect (the unification- or clone-effect), this effect is the type of disalienation possiblefor the statements of the World, de jure representable or philosophizable, since the One-in-person cannot be this bearing, itself being unidentifiable. Already one could object,and one could understand what has just been said as follows, that this non-philosophical

practice is not identifiable as specifically non-philosophic al, its cause being Identity -in-person, which is not identifiable in exteriority as an available criterion since it is lived-in-

immanence. Its cause could also be just as easily the effect of a machine simulating acompletely absent subject, in some way a charitable automatism (automatic operation),and thus, all things considered, it was not necessary to critique philosophy. If a machinein the classic sense of this word can do what non-philosophy does, are not the latter andits theory useless? More exactly this objection is the consequence or the continuation of adivision of non-philosophy liable to give rise to two images: an inert theoretical image of a machine or mechanism composed of objectified parts and an image of practicalfunctioning, the latter given without objectivized, but lived, difference. The objectionsupposes the right to resolve the non-philosophical practice into an inert structure as thephotographer does, who supposes that the photograph must be constructed beforehand,even before she is able to function and in order that she may function. However, if there

is indeed a presupposition to this thought, it is not a structure, a diagram, an intelligiblefigure in a space of transcendence (a structure of this type exists for philosophy itself; it isone of its modes of settlement in itself philosophical), but it is precisely what defies everytranscendence and every inert structure composed of terms and relations, points andvectors, etc. ; it is the Real-in-person.


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According to this objection, only effects would be appreciable as relevant or notto non- philosophys presuppositions of humanhood [ humanit ]. 1 But this objectionconceals its own presupposition, which is to consider a priori the effects themselves asalready being those of an insertable automatism with the latter in a structure, inert effectsalready given in the World (Husserl would have said in the natural attitude) and

recorded. This is to prejudge the nature of Identity-in-person and, based on this viciouscircle, to conclude from the automatic nature and alleged mechanism of these effects theirproducibility by a machine. But nothing occurs in this way in non-philosophical practice,which is not a robot simulating man. It is a contemplative or theoreticist vision, thus anabsolute objectivism materialist or somehow mechanistic a priori that is aphilosophical possibility. Let us examine these effects of non-philosophical practice sincethis is the criterion or the objections subaltern argument.

Of course there are effects (of cloning), but there is nothing automatic about them,and should not be considered dogmatically as inert things. They are, on the material side[ part ] and on the one hand, formed from the inert things of the World yet alreadyenveloped in a horizon of philosophizability or transcendence (which itself includes the

possibility of a subject or what is labeled as such), these two components being mixed.And on the other hand [ part ], from a radical or lived immanence (the Lived -in-person)which excludes being mixed and is not in any way a part of a whole. Yet the mixture andnon-mixture do not mix themselves but, so to speak, wed and embrace one another, jointogether without circular synthesis in an irreversible alliance known as the existing-subject-Stranger or the subject-existing-in-struggle. This subject is the veritable effect,complete in its identity and its (unilateral) duality; it is practice including a material of form-philosophy. Where is the effect of practice intelligible in the subject? In and as thatwhich we have called the phenomenon or the appearing of the practical subject, which isnot the juxtaposition of the two halves but the transformation of one of the sides by theother with which it unites without synthesis. For example, the effects of performedtextual statements, if they are not continuously brought back to Identity-in-person or thecloned, again give rise to thingified [ choisifie ] and inert automatic practice seen from thepoint of view of philosophy alone and then delivered to the division of which we spokeabove. The being-performed of Identity or Man-in-person and its cloned effects,however, is not itself visible or perceptible, yet makes its mark through such effects not

just in the visible and the perceptible of history and the world, as in a receptacle, but ascontiguous with their form-philosophy or world. This form thus transformed gives rise toan appearing that is phenomenal or determined-in-the-last-identity (in-the-last-lived-experience?). It is form-philosophy as given in-One, or even its transcendental identity.

In this form-philosophy is included in particular the subjectivity whosephenomenal appearing in-One is the mater ial of the subjects effect. It is thus excluded inany case that the determined effects, which are of philosophical extraction, can beproduced by an automatic system, at least insofar as the transcendental mechanism of philosophy can itself escape from this automatism and this reduction to a simplemechanism. It is transcendence in general that excludes its reduction to an algorithm.

1 The word Laruelle uses, humanit , is most likely a combination of the words humanit (humanity) andipsit (ipseity), a philosophical combination of individual identity and selfhood. For this reason, I havetranslated Laruelles word as humanhood, the constitutive aspects of the act of identifying oneself as ahuman.


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Now we can obviously pose the problem of transcendences possible degree of automation, which is the transcendental nerve of philosophy. But to the degree that itcontinues although transformed in the subject, it limits the chances of automaticity andformalism.

We can obviously compare the modes of immanence of Man and machine. Or

instead the former supposes a human whose functioning the machine imitates to thenearest point; it is an interiority of consciousness displayed in space. Or instead thismachinic and algorithmic immanence is first, and it is consciousness or our concept of consciousness that imitates the machine. We turn in a vicious circle.

Man-in- person indeed is not a subject in the traditional sense nor a man in theanthropological sense, a general manner of consciousness or being. In one sense thepassivity of Man -in-person does nothing but reinforce the mechanistic aspect, even if we say that it is of pure lived experience. Its automatismic aspect is perhaps anappearance created by the absence or the lack of an active subject, locatable andidentifiable, which makes believe in a machine. Identity-in-person resembles a machinewithout being one; it is the radical immanence that makes us think here of transcendence

and of its void of subjectivity. Radical immanence is also void of subjectivity but not of lived experience, for this is what distinguishes radical immanence from a machine. Herethis is not the machine that simulates a man at the vanishing limit of consciousness, butMan-in-person who simulates a machine or an automatism.

Man, being neither a consciousness nor an unconscious, undoubtedly and in anegative way seems closer to the machine, if not its immanence, and is necessary aspresupposition, as logical and real unmixed necessity. Everything that comes fromphilosophy or supposes it is of the order of the Real, at least as a symptom; that whichcomes from logic and necessity is of the order of identity. We could say that Man-in-person is an-axiomatic or an- hypothetical, in the sense that the privative an - is radicalor expresses that Man is in-Man and not at himself or in himself, and thus foreclosed tophilosophy and all automaticity. Instead of supposing axioms to be true as in logic, wesuppose them to be real or an-axiomatic. Not an axiom of axioms, but a non-axiom or an-axiomatic.

These are unilateral axioms; they are such by one of their sides alone; they arethus not self-referential axioms (non-Gdelismic), although it is not certain that theseexist, except in the forms of language and meta-language, meta-discourse being useful fortalking about the axioms or their constitution. The One-in-One is not the 1 opposite the2/3 of philosophy. It is not describable by a vocabulary of absolute transcendence but byaxioms that give them where its effects are. Still automatism, the One is perceptible onlythrough these effects of discourse or its practice, not in itself, for it is not a thing orintelletual intuition. M. Henry could not stop himself from giving it an identifiablecontent in transcendence. But this is not the algorithmic automatism that is fullyperceptible and given in a finitary and quasi-geometric manner. The scientificautomatism is of transcendence but not philosophical; it thus supposes a meta-language,undoubtedly the complex form of the scientific relation to reality.

Man-in-person is neither an automaton, an auto -nomic, auto- functionalfunctioning, nor a functioning that supposes a multiplicity of causes and effects. If absolutely necessary it is a uni-maton in the occurrence determining a practice ( uni-maton signifies that the -maton aspect is ordered with respect to the identity aspect or


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determined-in- One). The term immanence is ultimately misleading like the others,leading philosophers to believe in a thing, whereas it is here as remainder nothing but anattribute which disappears in an axiom which makes use of it, a term designating the Realthrough objective appearance. Non-philosophical practice is a uni-maton in the sense thatit is a unified first term and not a unitary syntagm. However, this can only be the

condition of knowledge, at best an automatism of a philosophizable nature. The latterwills itself in auto - mode (that which is never all made true). The auto - supposes anactive-passive immanence, a transcendence, a unified system of multiple pieces, at leasttwo and ultimately 2/3.

In any case we must begin by distinguishing between the two forms of automatism, the philosophical and the logical, and a minimal form that is insteadunimatic. The logical admits a metalanguage, the philosophical, rather, admits ahermeneutics; the unimatic bans metalanguage and hermeneutics or operates their unifiedtheory. In all three cases it is a matter of speaking about a discipline, philosophy, or logic. These latter two resolve the problem by speaking of one another with their ownlanguage, which allows them also, obviously, to speak of themselves respectively.

Since the duality of logical metalanguage is opposed to philosophical mixture,non-philosophy is perhaps that which unifies these two practices, the transcendental andthe metalinguistic, two types of duality, or even that which I have always called thephilosophical posture and the scientific posture. If these would be the three grand styles,is perhaps the word style the most suitable? That which I call axiom is neither ametalanguage for philosoph y and its own axioms nor a philosophical hermeneuticwhere something transcendental is conserved, even if the axioms hold for themetalanguage and for the interpretation of philosophic postulates. The an-axiomatic ornon-axiomatic Real prevents axioms from sinking into Being, Nothingness, the Multiple,ontology, or into the finitary-intuitive space of logic and symbolizing with ideality. Itdeprives them of their sufficiency.

Indeed, final review on the problem which simulates which? requires seeing thatthis simulation exists for a philosopher, not for human Identity itself which knows itself separate from the machine like the rest. It would obviously be necessary to review theconcept of simulation in all its uses and perhaps review the meaning of this obsessionwith the machine. Ultimately is not the machine in-philosophy or philosophized thatphantasms a simulation of the machine through Identity-in-person, that of which wespeak? Would there be a narcissism of the philosophized machine that would throw back the functioning of the simulation onto Man-in-person? Watch as if I were beautiful andfascinating

Once reduced to the state of symptom, form-philosophy does not become a puremachine. In this case it is Man-in-person who would reduce this form to the state of automatism, while in addition it and its practice would arise from the uni-maton. Non-philosophy or the unimaton would make use of philosophy by reducing it as automaton ina truly special sense, but whence would the impression come that non-philosophy doesthings that a machine could do?

The thesis of the possibility of a transcendental computer (TC) could be sustainedunder two distinct forms:


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- under a strictly machinic and technological form of AI (artificial intelligence),immediately supposed realizable in the near technological future, with no other difficultythan that of the current age,

- under a non-philosophical form for which a TC is a plausible but indirect Idea,which supposes a detour out of the machine. This bridge between the machine and the

transcendental is the theory of thought and calculation unified-in-the-last-instance , beingunderstood that the conditions of the machine are necessary but insufficient, thus that amachine alone cannot be a TC but that for the latter Man is necessary (not asconsciousness, which eliminates a part of the classical discussions between philosophersand information theorists of AI, for we no longer oppose the thought in calculation in acomplete fashion).

Solution 1 would realize the same performances as the TC of solution 2. Thisimplies that it would suppose that its machine attains the same effects as Real structure +determination-in-the-last-instance. Can a machine imitate immanence and above all DLI(determination-in-the-last-instance)? It is at least doubtful. If we refuse to make thispostulation (the effects similar to those produced by DLI necessarily supposing this

postulation, which can merely be simulated only to the point of being mistaken for DLI),we are, however, obliged to suppose or to give ourselves 1/3 of synthesis betweenmachine and philosophy, which is the concept of performance (the same

performances).It is necessary to turn the discussion towards the all-purpose concept of

performance that permits in general for AI to claim to be equivalent to theperformances of intelligence and even thought (for we still do not distinguish betweenthe two yet). Performance is measurable and utilized or supposed as an identificationcriterion of the calculation in thought and conversely of the reduction of the former to thelatter. However the psychological situation is still more complex, the machine not attaining the same performances as human intelligence except on condition of surpassing them or secretly hoping to surpass them. If not, what is the point (withoutsupposing that it is intelligence itself that still wants to surpass itself by creating themachines mirror in which it can see itself triumphing over itself)?

The notion of performance is a presupposition that e ncroaches on intelligencessense and on that of which it is capable. It is a notion of technological and quantitativemeasure but supposedly equivalent to intelligence. It supposes between the departure andthe target an identity of effects or ends and undoubtedly a homogeneity of syntax andsemantics, an algorithmic transparence. This is to say that it is worth nothing tophilosophy (as much a failure as a success, and the failure here is not necessarily theopposite of success), in which such a transparency does not exist, philosophy reciprocallydetermining dualities, for example its syntaxes and its materials. Here it is necessary todistinguish intelligence and philosophy. Cognition is a priori parceled into systemsmore or less closed and isolated, which can in effect be measured in terms of performance. AI prejudges intelligence by setting for it limits or goals determined andfinite in the measurable sense in order to compare it to the machine. The situation is quitedifferent with philosophy. We could with the same rigor define intelligence by the type of performance it can simulate, a machine either in its functioning or in its effects. Butphilosophy cannot be thus reduced a priori, parceled into functions or into effects andprejudged. Why? Philosophy makes use of intelligence or cognition, but on behalf of a


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constant that traverses every occidental thought, where the numerical regularlypromulgates its victory and the continuous its survival. In their generality these areimaginary transcendentals or apparently inseparable paradigms (Bachelard), as if thought were condemned to follow a double path or to struggle on two fronts. These aregood reasons for maintaining the originality of philosophy, at least of its essence. Non-

philosophy is among other things a manner of recording this survival without claiming tosee one of the parts crush the other but by relating each one to an instance that is neitherthe continuous (dominant in philosophy) nor the discontinuous (dominant in science).

The contradictory argumentation of AI and the advocates of Consciousness isalways wearisome and the same. The first states that it has already realized such aperformance and therefore that it will realize others still more important in the field of thought. It is animated by a philosophical claim but advances under the guise of science.The second always responds through a final domain where it takes refuge in its masteryand defies AI to access it. But this is always an object or a domain of philosophy, not thelatter in its essence. I will consider that this conquest and this self-defense both have apositivity and a validity, that they not only have the same sense through their reciprocal

opposition, and that the latter justifiably testifies to their common claim, their will of theabsolute which it divides . I propose to call this conflict the antithetical of cognition or of thought-calculation , a restrained antithetical under the form Consciousness/Cognition,and generalized or extended under the Philosophy (rather than thought)/Calculation form.We shall posit that non-philosophy is an attempt to give a (non- Kantian) solution tothis conflict, i.e. in order to exit it or more precisely to show how and under whatconditions thought can never have entered it.

As for the program/execution distinction (and, on this model, theory/practice),this is a duality of another nature, internal to computer engineering. In a sense everyduality of this kind is always usable to characterize non-philosophy, which functions withsuch dualities, but on condition of previously interpreting it in a philosophical rather thanunilaterally machinic sense, of deploying its potential horizon of philosophical sense.Non- philosophy only denies over -human or ultra -human pretensions, but it is apragmatic that can make good use of all dualities. If we do not pass through thispreliminary preparation phase of the material, we reduce inversely philosophy and non-philosophy to inert sets and we forget what truly constitutes life (perhaps hallucinatory

but philosophys life all the same) to know auto-position without speaking of that of non-philosophy, the vision-in-One. A person might endeavor to resolve the TC in apurely machinic manner if he begins by reducing or restraining the extension of theproblem and its givens in the program/execution couple. Transcendental life and still lessreal lived experience are not reducible to algorithmic repetitions but can make use of them (always unilaterality).

A performance fundamentally consists in simulating either the functioning ormore simply the eff ects (the same effects, but a last simulation conceals itself in thisnotion), by completing as well as succeeding in an already defined or fixed task, free tosurpass it. But who has completed the task or determined the goal to be attained and whohas already realized it in a certain way? This question does not have meaning fornumerical representation but has a fundamental meaning for philosophy, which realizesor effectuates things for the first time, which is first philosophy or radicalcommencement . Even if it is a pretension there, it is that of the meaning of philosophy


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and its life, even of its functioning, undoubtedly a repetition but second or in relation toitself, an auto-repetition, thus finally first. Philosophy is first; engineered calculation orthe machinic use of calculation (I am not speaking of arithmetic but of its usage in AI, ausage which should already attract the attention to the extent that philosophizablevirtuality exists in this notion) imitates or stimulates something other than itself.

Philosophy is not a performance, neither a simple machine notwithstanding the desiringmachines, nor even a behavior despite the Verhalten of Heideggerian Dasein , whichare intra-philosophical interpretations impregnated with metaphor, thus inseparable fromlanguage.

If philosophy is not reduced to Consciousness and to its performances, andshows itself all the more irreducible to a machine using calculation, non-philosophyradicalizes this irreducibility. As Lived-experience-without-life radicalizes Life (a regulartranscendental theme of philosophy), the Performed-without-performation (and without-performance to a greater degree), radicalizes the concepts of performativity andperformance. It is the symbol or the first name (already an axiom) that permits the veryvisible critique of sufficiency that impregnates the notion of performance, but without

simply denying or entering into conflict with it.

Which Simulates Which, Non-philosophy or Machine?

It is undoubtedly this refusal of the Consciousness antithetical/AI that gives theimpression that non- philosophy is better prepared than philosophy to bind amicable(Heidegger) relations with calculation and more generally every form of automaticity. Itcan appear as an attempt to save philosophy against or from its traditional adversaries,but it is there only a consequence and the attempt at the solution of the antithetical is aneffect, not a cause or a motive of non-philosophy. The resistance that critiques non-philosophy in philosophy quite exceeds that of philosophy in cognitivism. But it mustalso give itself the most enlarged concept of philosophy in order to grasp the force andthe resistance, perhaps the source, of the continuous or the analogical. Let us attempt touncover the reason behind this largest proximity and what makes us avoid believing in anapparently possible computing reduction of non-philosophy.

The Performed does not define itself by the saying-doing couple in the style of linguistic performativity, but as that which determines in-the-last-identity the mixture of performation and the performed. This type of Real seems in the first manner to requireridding ourselves of philosophy so that it only rids ourselves at best of Consciousness,and thus be able to simulate the machine or simply the Unconscious. We do not sayeasily that philosophy simulates the machine, but we are more easily tempted to say it of non-philosophy. It is that the Performed or Man-in-person seems to be a moot point, anontological or even formal void, or a blank screen. Hence the impression that non-philosophy is an automatism and above all a machine. But nothingness or even the voidcan be defined ontologically, by the Performed. Non-consistency is capital; it is no moreNothingness than Being but determines their mixture; it is non-nothingness, the (non-)One such that it applies itself equally to non-being, i.e. to nothingness. That it is anegative condition or sine qua non does not make it a positive essence (= that withoutwhich); it is a non-essence, a non-(that without which), which determines thus in this


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way, but as a negative condition, necessary but without anything to bring about a positivepredicate in the material and in its positivity. The cause is positively or philosophicallyabsent, but in order to withdraw from it this positivity, not to relegate it to nothingness. Itis absent as activity and passivity, insofar as they are mixed . Can we speak of a negativeacting? No more than of a positive acting. Even the positive and the negative couple are

not satisfactory if we claim to create them from a usage of predicate and apophanticdefinition. This negative trait is thus not itself anything positive in general but ispositive, if we may say, in its kind. Of the real cause, thus, we can say that, it either actsor does not act (neither is their synthesis or their at the time, cf. Derrida) it is its non-consistency determining in every way the mixture of the acting and the non- acting. Todetermine is to put forward or to imprint negatively, in philosophy and under anypositive material condition, real identity. It appears to me that this way of thinking, whichundoubtedly can seem to bring together by its apparent dogmatism non-philosophy and acertain scientific argumentation, is foreign both to philosophy and to science.

This effect explicitly extends itself to this way of thinking in the subject-Stranger.The clone, i.e. the transcendental phenomenon, is structured like the One (of) philosophy,

being as uni-lateral Identity. This structure renders the clone foreign to philosophy at theoutset in a self that is constructed at least on two basic sides. The One itself does not havesides, contrary to what M. Henry, who makes it a transcendental Ego, posits; theIdentity-clone has a single side, philosophy in itself possess it or thinks itself as 2/3. Thetrait of stranger-hood [ trangret ] no longer has anything to do with an otherness or atranscendence simply opposed to philosophy. There is a transcendence of two sides,necessarily in order that there be a certain efficacy or that the clone stand out clearly onand in the transcendence of the World. But the two transcendences (which obviouslycontain correlative immanence) are heterogeneous structures, the philosophical in itself isbi-facial, the cloned uni-facial. A machine is always bi- facial in each of its parts andeffects, and hence multi-facial. The machine tends towards autonomy and wants to think itself as philosophy does, making a success of its tour de force ; it pushes autonomy as faraway as possible and stumbles on the manufacturer agent of the machine, but gets nearerto non-philosophy in so far as it has a presupposition. The idealistic argument accordingto which machines can build other machines does not, despite appearances, forget that afirst constructor, an anthropomorphic inventor of the first machine, is necessary, but itcan always hope to reduce it in turn to a component inseparable from a continuous man -machine system, obviously at the ri sk of inciting protests from the rival party of Consciousness. On the other hand, it forgets something else, that the man -machinesystems tend toward the auto-dissolution of all their internal distinctions and towardinherent nihilism, and that if this phenomenon is only underlying, it is because thereexists an instance capable of re-determining them and re-launching them, so to speak. Itis necessary to distinguish an absolute commencement, relative-absolute of the man-machine circuit and which disappears in the system and a radical commencement, a firsttechno-logy or a non-technology, a human subject in-the-last-identity but existingaccording to variables which are technical discoveries: therefore, a human subjectivitybut co-determined by the forms and the style of various technologies. This argument isapparently too simple and formal, but here there is also an antithetical of technologybetween those who wish for a first anthropological commencement of the tool-circuit, ahuman agent, and those who, like Leibniz, infinitely prolong the circuit up to a God-


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machine or a universe-machine. Non-philosophy resolves this antithetical between theconstructive man of consciousness and the machine of machines, by suggesting that itsmeaning is purely apparent, indeed hallucinatory, and by relating it unilaterally to Man-without-machine, who determines a thought-machine as a clone of the techno-logicalmixture. In other words, the hypotheses on the origin and specific power of the machine

rest upon the metaphysical order, and thus their solution is not within our scope.

Against Theoreticism

Theoreticism is not to be confused with the program, which is non-philosophysupposedly completed or in a stable state, the material of non-philosophy. What we put inthe program is variable provided that it has the variance-and-invariance of philosophy.The rules and procedure of unilateral duality are fixed once the material itself is givenand fixed, since it intervenes in the formulation of rules (which always have a concreteaspect). Under this condition of material fixedness, non-philosophy is indeed a machineor regularly transforms a given material into a given product, and as a result can seem

like a program that simply awaits its execution. It is even a human machine or lived anddetermined in-the-last-instance by Man. Yet there is then something bizarre, close toscience-fiction in this concept, as if a machine in good and due form, imposed on atechnological circuit, has been transplanted not onto a Consciousness but onto Man-in-person. Non-philosophy is no longer this monster obtained by the synthesis of technologyand the Real. Not to mention that the once and for all material fixation is a return to aphilosophical gesture that equally fixes in turn and thus renders the Real transcendent. Allis lost, but this would be a joke of science- fiction, radical in some way.

As a matter of fact, the material varies, and with it the rules of the unilateralduality in their formulation, only if a transcendental indifference and equivalence of thematerials are posited, which suppose a radical immanent Real. When transcendence is theunique principle, the contingency of the material disappears and the process becomesmotionless in a new circle, in the argument or the philosophical doctrine. It is necessaryto set against the once and for all of philosophy (cf. Deleuze) the one time each timeof non- philosophy and its special performativity. It is lived experience or the Real in itsradical identity that one time each time determines (without creating) the material (and itsinvariable form) and from it clones a subject. Thus the most singular identity now issaid of totality or wholes, therefore also of invariant phenomena (because it is of them),rendering them foreign to the philosophical and technological economy. Non-philosophyis a machine necessarily specified or even singularized (identified) as machine by whathere enters information, which, necessitated , comes to it in fact from its negativecause. Unilateral duality is indeed an invariant structure, but we must distinguish in thisformulation between the effect of invariance that proceeds from the surreptitious orimperceptible fixation of a philosophical vocabulary with its horizon of potentiality (aninvariance-artifact), and a more profound invariance that reduces itself in-the-last-instance to the identity-in-identity of the cause. As if (it is an effect or an objectiveappearance) the invariance of non-philosophy vanished here, became elusive, and wereno longer even identifiable and recognizable than through the invariance of form-

philosophy and its content of terms or its semantics.


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The Transcendental Computer (English)

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