The Tor Project - DEF CON CON 25/DEF CON 25... · Alice1 Alice3 Irrelevant Relay E (B o b 3, “ X...

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1 The Tor Project Our mission is to be the global resource for technology, advocacy, research and education in the ongoing pursuit of freedom of speech, privacy rights online, and censorship circumvention.

Transcript of The Tor Project - DEF CON CON 25/DEF CON 25... · Alice1 Alice3 Irrelevant Relay E (B o b 3, “ X...

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The Tor Project

Our mission is to be the global resource for

technology, advocacy, research and

education in the ongoing pursuit of freedom

of speech, privacy rights online, and

censorship circumvention.

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● Online Anonymity– Open Source– Open Network

● Community of researchers, developers, users and relay operators.

● U.S. 501(c)(3) non-pro%t organization

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Estimated 2,000,000+ daily Tor users

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Threat model:what can the attacker do?

Alice

Anonymity network Bob

watch (or be!) Bob!

watch Alice!

Control part of the network!

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Anonymity isn't encryption: Encryption just protects contents.

Alice

Bob

“Hi, Bob!”“Hi, Bob!” <gibberish>

attacker

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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.

Anonymity

Private citizens“It's privacy!”

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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.

Anonymity

Private citizens

Businesses

“It's network security!”

“It's privacy!”

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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.

Anonymity

Private citizens

Governments Businesses

“It's traffic-analysisresistance!”

“It's network security!”

“It's privacy!”

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Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups.

Anonymity

Private citizens

Governments Businesses

“It's traffic-analysisresistance!”

“It's network security!”

“It's privacy!”

Human rightsactivists

“It's reachability!”

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The simplest designs use a single relay to hide connections.

Bob2

Bob1

Bob3

Alice2

Alice1

Alice3

Relay

E(Bob3,“X”)

E(Bob1, “Y”)

E(Bob2, “Z”)

“Y”

“Z”

“X”

(example: some commercial proxy providers)

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But a central relay isa single point of failure.

Bob2

Bob1

Bob3

Alice2

Alice1

Alice3

EvilRelay

E(Bob3,“X”)

E(Bob1, “Y”)

E(Bob2, “Z”)

“Y”

“Z”

“X”

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... or a single point of bypass.

Bob2

Bob1

Bob3

Alice2

Alice1

Alice3

IrrelevantRelay

E(Bob3,“X”)

E(Bob1, “Y”)

E(Bob2, “Z”)

“Y”

“Z”

“X”

Timing analysis bridges all connections through relay ⇒ An attractive fat target

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Tor's safety comes from diversity

● #1: Diversity of relays. The more relays we have and the more diverse they are, the fewer attackers are in a position to do traffic confirmation. (Research problem: measuring diversity over time)

● #2: Diversity of users and reasons to use it. 50000 users in Iran means almost all of them are normal citizens.

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Transparency for Tor is key

● Open source / free software● Public design documents and

specifications● Publicly identified developers● Not a contradiction:

privacy is about choice!

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But what about bad people?

● Remember the millions of daily users.● Still a two-edged sword?● Good people need Tor much more

than bad guys need it.

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Myth #1

● “I heard the Navy wrote Tor originally, so how can I trust it?”

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Myth #2

● “I heard the NSA runs half the relays.”

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Myth #3

● “I heard Tor is slow.”

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Myth #4

● “I heard Tor gets most of its money from the US government.”

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Myth #5

● “I heard 80% of Tor is bad people.”

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Myth #6

● “I shouldn't use Tor, because if I do the NSA will watch me.”

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Myth #7

● “I heard Tor is broken.”

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Onion Service

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Onion service properties

● Self authenticated● End-to-end encrypted● Built-in NAT punching● Limit surface area● No need to “exit” from Tor

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q

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SecureDrop

https://securedrop.org/directory

Today, 30+ organizations use SecureDrop

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Ricochet

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OnionShare

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Services and Tools

https://help.riseup.net/en/tor#riseups-tor-hidden-services

All Riseup.net services are available using hidden service

... and many others

Package repository

apt-get install apt-tor-transport

http://vwakviie2ienjx6t.onion/

...

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Anonymous updates are awesome

● Evil package repository can't target you with a bad update, because they don't know it's you

● Local observer can't learn what you're updating, so they can't target you for being out of date

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HS Directory

Hashring

HSDirn

Desc IDrep0

Desc IDrep1

HSDirn+1

HSDirn+2

HSDirn

HSDirn+1

HSDirn+2

Desc ID = H(onion-address | H(time-period | descriptor-cookie | replica))

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#1: Old onion keys are weak

● “The first 80 bits of the SHA-1 of the 1024-bit RSA key” :(

● The new system uses ED25519 (i.e. much stronger ECC keys)

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New keys => longer onion addresses

nzh3fv6jc6jskki3.onion

From 16 characters:

... to 52 characters:

a1uik0w1gmfq3i5ievxdm9ceu27e88g6o7pe0r,dw9jmntwkdsd.onion

(ed25519 public key base32 encoded)

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The HSDir relays are too predictable

● The six daily HSDirs for a given onion address are predictable into the future

● So a bad guy can run six relays with just the right keys to target a specific future day...to censor or to measure popularity

● People – we don't know who – were doing this attack in practice

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#2: Global shared random value

● The solution: make the HSDir mapping include a communal random value that everybody agrees about but that nobody can predict

● The directory authorities pick this value each day as part of their consensus voting process

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HSDirs get to learn onion addresses

● The onion service descriptor (which gets uploaded to the HSDir) includes the public key for the service (so everybody can check the signature)

● So you can run relays and discover otherwise-unpublished onion addresses

● “Threat intelligence” companies have been trying to do just that

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#3: New crypto hides the address

● The solution: the new cryptosystem has a cool feature where you can sign the onion descriptor with a subkey

● So everybody can check the signature but nobody can learn the main key from the subkey or signature

● Should finally kill the arms race with jerks running relays to gather onions

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#4: Rendezvous Single Onion Services

Rendezvous Point

Proposal 260

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OnionBalancehttps://onionbalance.readthedocs.org

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#5: Guard discovery is a big deal

● Your Tor client uses a single relay (called a Guard) for the first hop in all your paths, to limit exposed surface area

● But there are relatively easy attacks to learn a user's guard, and for onion services that can be especially bad

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Vanguards (Tor proposal 271)

● Multiple layers of guards protect better against Sybil+compromise attacks

● Path selection is still a huge open research area

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Deployment timeline

● HSDir side: deployed in Tor 0.3.0

● Relay side: deployed in Tor 0.3.0

● Client side: upcoming in Tor 0.3.2

● Service side: upcoming in Tor 0.3.2

Try it at % git clone https://git.torproject.org/arma/tor.git % git checkout dc25

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Tor isn't foolproof

● Opsec mistakes

● Browser metadata fingerprints

● Browser exploits

● Traffic analysis

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How can you help?

● Run a relay (or a bridge)

● Teach your friends about Tor, and privacy in general

● Help find -- and fix – bugs

● Work on open research problems (petsymposium.org)

● donate.torproject.org

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“Still the King of high secure,low latency Internet Anonymity”

“There are no contenders for the throne”


WEAPONIZING THE BBC MICRO:BIT - DEF CON CON 25/DEF CON 25...SPI bus I2C bus 20 GPIO 3V powered (2 x AAA) ... READ EVALUATE PRINT LOOP $ minicom -D /dev/ttyACM0 -b 115200 MicroPython

WEAPONIZING THE BBC MICRO:BIT - DEF CON CON 25/DEF CON 25...SPI bus I2C bus 20 GPIO 3V powered (2 x AAA) ... READ EVALUATE PRINT LOOP $ minicom -D /dev/ttyACM0 -b 115200 MicroPython

Network Protocol Reverse Engineering - DEF CON CON 24/DEF CON 24...Katea Murray –murrayka@leidos.com 2016-08-05 Estell/Murray Eavesdropping on the Machines 28. Title: DEF CON 24

Network Protocol Reverse Engineering - DEF CON CON 24/DEF CON 24...Katea Murray –[email protected] 2016-08-05 Estell/Murray Eavesdropping on the Machines 28. Title: DEF CON 24

SCADA - DEF CON

SCADA - DEF CON

HACKING HOTEL KEYS - DEF CON CON 24/DEF CON 24 presentations/DEF… · HACKING HOTEL KEYS Security Consultant ... Researcher. 9About 11 years pen-testing, Security Research, ... 912

HACKING HOTEL KEYS - DEF CON CON 24/DEF CON 24 presentations/DEF… · HACKING HOTEL KEYS Security Consultant ... Researcher. 9About 11 years pen-testing, Security Research, ... 912

How to secure the keyboard chain - DEF CON CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF… · How to secure the keyboard chain DEF CON 23 Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest c

How to secure the keyboard chain - DEF CON CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF… · How to secure the keyboard chain DEF CON 23 Paul Amicelli - Baptiste David - CVO Esiea-Ouest c

802.11 Massive Monitoring - Paper Conf/Defcon/2015/DEFCON … · managed by a Python framework ... DEF CON 23 Presentation ... Subject: DEF CON 23 Presentation Keywords: DEF CON Conference,

802.11 Massive Monitoring - Paper Conf/Defcon/2015/DEFCON … · managed by a Python framework ... DEF CON 23 Presentation ... Subject: DEF CON 23 Presentation Keywords: DEF CON Conference,

Eric Sesterhenn 2018 CON 26/DEF CON 26 presentations/DEFCON-26... · DEF CON 26 Hacking Conference Author DEF CON Speaker Subject DEF CON 26 Presentation

Eric Sesterhenn 2018 CON 26/DEF CON 26 presentations/DEFCON-26... · DEF CON 26 Hacking Conference Author DEF CON Speaker Subject DEF CON 26 Presentation

You’re Just Complaining Because You’re Guilty CON/DEF CON 26/DEF CON 26...You’re Just Complaining Because You’re Guilty: A DEF CON Guide to Adversarial Testing of Software

You’re Just Complaining Because You’re Guilty CON/DEF CON 26/DEF CON 26...You’re Just Complaining Because You’re Guilty: A DEF CON Guide to Adversarial Testing of Software

WhyMI so Sexy? WMI Attacks, Real-Time Defense, … CON 23/DEF CON 23...Title DEF CON 23 Presentation Author DEF CON 23 Speaker Subject DEF CON 23 Presentation Keywords

WhyMI so Sexy? WMI Attacks, Real-Time Defense, … CON 23/DEF CON 23...Title DEF CON 23 Presentation Author DEF CON 23 Speaker Subject DEF CON 23 Presentation Keywords

Crypto for Hackers - DEF CON CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · Crypto for Hackers Eijah v1.00 August 7th, 2015 “Shall we play a game? ...

Crypto for Hackers - DEF CON CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF CON 23... · Crypto for Hackers Eijah v1.00 August 7th, 2015 “Shall we play a game? ...

DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23... · DEF CON 23 Presentation Keywords: DEF CON Conference, DEF CON, DEFCON, Speeches, Hacking, Hackers, Hacker Conference, Computer Security,

DEF CON 23 Presentation CON 23/DEF CON 23... · DEF CON 23 Presentation Keywords: DEF CON Conference, DEF CON, DEFCON, Speeches, Hacking, Hackers, Hacker Conference, Computer Security,

DEF CON 23 Presentation

DEF CON 23 Presentation

Hacking MANET - Def Con

Hacking MANET - Def Con

DEF CON 26 Hacking Conference CON 26/DEF CON 26...Find us on Twitter: @michaelossmann / @dominicgs Title DEF CON 26 Hacking Conference Author DEF CON Speaker Subject DEF CON 26 Presentation

DEF CON 26 Hacking Conference CON 26/DEF CON 26...Find us on Twitter: @michaelossmann / @dominicgs Title DEF CON 26 Hacking Conference Author DEF CON Speaker Subject DEF CON 26 Presentation

Cracking Cryptocurrency Brainwallets - DEF CON CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF… · Cracking Cryptocurrency Brainwallets Ryan Castellucci ... pass a file with pubkeyhashs, ...

Cracking Cryptocurrency Brainwallets - DEF CON CON 23/DEF CON 23 presentations/DEF… · Cracking Cryptocurrency Brainwallets Ryan Castellucci ... pass a file with pubkeyhashs, ...

DEF CON 26 Hacking Conference - DEF CON Media Server CON 26/DEF CON 26 presentations/DEF… · started in late 2017 to prepare for the 2018 CCDC season. We ended up using the BETA

DEF CON 26 Hacking Conference - DEF CON Media Server CON 26/DEF CON 26 presentations/DEF… · started in late 2017 to prepare for the 2018 CCDC season. We ended up using the BETA

Hacking travel routers like it’s 1999 - DEF CON Media Server CON 25/DEF CON 25 presentations/DEF… · Hacking travel routers like it’s 1999 Mikhail Sosonkin. Mikhail Sosonkin

Hacking travel routers like it’s 1999 - DEF CON Media Server CON 25/DEF CON 25 presentations/DEF… · Hacking travel routers like it’s 1999 Mikhail Sosonkin. Mikhail Sosonkin

Keren Elazari aka @K3r3n3 - DEF CON Media Server CON 22/DEF CON 22...Empowering Hackers to Create a Positive Impact, Keren Elazari, DEFCON, DEF CON, Hacker, Security Conference, Presentations,

Keren Elazari aka @K3r3n3 - DEF CON Media Server CON 22/DEF CON 22...Empowering Hackers to Create a Positive Impact, Keren Elazari, DEFCON, DEF CON, Hacker, Security Conference, Presentations,

DEF CON 24 Hacking Conference - Ruxcon · Title: DEF CON 24 Hacking Conference Author: DEF CON 24 Speaker Keywords

DEF CON 24 Hacking Conference - Ruxcon · Title: DEF CON 24 Hacking Conference Author: DEF CON 24 Speaker Keywords

DEF CON 25 Hacker Conference - DefCon Media Server CON 25/DEF CON 25 presentations/DEF… · functionality = self.checklist["Functionality"] ... Manually add ancillary data (pentest/other

DEF CON 25 Hacker Conference - DefCon Media Server CON 25/DEF CON 25 presentations/DEF… · functionality = self.checklist["Functionality"] ... Manually add ancillary data (pentest/other