The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: The ...
The Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa...
Transcript of The Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa...
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The Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa (GABAC) is a specialised body of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) whose missions include :
• Combatingmoneylaunderingandtheproceedsofcrime;• ImplementingappropriatemeasuresinasmoothandconcertedfashiontosupporttheseeffortswithintheCEMAC;• Assessingtheimpactandeffectivenessofthemeasuresadopted;• Assistingmemberstateswiththeiranti-moneylaunderingpolicy;• WorkingwithexistingAfricanandinternationalorganisations.
GABAC has been an associate member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) sinceOctober2015.
©2017GABAC.AllrightsreservedThisdocumentmaynotbereproducedortranslatedwithoutexpresspermissionfromGABAC.
GROUPE D’ACTION CONTRE LE BLANCHIMENT D’ARGENT EN AFRIQUE CENTRALE
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entsContents
Executivesummary………………………………………………………………………Introduction………………………………………………………………………………Chapter I:Context…………………………………………...…………………………I.1.Generalcontext…………………………………………………………...…………I.2.Specificcontext……………………………………………………….......…………
Chapter II :Discussion……………………………...….........…………………………II.1.Objectives……………………………………...……………………………………II.1.1.Generalobjective………………………………………...………………………II.1.2.Specificobjectives………………………………...……………………….....……II.1.3.Méthodology………………………………………………………………………II.1.3.1.Collectingandprocessingphenomenologicaldata…………...............…………II.1.3.2.Collectingandprocessingdataonthefinancingofterrorism…...................……
Chapter III:Reviewofliterature………..…………….…………………...……………
Chapter IV:Cross-borderconnections,theregionalisationofterrorismandopportunitiesforendogenousfinancingintheLakeChadBasin………….............................…..………IV.1.Arelativelyhomogenoussocio-culturalareapromotingtheestablishmentofcross-bordernetworks………………….............……………………IV.2.Fromsmugglerstoterrorists,knowledgeoftheterrainandtrafficcapitalisedbyBokoHaram…………………………………………IV.3.Thelureofprofitforyoungpeoplepersistinginresourcefulnessandsocialpressure…………………………………………………………………………
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Chapter V :Analysisoftypologiesandredflags………………...........……………………V.1.Typologies………………………………………………………………………………Typology 1:Misuseofnon-profitorganisations…...….................................………………Typology 2 :Misuseofmoneytransferagencies……................................…………………Typology 3:Misuseoffinancialestablishments…………...………….....................………Typology 4:Illicittrafficking……………..……………...…………………………………Typology 5:Financingbyeconomicoperators……………..........................………………Typology 6:Collectingandremittingfunds………………..………………………………Typology 7:Extortion……………...….................…………………………………………Typology 8:Financingbypoliticallyexposedpersons…….…….........................…………Typology 9:Kidnappingwithdemandsforransom……….........…..………………………Typology 10:Ambushesandlooting………………...………...……………………………Typology 11 :Crimeinvolvingwildlife…….…………………………...…..………………V.2.Riskindicatorsandredflags……………………………................……………………V.2.1.Riskindicatorsofterrorismfinancing………………..................…….............………V.2.2.Riskindicatorsofterrorismandredflagexpansion………………......................……
Conclusionetrecommendations………………………………………………….…………Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………...………Recommendations……………………………………………...……………………………Indicativebibliography…………………………....................………………………………
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Since independenceof the countries therein,CentralAfricahasbeenoneof themostunstablesub-regionsofthecontinent.However,despitethepresenceoftheLordResistanceArmy (LRA) in the east of theCAR since 2008, the countriesremainedrelativelylittleaffectedbythecurrentnotionofterrorism.ThissituationhaschangedsincetheirruptionofBokoHaramonthestrategicsceneoftheLakeChadBasin.DeadlyattacksbyBokoHaram,whichwaslistedasaterroristorganisationin2014,directlyconcernCameroonandChad,withapotentialriskofinfiltrationintotheCAR.Hencethistypologyexercise,extendedtoananalysisofthecontext,tobet-terdevelopanunderstandingfirstlyoftheextensionofterroristactivityinCentralAfricaandsecondlythemechanismsforfinancingterrorism.Thedatausedtoachievethisendshowsthatthephenomenonneedstobeanalysedfromaholistic,cross-borderperspective.Asub-regionalapproachisthereforere-quired,atthelevelofthecountriesconcerned,bothfortheintelligenceofthefoun-dations,players,actionsandincidencesofterrorismandforidentifyingtherisks,trendsandmethodsoffinancing.Local,mainlycross-border,socialandeconomicmodels, togetherwith the socio-political context, provide terrorist organisationswiththemeansfornetworking,recruitmentandself-sufficiency.Ithasemergedthatthemostseriouscurrentterrorist threatinthesub-regionco-mesfromthereligiousextremismdistilledbyBokoHaram, takingadvantageofthesocio-economicproblemsfacingyoungpeopleandbackwardnessintermsofschoolingandprofessionaltraining,especiallyinborderareas.BokoHaramhastakenadvantageoftheporosityofborders,knowledgeoftheter-rainandexistingsocial,culturalandeconomicinteractionstorecruitfromsocialcategoriesthatarereceptivetoitsreligiousdiscourseandtheperspectiveofeasygainsofferedbytheprofitabilityofthedisorderthatithasjustcreated.Ithasalsoemergedthatothercategoriesofoperatorshaveseenanopportunityforbusiness,especiallythroughhostagesandvarioussuppliesprovidedfortheterroristorgani-sationinexchangeforenticingpayments.TheLRA,foritspart,isbenefitingfromthelonginstabilityinthecontactzonesbetweenCentralAfricaandEastAfrica to transmigrate to thebordersofStates,carryingoutincursionsintotheCAR.Littleinformationishoweveravailableonitsactualmechanismsoffinancing.Asregardsthefinancingofterrorism,itisclearthatalthoughterroristorganisationsreceiveexternalfunding,theymainlyproducetheirownresources.Otherforeign
summaryExecutive
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terroristgroupsraisefundsinthesub-region.EleventypologiesofconfirmedfinancingofterrorisminCentralAfricahavebeenidentified,namelymisuseofnon-profitorganisations;misuseofnewmethodsofpayment;misuseofmoneytransferagencies;illicittrafficking;financingbyecono-micoperators;theraisingandremittanceofmoney;extortion;financingbypoliti-callyexposedpersons;kidnappingwithdemandsforransom;ambushesandlootingandcrimeinvolvingwildlife.Otherpotentialsourcesoffinancinghavealsobeenidentified.Theseincludeinformalmanualmoneyexchange,thetraffickingofagri-culturalproductsandthetraffickingofgems.Themoneyraisedpassesthrougharangeofchannels,includingphysicaltransportand remittance as already practised by economic operators trading outside of the region;transferbyelectronicmeansandtheprovisionofgoodsinsteadofcash.Betweennorth-easternNigeria,theextremenorthofCameroonandwesternChad,the ways in which funds are raised and circulated rely on trading agents and cir-cuits, inparticularcross-bordersmuggling.BokoHaramusesfundsgeneratedinCentralAfricainparticulartopurchaseweapons,foodsuppliesandproductsusedtomakeexplosivedevicesortofinancecellsandremuneratecertaincategoriesofitsmembers.As with the widespread wayside robberies and kidnappings that the studied area has experiencedoverthepasttwodecades,terrorisminCentralAfricaismulti-faceted.Someofthesefacetsaremanifest,whereasothersstilllackprecision.Itsfinancial,economicandsocial impact,however, is considerable,particularly inCameroonandChad.Hencetheexistenceofnationalandsub-regionalcounter-terrorismmea-sures,introducedbothbyStatesdirectlyimpactedandbythoseawareoftheriskofinfiltration.Majorriskshavebeenhighlightedregardingthedisseminationofterroristcells.Theanalysisoftheconditionsofeffectivenessofthesemeasuresandofcellscombatingthefinancingofterrorismsuggestthatasthethreatissub-regional,theimplemen-tationorconsolidationof integratedcounter-terrorismpartnerships, involvingallservicesconcernedbyissuesregardinghumanandanimalcross-bordermigration,economicandsocialexchanges,defenceandsecurity,tradeandfinancialflow,etc.,is urgent
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Over time,CentralAfrica has proved to be themost unstable sub-region of theAfricancontent.Shortlyafterindependencein1960,theCongowasplungedintowar,subsequentlytriggeringthefirstinterventionbyUNpeacekeepers.Sincethen,thispartofthecontinent,whichgenerallycorrespondstotheECCAS*zone,hasen-dlesslyexperiencedsuccessivemassviolence,withsprawlingcivilwarsthathavehaddevastatingeffectsonpeace,safety,developmentandcommunity life in thecountriesthathavehadlittletimetostarttheirnationalconstruction.AsidefromGabonandEquatorialGuinea,whichhavebeenrelativelysparedbysecuritycrises,eachoftheelevenothercountrieshasexperiencedperiodsofmajorinstabilityduemainlytopoliticalandintra-communityfightingandorganisedcrime.Angola,Burundi, theRepublic of theCongo,Rwanda and theDRCongo haveexperiencedlongyearsofviolencebetweenmilitaryfactionsunderpinnedbygeo-politicalrivalriesdatingbacktotheColdWar,geo-strategicalreconfigurationwarspre-datingtheEast-Westconflictandethno-politicalcombats.Althoughnotdirect-lyconcernedbythisstudy,thesecountriesneverthelessplayaroleindisseminatingawarinfrastructure,theeffectsofwhicharefeltbeyondtheGreatLakesregion.In such an open sub-region, violence is not exclusive to States, since fighters,weapons and criminal resources resulting from the exploitation of controlledland, spreadand sometimesplaya role in inflaming the socio-political situationof neighbouring countries. The example of violence perpetrated by Jean-PierreBemba’sMLCfighters in theCAR is indicativeof the regionalisationof crises,theconvertibilityofrebelsandthetransferofarmsfromonezonetoanotherinaprocess that reproducesconflicts.This ishowcriminalorganisationssuchas theLord Resistance Army (LRA) managed to renew their arsenal within the local black market.Thespatial frameworkof this study lieswithin thezonecoveredby theCentralAfricaEconomicandMonetaryCommunity(CEMAC),comprisingCameroon,theCentralAfricanRepublic,Chad,theCongo,theGabonandEquatorialGuinea.Thelatterthreearenotdirectlyconcernedbythisstudy,sincenoterroristactivityper-petratedbyarecognisedorganisationhasyetbeenreportedwithintheirrespectiveterritories.However,thefactthattheybordercountriesthatareaffectedbyactsofterrorismandfromwhichnationalsparticipateinterroristoperations,hasledthe
ctionintroduction
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* Economic Community of Central African States comprising the following States: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Republic of Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda and Sao Tome & Principe.
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GABAC to include them in this analysis of the facts and risks of terrorism in general and,moreparticularly,itsfinancing.Inaddition,thesub-regionalapproachadoptedbythestudyjustifieslookingbeyondtheborders,whichareultimatelyporous.Inordertoremainconsistentwiththesubjectofthestudy,theonlyStatesdirect-lyconcernedareCameroon,ChadandtheCAR,whichareexperiencingterroristactivity and confirmed risks of activity, aswell as thefinancing of terrorism. Itshouldbenoted that the termsof referencerequirefirstlyabetterunderstandingofallaspectsofthisrelativelynewphenomenoninthesub-regionandsecondly,intelligenceofitsfinancingmechanisms.However,thisstudyonlyinvolveslocalphenomenologicalparametersthataffectthemechanismsoffinancingterrorism.
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I.1 General context
InCameroonattheendofthe1980s,atthetimeoftheirruptionofasevereeco-nomiccrisis,ruralandcross-bordercrimeemerged,followedbyextensivehostagetakingalongitseasternborderandseapiracy.Onaninternallevel,highwayban-dits,kidnappersandpirateshadsuchaneconomicandsocialimpactthattheyleadto thecreationofa special forcecalled theRapidResponseBrigade,whichhassinceconductedanti-criminal,counter-insurgencyandcounter-terroristmissions,notablyagainstBokoHarem.Chadhasexperiencedabellicosepoliticalperiod,characterisedfrom1966to2008by a succession of rebellions and coups, some successful and some not, aimedatoverthrowing theexisting regime.Overaperiodofnearlyhalfacentury, thiscountryhasseendozensofpolitico-militarygroupsform,breakupandreproduce.Chad’seasternborderwithSudanhasbeenthelaunchpadforallmajorrebellions.ThissideisalsowheretheSudaneseJanjaweedcarriesoutattacksand,aboveall,where a range of smuggling operations are conducted between the East and Central Africa,notablytheCAR.Inthisstudy,thedescriptionofthemilitarypastofChadhighlightsthechallengethiscountryrepresentsforterrorisminAfricaingeneral,aswellasthechallengeitsetsforthisphenomenonintheLakeChadBasininparticular.Indeed,innearlyhalfacenturyofcontinualconfrontationbetweenrebelfactionsandgovernmentforces,Chadhasaccumulatedthreemilitaryvariableswithsometimescontradicto-rystrategicaleffects,namelyestablishedexperienceofanti-guerrillafightingintheSahelregion,extensivelogisticsandthousandsofformerfightersneedingtostartanewlife.ThisstrategicexperienceenablesN’Djamenatointervenetohelpcountriesthreate-ned by terrorist attacks, as can be seenwith the deployment of Chadian forcesinMali,Nigeria,CameroonandNigerinasynergyofactionswitharmedforcesfromFrance, theUNor thecountriesaffected,dependingonthecase.However,manywarweaponshavebeendisseminatedclandestinelyfromorviaChad,someofwhichareused inorganisedcrime,notably terrorism.ActiveparticipationbyChadinintegratedanti-radicalisationinitiativesledbytheSahelG5,supportedmi-litarilybyOperationBarkhane,togetherwithitsdiplomaticactivismtofindarapidsolutiontotheLibyanproblem,theprolongationofwhichisprovidingfertilesoilforDaesh,addstothespecificsituationofChadontheAfricanchessboardinthefightagainstterroristorganisations.Inlightoftheabove,itisclearthatChadhas,onewayoranother,openedfireonthemainterroristorganisationsactiveontheAfricancontinent,namelyAQIM,BokoHaramandIslamicState.AsfortheCentralAfricanRepublic,itisparticularlythepresenceoftheLRAintheeastofthecountry,borderingontheDRCongo,thatmakesitacountrysubjecttoterroristthreats.However,therearegroundsforexaminingthecriminalisationofitssocio-politicalandeconomicenvironmenttoexploretherisksofinstrumentali-
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Chapter I n Context
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sationofitsweaknessesbyopportunists.Forthepasttwodecades,thecountryhasbeentornapartbymutinies,coupsd’état,foreigninterventionandtheoccupationofentireswathesofterritorybyarmedgroups.Themostseriouscrisisisthatopposingarmedgroupsgathered togetherunder theSelekamovement to theAnti-Balaka,causinghundredsofthousandsofpeopletofleetoneighbouringcountries,de-struc-turing many community resources and bringing the country back to its initial efforts ofnationalconstruction.AreportbyaUN-commissionedgroupofexpertsrecentlyportrayedagrimviewofthecriminaleconomiesprofitingfromdisorderinCentralAfrica.Irrespectiveoftheirnameandareaofoperation,armedgroupsplunder,organisetheplunderingorreceiveashareoftheplunderingofthenaturalresourcesofCentralAfrica.With tolls, plundering, poaching, racketeering, illegalmining andmiscellaneoustrafficking,theCentralAfricanhinterlandhasbeendescribedasanopen-airbankfromwhichwarlordshelp themselves,whilst thepopulationstruggleseverydayundertheweightofpovertymadeworsebyabreakdownineconomicactivitydueto the lack of security.Creating fear and profiting fromdisorder thus appear tobe the common threads of awar economy, combinedwith flourishing entrepre-neurship based on insecurity. In nearly allCARborder areas, transmigration ofarmedgroupsmakes iteasier for illegalactivities to takehold.Thiscontexthaspromotedthesettingupofnon-profitorganisations,whoseobviouslycriminalac-tivitieshaveemerged,withoutitbeingpossibletorepressthemintime.PoorStatecontrolovertheperipheriesfostersthering-fencingofborderareas,whosecovetedresourcesarelikelytofundterrorists,justastheycanfinancethemilitary-criminalandpolitical-militarygroupsthatplundertheseareas.Thecountryisalsoexposedtoenvironmentalcrime, theproductsofwhich transit throughporousborders tosupplyAsianmarkets.Thisbriefdescriptionof the socio-political contextof the studiedareabrings tolightthepre-existenceoforganisedcross-bordercrimeinthebordersbetweenCa-meroon,CARandChad,togetherwithbordersbetweenthesecountriesandsomeoftheirneighbours,inparticularSudan,SouthSudan,theDCRandNigeria.Aboveall,itmakesitpossibletotranscendanimmediateinterpretationofthesecuritypro-blemsraisedatanygiventime**,asthereisacrime-feedingsubstratepresentinthemediumorlong-termcontext,dependingonthecase.Thissubstrateisasystemofconflictsthatfacilitatestherenewalofthreatsinapermanentlyunstablesub-region.Thesearenolongerfacts,butrathercriminalphenomena,forwhichthenatureofthegame,inotherwordsthemethods,variesaccordingtotherelatingissues,whichcantakeonidentity-based,politicalorreligiousconnotations,withouteverdispo-singoftheconsiderableeconomicandfinancialmotivation.Itisalsoimportanttoperceivetheterrorismofthestudyareaasaphenomenontobeanalysedinasystemicmanner.Asub-regionalapproachisthereforerequired,at thelevelofthecountriesconcerned,bothfortheintelligenceofallaspectsofterrorismandforidentifyingtherisks,trendsandmethodsofitsfinancing.Further
11** See GABAC, Rapport de l’exercice de typologie sur l’utilisation abusive des organismes à but non lucratif à des fins de financement du terrorisme en Afrique Centrale, 2015.
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oninthereport,wewillseehowthelocalandmainlycross-bordereconomicandsocialmodels provide terrorist organisationswith the resources for networking,recruitmentandself-sufficiency.
I.2 Specific context
TerrorismisperpetratedinCentralAfricabytwoofficiallylistedorganisations.Ittakesadvantagehoweverofthestructuredcriminalworkings,methodsandriskscreatedbydisparateorganisations,which,despitemeasuresaimedatsecuringtheborders,continuetoplunderthesub-regionborderzones.
- TheLordResistanceArmy(LRA):foundedin1988,ithasbeenactiveintheeastoftheCARsince2008.TheLRAespeciallyoperatesintheregionsofHautMbomou,MbomouandHauteKotto.TheoriginalkeyobjectiveoftheLRAwastooverthrowtheregimeofPresidentYoweriMuseveniandsetupanewregimebasedontheTenCommandments.Mostsourcesnowsuggestthatthegroupiscurrentlyfightingforitssurvival.TheLRAhasallegedlybeenreducedtobetween200and300menroamingtheruralareasonthebordersofSudan(Darfur),SouthSudan,theCARandtheDRCongo.Itismadeupofrecruits,includingkidnappedchild-ren,andsurvives throughpoachingandthe illegal tradeof ivory,wood,oreandweapons,witharmedgroupsinDarfur.AccordingtoinformationprovidedbyCen-tralAfricanmembersoftheTaskForce,LRAfightersaretraffickingwithex-Selekaarmedgroups.
TheLRAwaslistedasaterroristorganisationbytheUSDepartmentofStatein2001andbytheAfricanUnionin2011.Theforests,porousborders,lowgovern-mentpresencenearthebordersandthering-fencingofcertainborderareasbyar-med groups all help to foster criminal economies and the transmigration of armed groups.TheLRAtakesadvantageofthisconfusion.
- BokoHarem,whichcallsitselfJama’atAhlal-SunnahLidda’awatiwalJihad(GroupofthePeopleofSunnahforPreachingandJihad),isanIslamicsectcreatedin2002byMohammedYusuf,ayoungpreacherfromtheIzalamovement,amel-tingpotofreformisminNigeria.YusefbrokeawayfromIzala,amovementthatcalls for the participation of Muslims in the political life of their country in order to mouldthesystemaccordingtoitsvisionofsociety.Yusef,ontheotherhand,wasanti-system,salafistanddeterminedtooverthrowmoderninstitutionsandtheirlea-derstosetupasocietygovernedbyIslamiclaw,theSharia.Hissocialandpoliticalsatireaccusedthoserulingthecountryofhavingsetupasystemofpoorgovernance
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inNigeriathatwasresponsibleforimmorality,povertyandmassunemployment,whilst theminoritybenefits fromcorruptionandnepotism tomonopolisepublicresources.Bothmillenarianandfocusedonthesocialproblemsofmodern-dayNi-geria,Yusefwanted Islamicorthodoxy ledbyaCaliphate tocleanse the IslamicreligiousenvironmentoftheSufibrotherhoodsaccusedofdilutingoriginalIslamwithpracticesforeigntotheTraditionsbequeathedbytheProphetMohammed.SincethedeathofYusufduringtheMaiduguriconfrontationinJuly2009,thesecthasbecomemilitarised,adheringtoviolentextremism,ring-fencingareasborde-ringonCamerooninnorth-easternNigeria,gainingterritorythroughattacksandsuccessesagainsttheNigeriansecurityforces,retreatingfollowingoffensivesfromthesecurityforcesandtheMultinationalJointTaskForceorganisedbythecoun-triessufferingfromattacks,recruitingwidelyfromyoungpeopleintheLakeChadBasin,massacringcivilians,perpetratingsuicideattacksandlayinganti-personnelmines,destroyingvillagesandinfrastructures,frequentlyperformingdecapitations,drivingpeoplefromtheirhomesandrecruitingwidelyfromyoungpeopleinbor-derareas.BokoHaramwaslistedasaterroristorganisationin2014andisdeemedtobethemostviolentarmedgroupintheworld.InCamerooninJuly2016,thereweremorethan56,000Nigerianrefugees,nearly200,000internallydisplacedper-sonsandover1,100civilianandmilitarydeaths1.InApril2016,32,728Nigerianrefugees were registered in Chad2.
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1 Sources: HCR/Maroua and Cameroon defence and security forces2 Expert report, 2nd regional summit on security in the Lake Chad Basin, 12 and 13 May 2016)
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TheLRAhasbeen carryingout terrorist activities in the east of theCARsince2008.BokoHaramstartedextendingitsfieldofactiontoCameroonandChadin2013,holdingoutagainstnationalarmiesandevenasub-regionalcoalitionwhichhashowevergraduallyreduceditsroomformanoeuvre.Howhavegroupsclaimingtobeonareligiousmissionmanagedtoturnthemselvesintomurderouscriminalorganisationsandresilientterrorists,despitetheresourcesthatStates,regionalandinternationalorganisationsinparticularhavedeployedtoendtheiroperations?Theanswertothisquestioncallsfirstlyforananalysisofallaspects of terrorism in Central Africa and secondly for a greater understanding of themechanismsthroughwhichtheyfinancetheiroperations.
II.1. Objectives
II.1.1. General objective
Thegeneralobjectiveof this study is todrawupaphenomenologyof terrorisminCentralAfricaand identify itssourcesandmethodsoffinancing toreveal theloopholesinnationalandsub-regionalinstrumentstocombatthefinancingofter-rorism,aswellasincreasingtheabilityofStatestoeffectivelycombattheaccess,movementanduseoffinancialresourcesbyterroristorganisationsandtheindivi-dualsthathelpthemcarryoutcriminalacts. II.1.2. Specific objectives
-ToanalysethedeterminantsofterrorismanditsspecificitiesinCentralAfrica;-Toidentifythemethodsandtechniquesusedbyterroristsandtheirfollowerstoraise,moveandusefunds,detailing,insofaraspossible, thebreakdownofworkbetweenthevariousplayersinthefinancingchain;-TocategorisethedifferentmethodsoffinancingusedinCentralAfrica;-To increase theabilityofauthorities inchargeofenquiriesandproceedings tounderstandhowlegalandillegalfundsareusedforfinancingterrorism;-Toidentifyrelevantindicatorsandredflags;-To help financial and supervisory institutions to take decisions relating to themonitoringofdeclarationsofsuspiciousoperationswithrespecttothefinancingofterrorism;-Tohelpdecision-makersand legislativeand judicialauthorities to identifyandcloseloopholesinlegislationonterrorismandthefinancingofterrorism.
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Chapter II nThe issue
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II.1.3. Méthodology
This study has been performed using double entry methodology meeting the two main orientationsprescribedbythetermsofreference.
II.1.3.1 Collecting and processing phenomenological data
AnumberofstudieshavebeenproducedonarmedgroupsinCentralAfrica,inpar-ticularontheLRAandBokoHaram.Althoughthefirstofthetwoorganisationsisquite well known due to its age and the assessment of its human impact on the borders ofUganda,theDRCongo,SouthSudanandtheCAR,thisisnotthecasefortheac-tivitiesoftheNigerianIslamicsectinCentralAfrica.Toavoidrepetitionofwidelyknownfacts,collecteddatahasfocusedontryingtounderstandthemachinationsofBokoHaraminthissub-region.Apart fromtheuseofopensources, thesearchforempiricaldatahasneverthelessproventobetheonlycredibleapproachtotrytoachieveabetterunderstandingofthefinancialactivitiesofBokoHaraminCameroonandChad.Thetopicalityofthesubject,togetherwithdataconfidentialityandsecurityparanoia,haverestrictedaccesstoinformation,leadingtoalternativeapproachesbeingneces-saryforthegatheringofdata.Usinginterviewswithlocalsandthoseworkinginad-ministrationandsecurity,togetherwiththesparsestatisticaldataprovidedbythese-curityforcesandinternationalorganisationsworkinginthefield,andcapitalisationofmiscellaneoussourcesprovidedbymembersoftheTaskForce,itisindeedamethodofresearchviatracesthathasbeenadopted.Duetothedataavailable,thestudyfo-cusesontheterroristactivitiesandfinancingofBokoHaraminCameroonandChad.
II.1.3.2 Collecting and processing data on the financing of terrorism Inthisaspect,theapproachisinlinewiththeframeworklaiddownbytheFATFasregardstypologiesfocusingonrisks,trendsandmethods.Tothiseffect,existingstu-dieshavebeentakenintoaccount,someofwhicharesummarisedinthereviewofliterature,toidentifyfieldsatriskandthemechanismsforfinancingterrorismlistedelsewhereandpotentiallyfieldsofvulnerabilityinthesub-region.Similarly,thepro-jectscopeforthiscombinedexerciseofanalysisandtypologywasset inadvance,namelytohelpStatesandbodiespreventingandrepressingterrorismanditsfinancingto better understand the determinants,mechanisms, effects and loopholes used byterroriststomobilise,moveandusetheirfunds.Thestudyalsoassessestheimple-mentationofgoodpracticecontainedintherelatedFATFRecommendationsand,if
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necessary,proposecorrectivemeasurestoimprovethecomplianceofnationalandsub-regionalinstrumentsandstrategiesforcombatingthefinancingofterrorisminCentralAfrica.Tothisend,theGABAChas:
- CreatedaTaskForcecomprisingfifteenmembersfromthesixcountriesoftheCEMACzoneandrepresentingthefollowingadministrations:justice,defence,internalsecurityandintelligence,andfinancialintelligenceunits(FIU);
- Drafted a questionnaire,with the technical support of the FATF and theInter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa(GIABA),whichithasthendistributedtoStates,requestingthefollowinginfor-mationinparticular:abriefdescriptionofthenationalsocio-politicalandsecuritycontextdetailingexistingarmedgroups;casestudiesonthefinancingofterrorism;anassessmentofthevulnerabilitiesofthefinancialintelligencesystem;thesources,flowandvolumesoftransactionsrelatingtothefinancingofterrorism;theoriginsanddestinationsoffunds;relevantlegalproceedingseitherclosedorinprogress;trendsandindicatorsforthefinancingofterrorism,etc.Requestsformoreinforma-tiononspecificsubjectswerealsosent;
- OrganisedfourTaskForcemeetings:inBanguiinFebruary2016toenableTaskForcememberstomeet,harmonisetheirviewsonthestudytobeperformedanddrawupanimplementationschedule;inDoualainApril2016andinN’Djame-na in May 2016 to assess the data collected and the data to be completed prior to the firstdraftingofthetext;inLibrevilleinAugust2016tosubmitthefirstdraft;
- ParticipatedinJointTaskForcemeetings,involvingtheGABAC,GIABAandtheFATF,onthefinancingofterrorisminCentralandWesternAfrica.It has been demonstrated herein that, investigating the sources andmechanismsoffinancingterrorismintheareainquestionshouldnotberestrictedtotheusualmethodsand targetsofbanking informationandother investigations into formaltransactions.Thenewaspectsofterrorisminthisareaofveryscarcebanking,cha-racterisedbythephysicalmovementoffundsandtradingofexchanges,callsfordiversificationofthesourcesandapproachesforcollectingdatainordertotakeintoaccountthecustomarymethodsofproducingandmovingfundsthatterroristsmayuse.Hencetheglobalapproachadoptedbythisreport:verifyingifthemechanismsforfinancing terrorismknownelsewhere areused in the studied zone and iden-tifyingnewtypologies.
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Since2001,agreatdealofliteraturehasstudiedterrorism,inparticulartheIslamicterrorismembodiedbyAlQaeda,theIslamicStateGroupandtheirrelatedgroups.Alongside the innumerablescientificarticlesandworkson thesubject, journals3 havespecialisedintheanalyticalmonitoringofadynamicphenomenonthathasnotbeenoutoftheheadlinessincetheattacksthatyearontheUnitedStates.Authorsgenerallyattributepolitical,ideologicaland,morerecently,socio-econo-miccausestotherelationsandmethodsofcontemporaryterrorism.Thismorere-centdevelopmentinthoughtcanbeexplainedbytheincreasingenrolmentofyoungpeoplebyterroristorganisations,drawinguponthemostunderprivilegedlayersofsociety,includinginEurope,fromwheremanyforeignfightershavesetofftojoinDaeshinIraqandSyria.In2004,KofiAnnan,endorsingtheUNHigh-levelPanelreportonThreats,Challen-gesandChange,commentedonthecomplexityofmoderndaythreats,saying:We cannot treat issues such as terrorism or civil wars or extreme poverty in isola-tion. The implications of this interconnectedness are profound. Our strategies must be comprehensive. Our institutions must overcome their narrow preoccupations and learn to work across issues in a concerted fashion4”. Since then, terrorismhasexpandedtonewareas,sometimesadoptinganinsurrectionalconnotationandsometimesmergingwithorganisedcrime.Aboveall,itpridesitselfonlarge-scalemassacres,conceptualisingthebarbarityitcauses,andclaimsonlytostopwhenitstime has come to rule5.
Between the partisans of absolute repression and those putting forward a more flexibleapproachfocusingonpromotinggoodgovernance,BanKi-moonhasop-tedforananticipativeapproachfocusingonpreventionagainstviolentextremism,drivenmainlybysocio-economicfactors.Effectivegovernance,developmentandpreventionformthetemplateofthenewUNPlanofactiontopreventviolentextre-mismpublishedinMay2016.
TheLRAhasbeenthesubjectofanumberofanalyses,someofwhichportrayitasamoribundorganisationreducedtoacriminalgangofafewhundredmen,whilstothersarescepticalastoitsdesignationasaterroristorganisation.HundredsofinsightshavebeenpublishedasregardsBokoHaram,mainlyintheformofarticles,noteson theeconomicsituationandreports.Most focuson thebackgroundofthesectanditsviolentactions.Withitbeingdifficulttoaccesstoinformationheldbythelegalandsecurityservices,difficulttoaccesstothezoneofaction,difficulttoaccessBokoHarammilitantsandwiththefragmentarynatureofavailabledata,intelligenceonBokoHaramisreducedtoconjectureandtheoreticalandconceptualdisarraywhichprovidesfurtherjustificationforthepertinenceofpursuingtheinvestigationandseekingmoreinformation.Itisespeciallyimportant
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Chapter III n Review of literature
3 See for example CTCSentinel, Perspectives on Terrorism3 Fifty-ninth session Agenda item 55 Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit, Note by the Secretary-General Koffi Annan, 2 December 2004. A59/5655 Abu Bakr Naji, Gestion de la barbarie, Editions de Paris, 2007.
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toascertaintheextentofregionalisationofthemovementandmorespecifically,thecircumstances,natureandeffectofitsexpansionintoCentralAfrica.Theothercoreissueofthisstudyinvolvesthefinancingofterrorism.Thishasbeenatopicalsubjectsince2001.AsW.A.Tupmanpointedoutinanarticlewithanevo-cativetitle6,manycertaintiessurroundingterrorismanditsfinancingarecontradic-tedbytheambiguityofsaidconcepts,whichmaycauseconfusionandconflationifcareisnottaken.Hedoesneverthelesshighlightthefactthatmethodsoffinancingterrorismgenerallyfollowthoseoforganisedcrime.Thenatureofthisstudy,howe-ver,callsforanaccreditedcomprehensionofterroristfinancing.AccordingtotheInterpretiveNoteofRecommendation2,“thetermterroristfinancingincludesthefinancingofterroristactsandofterroristsorterroristorganisations”.Consequently,itisthetrendsandmethodsoffinancingidentifiedbypriortypologyexercisesthatestablishthemechanismsknowninthisfield.
ThefirstreportproducedbytheFATFonterroristfinancingdatesbackto20087.Itemergesthatthefinancialrequirementsofterroristorganisationsvaryaccordingtotheirsize,organisation,extent,etc.Moneyisusedtofinanceoperations,fortheoperationalchargesoforganisationsandtodevelopanenvironmentthatfavoursthedeploymentoftheiractivities.Carryingoutaterroristactcostsless,butpreparingit requires relatively high resources (maintaining networks and cells, recruiting,carrying out propaganda, financing, activities, etc.).Opportunism andflexibilitycharacterisethemethodsoffinancing,whichnotablyincludenon-profitorganisa-tions(NPOs),standardinvestmentsandtheuseoftheirownfunds.Terroristsalsobenefitfromillegalmethodsoffinancing,includingdrugs,fraudandgovernmentsupportinfragileStates.Tomovefunds,theyusethephysicalcarryingofcash,themovementofgoods,NPOsandalternativesystemsoftransfer.
Infact,allmethodsusedtomovemoneyarerisky.Topreventterroristfinancing,the2008Reportrecommendscombiningcounter-terroristintelligenceandfinancialintelligencetoenhance theabilityofauthorities todetectandconduct investiga-tionsintoterroristactivities.Fourmainareasforcombatingterroristfinancingarealsoidentified:legalactionagainstfragileStatesandtaxhavens;workingwiththeprivatesectortoensuretheavailabilityofinformationtobeabletodetectterroristfinancing;buildingabetterunderstandingbetweenpublicandprivatesectors;andincreasingtheroleoffinancialintelligenceasatoolforcombatingterrorism.
In2015,amoreextensivereport8summarisedcasesresultingfromseveraltypologyexercisesandothersources.Itobservedthatinlessthanadecade,methodsoffinan-cinghadevolvedwithchangesinterroristorganisations.Hencetheneedtomoreclearlyascertain theuseoffunds(areasofexpenditure) toprevent terroristacts:
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6 W. A. Tupman, “Ten myths about terrorist financing”, Journal of Money Laundering Control, vol. 12, no. 2, 2009.7 Terrorist Financing, Rapport GAFI 2008.8 Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks, 2015 FATF Report
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operational requirements and personnel; propaganda and recruitment; training,wages,paymentsandmiscellaneouscompensationforthefamiliesofthedeceased;andactionaimedatthevulnerablelayersofsocietytoundermineStatesupportandpromoterecruitment.Informationalsoneedstobegatheredonthefinancialagentsoforganisations,suchaswhoconnectsthefunds,whodoestheaccounts,howthefundsaremovedandwhohandlesthetransactions,etc.TheReportindicatesthatthefundsaretransferredviabanks,remittanceagencies(particularlyintheabsenceofAML/CFTmechanisms for this sector,agentsandotheremployeescanmaketransfers and falsify supporting documents on behalf of terrorist groups) and cash couriers.
Thetraditionalmethodsoffinancingfundsare:privatedonors,misuseofNPOs,criminalactivities(smuggling,counterfeiting,bankrobberies,drugs,taxfraud,ex-tortionandransoms),self-financingofcells(loansandsavings),incomefrombu-sinesses(carrental,restaurants,etc.),financingfromStates(eventhoughwedonothaveaclearlyestablishedtypologyonthisissue).Emergingrisksinclude,infirstplace,self-financedForeignTerroristFighters,whoprovidelogisticsupport,recruitandfacilitatetheobtainingoftraveldocuments,meansoftransportandaccesstoconflictzones.Moderndaymeansofcommunicationandpaymentarealsoaboonforterroristswhocollectfundsviasocialnetworksandnewpaymentmethods(suchasvirtualcurrencies,pre-paidcardsandelectronictransfers).It isacknowledgedthatasregardsnewpaymentmethods,asignificantamountofworkremainstobecarried out to ascertain how they are instrumentalised by terrorists. In addition,terroristsexploitnaturalresources,suchasmineralores,oil,gasandpreciousme-tals,mainlyinareasoutsideofStatecontrol.Theyarealsoinvolvedinextortion,smuggling,kidnappingforransom,theftandtheillegaltradingofivoryandcoal.AsregardsthespecificcaseofAfrica,theGIABAReportisourinitialfocusofat-tention.ItwasproducedinacontextofemergingterrorismintheSahel,whereterro-ristorganisations(includingtheAQIM,MOJWA,AnsarDineandAl-Mourabitoun)spread,committingterroristactsinNigeria,NigerandMali.Thisreportestablishesfour typologies:financingvia tradeandother lucrativeactivities;viaNGOsandcharitypayments;viathesmugglingofweapons,merchandiseandcurrency(cashcouriers);andbydrugtrafficking.TwocasesrespectivelyillustratetheinvolvementofPoliticallyExposedPersonsandtheuseofalternativetransfers(Hawala).Oneofthepioneeringaspectsofthestudywastohaveshowedhowvulnerablein-dividuals,inthesecasepupilsinKoranicschools,aremanipulatedtocollectfundsforBokoHaram.InadditiontoprovidingproofthatthemechanismsidentifiedbytheFATFfinanceterrorisminWestAfrica,thestudyalsoopensleadsforinvestiga-tionsintowhatitcallstheendogenousproductionoffunds.Itiswithrespecttothisself-financingthatthepresentreport***seeksoutnewmethodsoffund-raisingbyterrorists,inparticularthemembersofBokoHaram.
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*** GIABA, Terrorism Financing in western Africa, 2013.
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TheGIABAReportdetailsseveralestablishedmethodsoffinancingbyBokoHa-ram inWestAfrica. It has been reviewed and extended by the joint FATF-GA-BAC-GIABAstudyonterroristfinancinginWestandCentralAfrica.TheGABACcontributedtothisstudybyattendingTaskForcemeetingsandprovidingexamplesofcases.ThisstudyshowsthatBokoHaramisself-financedmainlythroughex-tortionandthespoilsresultingfromattacksonbanksandvillages.Aswewillseeinthepresentstudy,othermethodsoffinancinghavebeenidentified,verifiedandonlyconfirmedbetweenSeptemberandDecember2016.TheJointReportright-lyestablishedthatthesourcesofterroristfinancingarelargelysimilarinthetwosub-regions.Consequently,ithasemergedthatcooperationbetweenStatesisthebestapproachtocounterthefinancing****.
OpensourceshavealsomentionedfinancingbyBokoHaremfromneighbouringNigeria.CitingsourcesfromtheUSDepartmentoftheTreasury,Reuters***** has reportedthatBokoHaramhasreceivedseveralhundredthousanddollarsfromtheAQIM,which is relatively insignificant compared to the amounts it reaps fromransoms.
ReportingontheFrenchfamilyofTanguyMoulin-Fournier,kidnappedintheex-tremenorthofCamerooninFebruary2013,thepressagencyannouncedthat“BokoHaramwaspaidanequivalentofabout$3.15millionbyFrenchandCamerooniannegotiatorsbeforethehostageswerereleased,accordingtoaconfidentialNigeriangovernmentreportlaterobtainedbyReuters”.
JacobZenfromtheCombatingTerrorismCenteratWestpoint,reportsthatthesectreliesmoreonlocalfinancing,listingthepoliticalandbusinesscirclesofBornoatthetimeofMuhammadYusuf,beforethefinanciersgraduallyappearonthescene,someofwhicharerecruitedfromthecross-bordersmugglingregulars:“BOKO HARAM has made inroads with new financiers, who are from Borno and bordering areas of Cameroon’s Extreme North Region… These financiers provide BOKO HARAM with weapons and a route to negotiation with the Cameroonian go-vernment in kidnapping-for-ransom operations. One Cameroonian financier, Alhaji Abdalla, is a vehicle exporter based in Amchide whose business operations extend to Qatar (the vehicles likely move from Doha to other ports in Asia). He served as a key negotiator for Boko Haram in talks with the Cameroonian government for the release of the French Moulin-Fournier family of seven…in February 2013. The government paid a $3.14 million ransom and released BOKO HARAM prisoners in
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**** FATF/GIABA/GABAC/, Terrorist Financing in west and Central Africa (october 2016)***** http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nigeria-bokoharam-insight-idUSKBN0F636920140701
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April 2013 in exchange for the family9”.
Accordingtosecuritysources,AbdallahdidtakepartinnegotiationswithBokoHaram,buthissubsequentquestioningbysecurityservicesopensloopholesintheinteractionsbetweenthesocio-culturalnetworks,businessnetworksandcriminalnetworks.
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9 Jacob Zen, « BokoHaram: Recruitment, Financing, and Arms Trafficking in the Lake Chad Region », CTC Sentinel, vol 7, Issue 10, October 2014, p. 8.
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Thischaptersetsoutthelinkbetweenthemanycross-borderplayers,thedi-versityoftheeconomicandsocialexchangenetworksthatconnectthemandthe opportunities that the informal nature of the workings and corridors of movementofbothpeopleandgoodsofferBokoHaramforitsrecruitmentoffollowersandproductionofresources.Thisinparticularinvolvesdemonstra-tingthattothesouthofLakeChadandtheSudaneseborderatMaiduguri,thesamesocio-culturalareaexists,inwhichindividuals,goodsandideashavebeencirculatingimmutablyformanyyears,involvingbothinstrumentsofde-velopmentandproductsoftrafficking.Asisthecasewithothercross-borderzones,playersexploittheintegrationthatStateshavefacilitatedbyreducingbordercontrolsorthatStatesendureinplaceswhereborderzonesareareasofinstabilityduetothemovementofarmedgroupsortheirring-fencing.
IV.1. A relatively homogenous socio-cultural area promoting the establishment of cross-border networks
InthesouthernpartoftheChadBasin,afewlargecross-borderethnicgroupscontrolbothtraditionalandmodernpoliticalpoweratthelocallevel,togetherwithcross-bordertradeandexternalexchanges.ThesearemainlytheShuwaArabs, theKanuri andKotoko from the north-east ofNigeria to thewestofChad, transiting via theLogone and theChari inCameroon.The othercommunitiesaresmallerandarefoundinsmallerareas,althoughtheseareasalsostraddleborders,suchas theMafa in theMandaraMountainsand theBoudoumaandKanembouontheislandsandshoresoftheLake.Themajorgroupshavedailycontactwitheachother,asalthoughthecolonialbordersdid not necessarily divide the same families,manymarriages have sealedlong-lastingties.Ethnicityandbusinessgohand-in-handwithrespecttothecontrolofproduc-tionsectorsorthedistributionofgoods.Forexample,whilstfishingandthefishtradearetheprerogativeoftheKotokoandtheMusgum,thedistributionofcolanutsandprovisionsappearstobehandledbytheKanuri.TheArabs,on
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Chapter IV n Cross-border connections, the regionalisation of terrorism and opportunities for endogenous financing in the Lake Chad Basin
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theotherhand,aremoreinvolvedintheimporttrade,especiallyfromtheMiddleEast.Although there are various gateways between the economic players fromthesedifferentcommunities,weagreewithKarineBennaflathattradenetworksintheBasinarecharacterisedbymonopoliesandco-optations10.BetweenMaidugu-ri,N’Djamena,Maroua,FotokolandKousseri,thesebusinesslinksareinterwovenwithsociallinksandarecatalystsforintegration,yettheyalsoconstitutechannelsforinfra-stateregulationandthereforearisk.Howhave these cross-border relationsbeen exploitedbyBokoHaram?RatherthanredundantlyresearchingtheethnicitiesofBokoHaram,itisintheinstrumen-taluseofeconomic-identitynetworksintheChadbasinthatweneedtolookfortheirpotentialdirector indirectparticipation in thefinancingorcommissionofterroristacts.ThecaseoftheeconomicoperatordescribedabovebyJacobZen,togetherwith those of other individuals questioned by security forces, suggestthatwhenitcomestoidentifyingtherisksofterrorismbeingfinancedbyecono-micoperators,weneedtolookatthesecross-bordertransactionscombinedwithidentitynetworks,whichterroristscanexploitoruseforsupplies,asissuggested,moreover,bythefieldnotesgatheredwhenseekingdataforthisstudy.
IV.2. From smugglers to terrorists, knowledge of the terrain and traffic capitalised by Boko Haram
ThesecondaspectoftheregionalisationfromwhichBokoHarambenefits,arisesfromtheidentityoftheindividualsthatthesectemployeesinitsdivisionofopera-tionalwork.Ithasemergedfromlegalandsecuritysources,aswellasfrompressdata,thatmanyemirs,recruitersandotherBokoHaramheadsofsectorsinitsope-rationalareasareformertraffickersofavarietyofsubstances,aswellasdriversdrivingtoandfromthebordertowns(suchasBanki,Kousseri,Fotokol,AmchidéandLimani)andGamburuorMaiduguri,andthosetransportingsmuggledgoods,particularlyfuel.Thisalsoappliestothoseinchargeoflogistics,thetransportofweapons,dailysuppliesortheprocurementofsparepartsformotorbikesandothervehicles.One legalsourcestates that theoperatingcostsofcellssetupoutsideNigeriawerepaidbyAbubakerShekauhimself,whilstinternalsectorswereabletofinance themselves. Ithasalsoemerged fromreadingarticlesand interviewsthatwholesalers previously livingbetweenAmchidé andBanki orFotokol andGambaru,tocitejustoneexample,playaroleinmanagingtheoperationalfrontoftheorganisationandprovidefinancingopportunitiesforBokoHaram,notablybytakinghostages.
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10 Karine Bennafla, Le commerce frontalier en Afrique Centrale [Cross-border trade in Central Africa], Paris, Karthala.
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IV.3. The lure of profit for young people persisting in resourcefulness and social pressure
TheStatesoftheChadBasinandinternationalpartnershaveconvergingviewsontheurgencyofprovidingviablesolutionstothesocio-economicproblemsofyoungpeoplebythecreationofjobs,increasededucationandvocationaltraining.Thisin-tegratedapproachisaimedatpreventingradicalisationandviolentextremismmorewidely,aswehavepostulatedthatitisthesocialinsecurityandexclusiveKoraniceducationofthemajorityoftheseyoungpeoplethatBokoHaraminstrumentalisestospearheadreligiousintolerance.Hereagain,itisworthemphasisingthatvarioussourceshaveprovedthatShekau’sorganisationrecruitedIslamicscholarsfromCa-meroonandChadtoindoctrinaterecruitsparalleltotheirmilitarytraining.Thereishoweveranothercategoryofyoungpeople,whohaveoftenquicklystartedafamilyandwhocarryoutjobsofminorimportance,whojoinedtheinsurgentsbecausetherecruitersheldoutthepromiseofeasygainsfromspoilsandotherex-pectedbenefits11.Thesecurityandlegalforcesreferredtolistthefollowing“jobs”forpresumedre-cruits.Theiroccupationsarequotedasdescribedinthedocuments:sellersofplas-tic;sellersofrice;motorbikemechanics;motorbikesalesmen;sellersofboubous;embroiderers;sellersofbuckets;sellersofmilletandbeans;shopkeepers;tailors;drivers;sellersofsmuggledmedicines;sellersofemptyperfumebottles;sellersoffuel;motorcycletaxidrivers,etc.BeforejoiningBokoHaram,theylivedinplacessuchasMaroua,Amchidé,BankiandKousseri.IdeologymeanslittleeithertothiscategoryofindividualsorforthemanymotorcycletaxidriversarrestedwhilsttransportingweaponsandmunitionshiddeninvariousgoodsbetweenN’Djamena,KousseriandtheNigeriaborder.ItissmugglersthatarefamiliarwiththebackroadsthathaveaddedvalueinthepricepaidbyBokoHaramaccordingtothecategoryofweaponstobedelivered.Ideology also counts little for thosewho devote themselves to the exchange ortraffickingoftheproductsneededforthesect’soperations,suchasfuel,gasandchemicalsubstances.Infact,thisisanexampleofwhatAlainBauercalls“lumpen-terrorism12”.This is also partly how the expansion ofBokoHaram toLakeChad should beinterpreted, inotherwordsasa “proletarian” strategy to reconquer resourcesbyislanders.ChristianSeignobos13developsthisinterpretationofthedeterminantsofmembershipoftheKanembou,Boudouma,Mobeursandothercommunitieslivingonthelakeislandsandsurroundingareas.HesuggeststhattheIslamicinsurgencyprovidedanopportunityforthesepopulationstoregainpossessionoftheincomegeneratedbytheexploitationoftheagricultural,grazingandfishingresourcesofthislargeoasisintheheartofasemi-aridenvironment.TheyhavewitnessedlanddisputesbetweentheStatesborderingtheLakesince1983,togetherwiththeinfluxofenvironmentalmigrantsfromvariouscountiesoftheChadBasinandtheSahelandanincreaseintraffickingandexploitationofboththefishandlandbyentre-preneursfromurbanareas,whohavelargelybenefitedfromthefruitoffishingandagriculture.Poorthereforeandwithoutanymeansofproductionoftheirown,localpopulationshavebeenreducedtoworkingforthe“foreign”investorsinexchange
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11 Security and legal sources: statements from prisoners12 Alain Bauer, Dernières nouvelles du crime [Latest in crime], Paris, Editions du CNRS, 2013.13 C. Seignobos, 2016, “BokoHaram : innovations guerrières depuis les Monts Mandara” [Boko Haram: innovations in warfare from the Mandara Mountains], Afrique contemporainen° 225.
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formodestremunerationincomparisonwithincomingrevenue.Theythereforere-mainstructurallyindebtedinanenvironmentwherethegeneralschoolenrolmentrateisunder10%andwherebasicsocialservicesarethinontheground.JoiningBokoHaramthereforeseemslikeanindigenousrevoltonthepartofyoungpeople,whoalsoseeitasanopportunitytomakeagreatdealofmoneyquickly,asconfirmedbyacertainnumberaftertheirarrestfollowingtheN’DjamenaattacksinJuneandJuly2015,whichkilled62people,including10suicidebombers,andleftnearly 200 wounded14.FortheIslamicsect,thisisalsoasurewayofextendingitsterritorialstrongholdandaccessingamajorsourceofself-financing,asconsiderablequantitiesoffishandpeppersleavetheLakeeachdayforthemarketsofneighbouringcountries.Onthissubject,BakarySambereportsthat“BokoHaramhasmanagedtoreorganisethesechannelsforitsowneconomicbenefit,whichitusestofinanceitsviolentac-tionsaroundabasinthatishighlystrategicalasarearbaseandfallbackzone.SomegovernmentsourcesinNigerestimatetheamountcollectedweekly,solelyintheNigeriaborderregionofDiffa,tobe8billionCFAFrancs(around€12,000,000)15.”.Itisthereforeperhapsnotbychancethatoutofthe10peoplesentencedandexecutedinN’DjamenainSeptember2015followingtheattacks,sevenwerefishermenandsixwereBoudoumafromLakeChad,allagedunder30and,exceptforone,withwivesandchildren16.Furthermore,itcanbededucedfromtherapiddeploymentofsocio-economicactionsparalleltothereinforcementofdefenceresourcesattheLakethattheChadiangovernmentisawareofthelinkbetweencrimeandpovertyinthisregion,overwhichstrategiccontrolisessentialforthesocio-economicandpoliticalstabilityoftheChadianBasiningeneralandChadinparticular.
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14 Chadian security sources15 Bakary Sambe, “BokoHaram dans le Bassin du Lac Tchad. Au-delà du sécuritaire, le danger ethniciste et le désastre humanitaire [Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. Over and beyond security issues, danger of ethnicity and humanitarian disaster] », La Lettre de l’Observatoire No. 2, May 2016, http://timbuktu-institute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Boko-Haram-dans-le-bassin-du-Lac-Tchad.pdf16 Legal sources
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Case n°1:MisuseofaforeignNPO
TheattentionoftheFIUwasdrawntoareportofsuspicionconcerningaconside-rableflowofmoneybetween2012and2014,comprisingcashdeposits.Intotal,over10.5billionCFAfrancs(around16millioneuros)weredepositedbyanationalof a country neighbouringCameroon, amember of theLakeChadBasinCom-mission,intothebankaccountofanNGOcalled“ABC”.Theoriginofthefundsremainsunknown.These fundswere thenwithdrawn in cash from theKousséribranchofthebankintheextremenorthofCameroon.FIUinvestigationsintothiscasereachedthefollowingconclusions:TheNGO“ABC”isinternationallyclassi-fiedasajihadistpropagandaorgan.Ithasestablishedtieswithterroristgroups(itwascreatedbyamemberoftheMuslimBrotherhood,hasestablishedlinkswithAlQaeda,AnsarAlIslam,thearmedbranchofHamas,theKashmirRebels,etc.).ThebrotherofOsamaBenLadenwasthetreasurerof“ABC”untiltheUSterroristattacksofSeptember2001.USsecretservicesuncoveredtheroleoftheNGOinthe logisticsupportof the2001WorldTradeCenterattacks.Onan internationallevel,theactivitiesof“ABC”havebeenbannedintheUSA(2002),Canada(2004),GreatBritain(2004),Pakistan(2004)andIndiaonsuspicionofprovidingfinancialsupportforterroristorganisations.TheFIUreachedtheconclusionthattheNGO“ABC”wasbeingusedasanins-trument to fundBokoHaramfightersunder thecoverofcharitywork.TheFIUconclusionsarebasedon:PrioractivitiesoftheNGO(anestablishedroleinraisingfundsforAlQaeda)andamassiveincreaseinthevolumeofbankdepositssince2012(intensificationofBokoHaramarmedoperations).Theunknownoriginofthefunds,despiteallefforts.Theareaswherethefundsarewithdrawnandincompa-tibilitiesbetweentheamountoffundsandtheactualactivitiesoftheNGOinthefield.TheFIUsentareporttotheMilitaryTribunalpursuanttolegalprovisions.Aconfidentialintelligencenotewassenttootheroperationalsecurityservices.
The financing of terrorism in Central Africa © 2017
Chapter V n Analysis of typologiesand red flags
V.1. Typologies
TentypologiesofestablishedterroristfinancinginCentralAfricahavebeeniden-tified.
Typology 1:Misuseofnon-profitorganisations
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ThekeypromotersoftheNGOinCameroonhavebeenarrested.
Source:Cameroun
Case n°2 :TerroristfinancingbyeconomicplayersraisingfundsandmisusinganNPO
The attention of the FIUwas drawn to a number of transfersmade by a natio-naleconomicoperatortoanABCNGObasedintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo.Thesectorofactivityofthisoperatorandthereasonsforthetransactiondidnotappearcompatible.Indeed,theeconomicoperatoriswell-knownintheimport-exportsector.Hege-nerallyperformslarge-scalecommercialtransactions.Furthermore,heisamajorpoliticalfigure.YetthetransfersofverylargeamountsofmoneytotheDCRdonotappearcompliantwithhisknowncommercialactivity.FIU investigations have shown that within a two-year period (2011 and 2012),nearly2.5billionCFAfrancs(around€3,000,000)weretransferredbythisecono-micoperatortotheABCNGO.TheABCNGObelongstotwoLebanesebrothers,MoussaandNabil,listedbytheUnitedNationsSanctionsCommitteeasfundraisersfortheHezbollahterroristgroup.Accordingtoinformationreceivedfromforeignpartners, the brothersMoussa andNabil recently forged an alliancewith theAlQaeda in the IslamicMaghreb (AQIM).The intelligencewas transmitted to thestateprosecutor(Article40oftheECCASRegulations).Operationalsecurityser-viceshavebeeninformed.
Source:Cameroun
Case n°3 :FinancingbyforeignsupporterstransitingviaanNPO
Apersonnamed“Chérif”,withnodeclaredoccupation,openedanaccountwithalocalbankinthelastquarterof2014.Oncetheaccountwasopened,aninternatio-naltransferofover360millionCFAfrancs(around548,780euros)wascreditedtotheaccountofMr“Chérif”withoutanyeconomicallyvalidjustification.ThebankfiledareportofsuspicionwiththeFIU.TheFIUinvestigationsinto thepersonsinvolvedandthereasonsforthistransaction,togetherwiththefinancialenviron-mentandactivitiesofMr“Chérif”revealedthefollowing:theaccountinquestionwasopenedsolelyforthepurposesofthisoperation;thetransferwasorderedby
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anNGOfromaEuropeancountry; thefundstransitingtheaccountofMr“Ché-rif”were in fact intended for aMr “Said”, representing a charity that allegedlyworksin theCameroon-Niger-Nigeria-Chadborderareas;accordingtotheinter-nalintelligenceservices,thisNPOisactuallyadummyassociationcontrolledbyBokoHaram,whichusedthecoveroftheassociationviaitsfollowers“Chérif”and“Said”totransferfundsraisedbyitssupportersabroad.Thecaseisduebeforethecompetentcourts;Messrs“Chérif”and“Said”havebeenarrestedandthenetworkiscurrentlybeingdismantled.
Source:Tchad
Case n°4 :Attemptedfinancingviaafraudulenttransferoffunds,abusingbothabankandanNPO.
On6May2012,areportofsuspicionfrombankPreachedtheFIU,reportinganelectronictransferof345,531,367CFAfrancs(around€526,800)sentfromaEu-ropeancountrytoanIslamicNGOwithheadquartersinBirmingham,viathebankaccountofMrV,butforthebenefitofanNGO.Investigationsestablishedthatthiswasafraudulenttransferoffundsmadeelectro-nicallyfromthewebsiteofthecentralbank.Thisinvolvedcybercriminalshackingintothebank’scomputersystem.Thebeneficiary,MrV,representingtheNGOinChad,wasactuallyconductingsubversiveterrorist-relatedactivities.
Source:Tchad
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Thesecasesgiveanideaofthevarietyofformsofmisusetowhichtheterroristsandtheirfinancierssubmitorganisationsnormallydesignedtorelievethedifficul-tiesencounteredbythevulnerablelayersofsociety.TheproliferationofNPOs,to-getherwiththeirdiversityandsourcesoffinancing,whetherprivateorfromabroad,constitutemajorchallengesforauthoritiesinchargeofmonitoringtheiractivitiesandcheckingtheycomplywithregulations,inparticulartheirtermsofreference.Yetstudieshaveshownthatdespitegoodregulationofthesector,NPOsareundertheradarofadministrativeandfinancialsupervision,which,inthecaseofCentralAfrica, does not have sufficient personnel or adequate logistics tomonitor theiractivitiesinthefield.Inaddition,therarityofcommunicationplatformsbetweenthedonorsandthepublicservicesmeansthattheStateshavenoinformationaboutthefinancingofNPOs,which,furthermore,rarelyregistertheirmanagementandfinancialreportswithsupervisoryauthorities,asstipulatedbyregulations.ItshouldbenotedthatChadhaswithdrawnitsaccreditationfromcertainNGOsforhavingoversteppedtheirstatutorymissionsbygettinginvolvedinreligiousactivism.
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Case n°1:Theraisingoffundsviaafinancialmessagingcompany
“Peter”,aCameroonnational,livedinBamendainthenorth-westregionofCame-roon.Hehadnofixedemploymentandearnedmoneyfromasmallcigarettestall.TheattentionoftheFIUwasdrawntoPeter’srepeatedreceptionofWesternUnionmoneytransfersin2014.FIUinvestigationsconcludedasfollows:TherewerenofamilylinksbetweenMrPeterandthepersondispatchingthemoney;Petercollectednearly112millionCFAfrancs(170,731euros)viaWesternUnionbetweenJanuaryandMarch2014;Dis-patchesweredividedintotransactionsofunder1millionCFAfrancs.Thereasonprovided for all these transactionswas “Family assistance to illegal immigrantsof ‘Gamma’ town”.There areno illegal immigrants listedby the administrativeauthorities in the townof“Gamma” located in thenorth-westofCameroon.MrPeter,whoisunknowntoallauthorities,hasnotcarriedoutanysocialactionsinthisregionofCameroon.ThefundsweredispatchedfromSaudiArabia,SouthSu-dan,KenyaandMali;ThefundswereallwithdrawnfromWesternUnionbrancheslocatedinthecombatzonesoftheExtremeNorth,eventhoughtheywereintendedforthe“Immigrantsofthetownof‘Gamma’”locatedintheNorthWest.Thesecu-rityservicesreportedregulartravelbyMrPetertoMaiduguriinNigeria.
Source:Cameroun
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Inlightofitssocio-economiccontext,thesituationoftheCARattractsanincrea-singnumberofcharities,withouttheStatebeingabletosupervisetheiractivities.Thehumanitariancrisisduetotheinfluxofrefugees,returneesandinternallydis-placedpopulationsintheChadBasinhasresultedinacleargrowthincivilsocietyorganisationsoperating,inthecaseofCameroon,undertheregimeofauthorisa-tion,whichcanbeobtainedmorequicklythanNGOaccreditation.
Typology 2 : Misuse of money transfer agencies
In today’sworld,financialmessaging isoneof theweak links in the internatio-nalmechanismsforcombatingthefinancingofterrorism,asitenablespeoplenotknowntofinancialestablishments(walk-inclients)toeasilymovemoneyanywhereintheworld.Theuseoffinancialmessagingcompaniesinthestudiedzoneissprea-dingrapidly,almostentirelyreplacingfaxedmoneyorderswhich,untilthebegin-ningofthe2000s,wastheonlyfastwayoftransferringmoney.Yettheinstabilityoftelephonelines,expansionofdigitaltechnology,upsurgeininsecurityonroadsandnearmarkets,andthedevelopmentoftradeinparticular,havecombinedtofirstlyencouragethecreationordomicilingofMicro-FinanceInstitutions(MFI)inareasofflourishingeconomicactivityandsecondlygeneratewidespreaduseoffinancialmessagingcompanies.
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Case n°1:Misuseofamanualcurrencyexchangeoffice
B.ExchangecurrencyexchangeofficewasbasedinCamville,atownontheborderwithNigeria.Camville(Cameroon)andNigerville(Nigeria)formasinglegeogra-phicaltown,withtheborderconsistingofasimplestreet.Upuntil2012,B.Exchangehadanaverageannualturnoverof100millionCFAfrancs(around€152,500),mainlygeneratedbythesaleofforeigncurrencytoCha-dian,CameroonianandNigerianshopkeepers.Theattentionof theFIUwasdrawn toamassive increase incurrencypurchaseoperationsbyB.Exchangebetween2012and2014.TheresultsoftheFIUinvesti-gationswereasfollows:Between2012and2014,B.Exchangepurchasedcurrencyfromlocalbanksforatotalamountof226billionCFAfrancs(€344.52million).The currency was acquired from local banks on the basis of forged currency pur-chaseauthorisations,allegedlyissuedbytheMinistryofFinance.Theoriginofthefundsusedforthecashpurchaseofsomuchcurrencyfromthebanksisunknown.B.Exchangeusedforgedtraveldocumentsandpassportstoaccountfortheuseoftheacquiredcurrency.RegularcontactbetweenthepromoterofB.ExchangeandcertaincommandersofBokoHaramwerediscoveredbythesecurityservices(oneofthesefightershadbeenkilledduringaskirmishwiththeCameroonArmyandfoundtohavenearly50,000eurosinhispack).TheFIUforwardeditsinformationtothestateprosecutorinDecember2014(Ar-ticle40oftheECCASRegulations).Theoperationalsecurityserviceswerenoti-fied(informationsharedwiththeoperationalintelligenceservices).Thoseinvolvedwerearrested.Theexchangeofficewasshutdown.
Source:Cameroun
The financing of terrorism in Central Africa © 2017
AlongsideforeigncompaniessuchasWesternUnionandMoneyGram,nationalcompanieshavebeencreated,suchastheExpressUnioninCameroon,thathaveopenedbranchesinneighbouringcountriesanddiversifiedtheirrangeofservicestoincludebankingservices.Morerecently,mobiletelephonecompanieshavein-troducedMobileMoney.AswithNPOs,transferringmoneytoreturnees,internallydisplaced populations and refugees outside of camps can carry risks of terrorist financing.Someindicationsofthishaveemergedfromdataprovidedbysecurityservices,whichshowtheconvergenceofsendingsmallamountsofmoneyfromNigeriatobenignpeopleintheExtremeNorthofCameroon.
Typology 3 : Misuse of financial establishments
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Case n°2 :NetworkforraisingandtransferringfundsbyBokoHaramfollowersviaamicro-financeestablishment
Mr“Kala”, aNigeriannational, livedbetweenMaroua andN’Djamena;hewasknowninbothtownsasafarmerofvarioustypesofvegetables.Basedoncertaininformationheldbytheoperationalintelligenceservicesandafteraperiodofob-servationbysaidservices(tailing,phonetapping,etc.),itwasestablishedthatsince2012,Mr“Kala”hadbeeninregularcontact(onceaweek)withBokoHaramfol-lowers,whowerealsobeingtailed.TheoperationalsecurityservicesthenbroughtintheFIUtoinvestigatethebusinessactivitiesofMr“Kala”.FIUinvestigationsrevealedthat:Mr“Kala”heldtwobankaccountsinamicro-fi-nance institution (Beta Finance) with branches in the main cities of the ten Came-roonregions.Histwoaccountswereheldbythe“BetaFinance”branchinKousseri.Whenopeninghisaccountswith“BetaFinance”,Mr“Kala”statedhisoccupationasa“salesman”withoutprovidinganyotherdetails.Heisnotknowntothetaxau-thorities.ThebankaccountsofMr“Kala”operatedexactlyastransitionaccounts,usedbyterroristnetworkstoraisemoneyorbydrugstraffickerstotransfermoney.Indeed, itwasobserved that largeamountsofmoneyweredeposited incashbyseveraldozenindividualsontothetwoaccountsinquestionfrom“BetaFinance”branchesinvariouscitiesinthecountry.Themoneythusdepositedwasthenim-mediatelywithdrawn in cashbyMr “Kala” inKousseri. In total, 38.789billionCFAfrancs(around€59,500,000)werethusraisedbythisnetworkbetween2012and2015.83Cameroon,Chad,MaliandNigeriannationalswereidentifiedasde-positorsofcashintothetwoaccountsofMr“Kala”incitiesinseveralregionsofCameroon.Thesedepositorshavenobusinessactivitythatcouldpotentiallyjustifypossessionofsuchcapital;thetotaldepositedbysomeofthemduringthisperiodexceeded1billionCFAfrancs.Whenwithdrawingthemoneyfromthe“BetaFi-nance”branchinKousseri,Mr“Kala”wasalwaysaccompaniedbytwoindividuals(suspectedbysecurityservicestobeBokoHaramlogisticians).Thiscaseisstillbeinginvestigatedbysecurityservices.Thedepositorsarestillbeingtrackeddownandarrested.
Source:Cameroun
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Manualexchangeoperationsconstituteoneofthekeyvulnerabilitiesinterroristfi-nancing,duelargelytotheuseofcurrencyininternationalcommercialtransactions(thebuyingofweapons)andtheeaseofmovinglargesumsofmoneyinverysmallvolumes(useof€500notes).
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Case n°1 :Financingviatraditionalbusinessactivities
AreportofsuspicionsenttotheFIUdenouncedasuspicioustransactionbetweenacompanyXsellingmiscellaneousproducts(foammattresses,plasticmats,etc.)anda foreignoperatorM.This transaction involved the transferof176,203,000CFAfrancs (around€268,602)orderedbycompanyX for thebenefitof foreignoperatorMfortheprovisionofaservicetobeperformedonthenationalterritorybycompanyX.FIUinvestigationsrevealedthat:operatorMisinfactacoverusedbyBokoHa-ramleaders;companyXisadummycompanycontrolledbytheBokoHaramsect.CompanyXwasformedtorepatriatefundsgeneratedviafictitiousserviceprovi-sionagreements.TheactualbeneficiaryofthefinancialtransactionswastheBokoHaramsectvia its followers inChad.Following the investigation, thiscasewaspassedontothecompetentcourts.Arrestshavebeenmadeandthecaseispendinginthecourts.
Source:Chad
The financing of terrorism in Central Africa © 2017
This case also illustrates the vulnerabilities of the financial sector in general inthese areas where business transactions with immediate neighbours and the areas forobtainingsuppliesofarangeofgoods,arerapidlyexpanding.Rulesofcautionare not always followed in the case of economic operators open to the outside world andwhocansuddenlyincreasetheirfinancialsurface.Theyalsobearwitnesstothesignificantriskofeconomic-identitynetworksbeingexploitedbyterrorism,whichusespre-existingbusinessrelationsandpersonalrelationshipsforitsownbenefit.The second case fully demonstrates the advantage of encouraging cooperationbetweennationalintelligenceunitsandoperationalintelligenceservicesforachie-vingbetterresultsintrackingdownterroristfinancing.Italsotakesintoaccountthetrans-nationalisationoffundraisingnetworkscontrolledbyBokoHaramfollowers,involvingCameroon,Nigeria,MaliandChadnationals.Furthermore,thecasesug-gests the urgency for increasing the sharing of information between neighbouring countriesandbetweencountriesbelongingtoseparatesub-regionssubjectedtoaterroristthreat.Italsohighlightsthevulnerabilityofmicro-financeinstitutionswithrespecttomisuseforthepurposesoffinancingterrorism.TheseMFIhaveincreasedinnumberinborderzones, improvingtheperceptioncertaineconomicoperatorspreviouslyhadofbanks,preferringastheydidtocarrysubstantialamountsofmo-neyoftenkeptathome.TheirvulnerabilitytomoneylaunderinginCentralAfricawasalreadysomewhatperceptible.
Typology 4 : Illicit trafficking
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Case n°2:Pillagingoflivestock
Duringthefirstquarterof2014,anassociationofChadianlivestocksellersleavingNigeriaonfootwith2,030cattlewasrobbedofitsanimalsbymembersofBokoHaram, on the border and onNigerian territory.On 8March 2016, inMidai, aNigerianvillageontheborderwithChad,BokoHarammembersstole700cattlefromthelocalpopulation.Thesetwooperationsprovidedthesectwithresourcesequivalentto2730x300,000CFAfrancs,namely819millionCFAfrancs(around1.248millioneuros).
Source:Chad
Case n° 3:BokoHaramfinancingviaincomefromlivestocktheft
In2013,alocalbankfiledareportofsuspiciontotheFIU,describingasuspiciousoperation.ThisinvolvedacashdepositfollowedbythewithdrawalofalldepositedfundsbyaMr“Rabia”.Followingan investigationby theFIU incooperationwithnationalsecurityser-vices, it emerged that:Mr “Rabia”was a national from a country neighbouringChad;HeenteredChadon14February2013carrying79.75millionCFAfrancs(€122,000)incash;thisamountwasdepositedinthebankaccountopenedforthispurposewiththesaidbank.Thismoneywasallegedlyincomefromthesaleofli-vestockbyMr“Rabia”.TheaforementionedwasidentifiedasamemberofBokoHaramandthelivestocksoldcamefromthevariouspillagingbytheterroristgroupoflocalfarmers.TheFIUpassedthecaseontothecompetentcourtsandMr“Ra-bia”wasarrested.
Source:Chad
Case n° 4 :Livestocktheftandcross-bordertrafficking
The recurrenceof livestock theft recordedbyadministrativeauthorities,defenceandsecurityforcesandtraditionalauthorities,togetherwiththeincreaseinprose-cutionsrelatingtotheseactsintheareaofMayoSava(Cameroon),adjoiningnor-th-eastNigeria,areseriousgroundsforsuspectingthatBokoHaramterroristsaremakinguseofthismethodoffinancing.Asthedecentraliseddepartmentsoflives-tock,fisheriesandanimalindustries(MINEPIA)recordalltypesoflivestockmo-
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vementwithintheirjurisdiction,theGABACcontactedtheMinisterinquestiontorequestaconsolidatedassessmentoflivestocktheftinthezonesaffectedbyBokoHaram.Afieldmissionofthesaidministryincludedthisconcerninitsagenda.Asummaryofcollecteddataestablishesthefollowinglosses:31,101cattle,19,306small ruminants and 4,003 poultry.The financial assessment is as follows: “thefinancialassessmentrecordsfinancialworthof8,553,414,500CFAfrancs(around€13,000,000).The species concerned are cattle,mainly stolen by terrorists, fol-lowedbysmallruminantsandthenpoultry.Horses,donkeysandcamelshavenotberecorded”.Inlightofthiswidespreadtrafficking,theGovernoroftheExtremeNorthRegionhasorderedthetemporaryclosureof21cattlemarkets.
Source:MINEPIA/Cameroun,“RapportdelaMissiond’évaluationdesrépercus-sionsdel’insécuritéliéeauxexactionsdel’organisationterroristeBokoHaramsurlesous-secteurélevageetpêche[ReportbytheAssessmentMissionontheeffectsofinsecurityrelatedtoexactionsoftheBokoHaramterroristorganisationonthefarmingandfishingsub-sector]”,June2016.
Case n° 5 :Motorcycletrafficking
Following the suicideattacksof June2015 inN’Djamena, investigationsby thesecurity committee implemented in Chad led to the dismantling of a motorcycle traffickingnetworkonbehalfofBokoHaram.Thisoperatedasfollows:acourierappointedbyBokoHaramdeliversre-sellers(alsoappointedbyBokoHaram)motorcyclesinspareparts,forreassemblingandsellingon the localmarket. Income from the sales is passedonto a collector inchargeof transferring it incash to theBokoHarambase.Whenquestioned, thesuspectsdeclared thata re-sellercould receivearound30motorcyclespermon-th.Eachmotorcycleissoldforbetween400,000(around€610)and500,000CFAfrancs(around€762).Thesamesourcescitedthenamesoffinancialintermediariesand routes along the chain which leads from where the motorcycles are sold to reci-pientsofthecashintheSambisaForest.SecuritysourcesmentionedthattheleaderoftheBokoHaramcellinN’DjamenahadpreviouslybeeninvolvedinmotorcycletraffickinginaCameroontown,beforemovingawayforfearofbeingrecognisedbythedisplacedpopulationsthatwerefloodingin.
Source:Chad
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Thesecases represent a sampleof the localfinancingopportunitieswhichBokoHaramcanaccess.Firstly,thereiscapitalisationofthefoodindustrybytakingoverorparticipatinginthesupplyofeverydayfoodstuffs.
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Case n° 1 :FinancingofBokoHarambyaneconomicoperator
In2012,abankfiledareportofsuspiciondenouncingunusualoperationsperfor-medbyaneconomicoperatornamedMr“Tango”.Indeed,Mr“Tango”,anocca-sionalclientofsaidbank,orderedamoneytransferviaaninternationalfinancialmessagingcompanyof89.67millionCFAfrancs(€137,000)forthebenefitofMr“Nono”,residinginaGulfstate.TheactivityofMr“Nono”,togetherwiththeeco-nomicreasonsforthetransactionandtheoriginofthetransferredfunds,hadnotbeenclearlyprovidedforthebank.Following the investigations performed by theFIU, both as regards internal in-telligence sources/financial institutions and certain diplomatic representations, itemergedthat:accordingtothedeclarationsofMr“Tango”,thetransactionwassup-posedtocoverhotelcosts;Mr“Nono”isaWestAfricannationalidentifiedbyse-curityservicesduetohisterroristactivitiesintheSahel,mainlywithBokoHaram.TheFIUreferredthecasetothecourtsandMrTangowasarrestedforfinancingterrorism.
Source:Chad
Case n° 2 :Illicitfinancialgainandfacilitatingthecommittingofterroristactsbyan economic operator
Inthefirsthalfof2015,aMrIdainvitedaMrKarkabi,residinginKousseri(Ca-meroon),toN’DjamenatopickupcertainmembersofhisfamilyanddrivethemtoKousseri,whereanotherpersonwouldbewaitingtotakethemtoNigeria.WhentheyarrivedinKousseri,theywerearrestedbysecurityservicesasaresultofthe
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Fishandmeatarethetwosourcesofanimalprotein,consumeddailyinmassivequantities,withapermanentsub-regionaldemand.Thesearesourcesoffastwealth.Secondly,thereistheareaofmanufacturedproducts,whichplayaroleintransport,weddingsandhomes,etc.Motorcyclesarenowthemethodoftransportcompetingwithbuses for short-distance inter-urban transport, exceeding taxis in somecityareas.Theyare themain instrument for smugglingbetween thecountriesof theChadBasin.This typology is essential forunderstanding the specificitiesof ter-rorismanditsfinancingintheChadBasin,asitisthecentrepieceoftherelationbetweeneconomictraditionsandcriminalpractice.Furthermore,itcallsonStatestoimprovetheircontrolovercross-borderexchanges,involvingserviceswhicharenotnormallyassociatedwithcombatingterroristfinancing.
Typology 5 : Financing by economic operators
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intelligencetheypossessedwithrespecttothefamily.InvestigationsrevealedthatKarkabiwasaninformalChadiantransporter,wellknowninthecityofKousseri.Foratleastsixyears,hehadbeensmugglingweaponsbetweenChadandCame-roononhismotorcycle.At thebeginning,heworkedwithaMrKasko,residinginBlangoua,towhomhedeliveredbagsofmilletcontaininghiddenAK-47typeassaultweapons.Theseweaponshadbeenobtainedat theAbéchébusstation inN’DjamenafromacertainAbouky,whohimselfobtainedthemfromtheChad-Su-dan border.Theweapons thatKarkabi transportedwere then sold byKaskoauxwaysiderobbers,knownas“roadblockers”.Receiving30,000CFAfrancsforeachweapondelivered,hewasabletobuildupasmallfortuneanddecidedtobuyacarwithwhichhecouldearnevenmoremoney.AidedbytheBokoHaramphenome-non,hebecamefriendswith“Ida”,aNigerianinthepayoftheterroristgroupforwhichhedeliveredweaponsandexplosives.UsingKarkabi’svehicle,theyconti-nuedtosupplytheterroristbaseslocatedinNigeriaviaChadandCameroon.OnceIdahadbeenidentifiedasthemastermindbehindtheN’Djamenaattacks,investi-gationswerecarriedoutbyCameroonandChadsecurityservicestoestablishtheidentityofothermembersofthenetwork.
Source:Cameroun
Case n° 3 : Logistical support for a terrorist group
On10January2015inMora,“Ripo”and“Isaka”werearrestedbythepoliceforbreachingsecuritydirectivesinforceinthislocation,whichhadbeenatargetforterroristattacks.Subsequent investigations established that Isakawas the tribal chief of theOruregion,fromwherehehadfledin2013duetoBokoHaramattacks,beforeseekingrefugeinIbashi,whereheformedafriendshipwithRipoandamannamedKasko.Together,theydecidedtosendfueltoOru,wheretherewasanestablishedneed.Initially,thiswasfordrivingmillstogrindthecerealsbelongingtoKaskoinordertofeedtheremainingpopulation.Tothisend,Ripo,thevigilancecommitteecoor-dinatorofMviam,wascalledupontocarryoutthetask.HehadtocollectdrumsofdieselthathadbeendepositedbyKaskoinMoukissa’sshop.KaskoalsotravelledtoOru,carryingfoodstuffsofallkinds.Ripo,however,whoreceivedthedeliveriesofdiesel,handedthemovertoanyindividualwhointroducedthemselvesasanem-ployeeofKasko.Hetookadvantageofthesituationtosupplyaverylargequantityofdieseltohischildhoodfriend,acertainIbasso,knownbythesecurityforcesasahighlyactiveagentfromtheBokoHaramterroristgroup.Similarly,Kasko,whoclaimedtotheoperatinghismills,didnothowevermakeanyprofits.
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Investigations established thatKaskowas sending fuel to themembersofBokoHaramwhowereroamingtheareasofLimaniandOmaka.
Source:Cameroun
Case n° 4:Supplyofproductsusedtocommitactsofterrorism
On24March2014inthecityofKousseri,amannamedAkoutouwasarrestedbyasecurityforcespatrol.HewassuspectedofbeingamemberoftheBokoHaramsect.In2002,followingthedeathofhisfatherandduetoincreasingfamilydifficulties,AkoutoulefthisvillagetojoinhiselderbrotherKemtainKousseri.Thebrotherownedadomesticgasbottlesupplystoreinthecity.Onhisarrival,heenrolledinaKoranicschool,wheretheteacherintroducedhimtoamancalledAkim,amemberofBokoHaramlivinginBanki.Alongsidehisreligiousstudies,hebecameinvol-vedinhiselderbrother’sactivity,whichmainlyconsistedoftraffickingdomesticgasbottles.TomeettheconstantincreaseindemandfromAkim,hestartedtravel-lingregularlytoChadwherehepurchasedanumberof12kgbottlesat12,000CFAfrancsapiece.Hethensiphonedthegasoffinto6kgbottlesanddeliveredtheminlargequantitiestoAkim,whousedthemtomakeimprovisedexplosivedevices.Hethensoldtheothersat8,000CFAfrancsabottlethroughthestandardchannels.On24March2014,Akoutouwasarrestedinthecompanyofotherindividuals,inparti-cularamannamedBika,whosecellphonecontainedBokoHaramvideos.Anotherofhiscompanions,Dodoum,wasarrestedbysecurityforces inMarouaandfor-mallyidentifiedbyanumberofwitnessesasapreacherinthepayofBokoHaram
Source:Cameroun
Aswiththecasesofmanualcurrencyexchange,thesegiveanideaoftheambiguitythatcancovertheactivitiesofeconomicoperators,especiallyinborderareas.Ope-ningoutwards,whetheronalocalorinternationallevel,isobviouslyariskfactorforinteractionwithterroristnetworks,especiallyincountriesunderthethreatofterro-rism.Theyhighlighttheneedtofindacompromisebetweenfreeexerciseofecono-micactivityandthestrengtheningofcontrolsonmoneytransfertransactionsofallkinds,andtheinvolvementofservicesinchargeoftransportincreatingdatabasesofaccreditedtransporters.Thelownumberofvehiclechecksandthehighnumberofsmugglingroutesfacilitatethetraffickingofarms,which,inthiscase,aredeliveredinsmallquantitiestoBokoHaramviaillegalcross-bordertransportoperators.Thesecond case also shows how criminal players are reproduced with changes in the practicesoforganisedcrime.Thetwoothercasesonceagainillustratestheurgentneedtoinvolveservicesinchargeoftradeandtransport,aswellasunions,inthepreventionofterrorism,particularlythecommittingofterroristacts.
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Case n° 1 : Collecting and remitting funds by cash couriers
Whencontrollingthebordercrossingsofpersonsandgoods,thesecurityservicesintercepted a large quantity of different currencies hidden in goods belonging to a MrZ,anationalofaWestAfricancountry.Thiscurrencycomprised:- 568,000eurosin500-euronotes(1,136notes)- 460,000eurosin100-euronotes(4,606notes)- 135,000Bahraindinarsin20-dinarnotes(6,750notes).Investigationsestablishedthat:- MrZ,anationalofaWestAfricancountry,hadalreadytravelledtoChadonseveraloccasionsasatourist.- MrZwasacashcourieridentifiedbythesecurityservices.- HewasamemberoftheBokoHaramterroristgroup.MrZwasarrestedandtheseizedcurrencywasplacedunderseal.
Source:Chad
Case n°1 : Financing through forced contributions
UndertheinvestigationscarriedoutfollowingtheJune2015attacks,severalsus-pectedmembersofBokoHaramwerearrestedinChad.Duringquestioning,theynamedahighlyrespected tribalandreligious leadernamedDaoud, living in theLakeChadregion,asaBokoHaramactivist.TheauthoritiesweresurprisedattheinvolvementandparticipationofthisrespectablecharacterinBokoHaramfinan-
Typology 6 : Collecting and remitting funds
Typology 7 : Extortion
Thiscaseraisestheproblematicissueofthecirculationofcashinthestudiedarea.Despite the risks arising from lack of security due to the frequency of armed at-tacks,economicoperatorshavecontinuedtotransportlargesumsofmoney.Thelengthoftheborders,numerouscrossingpointsandbackroadsforavoidingcus-toms,insufficientsecurityforcesallocatedtomonitorborderareasandcorruptionamonggovernmentofficialsarejustsomeofthefactorsthatencouragethephysicalcarryingofcash.Thefactthatthismoneyisoftenkeptinhomesmakesitdifficulttodetermineitsoriginandvolume,ortrackthemovementsofcouriers.Itischancesearches,whichhavebecomeroutineduetoBokoHaram,thatleadtomoneyhid-deningoodsbeingdiscovered,asisalsothecasewithweaponsandmunition.
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cingandrecruitment.Investigationsbysecurityservicesestablishedthat:- DaoudhadbeenactivelycollaboratingwithBokoHaramsincethebegin-ningofitsactivitiesintheLakeregion.- Accordingtohisdeclarations,thiswasaforcedcollaborationinexchangeforprotectionofhiscommunityandgoodsfromthescourgeofBokoHaram.- Tothisend,Daoudcollectedmoney,suppliesandcattlefromhiscommu-nity,whichhethenforwardedmonthlytoBokoHaramchiefs.- Youngsterswerealso recruitedascontributionsofyoungmen fromeachfamily.Daoudwasarrestedbythesecurityforcesforfinancingterrorism.
Source:Tchad
Case n° 2 : Financing through illegal payments
AmajorChadianeconomicoperatorofNigerianorigin,withasignificantpartofhisfamilyinNigeria,wascitedbyterroristsarrestedundertheinvestigationsconduc-tedsubsequenttotheJune2015attacksasoneoftheBokoHaramfinanciers.Thesecurityservicesidentifiedandarrestedhim.Afterquestioning,headmittedpaying5,000,000CFAfrancseachmonthintheformofchequesmadeouttoanindividualholdinganaccountwithalocalbank.Hedeclaredthathehadnevermetthepersoninquestion.ThesemonthlypaymentsweremadetoprotecthisfamilylivingunderdeaththreatsinNigeria.InvestigationsbyintelligenceservicesconfirmedthatthiseconomicoperatordidindeedhavefamilylivinginKanoandMaiduguri.Thebankalsoconfirmedmonthlypaymentsof5,000,000CFAfrancsfromhisaccountduringtheprevioustwoyears.ThebeneficiaryofthechequeswasidentifiedbyterroristsarrestedaftertheaforementionedattacksasoneofthelocalBokoHaramchiefs.Bothheandtheeconomicoperatorwerebroughtbeforethecompetentcourts.
Source:Chad
This case demonstrates continuity between the methods used by organised crime andthoseadoptedbyterrorists.BetweentheperiodofwaysiderobberiesandtheemergenceofterrorisminCentralAfrica,therewasalmostadecadeofprosperityofkidnappingswiththepaymentofransoms.Fromthenorth-westoftheCARtotheshoresofLakeChad,theelderchildrenofPeullineages,thechildrenoffarmersandtradespeopleandtheirchildrenhaveinparticularbeenkidnappedbyvariousgroupsthathavethendemandedandobtainedthepaymentofransoms.
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From2003 onwards, tens of thousands of farmers, sometimes deprived of theircattlewhichtheyhavehadtoselltomeetthekidnappers’demands,movedawayfrominsecureareastofindrefugeinneighbouringcountries.Despitethepresenceofsecurityforces,manyfamilieshavepreferredtopaytheransomsaskidnappershavebeenknowntoexecuteanumberofhostageswhenthemoneyhasnotbeenpaid.Thisphenomenon is continuing in theRegionofAdamaoua inCameroon.Unwillingly,parentsareparticipatinginthefinancingoforganisedcrimeand,intheaforementionedcase,tothefinancingofBokoHaram.Thisappliestocommunityleadersandfamilies,whohavefacedthedilemmaofgivingintothedemandsofBokoHaramorfleeing.CameroonandChadian securityand legal sourceshavereportedonthispredicamentofhavingtochoosebetweenthesurvivalinstinctorcomplicitywithaterroristorganisation.
Case n°1 : Financing of armed groups and terrorist acts by politically exposedpersons
In2003,an“Alpha”countrywasrepeatedlyattackedonitsborderwiththe“Beta”countrybyanarmedgroupfrom“Beta”whichinitiallyhadnogrievancewith“Al-pha”.TheinterceptionoftelephonecallsbyleadersofthearmedgrouprevealedasignificantnumberofcallstoaMr“Sam”,aneconomicoperatorandpoliticianwhoisanationalandresidentofthe“Alpha”country,whohadbusinessrelationswithanumberoftradersinthe“Beta”country.Investigations conducted into money transfer institutions and mobile telephoneoperators revealed that: itwas at the request of “Yota”, a politician, citizen andresidentofthe“Alpha”countrythat“Sam”allegedlyenteredintocontactwiththearmedgroupviaitspartners,thefinancialpreyofthesaidgroup.ThisinvolvedYotainflictingterrorinthispartofthe“Alpha”country,aftertheterroristthreatthathademergedinanotherpartofthiscountry.TheterroristactsandmedicalcareofthegroupwerefinancedbyYotaeitherbymoneytransferredtothegroupleadersorbycashcarriedbySam,whofrequentlytravelledtothe“Beta”country.
Conclusion:YotaandSamcommittedthecrimeofterrorismfinancing,asdefinedbytheECCASRegulationsandotherlegalprovisions.Thiscaseisstillbeingun-dergoingadjudicationinthenationalcourtsofthe“Alpha”country.
Case n° 2 : Financing of terrorism and the laundering of the proceeds of terrorism by a local politician
Mr“MOTO”,anationalofcountry“A”ofCentralAfrica,highlypopularamongthepeopleofhisregionoforigin,wascontactedbytheauthoritiesoftheRepublic
Typology 8 : Financing by politically exposed persons
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tonegotiatethereleaseofforeigntouriststakenhostagebytheBokoHaramterro-ristgroup.Thedemandedandnegotiatedransomwaspaidandthehostageswerereleased. Shortly after, other kidnappings occurred and the same procedurewasfollowedtoreleasethehostages.Investigationsundertakenrevealedthefollowing:Withoutbeingamemberoftheterroristorganisation,MrMotoallegedlyhadacquaintanceswithwhomhemain-tainedintelligencetohisbenefit.Afterthefirstnegotiations,MrMotoputhimselfforwardasacandidateandthenwonthelocalelections.Hiscampaignwasfinancedby the commission received from thenegotiation.MrMoto’s standardof livingallegedlysuddenlyincreasedandhedevelopedanumberofbusinessactivities.Af-terthefirstreleasetransaction,hehimselforganisedandfinancedotherkidnappingoperations,assistedbyhisacquaintanceswhoweremembersoftheterroristorgani-sation.ItwasestablishedthatMrMotocommittedthecrimeoffinancingterrorism,aswellaslaunderingtheproceedsofterrorism,asstipulatedandpunishableunderlegalprovisionsinforce.MrMotoandseveralofhisacolyteswerebroughtbeforetherelevantcourts.
Case n°1 : Financing through hostage ransoms
In2013and2014,BokoHaramcarriedoutseveraloperationsthatresultedinthekidnappingofpeopleintheExtremeNorthofCameroon.Fouroftheoperationswerespecificallyaimedatkidnappingdesignatedtargets.Securitysourcesstatethefollowing facts:- On16May2014,BokoHarammembersattackedtheofficesofaChineseroadconstructioncompanyinWazaintheareaofLogoneandChari.Theyseized10Chinesemembersofthestaff,10vehiclesandexplosives;- On19February2013,sevenFrenchtouristswerekidnappedneartheWazaNationalParkintheExtremeNorthofCameroon.BokoHaramconfirmeditwasholdingthem;- InNovember2013,aFrenchpriestwaskidnapped inNguetchewein theExtremeNorthofCamerooninanoperationapparentlyco-ordinatedbyBokoHa-ramanditsAnasarudissidence;- InApril2014,twoItalianpriestsandaCanadiannunwerekidnappedintheparishofTchérénearMaroua,byarmedmenbelongingtoBokoHaram;- On22July2014,hundredsofheavilyarmedindividualsbelongingtoBokoHaramstormedthelocalityofKolofataintheareaofMayoSava,followinganin-filtrationduringthenightfromtheNigerianborder.Itwasthedaybeforeareligiousfestivalinvolvinghundredsofpeoplethathadcometopayhomagetoamajorpo-liticalfigurewhooriginatedfromthetown.Thisparticularlyviolentattackresulted
Typology 9 : Kidnapping with demands for ransom
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inthekidnappingof17people,includingthewifeofthepolitician.Allthehostageswerereleasedfollowingnegotiations.Noofficialsourcehasconfir-medthepaymentofaransom.However,anumberofcluestendtosuggestthiswasthe case :- Banknotes,probablypartoftheransom,wereseized;- Oneofthenegotiatorswasarrestedbythesecurityservicesandisstillheldincustody;- Onepersonwasarrestedandremainsincustodyinrelationtothekidnappings;- Certainintermediariesinthenegotiationshavebeenbroughtbeforethecourts.
Source:cross-referencingofsecurity,legalandopensources
Case n° 1 : MrsAminawasastallholderattheseasonalmarketofDoumbère,whereshesolda rangeof consumergoods, aswell as second-hand items. InApril 2016, alongwith eight otherwomen, shewas arrested by the security forces.Threemonthspreviously,thelocalityofDoumiahadbeenlootedbyagroupofarmedindividualsusingtrucks.Theypillagedthe locality,ransackingshopsandstoreswhichwereemptiedoflargequantitiesofconsumergoodsandvariousitemsofequipment.MrHosha,ashopkeeper,whohadnumerouskitchenutensilsstolen,thensawseveralcookingpotsfromhisstockforsalebyMrsAminaonthemarketinDoumbère.In-vestigationsrevealedthatMrsAminaandhercompanionswereregularlysuppliedbyadormantbranchofBokoHaram,whogavethemproductsandobjectstosell.Theyalsoreceivedremuneration.Atthetimeoftheirarrest,theyhadalreadybeenactiveforatwo-yearperiod,duringwhichtimetheyhadsoldmanyitemsinvariouslocalmarkets.
Case n° 2 :
InJuly2015,mennamedAlidou,BouskaandIsmawerearrestedbythesecurityforcesafterbeingdenouncedbytheheadoftheBirdinalocality.BouskahadcometothevillageandbeenprovidedwithaccommodationbybrothersAlidouandIsma.
Typology 10 : Ambushes and looting
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TheattentionofthevillageheadwasdrawntothefactthatBouskahadanampu-tated arm and followed an intensive care programme involving a large quantityofdrugs.Thevillageheadnotified the security forceswhich for some timehadbeenlookingforagroupofindividualsthathadransackedthepharmacyofKountiHospitalCentre,stealingmorethan10tonsofdrugsandarangeofpharmaceuti-calitems.DescriptionsofthecriminalsprovidedduringtheinvestigationmatchedthoseofAlidou,BouskaandIsma,whosegrouphadjustclashedwithanationaldefenceforceofthecountry,resultingintheinjuryofBouska,whohadmanagedtoescape.TheirquestioningrevealedthatthestolendrugshadbeentransferredtothegeneralstaffoftheBokoHaramterroristgroup.
Casen°1:Thesaleandexchangeofpoachedproducts
TheChadiandefenceandsecurityforceshavearrestedpoachersoriginatingfromseveralcountries.Theywereinpossessionofarangeofwildlifeproducts(espe-ciallyelephanttusks)resultingfromtheircriminalactivities.AmongthearrestedpoacherswereseveralterroristslistedasmembersoftheLRA,andmembersoftheSelekagroup.Whenquestioned,theystatedtheywereonanassignmentorderedbytheirrespectivegeneralstaffstoexchangethesewildlifeproductsforweapons,
Aswithcattleandfish,therearesomanyspecificcaseswithinthistypologythatitvergesonalistofInBriefnewsitems.Attackstargetingtrucksandpassengertrans-portvehicles,togetherwithraidstoplundergoods,arenumerousanddailyoccur-rences.Theysometimesdemonstratetheconfusionbetweenorganisedcrimeandterrorism.Accordingtothetestimoniesofvictimsandthesecuritysources,theseattacksformthemainmethodofprovidingsuppliestoBokoHaramunitsspreadoverdifferentareas.Insomecases,theseareintentionaldeliveriesofsupplies,dis-guisedasattacksonthetruckstransportingthem.This iswhere it isworth remembering that asmembership of BokoHaram in-creases, recruits are obliged to self-finance from the spoils resulting from theseattacks.ThesameobservationappliestotheLRA,whofrequentlypillageandcarryoutotheraggressionsonthebelongingsofpeopleintheEastoftheCAR,inparti-cular.AccordingtotheLRACrisisTracker,“TheLRA(…)conducted145lootingsbetweenJune2011andJune2012…looting,orthestealingofgoods,isseriousandlife-alteringforgeographicallyandeconomicallyisolatedcommunities.WhentheLRAlootsacommunity,theyarerobbingthatcommunityofnotonlyitsresources,butalsoitslivelihood;andacrosstheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRCongo)andCentralAfricanRepublic(CAR),theLRAcommitsthisatrocitydaily17.«
Typologiy n° 11 : Crime involving wildlife
17 http://invisiblechildren.com/blog/2014/06/18/lra-lootings-and-its-life-altering-effects/43
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carsandsupplies,orelsetosellthem.ThepurchasersinthiscriminalnetworkaretheheadsoftheJanjaweedgroupbasedinDarfur,withwhomtheLRAandSelekahavebusinessrelations.Duringthisoperation,thedefenceforcesrecoveredandconfiscatedawarweaponintheirpossession.AssistedbytheconsularservicesofaWesterncountry,itwasestablishedthatthisweaponhadbeenlawfullyacquiredbytheUgandanarmyin1999.
Source:Chad
Case n° 2:Riskoffishingandtheillegaltrafficoffishproducts
ThebanimposedbyNigeronsellingfishfromLakeChadledtheCameroonau-thoritiestotakeaninterestintheriskoftheillegalexploitationofthisresourcebyBokoHaraminitssectionsoftheLake.Observationofthefishmarketrevealedthatcatcheswereindeclineandthequantitiessoldhadbeenhalvedoverathree-yearperiod,withfishermennolongerallowedaccesstothefishingareasorhavingsimplygivenuptheactivity.Thecumulativeeffectofthereductionamountedtoa lossofbusinessevaluatedat8,554,296,000CFAfrancs (around€13,000,000).AsinsecurityhadledtothedepartureoffishermenfromtheLakeChadarea,thishadan improvisedeffectofacircumstantialbiological restperiod.Thisresultedinanincreaseinnumberandstrongdevelopmentoffishingresources,leadingtolargercatchesandlargerfish.Thisnowprovidesbaitfortheterroristswhotargetthefishermenattractedbythisboon,whohavenohesitationinfishingdespitethedangerstowhichtheyareexposingthemselves.
Source:MINEPIA/Cameroun,“RapportdelaMissiond’évaluationdesrépercus-sionsdel’insécuritéliéeauxexactionsdel’organisationterroristeBokoHaramsurlesous-secteurélevageetpêche[ReportbytheAssessmentMissionontheeffectsofinsecurityrelatedtoexactionsoftheBokoHaramterroristorganisationonthefarmingandfishingsub-sector]»,June2016
Thistypologyraisestheincreasingproblemofenvironmentalcrime.Armedgroupsareresponsibleforthewidespreadtakingofnaturalresourcesandprotectedspaces.Despite the security and regulatory measures taken to protect elephants in parti-cular, their tusks are at the core of increased traffickingbetweenCentralAfricaand Asia18.Thedeterminationofpoachersismatchedbytheiroperatingmethods,which involvemobilisingsmallarmiesandusingheavyweaponry.Thiswas thecaseinJanuary2012,withthemassacreofhundredsofelephantsfortheirtusksintheBoubaNdjiddaReserveinCameroon.
18 https://www.savetherhino.org/rhino_info/thorny_issues/is_elephant_and_rhino_poaching_funding_terrorism44
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V.2. Risk indicators and red flags
V.2.1. Risk indicators of the financing of terrorism
Thesearenotformalcases,butprobablemechanisms.
• Productionandsaleofagriculturalproducts:peoplelivingontheshoresofLakeChadreceivemodestamountsofmoneyfromBokoHaramintheformofloanstofinance thegrowingofpotatoes,onionsandothervegetablesandsell themonlocalmarkets.(Securitysources).
• Informalmanualcurrencyexchange:aCameroonFIUreportstatesthattheactivityofmanualcurrencyexchangeisflourishinginDoualaandYaoundé.Thismainlyinvolvesprivateoperators,mostlyoriginatingfromMali, theIvoryCoast,Senegal andGuinea. Informalmanual currency exchangewaswidespread in theAmchidé-Bankiregionbeforelocalswereforcedtoleavetheareaduetoinsecurity.BokoHaramhadinstalledoneofitsbasesinBanki.
• Preciousmetaltrafficking:thecontrolofAnti-Balaka,ex-Selekaandotherpolitico-militaryarmedgroupsovertheminingareasofCARislikelytopromotetraffickingforterroristgroupsoperatinginCentralAfricaandbeyond.
AlthoughthesepoacherscamefromChad,investigationshaveshownthatpoachersalsocome fromother countries, especiallySudan.Linkshaveemergedwith theJanjaweed,whoareinvolvedinarmstraffickingintoCentralAfrica.Thisisacriminaleconomyfinancedbyresourcesraisedviacriminalactsandrein-vestedintraffickingaimedatmaintainingorganisedcrime,includingterrorism.Inthiscontext,itappearsincreasinglyevidentthatAlShabbab,theJanjaweedandtheLRAareengagedin the lucrative traffickingofrhinoceroshornandivory toAsia.InvestigationsbyCentralAfricansecurityserviceshavealsoshownthativo-rystoredontheCentralAfricanterritoryisexchangedbymembersoftheLRAforuniforms,weapons, chargers andmunition supplied by the Janjaweedmilitia ofDarfur.Theydelivertheivorytointermediaries,whothensellitontotheAsianmarkets.Asanexample,thediscoveryofastashofelephanttusksintheCentralAfricanjunglenearDjéma(north-eastCAR,closetoDarfur)furtherconfirmedtheimportanceofpoachinginthemechanismsforfinancingtheLRA19.Advancedmilitarytrainingofeco-wardens,togetherwithmilitarisedprotectionofwildlifereservesandmonitoringofisolateddepositsofgemsneedtobestrengthe-ned inmost countries on account of thegold rushobserved inChad, continuedattacks on elephants in Cameroon and the CAR and many other forms of illegal ac-cesstonaturalresources.Thissituationonceagainraisestheneedforcross-borderpartnerships.
19 Sources : Journal de Bangui du 12 février 2013, Ministère des eaux et forêts de la RCA.45
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V.2.2. Risk indicators of the expansion of terrorism and red flags
• BokoHarammembersarrestedfollowingtheN’DjamenaattacksrevealedtheexistenceofcellsinotherareasofChadandKousseri,inparticular;
• ThepersistenceofviolentextremisminCAR,whichislikelytoattractjihaditerroristgroups;
• PiracyattacksonpetroltankersinGaboneseterritorialwatersin2015andwide-scalepoachingintheMikebeborderareabetweenCameroonandtheCongobothcontributetotheriskofterrorismfinancingactivitiesexpandingintothispartofCentralAfrica.Thiszonecontainsnationalsofanumberofcountries(Gabonese,Cameroonians,Congolese,CentralAfricans,Chadians,Senegalese,Burkinabes,Malians,Chinese,Malaysians,GhanaiansandLebanese,etc.),whocarryoutnumerousoffences,includingpoaching,miningpreciousmetals(includinggold)anddeforestation;
• NationalsfromCameroonandChad,trainedinterrorismintheranksofBokoHaram,whichhasrecruitedtheminlargenumbers,constituteanongoing,latentthreat;
• Theabsencesofarofanyde-radicalisationpoliciespromotesthepersistenceofterrorism.ThisalsoappliestothemixedresultsofDDRpolicies,whichleadtofightersbeingrecycledintootherformsofviolence;
• CentralAfricaisincontactwithregionsunderthethreatofterroristgroups,piratesandothercriminalgroups,whosemovementsinporousborderzonesfacilitatesrepeatedthreatsandthepotentialinfiltrationofterroristactivities;
• Lowsecuritylevelsinidentificationandnationalitydocumentsfacilitatethehidingofterroristsandotherwantedpersons;
• Withouttheperpetuationofsub-regionalmechanismstofightterrorism,suchastheMultinationalJointTaskForce,thereisariskthattheterroristgroups will relocate
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ConclusionThisstudyshowsthatBokoHaramdrawsadvantagefromaregionalenvironmentthatfacilitatescross-bordercriminalactivity.Theporosityofborders,integrationofeconomicandsocialnetworksintheborderzonesoftheChadBasin,theinformalnatureofeconomicexchangesandtheexistenceofanitineranteconomybasedonthe sale of produce are some of the endogenous factors that the organisation instru-mentalisesbothtocarryoutitsattacksandmobiliseitsresources.Povertyandtheunder-employmentofyoungpeople,whoinadditionreceivelittleformaleducation,provideitwitharecruitmentpoolofpeoplewhosesocio-economicfrustrationsareinstrumentalised within the framework of an insurgency that is both ideological and socio-economicinnature.Themovementofcashfromonemarkettoanotheroronecountrytoanotherfaci-litatestheconcealmentoftransactions.Overall,ithasemergedthatitistheregio-nalisationofbusinessnetworks,communityidentitiesandexchangesthatenablestheorganisation todiversify its sourcesoffinance,movestolengoodsand raisefunds.Insufficientcross-bordercooperationasregardssecurityingeneralandthefight against terrorism in particular, are a factor that contributes to the ongoingpersistenceofthreats.TothisisaddedthecorruptionanddeficienciesreportedintheimplementationofinstrumentstocombatterrorismfinancingcontainedintherelevantFATFRecommendationsandcommunitytexts.
RecommendationsTherecommendationsarechieflyaimedatStates,astheyprovidetheimpetusandguidelinesrequiredforimplementingthelegalinstruments,trainingandpartnershipssuggested by the Task Force :
A. A. Regulation or implementation of existing norms
1-Adaptnationalandsub-regionalregulationsandlawstothenewterroristthreatsandtheirfinancing,takingintoaccounttheirspecificnatureandsensitivity.Inves-tigationprocedures,characterisationofoffencesandpowersofinvestigativeautho-ritiesmustbeinlinewiththenewtrendsinthisareaofcrime.
2-Adoptnationalandsub-regionallegislationthatsupervisesfinancialmessagingand enables effective control of transfer operations involving funds and securi-tiesmadebymoneytransfercompaniesbothinternallyandinternationally.Inthiscontext, it isurgent tooblige internationalmoneytransfercompanies tocreateanational and legally independent entity that is accountable for operations performed withintheirnetwork.
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3-Implementamechanismtodetectandneutralise“Hawala»typenetworks,whichenablefundsandsecuritiestobemovedwithoutanytraceability.
4-Improvesupervisionofnewmethodsofpaymentimplementedbyeconomicplayersaspartoffinancialinclusionpolicies,inordertopreventmisusebyterroristgroups.
5-RevitaliseandempoweradministrationsthatoverseeNPOsandespeciallyNGOs.Accreditationprocedures, identificationof theirdirectors,controlof theiractivities,formal determinationof their source offinancing andknowledgeof their bank ac-countsareafundamentalaspectofthefightagainstterrorismfinancing.Morewidely,implementtherelevantrecommendationsofthetypologyexerciseonthemisuseofNPOsinthefinancingofterrorisminCentralAfrica.
6 -Urgently takemeasures to computerise civil status and improve the securityofnationalidentities.
7-ImplementRegulationno.02/03/CEMAC/UMAC/CMof4April2003onpaymentsystems,methodsandincidents,theprovisionsofwhichshouldconsiderablyreducethemovementofcashineconomictransactions.
8-Strengthennationalandcommunitylegislationonenvironmentalcrimes.
9-ImplementalltheFATFRecommendationsonterroristfinancing.
B. Training those involved in combating terrorist financing
1.Trainthoseinvolvedinthechainofthepreventionandsuppressionofterrorismanditsfinancingwithrespecttofinancialinvestigationandcounter-radicalisationmethods.Disseminatethevarioustypologiesofterrorismfinancingrecordedwor-ldwideamongthedepartmentsresponsibleforapplyingthelaw.
2.Raiseawarenessamongthoseinvolvedonthediligencerequiredintermsofde-tectingoperationspotentiallylinkedtoterroristfinancing.
C. National and sub-regional partnerships
1.InvolvetheGABACwithallforumsorganisedbytheECCASinvolvingsecurityproblemsinthesub-region;
2.EncourageconsultationsbetweenthevariousmonetaryauthoritiesandtheBEAC/COBAC for improving supervision ofmanual currency exchange opera-tions.Due to the securitycontext,States shouldprohibit thedirect importingofcurrencybycommercialbanksandmicro-financeinstitutions.Asaparallelmove,strictmeasuresshouldbeintroducedtocounterinformalcurrencymarkets,whilstreviewingapplicablelawstofacilitatetheopeningofcurrencyexchangeofficesby
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thoseoperatingintheinformalsector,whichwouldimproveclarityinthemove-mentofcurrency.
3.Bringtherelevantpublicservicesandfinancialinstitutionsofallkindstogetherontoapermanentplatformforconsultingandexchanginginformationonterroristfinancing.
4.Createacooperationframeworkforservices,whichcouldtaketheformofa“Na-tionalCriminalIntelligenceCentre»,comprisingthefinancialintelligenceservices,policeintelligenceunits,localpolice,thearmy,customsandexternalintelligenceservices.ThisCentrewouldfuseinformationheldseparatelybythevariousentities.Intelligenceproducedby thisCentreshouldbeable tobeuseddirectlyasproofduringlegalproceedings.
5.CreateexchangeplatformsbetweentheCRFandotherintelligenceservicesandensuretheyattendappropriatemeetingstowhichtheGABACisalsoinvited.ThecostinvolvedinthisparticipationshouldbepaidbytheStates.
D. Implementation of integrated strategies for combating terrorism and its financing
1.Drawupa sub-regional anti-terrorist strategyadapted todevelopments in thethreatandendogenousfinancingrisks
2.Carryouturgentactionstoresolvethesocio-economicproblemsofunderprivile-gedgroups,particularlyyoungpeople.
3.Updatedataonpoaching in the sub-regionand itspotential linkswith crimi-nalsystemsoperatingin,fromandtowardsCentralAfrica;renderthesub-regionalforceoperationalincombatingthisphenomenon.
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IndicativebibliographyAbuBakrNaji,Gestiondelabarbarie,EditionsdeParis,2007.
Bakary Sambe, «BokoHaram dans leBassin du LacTchad.Au-delà du sécuritaire, ledangerethnicisteetledésastrehumanitaire»,LaLettredel’ObservatoireN°2,mai2016,http://timbuktu-institute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Boko-Haram-dans-le-bassin-du-Lac-Tchad.pdfhttp://invisiblechildren.com/blog/2014/06/18/lra-lootings-and-its-life-alte-ring-effects/https://www.savetherhino.org/rhino_info/thorny_issues/is_elephant_and_rhi-no_poaching_funding_terrorism
Bauer,Alain,Dernièresnouvellesducrime,Paris,EditionsduCNRS,2013.
Bennafla,Karine,LecommercefrontalierenAfriqueCentrale,Paris,Karthala.
EmergingTerroristFinancingRisks,RapportGAFI2015
FATF/GIABA/GABAC,TerroristFinancinginWestandCentralAfrica,October2016.
GABAC,Rapportdel’exercicedetypologiesurl’utilisationabusivedesorganismesàbutnonlucratifàdesfinsdefinancementduterrorismeenAfriqueCentrale,2015. GIABA,LefinancementduterrorismeenAfriquedel’Ouest,2013.
Rapportdesexperts,2èsommetrégionalsurlasécuritédansleBassinduLacTchaddes12 et 13 mai 2016)
Seignobos,Christian,2016,«BokoHaram:innovationsguerrièresdepuislesMontsMan-dara»,Afriquecontemporainen°225.
TerroristFinancing,RapportGAFI2008.
Tupman, W.A.,«Tenmythsabout terroristfinancing»,JournalofMoneyLaunderingControl,vol.12,n°2,2009.
Zen,Jacob,«BokoHaram:Recruitment,Financing,andArmsTraffickingintheLakeChadRegion»,CTCSentinel,vol7,Issue10,October2014,p.8.
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