The Tabloid Terrorist in the Metaphorical Makin

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March 19, 2008

The Tabloid Terrorist in the Metaphorical Making

(draft, please do not quote)

Paper prepared for the 49th Annual Convention of the International StudiesAssociation (ISA), San Francisco, March 26-29, 2008

Terrorism studies is obsessed with primary sources. Despite (or because) of thedifficulties and dangers involved, access to first hand information is considered to bethe gold-standard of terrorism research. And, although calling for greater reflexivity,even the latest wave of critical terrorism research shares this obsession. From aconstructivist perspective, however, the high esteem for inside-research hardlymakes sense. If Al Qaeda is a social construction, an outside-approach is the

appropriate way of studying Al Qaeda. The present article develops such aconstructivist approach to terrorism studies. It argues that terrorism is constituted indiscourse, especially through metaphors. To illustrate this approach the metaphoricalconstruction of Al Qaeda in the German popular press in the aftermath of the terroristattacks in New York and Washington (2001), Madrid (2004) and London (2005) isanalysed. Terrorism was first constituted as war, but from 2004 onwards, theprincipal metaphor shifted from war to crime, constructing Al Qaeda as a criminalinstead of a military organisation. This shift has transformed Al Qaeda from anexternal to an internal threat, which entailed a shift in counter-terrorism practices froma military to a judicial response.

Rainer Hlsse Alexander SpencerLudwig-Maximilians-Universitt Mnchen Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitt [email protected] [email protected])


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1. Introduction

Terrorism Studies is obsessed with primary sources: First hand information is thought to be

the best, if not the only access to truth about Al Qaeda and other terrorist organisations. Yet,

such first hand information is difficult and dangerous to come by and consequently, scholars

mostly rely on secondary sources. As a result the subject fails to live up to its own quality

standards. Though everyone agrees that primary sources should be analysed, hardly anyone

does so. This, we claim, comes close to a declaration of bankruptcy. Therefore, it is high time

to re-think the foundations of terrorism studies and most importantly its obsession with

primary sources. We argue that this obsession should be left behind and that terrorism studies

should make the analysis of the social construction of terrorism its major topic instead.

While large parts of the social sciences, including International Relations (IR), have come

under the influence of constructivism, terrorism research remains one of the last strongholds

of objectivism. This is unfortunate, because constructivism has the potential of overcoming

the impasse of terrorism research: if we accept that terrorism is a social construction which

is not, as many falsely believe, to claim that 9/11 happened only in our minds the entire

obsession with doing research inside Al Qaeda falls by the wayside. Instead of aiming at

objective accounts of Al Qaeda, terrorism research would investigate the social constructionof Al Qaeda, i.e. do research outside Al Qaeda. At the centre of such an approach is the

analysis of the discursive processes through which a particular interpretation of Al Qaeda has

been shaped and become a commonly held view of what Al Qaeda is like. The great

advantage of such an approach is that it relies on primary sources which are easily and safely

accessible: texts.

It is the goal of this article to spell out a constructivist approach to terrorism studies. While

similar ideas have been introduced by others, none of them has of now debunked the

obsession with primary sources. However, in our understanding, this is one of the crucial

implications of a constructivist perspective on terrorism, where the social construction of Al

Qaeda, rather than Al Qaeda itself, is of interest. In the following, we seek to show how such

a constructivist approach to terrorism works in practice by examining the German popular

media discourse on terrorism since 9/11. We indicate some of the results such research can

produce and how it impacts on our understanding of (counter-)terrorism. Thus we hope to


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contribute to a constructivist turn in terrorism research, which could re-connect the field to the

discipline of IR. This, we believe, would be beneficial for both sides: terrorism research

would get its urgently needed theoretical update, and IR an equally urgent empirical update.

Curiously, terrorism and especially Al Qaeda have only been marginal topics in IR and its

subfield of Security Studies. Take Security Dialogue, for example: Surprisingly few articles

published since 9/11 deal with terrorism and the few that do so focus on counter-terrorism

(e.g. Heng 2002; Ulfstein 2003; Hglund 2003; Heupel 2007; Erickson 2007). Perhaps a

constructivist approach to terrorism would find its way into IR-journals more easily and thus

end the artificial separation between terrorism and security studies as two distinct fields.

The following section two reviews the field of terrorism research. We demonstrate the fields

obsession with primary sources, but also point to promising new developments, namely thelatest calls for a critical turn in terrorism research. While we agree with many of the

suggestions made there, we show that critical terrorism studies has not overcome the primary

source obsession found in the traditional approaches. Section three shows what needs to be

done: We argue in favour of a discourse approach to terrorism, and suggest metaphor analysis

as a particularly promising method for finding out about the discursive mechanisms of reality-

construction. Section four illustrates our approach empirically: We analyse the metaphors

applied to Al Qaeda in the German tabloid Bild Zeitung, showing that they have changed

considerably between 9/11 and the London bombings in 2005. Metaphors of terrorism shifted

from war to crime, a change that has important implications for counter-terrorism policies.

The final section summarises our main argument and calls for methodological pluralism in

terrorism studies.

2. Inside Al Qaeda: The Obsession with Primary Sources

Above, we have proposed that terrorism research is obsessed with getting direct informationon Al Qaeda. The present section seeks to substantiate this claim by demonstrating that

indeed, this is a central issue in the terrorism literature. While we concentrate on conventional

terrorism research in the first part of this section, we turn to its critics in the second part,

showing that they, too, are haunted by the idea of looking directly into Al Qaedas eye.


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Conventional Terrorism Studies

Terrorism research bears a strong resemblance to cultural anthropology: Both seek to find out

about a group of people which seem to function according to a logic that escapes Western

minds, is difficult to access and possibly even dangerous to investigate. In anthropology these

problems have produced two kinds of academics: The first kind consists of adventurous

scholars who live for months or even years amongst their informants, thus being able to learn

about their research objects from their first-hand experience. The second kind keeps a safe

distance to its research objects, relies on secondary information rather than going native,

observing from afar instead of participating. For a long time, there was a clear hierarchy

between the two types of anthropological research: The first group was found to be the real

anthropologists while the latter was dismissed as Veranda-anthropologists (Malinowski). Thisis no different in terrorism research: Al Qaeda is our stranger, appearing uncivilised, in fact

barbarian to us. Because these cannibals do not want scholars to do field research among

them and because this does not sound like an attractive and safe way of collecting data

anyway, only a few scholars have dared and managed to do research inside Al Qaeda. These

are the heroes of terrorism studies. Most of us, however, have stayed on their verandas, or

should we rather say libraries, and contended ourselves with re-interpreting the few first hand

sources available.

Who are the heroes of terrorism studies, the ones who have produced accounts of Al Qaeda

based on their own experience? This is not easy to answer, because many claim to have first-

hand information, but only very few have revealed their sources. Hence it us up to the readers

to believe what is reported from the field as the information cannot be verified. However,

there are a few names in the terrorism research community that stand for inside-information,

foremost Rohan Gunaratna (2001; 2003; 2004) and Bruce Hoffmann (2003; 2004). The

privilege of inside-information has also been claimed by a vast number of other scholars who

have done interviews with Al Qaeda-members or associates (Bergen 2001; Fielding/Fouda

2003; Mushabarash 2006), or even infiltrated the organisation (Siafoni 2004).1

Surely, this is not to say that everyone else writing about Al Qaeda bases his or her

information only on hearsay. In fact, perhaps the most striking feature of terrorism research is

1A number of other scholars who have had direct contact with other non-Islamist active and former terrorists

prior to the event of 9/11 include Della Porta (1995), Coogan (1995) and Bowyer-Bell (2000).


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that more often than not there is no explicit discussion of where the author has got his or her

information from. While it may be possible that some have had access to Al Qaeda more

directly, it is safe to assume that most of what has been written about this organisation draws

uniquely on secondary material be it books written by others, press reporting or intelligence

reports. The latter, in particular, are interesting, because in terrorism research they are often

treated as if they were primary material (e.g. Burke 2003; Gunaratna 2001; Jacquard 2001;

Koch 2005; Reeve 1999). Yet, while it may be true (we dont know because they are secret)

that these intelligence reports are based on primary sources, e.g. on successful infiltration,

these reports nevertheless are secondary, not primary information for terrorism researchers.

Research informed by such reports is the interpretation of other peoples first-hand

information at best.

The implications of such second-hand research on Al Qaeda is obvious: Rather than providing

new insights based on direct observation, this kind of research re-produces the views of

others, wrong or false we do not know. This leads to a rather incestuous field of knowledge,

where one scholars quotes the unverified views of another and thus contributes to the

circulation of the ever-same facts (which in fact are often beliefs) about Al Qaeda. This is

hardly a new insight about terrorism research: Back in 1988, Alex Schmid and Albert

Jongman found that there are probably few areas in the social science literature in which so

much is written on the basis of so little research (Schmid/Jongman 1988: 177). And in the

same year, Ted Robert Gurr remarked that with a few clusters of exception there is, in fact, a

disturbing lack of good empirically-grounded research on terrorism (Gurr 1988: 2). This

point has often been repeated since (e.g. Merari 1992; Silke 2001; Horgan 2004; Schulze

2004), with Brian Jenkins having found the analogy we like best: He compares terrorism

researchers to Africas victorian-era cartographers who mapped the continent from afar

without ever having seen it (Jenkins cited in Hoffmann 2004b: xviii).

Hence, the lack of primary information is a constant source of concern in terrorism research

(Sinai 2007; Silke 2007). In fact, we suggest that this concern is constitutive of the field itself:

That more first-hand information is desperately needed, yet so hard to come by, is the central

narrative that binds the members of this particular community together. If anything, what they

have in common is an obsession with primary sources: they all long for first-hand information

and still they know that they are unlikely to make their dream come true. As a consequence,


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the discipline has developed a narrative that nicely explains why there is so little research

based on primary sources: Terrorist organisations are dangerous and clandestine organisations

(Ranstorp 2007). Therefore, Ariel Merari points out, in situ studies of group structure and

processes () are inconceivable modes of research on terrorism (Merari 1991: 89-90). What

is more, even if access would be granted to researchers, there is good reason to refrain, as

Andrew Silke makes clear: Academic researchers have been threatened, kidnapped, attacked,

shot and killed for attempting to research terrorism (Silke 2004: 189). Hence, it is the

characteristics of the research object that serve as an excuse for the failure to study it in a

more direct way normally considered central to social scientific analyses.

While this, of course, raises the question how these people can then know that terrorism is

really dangerous and a risky thing to research, this narrative is revealing in a more importantrespect: If primary sources really are that important and at the same time so hard (and

dangerous) to come by, there is not much to be expected from terrorism studies. If only a

fraction of the research fulfils the fields self-proclaimed standards of quality, then the field in

general has failed. And this is why we believe it is high time for a new kind of terrorism

studies. However, we are not alone in believing so. Most notably, there is a group of scholars

advocating what they term a critical terrorism studies. In the following section we introduce

this group and show that despite introducing a more reflexive approach to terrorism studies

it, too, adheres to the cult of primary sources, as it is equally preoccupied with getting first-

hand information on terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.

Critical Terrorism Studies

In response to the many problems terrorism research is facing, a number of scholars have

called for a critical terrorism studies (Gunning 2007a, Jackson 2007a, Breen Smyth 2007,

Blakeley 2007).2

What they refer to as orthodox terrorism research is criticised, first, for

treating terrorism in the form of Al Qaeda as a new phenomenon, i.e. for lacking sensitivity

for terrorist experiences in other countries, contexts and time periods (Gunning 2007b; Breen

Smyth 2007: 260). Second, the orthodoxy is found to ignore research on terrorism in other

fields such as anthropology, sociology, psychology and peace and conflict studies (Gunning

2 Academics involved in this effort have organised a number of workshops and conference-panels, created a

working group at the British International Studies Association and launched a new journal (Critical Studies on

Terrorism). For more information on the Critical Studies on Terrorism Working Group see:

http://www.bisa.ac.uk/groups/7/index.asp (accessed on the 06.02.2008).


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2007a). Third, it is said to be uncritical of the role of the state in perpetrating terrorism itself

or at least contributing to the conditions which foster terrorism by none-state groups

(Blakeley 2007). Fourth, conventional terrorism studies is condemned for poor research

methods and equally poor theoretical foundations (Blakeley 2007). If theory is used at all, it is

informed by rationalism and positivism, while constructivism is virtually unheard of (Jackson

2007b). Fifth, it is criticised for producing only problem-solving theories, i.e. for treating

terrorism as an objective problem which terrorism research should help solve (Jackson

2007b).

This critique is important and suggests a way forward for terrorism studies, which should

become more historical, interdisciplinary, state-sceptical, theoretical, constructivist and

reflexive. While we find ourselves in agreement with all of these points, there is a sixth pointof critique that we do not find very convincing at all: Conventional approaches are criticised

for being over-reliant on secondary information instead of basing their research on primary

sources (Jackson 2007b: 244). As we have shown above, this is hardly an original

observation, because conventional scholars are well aware that a lack of first hand

information hampers the quality of their work. What is more, critical terrorism scholars sound

very conventional when they claim that interviews with terrorists, for example, are pivotal to

good scientific research (Gunning 2007a: 378), or when they concede that collecting primary

data is difficult, but maintain that nonetheless these problems must be negotiated and

overcome if the credibility of research is to be maintained (Breen Smyth 2007: 262). Hence,

we cannot see much of a difference between critical and not so critical terrorism studies when

it comes to celebrating the importance of primary sources. Indeed, we would hold that critical

terrorism scholars, too, are obsessed with getting first hand information, while at the same

time disregarding the intrinsic value of secondary sources.

This poses a huge problem for the critical terrorism studies project, as the cult of primary

sources is diametrically opposed to the call for a more reflexive and constructivist research

agenda. One cannot call for more reflection on how knowledge on the terrorist is being

produced and at the same time argue that more first hand information is needed (as if this was

to bring us closer to the truth about the terrorist organisation). And one cannot call for a

constructivist approach to terrorism which would entail shifting the focus from the terrorist

to the social construction of the terrorist and still maintain that we need to analyse primary


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sources. From a constructivist perspective, not the terrorist him- or herself is the primary

source that can be studied, but the texts and practices which constitute the terrorist actor.

Hence, a constructivist approach to terrorism, we claim, must abandon the conventional and

critical terrorism studies fascination with primary sources. Getting first hand information

from the terrorist him- or herself is no longer important. What really matters, for a

constructivist, is how the terrorist actors are constituted in discourse.

In summary, we suggest that terrorism studies should downgrade the importance of first hand

information about Al Qaeda. If terrorism is a social construction, it is impossible to study Al

Qaeda from the inside, because it is only through the outsides construction that Al Qaeda

exists. This is why, in the following section, we will develop an approach to studying

terrorism from the outside.

3. Outside Al Qaeda: Towards Constructivist Terrorism

Studies

Constructivists in psychology (e.g. Harr 2003) and sociology (e.g. Turk 2004) argue that

terrorism is a social construction. Yet terrorism studies itself has remained largely unaffected

by the constructivist turn in the social sciences and sticks to the idea that there is an objective

reality of terrorism that terrorism studies need to uncover. It is only with the recent rise of

critical terrorism studies that a constructivist approach seems to be gaining some ground in

this field. While critical terrorism studies generally seems to sympathise with a constructivist

take on terrorism (Gunning 2007a: 377; Breen Smyth 2007: 265), only one scholar has

actually conducted empirical research along these lines. For Richard Jackson, "terrorism is

fundamentally a social fact rather than a brute fact" (Jackson 2007b: 247) and critical

terrorism studies "rests (...) upon an understanding of knowledge as a social process

constructed through language, discourse and intersubjective practices" (Jackson 2007b: 246).

It is against this background that he studies US and European post 9/11-discourses on

terrorism with a view to finding out how these discourses have constituted the terrorist act and

actor as well as counter-terrorism action (Jackson 2005; Jackson 2007c). Hence, Jackson is

the first in terrorism studies to have analysed the discursive construction of terrorism. This is

certainly a major contribution to the field, and yet we claim that this is but a half-hearted

constructivism: For one, because despite doing discourse analysis himself, he still deplores


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the lack of first hand information in terrorism research (Jackson 2007a: 225), as if this would

allow us to find out the truth about Al Qaeda. A stronger constructivism, in contrast, would

emphasise that there is no such truth, as even direct encounters with Al Qaeda produce but an

interpretation of the phenomenon an interpretation which is not inherently better than any

other. Ultimately, constructions of Al Qaeda are all there is, and consequently terrorism

research must be discourse analysis. Two further issues indicate that Jackson offers but a

weak version of constructivism: He has an instrumental understanding of language and

discourse and he takes an elite/state-centric-approach to terrorism. We discuss both these

issues in the following and thereby sketch out our own approach in comparison, which is

characterised by a non-instrumental understanding of discourse and a focus on popular, low

data.

From Instrumental Language to Metaphor

Jackson has an instrumentalist view of language and discourse. Language, in his

understanding, is deployed to maintain power (Jackson 2005: 25), discourse is designed to

achieve a number of key political goals (Jackson 2005: 2) and thus has a clear political

purpose (Jackson 2005: 2; original emphasis). This view of discourse as something that can

be used and manipulated is shared by another critical terrorist scholar, Jeroen Gunning, who

suggests to analyse how terrorism discourse is used to discredit oppositional groups and

justify state policies (Gunning 2007a: 377). While such an understanding of discourse may

correspond to the common sense understanding, it is certainly at odds with discourse analysis

as it has been put forward in International Relations by, among others, David Campbell

(1990), Roxanne Lynn Doty (1996), Jennifer Milliken (1999) or more recently Lene

Hansen (2006). Drawing on Michel Foucault, these scholars share a concept of discourse

which is above individual discourse-participants. Discourse constitutes actors and structures

what they can meaningfully say or do. Accordingly, actors have very limited agency. Rather

than being able to use words intentionally and manipulate discourse to further their own

purposes, they are themselves inextricably bound up with discourses that leave them little

room for individuality. What they say and what they do is to a large extent determined by the

discourse. Seen in this light, it hardly makes sense to ask about the use of discourse by

particular actors. Instead, the main focus is on how discourse shapes the world, i.e. the actors,

their self-understandings, their purposes and their practices.


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It is against this background that we have decided to focus on metaphors, a focus that has

become increasingly popular in discourse approaches in IR over the past few years.3

To

explain why metaphors make for a particular interesting object of research, let us briefly

introduce the concept. According to classical rhetoric, a metaphor is nothing but a substitute

of the proper term. It serves as an embellishment for ones speech (Chilton 1996: 359;

Charteris-Black 2004: 25). Today, however, students of metaphor agree that a metaphor

cannot be reduced to an ornamental substitute. Rather, by mapping a source domain (i.e. the

new term) onto a target domain (i.e. the original term), a metaphor puts the target domain into

a new light (Charteris-Black 2004: 13; Schffner 1996: 32). By projecting the known onto the

unknown metaphors create reality, they constitute the object they signify. Hence metaphors

embody the constructivist principle in their very logic of operation and this makes them such

an interesting research-object for constructivists.

What is more, the use of metaphors contradicts an instrumental view of language and

discourse. While there certainly is the rare creative moment when we invent a new metaphor,

we most of the time speak in metaphors many others have used before us, i.e. in dead or

conventional metaphors (Charteris-Black 2004: 17-19). Every discourse carries with it a

particular stock of metaphors which is commonly used when referring to the discourse-topic.

If we participate in a discourse we have to use the metaphors associated with it (Doty 1993).

And we do so quite automatically, as this is the established way of relating to the topic

(Charteris-Black 2004: 17). As a consequence, the metaphorical variation in most discourses

is low (Schffner 1996: 36).

In effect, metaphor analysis can limit itself to interpreting the principal metaphors of a given

discourse. These metaphors reflect and constitute the discourses fundamental constructions

of a certain topic. If we want to know how Al Qaeda is seen in the German discourse, for

example, the analysis of the main Al Qaeda metaphors used in this discourse provides us with

a good picture. As to the interpretation of metaphors our analysis is guided by Umberto Ecos

(1995: 191) suggestion to interpret a metaphor from the point of view of someone who

encounters it for the first time. The idea is to pretend ignorance about the target domain, in

3 Metaphors play an important, yet not very explicit role in the discourse analytical classics in IR (e.g. Campbell

1992, Doty 1996). More explicit analyses of metaphors role in world politics have been given, among others, by

Chilton (1996), Milliken (1996), Fierke (1998), Drulak (2006), Hlsse (2006), Beer/De Landtsheer (2004) and

Luoma-aho (2004).


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this case: Al Qaeda. The only way to find out what Al Qaeda is and how it has evolved

between 2001 and 2005, is to look at its metaphorisations. Hence we manually re-construct

the projection from the source domain (about which we have knowledge) to the target domain

(of which we are ignorant), which has become automatised in the use of conventional

metaphors. In order to make sure that our knowledge of the source domain is not arbitrary, we

refer to dictionaries. For example, the murderer-metaphor is important in the terrorism-

discourse. To find out how this particular source domain constitutes Al Qaeda, we consult the

definitions of the murderer provided in dictionaries. Dictionaries, so the assumption, store

the common knowledge about a phenomenon. With this technique of spelling out what

appears to be obvious, i.e. the de-automatisation of the usually automatic projection from

source to target, we can reconstruct the reality constructions of metaphors.4

From High to Low Data

A second major weakness in Jacksons approach, which is related to the first, is his focus on a

particular type of discourse participants, namely political elites. In his book Writing the War

on Terrorism, the focus is explicitly on the speeches, interviews and public addresses given

by senior members of the Bush administration (Jackson 2005: 26). This focus is justified, he

claims, by the fact that these speeches represent the source of the discourse (Jackson

2005: 26) and by the fact that the war on terrorism is an elite-led project (Jackson 2005:

26). However, Jackson does nothing to substantiate this claim. Surely, no one would deny that

the political elite is important, but it is quite something else to state that they are the source

of the discourse, that they and here is the connection to our first criticism have initiated

and now control the discourse at their own will. As the proponents of critical terrorism studies

themselves are eager to point out (Breen Smyth 2007: 260), the post 9/11 discourse on

terrorism is not entirely new. Rather, it builds upon former discourses of terrorism and it

intersects with other discourses (on Islamism, for example). Hence, it is impossible to identify

any single source of this discourse. And talk of the discourse as an elite-led project grossly

overestimates the agency of actors. The political elite, like anyone else, is bound by

discourses. What the elite perceives, believes, says and does is pre-structured by discourses.

Hence, it is former discourses on terrorism which have shaped the political elites

4This technique, of course, recalls the post-structuralist method of deconstruction, i.e. denaturalising and

making strange taken-for-granted meanings (cf. Gregory (1989: xiv); Der Derian (1989: 4)).


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understanding of 9/11, making certain kinds of political action possible while excluding

others. While the political elite may have the ability to opt for one reaction rather than

another, the array of possible reactions has already been severely restricted by the discourse.

The elite chooses from a very limited set of options, thus one can hardly speak of the war on

terrorism as an elite-led project. If anything, we should conceive the political elite as a

discourse-led project.

The elite-focus of Jacksons research is not only indicative of a discourse-approach that

underestimates the power of discourse (and overestimates the power of actors), but also of the

fact that critical terrorism studies is more conventional than it would like to be seen. Not only

does it share with the mainstream an obsession with primary sources, but also a state-centric

view. It is one of the core commitments (Jackson 2007b: 246) of critical terrorism studies toovercome terrorism researchs traditional states-centrism (Breen Smyth 2007: 261). Yet,

from our perspective a sceptical attitude towards state-centric understandings of terrorism

(Jackson 2007: 246) would have to entail a shift of focus towards other segments of discourse,

e.g. civil societys or popular cultures terrorism discourse. Otherwise, the call for a less state-

centric perspective sounds hollow.

Our approach, in contrast, seeks to overcome the state-centrism of both conventional and

critical terrorism studies by focusing on popular rather than elite discourse. We do so throughan analysis of the popular press. Although there has been some investigation of quality press

newspapers (Winfield et al 2002; Flowerdew/Leong 2007), analysis of popular tabloid news

has so far been neglected. Nevertheless, it seems important to examine the social part of the

social construction in discourse. If one is interested in examining the social construction of a

phenomenon then surely it makes sense to examine the medium which many members of

society interact with. The normal average person does not read government press-releases,

presidential speeches or parliamentary debates. Most people get their information from the

media. The Bild Zeitung here is particular interesting because it is the largest national

newspaper in Germany with over eleven and a half million readers. It is widely accepted that

theBild Zeitung has great influence on the perception of many people in the country (Alberts

1972, Klein 2000, Gabrys 2005). It is also the paper which is quoted most commonly, and it

has frequently taken the top slot in a national agenda-setting ranking conducted by Media


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Tenor.5

It can therefore be considered one of the most important agenda setters in Germany,

able to not only influence the national discourse but to actually set the national debate. As we

want to find out about the social constructions of Al Qaeda in Germany and how this

construction has changed over time, we have chosen to disregard the high data of

politicians statements and the quality-press and instead analyse the low data (Weldes 2006)

produced by the tabloid press.

Summing up this section, we propose an outside-approach to Al Qaeda that analyses the

metaphorical making of the actor. We examine the metaphors used in the popular press and

thus leave behind the elite-focus of both conventional and critical terrorism studies. The

following section illustrates this approach by reporting the results of an empirical analysis of

terrorism-metaphors in the German tabloid press.

4. The Metaphorical Construction of Al Qaeda

So far, we have argued that most approaches in terrorism studies fail to recognise that

terrorism is a social construction. A constructivist approach is needed and we have tried to

develop one in which the metaphorical constitution of Al Qaeda in terrorism-discourse is re-

constructed. In the present section we want to give an impression of the results such an

approach can produce. To this end we summarise the findings of a research project on themetaphorical construction of Al Qaeda in the German popular press. What are the key

metaphors applied to Al Qaeda between 2001 (9/11-attacks in New York and Washington),

2004 (Madrid train bombings) and 2005 (London underground bombings)? Have the

metaphors changed during this period of time? We then go on to interpret our findings: How

can metaphorical change be explained? What do the metaphorical constructions of Al Qaeda

mean for our understanding of Al Qaeda and for our counter-terrorism policies?

Shifting Metaphors

One of the difficulties we encountered in this research project was that digital archives are

still rare for the tabloid press. While one can easily research the quality press in archives such

as Lexis Nexis, analysing the metaphors used in theBild Zeitung requires looking through the

original print-editions. This not only made the analysis rather time-consuming, it also caused

5 See Media Tenor http://www.medientenor.com/newsletters.php?id_news=239 (accessed on 02.02.2008).


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some embarrassment, as we sat in our library for months reading nothing but the yellow press.

Still, compared to the reported difficulties and dangers of primary research in terrorism

studies discussed above, this kind of research is less hazardous (unless one considers the

impact of such work on ones image within the faculty). We examined all texts in the Bild

Zeitung dealing with terrorism in the month after three major terrorist attacks since 2001,

namely the attacks on September 11th

, 2001, the Madrid bombings on March 11th

, 2004 and

the London bombings on July 7th

, 2005.

Regarding the first period of time we studied, i.e. the one month after 9/11, the most striking

observation is how many metaphors have a military connotation. The general picture painted

was that there had been a military strike conducted by a military organisation. Various

metaphors contributed to this general theme: For example, according to one popularinterpretation the actors perpetrating the attacks were kamikaze flyers

6, kamikaze pilots

7or

kamikaze assassins8, and the airplanes used to crash into the targets were described as

kamikaze-weapons9

or kamikaze-flights10

. The act of terrorism was also referred to as a

kamikaze attack11

, explicitly connecting the events of 9/11 to the war with Japan and their

use of kamikaze tactics during the Second World War. This constituted the target domain

9/11 terrorist attacks in terms of the source domain war, and more precisely Japanese

attacks during Second World War.

This military style construction of the terrorist in the popular media discourse was further

strengthened by the use of words like death-troop12

or suicide-commandos13

. Osama bin

Laden was said to have a private army14

. And in other places the actors involved were

considered as a terrorist army made up of 3000 veterans from the war with Soviet Union in

Afghanistan.15

This army used camouflage16

and was thought to be hierarchically structured,

with bin Laden being the head of this organization. Several metaphors constructed him as the

6 Kamikaze-Flieger, Bild Zeitung 13.09.2001: 10. Note that all of the following quotes are from the Bild

Zeitung.7 Kamikaze-Piloten, 12.09.2001: 1, 14.09.2001: 2, 4.8 Kamikaze-Attentter, 13.09.2001: 4, 22.09.2001: 4.9

Kamikaze-Waffen, 12.09.2001: 2.10 Kamikaze-Flge, 20.09.2001: 1.11 Kamikaze-Angriff, 12.09.2001: 5.12 Todestruppe, 20.09.2001: 4.13 Terror-Kommando, Selbstmordkommando, 14.09.2001: 1, 15.09.2001: 1, 2, 18.09.2001: 4, 20.09.2001: 5.14 Privat-Armee, 19.09.2001: 4.15

Terroristen-Armee, Veteranen, 14.09.2001: 2.16 Tarnung, 20.09.2001: 4.


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15

ultimate leader of a hierarchical structure who is in full control of his organization. He was

referred to as a top-terrorist17

, terror-chief18

, terror-leader19

, terror-boss20

and senior-

terrorist21

. Accordingly, he was described as someone who controls22

, directs23

and

orders24 his army of heavily armed warriors25 from the safety of his military bases26 in

Afghanistan. This shows how with the projection from the source to the target domain

numerous connotations of the source domain are being transferred to the target domain.

Applying military metaphors to Al Qaeda meant more than simply comparing the terrorist

attacks to a military attack. It also attached various characteristics of the military to Al Qaeda,

such as the organisational structure common to an army in a war. The military metaphors of

9/11 constituted Al Qaeda as an actor the West is quite familiar with, a rational-bureaucratic

military organisation.

After the Madrid train bombings in 2004, again, military metaphors were used in the Bild

Zeitung. For example, terrorists were said to have been given terror-orders27

, they were

commanded28

to attack and they were described as having been especially drilled29

for

such operations. However, in comparison to 9/11 these metaphors were used much less often

and the most obviously militaristic metaphors such as terrorist army were no longer in use.

Hence, the dominant source domain in 2001 was much less important in the aftermath of the

Madrid bombings. Instead, a new source domain entered the metaphorical stage. Now, Al

Qaeda was quite commonly referred to as a criminal organisation: The term murderer30

was

used as a synonym for the actor involved in terrorism and his act was referred to as murder

and mass murder31

, as a murderous strategy32

or a criminal assault33

. The actor was

17Top-Terrorist, 13.09.2001: 4, 14.09.2001: 2, 15.09.2001: 5.

18 Terror-Chef, 12.09.2001: 4, 13.09.2001: 2, 18.09.2001: 1.19 Terror-Fhrer, 17.09.2001: 4, 18.09.2001: 2.20

Terror-Boss, 19.09.2001: 4.21

Oberterrorist, 19.09.2001: 4.22 lenkt, 13.09.2001: 4.23

dirigiert, 15.09.2001: 5.24 befiehlt, 15.09.2001: 5.25 Gottes-, Glaubens und Heilige-Krieger: 12.09.2001: 4, 5, 14.09.2001: 2, 17.09.2001: 2.26

Sttzpunkte, 21.09.2001: 2.27 Terror-Befehl, 16.03.2004: 1.28 kommandiert, 17.03.2004: 2.29 drillen, 18.03.2004: 2.30 Mrder, 12.03.2004: 1, 13.03.2004: 12, 15.03.2004: 2, 22.03.2004: 1, 25.03.2004: 9, 01.04.2004: 2.31 Mord, Massenmord, 12.09.2004: 7, 15.03.2004: 2, 07.04.2003: 1.32

mrderische Strategie, 01.04.2004: 2.33 verbrecherische Anschlge, 27.03.2004: 2.


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16

repeatedly described as an offender34

and those assumed of committing or aiding the act

were referred to as suspects35

whose acts leave behind traces or leads36

which can be

followed and solved37

by the police and the judicial system. Again, these metaphors render

the phenomenon of terrorism familiar. Where before the terrorist acts were constituted as acts

of war, they were now constructed as a crime.

The metaphors to be found in the Bild Zeitung after the London tube bombings in 2005

strongly confirm the Madrid-trend towards constructing Al Qaeda as a criminal organisation.

Military metaphors were almost completely absent from the terrorism-discourse in 2005.

Instead, the terrorists were labelled assassins38

committing an assassination39

. Similarly,

one frequently comes across terms associated with murder40

such as murderers41

or

murderous

42

, and words such as criminal

43

, suspect

44

and offender

45

. And the criminalsource domain is also obvious when the terrorist is said to be a killer

46who is part of a

terror-gang47and helped by accomplices48

.

Hence there is a clear shift in the way the Bild Zeitung metaphorised Al Qaeda: In the

beginning, Al Qaeda was constituted as a military organisation that poses a military threat to

the West. Starting with the Madrid-bombings and especially after the London-bombings,

however, military metaphors were replaced by criminal metaphors. Given that we have

argued that Al Qaeda is a discursive construction, one can state that the terrorism discourseand its principal metaphors in particular have transformed Al Qaeda: from a military to a

criminal actor. The following section will discuss what this transformation means, what

reasons there may be for it and what consequences it may have.

34 Tter, 15.03.2004: 3, 23.03.2004: 2.35

Verdchtige, 12.03.2004: 7, 23.03.2004: 2, 06.04.2004: 1.36

Spuren, 13.03.2004: 3, 15.03.2004: 3, 16.03.2004: 1.37 aufklren, 16.03.2004: 2.38

Attentter, 08.07.2005: 2-3, 09.07.2005: 4, 13.07.2005: 6, 25.07.2005: 10-11, 30.07.2005: 1.39 Attentat, 08.07.2005: 2, 09.07.2005: 4, 13.07.2005: 6, 18.07.2005: 1, 25.07.2005: 11.40 ermorden, 08.07.2005: 4.41

Mrder, 14.07.2005: 2.42 mrderisch, 08.07.2005: 2.43 Verbrecher, 08.07.2005: 2.44 verdchtig, Verdchtiger, 20.07.2005: 2.45 Tter, 18.07.2005: 8.46 Killer, 14.07.2005: 8, 15.07.2005: 7.47

Terrorbande, 08.07.2005: 4.48 Komplizen, 19.07.2005: 6, 23.07.2005: 12.


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17

Shifting Experiences

How can one make sense of the metaphorical shift from war to crime? We first discuss how

this change would be explained by conventional and critical terrorism studies, before we

develop our own interpretation.

Conventional terrorism studies would probably argue that the metaphorical shift quite simply

reflects actual changes on the ground: The metaphors have changed because Al Qaeda has

changed from a military to a criminal actor. However, such a claim is difficult to sustain from

a constructivist perspective. If reality is constituted in discourse, it is impossible that

metaphors are mere reflections of reality. Yet, this does not mean that from a discourse

perspective there is no reality or that discourse is completely independent from reality. Quite

the opposite: The terrorist events in New York, Madrid and London were very real. However,

these events did not speak for themselves, but needed to be interpreted. And because

metaphors help to make sense of new and unfamiliar events, they were used to frame what

had happened. And apparently, this principal frame has shifted over time from war to crime.

From the perspective of critical terrorism studies, in particular the critical discourse analysis

of Richard Jackson, the metaphorical shift must be due not to empirical changes on the

ground, but to the interests of those using the metaphors. As we have shown above, Jacksons

approach features a very instrumental view of language. In the case studied here this would

mean that journalists have their own agenda and this is why they used different kinds of

metaphors in 2005 than they did in 2001. Perhaps, they did so because they no longer

considered the old military metaphors exciting enough to attract the attention of potential

readers. In order to sell the Bild Zeitung it was necessary to come up with a new

interpretation. Or, if one would argue that the Bild Zeitung mostly takes over the metaphors

used in the political discourse, one would have to search for an explanation for the

metaphorical shift in the political actors interests. According to such a perspective, the

metaphorical shift is the result of politicians manipulation. They increasingly applied the

crime source domain because they believed this to further their interest. However, as we have

argued above, the poststructuralist version of discourse analysis that we prefer is characterised

by an understanding of discourse that leaves very little room for agency. Accordingly, Bild

Zeitung journalists or political actors today write and speak in crime metaphors not because


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18

they have consciously chosen to do so, but because this has become the normal way of

referring to Al Qaeda.

But why has the normal way of referring to Al Qaeda changed? In our view this can best be

understood as the result of us getting used to Al Qaeda-terrorism. In the face of 9/11 war-

metaphors could grasp the dimension of what had happened. The sheer number of victims

made it necessary to find a source domain where such a death toll was known. Over time,

however, the military metaphor seemed increasingly at odds with how terrorism was

perceived, at least in Germany. Without the direct experience of a terrorist attack, Al Qaedas

terrorism could not compare to former experiences with war in Germany. Terrorism did not

cause the kind of suffering World War II had caused. Therefore, the criminal metaphor was

much better at grasping the general sentiment in Germany. It constitutes terrorism as beingthere all the time without constantly affecting us. Crime is a common phenomenon in all

societies, hence metaphorising terrorism as crime constitutes terrorism as a fairly normal by-

product of society. Rather than being an exceptional state, as indicated by the war metaphor,

terrorism has become normal. This both reflects our getting used to Al Qaeda and contributes

to our getting used to it.

At first glance, this explanation might not look very different from the conventional one we

offered first. However, while conventional approaches would read metaphors as exact mirrorsof events, our model suggests that there cannot be a 1:1 relationship between reality and

metaphors. We cannot observe empirical events directly, but we do so within particular

interpretive contexts, i.e. within a discourse. Discourse makes us see things in a particular

way. And yet, discourse is not independent from empirical events. If, for example, there are

no terrorist attacks in Germany for an extended period of time, then this can be expected to

have an impact on the terrorism discourse in Germany. And this discourse, in return, shapes

how we view empirical events. Put differently, discourse and our experience of empirical

events feed into each other, they are mutually constitutive.

Shifting Enemies

Above, we have argued that the metaphorical shift from war to crime normalises Al Qaeda.

However, this shift has further implications: It transforms Al Qaeda from an external into an

internal enemy and from a legitimate into an illegitimate actor.


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The military metaphors constitute Al Qaeda as an external enemy. Al Qaeda is a military

organisation which is conducting a war against us. It is a threat that comes from the outside.

The war-metaphor thus constitutes the relationship between those affected by terrorism and

the terrorist actor as an inter-state relationship. Al Qaeda is constructed as a state-like actor.

As such it is in principle on equal terms with us (or the U.S.), it is if you wish a like

unit. This construction of Al Qaeda as being a state-like actor and as such basically equal to

all states has further implications: It constitutes Al Qaeda as a legitimate actor. In fact, even

the conduct of war is a right that is, at least under certain conditions, granted to such actors.

The crime metaphor, in contrast, makes Al Qaeda an enemy within. Rather than being located

outside ones own territory, the terrorists are now constructed as being among us. This way

the threat becomes more diffuse, more difficult to pin down. Every citizen could nowpotentially be a terrorist, not just the people living beyond ones borders. So the metaphorical

shift transforms the relationship between us and the terrorists. No longer is Al Qaeda a like

unit, basically enjoying the same sovereignty as we do. Now, as a criminal actor, it is being

subjected to our laws. This makes Al Qaeda an actor which is inferior rather than equal to us,

it constitutes a clear hierarchy between us and them. And what is more, it constitutes Al

Qaeda as an illegitimate actor, as an outlaw. Hence the metaphorical shift from war to crime

not only entails a devaluation of Al Qaeda but also its de-legitimisation.

Shifting Policy-Options

Metaphors constitute reality and thus shape our experiences, make our enemies and enable

our actions. It is the latter we focus on now. What implications do the military-metaphors on

the one hand and the criminal metaphors on the other hand have for counter-terrorism policy?

The underlying assumption is that how we react to terrorism is dependent on how we see

terrorism (Schmid 1992; Daase 2001). If we regard it as a military threat then certain kinds of

policies become possible while other means of addressing the issue remain outside the options

considered as a response. Or, in Jacksons words: Embedded within specific labels for Al

Qaeda group, network, movement are very different answers to key questions for policy

and counterterrorism design (Jackson 2006: 242).

Apart from the connections made to the Second World War by referring to kamikaze tactic

and incidences such as Pearl Harbor, the military style construction of Al Qaeda is important


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20

for the understanding of the counter-terrorism policies which followed the events of 9/11.

Referring to the actors involved in the hijacking of the four planes as troops, therefore

constructing them as soldiers or armed forces49

, which constitute and are part of a external

terrorist army, automatically makes the use of ones own military to confront the threat

appear logical. The fact that the terrorists are constructed to compose a foreign army that

uses military bases, makes the use of military air-strikes to bombard these heavy defenses in

other countries a concrete possibility. It seems appropriate to mobilise ones own army if

faced with an external military foe who uses camouflage: the disguising of military

personnel, equipment, and installations by painting or covering them to make them blend in

with their surrounding.50

On top of this, the terrorist is not just a normal soldier, but a commando, so an amphibiousmilitary unit

51which is specially trained for carrying out raids

52into our country from

outside. The West was confronted by veterans, i.e. soldiers who have seen considerable

active service53

. In other words, Al Qaeda was constructed not only as a military actor, but as

an elite fighting force which is battle hardened, highly trained, disciplined and deadly and

therefore warrants the use of our own special forces in the form of the British SAS or the

German KSK. The construction of terrorists as heavily armed actors from abroad makes the

use of ones military elite forces as opposed to the normal police seem necessary, it enables a

military rather than a judicial response. It might therefore be possible to argue that the

German support of and the contribution towards a military response to the event of 9/11, most

visible in the invasion of Afghanistan, was made possible by the construction of the terrorist

actor as a member of an external, hierarchical organization with specific military

characteristics. The explicit focus on the person of Osama bin Laden as a kind of general who

commanded his troops and was almost solely responsible for planning the attack, makes his

removal by any means a concrete necessity to prevent further attacks. Hereby the

personalization constructs terrorists in such a way that makes proactive policies such as

military strikes and assassinations designed to remove and kill this person seem more

49Oxford Dictionary of English (2005): Second Edition, Revised, Oxford: Oxford University Press,1889.

50Oxford Dictionary, 249.

51Collins English Dictionary (1998): Millennium Edition, Glasgow: Harper Collins Publishers, 322.


53Collins Dictionary, 1695.


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21

appropriate than defensive policies such as increased fortifications or internal security

measures.

In comparison, the construction of Al Qaeda as something internal and criminal rather than

external and military after the bombings in Madrid and London implies a judicial response

rather than a military one. The use of criminal metaphors such as murderer, offender,

accomplice, i.e. a person who helps another commit a crime54

, frames our thinking to

consider a police response as more appropriate. Here counter-policies such as house or online

computer searches, the detainment of suspected terrorists, tough anti-terror laws or the

tapping of phones becomes a viable option in the fight against a criminal terrorist. The

metaphorical transformation from an external terrorist army to an internal terrorist gang

a group of persons working to unlawful or antisocial ends

55

may constitute as well asreflect a policy shift in the case of Germany away from a military approach to counter-

terrorism after 9/11 to a criminal one after Madrid and London.

In summary, this section illustrated a metaphor approach to terrorism. We analysed the

terrorism metaphors in the Bild Zeitung and how they evolved between 2001 and 2005. We

showed that the guiding metaphor changed from war to crime, transforming Al Qaeda from an

exceptional external threat to a normal and permanent internal threat.

5. Conclusion

The role model of the terrorism scholar is the traditional cultural anthropologist. Like him he

is white, male and courageous, and like him he privileges field research, the direct encounter

with the terrorist/native over any other form of knowledge. Unlike him, however, he rarely

lives up to his ambitions. Only a handful of students of terrorism have managed to actually

infiltrate Al Qaeda, live among its members and talk to them directly. As a result the

discipline is in a very sad state, where most research merely recycles the few bits and pieces

we know about Al Qaeda from primary source research or from intelligence reports. Yet,

resolve is not far and, again, cultural anthropologists can serve as our role-models. Following

a powerful attack on their traditional mode of inquiry in the 1980s (Clifford/Marcus 1986),

many stopped going native and began to study the Wests (including the anthropologists)


55 Merriam-Webster Online dictionary, available at: www.m-w.com (accessed on 02.02.2008).


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social construction of the native instead. A similar constructivist turn in terrorism studies has

been called for in this article. This new kind of terrorism studies analyses the making of

terrorism in academic, political and popular discourse and may be better suited to the post-

heroic era we live in. Rather than risking ones life in the field, scholars can now study Al

Qaeda from the safe distance of their offices.

This contribution demonstrated how such a constructivist terrorism studies could look like by

developing a metaphor-approach to terrorism. Metaphors, we argued, are particularly

important makers of social reality, because they project familiar worlds onto unfamiliar

phenomena and thus constitute the new in terms of the old. We then showed how the new

terrorism of Al Qaeda has first been constructed with the help of the old concept war and later

with the equally old concept of crime. The Bild Zeitung, through which we studied thepopular terrorism discourse in Germany, constructed Al Qaeda as a military organisation

following the events of 9/11, but later on used metaphors that constituted Al Qaeda as a

criminal actor. This metaphorical shift, we claimed, has transformed Al Qaeda from an

external into an internal threat and enabled policing rather than the use of military forces as

the appropriate response to terrorism.

Constructivist takes on terrorism that re-construct the social production of the terrorist threat

have many advantages over conventional approaches: They work with data that is betteraccessible, they allow for armchair-research without risking ones life, and they teach us that

one and the same terrorist actor may have very different meanings to different people,

depending on place and time. The greatest strength, however, has to do with the goals of

terrorism. If, as many scholars agree, terrorism is not so much about causing material damage,

but about causing fear among its targets (Mueller 2005, Spencer 2006), then a constructivist

approach brings us much closer to the heart of terrorism than conventional ones. Interviewing

a terrorist would hardly help us to find out if and how terrorism has been effective, i.e.

whether it has attained its self-declared goal of creating a state of terror. If it is true that

terrorists main goal is to creep into our heads, then we ourselves become a valid primary

source of terrorism research. Only we how we think, how we talk and how we act, i.e. our

discourses can provide evidence about whether or not terrorism actually works.

Still, we do not want to replace one obsession getting inside Al Qaeda with another the

discursive construction of Al Qaeda. We have here advocated a constructivist approach,


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because we find terrorism research remarkably untouched by what is by now well-established

thinking in the social sciences more generally. Only a wake-up call has the chance to alert

terrorism studies to the fact that it lags far behind other disciplines as far as its ontological

assumptions, not to speak of its epistemology, is concerned. Once awoken from its realist-

objectivist dreams, however, terrorism studies need not give up its traditional style of research

altogether. There is room for both approaches, in fact we would be the first to acknowledge

that there are some things one can only find out through first hand information and not by

way of metaphor analysis, e.g. how terrorist organisations recruit their personnel. However,

after a constructivist turn in terrorism studies primary source research could no longer pretend

to be reporting on reality or describing the truth about Al Qaeda. Instead, it would be a much

more modest undertaking. Like their colleagues who study the discursive construction of

terrorism, those scholars who investigate inside Al Qaeda would simply contribute one

particular interpretation of the phenomenon: not inherently better, nor inherently worse than

other interpretations.

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