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The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Bad and Worse Options
Daniel Byman & Sloane Speakman
To cite this article: Daniel Byman & Sloane Speakman (2016) The Syrian RefugeeCrisis: Bad and Worse Options, The Washington Quarterly, 39:2, 45-60, DOI:10.1080/0163660X.2016.1204352
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Daniel Byman and Sloane Speakman
The Syrian Refugee Crisis:Bad and Worse Options
The Syrian civil war has spawned a host of evils. Perhaps 400,000
Syrians have died in the carnage, and regional powers like Iran and Saudi
Arabia treat it as a proxy war. Terrorist groups like the Islamic State seem to
delight in creating new horrors for those who fall into their clutches, and use
Syria as a base to expand in the Middle East, attack Europe, and inspire terrorists
around the world. Syria’s problems, however, are also the world’s problems, and no
problem is more immediate than the country’s refugees.
Syria is the world’s largest producer of refugees—people who cross a state border
due to conflict or persecution. Of the world’s 15 million refugees, the Syrian civil
war has produced over 6 million of them, and has displaced roughly 7 million more
within Syria. Indeed, over half the country’s pre-war population of 21.5 million is
displaced, either externally or internally. Most of the refugees are living near
Syria’s borders. Turkey hosts more than two million, Lebanon over one million,
and Jordan over 600,000. Things are so bad that 250,000 Syrians have even
fled to Iraq. The regional refugee crisis has become a global one, as Syrians seek
refuge in Europe. Germany opened its doors, accepting almost 500,000 Syrian refu-
gees in 2015; other European states, however, have closed their gates or otherwise
tried to limit the number of Syrians they take.1
The refugee crisis has reached epic proportions, and neighboring states feel
trapped. Refoulement, forcefully expelling refugees to their home countries while
Daniel Byman is a professor at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a
senior fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. His latest book is
Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know(Oxford, 2015). Follow him on Twitter @dbyman. Sloane Speakman is a Syria analyst and
Deputy Foreign Policy Editor of the Lawfare blog. She recently returned from a year working
with Syrian refugees in Jordan as a Fulbright Scholar and Boren Fellow. Follow her on
Twitter @sloanesp.
Copyright © 2016 The Elliott School of International Affairs
The Washington Quarterly • 39:2 pp. 45–60
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2016.1204352
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016 45
the conflict or other dangers persist, is forbidden under the 1951 UNRefugee Con-
vention and 1967 Protocol. Not all countries are signatories to the convention and
protocol, but the norm is well accepted. So once refugees are admitted, states feel
they could never escape the responsibility of caring for them.
Nor are the refugee flows likely to abate. The Syria conflict is entering its sixth
year and has seen ferocious levels of violence. The Assad regime is the leading
culprit, using indiscriminate attacks on civilians and sectarian atrocities as part
of its efforts to intimidate its enemies and rally its supporters. Waves of refugees
and displaced are also a means for the Assad regime to put pressure on neighboring
states and opposition areas in the country, overwhelming their ability to provide
for the civilians under their protection.2 The Russian bombing campaign, which
has repeatedly targeted civilians and civilian infrastructure on a massive scale,
led even more to flee the country.3 The Islamic State has sent religious minorities
and many Sunni Muslims fleeing its barbaric version of law and order, too. For
instance, a UN Commission cited “fear of rape” as a driver for many refugees.4
More broadly, the devastation of the civil war and the absence of any hope in
Syria have left most Syrians doubtful that any future remains for their country.
The United States and its allies seem overwhelmed by the crisis. Their
responses are often uncoordinated, sending mixed signals to regional states and
to Syrians themselves. For instance, the Obama administration initially promised
to punish the Assad regime for its chemical attacks on civilians, yet pulled the plug
on a 2013 airstrike at the last minute. Then a year later, it was bombing the Islamic
State, one of the regime’s enemies. At times the United States and its allies have
backed different factions among the fractious Syrian opposition. Politics at home
often overwhelms sober policy discussions, with the specter of terrorism hanging
over many debates.
This essay seeks to break through this paralysis, offering five options for hand-
ling the refugee crisis. The options run the gamut from turning our collective backs
on the refugees to a massive resettlement program. The United States and Europe
could also increase support for regional states, create safe zones within Syria, or
even step up intervention in Syria itself to diminish the flows. All these options
are flawed, but our hope is that by laying out the advantages and disadvantages
of each, we can move the debate forward and enable a better discussion of the
benefits and risks of any course of action.
The Dynamics of Paralysis
U.S. policy toward Syrian refugees has exhibited a mix of confusion, fear, and
politics—and many long-term dangers are growing as a result. Beyond the
humanitarian concerns, the refugee crisis may lead to instability in host countries,
Daniel Byman and Sloane Speakman
46 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016
foster terrorism if the refugees are not integrated, and worsen the civil war at home
by providing fighters with rear bases.
The United States historically has accepted many refugees—Cuba and
Vietnam stand out in the ColdWar period, when the United States took hundreds
of thousands fleeing these brutal communist regimes—but this generosity has not
held up in the Syrian case. In 2014 and 2015, the United States took in almost
70,000 refugees each year. Of that number, more than 32,000 were from Iraq,
32,000 from Burma, and 17,000 from Somalia.5 In
contrast, the United States has taken fewer than
2,000 Syrians in the five years since the conflict
began in 2011.6 In moral and humanitarian terms,
at least, the United States is falling short. U.S. allies
in Europe, such as Germany, have accepted more,
but thousands of refugees are still dying as they
attempt to cross the Mediterranean in ramshackle
boats or otherwise risk their lives to gain security
and a future for themselves and their families.7 And
even Europe is trying to tighten its borders. In April 2016, the European Union
and Turkey began enforcing a deal that would try to stop refugees from crossing
the Aegean Sea by immediately returning new arrivals to Turkey.
So far, the main U.S. effort is financial. As of February 2016, the United States
has offered around $5 billion dollars to assist Syrians, as well as several hundred
million more to bolster Jordan and Lebanon.8 Over a billion of this is specifically
for the UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR).
What explains the limited U.S. effort? Domestic politics. Initial U.S. public
attitudes toward the Syrian refugees were favorable. However, the 2015 attacks
in Paris and San Bernadino vaulted terrorism to a top public concern: after the
attacks, 52 percent of Americans opposed taking in refugees, a figure that was par-
ticularly high among Republicans (84 percent).9 Many Republican governors in
the United States declared their opposition to allowing Syrian refugees to enter
their states, a policy of dubious constitutionality but considerable political
benefit.10 The commander of U.S. forces in Europe, General Philip Breedlove,
warned that among refugees, the Islamic State “is spreading like a cancer, taking
advantage of paths of least resistance, threatening European nations and our
own with terrorist attacks.”11
U.S. allies are experiencing even more disarray domestically. A virulent anti-
immigrant and anti-Muslim political strain is spreading in Europe. Right-wing
and even fascist parties are gaining more influence, and countries like Austria,
Hungary, and Slovakia are shutting their doors to refugees. Neighbors may have
completely different approaches: Sweden takes in many refugees, while Norway
is far more conservative. The common borders of the European Union are
The U.S. has fallenmorally short,taking in fewer than2,000 Syrians in fiveyears.
The Syrian Refugee Crisis
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016 47
under strain, as governments try to prevent refugees from coming their way, which
is almost impossible in a Europe where people can pass freely from country to
country. Greece, the closest access point to Europe for many refugees, is under
the most strain. Despite repeated calls for all EU countries to share the responsi-
bility in resettling refugees and providing financial support to mitigate the crisis,
no common policy has jelled.
If refugees roil politics in Europe, it might mean a government loses the next
election. The destabilization risk in the Middle East is far worse. Refugees have
a history of bringing conflict with them: they wage cross-border wars from
refugee camps, serve as recruiting pools for militant groups, upset delicate ethnic
and sectarian balances in host states, and otherwise act as carriers for regional radi-
calization.12 The Islamic State reportedly used someone entering Turkey as a
refugee to carry out an attack there.13
The problem is a long-term one and will fester. Just look at Israel and Palestine:
almost 70 years after the Israeli war of independence, the Middle East is still shaped
by the Palestinian refugee crisis. A standard approach to refugees is to treat them as a
short-term humanitarian problem, while waiting for the conflict in their homeland
to resolve itself or die out. This approach was usually misguided: the average refugee
crisis saw refugees only returning after almost twenty years.14 This misconception
prevailed at the start of the Syria crisis, when Syrian refugees often were welcomed
with open arms, in part because regional regimes assumed the Syrian government
was on the verge of falling. Although nego-
tiations to resolve the Syrian conflict continue,
few are optimistic. Even if the talks go better
than anticipated, the country is in ruins and
no one expects refugees to return home
anytime soon. It is best to conceptualize the
Syrian crisis as one of forcedmigration and reset-
tlement, rather than a temporary humanitarian
emergency.
Option One: Open Arms
The first option to address this problem would be for the United States to increase
its resettlement commitments. Since 2011, the United States has accepted less
than 2,000 Syrians. In September 2015, President Obama announced that the
United States would increase this number to 10,000 over the next year.15
Canada, with its population of 36 million, accepted more than 25,000 Syrian refu-
gees within a matter of months.16 If the United States were to match this commit-
ment proportionately, this would mean accepting roughly 230,000 refugees. While
The crisis is anongoing, long-termproblem, not just atemporary humani-tarian emergency.
Daniel Byman and Sloane Speakman
48 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016
that number is unrealistic, 10,000 is significantly less than the commitments of
other, much smaller states.
Settling Syrians could have myriad benefits in the United States, such as pro-
viding a demographic lift and vibrancy in certain places. The scholar David Laitin
and housing expert Marc Jahr point out that Hmong refugees have revitalized parts
of Minneapolis, Minnesota; Bosnians have done so in Utica, New York; and
Somalis in Lewiston, Maine—to say nothing of the stunning contributions to
the United States made by Vietnamese, Cubans, and other groups of refugees.
Laitin and Jahr call for settling tens of thousands of Syrians in Detroit, where
they would revitalize a decaying city and fit in well with the broader Arab-Amer-
ican community in Michigan.17
Settling significant numbers of refugees anywhere in the United States would
require streamlining the current processes and bureaucratic hurdles within the
U.S. agencies that process resettlement. Currently, the average processing time
for resettlement is 18–24 months.18 Refugees undergo thirteen different reviews
and screenings, including multiple in-person interviews with U.S. and inter-
national agencies, medical screenings, and intensive biographic and biometric
security checks by the Department of State, Department of Homeland Security,
and law enforcement and intelligence agencies—and this does not include the
additional screenings to which Syrian refugees are subjected.19 The resettlement
process would need revamping in order to be meaningful. Although this step
would be difficult—as “streamlining” anything in the U.S. government usually
is—it is certainly possible if the United States made resettlement a priority.
Accepting a greater number of Syrian refugees offers a host of further benefits. It
would not only be a signal of goodwill to displaced Syrians who largely feel ignored
by the international community, but would also counter the extremist narrative of
the U.S. “war against Muslims.” Additionally, studies have shown that although
there is a short-term financial cost in accepting immigrants and refugees, there
are significant long-term economic benefits including increased wages and econ-
omic growth.20 Accepting refugees also aligns with the United States’ identity
as a haven for those fleeing persecution and our country’s long history of enjoying
the benefits that diversity brings.
Admitting a greater number of refugees would also fulfill a moral obligation. The
widespread suffering of displaced Syrians has been well documented. The UNHCR
reports that 38 percent of Syrian refugees in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon are living
in substandard shelters, and only one-third of Syrian children are in school.21
UNHCR High Commissioner Filippo Grandi recently told donors in London, “A
tragedy of this scale demands solidarity beyond funding. Put simply, we need
more countries to share the load by taking a greater share of refugees from what
has become the biggest displacement crisis of a generation.”22 In a conflict with
little prospect of ending soon, resettlement offers a potential solution for those
The Syrian Refugee Crisis
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016 49
who have been able to escape. The United States has a long and storied history of
accepting refugees from brutal, even ongoing, conflicts from South Sudan to
Vietnam. Moreover, the United States’ leader-
ship in resettlement would encourage other
states to do the same and signal our seriousness
in resolving the crisis to both our regional and
European partners dealing with its fallout.
At the same time, there are several costs
associated with accepting refugees, especially
those from an active conflict in which the
United States is involved. Even refugee advo-
cates refer to resettlement as a shared
“burden.”23 First, the decision to admit more Syrians would be politically unpopular.
After the November 2015 Paris attacks, 53 percent of Americans were in favor of
ending refugee resettlement altogether.24 As a result, any problems refugees create,
such as crime, will come under a magnifying glass—to say nothing about potential
refugee involvement in terrorism.
Second, there is a security risk involved in accepting large numbers of refugees,
including the possibility of terrorists entering the United States amid the wave of
admitted refugees. Though the risk is small and not as immediate as the one facing
European nations, it is not zero, and could be exacerbated by an expedited reset-
tlement process.
Third, there are economic costs in taking in refugees, especially in the short
term. Though there is no easy way to determine the per refugee cost—much
depends on the degree of screening and level of support—it runs into the thou-
sands per refugee.25 This cost is not prohibitive—accepting 100,000 refugees at
this price would still cost less than many alternatives—but it would increase the
short-term economic burden, which would also include increased job competition
and social service provision.
Lastly, accepting a large number of refugees would not, on its own, offer a sol-
ution to the crisis. Of the millions of Syrian refugees, there is no number the
United States could realistically accept that would be anything other than a
small dent. To have any real impact, the United States would still need to take
other steps, including ensuring that regional and European partners also commit
to accepting their share.
Option Two: Help from Afar
Instead of the United States taking in more refugees, another option is to bolster
regional partners’ and European states’ abilities to deal with the crisis by providing
U.S. leadership inresettlement wouldencourage otherstates to do thesame.
Daniel Byman and Sloane Speakman
50 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016
increased, targeted aid. Of the roughly 6 million Syrian refugees, 4.8 million live in
neighboring states, primarily Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. After five years of con-
flict, nearly 25 percent of Lebanon’s population and one in ten residents in Jordan
are now Syrian. These regional hosts are also part of the Syrian civil war: Jordan
has flown missions in Syria against the Islamic State and allows the United States
to base its ground-based missiles in the country as well as train opposition forces
there; Turkey has actively engaged Kurdish militias both in its eastern territories
and over the border, even as the United States supports various Kurdish forces
in Syria; and Lebanese Hezbollah is openly fighting in support of the Assad
regime. In Europe, more than 1.5 million migrants reached the European Union
in 2015—one-third of them from Syria.26 As of December 2015, the number of
Syrian asylum applications in the EU reached nearly 900,000.27
To be sure, Syrian refugees have received significant aid: more than any other
refugee situation in history. At a fundraising conference in London on February 4,
2016, European nations raised more than $5.8 billion for 2016 and pledged an
additional $5.4 billion through 2020. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
remarked that “Never has the UN raised so much in a single day for a single
cause.”28 Robust aid programs allow for burden-sharing across budgets and services,
which diffuses the view of refugees as “burdens” in the first place.
Still, having met only 62 percent of its funding requirements,29 the UNHCR
has admitted that it is “financially broke.”30 The UNHCR has argued that
funds still need to be “urgently dispersed” and “matched by other forms of inter-
national solidarity,” including better access to education and economic opportu-
nity for refugees in neighboring countries.31
Aiding the crisis from afar, via increased financial or material assistance, would
allow the United States to participate in alleviating the massive suffering without
directly accepting any risk or role itself. Money can help in so many ways, from
immediate relief—providing medical aid, sanitation, and shelter—to longer-
term issues like boosting education and building infrastructure.
This approach could also include bolstering host communities bearing the
largest share of the burden. In Jordan, an already-high unemployment rate has
reached record numbers after refugee arrivals, and under-staffed schools operate
on a shift system.32 In Lebanon, most refugees live outside of camps, competing
with Lebanese citizens for jobs and driving up rent prices in many areas.
Turkey’s delicate ethnic balance has been challenged as the Syrian refugee popu-
lation becomes less homogenous and the protracted state of the conflict becomes
increasingly sectarian. The security risks associated with the Syrian refugee crisis
can be seen in a string of Islamic State attacks in Turkey, most recently in a
March 2016 suicide bombing that killed four tourists in Istanbul’s main shopping
district.33
The Syrian Refugee Crisis
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016 51
In addition to the considerable cost, massive influxes of financial assistance for
the refugee crisis could exacerbate host community tensions in places like Jordan
and Lebanon, whose own populations face considerable economic and social chal-
lenges. In February 2016, King Abdullah of Jordan said that the crisis has “gotten
to a boiling point… Sooner or later, I think the dam is going to burst.”34 In
Turkey, where the government says it has spent $6.5 billion from its own
budget, citizens have expressed anger that taxpayer money is being spent on refu-
gees.35 Over 60 percent of those surveyed in Turkey in October 2014 saw Syrian
refugees as linked to increased criminality.36 Ultimately, the United States would
need to include host communities in order to manage these tensions, further
driving up the cost.
Option Three: Safe Zones
To avoid placing the burden on U.S. allies—and to avoid the risks of doing
nothing—several leaders have called for establishing a sanctuary inside Syria to
protect those fleeing the Assad regime and the Islamic State. Senator John
McCain (R-Arizona) and Democratic front-runner Hillary Clinton have both
embraced this idea. Government leaders in Turkey have also advocated for it,
and Jordan has helped establish a de facto safe zone in southern Syria along its
border.37 Safe zones occupy a ‘Goldilocks space’ in the minds of their proponents,
helping refugees and otherwise stepping up pressure against Assad and the Islamic
State, but not requiring the resources and commitment that a direct intervention
would demand. One model is Operation Northern Watch, which in the 1990s
relied on U.S. air power to keep part of northern Iraq free from Saddam’s clutches,
allowing the Kurds there to enjoy de facto autonomy.
What, precisely, a haven entails is unclear. Some see it as a neutral area in Syria
where civilians would be protected; for others, it is a sanctuary where opposition
forces would organize and train, safe from Syrian regime as well as Russian air and
ground attacks. Nor is it clear who would protect the safe zone: some call for U.S.
airpower, while others call for a U.S. or allied ground component.
Like many solutions that promise high reward and low cost, both may be illu-
sory. Unless they are well-protected, the civilians in the zone would offer a target
for both Assad and the Islamic State, particularly if the zones are used for military
operations. Civilians under the thumb of Assad or the Islamic State would find it
difficult to travel to such sanctuaries, and those traveling to the zones would be
vulnerable to attack. UN agencies, which have worked closely with Assad to
deliver aid in parts of Syria,38 would face pressure to do little in the zones or
risk having their operations elsewhere in Syria jeopardized. Neighboring states,
meanwhile, would have a legitimate excuse for taking fewer refugees, arguing
Daniel Byman and Sloane Speakman
52 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016
that they no longer face a threat of conflict or persecution because of the zone’s
theoretical protection. Indeed, they might push for refoulement on the same
grounds.
To secure the zones, their borders must be protected and the populations
policed—both are manpower intensive. The zone must be protected against
threats as diverse as the Russian air force, the conventional forces of the Assad
regime, and Islamic State infiltrators that might launch attacks or suicide bomb-
ings against moderate leaders in the zone. Secretary of State John Kerry’s estimate
that 15,000–30,000 troops are needed to establish a zone39 is probably on the low
side, particularly if more than one zone is established or if they are established in
militarily vulnerable areas, such as near Aleppo. Diplomatically, the zones would
be difficult to establish as well. Both China and Russia oppose such zones as a vio-
lation of Syria’s sovereignty, and without their support, hopes for UN approval dis-
appear—and European states might balk at what they perceive as the lack of
legitimacy and legality of establishing a zone without the blessing of the UN.
The international track record on safe zones is
often disappointing, if not downright bleak. When
NATO created six safe zones in the Balkans in
1993, two of them fell to Serbian forces, leading to
the horrific 1995 massacre in one of the havens, Sreb-
renica, in which roughly 8,000 Bosnian men and boys
were rounded up and slaughtered. Such horrors
prompted the United States to intervene to end the
war.40
The risks for intervening forces increase if the zone
is protecting a staging area for anti-Assad and anti-Islamic State forces, as they
would have to secure the area against formidable enemies. If the zone is humani-
tarian only, the challenge shifts. Assad and the Islamic State might—but only
might—see it as less of an immediate threat. However, intervening forces would
have to stop those in the zone from organizing, training, and otherwise becoming
part of the conflict, which proffers a massive policing challenge.
Because the zones put U.S. and allied credibility on the line, they are a potential
source of unwanted escalation. If Russia or the Islamic State challenged the zone,
the United States would have to push back hard, and both are likely to test U.S.
resolve given uncertainties over what the zones entail and the overall U.S.
commitment.
In addition, the zones are a short-term fix. Operation Northern Watch, that
rare success, strained U.S. air force capabilities,41 and it required far fewer resources
than a zone in Syria would. In addition, the zones risk becoming de facto borders
over time, hardening divisions in Syria and making negotiations to end the war
The internationaltrack record on safezones is often dis-appointing, if notdownright bleak.
The Syrian Refugee Crisis
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016 53
less likely to succeed in the future. So a serious conflict resolution approach would
have to complement the zones, and no such approach is in the offing.
Not surprisingly, senior aid organization officials—who in the past in places like
Rwanda and Somalia championed such efforts—are skeptical. In these places,
efforts to carve out humanitarian enclaves failed on the ground, as local warlords
and factions saw them as potential threats. As one official noted about these zones,
“We’ve been there. We’ve seen it doesn’t work.”42
Option Four: Fix the Problem at its Source
If safe zones are so flawed, and if we want to ease the burden on neighboring states
and the world in general, a bolder option is to end the flow of refugees by ending
the conflict itself. Indeed, all the other options discussed in this article are at best
Band-Aids by comparison. In addition to allowing the refugees to eventually go
home, resolving the conflict would end the world’s bloodiest civil war and
resolve a tremendous source of regional instability.
Notionally, there are two ways to end a conflict: through negotiations or
through military victory. Secretary Kerry and other Western leaders have for
years tried to resolve the conflict through negotiations. However, many of the
key players—Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Russia, among others—have fundamentally
different interests, and split over issues such as whether the Assad regime must go
and how much power to give opposition groups. The Syrian opposition itself is
highly divided, and no single entity speaks even for the more moderate elements
at the negotiating table, let alone more disparate groups like the Syrian Kurds or
jihadists. The United States and theWest in general appropriately want to exclude
the Islamic State and the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra from the negotiations,
but they are a huge part of the violence—so even successful negotiations without
them would not end the fighting. Until the military balance changes, diplomacy is
not likely to work.
Military victory is more appealing in theory, but only as long as the right
Syrians are victorious. For now, this seems unlikely. Since the Russian military
intervention began in fall 2015, the Assad regime and its allies have regained
the upper hand, and some of their strongest opponents are jihadist groups like
the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra, and other radical groups like Ahrar al-Sham.
More moderate opposition elements remain a serious force—which is, in part,
why they remain a top target of Russia and the Assad regime—but they are
dwindling. The United States could, in theory, support the Assad regime, but
that is a dubious moral choice; the regime’s ties to Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah
indicate that it would not be a strategic partner even if the United States could
ignore the sea of blood the regime has created. And should Assad win, in the
Daniel Byman and Sloane Speakman
54 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016
short term more Syrians would likely flee the country, fearing his harsh brand of
victor’s justice.
U.S. efforts to train Syrians have gone nowhere. Part of the problem is that the
United States wants its Syrian allies to focus on the primary U.S. enemy,
the Islamic State, while the Syrian groups are focused first and foremost on the
Assad regime. Indeed, pushing back the Islamic
State in Syria would do little to solve the overall
refugee problem, as the vast majority of the flows are
caused by the brutal tactics of the Assad regime. In
general, U.S. military training and equipping efforts
have seen few successful cases, with some only train-
ing a dozen or so fighters at the cost of hundreds of
millions of dollars. Others trained by the U.S. military
even turned their weapons over to the al-Qaeda affili-
ate, Jabhat al-Nusra.43 At most, approximately 60
Syrians have been trained at the cost of $500 million, with General Lloyd
Austin admitting to the Senate Armed Services Committee that only “four or
five” remain fighting the Islamic State.44
In our view, both efforts to train the opposition and to negotiate an end to the
conflict should continue—but we shouldn’t hold our breath while they are hap-
pening. Neither is likely to succeed in the near term, and the United States and
its allies will still need a refugee policy until they do. Such hedging becomes par-
ticularly necessary, since failure remains a distinct possibility.
Option Five: Shut the Gates
Of course, to eliminate all risk of terrorism from Syrian refugees, one option would
be to close Syria’s borders completely. Closing the borders would end the flow of
refugees pouring into neighboring states and would allow the international com-
munity to focus on those who have already made it out. Although bolstering
border security measures would incur a cost, it is a significantly cheaper option
than any of the previously mentioned, resource-heavy alternatives. Moreover,
containing the problem would allow the United States and international commu-
nity to manage the crisis—to prevent its spread and focus on securing already-
destabilized neighbors and stemming its flow across the Mediterranean.
This option would not only carry a significant moral cost—including the inevi-
table, large-scale suffering that would likely result—it would also come at a con-
siderable strategic cost. Not only could this anger Muslim communities in the
United States and Europe, it could also create greater terrorism risks. Many
foreign fighters who have traveled to Syria were motivated by the large-scale
The vast majorityof refugee flows arecaused by the Assadregime, not theIslamic State.
The Syrian Refugee Crisis
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016 55
suffering of the Syrian people and fellow Muslims.45 Sealing the borders, leaving
thousands to face assaults from both the regime and Islamic State with no
option for escape, would further feed the jihadist narrative that the West does
not care about the lives of suffering Muslims around the world.
Lastly, enforcement would not be as easy as it may seem. Though sealing
Jordan’s border with Syria may be possible—given its highly-trained and U.S.-
funded border security apparatus—Turkey’s 510-mile, heavily active border
would be nearly impossible to secure entirely. Additionally, U.S.-supported
groups and equipment, mostly aimed at bolstering the Syrian Democratic Forces
in northern Syria, rely on routes running through key towns along the Syrian–
Turkish border. Lastly, the United States has limited ability to function along
Lebanon’s and Iraq’s borders with Syria, possibly forcing those fleeing to make
the dangerous trip toward these areas.
The above options, of course, are not
mutually exclusive. Canada, for example, is
increasing its resettlement commitments and
is involved militarily in Syria. Yet even in com-
bination, the above options make clear there
are no silver bullets: each option at best fixes
only part of the problem, demands enormous
costs, or both. Some even violate the first law
of intervention: do not make the situation
worse.
Making the Best of a Bad Lot
As the above discussion makes clear, the policy options for dealing with the
refugee crisis range from bad to worse. A few allow the situation to deteriorate
further, while many of the most effective options are costly and probably politically
prohibitive. It is always tempting to look for middle ground options, but sometimes
they represent the worst of all worlds.
Regardless of which path the United States and the international community
choose, we should treat the crisis as a long-term, perhaps permanent one. These
refugees will not return in the near term, and perhaps not ever. With this in
mind, helping them needs to go beyond humanitarian relief. Refugees need
jobs, the right to move within their hosts’ borders in search of those jobs, and
their children need education. We cannot risk a lost generation of Syrians.
At the very least, we must help their hosts, particularly those in the region.
They have legitimate concerns about radicalization among Syrians and among
their own population, and because the crisis is a long-term one, these problems
The above options,ranging from bad toworse, make clearthere are no silverbullets.
Daniel Byman and Sloane Speakman
56 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016
are more likely to grow if not addressed. These countries bear most of the burden,
and Jordan and Lebanon in particular have few resources to spare.
Moreover, integrating refugees is vital. If they remain an isolated people, separ-
ate and apart, with few opportunities for jobs and little hope for the future—
especially when linked to an ongoing, brutal war—then, a generation from
now, the problem will be even harder to resolve. Islamic State recruiters, or
their successors, will have a field day.
In the end, doing nothing is the worst option, from both a moral and strategic
perspective. It is a moral failing if wealthy European countries, Canada, the United
States, and others do not aid those fleeing the worst war of our generation. But it is
also a strategic failure, risking more conflict and instability in a region and world
that have seen too much of both.
Notes
1. Michael Martinez, “Syrian refugees: Which countries welcome them, which ones don’t,”
CNN, September 10, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/09/world/welcome-syrian-
refugees-countries/.
2. Kelly Greenhill, “Demographic Bombing,” Foreign Affairs, December 17, 2015, https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-12-17/demographic-bombing.
3. “Russian bombing ‘fuels refugee crisis’ US official says as airstrike kills 39,” The Guardian,January 9, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/09/imprecise-russian-bombing-
syria-fuelling-refugee-crisis-us-official; Siobhan O’Grady and Reid Standish, “Growing Air
War in Syria Sparks New Refugee Crisis,” Foreign Policy, November 16, 2015, http://
foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/16/growing-air-war-in-syria-sparks-new-refugee-crisis/; and “State-
ment to the UN Security Council on Syria,” UNOCHA, October 27, 2015. https://docs.
unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/USG%20Stephen%20OBrien_Statement%20to%
20Security%20Council%20on%20Syria_27%20Oct%202015%20CAD.pdf.
4. UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Commission of
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” paragraph 91, 2013, http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A-HRC-23-58_en.pdf.
5. Jie Zong and Jeanne Batalova, “Refugees and Asylees in the United States,” Migration
Policy Institute, October 28, 2015, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/refugees-and-
asylees-united-states#Refugee Countries of Origin.
6. Martinez, “Syrian refugees: Which countries welcome them, which ones don’t.”
7. “Over 3770 Migrants Have Died Trying to Cross the Mediterranean to Europe in 2015,”
IOM, December 31, 2015, https://www.iom.int/news/over-3770-migrants-have-died-
trying-cross-mediterranean-europe-2015.
8. Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Stephen Castle, “Syria Aid Pledges From Rich Countries Reach
#10 Billion,” New York Times, February 4, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/
world/europe/john-kerry-calls-on-russia-to-honor-syria-airstrike-resolution.html?_r=0.
9. Elizabeth McElvein, “What do Americans really thing about Syrian refugees?” Markaz
Blog, Brookings Institution, March 4, 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/
posts/2016/03/04-syrian-refugees-us-public-opinion-mcelvein.
The Syrian Refugee Crisis
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016 57
10. Gregory Korte, “Governors have little power to block refugees,” USA Today, November
16, 2015. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/11/16/governors-have-little-
power-block-refugees/75888766/.
11. Lisa Ferdinando, “Breedlove: European Security Situation ‘Serious, ‘Complicated,’”
Defense Media Activity, U.S. Department of Defense, March 1, 2016, http://www.
defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/683569/breedlove-european-security-situation-
serious-complicated.
12. See, among others, Kelly M. Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement,Coercion, and Foreign Policy (Cornell University Press, 2011); Seung-Whan Choi and
Idean Salehyan. "No good deed goes unpunished: refugees, humanitarian aid, and terror-
ism," Conflict Management and Peace Science 30, no.1 (2013): 53-75; and Daniel Byman
and Kenneth Michael Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an IraqiCivil War (Brookings Institution Press, 2008).
13. Dion Nissenbaum, Ayla Albayrak, and Raja Abdulrahim, “Istanbul Suicide Bombser
Entered Turkey as Syrian Refugee, Officials Say,” Wall Street Journal, January 13, 2016,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/istanbul-suicide-bomber-entered-country-as-syrian-refugee-
officials-say-1452685264.
14. “UN Special Envoy Angelina Jolie Pitt calls for action of World Refugee Day,” Press
Release, UNHCR, June 20, 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=
search&docid=558595e96&query=average%20stay%20in%20refugee%20camp.
15. Gardiner Harris, David E. Sanger, and David M. Herszenhorn, “Obama increase number of
Syrian refugees for U.S. resettlement to 10,000,” New York Times, September 10, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/11/world/middleeast/obama-directs-administration-to-
accept-10000-syrian-refugees.html?_r=0.
16. “#WelcomeRefugees: Canada’s plan to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees,” Goverment of
Canada, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/welcome/index.asp?wbdisable=true
17. David Laitin and Marc Jahr, “Let the Syrians Settle in Detroit,” New York Times, March
14, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/15/opinion/let-syrians-settle-detroit.html?
action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=opinion-c-col-right-region®ion=opinion-
c-col-right-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-right-region.
18. “US Refugee Admissions Program: Application and Case Assessment,” U.S. Department
of State, http://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/admissions/.
19. “Refugee Process and Security Screening,” U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services, https://
www.uscis.gov/refugeescreening.
20. Ana Swanson, “The big myth about refugees,” The Washington Post, September 10, 2015,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/09/10/the-big-myth-about-
refugees/.
21. “Access to Education for Syrian Refugee Children and Youth in Jordanian Host Commu-
nities: Joint Education Needs Assessment,” UNICEF Education Sector Working Group,
March 2015, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/REACH_JENA_HC_
March2015_.pdf; and Beth Ferris and Kemal Kirisci, The Consequences of Chaos: Syria’sHumanitarian Crisis and the Failure to Protect (Brookings, 2016), p. 62.
22. “Syria conflict at 5 years: The biggest refugee and displacement crisis of our time demands a
huge surge in solidarity,” Press release, UNHCR, March 15, 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/
56e6e3249.html.
23. Swanson, “The big myth about refugees.”
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58 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016
24. Bloomberg Politics National Poll, November 2015, archives at: http://www.scribd.com/
doc/290824881/Bloomberg-Politics-national-poll-Nov-23-2015.
25. Amber Phillips, “Here’s how much the U.S. spends on refugees,” The Washington Post,November 30, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/11/30/
heres-how-much-the-united-states-spends-on-refugees/.
26. Fabrice Blanche, “The worse of Syrian refugee crisis is coming for Europe,” Business Insider,February 16, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/the-worst-of-the-syrian-refugee-crisis-
is-coming-for-europe-2016-2.
27. “Europe: Syrian Asylum Applications,” Syria Refugee Response, UNHCR, Updated
January 2016, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/asylum.php.
28. “Donors pledge more than US$6billion for Syrians,” UNHCR, February 4, 2016, http://
www.unhcr.org/56b3902c6.html.
29. “Needs and Funding Requirements,” UNHCR Global Appeal 2016–2017, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/564da0e20.html.
30. Hariet Grant, “UN agencies ‘broke and failing’ in face of ever-growing refugee crisis,” TheGuardian, September 6, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/06/refugee-
crisis-un-agencies-broke-failing.
31. “Donors pledge more than US$6billion for Syrians,” UNHCR.
32. “Assessment of the impact of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and their employment profile,”
International Labor Organization, April 2014, http://www.ilo.org/beirut/publications/
WCMS_240134/lang–en/index.htm.
33. “Turkey blames Islamic State for Istanbul bombing,”BBC,March 20, 2016. http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-europe-35856201?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_
campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=%2ASituation%20Report.
34. David Shenker and Andrew J. Tabler, “A Safe Zone in Southern Syria,”Washington Insti-
tute, March 8, 2016, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/a-safe-zone-
in-southern-syria.
35. Ferris and Kirisci, The Consequences of Chaos , p. 4136. Ibid., p. 4037. Schenker and Tabler, “A Safe zone in Southern Syria”; see also Kristina Wong, “McCain
backs Clinton’s call for a no-fly zone in Syria,” The Hill, October 20, 2015, http://thehill.
com/policy/defense/257406-mccain-backs-clintons-call-for-a-no-fly-zone-in-syria, and
Johnny Hogg, “Saddled with 2 million Syrian refugees, Turkey shows signs of strain,”
Reuters, September 16, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-migrants-
turkey-analys-idUSKCN0RF1PX20150915.
38. Annie Sparrow, “Aiding Disaster: How the United Nations’ OCHA Helped Assad and
Aided Disaster,” Foreign Affairs, February 1, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/syria/2016-02-01/aiding-disaster.
39. Justin Fishel, “Up to 30,000 Troops for Syria Safe Zones Kerry Says,”ABCNews, February
24, 2016, http://abcnews.go.com/International/30000-troops-needed-syria-safe-zone-
kerry/story?id=37173697.
40. Ivo Daalder, “Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended,” Foreign Service
Journal, Brookings Institution, December 1998, http://www.brookings.edu/research/
articles/1998/12/balkans-daalder.
41. James Kitfield, “Highs and Lows of Northern Watch,” Air Force Magazine, August 2002,
pp. 50-55, http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2002/August%
202002/0802northern.pdf.
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THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016 59
42. Ferris and Kirisci, The Consequences of Chaos , p. 104.43. “Udall, Manchin, Murphy, Lee Call for an End to the Failed Syria Train and Equip
Program,” Office of Senator Tom Udall, October 2, 2015, http://www.tomudall.senate.
gov/?p=press_release&id=2117.
44. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Only 4-5 American-trained Syrians fighting against the Islamic
State,” The Washington Post, September 16, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/checkpoint/wp/2015/09/16/only-4-to-5-american-trained-syrians-fighting-against-
the-islamic-state/.
45. Dan Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, “Be Afraid, Be A Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism
from Western Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria,” Brookings Institution, Policy Paper No.
34, November 2014, p. 12, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/
11/western-foreign-fighters-in-syria-and-iraq-byman-shapiro/be-afraid–web.pdf ; see also,
Richard Barrett, “Foreign Fighters in Syria,” The Soufan Group, June 2014, p. 18,
http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf.
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60 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016