the up political society review of political scienceThe Sword

meditations on politics

Volume 1, Number 1First Semester 2014–15

Edcel John A. Ibarra

Editor-in-Chief, Layout Artist

Alphonse G. Samson

Deputy Editor for Externals

Reiner S. Gallardo

Contributing Editor

Patricia S. Ignacio

Contributing Editor

Rodolfo L. Lahoy Jr.

Contributing Editor

Shiela Marie C. Malabanan

Deputy Editor for Internals

John Rey C. Alvior

Correspondent

Mark Ernest E. Mandap

Correspondent

Pauline Faye S. Fajardo

Illustrator

From the Editor-in-Chief

The Sword is the official external publication of the UP Political

Society featuring members’ political analytic compositions for

political science students. Consistent with the principles of ac-

ademic excellence, critical thinking, and political awareness, it

strives to advance the discipline of political science, to carefully

analyze relevant social issues for possible solutions, and to in-

still awareness of the current social and political developments.

There is another The Sword, the internal publication, which pub-

lishes news on the states of affairs of the organization for mem-

bers and non-members alike. With all due respect to the history

of the organization’s official publication, I settled to divide The

Sword into two parallel publications. You can read the internal

publication through this link: bit.ly/ts-inter-1415a. (I elabo-

rated in there my reasons for dividing the publication.)

For the external publication’s first issue, the editors find it but fit-

ting to start from the beginning. We decided to write on the concept

that is the root of our discipline: politics. There are a myriad of con-

ceptions of politics, many of which are incompatible with others in

terms of focus and scope; politics is after all a contested concept.

But amid this pool of options, we must eventually subscribe to one

particular conception, thereby implicitly contesting the contested-

ness of the concept. As critical thinkers, we do not indiscriminately

settle with conceptions provided for in books or by our professors.

Instead, we must investigate for ourselves what we mean when we

say that something is political. Not only does clarifying the concept

help us in our systematic pursuit of knowledge, but it also deter-

mines when and where human action becomes socially meaningful.

My fellow political science students, I hope the present contribu-

tions offer you insights for your own meditations on politics.

Breathing politics,

University of the Philippines Political Society (UP POLSCi)

www.uppoliticalsociety.com | uppoliticalsociety@gmail.com | facebook.com/up.political.society | twitter.com/up_polsci

Beside Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines–Diliman

Remember Foucault | 4Rodolfo L. Lahoy Jr. opens with an inquiry into the act of defining politics itself. The activity

is far from neutral, he argues, and it suits purposes beyond those of research. Instead, de-

fining politics is itself political in that it limits or expands the possibilities of social action.

Politics for Dummies | 8Patricia Joy S. Ignacio introduces the concept of politics, tracing its evolution from the

Greeks to the present, for pedestrians. Eventually defining it as power, she points to the

ubiquity and pervasiveness of politics in everyday life.

Politics in the Mundane: Love and Power | 10Reiner S. Gallardo locates the politics in romantic relationships. He contends that romantic

relationships begin, thrive, and end through politics: they are defined by decisions that

involve the exercise of power and the exercise of restraint from power.

Towards a Relevant Concept of Politicsin the Philippine Context | 14Alphonse G. Samson contextualizes the concept of politics in the Philippines. He traces how

Filipino political scientists have understood it over time. Ultimately, he argues for a pow-

er-based conception, maintaining that it better exposes the realities of Philippine politics.

After Power | 18Edcel John A. Ibarra closes with a critique of politics defined as power. He finds contradic-

tions in the attempt to bring out the ubiquity of politics and in the agenda to liberate the

individual from relations of power. He settles instead on the idea of collective existence.

Other Contributions | 22The Tinkerer and Her Toolbox: Concepts as Devices of Power Christine Joy L. Galunan

Endnotes | 26

Meditations on PoliticsVolume 1, Number 1

First Semester 2014–15

4 t h e s wor d

Remember FoucaultRodolfo L. Lahoy Jr.

The actors who call the shots within the academic

discipline have been keen to distinguish “political

science” as a field. Firstly, by referring to it as a

science, it is implied that the field follows fairly

reasonable methods that can result to reliable

knowledge. In short, political science has been set

apart as different from (and more valid than) the

analyses of your local

barber or taxi driver. In

the American context

of the 1960s, this sci-

ence of politics meant

a “logical positivist

behavioralism,”1 which

has not been free from

antagonists such as the movement, in the same

decade, towards a “New Political Science.”2

Another set of antagonisms can be seen in

defining the other word: politics. What has

been deemed as political has not been static

throughout history, especially in the 20th

century. Actors have since attempted to fix

the meaning of politics and the “political.”

In the context of the classroom, behind the

usual introductory inquiry into what is “polit-

ical,” defining is not only a mere practicality, a

mere necessity for us to know what exactly we

are studying with our scientific way of viewing

the world. There is a desire to delimit the scope

of what can be studied by political science as

a discipline. It is akin to specialization that is

typical of modernity, establishing a “division of

labor” among those who produce knowledge about

man and society. This question about what is

political is a second way of setting political sci-

ence apart, this time from other social sciences.

However, defining the term can serve a pur-

pose beyond that of an academic nature, and

thus matters in contexts outside the classroom.

Describing politics can be oriented towards de-

scribing a world that can be acted upon by agents.

This way, practice can later have a role in the

theoretical pursuit of inquiring about politics.

As it stands, it is usual in political science to accept

the notion that politics is more-or-less concerned

Defining politics can

serve a purpose be-

yond that of an aca-

demic nature, and thus

matters in contexts

outside the classroom.

t h e s wor d 5

with power. As early as Niccolò Machiavelli’s The

Prince, gaining and maintaining power has been

important for the practice of rulers. Power, in this

sense, is tied to ruling particular socio-political

units (principalities or princedoms), to what we

now call “matters of the state.” What can be no-

ticed here is a conception of power as something,

in the first place, that can be gained or held.3 It can

also be a position: one can be “raised to power.”4

Akin to these is the notion of power as something

that can be “possess[ed] like a commodity” and

can be transferred, for instance, through a con-

tract.5 This is one of the two conceptualizations of

power in the modern era, as described by Michel

Foucault. This notion has been located within

a Hobbesian theory of sovereign, in which an

all-powerful state demands obedience after power

has been transferred to it. The second involves

power as something repressive, tied with the idea

of politics as war-like, consisting of struggles,

and involving relations of conflict.6 Foucault,

however, later seems to abandon this idea of

power-as-repression in “The Subject and Power,”

even though he still talks of power relations and

not merely power as such. In this later writing, a

power relationship is that which involves a person

attempting to guide the possibilities of another’s

actions. However, it does not imply domination or

complete determination of another’s actions, for

a freedom to refuse the other’s exercise of power

is always recognized.7 Conflict, struggle, or “ag-

onism” is the character of a power relationship.

In this conceptualization, politics as power is

definitely outside the limited realms of the state

and the polity. The exercise of power, as Foucault

demonstrated, can also be seen in micro-contexts

such as prisons and hospitals. It is through rules

that prescribe what is true and false, insane and

sane, proper and improper, which are acted upon

individuals (e.g., as delinquent or mentally ill) and

their relations (e.g., in the family). Power, with

rules of truth as one of its organs, has been shown

to affect actual, material bodies of individuals.

These ideas have had

some prominence in

classes of political and

social theory. Political

science, however, has

not really caught on to

adopting Foucauldian

analyses that focus

more on smaller insti-

tutions. This is not at

all surprising, given

Foucault’s eccentricity

as a thinker, how he

only provided “vague guidelines,”8 and the

differences of his methodological practices

with traditional political science approaches.

Mid-20th century American political scientists

have also thought of power as central to what

is political. Robert Dahl in “The Concept of

Power” defined the concept, like (and preceding)

Foucault, as a “relation between people.”9 It is

about A making B do something that B would

not have otherwise done. In the context of Dahl’s

time, the study of power is about making it mea-

surable and reducible to probabilistic rules.

Some, however, have altogether contested the

centrality of power. Jacques Rancière, a con-

temporary political philosopher, stated this

clearly in the first sentence of his “Ten Theses on

Politics”: “Politics is not the exercise of power.”10

What we traditionally deem to be political in-

stitutions (e.g., government) that hierarchize

Even in the act of

defining politics there

is politics. There is

an attempt to limit

individuals into partic-

ular ways of thinking

about a concept,

about a field, and

therefore also lim-

iting the possibilities

of their behavior.

6 t h e s wor d

and order individuals and groups in society, he

calls the “police” order.11 Instead, he defines

politics as a practice in opposition to this hier-

archized state of things. Politics is an act by the

excluded (the demos ) in intervening into this

order, disrupting, antagonizing, and disagreeing

with the supposedly contingent hierarchy, to

assert equality. In this, the notion of politics as

dissensus (compare “consensus”) does not serve

scientific inquiry, but that of political action.

Similarly, Ernesto Laclau

and Chantal Mouffe

highlight contingency:

“to say contingent artic-

ulation is to enounce

a central dimension

of ‘politics.’”12 This

means that essential

to the notion of politics is a particular way of

constituting individuals and organizing society

through discourses (i.e., attempts at establishing

a closure and fixity of meanings in a socio-his-

torical context, and therefore constrain what

can be thought by individuals and groups).13

The hegemony of a particular order is therefore

not inevitable, and is open to be challenged.

In Foucault’s notion of a power relationship, and

in Rancière’s and Laclau and Mouffe’s notions

of politics, two common elements can be seen.

Firstly, there are attempts, inevitably, to constrain

individuals’ actions, their identities as subjects,

and the ideas that they engender. Therefore,

even in the act of defining politics there is pol-

itics. There is an attempt, conscious or other-

wise, to limit individuals into particular ways

of thinking about a concept, about a field, and

therefore also limiting the possibilities of their

behavior in regard or in response to that idea.

The second common feature of the three afore-

mentioned notions is a capacity to resist how

one is advised to behave, or an ability to disagree

with how a particular order is organized. Here,

the function of describing different notions of

power is to show that how we think of our con-

cepts now differs from how other people have

thought of them in other periods of history

– “what is” is therefore contingent. The function

of providing alternative notions of politics is

to attempt to suggest particular possibilities of

action: to loosen up a potentially rigid thinking

about the concept, or to encourage going beyond

the ideas given to us by academic institutions.

The value of Rancière and Laclau and Mouffe

in particular, is in their formulation of politics

as something not merely studied, not merely

a box into which we can peek and from which

derive descriptions and theories. The purpose

of an inquiry about politics can move away from

merely setting the limits of an academic dis-

cipline, and initiate thinking into what can be

done about how society is currently organized i

The function of pro-

viding alternative

notions of politics is

to attempt to suggest

particular possi-

bilities of action.

Note: The deadline has been extended to February 15, 2015.

*

8 t h e s wor d

Politics for DummiesPatricia Joy S. Ignacio

As I write this essay in a futile attempt of reaching

a deadline assigned to me by some higher au-

thority, I contemplate the choices I have at hand.

I could either, rather unwillingly, succumb to

the power of that higher authority by writing

this essay, or refuse to do so and face the conse-

quences it might bring

to me and my editor

afterwards. Of course,

by now you know my

choice. However, rather

than an actual choice,

it was more of a sense

of obligation and a fear of what might happen

upon my refusal to comply. Power. Politics.

In everyday life, how many times have you

mused over why you have to do chores when

you are too lazy to do them, why you have to

take a subject that you do not even like, or why

you follow laws even when sometimes they do

not make any sense at all? The reason may lie

in your respect for your parents, compliance to

school rules, or respect for the government and

its laws. Whatever it is, it all boils down to one

underlying fact: that we are all under or bidding

for the influence of someone else. Power. Politics.

The definition of concepts and terms evolves

through time. Words once used in the past may

now cease to exist or mean differently. Similarly,

the term “politics” has evolved through time.

Going back to the ancient Greeks, politics or poli-

tikos meant (1) of, for, or relating to citizens, (2) be-

longing to the state, and (3) the affairs of the cities.

It is associated with the Greek word polis, meaning

city-states. Aristotle said that “man by nature is

a political animal.”1 It is then assumed that the

characteristic of being political is already innate,

almost like second nature. This can be proven,

since humans can be seen as self-preserving

creatures who forward their own interests while

still, if superficially, seeking to create a better

society. Everything we do has involved the society

in which we live; politics is therefore a social act.

As time passed, different people began to have

different notions of politics. For most, politics

involves the government, policies, laws, and

other public institutions. They believe that what

Everything we do

has involved the

society in which we

live; politics is there-

fore a social act.

t h e s wor d 9

belongs to the public sphere is political – a no-

tion closely interrelated to that of the Greeks. A

shallower definition of the term connotes politics

as merely limited to the acts of voting, cam-

paigning, and the use of power while in position.

It is for this reason that politics is commonly

described as “dirty” by the common person.

Within the academe, scholars also have different

conceptions of politics. Rather than defining it

and giving limitations to its scope, the term has

extended so vastly that we sometimes become

confused as to what is considered political and

what is not. What can be observed, however,

is that the most basic conception of politics

equates it to power. Robert Dahl defines power

as the ability of person A to make person B do

something that he/she would not have other-

wise done.2 Going back to the Greeks’ original

definition, politics is associated with the concept

of society and man is considered as a political

animal. In any society, it would be normal for

humans to have conflicting interests. To resolve

them, however, they must come to a conclu-

sion either by lobbying, persuasion, force, or

whatever means they have at hand. Power.

Some may argue, however, that choice

is just an illusion. As Samantha Borgens

says in the film Stuck in Love,

As we equate power to the ability to influence

another person, we also create the notion that

that other person has a choice as to whether or

not he/she would succumb to the interests him/

her who tries to exercise power. We then create a

hierarchy in society where there is a person at a

level higher than us in some aspect who is able to

influence us. Subsequently, there may be another

person higher than her who can exercise power

over her and influence her decisions. Delusions

and illusions. We believe that we do have options –

freedom to decide for ourselves when to be influ-

enced by some higher

authority; the ability to

do something on our

own volition – when

in reality, we may not

even have the luxury of

choice. We think we act

based on our own free will when, in fact, we

may be under the influence of someone else.

But politics does not always work that way. Politics

is not always a zero-sum game and power does

not travel in only one direction. There is no need

for a higher authority or a prime mover because

power can come from any individual as long as he/

she is able to influence the decisions of others. For

this reason, politics is understood to be no longer

limited to what is social and what is public. The

concept has certainly evolved through the years.

Politics now involves both the public and the pri-

vate spheres – you can exercise power anywhere.

Power relations show us that politics is ev-

erywhere. It is neither limited to the govern-

ment and its laws, nor to acts of voting or

campaigning. It is present wherever power

is present – in my relationship with my ed-

itor, in a person’s relationship with his/her

parents, in a student’s constant struggle with

required subjects, and in our everyday life

as a citizen of whichever country. As long as

power is present, politics is present as well i

We believe that we do

have options, when

in reality, we may

not even have the

luxury of choice.

Society, government, money, religion, careers, nu-

clear families, monogamy. These are all just highly

creative, socially accepted delusions that we impose

on reality to try and gain some semblance of control

over our lives. It gives us the illusion of choice.

10 t h e s wor d

Politics in the Mundane: Love and PowerReiner S. Gallardo

Politics has always been connected to the concept

of power. Politics as the study of power is one of

the most commonly used conceptions to describe

what we concern ourselves with in our discipline.

We acknowledge something as political if it in-

volves power relations. We are not talking about

power as understood in physics, but rather power

as in authoritative power, defined as having A to

“get B to do something

that B would not oth-

erwise do,”1 or having

the ability to “realize

their will, even if others

resist it,”2 or “the acts

of men going about the

business of moving

other men to act in relation to themselves or in

relation to organic or inorganic things.”3 We are

dealing with power as having others do what

we want them to do regardless if they want to

do it or not. It is the activity that manifests an

exercise of power that we regard as political.

While we can define power, it is not at all always

directly observable. One clear manifestation

of power is through the decisions we make.

Decisions are exercises of power. Every day we

are unaware that our interactions are a result of

our positions within power relations. Sometimes,

we have power over others, like in the case of

having to choose where to eat during a group

outing. At other times, we are subjected to the

power of others. For instance, academic require-

ments and deadlines are clear indicators of some

people having power over you. Aware or not, it is

undeniable that power guides our everyday in-

teractions – even interactions concerning love.

Romantic relationships, or what we often refer to

as “love”, are nothing more than a set of decisions

we do every now and then. While I do not deny

that philosophical love transcends romantic love,

I shall focus on the latter, since it is more apparent

and more commonly known. Moreover, unlike

philosophical love, which could be described as

unconditional, endless, and even perhaps, true,

romantic relationships are ridden with struggles.

Struggles are clear demonstrations of power. They

are proofs of a system of authority that decides

Aware or not, it is

undeniable that

power guides our

everyday interactions

– even interactions

concerning love.

t h e s wor d 1 1

the actions the rest of us should take. From the

start, human interests have always been so di-

verse. While individuals of presumably similar

interests gather to form a society, these individ-

uals are not unified all the time. This is why it is

necessary for an order, a system to hold society

together. However, our rigid social structure

makes sure that our interests remain divided,

that with a concurrence of scarcity of resources,

people must strive in order to get their needs to

be addressed, bringing forth the need to compete

for opportunities. Power directs these struggles.

Having power means getting to decide which

interests should be given attention and pursued.

Similarly, romantic relationships are never

without struggles. Interacting and having rela-

tionships with people who are not exactly like us

are more likely than finding a person who is in all

aspects similar to us. At some point, there would

be some minor, or even perhaps, major differ-

ences in preference, attitude, and many other

things. Problems arise from these differences.

In order to address differences, individuals in a

romantic relationship must arrive at a decision

that would be binding to the involved. Hence,

power gets involved at this phase. It is not at

all times that both parties in a relationship

equally contribute to the decision that binds

them. At some point, one must submit to the

other, building up some sort of authority within

the relationship. However, in a romantic setting,

this “authority” would not hold for all decisions

– though we may encounter “authoritarian” rela-

tionships where one gets to decide for the other

in all circumstances. Of course, there is a higher

chance that this kind of relationship would not

last (for several reasons that I will talk about

later). In most functional relationships, the idea

of submitting to an authority is not for the sake

of interest, but rather, of arriving at a decision.

Love is like politics. It is full of problems that

many people claim to understand, but only a few

really do. It is also used

by people to justify their

domination over the

weak and the ignorant.

Some would want to

dominate in it, some

would not care about it,

some would want to be

in it, some would want

to stay away from it, and

some would want to un-

derstand it. It is every-

where, yet it can hardly

be understood because

of its complexities and paradoxes. Metaphor and

hugot aside, love, like politics, involves power.

In societies, those who have power, such as the

authorities, decide which goals will be collec-

tively pursued, which interests will be addressed,

and many other binding actions. While this may

resemble romantic relationships, it is not for the

same reason in most cases. Bickering couples find

it more beneficial to submit to the other in order

to arrive at a decision, rather than risk losing the

relationship. We have to note that unlike in the

case of government-governed relationship, where

power is attained for the purpose of addressing

interests, in some cases of romantic relationships,

it is necessary to “assign” power to come to a

decision in order not to jeopardize the system.

Everyday interactions of love involve the exer-

cise of power. All relationships start with the

decision of one party to acknowledge the pres-

Love is like politics. It

is full of problems that

many people claim to

understand, but only

a few really do. It is

used to justify one’s

domination over the

weak and the igno-

rant. It is everywhere,

yet it can hardly be

understood because

of its complexities.

1 2 t h e s wor d

ence of the other. A girl deciding whether to talk

to a boy or not clearly is an exercise of power.

Power drives people to do things within rela-

tionships. Love in itself is an exercise of power.

Relationship, based on mutual dependence, re-

lies on power to stabilize it. Love is when one

person lets his or her loved one overcome his own

reason. Love is when one puts his or her loved

ones needs before his own. Love is when one

recognizes the power of the other over the self.

To illustrate, let us

analyze the traditional

love-at-first-sight-then-

everything-happens-

like-destiny story. In

this case, I assume

heterosexual roles for

the sake of simplicity.

Imagine a guy meeting a girl at class. This is not

just a girl – she’s the one who fits perfectly the

description of the guy’s dream girl. While we

commonly assume that the beginning of this

romantic relationship resides on the girl’s decision

to entertain the guy, it would be equally accept-

able to assume the other way around: the start of

the relationship lies on the decision of the guy to

gather his balls and talk to the girl. (I am being

traditional here. There may be cases where girls

would take the first step, but the point is that the

relationship starts when one decides to talk to the

other.) This is followed by the decision of the girl

to entertain the guy. At this point, the decision to

interact with one another, as well as the decision

to entertain such interaction, commands some

sort of authority, as far as this relationship is

concerned. It is observable that the beginning of

the relationship depends a lot on mutual recog-

nition of power. No progress can occur if not for

one exercising power and the other recognizing it.

This is also the same in maintaining relationships.

Real relationships are not exactly the same as

those depicted in fairy tales. Not all that is “ever

after” in relationships are happy, in the same

manner that not all matches are ideal. Our signif-

icant other may not be the person that we have

expected him or her to be. It may be the case that

our significant other would not get along with us.

Even more, there is no guarantee that being with

your special one would be like heaven on earth.

Being in a romantic relationship does not elimi-

nate the human side of us – meaning, we would

still feel pain, hunger, and so on. Responsibilities

are still there. There is a lot more that we have

to do other than be in love. Couples encounter

problems that may endanger their relationships.

Sometimes it is caused by external factors, like

workload of a partner or rumors. In some cases,

it arises internally, like jealousy or misunder-

standing (e.g., the vagueness of “okay,” which can

mean either “do it” or “do not it”). But neverthe-

less, relationships work. Why? Because of power.

Contrary to the popular belief that power is det-

rimental to love, the opposite is actually truer:

power stabilizes love. When power is exercised

and recognized, relationships work. Conflict

arises as some people tend to overuse “love” in

relationships and take the better out of the

other. Conflict in love, like in politics, can only

be “constrained by a balance of power.”4 Since

relationships are expressions of mutual depen-

dence, it would work only when there is mutual

recognition of power. It is the love for the other

person that drives us to do things that we would

not otherwise do. It is for love that we make de-

cisions. It is for love that we exercise power i

Contrary to the

popular belief that

power is detrimental

to love, the opposite

is actually truer:

power stabilizes love.

1 4 t h e s wor d

Towards a Relevant Concept of Politics in the Philippine ContextAlphonse G. Samson

There is no settled definition of politics.1 Even

after almost four years, I still find difficulty in

defining the very term whose referent I have long

been studying. Despite the apparent lack of defi-

nitional clarity, students of politics are still able

to engage in academic discussions. This made me

think that the definition of politics can depend on

context. I believe that

the greater purpose of

studying politics is in the

manner that it can be

applied, such as political

analysis, which has to

be context-based. Thus,

my objective in this essay, instead of indiscrim-

inately listing down definitions of politics, is

to situate the act of defining politics in the

Philippine context and thereafter provide a con-

ception of politics which suits that context.

To my disappointment, whenever I would scan

introductory political science textbooks in major

bookstores in the country, it appears that de-

fining politics is as easy as equating it to matters

of government and state institutions. Rarely do

I find a definition that does not include “govern-

ment,” “states,” and “institutions.” Meanwhile,

political science has been defined as the study

of these matters. Worse, you will find these text-

books placed on a shelf along with law books.

Should textbook authors and bookstores be

blamed for this definitional blunder? I believe

not. Rather, I think that cultural underpinnings of

defining politics are liable. Students of politics like

me have experienced the burden of being asked

several times by many people regarding our ca-

reers after graduation. Short of making their own

questions futile, these people already expect an

answer: political science graduates are destined

to become lawyers, politicians, diplomats, or civil

servants – nothing else; otherwise, our four years

have been simply pol-sayang. To wit: “You are

studying political science? So you will proceed to

law?” Quite interestingly, those aforesaid careers

are connected to the definition of politics as mat-

ters of government, states, and institutions. This

particular observation is in accordance with the

fact that through history, several politicians and

government officials – some prominent – have

Historically, the

realm of politics was

never limited to the

government, the state,

and institutions.

t h e s wor d 1 5

taken a degree in political science, along with eco-

nomics, business, and law. Hence, a Filipino pe-

destrian would not expect “politics” to go beyond

the arena of government, states, and institutions.

Historical adaptation of the definition of politics

and political science can also be liable. According

to Remigio Agpalo in his discussion of the history

of political science in the country, the discipline

was brought to the country by the Americans

when it was the high time for statist, legalistic,

and institutionalist paradigms in politics.2 In ad-

dition, the discipline, when it was first established

as a department in the University, had its roots

in the College of Law, with its first department

chair, who was also the acting Law Dean and an

American, George Malcolm.3 However, Agpalo

further discusses paradigmatic changes in the dis-

cipline in response to the exigencies of the times.4

During the 1930s, for instance, the behavioralist

paradigm became influential in its critique of the

legalistic paradigm that rules and laws alone do

not determine the behavior of actors. During the

1960s, the Marxist paradigm likewise became

prominent because of two factors: the influence

of Maoism from China, and the response against

Marcos’ dictatorship. The point here is simple:

historically, the realm of politics was never lim-

ited to the government, the state, and institutions.

To discount the fact that the discipline may have

been introduced in the country and developed

in some other way is dangerous, however. This is

because Agpalo mostly focused on the develop-

ment of the discipline in the University.5 Thus, it

is possible that the paradigm of politics for other

educational institutions may have remained

statist, legalistic, and institutionalist – not all

political science scholars and authors in the

country were able to carry on with the paradig-

matic developments in the discipline. There is,

however, a problem with the continued adoption

of the old paradigm. These paradigms gained

prominence because the country was reeling

from foreign occupation and the Second World

War; hence, there was

a need for a paradigm

that would aid state-

building, which I argue

is no longer the concern

of the country today.

There can indeed be

many realms of poli-

tics, yet many people

have not removed their

focus on the arena of

politics. Most of the

concerns, issues, and problems that the nation

faces nowadays are not matters of government,

state, or institutions in their entirety. Instead,

these are matters of processes within, but not

limited to, these arenas. In saying these, I echo

Colin Hay’s perspective that analysis of politics

encompasses social relations, that which involves

the greater sphere of society.6 He was quick to

distinguish the political from other aspects, such

as the “cultural” or the “sociological,” both of

which also encompass the societal sphere. He

made clear that the political is concerned with

power, but not its distribution, exercise, or con-

sequences. Instead, it is concerned with relations

of power that is implied in social relations. Hence,

for Hay, “politics is not defined by the locus of

its operation but by its nature as a process.”7

In another chapter, Hay elaborates the concept of

power.8 There he speaks of three “faces” of power

in terms of dimensions. The one-dimensional

view conceptualizes power as decision-making,

Most of the concerns,

issues, and problems

that the nation is

facing nowadays

are not matters of

government, state, or

institutions. Instead,

these are matters

of processes within,

but not limited

to, these arenas.

16 t h e s wor d

which is observed in the formal political arena.

The two-dimensional view combines deci-

sion-making and agenda-setting, manifested in

both the informal and formal arenas (e.g., “behind

the scenes”). Lastly, the three-dimensional view

combines decision-making and agenda-setting

with preference-shaping,

which is implicated in

the public sphere or

civil society (e.g., dis-

courses and ideologies).

Thus, in contrast to

power conventionally

defined as the ability of

A to make B do an action

that B would not have

done otherwise, Hay

conceives power as the

ability of actors to influence the context which set

the range of possibilities for action of others. Thus,

the implications of this particular conception of

power allow the analysis of issues to go beyond

the formal arenas of the government and state

institutions towards the greater sphere of society.

Using this perspective of politics, the patron–

client framework (PCF) theory9 gains hold in

its analysis of Philippine politics10 as one that

is characterized by dyadic and reciprocal ties

between patrons and clients. The patrons are

typically elected government officials. Meanwhile,

the typical clients are the electorate, but public

officials can also become clients of their supe-

riors. PCF theory is seen in action especially

during the months before elections, during which

incumbent mayors would give dole-outs and

scholarships – as well as shoulder expenses for

baptisms, weddings, and funerals, among others

– to their constituents who, in turn, would sup-

port and vote for them. What PCF theory shows

is that these relations of power, while mutually

beneficial, allows patrons to strengthen and

extend their control and influence in their turfs.

Another application of the same perspective of

politics is on the issue of labor exportation. Here

we see that the government is encouraging more

Filipinos to become modern-day heroes ( mga

bagong bayani ) by becoming overseas contact

workers (OCWs). Jean Encinas–Franco argued

that this “labeling scheme” of the government is

simply a discourse that justifies labor exporta-

tion.11 Through this powerful discourse, Filipinos

are made to think that being an OCW is an act

of heroism while the government is able to hide

the fact that it is not providing enough and sus-

tainable jobs with competitive salaries within

the country when it should. In essence, by legit-

imizing labor export, the troubles that Filipino

OCWs face, such as estrangement from their

families, abuse by their foreign employers, and

discrimination, are being taken for granted.

These realities, among a plethora of other issues

and problems that this country currently faces,

have been revealed to us through a perspective

of politics that is not limited by a statist, institu-

tionalist, or legalist paradigm. I argue that using

a conception of politics based on power – not

on the arena of government and state institu-

tions – in political analysis is more relevant and

useful especially in the Philippine context i

The implications of

Hay’s conception

of power allow the

analysis of issues

to go beyond the

formal arenas of the

government and

its institutions and

towards the greater

sphere of society.

1 8 t h e s wor d

After PowerEdcel John A. Ibarra

Politics as power is fashionable.1 It makes us

students of politics take pride in our discipline,

for when politics is power, politics becomes

all-present and political science becomes an

emancipatory venture. I, however, cannot find

the same pride in politics as power. I only find

contradictions and re-

strictions, which I briefly

explore in this essay.

Politics as power re-

formulates politics as

the struggle over the

production, distribution,

and use of resources

by attempting to in-

fluence, dominate, or

control the behavior

of others.2 It is a reac-

tion against traditional

definitions that confine politics to the public

sphere. Politics also takes place at the private

sphere; indeed, it can be all-present, for power

can be located in all spheres of social interac-

tion. In addition, the reformulation also radically

changes the research agenda. The study of politics

should aim to expose asymmetrical relations

of dominance and control over resources, and

thereby, liberate the individual from those bonds.

If politics is power, then politics becomes ubiq-

uitous. Advocates claim that politics as power

does not render every relation of power political,

but only those that concern the production, dis-

tribution, and use of resources. Yet any relation

of power can be framed (and rather easily so) as

having an end of securing material resources. For

instance, in criticizing politics as power, this essay

may be charged by radical feminists and clas-

sical Marxists – the prime advocates of politics

as power – as an ideological weapon, a product of

male or bourgeois hegemony, that only serves to

silence gender or class struggles and perpetuate

the domination of men or the bourgeoisie over

resources that have long been denied to women

or the proletariat. (So be it; I will have my turn

later.) Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of power

without reference to some material end. Power

cannot be its own end, since the most effective

power relies on having material support, rein-

In criticizing politics

as power, this essay

may be charged by

radical feminists and

classical Marxists as

an ideological weapon

that only serves to

silence gender or class

struggles and perpet-

uate the domination of

men or the bourgeoisie

over scarce resources.

t h e s wor d 19

forcing and punishing, to augment one’s influence

over others. Moreover, even ideology is propa-

gated precisely to preserve the existing distribu-

tion of resources or legitimize a new one. Thus,

any power relation can be rendered political.

Similarly, any social relation can be rendered as

a power relation. As in above, any action can be

framed as having been caused by some external

power. If power is not already manifest, the an-

alyst can (and often does) resort to supposedly

latent, i.e., difficult-to-verify, forces. But it is a

truism that we are always somehow externally

influenced. Nothing we think is ever truly per-

sonal, for beginning with language, thought is

always socially mediated.3 And if thought breeds

action, nothing we do is also ever truly personal,

for not only does the supposedly private action

entail public consequences, but it is also either

socially motivated (i.e., there is a desire either to

change the behavior of others or to prove oneself

to others) or publicly learned. The determined an-

alyst will always find an external power to blame.

Thus, any social relation can be framed as a power

relation, just as any power relation can be framed

as political. Now, because social relations are

ubiquitous, politics itself also becomes ubiquitous.

But politics as power, while speaking of the

pervasiveness of relations of dominance and

control, and thus, of subservient behavior, also

simultaneously speaks of liberation from pre-

cisely those relations, and thus, of the possibility

of autonomous thought and action. Yet if power

is everywhere, then nowhere lies my liberation

from it. The premise of ubiquity contradicts the

promise of emancipation. Politics as power prides

itself on exposing the omnipresence of power, and

thus, of politics, in social relations; but how can

now an individual escape an all-present relation?

I can conceive of one way: death; but surely, that

cannot be emancipation. For the moment that we

remain alive, we cannot truly talk of liberation

from power, because power will persist even after

the supposed liberation. The aftermath of every

political revolution illustrate this supreme irony.

In fact, even during liberation, be wary of the sup-

posed liberator. Does she not exercise ideological

power over a population in defining the terms of

their oppression and their freedom from it? In this

sense, emancipation may

very well be subjugation

to the emancipator.

The absurdity is clearer

when we take “politics

as power” as itself an

ideology. It claims, as

do its begetters fem-

inism and Marxism, to be emancipatory, yet it

imposes its own terms of emancipation. It tells

us that the way to heaven begins with a recogni-

tion that politics is power, and when we reject its

sacramental bread, it tells us that we are uncon-

sciously enslaved by invisible demons. But who is

enslaving? My feminist and Marxist friends will

point to men and bourgeois hegemony, but surely,

they cannot deny that they themselves insist on

ideological domination. Politics as power and its

advocates claim to be empowering, but along the

way, they deny us of our autonomy and agency.

Advocates will retort that politics as power does

not aim to liberate the individual from relations

of power per se, but rather from unequal or unjust

relations of power. But how can there be a just or

an equal relation of power? Power imposes, ne-

glecting along the way the will of the recipient,

while justice and equality forge compromises,

acknowledging along the way the wills of the

If power is every-

where, then nowhere

lies my liberation

from it. The premise

of ubiquity contra-

dicts the promise

of emancipation.

2 0 t h e s wor d

people involved. A just or equal relation of power

is thus a contradiction of terms.4 Moreover, the

assumption remains that when all relations cease

to be relations of power, when they flatten to be

equal or realign to be just, society will reach its

most desirable form. But in the reduction, if not

absence, of power, the concepts of order (which

relies on power), society (which relies on order),

and politics (through

which societal order

is decided) lose their

meaning. If anything,

politics as power wants

to lead us into a world

with neither politics

nor power. Indeed, fem-

inists speak of a genderless heaven while

Marxists speak of a classless heaven.

Behind all pretensions, politics as power is ac-

tually apolitical: it politicizes everything only to

eventually depoliticize them. It also results in

unproductive discussions. What happens next

after exposing where or to whom power is con-

centrated? Often, the intent in exposing power

is to democratize it. And then? How – towards

what vision of collective life – should that power

be used? It does not end in genuine democracy,

with each having uniform power to define the

conditions that govern them, for democracy does

not solve collective problems: it only presents a

method to arrive at a solution.5 Politics as power

distracts us from focusing on the problems of

collective living, for the erosion of power does not

automatically lead to the erosion of the problems.

I am partial to Andrew Heywood’s conception

of politics as, paraphrasing, the activity through

which people determine the conditions of their

existence within a collectivity (i.e., a polis).6

Politics as power already recognizes this, but it

emphasizes power far too importantly in the

equation. Some relations of power are necessary,

for collective existence relies on some settled

order.7 (Think of that between the state and the

citizens.) Moreover, the definition suggested

above already fits to what politics as power at-

tempted to fulfill in the first place. That politics

concerns the settlement of collective existential

conditions does not mean that politics should

only concern the public sphere. Collectivity can

be defined such that there are overlapping collec-

tivities, from one as small as the family to one as

large as humanity as a whole. By extension, those

who determine collective existential conditions

need not always be state actors, and the method

need not always be formal decision-making.

Indeed, social movements are also sometimes able

to determine circumstances of collective living

through agenda-setting and preference-shaping.

As an alternative to politics as power, I suggest

that the idea of collective existence is far more

characteristic a conception – and far more opti-

mistic a depiction – of politics than power. In so

doing, I also suggest that the state should remain

central to political analysis, for with its resources,

it remains the entity most effectively able to

shape how we live with each other.8 Indeed, the

less radical advocates of politics as power like

the liberal feminists politicize personal relations

precisely to bring problems of collective exis-

tence at that sphere to the attention of the state.

Of course, power is an important currency in

setting collective existential conditions, but it is

simply that: a means towards some vision of how

best to manage a shared destiny with others i

Behind all pretensions,

politics as power is

actually apolitical: it

politicizes everything

only to eventually

depoliticize them.

2 2 t h e s wor d

Since I started out as a student of politics, I had

come to the conclusion that nothing is more

empowering than encountering an interesting

concept for the first time. The reaction is not

only a post-highlighting internal giddiness, but a

breakthrough with a newfound ease to commu-

nicate with people who speak the same language.

Not only do previous discussions with previously

unknown words finally make sense, but a linear

thought process, as in taxonomy, emerges and

becomes part of communal understanding.

It seems all fine and good – nothing more than

a tinkerer getting acquainted with her “toolbox,”

as Prof. Jean Paul Zialcita would put it – but the

other side finally reveals itself when our concepts

begin to intrude in experiences and people.

Waltzing with Waltz “If you expect that ev-

eryone has the capacity to hurt you, then you

would harden your shells as tough as you can that

when it does hit, you wouldn’t crumble as much,”

Prof. Amador Peleo IV started the class. He was

talking about the billiard-ball model, wherein

“you” and everyone else are states likened to

billiard balls that roll in perennial risk of collision.

States behave like people – so realists assume. It

means that if states reflect human nature, then

we can expect state behavior to mimic human

behavior. It leads to a(n) (il)logical conclusion that

human interactions exist within the billiard-ball

model: each person must fend for himself, and

build a wall of protection at the risk of being

completely destroyed. It takes root not only from a

realist view on human nature, but from a broader

worldview: if you expect things to turn out for

the good, you will always end up disappointed,

because there is inevitably a point when things

will fail. So expect the worst not just of outcomes,

but of people who are bound to hurt you anyway.

Under all hopes and expectations, there lies the

nagging realist constantly telling us that things

would have been better if only we believed less in

the possible. Earlier in the semester, I was under

duress of a potential connection with someone,

a connection which I thought was doomed from

the beginning. It seems almost natural, therefore,

that realism is the most compatible with situa-

tions that involve us, that even in the absence of

any perceivable threat on his part, for instance,

shields must always be up and expectations down.

Limited interaction, creating deterrence, and

maintaining a balance of power were strategies I

actually put to action with regards the potentiali-

ties, all in the intention of self-survival. However,

the “real” hook of realism, both its best and

worst feature, is its self-fulfilling character. With

this, the outcome can already be inferred. And

to tell you honestly: no, it did not hurt any less.

Bayan? It was naive of me to think that just

because a person or a group professes love for the

nation, the actor automatically holds the scepter

as a defender of rights, justice, or progress of (and

for) the people. I was seeing “the people” as a

concept, without knowing or understanding “the

people” as subject-agents rather than objects.

It is not merely a battle of positions in-themselves,

but between an array of discourses. While there

may be a scepter of authority, (the perception of)

its possession is not accorded through sharing or a

consensual division of interests, but won through

competition. The people is not a monolith, but

The Tinkerer and Her Toolbox: Concepts as Devices of PowerChristine Joy L. Galunan

t h e s wor d 2 3

certain actors lump competing interests under

the banner “with or for the people” and expect

their audiences to swallow it in whole and cheer

in response to a seemingly populist position.

When you actually interact with people out-

side these actors’ spheres of influence, there

emerges the question: who are included and

excluded in their view of “the people”? More

problematically, does it not run the risk of

treating “the people” as a detached group of ob-

ject-receivers, whose interests can only be rightly

perceived and defended by those above them?

For Paulo Freire, “to simply think about the

people, as the dominators do… to fail to think

with the people, is a sure way to cease being

revolutionary leaders.”1 To involve and fight at

the side of the oppressed, not merely for them as

their liberator, is a step towards answering the

first question, and more importantly, towards

beginning to conceive of “the people” as ac-

tors’ “constituent matrix”2 or as subject-agents.

This is particularly significant in Marxist thought.

Society’s preoccupation with objectification has

a discursive underpinning in its view on sub-

ject-object relations wherein subjects are reified

as objects. Reification renders the determinant

subjects (e.g., “the people”) to be abstractions

or objects who only obey laws or models of be-

havior assigned to them. Thus, lumping “the

people” as a concept creates a power relation

in which we, as subjects, may approach the

world in a controlled and reductionist manner.

What does Foucault say? Confronted with

the seemingly inescapable web of these power

relations (under which all of us appear to be

embedded in everyday interaction, relationships,

and principles), we may be tempted to assume

these relations as semi-permanent structural

arrangements that agents have little or no power

of subverting. At least, this is how many the-

orists frame Michel Foucault’s view on power

relations: their ubiquity implies inescapability.

However, in his article “The Subject and Power”

and in a 1980 interview, Foucault tells us oth-

erwise.3 Power relations are embedded, such

that they continue to exist between persons

in any circumstance, but they are also mal-

leable, convertible, and reversible. But does

this not mean that once one escapes a partic-

ular relationship of domination, one only en-

ters into another relation of power, either as

the subject or the object, the conceiver or the

concept, the controller or the controlled?

Foucault answers that it is not necessarily

so. It ultimately depends on how these rela-

tions are constructed between persons, and

whether these constructions turn out to be

despotic or dominating. As Foucault concurs,

“power is not always repressive. It can take a

certain number of forms. And it is possible

to have relations of power that are open.”4

This was certainly the most curious revelation to

me after taking a sociology class on the theory of

society of Foucault under Prof. Luis David. As he

pinned down in the last lecture, Foucault’s project

was precisely to demonstrate “the absurdity of our

label-producing proclivities, markers, producing

a social grid that instead of pulling us together,

explodes us apart.” Labels that trap people within

concepts take us farther from the “freshness

that actually subsists behind [human] masks.”

2 4 t h e s wor d

The final word, however, still rests on how

these power relations, instead of being re-

lations between subjects and objects, can

be reconstructed to be between agents in a

non-repressive form. Refusing to be prescrip-

tive in the “how”-sense, Foucault tells us a way:

through the resurrection of ethics – a person’s

relation with himself grounded in human re-

lationships – as a basis for action.5 In other

words, a way to subvert the modern project

of “mastering” people and the environment is

to master the self – our passions, inclinations,

and purpose – in the Greek tradition of arête

(virtue), that is by working in interdependently

in our community for the common good.

The problem here has already transcended how

one perceives the world as a personal subject,

but the question reflects the ever-present di-

lemma of the social scientist, of the tinkerer

with a toolbox. Do we approach the world

hoping to understand and predict social be-

havior using concepts and models, or should

we instead begin to approach “the people” as

they are, as impossible and unattainable an en-

tire body of knowledge about them may be?

The former leads to a comfortable setting where

we can claim to have a sense of security over re-

ality, but does this lead us to construct authentic

relationships? The latter gives us the option, but

only if we stop treating people as actors outside

ourselves that we need to study, and instead start

to regard them as humans with an equally com-

plex ethical substance. This distances us from

mere knowledge of one another and brings us

closer to what human relationships should really

be about: mutual support towards liberation from

relations of domination and towards the reali-

zation of one another’s potentials and purpose.

So nothing seems to be as empowering for the

student as the discovery of new concepts with

which we gain knowledge of the world. But this

experience have placed another meaning of

empowerment: to synergize being a student

and being a member of a polis, concerned not

only with knowing and mastering the world

around us, but also with relating with one an-

other in authentic and ethical terms of power,

that is, with concern and compassion i

Read the Internal Publication at bit.ly/ts-inter-1415a

Get aninsider

lookof the

org!

26 t h e s wor d

Remember Foucault** Excuses to Jean Baudrillard, and his essay, “Forget Foucault.”

1. Clyde W. Barrow, “The Intellectual Origins of New Political Science,” New Political Science 30, no. 2 (2008): 215-44.

2. Ibid., 238. This “New Political Science” espoused an “intellectual revolution” that called out the behavioralists’ supposed

methodological dogmatism and their implicit complicity with the status quo, with liberal-democracy.

3. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (London: Bantam, 1984), 9.

4. Ibid., 15.

5. Michel Foucault, “Two Lectures,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings; 1972–1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New

York: Pantheon, 1980), 88.

6. Ibid., 90.

7. Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (1982): 777-95; see esp. 789–90.

8. Paul Brass, “Foucault Steals Political Science,” Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000): 305-330.

9. Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science 2, no. 3 (1957): 201–15.

10. Jacques Rancière, “Ten Theses on Politics,” Theory and Event 5, no. 3 (2001). http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jacques-ranciere/

articles/ten-thesis-on-politics/.

11. Ibid.

12. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 1985), xii.

13. Marianne Jorgensen and Louise Phillips, Discourse as Theory and Method (Sage: London, 2002), 36.

Politics for Dummies1. Aristotle, Politics, qtd. in Andrew Heywood, Politics, 3rd ed. (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 3.

2. Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science 2, no. 3 (1957): 201–15.

Politics in the Mundane: Love and Power** I would like to acknowledge the girl who exercised power over me. This article would not be written if not for you. I would like to

also acknowledge Carmille Romero for giving me the idea that love and power are intertwined.

1. Robert Dahl, The Concept of Power (1957), 202-3, quoted in John Scott, Studying Power (Blackwell, 2004), 86.

2. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (1956), 9, quoted in John Scott, Studying Power (Blackwell, 2004), 88.

3. Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structures (1953), 2-3, quoted in John Scott, Studying Power (Blackwell, 2004), 85.

4. Andrew Heywood, Global Politics (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 2.

Endnotes

t h e s wor d 27

Towards a Relevant Concept of Politics in the Philippine Context1. The definition popularized in Andrew Heywood, Politics, 3rd ed. (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 4 – “the activity

through which people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live” – is not even an agreed one.

2. Remigio Agpalo, “Political Science in the Philippines 1880-1998: A History of the Discipline,” Philippine Social Sciences Review 55

(1998): 1–4.

3. Ibid., 4.

4. Ibid., 20–4.

5. Agpalo made this clear in p. 11: “If one talks of political science in the Philippines, he must refer to political science in the

University of the Philippines.”

6. Colin Hay, Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 3.

7. Ibid.; emphasis retained.

8. Ibid.

9. Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, “Review: Oligarchic Patrimonialism, Electoral Clientelism, and Contested Democracy in the

Philippines,” Comparative Politics 37, no. 2 (2005): 229–50.

10. I am aware that the PCF theory has been contested, if not debunked, by subsequent theories (e.g., Bossism, Contested

Democracy, Oligarchic Patrimonialism, etc.), but my goal here is to illustrate how a statist, institutionalist, and legalist

perspective are unable to explain the phenomena of patron-client relations in the Philippines. This is also to provide the basic

view of politics in the Philippines.

11. Jean Encinas–Franco, “The Language of Labor Export in Political Discourse: ‘Modern-Day Heroism’ and Constructions of

Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs),” Philippine Political Science Journal 34, no. 1 (2013): 97–112.

After Power1. The other essays in this collection prove the point.

2. Andrew Heywood, Politics, 3rd ed. (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 11.

3. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, esp. his skepticism with the possibility of a “private” language roughly at

secs. 243–351.

4. There is, however, a legitimate relation of power: that which is defined by authority.

5. Democracy cannot even function because politics as power in its extreme must eradicate the state, which is a bastion of coercive

power that is inherently dominating and controlling.

6. Heywood, Politics, 4: politics is “the activity through which people make, preserve, and amend the general rules under which

they live.”

7. Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972); see esp. chap. 1.

8. Gene L. Pilapil, “Some Arguments for an Institutional Approach to Philippine Politics,” Philippine Political Science Journal 27

(2006): 89–124.

The Tinkerer and Her Toolbox: Concepts as Devices of Power1. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 30th anniversary ed. (New York: Continuum, 2000), 132.

2. Ibid.

3. Michel Foucault, “Power, Moral Values, and the Intellectual,” interview by Michael Bess, November 3, 1980; “The Subject and

Power,” Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (1982): 777-95.

4. Foucault, “Power, Moral Values, and the Intellectual.”

5. Claire O’Farrell, “Key Concepts,” Michel-Foucault.com (2007), http://www.michel-foucault.com/concepts/.

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POLITICAL SOCIETYuniversity of the philippines

UP POLSCi Leadership. Service. Excellence. Politics.

the up political society review of political scienceThe Sword