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The spy who never was:An intelligence myth inPalestine, 1914–18Yigal Sheffy a ba Lectures at the Program for Security Studies ,Tel Aviv University ,b Lt. Colonel (res.) in the Israel DefenceForces ,Published online: 02 Jan 2008.

To cite this article: Yigal Sheffy (1999) The spy who never was: An intelligencemyth in Palestine, 1914–18, Intelligence and National Security, 14:3, 123-142,DOI: 10.1080/02684529908432555

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529908432555

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The Spy Who Never Was: An IntelligenceMyth in Palestine, 1914-18

YIGAL SHEFFY

Myths, like old soldiers, refuse to die, let alone myths about spies. Theadventures of the daring German super-spy, Fritz Frank (1873-1968),who operated behind British lines in Sinai and Palestine during WorldWar I, disguised as a British officer, have fired the imagination ofcontemporaries as well as historians and scholars to date. This articleshows that while Frank himself was a real, flesh and blood figure, thedeeds attributed to him were almost entirely imaginary.

British counterintelligence (CI) and counterespionage (CE) on the eve ofand during the First World War has been the subject of academic studyespecially since the mid-1980s.1 All scholars agree that the professionalspy-catchers in Britain, as well as the British public generally, were caughtup in what has been called 'spy fever' or 'spy mania', imagining a Germanspy behind every bush. They are in consensus that this frenzy, moreover,played a significant role in institutionalizing central British C[ apparatus atthat time.2

Existing studies focus mainly on the British Isles, barely touching oncounterintelligence in the vast territories of the Empire.3 However, inexamining the available evidence on British CE in the eastern parts of theBritish Empire, recently enhanced by the release of the MI-5 War HistoricalReports of the Great War,4 one realizes that the notion of the ubiquitous spyspread from the British Isles to the Middle East, Persia and India longbefore August 1914. As early as 1905, for example, British authorities inEgypt were convinced that the orientalist Baron Max von Oppenheim, thenoriental secretary to the German Agency in Cairo, was 'the Kaiser's Spy'and the organizer of clandestine networks of pro-German agents in thecountry.5 Although, spy mania in Britain died out soon after the war (to bereplaced by the 'Red Scare'), in the Middle East it evolved into awidespread post-war myth of daring spies who had operated with immensesuccess against the British Empire's interests during the Great War.

A related phenomenon is that British war literature reflects a perceptionof the Western Front that is far different from that of the campaigns in the

Intelligence and National Security, Vol.14, No.3 (Autumn 1999), pp.123-142PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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Middle and Near East. While the former embodies all the grim and dreadfulrealities of modern warfare with its unforgivable slaughter, the latter has acertain romantic aura, somewhat akin to the Crusades, which has imprinteditself onto the collective memory. This perception is also less critical of andmore sympathetic to the British war effort in the eastern arena. Even failuressuch as the Gallipoli Campaign are recollected in light of their heroic naturerather than their deficiencies. It is not uncommon to view the war in theNear East as a sort of continuation of the romantic 'Great Game' of thenineteenth century.6

The historiographic treatment of intelligence in both arenas reflectsthese different approaches as well. The literature about the Western Frontemphasizes faulty intelligence and erroneous assessments, and a life-or-death struggle against nefarious spies. As far as the Middle East isconcerned, however, the war of wits has been portrayed much moreglamorously. It is not unusual for British writers to speak admirably of a'German T. E. Lawrence' (Wilhelm Wassmuss in Iran), to salute 'a gallantyoung German officer' (Count Kanitz), and to idealize the atmosphere offair play that ostensibly prevailed in the intelligence game.7 This perceptionencouraged the rise of Middle East myths that embraced friend and foealike.

One such myth is the subject of this essay - the myth of Fritz Frank, theGerman super-spy who supposedly operated behind British lines in Sinaiand Palestine disguised as a British officer. While Frank himself was a realflesh and blood figure, the deeds attributed to him were almost entirelyimaginary.

THE PLAYGROUND

The Ottoman Empire entered the war in early November 1914. By the startof 1915, the Ottoman Fourth Army, assisted by German officers and civilianexperts attacked the Suez Canal after having crossed the entire 300-kmwidth of the Sinai desert, without encountering any resistance. The Canal,however, was well defended by the British army in Egypt, and the Ottomanswere forced to withdraw. Thereafter, the Sinai peninsula became virtually ano-man's land, the scene of minor operations initiated by both sides. InApril 1916, the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) under Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Murray began its advance eastwards, reaching thePalestine border by early 1917.8 After two costly failures to break throughthe Ottoman defence line that stretched from Gaza to Beersheba, Murraywas replaced in June by General Sir Edmund Allenby, who resumed theoffensive in October 1917 and occupied the southern half of Palestine,including Jerusalem, by the end of the year. The EEF attacked again in

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AN INTELLIGENCE MYTH IN PALESTINE 1914-18 125

September 1918, defeating the Turks and their German allies in the Battleof Meggido and overruning the rest of Palestine within a week and the entirearea of Syria within a month. The war ended soon after.9

Two organizations were responsible for counterintelligence in the Egyptand Palestine Theatre on a territorial basis - one military and the otherimperial. In the zone of military operations (namely the Suez Canal, Sinaiand the Palestine front) the I(b) branch of the EEF's Military IntelligenceSection was in charge. The rest of Egypt and the eastern Mediterranean wascontrolled by an imperial organization - the Eastern Mediterranean SpecialIntelligence Bureau (EMSIB), created early in 1916 as the result of anattempt by the security service, MI-5, in Britain (still under the title CentralSpecial Intelligence Bureau) to intensify its cooperation with similarorganizations in the colonies and dominions of the Empire. EMSIB wascomprised of a secret service branch (Branch A), established in Athens ayear before as the Middle Eastern station of London's Secret Service Bureau(forerunner of MI-6), and of a newly-born CI branch (Branch B), whichrepresented the security service. By late 1917, the new organization wasrecognized as central controlling agency for all counterespionage work inthe area, which included Egypt, the Sudan, Abyssinia, Cyprus, the occupiedterritories in south Palestine, the Hijaz (through the Arab Bureau) and, to alesser extent, Eritrea, Libya and Crete.10

The British identified military espionage as one of the major CI threats inEgypt and Palestine (the others were subversion and anti-British agitationamong the local Muslim population; leakage of information; and support ofGerman U-boats in interfering with maritime traffic in the easternMediterranean)." In reality, however, British commanders had no reason to beseriously concerned over this threat. The Ottomans, naturally, sent Arabinformants behind British lines and extensively doubled captured Bedouinagents from the other side. However, as far as available evidence is to berelied upon, no Ottoman agent in the entire arena succeeded in collectingsignificant military secrets (such as intentions, war plans or even reliable dataon the overall capability of the EEF), and no German was ever even sentbehind enemy lines in Palestine for espionage. The Germans preferred usingtechnical means of collection, such as air reconnaissance, air photography andwireless interception. Yet, British CE never realized the true state of affairs,and their spy mania continued to proliferate, reaching a zenith in the summerof 1917 when the legend of Fritz Frank also assumed mythical proportions.

THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE POST-WAR FRITZ FRANK MYTH

Frank was first mentioned in post-war literature in 1920, when CaptainFerdinand Tuohy published a book titled The Secret Corps. Tuohy had

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served in wireless intelligence during the war, and in that capacity touredthe Palestine front in 1917. His book, therefore, was assumed to be adocumentary account of the secret war within the Great War. The truth isthat the author was somewhat carried away by his own stories. Among thenon-existent daring men and attractive women spies whom he depicted asoperating in the Middle East was a German, 'Major Francks', who 'hadspent nearly all his life in the British colonies and would have passed for anEnglishman in any society'. According to Tuohy, Francks, wearing theuniform of a British or Australian officer, crossed the lines in Egypt andPalestine many times, penetrating headquarters and collecting operationaldata. He became well known and caused the 'Frank Scare', resulting in thedetention of many genuine officers. Tuohy concluded: 'Despite the realdanger this man presented and the hundreds of casualties he must havecaused ... a general hope prevailed that so brave a sportsman would neverbe caught'.12

A year later, in 1921, the unofficial war history of the famous MountedDesert Corps was published in London (the Corps was the formation underwhich all mounted and cavalry divisions operated in Palestine). This bookwent one step further in the area of German espionage, recounting that therewere at least 'two very daring and bold German spies, who several timespenetrating British lines disguised as British officers, obtaining a good dealof useful information' .l3

In 1928, Field-Marshal Archibald Wavell (then Lieutenant-General)published the standard military textbook on the Palestine Campaign. Wavellwas (and is) considered one of the most reliable authorities on thiscampaign, having served as liaison officer between the General Staff inLondon and Allenby in Palestine and been privy to all plans and events. Itis quite likely that he contributed much to the spread of the myth when hestated categorically that in 1917 'most of the spies were natives or in nativedress, but there was at least one daring German who penetrated to thecamps, disguised as a British or Australian officer'.14

An American journalist, Joseph Gollomb, also contributed to the myththat same year in his anthology on human intelligence Spies. Withoutrevealing his sources, Gollomb included new 'details' on Frank, namely hispre-war life in Australia, India and South Africa; a paradrop behind Britishlines; and his tapping of British HQ's main telephone line, which enabledhim to glean secrets from staff officers, resulting, ostensibly, in the failureof several attacks."

The next layer of evidence was added in 1930 by Brigadier Sir JohnAston, a pre-war British naval intelligence officer who was employed in thesecretariat of the War Cabinet in the latter stages of the war. His book on theBritish secret service during the war details the adventures of Fritz, a

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German spy in Palestine, and the war of minds that took place between himand a British intelligence officer, the pseudonymous 'Mannering', who wasto play a significant role in the true story under his real name - RichardMeinertzhagen.16

In 1934, the prestigious London quarterly The Cavalry Journalpublished a memoir article by Major H.C.H. Robertson, an Australian whohad served in the Yeomanry Mounted Division in Palestine. Robertsonwrote that in the summer of 1917, he had bumped into a British stafflieutenant-colonel who, despite his 'nice upstanding bay horse', immaculateuniform, perfect English and Guards-like appearance, seemed to besuspicious . Regrettably, Robertson had not detained the officer. Inquiriesmade by him soon thereafter persuaded him that the man he hadencountered was the 'brave and quick-witted spy' sought by the entireEEF."

Commenting on the article, General Sir George Barrow, the commandingofficer of the Yeomanry Division during the war, supported Robertson'sclaims completely. Not only did he remember the case, but he asserted thatthe German officer had been seen by several persons, including thecommander of the entire Desert Mounted Corps, General (later Field-Marshal Lord) Philip Chetwode. 'He was certainly a cool and brave man andwe all admired his intrepidity', Barrow observed: 'We should all be greatlyinterested if the officer concerned would come forward and give his story."8

Oddly, Chetwode was never requested to present his version of the event.An ex-German officer, intrigued by the Cavalry Journal article,

requested the help of General Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein (the chief ofstaff of the Ottoman 8th Corps during the early part of the war and latercommander of the 8th Army in Palestine) in locating the mysterious officer-spy. Von Kressenstein denied in no uncertain terms that a German orOttoman officer had ever been sent behind British lines for espionage,disguised or undisguised. He also labeled as absurd the stories about FritzFrank. According to the German general, Frank, a German citizen living inPalestine, had volunteered to assist the military effort after the outbreak ofthe war by conducting topographical surveys in Sinai. Unable to speak aword of English, Frank had never even come close to the British lines, letalone crossed them."

Kress von Kressenstein's statement was the most reliable evidence ahistorian could wish to obtain, especially when the German generalreiterated it in his memoirs published three years later.20 One writer who waswon over by it was Wavell, who consequently withdrew his traditionalaccount of Frank that he had prepared also for his new biography ofAllenby, published in 1940, substituting an explanation of the entrenchmentof this legend in British minds at the time.21

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Others, however, chose not to be confused by facts. Accounts of themythical Frank continued to appear in books published in the US, Englandand Israel during the 1950s.22 In 1960, Colonel (ret.) RichardMeinertzhagen, a key figure in the Frank affair, published his Army Diary,bringing a new angle to the story. Meinertzhagen - the real figure behindBrigadier Aston's 'Mannering' - had arrived in Palestine in May 1917 andhad headed Palestine Intelligence (the Field Intelligence Branch of the EEF)until early 1918. His diary is considered an important source for the historyof British Intelligence in Africa and Palestine during the war and was thebasis for Army Diary. Yet, it is a problematic and controversial source, forconfirmed events were juxtaposed with questionable accounts that aredifficult to verify or refute. The Frank segment, in fact, demonstrates theneed for a critical approach to the diary."

According to Meinertzhagen, upon his arrival at the Palestine front hediscovered that insufficient attention was being paid to internal security, andthat enemy agents could come and go at will. He also learned about a 'bogeyagent' whom nobody had seen but about whom everyone had heard, calledFranks, a German who supposedly crossed freely into British linesdisguised as an Australian. Meinertzhagen decided to fabricate a story aboutthis agent for the purpose of heightening the EEF vigilance, obtainingGeneral Murray's personal approval, probably in early June 1917.According to Meinertzhagen's account, 'A dummy description was issuedto the troops and his supposed activities were described in detail. All rankswere asked to help in catching the villain.'24

The result exceeded Meinertzhagen's expectations, as the troops becamehighly vigilant, arresting suspects - including British officers, right and left.Intelligence officers, too, were kept in the dark and, according to the diary,'redoubled their energies' to secure the front.

This personal evidence is the best explanation for the proliferation of thelegend, at least on the face of it. It also points to a logical counter-intelligence analysis and a keen understanding of the human mind: guidingthe target to react in a desired way by enhancing his existing perceptions.Other evidence indirectly corroborates Meinertzhagen's claim, showing thatthe myth indeed spread, at least among the troops, if not in the intelligenceservices, mainly after he had begun to disseminate his disinformation. Theproblem facing the historian is that in the same breath that the author refutedthe legend, he immediately rebuilt it. It turned out, Meinertzhagen reveals,that Frank was not merely a myth but a real live super-spy. Meinertzhagenrecords that he even engaged in a shooting duel with the German whentrying to capture him, but the spy managed to escape, although not beforeMeinertzhagen had killed Frank's wife, who had joined her husband in hishazardous forays behind British lines. Frank did not disappear from

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Meinertzhagen's life even after the war. The diary records that he receiveda threatening letter in 1919, in which Frank vowed to avenge his wife'sdeath; that they engaged in a shootout in the Aleppo railway station laterthat year; and that they actually met face to face at a restaurant in Cologne,Germany, in 1924 - this time apparently without incident. According to thediary, Frank was then the head of a German secret intelligence bureau atCassel.25 Checking the known dates of the whereabouts of the two men, onecannot but reach the conclusion that both encounters were unlikely.

Despite these discrepancies and questionable accounts, threebiographies written about Richard Meinertzhagen (published in 1970, 1989and 1998) all used his diary almost uncritically, treating the accounts of thedisguised German spy as unshakable fact.26 Other published materialsadopted this approach as well. Frank's obituary in a German newspaper in1969, for example, recalled that he had habitually visited Jerusalem forintelligence purposes after its occupation by the British, disguised as anArab.27 In 1972, espionage writer Ronald Seth devoted almost a full page toa Munchausen-like entry about 'Wolfgang Francs' in his Encylopedia ofEspionage, repeating verbatim his own 20-year-old account of the Germanspy, who, after living in British colonies for many years, 'not only spokeEnglish perfectly, but a number of colonial variations equally well' and hadcome to Palestine from Germany 'supplied with a variety of Britishuniforms' to help him in his 'perfect impersonations'.28 Even as late as 1994,the Marquess of Anglesey, in his magnum opus on the British cavalry,reiterated Wavell's original fictional version in The Palestine Campaignsalmost word by word.29

THE PICTURE

Friedrich (Fritz for short) Frank was born in Jerusalem in August 1873 toone of the oldest families of Swabian Templer settlers in Palestine.30 YoungFritz learnt carpentry and masonry in Palestine and Germany. Until theoutbreak of the war he was employed in railway construction. Knowledgeof his activity during the war comes mainly from a long interview he gaveto the Nazi newspaper Der Fiihrer in 1938, from biographical documentsprovided by his daughter, and from letters he wrote in the 1950s and 1960sto a colleague in Israel.31 According to these sources, once the war brokeout, Frank, then 41, approached the German consul in Aleppo to volunteerhis services. Initially rejected due to his age, he later volunteered to organizea raiding party for sabotage of the Suez Canal.

Sabotaging British waterways and ports was a popular idea at the timeamong German officers and settlers in Palestine, and schemes for damagingtraffic in the Canal by mines or firearms were in various stages of

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implementation in late 1914 by persons such as Kapitanleutnant FritzHilgendorf and Oberleutnant Ernst Brush (or D.R. Brasch), both of theGerman battlecruiser Goeben anchored at Istanbul, and Hans Erich vonTzschirner-Tzschirne, who would later command the German detachmentin Trans-Jordan.32 As these early plans came to naught, Frank waseventually taken on to join other Germans assigned to collect topographicalinformation in Sinai. The Ottoman-German command wished to learn moreabout the most critical element of their impending expedition against Egypt- water.33

Frank surveyed water sources in Sinai, and, according to his testimonyin Der Fiihrer, even took part in the January 1915 march of the Ottomanexpedition against the Suez Canal. Following the failure of the attack inearly February, he was assigned by Kress von Kressenstein's orders toremain in the peninsula, accompanied by a small Turkish force, to harass theBritish by mining the Canal - the vital link between Britain and India.According to this same post-war interview, he roamed the Sinai until heeventually laid a mine in the waterway. Later, he heard that a ship had sunkafter hitting it.34 Frank's low-keyed account corresponded generally withdocumented events in Sinai and the canal at that time,35 althoughcircumstantial evidence raises doubt as to whether he could actually takecredit for that particular mining operation.36

No evidence is available as to his whereabouts thereafter, between mid-1915 and late 1916-early 1917, when he was transferred to Trans-Jordan insome kind of internal security function, assigned to liaise with and collectinformation on the Bedouins, and purchase grain for the army. Eventually,he became embroiled in a dispute with the local Ottoman authorities andreturned to Palestine in late 1917 or early 1918, where he remained until thefinal British offensive in September 1918.

Information on Ottoman and German covert activity generally, and onthe whereabouts of Frank in particular, began reaching British Intelligencein Egypt from late 1914 onwards as a result of the British effort to trackOttoman preparations for an attack on the canal and enemy activity in Sinai.The informants' reports, however, were frequently exaggerated andunfocused, making no distinction, for example, between the variousactivities of the Germans, namely, the dispatch of German officers andNCOs to mine harbours in Syria and Palestine as a defensive measure vis-a-vis to mine the Suez Canal and Aqaba Gulf offensively.37

Several isolated cases of espionage in Egypt in late 1914 and early 1915served to enhance the basic British perception that Ottoman agitators andGerman spies were roaming through the entire Middle East. Robert OttoMors, a German subject and former police officer in Alexandria, who hadbeen recruited by the Ottomans during a visit to Istanbul after the outbreak

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of the war in Europe, was sent back to Egypt, where he was then discoveredcarrying concealed code and explosives. Convicted of espionage,incitement and conspiracy to overthrow the British military occupation inEgypt, he was lucky to be sentenced to only penal servitude for life to beserved in England where he was eventually released in 1922.38

Almaz 'abd-Alla, a Sudanese who had served alternately in the EgyptianCoast Guard and the Ottoman gendarmerie, was arrested in Port Sudan witha Turkish cipher in his possession after crossing from the Hijaz on orders byhis Turkish controller to 'seduce the [Egyptian] officers from their duty'. Hewas sentenced to death, later commuted to imprisonment for life.39

Yet another affair was the discovery of a German naval lieutenant,Clements Baumker, under an assumed name in a Dutch ship passingthrough the Suez Canal in January 1915, Baumker, who very likely wasonly trying his best to serve the fatherland by returning from the Far East toenlist, was labeled a spy and interned for the duration of the war in Malta.40

The 'spies everywhere' perception was further strengthened in 1916,when the newly created EMSIB, wishing perhaps to make its own mark inthe counterintelligence field, raised an alarm about leakage of informationthat fell on fertile ground. The new commander-in-chief, Sir ArchibaldMurray, who, even before arriving in Egypt in January 1916 as the firstchief of the EEF had been mindful of the necessity to combat espionageeffectively,41 was concerned about the internal security situation heinherited:

The condition of Egypt is analogous to that of the condition of Irelandbefore the late rebellion. The Germans are trying to bring off asimultaneous attack on the east and west, coupled with a rising in theDelta and air attacks wherever they can produce an impression on thepopulace.

The place is full of rich German and Austrian spies and, so far as Ican make out, hidden arms. I am hard at work on the subject... and youmay rely on my dealing with the matter with a firm hand and before itcan reach the stage it did in Ireland. I propose to take strong action veryshortly regarding the rich (I may say enormously rich) Germans andAustrians sheltered in this country under the veil of Swiss or otherneutral nationalities ... I have been fortunate in securing an Egyptian,who is a Turkish officer, travelling through this country as an agent andspy ... who is awaiting court martial as a spy.42

The state of security in the Sinai front was another source for concern.In April 1916, the Ottomans surprised forward mounted Yeomanry troopsassigned to the Qatia area in northern Sinai (40 km east of the Suez Canal)as an advanced guard to secure the construction of the British railway. The

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surprise attack cost the EEF the loss of three and a half squadrons incasualties and prisoners, marking the episode as one of the worst defeatsinflicted on the Force in the entire campaign. In its wake, bitter accusationsand criticism were leveled against commanders and intelligence alike, whilesuspicion was raised that enemy agents had provided the Turks withadvanced information.43

Troubled by what it perceived as growing hostile clandestine activity atthe front as well as in the hinterland, the EEF initiated vigorouscounterespionage measures. A campaign to detain and deport 'undesirableelements' - mostly Europeans - had begun inside Egypt, while in the Canalzone Bedouins were forbidden to congregate near the forward British linesor to cross them in either direction, and I(b) was busy 'cleaning the canalfrom suspects'.44 EEF General Headquarters (GHQ) was concerned enoughto warn all officers: "There is good reason to believe that a certain numberof persons are ... by no means unwilling to intrigue against the British orAllied Forces if the opportunity should offer'.45

Furthermore, papers confiscated from deportees in early June reinforcedthe impression of the vast German espionage activity inside Egypt. ToBritish mind, at least, they bore witness to a very unsatisfactory state ofaffairs, even, for example, 'among the personnel of [the Sheaperd's] hotel[in Cairo] which is so much frequented by officers'.46

By early July, however, Murray's confidence in the achievements of hiscounterespionage campaign rose sufficiently to enable him to report:

I am quietly going on with the work of clearing Egypt of thedisaffected and, I think, with good results. By the aid of martial lawthe Delta is a very different place from what it was when I came outin January last.47

Nevertheless, the EEF and EMSIB remained concerned about Britishvulnerability to German espionage. All during the second half of 1916 andin early 1917, they endeavored to track down enemy agents, who were sentto Egypt by a Turkish-German espionage center in Switzerland in order toobtain information 'as to the military situation, number of troops etc.',according to informants,48 and 'to encourage disaffection in southernEgypt', according to French intelligence.4'

British intelligence also learnt, probably from a double agent operatingagainst the Germans in Europe, that spies for Germany were still active inEgypt, collecting military and economic information. Additionally, themounting success of the enemy underwater campaign against Alliedshipping in the eastern Mediterranean, which by the first six months of 1917reached crisis proportions, convinced the British that enemy agents in thecountry were in communication with the U-boats and were providing them

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with updated operational data.50 A rumour within intelligence circles evenpointed to an unspecified 'international espionage agency' which showedinterest in Egypt.51

As a result, military, naval and civilian authorities endeavored - with noapparent successes - to ban all lights and fires along Egypt's entireMediterranean coast, while German citizens discovered in neutral shipscrossing the Suez Canal were immediately detained and interrogated byI(b). A series of suspects arrested within the canal zone were charged withespionage, and several even faced court-martial.52

THE IMAGE OF SUPER-SPY FRANK

During the first two years of the war, Bedouin informants, reporting on theactivity of Turkish patrols periodically accompanied by German watersurveyors in western Sinai, described Frank as a surveyor, well-digger andleader of mining parties. There is no evidence they ever mentionedespionage, disguise or penetration behind enemy lines - by him or any otherenemy agent.53 These elements were introduced later, and there is noinformation as to whether they were based on specific (albeit false) reportsreceived from dubious sources, such as the Bedouins, or on sheerspeculation derived from the general counterespionage concern of theBritish staffs.

It is clear, however, that the arrival of the EEF at the Palestine frontierheightened British concern over espionage, as the troops were now rubbingshoulders with a local population that was larger and more hostile than theBedouins they had encountered during the advance in Sinai. Headquartersand camps were close by the large villages of Rafah, Dir al-Balah and KhanYunis, whose inhabitants were suspected ipso facto of supporting theenemy. Moreover, Ottoman defectors informed their interrogators thatBedouin spies continually passed military information to their Germancontrollers.54 In order to counter the threat of espionage and agitation, theBritish banned the inhabitants of al-Arish from leaving the village,preventing contact with Bedouins within enemy territory. GHQ actuallycontemplated evacuating the entire Arab population from the border zone toa concentration area west of the canal, but dropped the idea, to avoidpolitical repercussions.55

In April 1917 - that is, even before Meinertzhagen's arrival - the EEFissued an explicit warning against spies in disguise:

It is not improbable that the enemy may attempt to pass spies withinour lines, perhaps dressed in British uniform. In any case whereground for suspicion existed, the suspect will be immediately arrested

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... It must be borne in mind by all ranks that cases of mistaken arrestare of no consequence even if they occur, whereas failure to arrest aspy may entail the most serious consequence.56

By mid-1917, therefore, when Frank resurfaced in the war documents asa super-spy, perhaps as a result of Meinertzhagen's ploy, the legend of theimpostor seemed already to have been rooted in the Egyptian ExpeditionaryForce.

Post-war memoirs by various army officers mention widespreadrumours of a German staff officer who spoke perfect English and who wasknown to cross British lines with ease.57 According to the soldiers'grapevine,

a man dressed as a British Staff Officer [had] offered himself as guideto certain troops at the withdrawal after the first battle of Gaza [inMarch 1917], and had begun to lead the troops towards the Turks ...He was no doubt a Boche, speaking perfect English.58

CE activities initiated at the front demonstrated that even senior officers(who, according to Meinertzhagen, were not privy to the secret of the bogusGerman, which was shared by himself and the commander-in-chief alone),were truly convinced of the spy's existence. For example, in mid-June 1917,several days only after Meinertzhagen had started spreading hismisinformation, Australian troops were ordered by Eastern Force HQ(commanding all fighting formations in the Palestine front) to spread outalong a wadi to capture 'a German who has been masquerading as amounted British General'.59 A fortnight later, when the authorities suspectedthat the German spy had succeeded in listening in on British telephone linesnear Khan Yunis, an intensive three-week hunt was carried out.60

The looming third attack on Gaza in October 1917 spurred the EEF todeal with counterespionage even more firmly than before. To begin with,GHQ reconsidered the option of evacuating all Arabs from the front zone,in order to minimize the danger of espionage. This time, I(b) was of theopinion that such a goal would be better served by pinpointed action, suchas 'summary deporting [of] some of the leaders of the village, than by awholesale deportation of the population of Khan Yunes which, from apolitical point of view, would be [an] inadvisable step to take'.61

In addition control over the traffic on the al-Arish-Qantara militaryrailway - the main link connecting the Palestine front with Egypt - wasintensified, and several railway workers caught passing uncensored letterswere arrested on suspicion of espionage.62 GHQ re-emphasized theimportance of preventing the infiltration of enemy agents from Palestine toEgypt and ordered an increase in surveillance of the 'swept track' along the

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Suez Canal: 'All ranks engaged in carrying out patrols on the east bankshould be warned of the great importance of making this system of trackingand catching enemy agents as effective as possible.'63

The entire zone of operation was alive with counterespionage activity,which, to some intelligence officers, seemed only to confuse matters 'owingto orders, counter-orders and disorders ... [and to] regulations that havebeen issued galore and on paper look charming ... but have been ill-thoughtout'.64 The general atmosphere is well summarized in a diary entry by abrigade major, in October 1917, shortly before Third Gaza began:

There is a positive mania for counter-espionage these days, chieflydirected against a gentleman known as Fictitious Frank ... He is adistinctive-looking individual possessing one green eye and onebrown, and a gray stubbly moustache, is of foreign appearance ... andyet curiously enough we can't catch him.65

This sort of mania provided the perfect ambience for the Frank myth toflourish, even without Meinertzhagen's ploy. Meinertzhagen's story aboutthe deliberate cultivation of the myth in mid-1917, if true (and the existingindirect evidence indeed supports it, as shown above), merely validates thefirst principle of psychological warfare, deception and manipulation: thecloser the deceptive story is to the victim's own perception, the greater thechances that it will be believed.

Even the intelligence officers, whose duty was to separate the wheatfrom the chaff, were taken in. By the summer of 1917, they knew that Frankwas not a German officer but a native inhabitant of Palestine. Yet, alarmedby what they believed to be an effective enemy intelligence activity, theywere disinclined to alter their perception of his feats. EMSIB briefed itsagents within Ottoman Palestine to collect every bit of informationregarding Frank,66 whereupon Captain George Lloyd, the officer in chargeof CE at the front (and future Secretary of State for the Colonies), conveyedto Aaron Aaronsohn, the head of the Jewish espionage ring, Nili, 'incredibletales about Frank ... the disguised German officer who penetrated our linesmore than six times', in Aaronsohn's words.67

Perhaps the best illustration of the entrenchment of the myth is Frank'spersonal data sheet, produced by EMSIB in late 1917. On the one hand, itdemonstrates how seriously he was taken by British Intelligence, quite apartfrom Meinertzhagen's disinformation. On the other hand, it reveals theuncertainty and ambiguity about this German. Even his name was unclearto the end: 'Franck or Franke or Franks'. EMSIB sources such as POWs,defectors and informants described him colorfully but contradictorily:short/tall, black/brown hair, clean-shaven/heavily bearded, a miller inJerusalem/a fisherman in Jaffa, deressed as a Bedouin/ as a European, an

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Arabic-/English-speaker.EMSIB was of the opinion that Frank was one of the two chief German

military agents employed by the Ottomans, in constant contact withsubagents in Egypt directly or via couriers (the other agent was identified asHugo Wieland - Willand to the British - another Templer who, accordingto British sources, owned a cement factory in Jaffa, but in reality was theowner's son and a Reserve Lieutenant with the German forces in Syria).68

The Security Service believed that by mid-1917, Frank was in the habit ofcrossing the Gaza line approximately three times a month, pretending to bea British staff officer, an Australian mounted officer, a gunner or an Arab.Moreover, he had tapped the main telegraph line to Cairo.69

The British occupation of south Palestine raised hopes that Frank mightbe apprehended at last. Colonel Wyndham Deedes, chief of the PoliticalIntelligence Branch of the EEF, under which I(b) operated, sent an urgentmessage to his forward officers: 'Could A.A. [Alexander Aaronsohn, of theNili ring] identify FRANCKE if he saw him?'70 Soon after, in early 1918,1(b)prepared a secret list of 78 wanted enemy agents and accomplices, whichclairvoyantly omitted Weiland (who died or was killed a month later inBa'al Bak, Lebanon) but included Frank among the few Germans named,this time with a fairly accurate description:

FRANKE, FRITZ: Height 5'6" to 5'9'7 age about 50. Eyes greenish, scarover right eyebrow, pink cheeks, with small-pox marks on cheeks andhand, black moustache and beard, the latter gray, broad shouldered,thick set and deep chested but thin from hips downwards, thin legs,teeth stained and yellow with smoking. Dresses sometimes as Araband sometimes in Turkish uniform. He speaks Arabic.

Gone were Frank's Australian/British disguises and his profoundknowledge of English. Yet, no less than 12 Arabs and Bedouins wereflagged as his subagents or bodyguards, testimony to his seniority in Britisheyes. His equally imaginary Ottoman controller was identified as Sherif HajMohamad, 'said to be a German Jew who embraced Islam [and] the chiefTurkish spy in Jericho'.71

When British troops occupied Jericho in February 1918, an I(b) advanceteam entered the town to interrogate suspects the British might lay theirhands on. Neither Frank nor Sherif Haj Mohamad were found; but anothersuspect, admitting to be the chief Ottoman intelligence agent in the area(and corroborating Frank's own account 20 years later), told hisinterrogators that Frank had recently left the area, following a row with theTurkish governor of Amman.72

The war in Palestine continued for nearly another year, during which the

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British concern over Turkish and German espionage in the occupied zonenever ceased. Furthermore, the long Mediterranean coast, considered an allyuntil Third Gaza, transformed suddenly into a source of security risk in1918. Prior to October 1917, British intelligence extensively used thisrelatively undefended sea approach to Palestine hinterland to land agentsbehind the front line. But, from that time onwards, the roles reversed and itwas the EEF which allotted troops and established camel patrols to protectthe beaches from the 'penetration of enemy agents, disguised as Arabs' andfrom shore signalling to enemy submarines.73 Preventing leakage ofinformation and espionage appeared regularly at the agendas of staffconferences and instructions for that matter were read to the troops twice amonth.74

Frank was still well implanted in British minds and EEF ceaselesslycontinued its search for the phantom and his associates.75 For example,during the September 1918 advance in northern Palestine, Australian lighthorsemen arrested German settlers who, they suspected, 'had been in andout of the British lines [for] about two years', but none turned out to bespies.76

In reality, Frank joined the retreating Germans following the collapse ofthe German-Ottoman resistance in the Battle of Meggido that month and,after a long journey through Syria, the Ukraine, Poland and East Prussia,reached Berlin, where he apparently spent the next seven years in casualjobs, far from Meinertzhagen's intelligence pursuits at Cassel.77

EPILOGUE

In 1920, Frank's name was put on a British list of persons whose return toPalestine was banned. After several appeals, it was removed from thisblacklist in 1927, although the authorities remained convinced of his activeintelligence role during the war. The British High Commissioner inPalestine, Lord Plumer sanctioned that:

In view, however, of assurances for [his] future good behavior andabstention from any form of political activity ... and subject to [his]surveillance by the police, I consider that it is no longer necessary tomaintain the prohibition against [him].78

Back in Palestine, Frank married at the age of 63 (becoming a father at66) and, returning to his old love, the desert, was the first to thoroughlyexamine several archaeological sites in the Negev, publishing his findingsthereafter.79 In 1960, Frank claimed, inter alia, that he had found ore in theNegev that may have contained uranium.80 But he could not get rid of thespy label. Even today, some scholars still believe that he resumed the second

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oldest profession after returning to Palestine, with archaeology serving onlyas a cover, a story reminiscent of the persistent myth that surrounding thepre-war activities of another intelligence officer, on the British side - T. E.Lawrence.81

In September 1939, a month after the outbreak of the Second World War,Frank, then 66, was detained by the British as an enemy subject, followedthree months later by the detention of his wife Ottilie and four-month-olddaughter Gertrud. The family spent the war years in detention camps inAcre and Waldheim (near Haifa, Alone Aba of today).82 Upon the outbreakof the Israel-Arab War of 1948, the family was forced to leave the country,along with the rest of the German community in Palestine, and went back toGermany. Frank died in Weinsberg (Wiirttemberg) on 8 June 1968 at the ageof 95, precisely a year after the demise of his ostensible 'archenemy'Meinertzhagen. His myth, however, has outlived him to this day.

NOTES

An earlier version of this article was presented to the conference on Intelligence Services and theSignificance of Espionage in World War I, held by the International Intelligence History StudyGroup at Tutzing, Germany, in April 1998. I would like to thank all those who responded withcriticism and suggestions. I am also indebted to Professor Yossi Ben Artzi, Professor WesleyWark and Dr Haim Goren for their helpful comments; to Professor Beno Rothenberg, forgenerously allowing me to use his private correspondence with Fritz Frank, to Mrs GertrudFondel, Frank's daughter for the biographical details she provided on her father, and to Mr PeterLange of the TGD Archiv for information on Hugo Wieland. I wish to thank the Trustees of theLiddell Hart Centre for Military Archives for permission to quote from papers for which theyhold the copyright.

All ADM, CO, FO, KV and WO files are held at the Public Record Office (PRO), Kew,London.

1. Conceptually, counterintelligence is a broad term referring to information gathering on, andactivity undertaken against foreign intelligence services. It includes counterespionage, whichis limited to operations aimed specifically at neutralizing the espionage efforts of suchservices. See: Leo Carl, International Dictionary of Intelligence (Mclean, VA: Int. DefenseConsultant Services 1990) p.83; idem, CIA Insider's Dictionary (Washington DC: NIBSPress 1996) pp. 123-5.

2. David French, 'Spy Fever in Britain 1900-1915', Historical Journal 21/2 (June 1978)pp.335-70; Nicholas Hiley, 'The Failure of British Counter-Espionage Against Germany,1907-1914', Historical Journal 28/4 (Dec. 1985) pp.835-62; idem, 'Counter-espionage andSecurity in Great Britain during the First World War', English Historical Review 101/400(July 1986) pp.635-61; Christopher Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the BritishIntelligence Community (London: Heinemann 1985) pp.34-85; Phillip Knightley, TheSecond Oldest Profession (London: André Deutsch 1986) pp.9-29; Douglas Wheeler, 'SpyMania and the Information War: The Hour of the Counterpsy 1914/1915', AmericanIntelligence Journal 14/1 (Autumn/Winter 1992/93) pp.41-5; David Stafford, 'Conspiracyand Xenophobia: The Popular Spy Novels of William Le Queux, 1893-1914', Europa 4/2(1981) pp.163-85; idem, Churchill and Secret Service (London/Woodstock and NY: JohnMurray/Overlook 1998) pp.40-59; Bernard Porter, Plots and Paranoia: A History ofPolitical Espionage in Britain, 1790-1988 (London: Unwin Hyman 1989) pp.120-50.

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What is less known is that the pre-war British image of the German influx was furtherenhanced by what was believed to be a lesson of the Franco-German War of 1870-71.Opinion within British Army circles on the eve of World War I was that the German victoryin France had been facilitated by an 'Advanced Guard of the Prussian Army' in the form ofsome 30,000 spies of both sexes, planted in Belgium and France and disguised as gardeners,agricultural laborers, commercial and industrial clerks and no fewer than 7,000 femaledomestics in cafes, restaurants, beer halls and hotels, with '50 or so young and prettyPrussian women in the canteens of the garrisons of the West'. 'Secret Service', Lecturedelivered by Capt. C.H.G. Black, 34th Horse, Staff College, Quetta, n.d., but presumably1909, WO 106/6148.

3. For studies on British intelligence and counterintelligence in the Middle East and the easternparts of the British Empire: Yigal Sheffy, British Military Intelligence in the PalestineCampaign, 1914-1918 (London/Portland, OR: Frank Cass 1998); Richard Popplewell,Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire1904-1924 (London/Portland, OR: Frank Cass 1995); H.V.F. Winstone, The IllicitAdventure: The Story of Political and Military Intelligence in the Middle East 1898-1926(London: Jonathan Cape 1982); Peter Hopkirk, On Secret Service East of Constantinople:The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire (London: John Murray 1994).

4. Security Service (MI-5) First World War Historical Report, KV-1.5. Ronald Storrs, The Memories of Sir Ronald Storrs (NY: AMA Press 1937) p.133. On von

Oppenheim, see also: Hopkirk (note 3) p.l9ff; Tilman Ludke, 'German and OttomanPropaganda Warfare during the First World War - The Quest for Loyalty', M.Phil. Thesis,Oxford, St Antony's College, 1995, pp.35ff. I am grateful to Mr Ludke for providing me witha copy of his work.

6. For an excellent collection of studies on the historiography of the First World War: BrianBond (ed.) The First World War and British Military History (Oxford: Clarendon Press1991). In particular, the articles on the Middle East by Edward Spiers, Jonathan Newell andBrian Holden Reid.

7. Christopher Sykes, Wassmuss: 'The German Lawrence' (London and NY: Longmans 1936);Ferdinand Tuohy, The Crater of Mars (London: Heinemann 1929) pp.181-92; F.A.Hamilton, 'Wassmuss', RUSI Journal 80/517 (1935) p.143; Earnest Oney, 'Drang NachIslam: Germany in Iran 1914-1918', 10: Intelligence Quarterly 2/4 (Feb. 1987) pp.1-3. Seealso Ronald Seth, Encyclopedia of Espionage (London: Book Club 1974, orig. 1972)pp.657-9; Vincent and Nun Buranelli, Spy/Counter Spy: An Encyclopedia of Espionage (NY:McGraw Hill 1982) pp.331-2.

8. The international border between Palestine and Egypt (Sinai), which stretches along theRafah-Taba line, was formally recognized only in 1949, as the border between Israel andEgypt. The line was demarcated in 1906 under the title 'administrative separation line', forreasons beyond the scope of the present essay. Yet, it served practically as internationalborder during the pre-war period and was treated as such by both British and Ottomans. SeePatricia Toye (ed.) Palestine Boundaries, 1833-1947, Vol.1, Palestine-Egypt (Oxford:Archive Editions 1989).

9. For a concise history of the Palestine Campaign: Archibald Wavell, The PalestineCampaigns (London: Constable 1928); David Bullock, Allenby's War: The Palestine-Arabian Campaigns 1916-1918 (London, NY, Sydney: Blandford Press 1988).

10. Imperial Overseas Intelligence, Vol.3: 'Eastern Mediterranean Special Intelligence Bureau',KV 1/17. On the Secret Service in the Middle East: Sheffy (note 3) pp.83-7, 146-63.

11. See, for example, Compton Mackenzie, First Athenian Memories (London: Cassell 1931)pp.207-8; idem., Greek Memories (Ann Arbor, MI: UP of America 1987, orig. 1932) pp.14,353ff.

12. Ferdinand Tuohy, The Secret Corps: A Tale of 'Intelligence' on all Fronts (London: JohnMurray 1920) pp.181-3.

13. R.M.P. Preston, The Desert Mounted Corps: An Account of the Cavalry Operations inPalestine and Syria (London: Constable 1921) p.5.

14. Wavell (note 9) p.106. On Allenby's trust in Wavell, John Connell, Wavell: Scholar andSoldier (London: Collins 1964) p.124.

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15. Joseph Gollomb, Spies (NY: Macmillan 1928) I am indebted to Julian Putkowskyfor providing biographical details on Gollomb.

16. George Aston, Secret Service (London: Faber 1930) pp.179-85.17. Major H.C.H. Robertson, 'A Spy Story', Cavalry Journal 24/2 (April 1934) pp.211-16.18. Ibid, p.216.19. A.G. Martin, 'A Spy Story', Correspondence, Cavalry Journal 25/3 (July 1935) pp.442-4.20. Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein, Mit den Türken zum Suezkanal (Berlin: Otto

Schlegel 1938) p.67.21. Viscount Wavell, Allenby: A Study in Greatness (NY: Harrap 1940) p.210. See also: idem,

Allenby: Soldier and Statesmen (London: Harrap 1946) p.174. Curiously enough, reprints ofWavell's Palestine Campaigns (note 9), which appeared after 1940, still stuck to the oldrefuted version. See, for example, 3rd ed., 8th imp., 1941, p.106.

22. Ronald Seth, Spies at Work: A History of Espionage (NY: Philosophical Library 1954)pp.154-5; Ya'acov Ya'ari-Polskin, parashat nili (Tel Aviv: Idit 1958) pp.426-8 [Hebrew;The Nili Affair].

23. Richard Meinertzhagen, Army Diary, 1899-1926 (London: Oliver & Boyd 1960). A criticalexamination of the diaries: Sheffy (note 3) pp.269-70; Jeremy Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia:The Authorized Biography (London: Heinemann 1989) pp.1112, 1117. A most critical, yetrather controversial, review: J.N. Lockman, Meinertzhagen's Diary Ruse: False Entries onT.E. Lawrence (Grand Rapids, MI: Cornerstone 1995).

24. Meinertzhagen (note 23) pp.216-17.25. Ibid, pp.217-19; Meinertzhagen diary, Vol.20, opposite entry dated 13 July 1917; Vol.24,

entry dated 10 Aug. 1924.26. John Lord, Duty, Honour, Empire: The Life and Times of Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen

(London: Hutchinson 1971) pp.325-6; Mark Cocker, Richard Meinertzhagen: Soldier,Scientist & Spy (London: Mandarin 1989, orig. Secker 1970) pp.101-2, 262 (note 17); PeterHathaway Capstick, Warrior: The Legend of Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen (NY: StMartins' Press 1998) pp.241-4. Although Cocker referred to 'apocryphal and invented tales'in the diary, he treated the 'running duel with the German Agent, Franks [as being among]the true ones' (p.255).

27. 'Allah ma es sabrin: Nachruf auf Fritz Frank', Heilbronner Stimme, 20 July 1968.28. Seth (note 7) pp.217-18; Seth (note 21) pp.154-5.29. The Marquess of Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry 1816 to 1919 Vol.5: Egypt,

Palestine and Syria 1914 to 1919 (London: Leo Cooper 1994) p.110.30. On the Temple Society and Frank Family: Paul Sauer, The Holy Land Called (Melbourne:

Temple Society Australia 1991, trans. from German). On the Frank family see also: AlexCarmel, ha-hityashvut ha-germanit be-erets yisrael be-shahe ha-tekufah ha-ot'omanit(Jerusalem: Hebrew U. 1973) p.33 [Hebrew: The German settlement in Palestine in the lateOttoman period]; David Kroyanker, adrichalut be-yerushalayim: ha-bnia ha-earopai't-notzrit mehutz la-homot (Jerusalem: Keter 1991) pp.96-8 [Hebrew: Jerusalem Architecture:European-Christian Buildings Outside the Old City Walls].

31. 'Der Mann, der den Suez-Kanal angriff', Der Führer, 13, 14, 15, 16 Jan. 1938.32. Kress von Kressenstein (note 20) pp.55, 110; Ulrich Trumpener 'Suez, Baku, Gallipoli: The

Military Dimensions of the German-Ottoman Coalition, 1914-1918' in Keith Neilson andRoy Prete (eds.) Coalition Warfare: An Uneasy Accord (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier UP 1983)p.43; H.W Neulen, Feldgrau in Jerusalem: Das levantekorps des kaiserlichen Deutschland(Munich: Universitas 1991) p.64.

33. Turkey Genelkurmay Askeri Tarihve Stratejik Etüt Başkanliği, Birinci Dünya Harbi'ndeTürk Harbi Sina-Filistin Cephesi, Vol.1 (Ankara: Gnkur. Basimevi 1979) [hereafter: TurkishOfficial History] pp.74-9ff. [Turkish: The First World War, The Turkish War in the Sinai-Palestine Front].

34. See note 31.35. On German-Ottoman topographical intelligence-gathering activity in Sinai in late

1914-1915: Kress von Kressenstein (note 20) Chapters 3, 7. On the mining operations: CyrilFalls and George MacMunn, Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine, Vol.1: From theOutbreak of War with Germany to June 1917 (London: HMSO 1928) pp.60-6; Turkish

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Official History (note 33) pp.301-17.36. On the specific mining of the Suez Canal: ibid, pp.313-15; Lt.-Gen. John Maxwell [General

Officer Commanding [GOC], The Force in Egypt] to Lord Kitchener [Secretary of State forWar], tel(egram) 1370E, 31 June 1915, WO 33/731; Committee of Imperial Defence paper438 B, 'Liability of the Suez Canal to Blocking Attack', App.6: 'Mining of steamship"Teiresias" at the southern end of the Little Bitter lake on June 30 1915', 24 June 1913, CAB4/10.

37. There are numerous reports by the British ambassador and military attaché at Istanbul,British consuls in Syria and Palestine and Bedouin field agents in Sinai, regarding theGerman covert activity, from Sept. 1914 onwards. For the period of late 1914-early 1915,see: FO 371/1971, FO 371/2140-1, WO 157/687-690.

38. American Consul General, Cairo, a report to German Foreign Office on Mulazim AwalRobert Mors, 14 Nov. 1914. FO 369/1145/137805. See also: Correspondence betweenForeign Office [hereafter FO], Admiralty and Sir Milne Cheethan, Chargé d'Affaires andlater High Commissioner at Cairo, Sept. 1914-Feb. 1915, FO 371/1972, files 53455, 53595,53845, 59684 and 66271; correspondence between Mrs Louise Mors, FO, War Office andHome Office, Oct. 1919-Feb. 1922, FO 371/2355/24729; FO 369/1145/137820; FO369/1468/13788; FO 371/7751, files C1565 and E555. More on the Mors affair: Donald M.McKale, War by Revolution: Germany and Great Britain in the Middle East in the Era ofWorld War I (Kent, OH and London: Kent State UP 1998) pp.53-7, 71.

39. High Commissioner, Cairo to FO, 5 Jan. 1915, FO 371/2355/5188.40. Correspondence between American Embassy, London; FO, Prisoners-of-War-Department

and War Office, Jan.-april 1917, FO 383/292, files 72047 and 23458; EEF, I(b) Diary, 8March 1917, WO 157/713.

41. On the pre-war involvement of Murray in counterintelligence, see Stafford, Churchill(note 2) p.30ff.

42. Murray to Gen. Sir William Robertson [Chief of the Imperial General Staff], letter, 26 May1916. Papers of Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, 1/32/29, Liddell Hart MilitaryArchives.

43. On the Qatia affair: Falls and MacMunn (note 35) pp.159-70; Sheffy (note 3) pp.201-1.44. Murray to Director of Military Intelligence [DMI], London, tel. AM 588, 31 May 1916, WO

95/4362; EEF Intellligence Diary, entries for 5 and 234 June 1916, WO 157/705.45. Maj.-Gen. Arthur Lynden Bell, Chief of the General Staff [CGS], EEF, 'Memorandum to be

brought to the Knowledge of all Officers', 20 June 1916, AWM 27/491/3, Australian WarMemorial.

46. GOC Egypt to CIGS (IG 691), 13 June 1916; also: DMI Cairo to DMI (IG 701), 14 June1916, FO 371/2672/115450 file title: German espionage in Egypt.

47. Murray to Robertson, letter, 1 July 1916, Robertson Papers, 1/32/37.48. Arab Bulletin, No.23, 26 Sept. 1916, FO 882/25.49. DMI to GHQ, EEF, tel. 29840, 22 Feb. 1917, WO 33/905.50. Rear-Adm. R. Wemyss [Naval Commander-in-Chief, Egypt] to Admiralty, letter, reference]

1045/1124, 3 Dec. 1916, ADM 137/548; EEF I(b) diary, 4 Feb. 1917, WO 157/712; DMI toGHQ, EEF, tel. 31534, 24 March 1917, WO 33/905. On the submarine warfare: MichaelWilson and Paul Kemp, Mediterranean Submarines: Submarine Warfare in World War One(London: Crecy 1997) esp. pp.125-51; Paul Halpern, The Naval War in the Mediterranean,1914-1918 (London: Allen & Unwin 1987) esp. Chapters 7-9.

51. EEF I(b) Diary, 27 June 1917, WO 157/716.52. EEF I(b) Diary, 14 and 18 Dec. 1916, WO 157/710; 20 Feb. 1917, WO 157/712; 8, 11 and

12 June 1917, WO 157/716.53. Egypt Military Intelligence files of the period Dec. 1914-March 1915 are missing at the

PRO. References found in subsequent files indicate Frank was already mentioned in reportsof Dec. 1914 and possibly early 1915. Cairo Intelligence Bulletin, 22 April 1915, WO157/690; Cairo Intelligence Summary, 23 July 1915, WO 157/693; Ismailia IntelligenceSummary, 3 Nov. 1915, WO 157/712.

54. EEF Intelligence Diary, 6 Feb. 1917, WO 157/712.

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55. 'Plan C', 19 Jan. 1917, WO 95/4429; Lynden-Bell to Maj.-Gen. Frederick Maurice [Directorof Military Operations, London], 27 April 1917, Papers of Maj.-Gen. Sir Arthur Lynden-Bell, Imperial War Museum; CGS, EEF to GOC Eastern Force, letter, ref. GSZ/73,'Evacuation of inhabitants of Khan Yunis', 4 May 1917, WO 95/4367: EEF I(b) Diary, 10June 1917, WO 157/716.

56. 52nd Division, (GS), Circular Memorandum No.18, 24 April 1917, WO 95/4450.57. Maj.-Gen. John Adye, Soldiers & Others I have Known: A Volume of Recollections (London:

Herbert Jenkins 1925) p.283.58. J. More, With Allenby's Crusaders (London: Heath Cranton n.d. prob. 1923) p.53.59. Henry Bostock, The Great Ride: A Story of a Trooper in the Third Brigade Scout Troop

(Perth, Australia: Artlook Books 1982) p.85.60. Ibid. Corroborating evidence on the event by Gen. Barrow, see: Barrow's comment on

Robertson, 'A Spy Story' (note 17) p.216.61. EEF I(b) Diary, 17 July 1917, WO 157/717.62. Ibid., 18 July 1917, ibid.63. CGS, EEF to GOC Southern Canal Section, 9 Auig. 1917, WO 95/4368.64. Capt. George Lloyd [Head of Advance Intelligence at the front] to Maj. Vivian Nugent [Head

of Military Intelligence Section, EEF], 31 July 1917, Papers of Lord Lloyd of Dolobran, file9/9, Churchill Archives Centre, College, Cambridge.

65. R.E.C. Adams, The Modern Crusaders (London: 1920) entry for 7 Oct. 1917, pp.9-10.66. Eliezer Livneh, Yossef Nedava and Yoram Efrati (eds.) nili: toldoteha shel he'aza medinit

(Tel Aviv: Shoken 1980, orig. 1961) p.58 [Hebrew: Nili: The History of Political Daring].67. Yoram Efrati (ed.) yoman aharon aharonsohn, 1916-1919 (Tel Aviv: Qarni 1970) pp.349-50

[Hebrew: The Diary of Aaron Aaronsohn].68. Papers of Wilhelm Otto Wieland, Tempelgesellschaft im Deutschland Archiv, Stuttgart. I am

indebted to Mr Peter Lange and Dr Haim Goren for the information.69. EMSIB to Director, Arab Bureau, Cairo, 'Particulars and Description of the Spy FRANCK

or FRANCKÉ or FRANCKS', ref. B4/3218/10390, 27 Nov. 1917, FO 882/14.70. Capt. E. Macrury, [EEF Advance Intelligence] to Alexander Aaronsohm, 11 Jan. 1918,

Papers of Alexander Aaronsohn, Beit Aaronsohn Archive, Zichron Ya'akov.71. 'Wanted Persons' Secret, n.d., but prob. Feb. 1918. Intelligence File, ibid.72. I(b) diary, 26 Feb. 1918, WO 157/724.73. Maj.-Gen. Louis Bols, CGS, EEF to WO, ref. 229/1, 30 June 1918; 'Organisation of coastal

patrol against espionage', 30 Aug. 1918, WO 95/4370. On the British activity of landingagents along the Levant coast; Sheffy (note 3), pp.78-83, 150-9.

74. 20 Corps CGQ Conference, 13 July 1918, WO 95/4481.75. Macrury to Aaronsohn, 8 Aug. 1918, Aaronsohn Papers.76. A.C.N. Olden, Westralian Cavalry in the War: The Story of the 10th Light Horse Regiment,

A.I.F., 1914-1918 (Melbourne: Alexander McCubbin n.d. but prob. 1921) p.268.77. Biographical notes on Fritz Frank, by Gertrud Fondel. Letter to the author, June 1998.78. Field-Marshal Lord H. Plumer, High Commissioner, Palestine to L.C.M.S. Amery, Colonial

Secretary, dispatch no.308, ref.2800/27, 1 March 1927. See also: H.E. Spencer, PassportControl Department, circular No. S.8260, to HM's Consular and Passport Control Officers,'FRITZ FRANK. TIMOTHEUS LANGE and family', 7 April 1927, FO 372/2348/T 3712.

79. Fritz Frank, 'Aus der Arava', Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palastina-Vereins [ZDPV], Part 1:Vol.57 (1934), Parts 2-4 Vol.58 (1935). On the findings, see also: Beno Rothenberg, zefunotha-negev: archiologia ba-negev ve-ba-arava (Tel Aviv: Masada 1967) [Hebrew: Negev:Archaeology in the Negev and the Arava]; ha-entsiklopedia ha-hadasha le-hafirotarchiologiot be-erets yisrael (Tel Aviv: MOD Publishing House 1992), Vol.2 pp.530, 579,Vol.4 p.1588 [Hebrew: The New Encyclopedia of the Archaeological Excavations in theHoly Land].

80. Letter by Fritz Frank to Beno Rothenberg, 26 Jan. 1960.81. Ze'ev Meshel, 'neveh yotveta; toldotav, nofav ve-atarav', Arieal 78 (Feb. 1991) pp.13-14

[Hebrew: Yotveta Oasis: its History, Landscape and Sites].82. List of detainees, Waldheim Perimeter Settlement, Camp 2, 21 Oct. 1942, CO 980/27.

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