The SOF CQB Program

8/10/2019 The SOF CQB Program

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SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCESSpecial Operations Training Group

CLOSE QUARTER COMBATAnd

HOSTAGE RESCUE

Edited and Compiled bySGM Michael E. Weber

USA (Ret)


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SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCESSpecial Operations Training Group

CLOSE QUARTER COMBAT

TACTICS INDEX

PagePREFACE 3

Ten Fundamentals of Close Quarter CombatImportance of Training

1. INTRODUCTION TO IHR/CQB 72. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION and REPORTING 203. URBAN HIDE 254. URBAN ROUTE ANALYSIS 475. LOG BOOK AND FIELD SKETCH 566. MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE 73

7. REACT TO SNIPER 798. ROOM CLEARING TECHNIQUES 819. TROOP CLEARS 10510. INTERIOR CONTINGENCY PLAN 11911. COORDINATED SNIPER 12912. OPEN AIR/SNIPER INITIATED ASSAULT 13213. WINDOW ENTRY 13714. VEHICLE ASSAULT 14115. HOSTAGE HOLDING AREA 14916. PERSONNEL HANDLING 15417. BODY BUNKER/CORRIDOR 15818. INNER/OUTER PERIMETER SECURITY 16019. INTEGRATION 16220. NIGHT OPERATIONS 16521. EVACUATION FROM THE OBJECTIVE 17522. WATERPROOFING 17723. MARKING AND SIGNALS 18024. PHYSIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF GUNFIGHTS 18225. RAPID PLANNING 18426. IHR ASSAULT ORDER 19027. MARITIME ASSAULTS 19928. SOP CQB OPERATIONS IN A WMD ENVIRONMENT 205


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PREFACE

FUNDAMENTALS OF CLOSE QUARTERS COMBAT

Ten Fundamental s: The ten fundamentals of close quarters combat address actions soldiers take whilemoving along confined corridors to the room to be cleared, while preparing to enter the room, during roomentry and target engagement, and after contact. Team members must:

1 Arrive undetected at the entry in the correct order of entrance, prepared to enter on a singlecommand.

2 Enter quickly and dominate the room. Move immediately to positions that allow complete controlof the room and provide unobstructed fields of fire.

3 Eliminate all enemy within the room by the use of fast, accurate, and discriminating fires.4 Gain and maintain immediate control of the situation and all personnel in the room.5 Confirm whether enemy casualties are wounded or dead. Disarm/segregate the wounded. Search

casualties.6 Immediately perform a cursory search of the room. Determine if a detailed search is required.7 Evacuate all wounded and any friendly dead.8 Mark the room as cleared, using simple, clearly identifiable markings in accordance with our unit

SOP.10. Maintain security at all times and be prepared to react to more enemy contact at any moment. Do

not neglect rear security.

The Importance of Training

Train-up

A good team relies heavily upon the professional competence of its NCOs, and particularly the team andsquad leaders. These junior NCOs are trainers who know and enforce the highest standards. Each must en-sure that his team or squad is mentally and physically prepared for the mission. It is not uncommon to seea team or squad practicing CQB in the battalion area, conducting battle drills on the physical training field,or gathered around a chalkboard during some downtime in garrison. In the field, companies try to spend 75

percent of their time training at squad and platoon level. This is common throughout the SpecOps com-munity and reflects the core belief that if a battalion has excellent squads, it will have excellent platoonsand companies as well.

Leader training for this mission can take the form of NCO and officer professional development sessionsor train-the-trainer classes. To gain and maintain proficiency in CQB, we have all attend the Special Oper-ations Training Course at Fort Bragg, forming a school-trained base of NCOs from which to draw. Leadershave also attended specialized demolition courses to learn nonstandard methods of entering buildings.

To build upon that base, the team has conducted professional development sessions at ranges to share thelatest techniques in reflexive firing and advanced marksmanship techniques. We also spend time at the


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tions. The best set of NVGs is of little use to a shooter who does not have a PAQ-4/AIM-1, or who hasone but has not learned to zero it. Most teams do not have enough PVS-7s to outfit every operator and wasforced to task organize night vision equipment within the company so squads and platoons could train tostandard at night.

Light discipline has an entirely new meaning. Teams have found that there is a point of diminishing re-turns in regard to the number of IR lights and lasers. As in most operations, SOPs guide what will be usedand by whom. At the same time a unit must carefully assess the enemy's night vision capability as well.Clearly the covert (IR) marking of breach points and friendly elements should become SOP.

CQB techniques work. CQB may be a critical element of special operations and works extremely well, but there is nothing secret about it. Every rifle squad, given the training time, can use these same tech-niques.

Under current Army doctrine, the indiscriminate tossing of flash bangs and hand grenades and burst firingupon entering depend upon the ROEs, but this technique still has flaws. Team sstack a team outside a dooror desired point of entry, use a shotgun to break any lock or a demolitions charge to breach a wall, thenflow into the room as a team. Grenades are used by exception, depending upon the ROEs and buildingconstruction. Teams never send one man in alone, as advocated in some of the most recent manuals on thesubject. Once in the room, Teams use white light to clear under most conditions; it works much better thanIR.

The squad/platoon attack is the infantry's fundamental battle drill. If there is no time to do anythingelse, this drill is the one collective task that should be performed. From it, the infantry derives virtuallyevery other task needed to perform offensive operations.

The Detachment has succeeded in maintaining proficiency in all of its offensive METL tasks - as well asin increasing the individual and collective proficiency of fighting at night -simply by focusing on the squad

platoon attack battle drill and CQB with a training frequency of every six to eight weeks.

Establish unit SOPs for night fighting. Because of the command and control challenges of operating inthe IR spectrum, units should establish SOPs that incorporate the Army's technological advances. TheseSOPs must be thoroughly war gamed and tested, then updated when new equipment is fielded.

Consider forming unit night fighting committees at company and battalion levels. The 1st OperatorBattalion's night fighting committee provides a forum that allows the junior NCOs and platoon leaders todemonstrate the latest innovations and share their experiences and lessons learned. They developed a bat-

tle roster for the battalion that shows which duty position uses which NVD. As new equipment is fielded,the committee makes recommendations to the commander on its disposition and distribution.

Although this article has outlined many of the training events and lessons the Detachment learned in its ef-forts to operate entirely within the IR spectrum, it is only one unit's experience. Force XXI envisions everyinfantry unit - light, mechanized, airborne, air assault, and Operator - outfitted to operate in the total IRspectrum. Being outfitted correctly, however, is just a part of the picture. We, as the total SpecOps force,must share the information we learn during night training -the lessons and the capabilities and limitations


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of current and new equipment - and apply it to tomorrow's night battle.

As we receive new night vision equipment, commanders must take the time to field it correctly, carefullyanalyzing which duty positions need which devices. The individual soldier, his weapon, and NVD must

become one; and we must encourage NCOs and soldiers to be innovative. Although we may never get

away from the use of electrician's tape, it is the ingenuity of soldiers that has led to some of the infantry'sgreatest breakthroughs in our efforts to "own the night."

It is certainly true that they have the latest and greatest "on the other side of the fence," but how they uti-lize that equipment is ultimately up to their personnel. When you encounter essays such as these in your

professional readings, do not discount them simply because you see the word "Operator" in the headline.Perhaps you are not a member of the Operator battalion, but the equipment and tactics they are testing andrefining today are the equipment and tactics we will be utilizing tomorrow. Remember that.

There is also something to be gained from their philosophy of training. What do you do with your soldiersin garrison? Are you holding classes with available soldiers, anticipating the skills needed for the next

field problem, or are you allowing your team leaders to relax with Joe in his barracks room? Use your timewisely and train your men.


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INTRODUCTION TO CLOSE QUARTERS BATTLE AND INEXTREMIS HOSTAGERECOVERY

1. INTRODUCTION: The mission of Inextremis Hostage Recovery (IHR) was assigned to the De-

tachment by the National Command Authority (NCA) in 1975. This is not a mission that former Generalsdreamed up over a cold beer at the Officers Club. The former Chief of Staff was indeed instrumental inthis endeavor however, the President of the United States of America and the Secretary of Defense, thenand now, require that the Detachment select, train, certify, and deploy units that have this "special" capa-

bility. This word "special" is often misconstrued and taken out of context. There are those of us, our bandof brothers, and fellow operators, that believe this "word" denotes elitism and arrogance. It has long beena standing tradition in our Team that elitism will not be tolerated because the Detachment itself is elite.We operators choose not to acknowledge one units attributes better than anothers. This ideology may beone factor that has kept the Detachment as a viable counter terrorist tool, and it has also been suggestedthat this ideology has made the detachment the first string counter terrorist unit in the Nation. Is this mis-sion special then? Ask any VIP that has sat in the proverbial chair during a live fire training evolution.

Ask any State Department employee that is assigned to a foreign post in the Middle East and elsewhere.Yes, IHR is a special operation.

2. OVERVIEW : This section is designed to introduce you to Close Quarters Battle and Inextremis Hos-tage Recovery.

3. OBJECTIVES :

a. Terminal Objective : Upon completion of this period of instruction, in accordance with the SOFClose Quarters Battle Program of Instruction, without the aid of reference, demonstrate a basic under-standing of Close Quarters Battle and Inextremist Hostage Rescue.

b. Enabling Objective : Upon completion of this period of instruction, in accordance with the SOFClose Quarters Battle Program of Instruction, and without the aid of reference, the shooter will demon-strate a basic understanding of:

(1) The chain of command related to IHR operations.(2) The terminology related to CQB/IHR.(3) The four assault options.(4) The two types of assaults.(5) The three types of environments.(6) The four principles of CQB.(7) The eight fundamentals of CQB.(8) The three rules of initiative based tactics (IBT).(9) The Reconnaissance and Surveillance reporting procedures.


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BODY

1. The Chain of command for IHR operations. When a crisis occurs that involves the taking of U.S.citizens hostage, a network of individuals and units are alerted. It is important that you know how thisnetwork works and where you fall into the equation. The information below is deliberately vague in plac-

es due to its sensitivity. The following is a brief description of each link:

a. NCA . The National Command Authority consists of the President and the Secretary of Defense.Only the President, or in his absence the Secretary of Defense, can order the detachment to execute anIHR.

b. NSC . The National Security Council consists of the NCA, the Vice President, and the Secretary ofState. The NSC can be compared to the Crisis Action Team (CAT) for the detachment except on the Na-tional level. When a crisis occurs, they assemble and decide how best to remedy the problem.

c. NSC advisor s. These individuals advise the NSC on matters relative to there agency or department.Those listed in illustration one, are an example of who might attend the NSC meeting. The NCA, NSC,and their advisors can be compared to the detachment's Battle Staff except on the National level.

Note: Once the NCA, NSC, and their advisors have reached a general course of action, orders are then passed down to the theater commanders. When a crisis occurs abroad involving U.S. citizens and terror-ism, at least two Commanders-in-Chief (CC) will be notified; First, the CC of the theater the crisis is in,and second, the CC of the Special Operations Command (CINCSOC).

d. CINCSOC . This Commander is in charge of all Special Operation Forces in the U.S. military.

e. Tier one assets . These forces are the primary forces that conduct Hostage Rescue. The Army forcesare primarily responsible for land based targets, and Navy forces are primarily responsible for maritimetargets. The Air Force is responsible for providing all air assets needed to accomplish the mission.

f. Tier two assets. These forces provide a myriad of support assets to the tier one forces.

g. Tier three assets. These forces are the primary forces that conduct Inextremis Hostage Recovery.They are the forces that will execute the recovery of U.S. citizens in an inextremis scenario should the Tierone forces not be able to arrive on the scene in time.

h. JTF. This Joint Task Force is comprised of all four service components and is commanded by the

CG of SOC Command. It conducts missions ranging from IHR to Humanitarian Relief.

k. CIF. A CC In extremis Force is a unit from a service component that is part of the JTF. They are primarily responsible for conducting IHR, but can also be used for more conventional missions.

2. Terminology related to CQB/IHR. In order to speak intelligently about CQB and IHR we need toknow the terminology associated with the mission. (See illustration one)


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k. Sniper Control Center. The Sniper Control Center is co-located with the SARC. This is the loca-tion that the R&S teams send their reports/traffic to. This intelligence is then deciphered and disseminatedto the rest of the MSPF for planning.

l. IP/EP. Insert point/Extract point.

m. R&S Objective Rally Point. This is a location close to, but not in view of the crisis site where theR&S teams on target report their information to. This information is then sent to the SARC. It is also alocation where the Assault and Security Elements can make final face to face to get updated information

prior to commencing the assault.

n. Release Point. A prominent terrain feature or object in which elements can release to move to sepa-rate last covered and concealed positions or other locations.

o. LCC. The Last Covered and Concealed position is a location as close to the crisis site as possible.This can be a prominent terrain feature or object, but it must conceal the force from observation of the Cri-sis Site. This location is where all final preparations are made prior to movement to the objective, ie.,equipment checks, preparing breaches, link-up with R&S teams, press-check weapons... This location isalso where Comprise Authority should be requested if it is not already granted. An LCC can be on theground or in the air.

p. Breach Point. The Breach Point(s) is the physical location on the objective where the assault forcewill gain entry.

q. Crisis Site, Target, Objective. This is the actual location or object that you will assault for the purpose of recovering the precious cargo.

r. Hostage Holding Area. The HHA is a location inside or outside the Crisis Site, depending on theenvironment, in which all living or wounded personnel are evacuated to. In the HHA you will have a Hos-tage Pit, Unknown Pit, Terrorist Pit, and a Medical Pit. The HHA can be controlled by DAP or SecurityTroop personnel.

s. R&S Teams. The R&S teams are comprised of 2-4 operators and their mission is to locate the tar-get, confirm presence of the precious cargo, report all pertinent information, and support the assault forceduring actions on the objective. These teams attempt to gain 360 degree coverage of the target without be-ing compromised.

t. Compromise Authority. Compromise Authority can only be granted by NCA. Compromise Au-thority grants the Strike Force to continue the mission even if compromised. If it is not granted and theStrike Force is compromised, they must withdraw. If the Strike Force does not have compromise Authori-ty, but has an "execute at" time, if they can maneuver to the breach point(s) uncompromised, they can ef-fect the breach at the appointed time.

u. Initial Staging Base (ISB). This is the location utilized for planning and rehearsals.


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v. Forward Staging Base (FSB). This is a location forward of ISB that is utilized for planning and re-hearsals. This location is usually land based.

w. Hostage Corridor. A protected lane leading to the extract point.

CRISIS SITER/S

R/S

R/S

R/S

ORPLCC

LCC

CRISIS SITE

BP

BP

EP

LHA

IP

HILL #13

FACTORY

RP

CORRIDOR

OCEAN

(ILLUSTRATION TWO)

3. The Four Assault Options. The recovery of U.S. citizens could take place from a variety of objec-tives. When planning for the recovery operation, four options must be considered. The assault options

listed below are listed in order of desirability:

a. Open Air Option, or Sniper Option. This option utilizes snipers to eliminate all the terrorists.There are two considerations however, that must be verified. First, the Strike Force must be certain of thenumber of terrorists, and the terrorists must expose themselves to the snipers all at once. Second, an as-sault element must be in place and ready to make entry into the objective once the snipers have fired. Thisoption is the most preferred because the assault element is now making entry into an objective undefended


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by personnel. Too much importance cannot be placed on being certain of the number of terrorists in thecrisis site.

b. Vehicle Option. The second most preferred. This option relies on negotiations with the terrorists.If the terrorists request a vehicle as part of the negotiating process, and the detachment/host nation can

support it, it is in our best interest to provide that vehicle. We can now place all the terrorists and the pre-cious cargo in a small linear target, ie., sedan, van, or bus. Movement of the terrorists and precious cargofrom the target to the vehicle may also allow the open air option. Should the mobile option become via-

ble, the vehicle that is delivered should be "doctored" to aid the assaulters in the clearing process. Doctor-ing the vehicle and tactics will be discussed in a future class.

c. Stronghold or Barricaded Option. The least preferred option. This option calls for the assaultforce to assault a defended structure. It probably also calls for the use of explosives to gain entry. As anyinfantryman will tell you, it is easier to defend than it is to assault or attack. Because of these disad-vantages, we will spend the majority of our training time on this assault option.

d. Maritime Option. The maritime option is nothing more than a stronghold or barricade optionafloat. This includes Merchant vessels, Naval vessels, Gas Oil platforms. Just because our target might

be a land structure, we must plan for all four assault options.

4. The Two Types of Assaults. Generally speaking, there are two types of assaults that we must be ca- pable of conducting. Under SOF standards, we have six hours from the receipt of the warning/alert orderto be able to start the execution phase. What happens on the target and during the planning phase will de-termine which of the following assaults we conduct:

a. The Emergency Assault . This is the bread and butter of the detachment's "Inextremis" Hostage Re-covery capability. It is usually conducted with little intelligence and little time to plan and rehearse. Anassault is considered an emergency assault if it is executed because of what has, or is, physically happen-ing on the objective. In other words, the terrorists are forcing our hand because of actions they are takingon the target. For example, if R&S is observing a terrorist physically abusing or killing a known hostage,and the NCA believes this action to be inextremis, this could prompt the order to conduct an emergencyassault. Whether we have one hour to plan or one week to plan, this is an emergency assault. We are as-saulting on the terrorists timeline. The focus of our training must be on the emergency assault. That iswhat the "I" in IHR means. If we have an address, a way to get there and back, we should be ready to as-sault.

b. The Deliberate Assault . A deliberate assault is nothing more than the troop assaulting the target

when they are ready. The six hours after the receipt of the warning/alert order is usually consumed byemergency assault planning. If the order to execute is not given by the end of the six hours, and the SOFis being fed practical intelligence, the deliberate assault planning phase will begin. Do not let the six hourcriteria confuse you. NCA can send the order to assault at anytime. It would not be unreasonable for the

NCA to send an alert order, immediately followed by an execute order. The deliberate assault is not thefocus of training for operators where IHR is concerned. That is not to say operators need n ot train to as-sault deliberately. The reasonable man theory however, would suggest if the detachment has enough timeto plan and rehearse for an emergency assault, and transition to deliberate planning and rehearsals, the na-


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(1) Explosive. Most commonly used for external breaching because of the high probability of suc-cess and "shock" value.

(2) Ballistic. This type of breaching uses a shotgun to breach internal and external doors and locks.It is most commonly used for internal locked doors because of the portability and speed of the shotgun.

Specialized shells are used to minimize collateral damage, ie., lockbusters and Avon rounds.

(3) Mechanical. This type of breaching utilizes mechanical tools to breach internal and externaldoors and locks. It is most commonly used as a back-up to explosive and ballistic breaching. Almost eve-ry shooter can carry a mechanical tool into the target. Mechanical tools include heavy and light sledgehammers, hooligan tools, bolt cutters, and crow bars.

(4) Thermal (Isothermic Cutting Torch). This type of breaching utilizes burning oxygen to defeata given target. It is the least preferred type of breaching because the time and effort involved to employthe system. If for example however, we are breaching reinforced concrete, the iso-torch would probably

be used to defeat any standing rebar after the explosive breach.

c. Diversions. Anytime that it is practical, we must plan and utilize a diversion. If we are planning tomake entry into the north side of an objective for example, we would want some type of diversion on thesouth side. Diversions can be audible, visual, or a combination of the two. Explosives are again the mostcommon. The idea is to attract the adversaries attention away from our intentions.

d. Mindset. The three principles above are all skills that have been, or will be taught to you during thiscourse of instruction. Mindset however, is a principle that we cannot teach you in just five short weeks.We can however, make you aware of what is required of you in respect to mindset. Being operatorsthough, this list of requirements would be redundant. You would not be here if there was a question onyour maturity, judgment, integrity, or ability to operate in an adverse environment. So lets look at a sys-tem devised by Jeff Cooper to describe ones mindset, and how that mindset relates to CQB. This systemhas assigned color codes to different conditions of awareness. (See illustration three).

(1) Condition White describes one who is "unready and unprepared" to deal with a lethal confronta-tion. The FBI conducts studies of convicted felons on a regular basis. One such study focused on convict-ed armed robbers. When asked if there was a particular type of individual that the robber chose to perpe-trate the crime upon, the felons almost unanimously answered, they chose the individual that appeared to

be an introvert, walked with his head down, and generally looked uncomfortable in his surroundings. Thistype of person is an easy target for criminals. This condition obviously has no place in the Army, muchless in field of Special Operations. Condition White will see you dead.

(2) Condition Yellow is an upgrade from Condition White and describes one is who is in a state of"relaxed alert". In other words he is aware of his surroundings, and understands the possibility of lethalconfrontation. This is the condition that you can live in. It is not a paranoid state, simply an awareness ofones environment. As conditions change, our level of alertness may also.

(3) Condition Orange is an upgrade from Condition Yellow and describes one who is in a state of"specific alert". Imagine yourself in condition yellow, where you should be, and while you are downtown


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room. Physically controlling an individual is the last resort technique. The verbiage currently being usedis "DOWN, DOWN, DOWN, WE'RE AMERICANS", pause for compliance, "DON'T MOVE". This ver-

biage may have to be given more than once before the individual's) comply. It must be given in an author-itarian manner and must be clear and concise in its delivery.

d. #4 - Dead-check. Those individuals that were engaged must be physically checked to verify theircondition. Using a search man and a cover man, the search man will deliver a thump to the eye of a seem-ingly dead individual. Medical doctors concur that this technique of establishing ones physical condition,dead or alive, is expedient and accurate. Anytime that you choose not to dead-check an individual, you are

potentially leaving a threat at your back. Unless this individuals head is in one location, and his body inanother, conduct a dead-check!

e. #5 - Search the room. Again while using the buddy system, the room or enclosure will now besearched for any hidden or unexposed adversaries or improvised explosive devices (IED's). If the DAPtroop is working independently, this search is a detailed search. If working with the security element trail-ers, the search for the DAP team now becomes a hasty search.

f. #6 - Search and cuff the living. Again while using the buddy system, those individuals that were notengaged must now be cursory searched and flex-cuffed. As you will see in your personnel handling class,this is for the individuals safety and the operators safety.

Note: The first six fundamentals above are done in every enclosure. The only exception is that the dead-check and search of the room might be reversed depending on the configuration of a particular room. Thelast two fundamentals are conducted when the entire crisis site has been cleared.

S S

T

HDESK

DEAD-CHECK

SEARCH & CUFF

?

SEARCH ROOM

S=SHOOTER T=TERRORIST H=HOSTAGE ?=UNCLEARED

POINTS OF DOMINATION

VERBIAGE

ELIMINATE

(Illustration four)

g. #7 - Send the HUTS report. Once the crisis site is cleared and marshaling is taking place, the hos-

tage holding area (HHA) controller gains accountability of all H's, hostages, U's, unknowns, T's, terrorists,


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and S's, shooters. The HHA controller must be sure of the accountability prior to sending the report toHQ's. A false report could cause a re-clear or mission failure. When sending the report, the categories arereported in HUTS sequence. Example #1: "You this is me, 1 hotel up, 1 uniform up, 5 tangos down, re-quest permission to evacuate, over". Notice that no shooter count was given. This is understood to meanthat all shooters are up and accounted for, or reporting by exception. Up means alive, and down means

dead. Regardless if an individual is wounded, if he is still alive, he is reported as "up". If a "s" or shooteris wounded, it will be sent at the end of the report. Example #2: "You this is me, one hotel up, one uni-form up, five tangos down, Sgt Gordon has a sucking face wound, request permission to evacuate, over".This example indicates that all shooters are up, but one is wounded. Prompting HQ"s of this will assist inthe treatment of the shooter once back to rear.

h. #8 - Evacuate. Once permission is granted, the evacuation begins. There are three types of evacua-tions:

(1) Deliberate. It is rehearsed and usually means that the assault went as planned.

(2) Hasty Deliberate. It is rehearsed and usually means that something on or near the objective iscausing the evacuation to be sped up, ie., fire, IED(s), reaction forces...

(3) Emergency. It is rehearsed and usually means great loss of life or failure of the mission if it is notexecuted ie. imminent firing of an IED, imminent failure of the mission due to an overwhelming force orcasualties...

The eight fundamentals of CQB are the foundation of IHR. Exclusion of even one of these fundamentalswill decrease our chance of success.

8. The three rules of Initiative Based Tactics (IBT). Our style of tactics have been coined as initiative based tactics. Because we conduct the "dynamic" assault, or "always changing" assault, the initiative ofthe individual shooter is what will provide us success in our operation. The following three rules seem toover simplify our tactics, but are really meant only to compliment the eight fundamentals of CQB.

a. #1 - Move to the lone shooter or danger area. During the assault, this rule states where you shouldmove to next. If you have just cleared a room and have moved into a hallway, you need only to find wherethere is a shooter by himself and/or where the next danger area is. That is the next threat that must bedealt with.

b. #2 - Shoot only threat targets. As discussed many times previously, we are not in the business of

shooting hostages . Be sure of your target and consider the background!c. #3 - Protect each other. If you see a teammate in need of assistance, immediately take the "initia-

tive" and lend a hand. Many a debate has been made on what has priority, the lives of the precious cargo,or the lives of operators in the assault. One side of this debate is, without protecting the lives of operatorsin the assault, the precious cargo may not have anyone to recover them.


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9. The Reconnaissance and Surveillance reporting procedures. As a member of the Direct ActionTeam, you must know the basic reporting procedures utilized by the R&S teams. Much of your planningmay come from the picture that was painted for you by those teams. (See illustrations five and six).

white

white 1

black

red 1green

(illustration five)

OVERHEAD VIEW

red MAIN ENTRANCE

-----------------------------------------------------------------

1

2

3

4

a b c d

a b c

a b

a b c d e

"white side"

white 1c

white 2b

white 3a

white 4e

(illustration six)

(SIDE VIEW)roof

T

T

T

T

T=terrorist

a. Reporting sides of structures . The main entrance or the most traveled side of a structure is labeledthe white side. If this is not discernible, the northern most side becomes the white side. Opposing thewhite side is the black side. As you are looking at the white side, the right side is red, and the left side is


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INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND REPORTING PROCEDURES

1. INTRODUCTION : Tasked to conduct a short notice in extremis hostage rescue there is no time to ob-tain solid intelligence (intel) on the objective. However, you can get eyes on the objective. But how doyou get a clear working picture that contains enough detail to answer critical Essential Element Infor-

mation (EEIs)'s?

2. PURPOSE : This section is provide you the policies, procedures and standards for the collection andreporting of intelligence information, during an in-extremis hostage recovery operation.Collection activity in an in-extremis operation will be primarily concerned with terrain, enemy, and the ob-

jective. The Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook (GIRH) will form the basis collection effort.The consulate security officer (SRC) will coordinate the transmission of EEI's, the concerns and intentionsof the host country and the international community, incident country information, hostage information,and terrorists groups.

The collection assets of the detachment will be principally concerned with the collection of information

concerning events and activities at the target area, terrain, and helicopter landing zones in and around thetarget area, real time information of the target area and identification of hostages.

3. COLLECTION OPERATIONS

The primary concern of the detachment collection assets will be centered on gathering information abouttargets. Collection assets must be able to effectively transmit observations about built up areas to the SRCfor analysis in graphic terms, with a minimum amount of transmission time.

Detachment collection assets must be thoroughly familiar with the architecture of countries in the area ofoperation, the specifics about construction and engineering, and the materials most often used in construc-tion.

a. SHAPE: The first concern for on-scene collection assets is the general shape of the building. Additionssuch as garages, patios, or porches will not be considered as part of the basic design. In traditional con-struction there are seven styles that may be observed.

(1) Square. A square shaped building is designed so that all four sides are of equal size. Square designsare normally found in inner city construction, smaller family dwellings, and in utility company mainte-nance buildings.

(2) Rectangle. A rectangle shaped building is designed so that opposite sides are equal size. The rectan-gle is the most commonly used shape in construction.

(3) T. A T-shaped building is a modification of a square or rectangle with a wing extending from the cen-ter of the front or back.

(4) L. An L-shaped building is a modification of a square or rectangle with a wing extending from oneend or the other of the front or back. A common design of family dwellings.


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(5) U. A U-shaped building is a modification of a rectangle with a wing extending from each of the frontor back. A modification of the U-shaped is the multiple U, with more than two wings extending from thefront or back. Common to large official buildings or hospitals.

(6) H. An H-shaped building is a modification of the rectangle with the wing extending from each end tothe front and back. A modification of the H-shaped building is the multiple H, with more than two wingsextending to the front and back. Common to military bases.

(7) X. An X-shaped building has a center common area with T-shaped wings extending from the center ofeach side. X-shaped designs are found in some apartment complexes.

(8) Buildings which do not fit the traditional designs will be treated as irregularly shaped and handled inthe manner described in paragraph b (3) below.

b. Designation of Front and Numbering Sides

(1) Once the general shape of the building has been determined, the collections assets will determine onwhich side the main entrance is located and designate that side the base side. If no side can be identifiedas the main entrance, the team will agree on which side will be designated as the base side.

(2) Once the base side has been determined, the sides will be numbered in a clockwise manner with the base side designated as side one. See enclosure (1) for geometric analysis of traditional design numbering.

(3) For irregularly shaped buildings the base side will be identified and the sides numbered, but theteam will transmit the direction the sides take relative to each other. Example: "Side one, right. Side two,right. Side three, right. Side four, right. Side five, right. Side one." describes a pentagon shaped irregulardesign.

c. Measurement of side lengths

(1) Once the sides have been numbered, the collections assets will transmit the general shape, sidenumbers, and their length. Example: "rectangle, side one 20 feet, side two 10 feet respectively." See en-closure (1).

(2) For irregularly shaped buildings, the same procedure is transmitted, plus the direction the sidestake relative to each other. Example: "Irregular, side one 20 feet, side two 20 feet right, side three 20 feetright, side four 20 feet right, side five 20 feet right, side one, describes a pentagon shape.

d. Numbering of floors

(1) Once the sides have been numbered, the collection team will number the individual floors. Floors will be numbered from one starting with the first floor.


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(2) Basements will not be included in the numbering, but rather, designated as basements.

(3) Roof, floors, or attics will not be numbered if the roof angle extends down to floor level. The floorwill be numbered if the angle does not extend down all the way to the floor levels or if the floor width di-minishes as it goes up in length.

e. Subdivision of Sides

(1) After the collection team has numbered the sides, they will subdivide each individual side to follow forreference points and areas when describing features of the side.

(2) The side will first be divided down the center line and each half will be further subdivided downtheir respective centerlines. This division will, in effect, divide the side into quarters. The imaginary sub-division lines will then be identified as the red, white and blue lines for use as reference points for featuredescription.

(3) When transmitting data concerning a particular feature on a particular floor of a particular side,the side number will be given first, followed by the floor number, and the reference point. Example: "2-2white indicates side two, second floor along the midline of the side.

(4) If the feature does not fall exactly on a reference point the reference areas will designated as fol-lows:

(a) Left area. The left area is the space between the left edge and the red line.

(b) Left Center area. The left center area is the space between the red line ans the white line.

(c) Right Center area. The right center area is the space between the white line and the blue line.

(d) Right area. The right area is the space between the blue line and the right edge.

f. Roof Designations

(1) As discussed in subparagraph d. above, a roof designation is given to floors where the roof angleextends down the entire height of the floor. The subdivisions of the sides discussed in subparagraph e.will be extended to the roof to describe any features such as gables, porches, etc.

(2) When discussing features of a roof on a particular side, the side number is given first followed byroof and the reference point or area. Example: "2-roof-red" indicates side two, roof, along the red line.

(3) If a feature such as a chimney is at the point where the roof angles converge then it is reported onone side only and the roof description is followed by peak. Example: "2-roof peak white" indicates sidetwo, peak of the roof on the centerline.


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g. Brevity Reporting

(1) The Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook, Chapter 34, will be the source document for

reporting information concerning in-extremis recovery in a built up area. All information concerningmeasurements will be given in feet.

(2) When applying the GIRH to brevity reporting, the collections team will first report the chapternumber in the GIRH followed by the paragraph concerning the information being reported. The team willthen briefly describe the feature using the procedures outlined in the paragraph. Example: "34-F-1-1while-work-none-in-left0right- 3 1/2 x 7". This indicates a wooden floor in the center of the first floor ofside one. The door does not have any windows, opens inward, hinges are on the left side of the door, thedoor knob is on the right side, and the door is 3 1/2 feet by 7 feet.

5. COLLECTION OF TERRORIST INFORMATION

a. Another major concern of detachment collection assets will center on the gathering of informationabout the terrorist holding the hostages. Emphasis on the terrorists will be focused on the weapons theyuse, pattern of activity, physical description, and areas avoided.

b. Any change in the number of terrorists at their target must be reported in the most expeditious man-ner either through the SRC or directly to the Assault Force Commander once the strike force is airborne.

c. Brevity Reporting

(1) One chapter of the Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook is concerned with terrorist datawhile another chapter deals with related vehicular data.

(2) When applying the GIRH to brevity reporting, the collections team will first report the chapternumber in the GIRH followed by the paragraph and subparagraph of the information being reported andthe information. If the chapter does not change in subsequent reporting during the transmission, only the

paragraph and subprogram need be stated. Example: "31-A-2, blond, 6ft, 180 lbs-A-3, make A0505, appears to be the leader", is a physical description of the apparent leader of terrorists.

6. COLLECTION OF DATA CONCERNING THE HOSTAGES

a. Depending on the situation and the target area, the collections team will endeavor to collect infor-mation concerning the hostages being held. Emphasis will be on the number of hostages, their physicalcondition, description, any pattern or routine of their confinement that can be determined, and relationswith their captors.

b. Any change to the location or treatment of the hostages or if the terrorists begin to execute themmust be reported in the more expeditious manner through the SRC or directly to the Assault Force Com-mander if the strike force is airborne.


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c. Brevity Reporting

(1) Another chapter of the Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook (GIRH) is concerned withinformation to be passed concerning the hostages.

(2) When applying the GIRH to brevity reporting, the collections team will first state the chapternumber followed by the paragraph and subparagraph of the information being reported and the infor-mation. If the chapter does not change in subsequent reporting during the transmission, only the paragraphand subprogram need be stated to pass additional information. Example: "32-B-2, male, B-3, Caucasian, ,B-6, no, B-7 yes, B-8, brown, B-9, 6 ft, B-10, 200, B-11, no, B-12, no, B-13, left arm"' is a description of ahostage.

7. TERRAIN ANALYSIS AND HLA SELECTION

a. Detachment collections assets must also provide to the strike force planners an accurate descriptionof the terrain immediately surrounding the target and possible helicopter landing zones around the target.

b. When dealing with the terrain immediately adjacent to the target, collections team will use the targetitself as a reference. The collections team will number the corners of the target corresponding to the sideswhich converge on them, take a bisection of the angle of the corner, and give a distance the terrain featureis from the corner. Example: "Tree, 3-4 corner, 50 feet", indicates that a tree is located 50 feet from thecorner of side three or four.

c. If the terrain feature does not fall exactly on the bisection of the corners, the collection team will uti-lize the reference points and areas on the side of the building to describe the terrain feature and give a dis-tance the feature is from the building. Example: "Tree,3, white, 50 feet", indicates that a tree is 50 feetfrom the centerline of side three.

d. The collection team will utilize this system to describe terrain features, man made barriers, outsidelight poles, other buildings, enemy positions, and potential landing zones.

e. Potential helicopter landing zones will be stated in reference to the target as described above or bygiving a map grid of the zone.

f. Descriptions of the potential landing zones will be given in accordance with the General IntelligenceRequirements Handbook or a pre-agreed HLA brief.


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THE URBAN OP/HIDE

1. INTRODUCTION: As we all know trying to stay hidden in a city when youre on the move is fairlyeasy. But say for instance you needed to observe one specific building. On television all you would needto do is park in a sedan out front and of course no one would see you! In everyday life almost every

neighborhood has a neighborhood watch program. Shortly after arriving there you would get a visit fromthe men in blue. Visiting a structure nearby is better if you do it right.

2. PURPOSE: The purpose of this period of instruction is to teach the student in various methods andtechniques to plan, construct and conduct a clandestine urban observation post/hide.

BODY:

1. DEFINITIONS.

a. Non-Permissive. This condition envisions evacuation of personnel under conditions ranging from

civil disorder, terrorist action, to full scale combat operations.

b. Semi-Permissive. This environment envisions host government forces, whether opposed to or recep-tive to operations, do not have total effective control of the territory and population in the intended area orcountry of operations.

c. Permissive. This condition envisions no resistance to operations and thus requires little to no dis- placement of combat forces to support movement. Host nation support can be expected and concurrencefor operations is normally given.

d. DARE. Designated area for recovery/extraction.

2. PURPOSE. The purpose for utilizing clandestine urban observation posts are:

a. Observing and reporting activity of individuals within a particular house, building, area, before, dur-ing and after specific operation.

b. Providing cover and protection for the strike element on the ground in the area.

c. Calling in reserve forces and/or engaging hostile forces.

d. Reduction of selected hostile targets.

3. SELECTING AN URBAN HIDE LOCATION. The first thing that you must realize is that until youactually occupy the op/hide it is considered a tentative site. The choice of the OP is usually dictated by the

purpose of the OP, the availability of concealment and cover, surveillance equipment available, and thefield of view of the target area. You should have several sites selected incase your primary site is a unsuit-able.


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a. OP Requirements.

(1) Every urban OP must provide the following elements:

(a) Cover

(b) Observation

(c) Concealment

(d) Clandestine means of entry and exit.

(2) To assist in determining if the OP meets the above requirements, the team can utilize the acro-nym KOCOA.

(3) The R&S team should try to AVOID THE OBVIOUS! If it appears to be a good location for a

hide, then the enemy has probably thought of it too.

b. Considerations for Selecting a Hide Site. The following are several considerations in selecting yourop/hide site.

(1) Enemy Situation.

(a) Hostile (all personnel).

(b) Semi-hostile (local partisans available).

(c) Friendly (with small groups of hostiles).

(2) Friendly Situation.

(a) No friendlies readily available.

(b) Partisans able to give limited assistance.

(c) Partisans able to assist freely.

(3) Location of Hostiles.

(a) Approximately what area.

(b) Approximately what building(s).

(c) Approximately what floor(s).


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(d) Approximately what room(s).

(4) Locations of Possible Hide Sites around Objective Area.

(a) Derelict houses or buildings.

(b) Occupied houses. (friendlies)

(c) Shops.

(d) Public buildings.

(e) Factories and warehouses.

NOTE: Do not use schools, churches, cemeteries or religious sites.

c. Area Routine Around Hide Site.

(1) When and where do children play. Avoid if possible; sometimes used to seek out/compromiseOPs.

(2) Businesses/shops. When opened/closed, how busy and when.

(3) Locations of meeting places. Bars, clubs parks, squares.

(4) Workmen/construction. When and where; avoid/use to advantage.

(5) Churches/religious shrines. Where, busy times, religious holidays.

(6) Vehicle traffic. Type, where, when, rush hours, average speed.

(7) Political situation/preference. Pro or anti host country government.

(8) Flash points. Possible hot spots, could expect trouble, trouble in the past.

(9) Area awareness of security force operations. Do they know how the security force operates.

(10) Every day activity.

4. HIDE SITE RECONNAISSANCE. Reconnaissance can be conducted by aerial and vehicular means, but if it is absolutely essential that a foot reconnaissance be made in the AO, these ground reconnaissance patrols must be conducted so as NOT to compromise or draw attention to the OPs. If possible, a CI repre-sentative should accompany the team conducting the reconnaissance.


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a. Preliminary Reconnaissance. These are usually conducted via map and/or photos (ground or aerial)and/or confirmed through HUMINT sources. They are conducted so that prior to any ground reconnais-sance or insertion of teams, you have established:

(1) Tentative locations for suitable primary and alternate sites.

(2) Tentative locations for primary and alternate staging areas, LCC, E&E routes, DARE's.

(3) Land marks/terrain features used for navigational aids.

(4) If possible, the prospective OPs should be viewed from a distance to determine their suitability.

b. Detailed Reconnaissance. The success of an OP can be increased by a thorough detailed reconnais-sance. A detailed reconnaissance is a physical survey of the tentative site and it's surrounding areas. Theinformation obtained during the detailed reconnaissance of the exterior of hide site will include:

(1) Approach routes.

(2) Entry points.

(3) Exit points.

(4) Departure routes.

(5) Cover, shadow, lights, and animals.

(6) Condition of the ground.

(7) Obstacles; entry, extract, vehicle hindrance.

(8) Escape and evasion routes.

c. If a leaders reconnaissance is conducted the following information should be obtained to assist theOP team on gaining access into the hide site.

(1) Doors. Type, where located, type of handles, opens in or out, windows on doors, damaged.

(2) Windows. Type, where located, how do they open, broken, curtains.

(3) Windows and Doors. Type locks, squeaks/noises, stiff/stuck.

(4) Tools that may be required. (Lock picks, bolt cutters, files, jimmies, glass cutters, screw drivers,hammers, etc.)

(5) Other means of entry. (Sewer lines, vents, air ducts, etc.)


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d. The following specifics of the tentative primary and alternate sites, if possible, should be investigat-ed:

(1) Building construction. Masonry, bullet proof, weather proof.

(2) Windows. Location, condition, type, size.

(3) Doors. Location, condition, type, size.

(4) Type of floor and noises.

(5) Type of ceiling. Acoustics.

(6) Type of walls. Sound, acoustics.

(7) Stairs. Number and noises.

(8) Furniture/fittings. Type and location.

(9) Loopholes. Type and location.

(10) Floor plans and photos.

(11) Direction and distance to the target or target area.

(12) Obstacles and vegetation. Between OP and target area.

(13) Dead space. (Observation and direct fire)

(14) Rubble and trash piles. Type, location. Possible firing position.

(15) Vehicles and machinery. Type, location, condition, movable/static.

(16) Buildings intended use.

(17) Other considerations:

(a) Signs of recent occupation.

(b) Possible hiding places.

(c) Tools, equipment, and materials for hide construction.

(d) Lighting.


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(e) Location of animals and pets.

(f) Location of alternate OP.

(g) Location for back up force. (Possible LCC for assault force)

(h) Mutual support between OP's.

(i) Allow for comfort.

(j) OP protection and intruder detection.

(k) Security and back up plans.

e. Security During the Reconnaissance.

(1) When the OP site is physically reconnoitered, some type of security intrusion device can be left behind so that when the OP party arrives for occupation, they will be able to determine if any activity hastaken place since the reconnaissance. Noted activity may warrant aborting the mission, placing the OP siteunder surveillance, or putting plans into effect for use of an alternate site.

(2) Active and passive sensors can be used in this security role. The reconnaissance team can stageobjects in and around the area that will identify any presence since their departure. All security devicesmust be able to withstand scrutiny. Consider using two devices independent of each other in case one iscompromised.

5. PLANNING FOR INSERT METHODS. You should keep fore most in your mind that a stealthy inser-tion is preferred over any deception. Hostile parties will be surveillance conscious and take note of thetroops and vehicles of our friendly forces. They will count heads as units enter and leave their areas orconduct their own searches upon completion of our operations. By now it should be clear that insertion ofthe OP teams is a very difficult phase of the operation. Inserting at night, during the late hours, will in-crease overall security, but must be practiced to overcome the difficulties of darkness.

a. Foot Patrol. The problems and dangers are obvious. The team will be vulnerable as it patrols to thesite through rural or urban terrain. In occupied or non-hostile areas, the team can be observed and the mis-sion effectiveness reduced or negated. In addition, equipment transportation will be difficult if it must beconcealed from the local populace. The team can be dropped off by a security patrol that is conductingnormal patrolling activities. The team must not look different than the security patrol. Obtrusive OPequipment must be disguised or dropped off separately at a safer time.

b. Military/Civilian Vehicle. Mobile patrols will fit in with the normal pattern of military operationsand are ideal for moving in and out both men and equipment. Once again, the tactical situation dictatesthe extent to which military vehicles can be utilized. Careful thought must be given to the selection ofdrop off points (DOP) and pick up points (PUP) since the team may be observed in the street from a num-


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ber of vantage points. Civilian vehicles can also be used for missions requiring clandestine insertion, ifthey fit into the AO. This must be well planned and practiced to make it go smooth.

c. Deception. A deception operation can be used to draw attention away from the insertion of the team;however, it can also draw attention to the area of the operation. Deceptions also require added resources

and manpower. Some methods are:

(1) Attack. Infantry attacks on enemy held terrain can be conducted to cover the insertion of a teamwhich would "stay behind" after the attacking force withdraws.

(2) Planned House Search. A neighborhood search for wanted persons, weapons, or compliancewith regulations can cover a team's insert and conceal the noise of access into the site. OP equipmentmust be disguised.

(3) Bomb Scare. A bomb scare or similar emergency can be conducted to clear the area of all per-sons.

d. OP Equipment Selection. Once the form of transportation for insert has been designated, the teamwill select the minimum amount of equipment needed to conduct and maintain the OP, taking into accountthe transportation and weight restrictions. Enclosure (1) is a comprehensive list of OP equipment andclothing.

e. Before departing friendly areas there are several tasks that need to be checked during final inspec-tion.

(1) All team members should have a good meal and make a long head call prior to departing.

(2) To insure no foreign smells are carried in, all team members should stop shaving and showeringat least 24 hours (minimum) before departure. This is dependent on the local culture.

(3) All weapons, ammunition, observation and communications equipment must be checked to en-sure proper functioning.

(4) Equipment used to access the site must be checked and readily accessible. Reconnaissance of thesite should give you an idea of entry points and gear needed to gain access to the OP site.

6. INSERTION OF THE URBAN OBSERVATION POST/HIDE.

a. The insertion phase of the mission starts from the last secure position the team occupies prior to theactual access into the OP site itself. The team can depart from within a friendly perimeter, from a securedwelling, from a ship, aircraft, or a motor vehicle. Regardless of the departure point, the movement to theOP site is dictated by the tactical environment surrounding the site.


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b. Security during the insertion is a critical part of the mission. Contact with hostile forces, either phys-ical or visual, will certainly jeopardize the team's safety and its ability to carry on. Inserting into the urbanOP is handled just like any other patrol with only minor changes.

c. Considering the above situations, the technique of movement into the site must be compatible with

the environment. It is always preferred that the team inserts clandestinely. In enemy controlled territory,the team must infiltrate using stealth, good intelligence, and possibly the aid of locals.

(1) Deception. As stated earlier, a deception plan that will divert attention away from the OP partycan be utilized. For example: Increased activity at other locations, dummy inserts, etc., but remember thatthe deception may draw attention to your AO.

(2) Routes. Regardless of the insert mode, primary and alternate routes are selected. Routes should provide as much cover and concealment as possible. Check points and rally points are selected to aid incontrol and security. All team members must be familiar with the AO and all planned routes to the site.

(3) Back up/Reaction Forces. To assist the team in security, an infantry squad or security platoonsquad (+/depending on mode of insert) can escor t the team on its insert. The squad may also help withequipment transfer, accessing the site, and construction if the situation permits. While the insert is taking

place, a sparrow hawk reaction force is placed on stand by for immediate deployment in case the teammakes physical contact. An emergency recovery vehicle is also placed on standby for extracting the team.Reaction forces and emergency recovery vehicles are kept on standby for the mission's entirety.

(4) Weapons. During insertion, all team members will carry weapons suitable for personal defense.Weapons will be loaded, with a round in the chamber, and the safety on. The team leader will assignfields of fire to provide 360 degree security while moving and at halts.

(5) Communications. Communication must be maintained with higher headquarters during inser-tion. Good comm checks must be made prior to departure. Comm must be kept to a minimum during in-sertion, an execution checklist must be utilized and encryption must be used.

(6) Contact. There are two types of compromise that are considered under contact, they are activeand passive.

(a) Active Compromise. An active compromise can be defined as a positive contact with hostilesforces or locals. This contact can take place while conducting your insert, extract, or while in the OP site.Examples of an active compromise include:

1 While inserting, being approached and questioned by local nationals or hostile forces as tothe nature of your business in the area.

2 While extracting, being approach and questioned by local nationals or hostile forces as to thenature of your business in the area, an attempt is made to apprehend your team or by being pursued or en-gaged by hostile forces.


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3 While in the OP, being visually seen by local nationals or hostile forces. This can be describeas someone on the outside of the OP looking at the hide site and pointing at it or it could be someonewalking in on the OP site while it is occupied.

4 Physical contact with hostile forces during insertion will require an immediate extract for the

team. The team will break contact by fire, close combat, and/or maneuver as per the Rules of Engage-ment. Extraction may be accomplished in the following ways:

a Extraction by emergency recovery vehicle at or near the location of the contact.

b Movement to a prearranged emergency PUP/LUP.

c Initiation of the E&E plan and subsequent movement to a prearranged PUP/LUP, DARE,safe house, or the nearest friendly overt position.

5 At worst, the compromise will involve contact by small arms fire or an explosive device.

There may be no indication of a successful compromise, so even if it is only suspected, appropriate actionshould be taken.

(b) Passive Compromise. A passive compromise can be defined as observation of the team whileit is inserting, extracting or operating within an OP but whoever observes the team pays little to no atten-tion to them. Examples of a passive compromise include:

1 While inserting, the team is observed by a passing vehicle or pedestrian but they seem to payno attention to them.

2 While extracting, the team is observed moving from the OP site to extract but are not en-gaged by hostile fire or pursued by nationals or hostile personnel.

3 While in the OP, and a passerby looks in the direction of the OP site but pays little to no at-tention and continues with their business.

4 Visual contact during insertion is a high probability of occurrence, but will not necessarilycompromise the mission. The team leader will determine the extent of the contact and its effect on mis-sion security. He can abort the mission with the approval of higher headquarters, if necessary.

7. GAINING ACCESS INTO THE URBAN OP/HIDE SITE. Gaining access to the OP site can range indifficulty and complexity. It is impossible to cover every entry situation, but as long as teams are trained in

basic principles, then improvisation will go a long way in dealing with different situations. The teamshould be trained in obstacle negotiation and forcible entry techniques. Noise is a major consideration onthe technique used for entry, and plans must be made to afford a quiet and unnoticeable entry. Entry willgenerally be made by removing parts of the structure or creating holes from adjoining structures. Here aresome items to consider:


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a. Windows. Having to break a window quite obviously creates noise and could attract attention. Ifthere is no alternate entry, then the window must be broken, using deception, long before entry to the

building (say, in the reconnaissance phase) is effected. Many windows can quite easily be opened with practice using a putty knife or similar object. Teams must be wary of leaving telltale signs on the glass orframe and should wear gloves. Glass cutters and suction devices can be used, but they are generally more

cumbersome to carry, and require practice to become proficient in their use.

b. Doors. Breaking down a door is also quite obvious and noisy. Obtaining keys from locksmiths,landlords, or other sources is preferred. If the door must be forced open, damage should be kept to a min-imum so that the door can still be used and entry remains unnoticed. There are a variety of tools that can

be used to breach doors, ranging from screwdrivers to sledgehammers to hydraulics. Whatever is used, thetechniques of usage must be rehearsed during the day and at night. The equipment must be both quiet and

portable. If hanging locks need to be cut, use the bolt cutters as close to the base of the shackle as possibleso that the shackle can be used to disguise entry. If keys or combinations are used, remember to turn overor receive them from the oncoming/ outgoing team.

c. Exterior/Interior Walls. Removing sections of walls is time consuming and the operation may haveto take place over more than one night. Intelligence on the site must be extremely good and security must

be tight. Entering from adjoining rooms is possible in row-type housing and multilevel buildings. This isokay with sheetrock, but a no go with fire wall. This technique of insertion must be well planned, re-hearsed, and coordinated.

8. OCCUPYING AN URBAN HIDE.

a. Entry. Upon entry, several tasks are conducted simultaneously by pre-designated team members.

(1) Post security.

(2) Tactical clearance of the site.

(3) Recover/reset intrusion devices.

(4) Stage gear.

(5) Disguise gear.

Once you have gained entry, established security and searched the area; a sketch should be made of thearea you are occupying, so that when you depart, it can be placed back as it was found.

b. Op/Hide Layout. To ensure that the OP runs as efficiently as possible and facilitate rapid departure(OP compromised) when necessary, the OP should be laid out in an organized manner. The following ar-eas should be planned for in your OP layout. (See figure 1)

(1) Observation Area. This is where the observer watches the target. In the observation area should be the optics, op log, observation log, camera and sketch kit.


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(2) Radio Area. The radios, message books and comm logs are kept here and all comm work should be done here.

(3) Eating Area. This area should be used for eating. There should not be any cooking in the OP.

Remember that all the trash goes out with you.

(4) Sleeping Area. This is your rest area. While you are in this area you should rest or occupy your-self with a book. But you should let your eyes rest as much as possible, and definitely NO walkmen orvideo games! As on a foot patrol, if you are not using it, it is packed away!

(5) Head Area. In this area you do your thing into plastic bags. Make sure that you seal the baggood (zip lock bags seem to work the best) and then place it in another bag. Again, what goes in, willcome out with you.

c. You also need to plan for the following:

(1) Observation times/shifts. (1-2 on/off)

(2) Communications/reports. (burst, field exp ant)

(3) Security. (booby traps, dead bolt, furniture, weapons)

(4) Head calls. (where, how, take out with you)

(5) Food/water. (pack in/out)

(6) Medical. (pack in/out, where is close facility)

9. HIDE CONSTRUCTION. You have gained access to the hide site, have security established, your next priority of work will be to construct your hide. Knowing full well that you are not, in most cases, going to be able to hammer nails in the walls, modify walls or in most cases even rearrange the furniture. We needa system that will contain all our gear, conceal us from observation, ensure we can still observe and yet notalert the hostiles to changes in the surrounding areas. Enclosure (2) contains a list of tools, not meant to

be all inclusive, or that you must take all the tools listed. This is a starting point.

a. Types of Hides. Hides can be broken down into two categories which are the hasty and the detailed.

(1) Hasty. A hasty hide is just that, something that does not take a lot of time and/or effort to put up.This can be as simple as a drape/curtain in front of you or a blackout drape behind you. It could even be assimple as standing to the side of a window that has a screen on it to obscure your outline. You may findyourself doing your observations from a hasty hide while the detailed hide site is being constructed.

(2) Detailed. A detailed hide site is usually on more of a permanent level, you build one of thesewhen you are going to occupy a hide for more than 24 hours, or it is a high traffic area and you need the


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additional concealment. There are several different types of detailed hides but we will just discuss twoduring this period of instruction. There are no "text book" answers when it comes to hides, you are justlimited by the surroundings and your imagination.

(a) Double Drape. A double drape is just that, a front drape set at approximately a 90 degree an-

gle, with the second drape behind the first at a 60 degrees angle (if both drapes are hung from the same point) with the observer in between the drapes. These drapes are hung from the ceiling or a point abovethe viewing aperture to the floor. They can be attached to the ceiling by means of tacks, riggers tape, sta-

ple gun or hung on 550 cord. The bottom should also be attached to the deck to prevent tale-tale move-ment of your front drape. It should be tight with no wrinkles that might give away your position. (See fig-ure 2)

(b) PVC Frame. A PVC frame is mostly used when there can not be any noise made (cover foraction) from hammer and nails. The frame is constructed out of the PVC pipe andfittings and is then covered with a front veil and blackout material. Ideally this should be constructed atnight or during low traffic times. The frame should be sized so that the sides of the frame are not in the

window/opening but extend past the sides and the top if possible.

1 Front Veil. The front veil should be of a shear type of material which will permit the ob-server to see out without the aid of optics (remember most optics will burn through minor haze) and breakup the observers outline when viewed in. Mosquito netting is ideal for this as it can be spray painted ei-ther lighter or darker as the situation dictates.

2 Blackout Material. This material should not be light permeable, it can be either black clothor cheese cloth. One attribute that cheese cloth has is it comes in a neutral color and could be dyed lighteror darker (done prior to the mission). A definite drawback to cheese cloth is that it weighs a lot for smallsections.

Note: When you are doing your rehearsals you must also practice constructing and disassembling yourhide so that there is a minimum of excess noise or movement that could disclose your position. In creatingyour hide you are just limited by the tactical situation, materials on hand and your imagination.

b. Hide Considerations. The following are a few things that you must keep in mind while you are es-tablishing your hide.

(1) Windows. Stay away from the windows! If at all possible, leave them exactly as they are andobserve around curtains or through blinds. If this is not possible you may need to adjust your position orthe curtains. Do so as little as possible. But always remember to make sure that it looks natural.

(2) Furniture/equipment. If the furniture/equipment is located in view of the windows that the hos-tiles have always seen should they look that way, don't touch them. If its out of view, go ahead and rea rrange it so that you'll be comfortable while observing.


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(3) Lighting. It's imperative that you control the lighting in your hide. If you allow light to filter infrom behind you, it may result in you being silhouetted. In the evening you'll need light, make sure thatyou use a red lens flashlight and ensure that it remains away from the windows or opening.

(4) Firing from behind walls/windows/doors. The designated marksman must ensure that he is well

back from the window or open doorway and in the shadows and must be aware of his muzzle flash. Hisobserver should also have an unimpeded view of the target and the surrounding area to ensure that anotherthreat does not take them by surprise.

(5) Firing from unprepared loopholes. An unprepared loophole is nothing more than a hole in thewall of a building to fire through. In this type of firing, the designated marksman is well back from theloophole to prevent muzzle blast from being detected. Ensure you allow enough room for the bullets pathas the barrel of the rifle is located below the line of sight of the scope.

(6) Firing from the peaks of a roof. The peak of a roof provides a vantage point for designatedmarksman to increase their field of vision and the range at which they engage their targets. When firing

from a roof, the Hawkin position is the most preferred shooting position. Consideration must be taken notto silhouette yourself. You must use all available concealment i.e. pipe vents, roof vents, chimney,smokestack or any other object protruding from the roof as a hasty firing position.

(7) Vents on attic level from sides of houses. Normally you would be constructing your hide and notneed to worry about the background lighting or furniture. The main concern is to ensure you and your

partner is not compromised in position.

10. OPERATION OF THE URBAN OP. There are many factors to be considered when operating in anurban OP. Mission requirements will vary the team's routine for every operation. The following guide-lines on routine are applied as necessary. Once again, the type of mission will dictate the actions of theteam. There are several different subroutines that the team conducts during the course of its stay in the ur-

ban OP. This section, although not all inclusive, will cover the routine of the OP party from the moment ofaccessing the site until the departure. (Four man team).

a. OP Activated. Once the site is secured, team members will begin performing assigned tasks.

(1) The OP party will separate into two teams of two men each. One two man team will be designat-ed as the observation team and the other will be designated the security team.

(a) The observation team is responsible for the sketch of the interior layout of the site for futureuse when vacating the OP, immediate observation of the target area, loophole construction, drawing up therange card, starting the observation log, and performing a communications check. A field sketch and pho-to log are also initiated.

(b) The security team is responsible for the immediate security of the OP site while the observa-tion team is conducting it's initial duties. One man will post as security at the entry point and listen for anysigns of compromise or excessive noise by the OP party. The other man will install and activate perimetersecurity devices such as claymores, sensors, body traps, etc.


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(2) Once the security team completes its initial tasks, they will join the observation team. All gearwill be packed and staged if not in use. The observation team will brief the other team members on its ini-tial observations and any other information concerning loophole construction, communications, etc.

b. Security.

(1) Security while in the OP site is similar to that used in a patrol base. Once the team enters the site,a tactical search is made to insure that the premises are secure. Entrances are sealed and Claymores can beemplaced. Electronic intrusion detection devices can be utilized inside and out of the site, if the situation

permits. Security immediately after insert is maintained at 100%. It will take at least four men to operatea site for more than 24 hours; two to observe and provide security while two rest.

(2) The primary security concern while operating the OP is compromise. The OP, the target, or the"tactic" being employed can be compromised. Compromise of an urban OP is not a frequent event, but it

happens. After studying the routine of the target area, an OP should suspect compromise if the followingoccurs in the AO:

(a) Increased local activity, or conversely, lack of activity.

(b) Undue interest of locals in the immediate area of the OP.

(c) Deliberate and systematic checking of streets and buildings.

c. Observation Routine.

(1) The OP team's primary mission is to gather information through observation of selected targets.Observation is maintained on the target by at least one member of the team around the clock. An observa-tion log is maintained from which patterns can be identified and EEI's satisfied. Still and motion photog-raphy should be utilized. The first observer team on duty will draw a field sketch and designate the targetarea and targets by using a coding system (numbers, letters, colors, nicknames). A range card will also bedrawn.

(2) When reporting information over the radio it must be clear, concise, and accurate. Reportingformats will minimize traffic and make dissemination easier. Transmission MUST be made in a securemode. Report only necessary traffic.

d. Communications. It is mandatory that communications be maintained by the OP with the supportingunit (control). The team must use a covered net or codes and deception traffic to defeat unfriendly moni-toring. Radio checks should be initiated by the OP, not the control station. Avoid communications pat-terns such as hourly radio checks, dependent on unit SOP's. If comm goes down, stay on the designatedradio frequencies and wait for control to initiate lost comm procedures. Depending on the tactical situa-tion, communications will be maintained in one of the following manners:


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(1) Live wire. All events are logged and reported as they happen. Maximum use of codes and en-cryption is necessary.

(2) Semi-live wire. All events are logged and reported only if the information is unusual or as anEEI requiring immediate transmission.

(3) Radio silence. All events are logged and the team stays on constant radio watch but doesn'ttransmit except for disguised radio checks or emergencies.

e. Watch Schedule.

(1) Approximately one to two hours after the site is entered and secured, the team will begin its ob-servation routine. This will depend on how long it takes to obtain a viewing/shooting aperture.

(2) With a four man team, the normal routine is two men on duty and two men resting. The two menon duty split so that one is observing and one is security. There are times when all members of the team

are required to be on duty (entry, stand-to, suspected compromise). Conversely, one man may be suffi-cient during non-peak activity hours. During daylight, four to six hour shifts are recommended. At night,one to two hour shifts are recommended. Those operators not on duty should sleep and eat. It should beemphasized that sleeping is a duty.

(3) The two men on duty will conduct the following tasks:

(a) Continuous observation of the target/ area.

(b) Security of the OP.

(c) Maintain radio watch and comm log.

(d) Maintain observation log (written/ recorded in duplicate).

(e) Thoroughly brief oncoming watches.

(f) Maintain and operate all observation/ surveillance equipment.

f. Living routine.

(1) Again, in many urban locations, existing household facilities may be utilized. If permitted, cook-ing should occur only once per day. A thermos should be filled with coffee for late night watch standing.(Coffee is diuretic, will cause dehydration and increase the need to urinate). All rubbish must be placed ina container, such as a plastic bag, and later taken out of the OP. Rubbish is never left behind.

(2) If a lavatory is available and can be used without risk of compromise, it should be utilized. Thealternative is plastic bags and bottles. A separate area is designated for waste storage. Waste will be takenout during extract.


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(3) Team members will become bored after prolonged periods of inactivity in an OP. Some form ofrecreation during off duty hours may be needed (books, cards, but NO radios or video games).

g. Actions on Compromise.

(1) Undoubtedly, enemy compromise of the OP is the teams greatest fear and concern. The firstthing that must be done is report to higher HQ that you think that you have been compromised! All teammembers stand-to, and all gear is packed and ready for extract. The team should send precise informationon the compromise, suspected or real. The control station willneed to know the nature of the compromise, any other activity in the area, and whether the target has beenextracted or not. This will be based on:

(a) The nature of the compromise.

(b) Current incidents and recent intel reports.

(c) Past experiences in the area.

(d) Known enemy reactions.

(e) Reaction time of backup forces.

(2) The ultimate decision to move must remain with higher HQ.

(3) The safest action on compromise is generally to remain inside the OP until the emergency backupforce arrives to cover the team's withdrawal. If the OP comes under attack, successful withdrawal will de-

pend on the evacuation plan given in the patrol order. At a minimum, the plan will include:

(a) Composition and orders for the emergency backup force.

(b) Orders for opening fire. (ROE's)

(c) The escape route for the OP team.

(d) Location of the emergency DARE (E&E plan).

(e) Casualty evacuation.

(f) Destruction of equipment and materials.

(g) Signals (passwords, short/long range recognition signals).


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(h) Cover story. (Only CI) You are US servicemen on a military operation. Cover stories will getyou tried as a spy.

h. Rules of Engagement.

(1) When operating in an urban OP, it may be necessary to engage targets by fire. Serious considera-tion should be given to the consequences of such action and the effects on the overall mission. You musthave compromise authority. Situations that may warrant shooting are when:

(a) Hostile personnel threaten the immediate security of the OP. (Self defense)

(b) Hostile personnel threaten the security of friendly troops or personnel within the team's targetarea.

(c) Hostile personnel that have a high tactical value are identified by the OP and no other means

exist to affect their capture or reduction.

(d) The teams mission dictates that selected targets will be reduced.

(2) Orders for engagement will be given in the patrol order. The OP, if at all possible, should informthe control station of the particular situation and request instructions. If time is limited, the ultimate deci-sion rests with the OP team leader. All team members must be thoroughly briefed on target engagement

procedures to avoid any confusion or mistakes. Even though the team may have no intention of shootingfrom the OP, preparations must still be made. When observation points are selected, consider their use asa firing point as well. The following points apply to shooting from the OP.

(a) Orders for engagement.

(b) Loophole construction and camouflage.

(c) Flash and blast concealment.

(d) Range determination/range cards.

(e) Ballistics.

1 The effects of weather.

2 Angle firing.

3 Shooting through objects.

4 Shot placement.


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5 Penetration.

(f) Target identification.

(g) Compromise of the OP and extraction.

i. Resupply.

(1) Resupply should be sufficiently frequent to allow OP logs and film to be collected on a regular basis. It also gives the controlling unit the opportunity to update the OP without using the radio. By re-viewing the OP's logs and photos, the controller will be able to assess and correct any camera or operatingfaults early in the operation vice waiting for an extended period and then discovering that the photos or in-formation is of no value. Once received, information and photographs will be annotated by control and acopy sent back to the team to ensure maximum efficiency and morale within the OP. Any damagedequipment will be replaced on resupply.

(2) Resupply will be planned for in the patrol order. Resupply will be activated either at set times or,

preferably, remain on call for the OP team leader. The nature of the articles coming in or going out of theOP will dictate the system of resupply. Consider the following:

(a) Small items can be passed through a ground floor window or a mail box by a foot patrol pass-ing by.

(b) Larger items can be put in a ruck sack or similar container and passed through a door, "roped"from adjacent windows, passed by a routine foot or vehicle patrol, or by any clandestine means (TrojanHorse).

(c) Irrespective of the method chosen, the OP team and resupply unit must rehearse the resupply prior to the operation.

j. Other Considerations. The events taking place in the OP are numerous and can be overwhelming. Awell rehearsed and planned operation will overcome most hardships. Still, there will be some difficultiesthat are unavoidable and all team members must be aware of these problems so that they can be dealt with.

(1) Fatigue. It is inevitable that all of the team members will become tired while on watch. Every precaution must be taken to ensure that no watch standers fall asleep while on duty. This may require ro-tating shifts every half hour or hour. The team leader must enforce sleep periods for team members.Boredom will also pose a problem.

(2) Distractions. During observation, there are numerous distractions and elements that influence anddistort ones awareness.

11. EXTRACTION OF THE URBAN OP. The extraction of the team can be a result of three situations;relief of the team, mission complete, and emergency. Security during extraction was covered earlier inthis period of instruction. Generally, the same procedures as were used in insertion are used for extract.Preferably, the same team that escorted the OP team in , will take them out. If

The SOF CQB Program

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