The Social in Post-Vygotskian Theory

The ‘Social’ in Post-VygotskianTheory

Harry DanielsUniversity of Bath

Abstract. In this article some limitations of the increasingly populartheories of the Russian semiotician L.S. Vygotsky will be identified.Emphasis will be placed on the lack of an account of social positioningwithin discourse as well as the social, cultural and historical production ofdiscourse. At the heart of these concerns there lies an underdevelopedperspective on the social function of language, particularly when it is usedto influence interpersonal relations. The theories of cultural transmissiondeveloped by Basil Bernstein in the later stages of his career will bediscussed in terms of the potential for refining the Vygotskian thesis.

Key Words: Bernstein, language of description, social positioning,Vygotsky

This paper will discuss some of the shortcomings of the social theory of L.S.Vygotsky and suggest that Basil Bernstein’s work on social positioning andhis approach to the development of multi-level languages of description maybe of value to those concerned with theoretical and empirical work on thesocial formation of mind.

In what is arguably his most influential text, Thinking and Speech,Vygotsky (1987) discusses the process of development in terms of changesin the functional relationship between speaking and thinking. He asserts that‘change in the functional structure of consciousness is the main and centralcontent of the entire process of mental development’ (p. 188). He illustratesthe movement from a social plane of functioning to an individual plane offunctioning. From his point of view the ‘internalization of socially rootedand historically developed activities is the distinguishing feature of humanpsychology’ (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 57). In this way interpersonal processes aretransformed into intrapersonal processes as development progresses.

Vygotsky provided a rich and tantalizing set of suggestions that have beentaken up and transformed by social theorists as they attempt to constructaccounts of the formation of mind which to varying degrees acknowledgesocial, cultural and historical influences. His is not a legacy of determinism

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and denial of agency; rather he provides a theoretical framework which restson the concept of mediation by what have been referred to as psychologicaltools or cultural artefacts.

Bernstein (1993) has suggested that the metaphor of the ‘tool’ itself servesto detract attention away from the relation between its structure and thecontext of its production:

The metaphor of ‘tool’ draws attention to a device, an empowering device,but there are some reasons to consider that the tool, its internal specializedstructure is abstracted from its social construction. Symbolic ‘tools’ arenever neutral; intrinsic to their construction are social classifications,stratifications, distributions and modes of recontextualizing. (p. xvii)

There is a long-running debate as to whether Vygotsky was a Marxist whowished to create a Marxist psychology. There is no doubt that he drew ontheoretical Marxism. It has been argued, for example by Bernstein (1993),that this in itself presented him with a particular theoretical challenge:

A crucial problem of theoretical Marxism is the inability of the theory toprovide descriptions of micro level processes, except by projecting macrolevel concepts on to the micro level unmediated by intervening conceptsthough which the micro can be both uniquely described and related to themacro level. Marxist theory can provide the orientation and the conditionsthe micro language must satisfy if it is to be ‘legitimate’. Thus such alanguage must be materialist, not idealist, dialectic in method and itsprinciples of development and change must resonate with Marxist princi-ples. (p. xv)

If activities are to be thought of as ‘socially rooted and historicallydeveloped’, how do we describe them in relation to their social, cultural andhistorical contexts of production? If Vygotsky was arguing that formation ofmind is a socially mediated process, then what theoretical and operationalunderstandings of the social, cultural, historical production of ‘tools’ orartefacts do we need to develop in order to empirically investigate theprocesses of development? These questions would appear to be a matter ofsome priority for the development of the field, as so much of the empiricalwork that has been undertaken struggles to connect the analysis of theformative effect of mediated activity or tool use with the analysis of toolproduction. I intend to try to invoke an account of the production ofpsychological tools or artefacts, such as discourse, that will allow forexploration of formative effects of the social context of production at thepsychological level. This will also involve a consideration of the possibil-ities afforded to different social actors as they take up positions and arepositioned in social products such as discourse. This discussion of produc-tion will thus open up the possibility of analysing the possible positions thatan individual may take up in a field of social practice. In this paper I will usethe following question as a device with which to open a debate about therelationship between principles of social production, regulation and in-

THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 16(1)38



dividual functioning: ‘How do principles of power and control translate intoprinciples of communication and how do these principles of communicationdifferentially regulate forms of consciousness?’ (Bernstein, 1996, p. 18).

Vygotsky’s account of development rests on notions of mediation andexternalization as well as what he termed internalization. The concept of‘mediation’ opens the way for the development of a non-deterministicaccount in which mediators serve as the means by which the individual actsupon and is acted upon by social, cultural and historical factors. There isconsiderable tension and debate as to the nature of such factors. The tensionsare revealed in competing definitions of ‘culture’ and the labelling ofcontemporary theoretical approaches as, for example, either socio-cultural orcultural-historical.

The means of mediation that have tended to dominate recent discussionsare cultural artefacts such as speech or activity. These semiotic and activity-based accounts may be seen as referring to different levels of emphasiswithin a single process. The field abounds with descriptors such as ‘socio-cultural psychology’, ‘cultural-historical activity theory’, and so on, each ofwhich has been defined with great care. However, confusions persistalongside what still appear to be genuine differences of emphasis.

Wertsch (1998) has advanced the case for the use of mediated action as aunit of analysis in social-cultural research because, in his view, it provides akind of natural link between action, including mental action, and thecultural, institutional and historical context in which such action occurs. Thisis so because the mediational means, or cultural tools, are inherentlysituated, culturally, institutionally and historically.

Activity theorists have adopted a different approach. Engestrom (1993)points out the danger of the relative under-theorizing of context. Forexample, it could be argued that mediated action is such an under-theorizing:

. . . individual experience is described and analysed as if consisting [of]relatively discrete and situated actions while the system or objectivelygiven context of which those actions are a part is either treated as animmutable given or barely described at all. (p. 66)

It is of interest that so much effort has been expended attempting to clarifythe movement from the social to the individual and yet relatively littleattention has been paid to the reverse direction. Bruner’s (1997) reminderabout Vygotsky’s liberationist version of Marxism serves to reinforce theview that his was a psychology that posited the active role of the person inhis or her own cognitive and emotional creation. Whether the emphasis wasdirectly on creativity itself or through the use of expressions such as‘mastering themselves from the outside’, in his early work Vygotskydiscussed externalization at some length.

DANIELS: THE ‘SOCIAL’ IN POST-VYGOTSKIAN THEORY 39



Engestrom has developed a model of transformation he calls the ex-pansive cycle in which internalization and externalization develop com-plementary roles. Engestrom and Miettinen (1999) provide a discussion of theinternalization/externalization process at every level of activity. They relateinternalization to the reproduction of culture and externalization to thecreation of artefacts that may be used to transform culture.

I wish to suggest that when the cultural artefact takes the form of apedagogic discourse, we should also analyse its structure in the context of itsproduction. Given that human beings have the capacity to influence theirown development through their use of the artefacts, including discourses,which they and others create or have created, then we need a language ofdescription that allows us to identify and investigate:

● the circumstances in which particular discourses are produced;● the modalities of such forms of cultural production;● the implications of the availability of specific forms of such production

for the shaping of learning and development.

As Bernstein (1993) argued, the development of Vygotskian theory calls forthe development of languages of description which will facilitate a multi-level understanding of pedagogic discourse, the varieties of its practice andcontexts of its realization and production. There is a need to connect thetheory of social formation of mind with the descriptions that are used in theactivity of research. This should provide a means of relating the social-cultural historical context to the form of the artefact. Bernstein (2000)illustrates the need for an appropriate language of description in hisdiscussion of the concept of habitus:

. . . if we take a popular concept habitus, whilst it may solve certainepistemological problems of agency and structure, it is only known orrecognized by its apparent outcomes. Habitus is described in terms of whatit gives rise to, and brings, or does not bring about. . . . But it is notdescribed with reference to the particular ordering principles or strategies,which give rise to the formation of a particular habitus. The formation ofthe internal structure of the particular habitus, the mode of its specificacquisition, which gives it its specificity, is not described. How it comes tobe is not part of the description, only what it does. There is no descriptionof its specific formation. . . . Habitus is known by its output not its input.(p. 133)

If processes of social formation are posited, then research requires atheoretical description of the possibilities for social products in terms of theprinciples that regulate the social relations in which they are produced. Weneed to understand the principles of communication in terms derived from astudy of principles of social regulation.

If, as Lemke (1995) argues, communication plays a critical role in socialdynamics, then social theories about discourse should point the way to a




dynamic, critical, unitary social theory. Lemke suggests that whilst linguis-tics furnishes theories of description and psychology provides theories ofmind, both tend to ignore the social functions of language and the socialorigins of human behaviour.

He laments the lack of progress in advancing this agenda:Unfortunately, most theories of discourse are not social theories. Indeedmost theories of discourse are mainly linguistic and psychological, payingrelatively little attention to the question of who says what when, why, andwith what effects. The social context of discourse, and issues of discourseas social action are largely ignored. Instead discourse is mostly seen as theproduct of autonomous mental processes, or it is simply described ashaving particular linguistic features. (Lemke, 1995, p. 28)

The concepts of both ‘habitus’ and ‘genre’ have been proposed as theoreticaldevices for ‘bridging’ the gap. As I noted above, however, Bernstein iscritical of habitus for its weaknesses when it comes to operational descrip-tion and thus comparative analysis.

Both Hasan (1992a, 1992b, 1995) and Wertsch (1985a, 1985b, 1991) notethe irony that whilst Vygotsky developed a theory of semiotic mediation inwhich the mediational means of language was privileged, he provides verylittle if anything by way of a theory of language use. Wertsch has turned toBakhtin’s theory of speech genres for such a theory. However, Hasan (inpress) has argued that whilst Bakhtin’s views concerning speech genres are

. . . rhetorically attractive and impressive, the approach lacks . . . both adeveloped conceptual syntax and an adequate language of description.Terms and units at both these levels in Bakhtin’s writings require clarifica-tion; further, the principles that underlie the calibration of the elements ofcontext with the generic shape of the text are underdeveloped, as is thegeneral schema for the description of contexts for interaction.

Hasan is also concerned with the bias within activity theory towards theexperiential function of language. She equates this with the ‘field ofdiscourse’ within systemic functional linguistics. Her concern is with theabsence of analysis of what she refers to as the ‘tenor of discourse’, bywhich she means the social relations and the positioning of the interactants,and the ‘mode of discourse’, that is, the nature of the semiotic and materialcontact between the discursive participants.

Within Vygotskian theory, speech is supposedly the primary means ofsemiotic mediation, and yet the social functioning of language is under-theorized. In an account of the social formation of mind, surely there is arequirement for theory which relates meanings to interpersonal relations.This emphasis on representational/experiential meaning and the absence ofan account of the ways in which language serves to regulate interpersonalrelations and in which its specificity is in turn produced through specificpatterns of interpersonal relations and thus social regulation constitute aserious weakness (Hasan, 2005).




Halliday’s (1978) view of language as a social semiotic requires us tothink of it as a resource to be deployed for social purposes. He seeks toanalyse the uses of language as integral to the social functions, the socialcontexts of actions and relationships in which language plays its part(Lemke, 1995). Halliday provides the account of language use that is absentin Vygotsky, and Bernstein provides the basis for a language of descriptionwhich may be applied at the level of principles of power and control whichmay then be translated into principles of communication. Bernstein alsoseeks to show how these principles of communication differentially regulateforms of consciousness.

As Bernstein (1996) noted in discussion of sociolinguistics:Very complex questions are raised by the relation of the socio to thelinguistic. What linguistic theories of description are available for whatsocio issues? And how do the former limit the latter? What determines thedynamics of the linguistic theory, and how do these dynamics relate, if atall, to the dynamics of change in those disciplines which do and couldcontribute to the socio. If ‘socio’ and linguistics are to illuminate languageas a truly social construct, then there must be mutually translatableprinciples of descriptions which enable the dynamics of the social to enterthose translatable principles. (pp 151–152)

One implication of this position is that different forms of social may be seenin relation to different patterns of communication:

From this point of view, every time the child speaks or listens, the socialstructure is reinforced in him and his social identity shaped. The socialstructure becomes the child’s psychological reality through the shaping ofhis acts of speech. (Bernstein, 1971, p. 144)

Different social structures give rise to different modalities of languagewhich have specialized mediational properties. They have arisen, have beenshaped by, the social, cultural and historical circumstances in which inter-personal exchanges arise, and they in turn shape the thoughts and feelings,the identities and aspirations for action of those engaged in interpersonalexchange in those contexts. Hence the relations of power and control whichregulate social interchange give rise to specialized principles of communica-tion. These mediate social relations.

Bernstein seeks to link semiotic tools with the structure of materialactivity. Crucially he draws attention to the processes which regulate thestructure of the tool rather than just its function:

Once attention is given to the regulation of the structure of pedagogicdiscourse, the social relations of its production and the various modes of itsrecontextualising as a practice, then perhaps we may be a little nearer tounderstanding the Vygotskian tool as a social and historical construction.(Bernstein, 1993, p. xix)

Bernstein also argues that much of the work that has followed in the wakeof Vygotsky ‘does not include in its description how the discourse itself is




constituted and recontextualised’ (p. 45). As Ratner notes, Vygotsky did notconsider the ways in which concrete social systems bear on psychologicalfunctions. He discussed the general importance of language and schoolingfor psychological functioning; however, he failed to examine the real socialsystems in which these activities occur. The social analysis is thus reducedto a semiotic analysis which overlooks the real world of social praxis(Ratner, 1997).

The feature that can be viewed as the proximal cause of the maturation ofconcepts, is a specific way of using the word, specifically the functionalapplication of the sign as a means of forming concepts. (Vygotsky, 1987,p. 131)

Whilst it is quite possible to interpret ‘a specific way of using the word’ tobe an exhortation to analyse the activities in which the word is used andmeaning negotiated, this was not elaborated by Vygotsky himself. Theanalysis of the structure and function of semiotic psychological tools inspecific activity contexts is not explored.

In Engestrom’s (1987) work within activity theory the production of theoutcome is discussed but not the production and structure of the tool itself.The rules, community and division of labour are analysed in terms of thecontradictions and dilemmas which arise within the activity system specifi-cally with respect to the production of the object. The production of thecultural artefact—the discourse—is not analysed in terms of the context ofits production, that is, the rules, community and division of labour whichregulate the activity in which subjects are positioned.

Mediating artefacts:Tools and signs

Subject

Object

SenseOutcome

Meaning

Division oflabour

CommunityRules

Figure 1. The structure of a human activity system (Engestrom,1987: 78).




Bernstein’s (1981) paper outlined a model for understanding the construc-tion of pedagogic discourse. In this context pedagogic discourse is a sourceof psychological tools or cultural artefacts. Bernstein’s primary object was toview the production of pedagogic discourse in the context of the action of agroup of specialized agents operating in a specialized setting in terms of theoften-competing interests of this setting.

Bernstein’s work on cultural transmission in schools shows his continuousengagement with the interrelations between changes in organizational form,changes in modes of control and changes in principles of communication.Initially he focuses upon two levels: a structural level and an interactionallevel. The structural level is analysed in terms of the social division oflabour it creates, and the interactional level in terms of the form of socialrelation it creates. The social division of labour is analysed in terms ofstrength of the boundary of its divisions, that is, with respect to the degreeof specialization. Thus, within a school the social division of labour iscomplex where there is an array of specialized subjects, teachers and pupils,and it is relatively simple where there is a reduction in the specialization ofsubjects, teachers and pupils. Thus, the key concept at the structural level isthe concept of boundary, and structures are distinguished in terms of theirboundary arrangements and their power supports and legitimations(Bernstein, 1996).

The interactional level emerges as the regulation of the transmission/acquisition relation between teacher and taught: that is, the interactionallevel comes to refer to the pedagogic context and the social relations of theclassroom, or its equivalent. The interactional level then gives the principleof the learning context through which the social division of labour, inBernstein’s terms, speaks.

Bernstein distinguished three message systems in the school: curriculum,pedagogy (practice) and evaluation. Curriculum referred to what counted aslegitimate knowledge, which was a function of the organization of subjects(fields), modules or other basic units to be acquired. Pedagogy (practice)referred to the local pedagogic context of teacher and taught, and regulatedwhat counted as a legitimated transmission of the knowledge. Evaluationreferred to what counted as a valid realization of the knowledge on the partof the acquirer. Curriculum was analysed not in terms of contents but interms of relation between its categories (subjects and units). Pedagogicpractice, again, was to be analysed not in terms of its contents but in termsof the control over the selection, sequencing, pacing and criteria of commu-nication in the transmitter/acquirer relation. It is apparent that the curriculumis regarded as an example of a social division of labour and pedagogicpractice as its constituent social relations through which the specialization ofthat social division (subjects, units of the curriculum) is transmitted andexpected to be acquired.




Bernstein uses the concept of classification to determine the underlyingprinciple of a social division of labour and the concept of framing todetermine the principle of its social relations, and in this manner heintegrates the structural and interactional levels of analysis in such a waythat, up to a point, both levels may vary independently of each other.

Classification is defined at the most general level as the relation betweencategories. The relation between categories is given by their degree ofinsulation. Thus, where there is strong insulation between categories, eachcategory is sharply distinguished and explicitly bounded and has its owndistinctive specialization. When there is weak insulation, then the categoriesare less specialized and therefore their distinctiveness is reduced. In theformer case, Bernstein speaks of strong classification, and in the latter case,he speaks of weak classification.

In terms of framing, the social relations generally, in the analysis, arethose between parents/children, teachers/pupils, doctors/patients, socialworkers/clients, but the analysis can be extended to include the socialrelations of the work contexts of industry or commerce. From Bernstein’spoint of view, all these relations can be regarded as pedagogic:

Framing refers to the control on communicative practices (selection,sequencing, pacing and criteria) in pedagogical relations, be they relationsof parents and children or teacher/pupils. Where framing is strong thetransmitter explicitly regulates the distinguishing features of the inter-actional and locational principle which constitute the communicativecontext. . . Where framing is weak, the acquirer is accorded more controlover the regulation.

Framing regulates what counts as legitimate communication in the ped-agogical relation and thus what counts as legitimate practices. (Bernstein,1981, p. 345)

In that the model is concerned with principles of regulation of educationaltransmission at any specified level, it is possible to investigate experimen-tally the relation between principles of regulation and the practices of pupils.Relations of power create and maintain boundaries between categories andare described in terms of classification. Relations of control revealed invalues of framing condition communicative practices. It becomes possible tosee how a given distribution of power through its classificatory principle andprinciples of control through its framing are made substantive in agencies ofcultural reproduction, for example families/schools. The form of the code(its modality) contains principles for distinguishing between contexts (recog-nition rules) and for the creation and production of specialized communica-tion within contexts (realization rules).

Through defining educational codes in terms of the relationship betweenclassification and framing, these two components are built into the analysisat all levels. It then becomes possible in one framework to derive a typologyof educational codes, to show the inter-relationships between organizational




and knowledge properties, to move from macro- to micro-levels of analysis,to describe the patterns internal to educational institutions and relate them tothe external social antecedents of such patterns, and to consider questions ofmaintenance and change. (Bernstein, 1977, p. 112)

The analysis of classification and framing can be applied to different levelsof school organization and various units within a level. This allows theanalysis of power and control and the rules regulating what counts aslegitimate pedagogic competence to proceed at a level of delicacy appro-priate to a particular research question.

Bernstein later (1996) refined his distinction between instructional andregulative discourse, such that the former refers to the transmission of skillsand their relation to each other, and the latter refers to the principles of socialorder, relation and identity. Whereas the principles and distinctive featuresof instructional discourse and its practice are relatively clear (the what andhow of the specific skills/competences to be acquired and their relation toeach other), the principles and distinctive features of the transmission of theregulative are less clear as this discourse is transmitted through variousmedia and may indeed be characterized as a diffuse transmission. Regulativediscourse communicates the school’s (or any institution’s) public moralpractice, values, beliefs and attitudes, principles of conduct, character andmanner. It also transmits features of the school’s local history, local traditionand community relations. Pedagogic discourse is modelled as one discoursecreated by the embedding of instructional and regulative discourse.

The language that Bernstein has developed allows researchers to takemeasures of school modality: that is, to describe and position the discursive,organizational and interactional practice of the institution. Research maythen seek to investigate the connections between the rules the children use tomake sense of their pedagogic world and the modality of that world.Bernstein provides an account of cultural transmission which is avowedlysociological in its conception. In turn, the psychological account that hasdeveloped in the wake of Vygotsky’s writing offers a model of aspects of thesocial formation of mind which is underdeveloped in Bernstein’s work.

Hasan (1995) brings Bernstein’s concept of social positioning to the forein her discussion of social identity. Bernstein (1990, p. 13) used this conceptto refer to the establishing of a specific relation to other subjects and to thecreating of specific relationships within subjects. As Hasan (1995) notes,social positioning through meanings is inseparable from power relations.Bernstein (1990) provided an elaboration of his early general argument:

More specifically, class-regulated codes position subjects with respect todominant and dominated forms of communication and to the relationshipsbetween them. Ideology is constituted through and in such positioning.From this perspective, ideology inheres in and regulates modes of relation.Ideology is not so much a content as a mode of relation for the realizing of




content. Social, cultural, political and economic relations are intrinsic topedagogic discourse. (pp. 13–14)

Here the linkage is forged between social positioning and psychologicalattributes. This is the process through which Bernstein talks of the shapingof the possibilities for consciousness.

The dialectical relation between discourse and subject makes it possible tothink of pedagogic discourse as a semiotic means that regulates or traces thegeneration of subjects’ positions in discourse. We can understand thepotency of pedagogic discourse in selectively producing subjects and theiridentities in a temporal and spatial dimension (Diaz, 2001, pp.106–108). AsHasan (1995) argues, within the Bernsteinian thesis there exists an inelucta-ble relation between one’s social positioning, one’s mental dispositions andone’s relation to the distribution of labour in society. Here the emphasis ondiscourse is theorized not only in terms of the shaping of cognitive functionsbut also, as it were invisibly, in its influence on dispositions, identities andpractices’ (Bernstein, 1990, p. 33).

As Engestrom and Miettinen (1999) note in their discussion of a Marxianinterpretation of Hegel’s conception of self-creation though labour:

Human nature is not found within the human individual but in themovement between the inside and the outside, in the worlds of artefact useand artefact creation . . . the creative and dynamic potential of concretework process and technologies remains underdeveloped in his [Marx’s]work. (Engestrom & Miettinen, 1999, p. 5)

Bernstein (1990, pp. 16ff.) argues that socially positioned subjects, throughtheir experience of and participation in code-regulated dominant and domi-nated communication, develop rules for recognizing what social activity ascontext is the context for, and how the requisite activity should be carriedout. Participation in social practices, including participation in discourse, isthe biggest bootstrapping enterprise that human beings engage in: speakingis necessary for learning to speak; engaging with contexts is necessary forrecognizing and dealing with contexts. This means, of course, that thecontexts that one learns about are the contexts that one lives, which in turnmeans that the contexts one lives are those which are specialized to one’ssocial position.

My argument follows that of Hasan that the Vygotskian account of the‘social’ is insufficient for the task Vygotsky set himself in his attempt toformulate a general social theory of the formation of mind. It lacks a centralrequirement of any theory of semiotic mediation that attempts to account forthe way we as humans behave: how language is used to serve a socialinterpersonal function. Bernstein’s account of social positioning within thediscursive practice that arises in activity systems, taken together with hisanalysis of the ways in which principles of power and control translate into




principles of communication, might allow us to investigate how principles ofcommunication differentially regulate forms of consciousness.

References

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Bernstein, B. (1977). Class codes and control: Vol. 3. Towards A theory ofeducational transmissions (2nd rev. ed.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

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Bernstein, B. (1993). Foreword. In H. Daniels (Ed.), Charting the agenda:Educational activity after Vygotsky (pp. xiii–xxiii). London: Routledge.

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Diaz, M. (2001). The importance of Basil Bernstein. In S. Power, P. Aggleton,J. Brannen, A. Brown, L. Chisholm, & J. Mace (Eds.), A tribute to Basil Bernstein1924–2000 (pp. 106–108). Institute of Education, University of London.

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theory. In S.Chaikin & J. Lave (Eds.), Understanding practice: Perspectives onactivity and context (pp. 64–103). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Halliday, M.A.K. (1978). Language as social semiotic: The social interpretation oflanguage and meaning. London: Arnold.

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Hasan, R. (1995). On social conditions for semiotic mediation: The genesis of mindin society. In A.R. Sadovnik (Ed.), Knowledge and pedagogy: The sociology ofBasil Bernstein (pp. 33–67). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Hasan, R. (2005). Language, society and consciousness (J. Webster, Ed.). Sydney:Equinox.

Lemke, J.L. (1995). Textual politics: Discourse and social dynamics. London/Bristol, PA: Taylor & Francis.

Ratner, C. (1997). Cultural psychology and qualitative methodology: Theoreticaland empirical considerations. London: Plenum.

Vygotsky, L.S. (1978). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological




processes (M. Cole, V. John-Steiner, S. Scribner, & E. Souberman, Ed. andTrans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Vygotsky, L.S. (1987). The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky. Vol.1: Problems ofgeneral psychology, including the volume Thinking and speech (R.W. Rieber &A.S. Carton, Eds.; N. Minick, Trans.). New York: Plenum.

Wertsch, J.V. (1985a). Vygotsky and the social formation of mind. Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press.

Wertsch, J.V. (1985b). The semiotic mediation of mental life: L.S. Vygotsky andM.M. Bakhtin. In E. Mertz & R.A. Parmentier (Eds.), Semiotic mediation:Sociocultural and psychological perspectives (pp. 223–261). New York: Aca-demic Press.

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Harry Daniels is Professor of Education: Culture and Pedagogy at theDepartment of Education, University of Bath. He is also Director of theCentre for Socio-cultural and Activity Theory Research. His researchincludes work on processes of social exclusion and collaboration. Hiswriting reflects his interests in socio-cultural and activity theory. He haspublished three books concerned with Vygotskian theory: Charting theAgenda: Educational Activity after Vygotsky (as editor, Routledge, 1993),An Introduction to Vygotsky (as editor, Routledge, 1996) and Vygotsky andPedagogy (Routledge, 2001). Address: Centre for Sociocultural and Activ-ity Theory Research, Department of Education, University of Bath, Bath,BA2 7AY, UK. [email: [email protected]]




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