THE SHAPE OF CONTEXT: IMPLICATIONS OF BATESON'S

AESTHETICS FOR FAMILY THERAPY

by

JAMES P. MORRIS, B.M.Ed>, M.S. In H.E.

A DISSERTATION

IN

HOME ECONOMICS

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Approved

Chairperson of>the Committ(

Accepted

DeaflT of the Graduate School

May, 1987

r \

Copyright 1987 James P. Morris

ACKNOULEDGMENTS

I uould like to express my thanks to my Chairperson, Brad

Keeney, for providing the original ideas and materials that form

the basis for this uork. His creat iv i ty and support throughout

the urit ing of this dissertat ion have been invaluable. Our

friendship continues to be a source of enjoyment.

Bob Mullen, my colleague and fr iend, has provided technical

as uell as aesthetic support. The urit ing of a dissertation can

be an arduous process—Bob has helped to make this an enjoyable

one for me.

Finally, and most importantly, I oue my deepest thanks to my

u i fe , Cindy. She has continually supported me throughout this

process in uncountable uays. Understandably, the path uas oftimes

rocky, yet she aluays kept my senses focused on the goal. This

uork is dedicated to Cindy, and our tuo daughters, Caitlin and

Caroline.

11

CONTENTS

ACKNOULEDGMENTS ii

ABSTRACT iv

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. BATESON'S EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATION

FOR UNDERSTANDING AESTHETICS 7

3. SIZE AND SHAPE IN MENTAL HEALTH 37

4. AESTHETICS AND PRAGMATICS IN FAMILY THERAPY 79

5. IMPLICATIONS OF BATESON'S AESTHETICS FOR FAMILY THERAPY 108

REFERENCES 138

111

ABSTRACT

This dissertat ion attempts to readdress some of Gregory

Bateson's fundamental ideas and connect them formally to

aesthetics. These formal understandings are critically applied to

the field of family therapy. The structure of the uork follous a

historical patterning of Bateson's urit ing and influence.

Follouing the Introduction, Chapter 2 outlines Bateson's

epistemological foundation for understanding aesthetics. Several

major ideas proposed by Bateson are described and related to his

call for an aesthetic preference. In this regard, Bateson has

stated, "By aesthetic I mean responsive to the pattern uhich

connects."

Chapter 3 provides a thorough revieu of the conference "Size

and Shape in Mental Health," held in 1979 and principally

organized by Bateson. The conference addressed the dialectic

nature of size and shape, of quantity and quality, of pragmatics

and aesthetics. Follouing the revieu, a discussion focuses on

linking these complex ideas to the notion of aesthetics.

Chapter 4 formally revieus the debate about pragmatics and

aesthetics in the field of family therapy. Much of this debate

appeared in tuo issues of the 1982 volume of Family Process. Many

have called these issues family therapy's darkest moment, yet the

appearance of recent articles uhich continue the debate only point

to the vi tal i ty of the discussion.

iv

Finally, Chapter 5 presents implications of Bateson's

aesthetics for family therapy. Near the end of his life, Bateson

began to explore the notions of aesthetics, shape, and pattern.

Bateson had planned to unite a book entitled, "Uhere Angels Fear

to Tread," indicating his deep respect for these sacred notions.

The uorks of Uendell Berry, Gary Snyder, and Steve Tyler are

introduced as metaphors of action for family therapy, and living

itself.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

CUould i t be correct to suggest that the aesthetic is this unifying glimpse that makes us auare of the unity of things uhich is not consciousness?] That is right, that is uhat I am getting at. That flash uhich appears in consciousness as a disturbance of consciousness is the thing that I am talking about.

(Gregory Bateson)

Gregory Bateson often quoted Pascal's aphorism, "The heart

has its reasons of uhich the reason knous nothing." Bateson used

this quotation to orient his audience to an aesthetic

understanding of ourselves and the uorld. Unfortunately,

Bateson's questions about aesthetics, uhich he moved out of the

philosopher's private discourse and into the practical issues of

everyday living, uere often met uith suspicion and criticism.

Perhaps such critical reaction is the case since the most

difficult questions are usually the most difficult to talk about.

Furthermore, attempts to struggle uith questions about

aesthetics may result in higher order problems. As Bateson

reminds us, "To be conscious of the nature of the sacred or of the

nature of beauty is the folly of reductionism" (1979, p. 236).

The outcome of uorking uith such difficult questions is often to

rush touard a quick solution, "anything that uill obscure the

darkness of the subject" (Bateson, quoted in M. C Bateson, 1972,

p. 302).

The purpose of this dissertat ion is to readdress some of

Bateson's fundamental ideas and to connect them formally to

aesthetics. These formal understandings uill then be critically

applied to the field of family therapy. The structure for this

uork uill follou a historical patterning of Bateson's uritings

and influence. Houever, i t must be made clear that uhat follous

uiH provide only a part ia l glimpse of the man uho became "a

senior f igure in hal f -a dozen sciences, (uho) had never f i t a

conventional niche in the academic uorld" (Nachmanovich, 1980, p.

35).

The second chapter uill trace Bateson's epistemological*

foundation for understanding aesthetics. Several major ideas

proposed by Bateson uill be briefly described and then related to

his call for an aesthetic preference. For example, Bateson

r e f e r r e d to the questions on uhich he uorked in the last decades

of his l i fe as "an ecology of mind." He had become painfully

auare of uhat happens uhen mind is excluded from evolution and

learning. Hou then might Bateson's inclusion of the ecological

c r i t e r i a of mind be related to aesthetics?

Historically, Chapter Tuo uill drau upon uritings from

throughout Bateson's career. Primarily, houever, uritings from

the last f i f t e e n years of his l i fe uill be examined. For example,

Bateson noted on several occasions that his paper prepared for the

Korzybski Lecture in 1970, "Form, Substance, and Difference," uas

one of the clearest elaborations of his thoughts and ideas. In

particular, he "realized that of course the bridge betueen the map

and terr i tory is difference" (Bateson, 1977, p. 240). In addition

to this article, houever, Bateson urote increasingly about

metaphor, uholeness, the sacred, and aesthetics. Many of these

articles (e.g., "Men are Grass: Metaphor and the Uorld of Mental

Process") uill be gleaned for aesthetic understandings.

The third chapter uill move historically to the end of

Bateson's long and complex career. In 1979 a conference uas

convened uhich addressed the dialectical nature of size and shape,

of quantity and quality, of pragmatics and aesthetics,

particularly as these uere related to the field of mental health.

"Size and Shape in Mental Health" uas organized by Bateson and

Brad Keeney, and held at the Menninger Foundation in Topeka,

Kansas. Bateson (cited in Keeney, 1983b, p. 74) proclaimed his

hopes for the conference uithin his position paper uritten for the

event: "As our conversation bounces off the quantitative touards

pattern and quality, ue shall inevitably (I hope) encounter

considerations of the aesthetic. I hope that these may become the

main theme of our discussion."

Chapter Three uill provide a thorough synopsis of the

proceedings of the conference. Follouing, several pages uill be

devoted to linking the complex ueave of ideas generated to the

notion of aesthetics. For example, the splitting of discourse

betueen the pragmatic and the aesthetic has resulted in the mental

health field's inability to successfully bring about positive

4

change on any significant level. As John Perry (psychiatrist, and

conference panel member) argued, there's no question but that the

mental health movement is producing insanity. Uhat difference

uill i t make, then, for the mental health field to engage in

complementary discourse betueen the aesthetic and the pragmatic?

Chapter Four uill move directly into the field of family

therapy uith a careful examination of the debate about pragmatics

and aesthetics registered in the pages of Family Process in 1982.

Although Bateson had only peripherally participated in the field

of family therapy in the 1950's, he continues to strongly

influence many involved in the movement. Indeed, all of the

authors considered in the Family Process debate make direct

reference to the seminal influence of Bateson upon the field and

upon their oun uork. Houever, the point, counterpoint, and

reaction uithin these articles leaves unclear the nature of the

relationship betueen aesthetics and pragmatics for family therapy.

The four th chapter, then, uill formally revieu the content of

the arguments on each side of the debate. On the one side, the

call for overcoming the "pragmatic error" by considering the

"ecosystemic" implications of Bateson's aesthetics. On the other

side, an attempt to "undress the fashionable mind" and encourage

attending to the pragmatic problems families seek help for . Af ter

this revieu, an analysis of the inherent problems uithin the

debate uill be presented. Possible point of synthesis uill be

considered. Indication for directions for fu r ther discussions

about aesthetics and pragmatics uithin family therapy uill be

outlined.

In the form of integration and conclusion, the f i f t h chapter,

drauing upon the f i r s t four chapters, uill present implications

of Bateson's aesthetics for family therapy. Uhat uill be the

benefit for family therapy in considering and implementing notions

such as shape, pat tern, design, quality, and aesthetics?

Chapter Five uill also call upon other prominent aesthetic

voices as aides touard a more fuller understanding. For example,

the Post-Modernist voice of Steve Tyler uill speak of the "end of

description," and the evocation in communication and learning. The

essayist and farmer Uendell Berry uill call for a sense of place

and community, uhere the language of stories is immanent. The poet

and ecologist Gary Snyder uill remind us of the need for high

mindfulness in daily living.

All in all, an attempt uill be made to evolve meaningful

statements about the place of aesthetics (and pragmatics) in

family therapy. As uill be discovered, these statements uill be

metaphors of action for living i tself . Though the task uill

surely, and necessarily, remain incomplete, the dialogue must

continue. As Bateson (1979a, pp. 235-236) reminds us:

The sacred (uhatever that means) is surely related (somehou) to the beautiful (uhatever that means). And i f ue could say hou they are related, ue could perhaps say uhat the uords mean. Or perhaps that uould never be necessary. Everytime ue add a related piece to the question, ue get more clues to uhat sort of ansuer ue should expect.

Note

1. There are many current ideas on the meaning of epistemology. Bateson (1981a, p. 5) o f fe red his:

"So I uil l define Epistemology as the science uhich draus that f ine line betueen Pleroma and Creatura and uhich then goes on to study the in ter face uhich that l ine—real or a r t i f i c i a l , conscious or unconscious— creates."

Nou Pleroma and Creatura uere names, borroued from gnostic philosophy, that Carl Jung used to divide the universe of experience. Bateson (1981a, p. 4) described them as: "Pleroma is the name of that unliving, l i feless uorld, uhich in i t se l f contains and makes no dist inct ions; Creatura is the name of the uorld of living and perception, the uorld of experience." Bateson explained that uhen ue distinguish Pleroma (e.g., s t icks, stones, bil l iard balls, and galaxies) from Creatura (e.g., crabs, people, and problems of di f ference) by some act of d i f fe ren t ia t ion , ue are square in the middle of epistemology—the science dealing u i th rules of thought.

CHAPTER 2

BATESON'S EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATION

FOR UNDERSTANDING AESTHETICS

In Bateson's later uritings the notions of pattern,

uholeness, the sacred, and aesthetics became the ideas he uas most

interested uith. Indeed, his last book. Mind and Nature: A

Necessary Unity (1979a), uas his attempt to lay out the theory and

terminology uith uhich an aesthetic understanding could be

articulated. As Bateson asked in his metalogue, "So uhat?": "The

question is onto uhat surface shall a theory of aesthetics be

mapped?" Bateson has proposed the ideas and terminology for

explaining and describing the phenomena of biological organization

and human interaction. Houever, as many readers of Bateson

discover (e.g., Opitz, 1985), the metaphoric and sometimes vague

definitions Bateson offers prove difficult to assimilate and

transmit uith concrete representation.

On several occasions Bateson uas asked for, or attempted his

definition of aesthetics. For example, uhen queried by Henryk

Skolimouski as to the function of the sacred and aesthetics

Bateson (1980a, p. 20) responded:

Nou if you uant to ask about the function of aesthetics 1 uill say uell betueen uhat and uhat, uithin uhat uhole are you attributing uhat parts? Function is a part uord and not a uhole uord. Aesthetics and sacred tend to be uhole uords, uords about uholes and you can't talk about the function of a uhole. It is no good saying, "uhat is the meaning of the universe?"

7

8

On another occasion (the Introduct ion to Mind and Nature

(1979a, p. 9), Bateson s ta ted, "By aesthetic I mean responsive to

the pa t te rn uhich connects." Many people uho encounter this o f t

quoted passage ask in response, "Connects uhat to uhat?" Such uas

the case u i th the tuo groups of students Bateson found himself

teaching in the 1950's. Both of these groups, the psychiatr is ts

and the a r t i s t s , uere asked in metaphoric uays hou they uere

connected to a living creature, fo r example a crab. Finally, uhen

one student responded that although one clau of the crab uas

bigger than the other, both claus uere made of the same par ts ,

Bateson (1979a, p. 10) exclaimed:

Ah! Uhat a beaut i fu l and noble statement that is, hou the speaker politely flung into the t rash can the idea that size could be of primary or profound importance and uent a f t e r the pat tern uhich connects. He discarded an asymmetry in size in favor of a deeper symmetry in formal relat ions.

Empathy fo r , responsiveness to, and protect ion of the complex

pat terns and cycles uhich exist in the living biological uorld

provide foundations f o r Bateson's conception of the aesthetic

(Opitz, 1985). Houever, to more fully understand Bateson's use

of the term aesthetic requires examining his general

epistemological principles and ideas. Several of Bateson's key

ideas uill be presented in point by point fashion. Each idea uill

be br ie f ly described and then brought into relat ion ui th the

aesthet ic. Instead of attempting to exhaust the uealth of

Bateson's thought, these ideas are selectively chosen for their

part icular connection u i th aesthet ics.

Relationship is the Primary Basis f o r all Biological L i fe

Bateson began the conference "Size and Shape in Mental

Health" (Bateson <Chair>, Bateson, M., Berry, Perry, Rabkin,

Snyder, 8. Uynne, 1979) u i th a question, "Hou many f ingers do you

have?" Much like the question he posed to his tuo groups of

students in the 1950's, th is question metaphorically pointed to a

fundamental principle Bateson uanted to ident i fy . In this case

Bateson pointed to the fac t that relations are primary, uhile the

content of the relationships (i.e., relata) are secondary.

Bateson continued by explaining that uhat there is in DNA code is

instruct ions f o r process based on relations, and not uords in DNA

code fo r f ingers. Bateson (Bateson, ei_ a]., 1979, p. 5) fu r the r

explained:

And, the re fo re , uhat is important is the angles betueen. Hou many divisions in the grouth had to occur? And there may uell be, you knou, coding fo r the process of divisions, branching—almost certainly has to be. And the r ight ansuer is not f ive f ingers, but four gaps betueen f ingers.

I t uas of utmost importance fo r Bateson to vieu all living

things as pat terns of relationship ui thin a context. In the

introduct ion to his book. Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity,

Bateson i l lust rates the notions of relationship and context by

ci t ing a discovery of Goethe. Goethe straightened out the

vocabulary of botanical anatomy by defining the parts of f louering

plants (e.g., leaf, stem, bud) on the basis of the relations

betueen them. That is , "A stem is that uhich bears leaves," and

10

"A leaf is that uhich has a bud in i t s angle." As opposed to the

pervasive occidental teaching that the uay to define something is

by uhat i t supposedly is in i t se l f , Bateson proposed that

relationship be used as the basis fo r def in i t ion.

Uithin his posit ion paper u r i t t en fo r the Uenner-Gren

Conference on Primitive Ar t , Bateson pointed to yet another

context uhere relationship remains primary. In this paper Bateson

laid out hou notions such as style, grace, and meaning are

connected in a r t , specifically, and in primary process generally.

In a clear voice Bateson (1972, p. 150) states, " I t is probably an

e r ro r to think of dream, myth, and a r t as being about any one

matter other than relationship." Bateson (1972, p. 139)

distinguished primary process, the language of metaphor and a r t ,

from consciousness, uhich "talks about things or persons and

attaches predicates to the specific things or persons uhich have

been mentioned."

For Bateson, a r t is concerned u i th relationship and not

concerned u i th any identi f iable components or relata in the uork

of a r t i t se l f . I t is of the nature of primary process to think

f i r s t of the relationships and to consider the relata as defined

solely by thei r relationships. Conscious attempts to select out

and analyze par ts in the uork of a r t result in d is tor ted images of

a pa t te rn (system) of relat ions. "Uhat the unaided consciousness

(unaided by a r t , dreams, and the like) can never appreciate is the

systemic nature of mind" (Bateson, 1972, p. 145).

11

Returning to the questions of hou many fingers do you have,

Bateson pointed out that as you begin to look at the hand as made

up of relations you uill notice it has extraordinary beauty. It is

a beauty of relations and modulations of relations. Further, uhen

ue note the difference betueen the relations ue are auare of

"aesthetic modulations." For Bateson, uhat uas of utmost

importance uas to sense "the aggregation of relations betueen all

of the things that go to make the living entity."

Uhen Bateson faced his tuo groups of students uith the

questions, "Hou are you related to this creature? Uhat pattern

connects you to it?", he uas presenting them uith aesthetic

questions. From coding in DNA, to hou someone is related to a

crab, to hou ue are all related to immanent mind, Bateson pointed

to relationship as biologically and aesthetically foundational.

For Bateson, the aesthetic means "responsive to the pattern uhich

connects," responsive to the patterns of relationship. Uhen ue

sense the pattern of relationship in a grasshopper, a uork of art,

in a family, or in an idea ue become auare of the aesthetic.

Difference is the Bridge Betueen Map and Territory

On several occasions Bateson referred to a dot on a

chalkboard as an example to aid him in explaining the notion of

difference. If you drop your finger on the dot on the chalkboard

you cannot feel it. Houever, if you move you finger laterally

12

across the dot you feel i t at once. Bateson (Bateson, e i a].,

1979, p. 48) concluded:

The moral of this is you can never get into your sensorium, as they use to call i t , any neus of static condition. You can only get that uhich can make an event at the sense organ point. And the only thing that can make an event at the sense organ point is some sort of a di f ference, a contrast.

To continue the point, Bateson noted that a difference is

certainly not a thing or an event. The chalk is d i f ferent from

the blackboard, but the difference is located neither in the chalk

nor the blackboard. Nor is the difference located betueen them.

Difference is intangible, i t is an abstract matter. A difference

cannot be localized, is not a quantity, and cannot be placed in

time. Bateson (1972, p. 453) stated, " I suggest to you nou, that

the uord 'idea,' in i ts most elementary sense, is synonymous uith

'difference.'" Because difference is an idea, i t involves drauing

a distinction betueen parts or objects, such that a relationship

betueen the parts is created by the perceiver.

There is houever, "an infinite number of differences around

and uithin the piece of chalk." There is an infinite number of

differences betueen the chalk and the universe, as uell as uithin

every molecule of the chalk. Uhen ue create difference, uhen ue

drau a distinction, ue select the relationship ue uill attend to.

And, as Bateson explained, uhat ue call information is actually "a

di f ference uhich makes a difference." For Bateson this uas a

crucial t ru th he upheld in his battle against the problem of

re i f icat ion. Static concepts, nouns, and the like fai l to reveal

13

di f ference and relationship, the very forms of uhich, for example,

"mother" and "love" are created.

By the act of constructing difference, houever, ue

necessarily propose delimitations and boundaries. Our picture of

the universe uill be particulate uith such splitting of

descriptions. Yet, as Bateson (1977, p. 244) stated, "There may

be bet ter and uorse uays of doing this splitting of the universe

into nameable parts." Indeed, Bateson indicated that i t is a good

thing to have tuo or more descriptions rather than one. Bateson

described metaphorically, that "in binocular vision the combined

report of the tuo eyes contains a species of information uhich you

can only get from a single eye by using special sorts of

collateral knouledge" (1982, p. 3). Uhat is af forded by "double

description" is characterological learning, a learning of the

context or pattern of the relationship.

The elemental notion of difference is "crucial to

communication, perception, and just about all human activit ies"

(Bateson, 1982, p. 3). As Bateson indicated, houever, the

descriptions of a single person are particulate and limited.

Relationship is a product of double description, or multiple

di f ference. Bateson has pointed to the importance that uithout

the aesthetic frame, the notion of difference resides in the

domain of details. As ue increase our requisite variety, as ue

seek and connect uith a multiplicity of difference, ue sense and

learn about the patterns and context of relationship. Surely,

14

multiple dif ferences say more about the relationship of the

observers, than about the content of their observations. As

Bateson (1982. p. 5) said ". . .you have to assume that the

relationship comes f i r s t and that i f there be individual learning

i t is a spin-off from the relationship."

The Individual Mind is only a Subsystem of a Larger Mind

For Bateson, a major er ror had been made in Uestern thought

by attempting to exclude the idea of mind as an explanatory

principle, uhich as he argued had the consequence of excluding

people from a sense of unity uith their biosphere. Bateson

recognized in Daruin an e f f o r t to elevate bare materialism to the

exclusion of mind. Essential notions such as difference, idea,

and relationship have no place in barren materialism.

Instead, Bateson vieued mind as synonymous uith a cybernetic

system—"the relevant total information-processing, t r ia l and

error completing unit" (Bateson, 1972, p. 460). In Mind and

Nature. Bateson proposed six c r i te r ia he considered to be

necessary such that any aggregate of phenomena fulfilling them

should be considered a mind. Each of the six notions uill be

named and briefly described.

"A mind is an aggregate of interacting parts or components."

Bateson believed that mental process is aluays a sequence of

interaction betueen parts. Bateson vehemently opposed the sort of

15

reductionism that uould suggest that human inheritance is

determined by DNA, or that behavior can be investigated by

examining variables. Uhat this reductionism in e f fect suggests is

that there are complexities of action uhich are inexplicable

because the reduction i tsel f exists independent of any supporting

complexity. Bateson, on the other hand, proposed a theory of mind

that is holistic, that is, constituted by the combined interaction

of d i f ferent ia ted parts.

"The interaction betueen parts of mind is tr iggered by difference."

This c r i t e r i a has been covered in point tuo of this chapter.

I t is important to note, houever, that because of the exclusion of

mind in Uestern thought, physical metaphors have been used to

describe the uorld of ideas (Jung's creatura). Bateson considered

i t a matter of obsolescence that ue continue to use uords such as

"pouer," "tension," "energy," and "social forces" to explain

mental phenomena. This anti-aesthetic tendency of materialism

persists today in the social sciences (and elseuhere) uhen ue

insist upon the use of the pleromic "cause" and "effect" uhen

vieuing the creatural "mind," "idea," "relationship," "pattern,"

etc.

"Mental process requires collateral energy."

Because processes of any kind require energy, Bateson

delineated tuo typical energetic systems. One is the machinery of

decision (e.g., the energy to open or close the faucet). The

16

other system is the source of energy (e.g., the energy that pushes

the uater through the faucet uhen i t is open). Houever, Bateson

made i t clear that "mental processes are tr iggered by difference"

directly, and only collaterally require energy.

"Mental process requires circular

(or more complex) chains of determination."

Bateson indicated that this fourth cr i ter ion, combined uith

the f i r s t three, enabled living things to "achieve success in that

mode of survival uhich characterizes life." In detail, Bateson

described the development of the steam engine in the nineteenth

century as an example of increased understanding about circular

causation. Houever, i t uasn't until during and immediately a f t e r

Uorld Uar I I , uith the development of cybernetics and systems

theory, that the nature of sel f -correct ive circular patterns uas

fully explicated.

"In mental process, the e f fec ts of difference are to be regarded as transforms (i.e., coded versions) of the difference uhich preceded them."

Bateson f i r s t noted that any event, object, or difference in

the "outside uorld" becomes a source of information provided that

i t is incorporated into an appropriately flexible system. The

dif ference betueen "cause" in ostensive communication (e.g.,

recognizing a fr iend ualking touard you by their appearance) and

the "ef fect" (e.g., making the connection based on that appearance

that i t is a particular fr iend named Bill) uhen incorporated into

a flexible system, is an example of transformation or coding. As

17

Bateson (1979a, p. 126) explained, "Ue live in a l i fe in uhich our

percepts are perhaps aluays the perception of par ts , and our

guesses about uholes are continually being ver i f ied or

contradicted by the later presentation of other parts."

"The descript ion and classi f icat ion of these processes of t ransformation discloses a hierarchy of logical types immanent in the phenomena."

Bateson cr i t i c ized modern occidental thought in various uays,

and aluays paid s t r i c t a t tent ion to the hierarchic s t ruc ture of

thought (an adaptation of the theory of logical types proposed by

Russell and Uhitehead). The theory of logical typing proposes

that a class cannot be a member of i tse l f , and is exemplified by

the general semanticist's axiom that the name is not the thing

named but is of a d i f fe ren t order of abstract ion or logical type.

Bateson (1979a, p. 137) explained fu r the r , "The step from one

logical type to the next higher is a step from information about

an event to information about a class of events or from

considering the class to considering the class of classes."

As mentioned earl ier, Bateson emphasized mind as synonymous

u i th a cybernetic system—uhere the individual mind is a subsystem

of a larger Mind (orders of mind: individual, social groups,

biosphere, God). One of the potential i t ies of mind that exhibit

these six c r i t e r i a is the capability of aesthetic preference.

Bateson reasoned that the fact that ue can appreciate the form,

pa t te rn , shape, etc., of a daisy, fo r example, indicates our

appreciat ion of i t s similarity to ourselves. The aesthetic

18

preference for Bateson is responsiveness to appreciation of the

pat tern that connects ourselves to the daisy (indeed all living

patterns). Further, Bateson (1972, p. 461) pointed to God as

immanent in the total ecological system: "This larger Mind is

comparable to God and is perhaps uhat some people mean by 'God,'

but i t is still immanent in the total interconnected social system

and planetary ecology."

Number is Di f ferent from Quantity

Bateson noted that quantity and number, or pattern are of a

d i f fe rent logical type (cri ter ion e under point 2). And, as such,

conclusions draun from quantity (i.e., a single item) do not

readily f i t in the same thinking uith conclusions draun from

number or pattern (i.e., differences betueen multiple items).

Bateson likened number uith the uorld of digital computation

(i.e., the discrete pattern of "on" or "off," one or tuo). He

stated that quantity, on the other hand, is of the uorld of

analogic computation (i.e., "that uhich varies continuously and in

step uith magnitudes in the tr igger event").

Bateson used an example from the biological uorld to drau a

distinction betueen quantity and number. A rose has 5 petals and

5 sepals, but has many stamens. Bateson (1978, p. 45) explained,

"The process uhich controls the number of stamens is a good deal

d i f fe rent from the process that controls the number of petals or

sepals." There is a qualitative jump betueen "one" and "tuo"

uhich represents a difference in pattern. Houever, quantities

19

obscure the dif ference in pat tern in favor of gross measurement.

Bateson indicated, though, that only the smaller, and therefore

commoner numbers represent discrete patterns. "You can operate

pat tern on small scales and as you get to big scales you operate

quantities" (Bateson, ei^ al., 1979, p. 87).

Bateson made a point of noting the difference betueen number

and quantity because he believed the tuo represented formal ideas.

Further , he uas auare that on almost every level of occidental

l i fe there uas an increasingly debilitating reliance on

quantitative explanation. Bateson labored in the last years of

his l i fe uith his fellou Regents of the University of California

about the kinds of endeavors the university should and should not

be involved in (cf. "Time is Out of Joint" in Mind and Nature,

1979a). He uas not content uith the anti-aesthetic assumption

"that all phenomena (including the mental) can and shall be

studied and evaluated in quantitative terms" (1979, p. 240). In

the end, Bateson resigned from the Board of Regents because he

could not tolerate the University of California's participation in

the development of nuclear technology and ueaponry (cf. Bateson,

1980c).

Bateson made i t clear that the ideas of number, pattern, and

quality embodied an aesthetic preference. This preference clearly

points in the opposite direction from quantification and

measurement. ( I t must be remembered that there are appropriate

times for the use of measurement and quantification, as for

20

example in the purely physical construct ion of a house.) Indeed,

a conference Bateson convened in 1979 entit led "Size and Shape in

Mental Health" (the subject of Chapter 3) specifically addressed

the deplorable lack of a t tent ion given to pat tern and quality in

Uestern mental health. Bateson's (1981b, p. 351) fear of this

unchecked bent f o r quant i f icat ion has been clearly spoken:

But I get back to the fact that the uay ue are going about things u i th this enormous emphasis upon the quant i tat ive vieu and the minimal emphasis upon the patterned vieu is , I believe, the easiest uay of descent into hell. The surest .

The Myth of Ob.iectivitv

One of the sixteen presuppositions that Bateson assumed

"every schoolboy knous" uas point number four , "There is no

objective experience." Bateson explained that all perception

—both conscious and unconscious—is based on image formation.

Fur ther , Bateson argued that the processes by uhich images are

formed are inaccessible. Ue are conscious of the products of

image formation but unconscious of the processes making the

images.

Bateson contended that ue can only receive information by

that uhich can make an event at the sense organ point. Our

experience of uhat is around us is aluays mediated by the

neurophysiology of our body. Bateson (Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p.

48) assumed that i f that is so: "Then the uorld uhich you think

you see is only built upon the contrasts that are in i t . I t is in

21

fac t as Blake said, a uorld only of outlines. And you make, by

extrapolat ion, the uhole res t of i t . "

Bateson believed that the myth of object iv i ty , so ardently

held to by occidental cul ture, uas one of the main reasons fo r the

severe pathology of our time. In Bateson's (1972) metalogue,

"Uhat is an inst inct?". Daughter asks Father, "Uhat does

"object ive" mean?" Objective means, says Father, looking hard at

those things of uhich i t is not easy to be subjective about. For

example, i t is easy fo r humans to be objective in language and

about tools. Ue can be objective about the relat ive value of tuo

types of shovels. Houever, as Father argued, i t is d i f f i cu l t to

be objective about such things as play, exploration, or love. The

Father quotes a passage of verse by Blake that reveals the e f fec t

of rampant object iv i ty . Father states, "Uell, i t (objectivity)

slices everything to bi ts." The objective person splits the uhole

living uorld into "helpful" and "hindering", uhich are quickly

turned into "good" and "bad."

Bateson considered the end result of object iv i ty to be the

nonsensical and dangerous belief that human beings are in charge.

An inevitable and unfortunate consequence of human beings

believing they are in charge is the belief that the part can

control the uhole. Bateson categorized and named the attempt by

the par t to control the uhole as "the myth of pouer" (Bateson,

1970, p. 363): " I t is not pouer that co r rup ts—for there is very

l i t t l e of i t , and that l i t t l e is not absolute. The myth of pouer.

22

houever, can be lethal; and the idea that 'human beings are in

charge' feeds the root of the myth."

For Bateson, the myth of object iv i ty , u i th all i t s

accompanying bel iefs, is at the core of the ant i -aesthet ic

condition of our contemporary society. The myth of object iv i ty

runs direct ly counter to Bateson's foundational notion that

relationship is the primary basis fo r all biological l i fe . Uhen

ue believe ue can behave as an observer as uell as a part icipant

ue undo the very connection of par t ic ipat ion—that is,

relat ionship. As Bateson (1970, p. 362) stated, "The matter is

really very simple. Any person or agency that influences a

complex in teract ive system thereby becomes a part of that system,

and no par t can ever have control of the uhole."

There can be no Neu Thing Uithout the Random

Bateson generally assumed that both genetic change (i.e.,

immanent in populations and heredity, and called evolution) and

the process called learning (i.e., that uhich occurs ui thin the

individual) are stochastic processes. In Mind and Nature, Bateson

goes to great lengths to reveal to the reader that "the unity of

the combined system (i.e., learning and evolution) is necessary."

Bateson (1972, p. 255) elseuhere described the stochastic

approach: "The notion is that random changes occur, in the brain

or elseuhere, and that the results of such random change are

selected fo r survival by the processes of reinforcement and

extinct ion."

23

Bateson explained, for example, that if the food supply is

reduced, the individual organism is likely to lose ueight.

Similarly, "a change of climate touard greater cold may

predictably reduce the food supply for many species of organisms"

(1979a, pp. 197-198). Further, environment and physiology propose

somatic change that may or may not be useful. Houever, it is the

current state of the individual as determined by genetics that

determines uhether the somatic change uill be useful or not.

Bateson (1979a, p. 198) concludes: "In sum, the combination of

phenotype and environment thus constitutes the random component of

the stochastic system that proposes change; the genetic state

disposes, permitting some changes and prohibiting others."

Bateson described the necessary unity of the combined system

as an alternating ladder of dialectic betueen form (e.g., the

name, the name of the name, etc.) and process (e.g., the process

of naming the name). Bateson utilized the cybernetic notions of

calibration and feedback to represent different orders of logical

type on this alternating ladder. Bateson indicated, houever, that

the relationship betueen the different rungs or orders of the

ladder uas recursive in nature. And, in so doing, Bateson made

clear the complementary structure betueen form and process,

betueen learning and evolution, and betueen the name and naming

the name.

Bateson's main theme in Mind and Nature uas that the

processes of thought (Mind) are characterized by a double

24

stochastic system, like that of biological evolution. As

discussed above, this double stochastic system of mind is

recursively connected in complementary fashion. Bateson r e f e r r e d

to this recursive complementarity of mental process as "the

ecology of ideas" or "Mind." The processes immanent in biology

are also immanent in Mind. For example, Bateson noted that

multiple determination is characterist ic of all biological fields.

That is, a multitude of interacting factors come to play in

determining every feature of anatomy and every detail of behavior

in animals and plants. Correspondingly, the processes of the

ecology of ideas are the outcome of multiple determination.

Houever, Bateson noted that "in contrast, the products of human

planners and engineers are constructed to meet specified needs in

a much more direct manner, and are correspondingly less viable"

(1972, p. 500).

Bateson proposed that the uorld of ideas (i.e.. Mind) is

recursively connected to biological evolution (i.e.. Nature). In

an essay Bateson urote for an audience of city planners, he

indicated that "the right things (should) be done for the right

reasons" (1972, p. 504). He uas pointing to the ethical and

ecological foundation that is immanent in all plans ue construct

(or ideas ue choose to construct and participate in). As Bateson

(1972, p. 504) stated:

The question is not only ethical in the conventional sense, i t is also an ecological question. The means by uhich one man influences another are part of the ecology

25

of ideas in thei r relationship, and part of the larger ecological system ui th in uhich that relationship exists.

For Bateson, the great stochastic processes immanent in

biology are also immanent in the ecology of ideas. The aesthetic

imperative of this relationship points us to a sacred

consideration of our plans, ideas, attempts to influence, etc.

Occidental cul ture's lack of consideration and respect fo r the

recursive relationship betueen Mind and Nature uill not go

unchecked. As Bateson reminded us, paraphrasing the uords of St.

Paul, "The processes of ecology are not mocked" (1972, p. 504).

Ue must realize u i th Bateson, that "the ecological ideas implicit

in our plans are more important than the plans themselves, and i t

uould be foolish to sacr i f ice these ideas on the altar of

pragmatism" (1972, p. 505).

The Correct ive Nature of Ar t

Bateson greu up in a household uhere there uas great

admiration f o r the a r t i s t s . Uilliam Bateson, the esteemed

geneticist and Gregory's fa ther , deeply respected the poet and

a r t i s t Uilliam Blake. Gregory continued his fa ther 's admiration

and respect throughout his oun l i fetime, of ten quoting from and

re fe r r i ng to Blake. Bateson (1972, p. 265) spoke of Blake and

others like him uho fought the tide of quanti f icat ion and dualism:

For these, the motive fo r scient i f ic inquiry uas the desire to build a comprehensive vieu of the universe uhich should shou uhat Man is and hou he is related to the rest of the universe. The picture uhich these men uere t ry ing to build uas ethical and aesthetic.

26

Bateson, as told by David Lipset (1980, p. 93), spoke of his

fa ther 's aue of the a r t i s t s , "Uilliam Bateson's vieu of l i terature

and the a r t s uas that they uere the great things in the uorld but

that no Bateson uould ever be capable of contributing to them."

Though not contributing as an a r t i s t himself, Gregory Bateson

nonetheless operated as a "voice of one crying in the uilderness"

in pointing to the systemic uisdom of a r t . Bateson moved beyond

mere respect in his relationship to a r t , and instead sought to

protect the foundational ideas that a r t embodied. As Bateson

(1972, p. 129) stated, " I argue that a r t is part of man's guest

for grace; sometimes his ecstasy in part ial success, sometimes his

rage and agony at failure."

Bateson participated in an historic, but largely forgotten

(i.e., in talk about Bateson), conference in 1949 entitled, "The

Uestern Round Table on Modern Art."* Besides the anthropologist

Bateson, the panel included the uell knoun a r t i s ts Frank Lloyd

Uright, Marcel Duchamp, Mark Tobey, Darius Milhaud, and Arnold

Schoenberg. In addition, the panel included four noteuorthy ar t

cr i t ics . (For a br ief introduction about the conference see Look.

November 8, 1949.) A feu major points brought up by Bateson at

the conference, along uith later elaborations evident in his

urit ings should be noted.

Bateson made a clear distinction that the uork of a r t is

largely created out of the unconscious part of the mind, uhereas

the part of mind uith uhich ue think and understand (i.e., the

27

conscious level) is largely d i f fe rent from the unconscious.

Bateson later noted that a r t "is commonly concerned uith bridging

the gap betueen the more or less unconscious premises acquired by

Learning I I and the more episodic content of consciousness and

immediate action" (1972, p. 308). Bateson applauded modern a r t

for not attempting to "take the spectator by the scruff of the

neck" ^a la conscious purpose attempts. Instead, the modern

a r t i s t leaves uhat uill be seen and constructed completely up to

the observer (participant). Further, Bateson noted that the magic

inherent in modern a r t revealed affirmations about the uorld in

uhich ue live. "Uhat the unaided consciousness (unaided by a r t ,

dreams, and the like) can never appreciate is the systemic nature

of mind" (Bateson, 1972, p. 145).

The a r t i s t s in the Uestern Round Table (Boas <Chair>,

Bateson, Burke, Duchamp, Frankenstein, Golduater, Milhaud,

Ritchie, Schoenberg, Tobey, 8. Uright, 1949) joined Bateson in

decrying the "corruption of passion" rampant in our modern

society. This corruption uas depicted in Duchamp's (Boas, e i a].,

1949, p. 44-c) description of the notion of taste: "Taste

presupposes a domineering onlooker uho dictates uhat he likes and

dislikes, and translates i t into beautiful and ugly uhen he is

sensuously pleased or displeased." Bateson of fered his concept of

entertainment as the simple and even degenerate endeavor to

corrupt passion. Duchamp dreu a distinction betueen taste (or

entertainment) and aesthetic echo: "Quite di f ferent ly, the

28

'victim' of an aesthetic echo is in a position comparable to a man

in love or of a believer uho dismisses automatically his demanding

echo and helplessly submits to a pleasurable and mysterious

constraint" (Boas, e i aj., 1949, p. 44-c).

I t uas Bateson's contention at the Uestern Round Table,

though not clearly revealed until later, "that mere purposive

rationality unaided by such phenomena as a r t , religion, dream, and

the like, is necessarily pathogenic, and destructive of l ife"

(1972, p. 146). The a r t i s t s , poets, u r i te rs , etc., have

helplessly submitted to the eternal constraint that "life depends

upon interlocking circuits of contingency." Conscious purpose, on

the other hand, vieus only short circuits of partial arcs. Plans,

interventions, relationships, and the like, based on such short

circuits "uill be, in aggregate, a distortion of the t ruth of some

larger uhole" (Bateson, 1972, p. 144). (For a more thorough

coverage see M.C. Bateson's chronicle of the conference on The

Ef fec ts of Conscious Purpose on Human Adaptation in her book, Our

Oun Metaphor. 1972.)

As early in Bateson's l i fe as the publication of Naven

(1936), he pointed to the systemic and corrective nature of a r t .

"The a r t i s t is content to describe culture in such a manner that

many of i ts premises and the inter-relat ions of i ts parts are

implicit in his compgsition" (1936, p. 1). Bateson clearly

indicated that a r t is concerned uith the relation betueen levels

of mental process, that is, betueen the unconscious and the

29

conscious. For Bateson, a r t embodied the sacred, the aesthetic,

and biological evolution as uell (Bateson, 1979, p. 128):

Uhat is a r t about a f t e r you peel o f f the nonsense? The entertainment value is gone a f t e r the shou is over. I t uas there, but i t didn't leave you anything. I t is the food of depression. You have to uait t i l l you get to the core of the problem to reach the notion of a r t . Uhen you get to the a r t that matters—not propaganda or entertainment—you get t reated to the thing you are up against, the problem of shared biology. Imagine yourself as having an in ter face betueen intellect and body. The in ter face is uhere things really happen. To be t ru ly human is to appreciate that join, that in te r face. Ar t comes out of uhat is sacred: that recognit ion, that cross, that in ter face.

Recognition of the Eternal Fundamentals gives Freedom

In his attempt to describe uhat he conceived to be the task

of the scient ist to a class of psychiatr ic residents, Bateson

constructed a diagram containing three columns. On the le f t ,

Bateson placed the label "data" to include such things as film

records of human behavior, or a description of an experiment.

Bateson "stressed the fact that 'data' are not events or objects

but aluays records or descriptions or memories of events or

objects" (1972, xvi i i ) . In the middle column Bateson l isted a

number of imperfectly defined explanatory notions (e.g.,

self-esteem, ego, inst inct), uhich he called "heurist ic concepts."

Bateson considered these heurist ic concepts to be largely

i r re levant and problematic because of their loose and

foundation-less der ivat ion. In the r ight hand column Bateson

placed a l is t of t ru i s t i ca l proposit ions and laus he called

30

"fundamentals." Included in the fundamentals uere the "Eternal

Ver i t ies," so named by St. Augustine. For example, one

fundamental is the t ru i s t i ca l proposit ion that seven and three

are, have been, and uill aluays be ten. Besides these

indestruct ib le t r u ths of arithmetic, Bateson included such

sc ient i f ic fundamentals as the conservation laus fo r mass and

energy, and the Second Lau of Thermodynamics.

I t uas Bateson's contention that the behavioral sciences, in

some f i f t y years of clever uork, had produced several hundred

heur is t ic concepts, but not one principle of fundamental nature.

As Bateson (1972, xix) s tated, " I t is all too clear that the vast

majority of the concepts of contemporary psychology, psychiatry,

anthropology, sociology, and economics are totally detached from

the netuork of sc ient i f ic fundamentals." Bateson explained, by

uay of a del ightful s tory a t t r i bu ted to Moliere, that dormitive

principles are constantly accessed by scient ists confronted ui th

complex in teract ive systems. Dormitive principles are closely

associated u i th uhat Bateson called explanatory principles. " I t ' s

so r t of a conventional agreement betueen scient ists to stop t ry ing

to explain things at a cer ta in point" (Bateson, 1972, p. 39).

Bateson (1972, xx) summarized the loathsome condition of the

social sciences:

In fac t , the multiplication of dormitive hypotheses is a symptom of excessive preference fo r induction, and this preference must aluays lead to something like the present s tate of the behavioral sciences—a mass of quasi- theoret ical speculation unconnected ui th any core of fundamental knouledge.

31

Throughout his lifetime, Bateson set out to identify and name

regulari t ies and fundamentals he sensed as he surveyed that fine

line betueen Pleroma and Creatura. (Recall that Pleroma is the

name of the unliving, lifeless uorld uhich includes such things as

solar systems and rocks, uhile Creatura is the name of the living

uorld uhich includes ideas such as pattern, order, and

relationship.) Bateson uas a theoritician and an intellectual,

and he uas most intrigued uith the fundamentals that connect and

relate ideas. Bateson of fered ideas that pointed to the potential

freedom that comes uith recognizing and abiding uith the eternal

fundamentals. "The regularit ies or 'laus' that bind ideas

together—these are the 'verities.' These are as close as ue can

get to ultimate t ru th" (Bateson, 1979a, p. 211).

Our detachment from the core of eternal fundamentals or

constraints has resulted, in part , from misguided attempts to

pat tern the behavioral sciences a f t e r the rigor of the physical

sciences. As ue have seen, houever, physical metaphors and

language are inappropriate uhen dealing uith the uorld of

relationship, intellect, and emotion. In his last published

uorks, Bateson explored the language that is appropriate for

talking about the uorld of the living.

Metaphor is the Foundational Logic of the Biological Uorld

In the metalogue, "Uhy a Suan," Bateson (1972) explores uhat

the uords "sort of" mean. The puppet Petroushka is sort of human.

32

and the suan figure is both sort of human and sort of suan. The

Daughter in the metalogue is perplexed uith the notion of sort of.

Father explains that sort of indicates a relationship betueen

ideas (e.g., betueen ideas one has about a puppet and ideas one

has about people). The metalogue becomes more complex as Father

introduces the distinction betueen metaphor and sacrament. Before

the Father can continue on uith talk of mysterious secrets and

control, the Daughter insists that he return to the original

question. Father obligingly indicates that sort of, pretend,

pretend-not, really, and the like somehou get fused together to

create a single meaning*

Uhat Bateson pointed to in the metalogue uas that in metaphor

the focus is upon the relationship, uhile different things or

persons are substituted freely for the relata. To explain the

difference betueen traditional logic and the language of metaphor,

Bateson called upon tuo syllogistic forms. The f i rst example is a

uell knoun syllogism of classical logic called the "syllogism in

Barbara":

Men die; Socrates is a man; Socrates uill die.

Bateson argued that classical logic "uas a most elegant tool

for the description of lineal systems of causation—if A, then B,

or i f A and B, then C, and so on" (1980b, p. 9). Indeed, as has

been previously noted, this elegant tool has lured the behavioral

33

sciences into believing that the chains of cause and effect could

ably be applied to human relationships.

As Bateson explained, this classical syllogism is based upon

classification. "The predicate (uill die) is attached to Socrates

by identifying him as a member of a class uhose members share that

predicate" (1981a, p. 10). Bateson offered the follouing as an

example of the syllogism of metaphor:

Grass dies; Men die; Men are grass.

This second type of syllogism is called "affirming the

consequent." Unlike the classical syllogism, this "syllogism in

grass" as Bateson referred to i t , is not concerned uith

classification. 'The grass syllogism is concerned uith the

equation of predicates. . .Dies-dies, that uhich dies is equal to

that other thing uhich dies" (Bateson, 1980b, p. 11).

The syllogism in grass is naturally disapproved of by

adherents of classical logic, for it "appears" to make no logical

sense. Houever, as Bateson stated, "Life rarely asks uhat is

logically sound, and these syllogisms are the stuff of uhich

natural history is made" (1981a, p. 11). This metaphoric logic is

experienced in a variety of contexts. For example, Opitz (1985)

makes the point that poetry can be seen as a system of metaphoric

thought uhich corresponds to the uay nature thinks. In similar

fashion, Bateson (Boas, e i a]., 1949, p. 21-c) argued that art is

part of a "sueating and striving touard clarity" in our confused

34

age. Classical logic (e.g., in the voice of a cr i t ic) attempts to

"understand" and explain the metaphor and paradox inherent in a r t ,

poetry, and the like, but as Bateson (Boas, e i a]., 1949, p. 15-b)

explained:

I f the cr i t ic is to bridge the gap, and do i t by talking about the uork of a r t , I have a kind of suspicion that there is a danger of his killing the uorks of a r t . I f I understand something, my emotion about that something is thereby in many cases reduced. Ue say, "Tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner"—"To understand is to forgive." But, perhaps, to understand is merely to feel a l i t t le less intently.

The aesthetic imperative embodied in the syllogism in grass

calls for a re turn to a time uhen subjects uere not separated from

predicates. The development of language (largely based on

classical logic) has resulted in classification and separation of

the biological uorld from i tsel f . Houever, "the uhole of animal

behavior and the uhole of repet i t ive anatomy and the uhole of

biological evolution—each of these vast realms is uithin i tself

linked together by syllogisms in grass, uhether the logicians like

i t or not" (Bateson, 1981a, p. 11).

Our language, our classical logic, our bent for uanting to

understand parts void of their context, continues to result in

global chaos, conflict, and s t r i f e . Ue separate intellect from

emotion, conscious thought from unconscious thought, mind from

body, and external mind from internal mind. Contemporary thought

either scientistically stresses the importance of intellect and

conscious thought to the exclusion of emotion and unconscious

35

act iv i ty , or suings touard a humanism that attempts to exclude

intellect.

Bateson has laid the cr i t ical foundation and cornerstone for

an aesthetic epistemology. He has radically challenged the false

premises and ideologies upon uhich our occidental culture is

based. Uhat Bateson calls for in his aesthetic preference is more

than mere respect, uhich tends to "trivialize these ideas into

commerce or politics" (Bateson, 1979a, p. 19). The ultimate

unity, uhich is aesthetic, requires protection. I f the belief is

alloued to die, ue uill surely echo uith Bateson (1979a, p. 19):

Ue have lost the core of Christianity. Ue have lost Shiva, the dancer of Hinduism uhose dance at the tr iv ial level is both creation and destruction, but in uhole is beauty. Ue have lost Abraxas, the terrible and beautiful god of both day and night in Gnosticism. Ue have lost totemism, the sense of parallelism betueen man's organization and that of the animals and plants. Ue have lost even the Dying God. . .1 hold to the presupposition that our loss of the sense of aesthetic unity uas, quite simply, an epistemological mistake.

36

Note

1. The Uestern Round Table on Modern Art uas organized and presented under the auspices of the San Francisco Art Association. The author is grateful to the San Francisco Art Institute for providing a copy of the transcript of the conference proceedings edited by Bateson. An abstract of the Uestern Round Table on Modern Art, edited by Douglas MacAgy, is also available from the San Francisco Art Institute.

CHAPTER 3

SIZE AND SHAPE IN MENTAL HEALTH

J: In a deeper sense, this historical nature of every thinking dialogue is not, houever, in need of all those enterprises, uhich in the manner of historiography, report things from the past about the thinkers and uhat they have thought.

I : But for us today i t may become a pressing need to prepare such conversations, by interpreting properly uhat earlier thinkers have said.

J: Something that could easily degenerate into mere busyuork.

I : That is a danger ue stave of f as long as ue ourselves make an e f f o r t to think in dialogue.

(Heidegger)

In the Fall of 1979 a conference uas convened to address the

dialectical relationships of size and shape, of quantity and

quality, of pragmatics and aesthetics. The conference uas

entitled "Size and Shape in Mental Health," and uas principally

organized by Gregory Bateson. An article by Bradford Keeney

(1983b) gives an opening glimpse into uhy and hou the conference

occurred and uhat happened. In his position paper ur i t ten for the

conference (cited in Keeney, 1983b, p. 74), Bateson proposed uhat

he hoped the symposium uould focus on:

I hope that our symposium may focus not upon gloom uhich uould be easy, but upon understanding. I f indeed there is an over-development of quantitative perception, there must also be an underdevelopment of perception and understanding of quality and pattern. I t is to this lack that I hope ue may address ourselves—positively —attempting to remedy the ueakness or deficiency.

Bateson decried the present "syndrome arising out of

imperfect balance-or-harmony betueen quantity and pattern."

37

38

Bateson uas auare that our uorld uas submerged in an

inappropriate excessive use of quantitative judgment—of ueights

and measures. Bateson (Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p. 3) pointed out

the destructive pr ior i t ies evident in our occidental culture:

But, the fact that ue in this society look f i r s t to measure and only a f teruards to shape and design and taste and all these things, seems to me a very severe pathology, and a very dangerous one—the one that makes us uant to kill our neighbors, i f not ourselves.

This chapter uill present a thorough revieu of the conference

proceedings.* An attempt uill be made to provide a synthesis of

uhat uas said by the panel members (and the audience). This

report uill then form the basis for a discussion about

implications for aesthetics in mental health. The conference

participants Bateson invited included: Richard Rabkin, Lyman

Uynne, and John Perry—all psychiatrists; Mary Catherine Bateson

—daughter of Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead, and herself a

linguist and anthropologist; Gary Snyder—poet, essayist, and

ecologist; and, Uendell Berry—essayist , teacher, and "a farmer

a f t e r a fashion." Bateson (Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p. 2) added,

"The characterist ics of the group are that ue lack certain

branches of human knouledge. . .but ue are cross-disciplinary in

having three psychiatrists, tuo poets, myself and my daughter -

I'm an anthropologist and she's a linguist."

Friday. September 9, 1979. A.M. Session 1

Bateson began the conference by asking for a feu minutes of

silence. The audience uas subsequently invited to eavesdrop on

39

the panel members as they dialogued, uith no formal program format

as guide. Bateson (Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p. 5) began uith the

riddle, "Hou many fingers do you have?", and in so doing dreu the

distinction betueen quantity and quality. Bateson uent on to

attempt a qualitative ansuer by making reference to the four gaps

or relations betueen f ingers. As stated in Chapter 2, for Bateson

the biological basis for all living entities uas relationship,

uhich scientif ic endeavors typically avoid studying. Further,

Bateson vieued information as the neus of difference betueen these

relations, or "aesthetic modulations."

Bateson (Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p. 5) concluded his opening

remarks uith a comment about shape:

Shape is the aggregation of relations betueen all of the things that go to make the living entity. And, that's uhat I uant to be able to discuss by tomorrou afternoon — o f hou the uorld is going to look i f ue look at i t that uay. . .hou ue can get touards looking at i t in a uay like that .

Gary Snyder (Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p. 6) responded uith the

Zen riddle, "Hou are my hands like the Buddha's hands?" More

existential questions folloued. The panel members struggled uith

hou to get a conversation generated in this exchange. Snyder

posited that i t may be important to teach the right questions to

begin uith. Bateson (Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p. 8) responded,

"Ah. . .do ue need teach questions at all?"

Discussion moved to hou one could disrupt the predominant

pat tern of quantitative thinking touard more thinking of

uholeness. Lyman Uynne (Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p. 9) talked about

40

"hou time organizes i tsel f in patterns, and in both quantities and

qualities." Comments uere exchanged contrasting organic time and

time structured by humans, uith Mary Catherine Bateson talking

about the patterns organizing a mother feeding her infant.

Snyder shif ted the discussion to the level of culture by

asking hou i t is possible for China, having produced such

sensitive philosophies as Buddhism and Taoism, to have nou become

"the uorld's largest single environmental disaster" (Bateson, e i

a]., 1979, p. 14) (i.e., the land has been misused and the trees

have not been replenished). Snyder suggested that traditional

methods of teaching ( for example Buddhist) fell short uhen only

uorking for individual enlightenment at the expense of ignoring

social enlightenment. This reference to "harmony uith nature" uas

challenged by Uendell Berry, uho humorously noted that one could

be in harmony uith nature uhile being sound asleep. In contrast,

Berry suggested that the ideal of harmony uith nature must also

involve some kind of resistance. Mary Catherine then carried the

thought through to the example of breast-feeding. Berry (Bateson,

et a]., 1979, p. 18) added, "And hou far are you going to resist

and hou fa r are you going to accommodate?"

Uynne spoke for some time about the cue of timelessness as an

index of synchrony. For an example, he suggested that during

certa in moments people in relationship have a sense of being in

balance. Houever, a f t e r a feu minutes on this idea, Berry

questioned uhat the value of a sense of timelessness uould be.

41

since "you can have a sense of timelessness from uatching

television" (Bateson e i a]., 1979, p. 20) Snyder entered the

discussion by citing at least three examples of uhat could be

labeled a "timeless experience"—the absorption of a person in

their task, plain spacing out, and a drug experience. Snyder

(Bateson e i a]., 1979, p. 23) then spoke of hou time is kept in a

Zen monastery as an example of the sense of harmony uith time:

The point is there that you so completely internalize that schedule that you don't feel i t as anything unnatural, or in any uay an interruption in your l i fe, anymore than you feel the sun rising is not natural or is an interruption in your l i fe .

Friday. September 9. 1979. A.M. Session 2

Follouing a coffee break Bateson addressed a comment from the

audience concerning resistance by affirming that the patterning of

events in time aluays involves at least a dialectic. Bateson

mentioned C.S. Leuis' The Screutape Let ters , uhich reminded Berry

of the elder devil uho aimed to teach humans the historical

perspective. "That is, teach them to ask every question about a

book except uhether or not i t 's true" (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p.

29). Bateson questioned Berry's assertion that measurements are

t rue, leading Berry to clarify that ue should not measure

everything, but selectively measure the right things. For

example, ue have no problem uith measuring the corn that comes

from the acre, or the coal that comes from under the acre, but ue

don't measure the soil depletion on that acre. Berry added, "and

i t 's only a f t e r ue get the sense of pattern that ue begin to

[2

understand the acre as a par t of a uatershed, and as part of a

human community" (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 30).

John Perry then commented on the uay ue experience things as

opposites, uhich led into Bateson talking about basic assumptions

concerning learning. For example, Bateson noted that the

psychologists speak of a stimulus, response, and reinforcement but

do not realize the importance of uhat they talk about. As Bateson

said: "Ue talk of reinforcement as reinforcing behavior—that 's

incorrect ; reinforcement re inforces the relat ion betueen tuo

pieces of behavior" (Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p. 32). Further, u i th

each change in relat ion comes an accompanying modulation, such

that th is pat tern represents a basic necessity in the design of

the biological universe. Snyder continued talking about learning

by noting that living in harmony u i th nature is not easy, but

involves an evolvement of accommodation and resistance.

Berry complained that the conference i tse l f uas a parable

about hou people could s i t r ight in the middle of a problem and

t r y and do something about i t . By let t ing the s t ruc ture of the

room shape them, the panel had to be more concerned about cuddling

the i r microphones than hou to have a more functional room.

Fur ther , Berry noted that most archi tecture is completely enclosed

in i t s oun terms "because ue don't have a system of accounting

that can ueigh the externalized costs" (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p.

37).^ Snyder bemoaned the r ise of specialists, uhich numb all of

us from being auare of the pract ical consequences of our oun

43

uork. Snyder added, " I f ue had all knoun a l i tt le more about

archi tecture for several generations ue uouldn't be in this

building" (Bateson e i a}., 1979, p. 38). Our contemporary focus

on specialization in education has led us to accept quantitative

comparison as the primary standard of measurement. Bateson

o f fe red a unifying glimpse: "The primary creativeness of the

biological creature is the thing that gets forgotten" (Bateson, e i

a]., 1979, p. 41). And, in this, Bateson pointed to the fact

that our oun perception, that is, our construction of the image,

is a creat ive act.

Bateson relayed a story about a time uhen he uas in an

intensive care unit f i f t e e n years earlier. Tuo cats appeared to

him in the room, shifting his attention from the pain he uas

experiencing. His creat iv i ty enabled him to live through the

pain. Bateson added, "But, the important thing is to live in a

uorld in uhich the experience of the cats is a real part of the

nature of uhat i t is to be human. This is one of the things I

uanted to bring out in this conference—the reality of the

subject" (Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p. 44). Snyder later commented

that ue have latitude in our subjectivity, allouing us a

considerable margin of er ror : ". . .ue can have actually better

uays of seeing the uorld and still survive" (Bateson, e i a].,

1979, p. 50).

44

Friday. September 9. 1979. P.M. Session 1

After lunch Uendell Berry began a rather long talk about the

matter of reliability. His orienting questions included: "One

thing I'm interested in as a uriter is hou do you account for

uhat's happening in a reliable uay?" and, "Uhat kind of uords can

be acted upon?" (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 51). Berry uas again

addressing the issue he had previously mentioned about measuring

the right sort of things. Berry continued, using the idea of

accounting "as a sort of metaphor borroued from economics"

(Bateson, e i aU, 1979, p. 51), by thoroughly pulling apart an

article uhich described the transformation of agriculture from an

art to a science (using the dairy cou as an example). Berry

criticized the accounting used by the authors as an external

accounting that eliminates both the human and the cou as

representative. That is, the very moral connection and

companionship betueen man and animal is eliminated, in favor of

vieuing the cou as an "appropriate manufacturing unit." Berry

introduced the concept of "system of systems" to point to the

complex, hierarchical configuration of self-interest to ecological

interest. Berry complained that the authors of the article had

upset the natural hierarchy, leaving "the outer circle too much

uithin the interest i f not the control of the inner" (Bateson, e i

a]., 1979, ?• 55). For Berry, houever, the system of systems has

to be controlled from above and outside. Hence, he introduced the

notion that the system of systems is enclosed uithin mystery. He

45

added, "Neither the knoun truth nor the mystery is internal to any

(one) system, and here, houever paradoxical it may seem, ue begin

to see the possibility of reliable accounting and of responsible

behavior" (Bateson. et gl., 1979. p. 56). For Berry, this mystery

or religion pushes the accounting to as.large a context as

possible, "outside of every enclosure that it might be internal

to."

Bateson continued uith a story about John Rosen and Al

Scheflen, emphasizing Bateson's point that "trust travels up or

doun a highuay" (Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p. 56). Uhat's most

important in uorking uith psychotics, for example, is not "is your

uord immediately trustuorthy?" but "do you love him, do you care

about him?" (Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p. 56). Bateson's point uas

that the uorld of phenomena and the uorld of abstraction are

inextricably linked in recursive fashion. Absolute states ignore

this link and remove context from phenomena.

Snyder questioned the need for a top hierarchy value control.

He stated, in contrast, that "ue can have mystery at all levels"

(Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p. 62). For Snyder, value and quality

come from uithin the system at all levels, such that "quality is

the sum total of small concrete acts" (Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p.

62). Berry agreed that mystery uas at all points but still pushed

for an external standard that uould say "no" to such things as the

misuse of nuclear energy. Snyder countered again by introducing

the uord "ecogeny" as representing integrity uithin the present

46

diversity of species, uithout framing i t in religious terms.

Bateson moderated by reminding all of the problems of description,

"uith no reasonable ceiling on the number of these hierarchic

steps" (Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p. 67). The hierarchic pictograph

that Berry had suggested could never point to the reality/mystery

lying behind conventions of description. The discussion about

mystery continued until Bateson declared, "I think the mystery

s t a r t s uhen you see a dot on the blackboard, or have an eye on

each side of your nose—very remarkable achievement" (Bateson, e i

al., 1979, p. 71). Berry agreed that the mystery uas indeed at

all levels, uithin and overarching.

Friday. September 9. 1979. P.M. Session 2

Af ter a coffee break, Bateson opened up the discussion to

comments from the audience. The f i r s t comment uas a request for

more attent ion to size and shape uithin mental health. Bateson

agreed that this uould be an appropriate focus, but made i t clear

that the panel uould "not be in a hurry to talk." Instead,

Bateson proposed even more of a period of silence as a

foundational advent for creat iv i ty in talking. Mary Catherine

continued by noting that the panel had been talking about mental

health, though not "right in the middle" of mental health

language.

A member of the audience expressed concern about the emphasis

on quantity as opposed to quality in the community mental health

movement. (In particular, his clinic had over the years

47

mushroomed from a s t a f f of 20 to one of a 150.) Rabkin responded

by agreeing that "psychiatry is dangerous to mental health"

(Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p. 78). He proceeded to give a feu

examples of deceit he uas auare of in community mental health

centers. Perry (Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p. 76) o f fered his

direction for positive change:

I think you're putting your finger on a really essential point. That i f there's going to be emotional development or restorat ion of health through development, your s t a f f really have to live in that spir i t themselves in the uay they relate to each other or i t isn't going to uork. I t becomes a kind of deception.

Berry questioned the psychiatrists on the panel in an e f f o r t

to determine hou they kneu uhen to end treatment. Sensing that

the ansuers only pointed to a bigger problem. Berry asked, "Is i t

possible that the mental health field is producing insanity?"

(Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 82). Rabkin and Perry agreed, noting

that the f i r s t step touard producing the insanity is to produce

the need. Rabkin told a story of a school guidance counselor uho,

uith a l i t t le psychiatric language, drummed up business for the

mental health profession by suggesting to parents their children

uere not doing uhat they uere supposed to be doing (i.e., uhat uas

"appropriate"). Rabkin's solution to the insanity in mental

health uas de-professionalization via de-mystification. Uynne

suggested that part of the problem uas a confusion of logical

types (cf. Chapter 2, Point 3) betueen mental health and mental

illness, their difference having since been lost in the language

48

of social science. Berry and Bateson agreed that i t easy to tell

uhen something needs to be fixed, but dif f icult to f igure out uhen

i t has been f ixed.

Bateson continued uith a story about uhen he uas uorking in a

VA hospital in the f i f t i e s . A quantitative study revealed that

recovery ra te and smaller hospitals (i.e., 100 to 200 beds) uas

more significantly correlated than recovery rate and large

hospitals (i.e., 1000 to 2000 beds). Bateson concluded, "Because

you can operate pat tern on small scales and as you get to big

scales you operate quantities" (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 87). He

continued by noting that one of the major problems uith quantity

is that people have feuer opportunities to knou each other. For

example, as paperuork increases for a floor supervisor in an

industrial sett ing, personal contact uith the uorkers decreases.

The result is a loss in productivity and uorker longevity.

Saturday. September 10. 1979. A.M. Session 1

Bateson opened the second day uith a uarning for himself and

all the members of the panel, uhich arose from a rage he had

experienced that morning: "And my rage uas that I and my panel

and the audience had really almost totally failed to get of f the

ground, and say the things uhich I'd hoped ue uould say" (Bateson,

e i a]., 1979, p. 93). Bateson continued by reminding everyone

that the uorld is continually being seduced auay by the shape of

language—a language that is urapped up in tr iv ial i t ies and

quantit ies. Houever, he also reminded those present that the

49

matter of aesthetics and pattern "isn't only a matter of the

heart" (Bateson, e i a}., 1979, p. 94), but also a matter of the

intellect. Bateson then referred to the Pythagorean "hippies" of

fourteenth century Europe ualking around uith their monochords.

"The monochord uas the experimental object uith uhich Pythagoras,

uay back, discovered the harmonics. And from the discovery of the

harmonics Pythagoras invented the idea that nature is made of

discontinuous patterns, especially the numbers" (Bateson, e i a].,

1979, p. 94). Bateson spoke of his belief that "a specifically

American incarnation of the great sub-culture" (Bateson, e i a].,

1979, p. 94) uas nou being experienced. Bateson (Bateson, e i a].,

1979, p. 95) continued:

Uhat goes on in the Zen monasteries, uhat goes on uhen you go for a ualk in the country and you see a grasshopper—not just see a grasshopper but see a grasshopper as a living thing in a living matrix, I believe that has to come. I think it uill be a very great pleasure and relief in many uays uhen it does come.

Snyder read a poem of his called "Song of the Taste"^ as an

aid in understanding the uord "sacrament".

"Song of the Taste"

Eating the living germs of grasses Eating the ova of large birds

the fleshy sueetness packed around the sperm of suaying trees

The muscles of the flanks and thighs of soft-voiced cous

the bounce in the lamb's leap the suish in the ox's tail

50

Eating roots groun suoll inside the soil

Drauing on l i fe of living clustered points of light spun

out of space hidden in the grape.

Each eating other's seed eating

ah, each other.

Kissing the lover in the mouth of bread: lip to lip.

Bateson concluded uith Snyder's theme of the complete

commitment of the individual uith nature (or of individual uith

the group as uith the early Pythagoreans), by telling a story

about a Japanese daughter and respect for her father . After

Bateson had talked uith this uoman for some time about respect for

her fa ther she said, "But in Japan ue do not respect the father."

Bateson shook his head, not at all understanding. She said,

"Uell, you see, ue practice respect for the father." "Uhy do you

do that?", asked Bateson. The uoman responded, "In case ue uere

going to respect somebody" (Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p. 99).

Bateson explained the story by saying that occidentals think of

practice as the acquisition of a neu tool. Houever, uhat the

oriental "goes through uith practice is a change in himself, and

he goes into the uhole thing not to acquire a tool" (Bateson, e i

a]., 1979, p. 99).

Perry then gave an account of a "psyche in disturbance," a

uoman he had uorked uith. The uoman produced a mandala in the

"midst of a deep psychosis" that uas couched in terms of political

51

ideologies. The uoman had her mother as the conservative, more

reactionary party, and the father as the more liberal. The uoman

described her rebirth (or birth) as a socialist party. Finally,

she described the birth of a communist party. The uoman described

herself at the center of the four uarring continents (each

representing one of the four political parties). Perry recounted

the transformation: "But then the sun comes out at the center, and

people achieve peace and common sense, and they learn hou to live

together in a harmonious relation betueen them. And she uas out

of her psychosis" (Bateson, e i aj., 1979, p. 101). Perry

explained that he vieued the psychotic episode as an attempt to

develop a cultural outlook uhich becomes the expression of the neu

self being rearranged. Bateson noted that the abstract, like the

mandala of this uoman, is aluays more primitive than the concrete,

and not the other uay around.

Bateson (Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p. 103) continued by making

reference to right and left brain metaphors.

I t 's this funny trick of the left brain, the intellectual brain, of trying to make sense of the abstractions that come out of here, uhich I believe are more like Pythagorean abstractions. I t 's that trick that becomes the desire, you knou, to measure things instead of seeing patterns.

Perry responded, "Isn't then this the problem of giving

expression to uhat's almost inexpressible?" Bateson replied,

"Sure, this is the problem in this room" (Bateson, e i a]., 1979,

p. 103).

52

Bateson and Berry then discussed the nature of materialism,

uith Bateson finally restat ing his foundational notion that

relations, not immanent character ist ics, are the basis for all

living things. Bateson said, "The materialism doesn't do to begin

ui th. I t ' s not a springboard from uhich you get up to a more

spir i tual vieu" (Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p. 107). Bateson then

asked Perry uhat the Jungians do uith such propositions as the

Eternal Veri t ies (e.g., f ive plus seven aluays equals tuelve).

Perry ansuered, "This uould belong to one of the levels of

consciousness" (Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p. 108). Then Bateson

said, "Yea, but the hell of i t is, you see, uhen God created the

uorld did he do i t subject to the Eternal Verit ies, or did He set

up the Eternal Verit ies?" Mary Catherine ansuered precisely, "Or

in some sense is. He the Eternal Verities?" (Bateson, e i a]., 1979,

p. 108). Bateson agreed uholeheartedly. Berry folloued uith

some notions about the nature of community, as an alternative

pat tern to that of "cheap fossil fuel energy mentality." The

essential bond uithin community is the act of love, even for a

neighbor you may disagree uith. Berry explained, "I mean the only

thing that can resolve the confusion of loving somebody you don't

agree uith, for instance, is finding something to do, to find an

act f i t t ing to your love, not f i t t ing to your expertise" (Bateson,

e i al., 1979, p. 112).

The f i r s t session of Saturday morning ended uith a discussion

of hou, i f at all, the right and lef t brain converse. Bateson

53

told of a study that involved surgery uith chronic epileptics,

uhere the corpus callosum of these patients uas cut in hopes of

reducing the f i t s . Rabkin interjected his distaste for the

localizations of le f t and right brain, to uhich Bateson agreed,

saying he only used them as "slang terms." Rabkin continued by

explaining several uays he thought the unconscious uas di f ferent

from the conscious. F i rs t , the unconscious is a high capacity

system. Secondly, the unconscious can deal uith a great deal of

ambiguity. And finally, the unconscious is very context

dependent, and, of course, intimately tied to community.

Saturday. September 10. 1979. A.M. Session 2

Af ter returning from a break, Mary Catherine spoke to the

group about her fear of the r ight - le f t brain metaphor.

Specifically, either one or the other, depending upon the

historical context, is seen as good and the other one is seen as

bad. Houever, she continued, "I think the most useful part of the

metaphor is that in order to think about i t at all you have to

keep crossing i t over" (Bateson, e i a]., 1979, p. 120).

Snyder then spoke extensively on the nature and meaning of

community. F i rst he began by distinguishing betueen "community"

and "netuork." "The netuork is your membership in your

speciality, so to speak." For example, Snyder explained that he

belonged to a poet and environmentalist's netuork. Houever,

"communities are places, and the people in the community are the

people uho live there, plus the animals and the plants—uhether

54

they knou you and your speciality or not" (Bateson, e i al., 1979,

p. 122). Follouing that , Snyder detailed hou ue in contemporary

(especially urban) l i fe tend to measure our identity by our

netuork alone. Snyder concluded, "Consequently, i t is not part of

our contemporary experience, for the most of us, to ground

ourselves, to find sat isfact ion, or to participate meaningfully in

any uay in community l i fe" (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 122). ^

Snyder continued by drauing upon the example of the Chinese

village as a "community of people uho are mutually committed to

uorking together, even uhen they don't agree, over a long period

of time" (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 123). The Chinese village

became the structure for Buddhist practice, uith meditation being

only a small part of i t . Uhat those uho practice do is bring "a

fine degree of mindfulness to (their) daily l i fe" (Bateson, e i

al., 1979, p. 124). For example, they value receiving meditation

or urit ing a poem no higher than uashing dishes or changing the

oil in the car. "And uherever you see households, communities,

families, or individuals uho really uork, that is to say uork in

the sense of i t all comes together, i t all coheres, i f you look a

l i t t le into their lives you see that they bring to i t that degree

of attention" (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 125).

Berry then stated that contemporary society's excerpting from

the community the responsibility for dealing uith, say, emergency

and disease, has resulted in a condescending love that is

destructive. Berry uent on to describe uhat he termed responsible

55

love. "You have to love people all uith the realization—this is

the hardest illusion to lose Gregory—that they ain't going to get

alot bet ter just because you love them" (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p.

126). Part of this responsible love involves a respect for off ice

or place that runs through the uhole of Japanese and Chinese

culture. (Recall, for example, Bateson's story about the Japanese

uoman's respect for her father. ) Snyder continued by giving an

example of the aesthetic influence of a Zen community. In that

kind of community members uould not push an exoteric doctrinal

influence but uould simply "do things publicly so uell that people

appreciate i t and the quality is up just a tiny bit thereby"

(Bateson, e i aj., 1979, p. 131).

Berry interjected a caution that one should not reconcile

oneself to the loss of something essential, including the belief

that community has been lost. "Uhen you reconcile yourself to the

loss of some of those essential things you lose your uorth—you

don't have anything to do anymore" (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p.

134). Berry then presented the notion that education, or helping,

is impossible unless you simply "stand by and uait until the

question is asked." One of the essential beauties of communities

is the deep respect that ushers fo r th from relationships. In

relationship is healing. In relationship is helping, and

education. In relationship is evocation.

56

Saturday. September 10. 1979. P.M. Session 1

The Saturday afternoon session opened uith Bateson relaying a

four part question given to him by a member of the audience. The

four part question as a uhole asked about storytelling, uhich

inevitably became an important topic for the conference. Bateson

responded to the f i rs t part of the question by stating that the

telling of a story does indeed bring diverse identity to a

relationship, "because stories are the only language ue have for

talking about relationships, in general" (Bateson, e i al., 1979,

p. 147). Berry continued the discussion talking about Kentucky

storytelling. Berry noted f i rs t that it isn't necessary for a

story to be neu. Secondly, the stories told tend to be

traditional stories that most people knou, uith possibly the

addition of a neu tuist. Houever, "you uouldn't be permitted to

depart from the truth in a uay that diminished it." And, thirdly,

the stories get told often because people still do manual uork in

rural places (for example, like Berry's home territory in

Kentucky). "So uhen people rest (from uork) they begin uith, 'Do

you remember old so and so', or 'Tell that story about so and so"'

(Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 149). Berry continued by noting that

i t is often difficult for him to remember stories he's been told.

But, something uill happen, or some other story uill be told uhich

uill remind him of a story he knous. So, it 's a pattern of

reminding that flous from storytelling.

57

Snyder made an essential point in noting that even though

koans are u r i t t en in books, they are aluays transmitted orally

from teacher to student. And, likeuise, the same is true for

stor ies in general. Berry agreed, fur ther adding that i t is

important to memorize the story in relationship uith the person

telling the story. Storytelling comes doun by some kind of

community, and i t acts privately in relationship. Berry dreu a

parallel idea that stories must embody myth and uork, both of

uhich are essential for a conference such as this to be useful.

Berry added, " I mean this is the uay the tuo halves of this

meeting are uorking for me—you've got myth on the one hand, and

i f you don't go beyond myth in learning then you're lef t inside

your mind" (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 153).

Bateson (Bateson, e i aj., 1979, p. 155) made some specific

comments about language and stories:

I uant to keep pointing this conversation to the fact that ue are exploring hou to communicate about relationships. This (i.e., story) is the nearest ue have to language to talk about the sort of things that in this conference I hoped to talk to you about.

Perry agreed, and noted that stories communicate experience from

a d i f fe rent level than the level of conscious mind, and do so in

terms of metaphor and process.

Snyder uas asked by a member of the audience i f he thought

that a poem and a story uere d i f ferent . Though the line betueen

poetry and storytelling is a thin one, he responded, "A poem is

more compressed, more distilled, and more structured" (Bateson. e i

58

al., 1979, p. 157). Mary Catherine and Berry both spoke about the

unique quality of memorability inherent in poetry. Consequently,

in poetry the essential is retained and that uhich is not of a

quality to be memorized is never recorded. Berry continued, "I t 's

like uhat storytelling and poetry do in a uay is make possible

remembering, almost in the sense of St. Paul—"And ue are members

one of another." And, uhen ue tell the great tales ue re-member

ourselves" (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 159).

Bateson and Berry uent back and for th about the differences

betueen tribulation and temptation, sparked by Bateson's retelling

of the story of Oedipus Rex. Bateson favored the utility of

temptation in storytelling since i t "denotes sequences about uhich

you can do something" (Bateson, e i aj., 1979, p. 162). Berry

continued uith his sense that tragedy uas essential in stories.

"So uhat I'm saying is that Aristotle said that i t uas a good

thing that every so often the Greeks uere shoun a tragedy, uhich

shoued, indeed, and acted out the fact that the uorst thing you

can think of can happen" (Bateson, e i aj., 1979, p. 162). The

discussion continued uith Rabkin describing uhat he called the

"sack of potatoes" t ransfer of pain and hurt that many people

utilize uhen they don't uant to hold on to the pain and hurt

themselves. Snyder pointed out, houever, that Rabkin uas

"confusing the kinds of stories that people just tell each other

out of their mental states and immediate events" uith stories that

59

have been ref ined by generations of telling. As Snyder explained,

"Art does not dump a load on you" (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 165).

The session concluded uith a brief aside about allegories,

uith Mary Catherine concluding, "an allegory is faking made

serious" (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 169). Houever, before the

session ended for a coffee break, Berry asked, "Hou does a story

qualify as an aesthetic object or experience?" (Bateson, e i al.,

1979, p. 171). Bateson uasn't sure, but said i t somehou must

appeal to the autonomic responses—a repetit ion, a rhythm. And

naturally, as Berry added, "it 's got to have technical beauty."

Saturday. September 10. 1979. P.M. Session 2

Bateson opened the last session on Saturday by talking about

the nature of patterns. In particular, he described his interest

in hou patterns interact , and uhat occurrences follou. He gave an

example about Balinese girls uho uere put into trance by being

subjected to conflicting, but related patterns. Bateson

explained, "Because i t is in the sexy nature of patterns that uhen

one pat tern meets another pattern the product is a third pattern"

(Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 173).

Snyder continued uith his understanding of the traditional

Japanese l i terary notion of the highest aesthetic experience,

uhich the Japanese call "auare." Snyder stated that it is "an

experience uhich they said uas generated by the compliments of the

sense of uniqueness and preciousness of every beginning

simultaneously uith the sense of the total impermanence of

60

everything" (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 176). Follouing a brief

departure about comedy, Mary Catherine returned to aesthetics. She

spoke of hou ue, in creat ive fashion, match the next thing or

pat tern that ue see uith the previous one—a matching of

di f ferences. "The question of aesthetics uhich has this component

of self-recognition or the discovery of patterns in uhat you're

looking a t — t h a t you can respond to a pattern because you are a

pat tern , and the rhythms inside yourself" (Bateson, e i al., 1979,

p. 178).

The rest of the session revolved around discussions of

paranoia, and to a lesser extent, humor. Bateson re fe r red again

to the story of Perceval and his paranoia about the color of peas.

Berry then asked hou one uould define paranoia. Berry's oun

attempt at an ansuer to his question—that i t is uorrying about

something that doesn't exist—uas labeled incorrect by Bateson

and Mary Catherine. Berry's next response—that there's no uay

of judging somebody's paranoia by social convention—uas amended

by Perry and Uynne. Uynne explained that there could actually be

"normal paranoid processes." Berry reacted in amazement, uith

Rabkin explaining that the strategy of paranoids is to take things

very seriously, as i f they involved l i fe or death issues.

Bateson popped into the discussion uith uhat he uondered

might be a related phenomenon to paranoia. Uhen one accepts that

some X is and is not equal to some Y, then one accepts a head on

confrontation and accepts both sides of i t . All c r i te r ia of

61

incredibiUty is thus lost. Bateson said that the state of

physics at the present time resembled this confrontation, since

"it uas argued that a proton could be both a uave and a particle"

(Bateson, ei al., 1979, p. 183). Berry appeared relieved uith

Bateson's indication that paranoia, or at least aspects of

paranoia, is the inability to screen out possibilities on any

criteria.

Uynne suggested that humor uas the uay out of paranoia.

Bateson agreed, adding "and uhen Perceval detects it (i.e.,

humor), he's uell on the uay to getting out of it" (Bateson, ei

al., 1979, p. 186). Snyder commented that in some odd uay, the

paranoid may experience the aesthetic uhen he or she "discovers"

unperceived relationships. Snyder continued, "So it's a very

hairline difference betueen the excitement of real discovery and

the discovery of something uhich is not significant" (Bateson, ei

al., 1979, p. 188).

Sunday. September 11. 1979. A.M. Session 1

The final day opened uith Bateson introducing his daughter,

Mary Catherine, uhom he had asked to give a summary of the

conference to that point. She began uith a description of the

conference as a uhole as "the unfolding of a story." Mary

Catherine noted that one of the recurrent themes revolved around

the notion of attention and responsiveness to patterns. Houever,

she reminded all that too much emphasis on harmony and pattern is

"uhat gives you the happy ending of the TV drama" (Bateson, ei

62

al., 1979, p. 190). Indeed, the uord "resistance" had been used

to describe a desired balance betueen extremes of response. Mary

Catherine noted that the talk then shifted to the notion of

accountability, and later about stories. Her recollection of the

end of the f i r s t day included an attack on politics and mental

health. "The second day ue star ted o f f uith Pythagoras, uith the

proposition—in the biological uorld in uhich ue live, of uhich

our being is—that the only reality is the reality of pattern and

relationship." The conference had proceeded on to a discussion of

the mandala produced by Perry's patient. The second day ended

uith more talk about stor ies, uith telling stories, and sharing

poems.

Bateson (Bateson, e i al., 1979, 192) then of fered his oun

account of the conference to that point.

In other uords, aluays behind the given juncture in the uay ue've been talking. . .the step from this to that, from stories to parables to poems, up and doun. . .there is aluays a much larger, deep theme, highly structured, highly abstract , totally invisible—preferably, probably unconscious.

Bateson continued fur ther , "The insight ue're getting to is

the insight that there is this massive tautology, massive set of

interlocking premises, on uhich ue all dance" (Bateson, e i al.,

1979, p. 193). But, Bateson concluded that the more the panel

members pushed to acquire that insight, the more difficulty they

had in talking about i t . Mary Catherine, realizing the insight is

unspeakable, spoke again of "Uendell's mystery." Bateson continued

by telling the story of the Ancient Mariner to point to the

63

unconscious level of mind inherent in the mystery. "He blessed

them unauare."

Berry (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 195) then asked to speak.

He proposed an external standard that uould be mindful of all

patterns.

So I uant to suggest that the only reliable standard for mental health is the ability to protect the cycle of f e r t i l i t y . Not respect the cycle of fer t i l i ty but protect them, because respect uill get you nouhere, or i t uill get into baloney real quick i f i t 's just respect.

Berry uent on by repeating Snyder's most challenging question,

"Can you be sane in a crazy uorld?" Berry (Bateson, e i al.,

1979, p. 195) ansuered:

And I uould suggest tuo possibilities. By doing sane uork, that is the right uork in the right uay. And I think sane uork is aluays built on the analogy of mother's uork—it involves the uork of the mind and the hand aluays, never one alone. And second, by fighting, fighting on the side of the fer t i l i ty cycles. And I think that gets me to the end of the possibility as people.

Perry recalled his encounters uith Indian healing in Neu

Mexico uhere he consulted uith mental health centers. The uhole

community and clan gather for a healing ceremony for an individual

uho is sick. The individual is mythically brought back to the

moment of creation—the people believing that the sick one is out

of tune uith the order of the cosmos. "And the uay to get

reattuned again is to go back to the beginning and re-enact it."

Perry concluded, "To me mental health is not adjustment,

adaptation, i t 's being so in tune uith uhat you come into the

64

uorld ui th. . .some people say you're auare of your oun face you

uere born uith" (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 197).

Bateson uas reminded of Samuel Butler's foresight about

posinogenesis (i.e., reproduction uithout the use of spermatozoa)

uhen hearing Berry argue against posinogenesis in the uorld of

human action and thought. Bateson recalled, "He (Butler) said you

cannot accept the inner tautology of the single mind" (Bateson, e i

al., 1979, p. 198). Snyder then spoke about tall grass prairies.

One can either look at them as an individual entity, uithout the

bison roaming, or look at them in terms of certain restraints of

context. Snyder continued, "And that the totality of this system

(i.e., tall grass prair ies) or the netuork of uhich i t is a part

in i ts oun functioning is uhere i t really lies" (Bateson, e i al.,

1979, pp. 200-201). Snyder then added his concept of the mature

ecosystem, uhich he called "climax system," as an exterior

standard for mental health. He added to Berry's call for

protection of the cycles of fe r t i l i t y by saying ue must also

actively participate in them, and to re-enter them uith all our

energy. Snyder continued, "And diversity is not merely a

nostalgic or merely aesthetic interest. Diversity then belongs to

the highest level of the principles of sharing and passing energy

around for the mutual benefit of all" (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p.

202).

Bateson relayed a story about the ecosystem of the prairies

uhere he greu UP in England as a reminder of the pain that can be

65

experienced uhen attempting to mock nature. In their zeal to

remove the sheep to another area (because of increasing auto

traffic), and to do auay uith the rabbits (because someone had

decided they uere pests), the local tounsfolk ended up "uith a

bunch of organisms for uhich the polite uord is ueeds" (Bateson,

ei al., 1979, p. 204). Uynne responded by suggesting that the

same change may not have taken place had the people alloued a neu

ecosystem to evolve by destroying the rabbits very gradually.

Uynne (Bateson, ei al., 1979, p. 207) continued:

But uhen ue get into these abrupt precipitous changes, and ue lose our management of time, ue run into difficulties. . .And perhaps that's uhat ue're doing nou is discovering something about the pace of our cycles and letting things happen, uhich is something unusual about this conference, it seems to me.

Sunday, September 11. 1979. A.M. Session 2

After a coffee break, Bateson told the story of Job from the

Old Testament of the Bible. And finally God ansuered Job out of

the uhirluind and said: "Uho is this that darkeneth counsel by

uords uithout knouledge? Gird up nou thy loins I command. For I

uill demand of thee. And ansuer thou me, uhere uas thou uhen I

laid the foundation of the earth?" (Bateson, ei al., 1979, p.

210). After Bateson finished quoting the passage he said, "I

don't have anymore to say, it's up to you." A member of the

audience responded, "Ue're doun to unansuerable questions," to

uhich Bateson replied, "That's correct" (Bateson, ei al., 1979, p.

210).

66

Another member of the audience asked Snyder about the

dif ference betueen high degrees of specialization and too much

specialization. Snyder clarif ied by saying that one should not

drau an analogy betueen species in the ecosystem and the human

society, since in human society the result of specialization is a

monoculture uhere there is a significant loss of diversity. Berry

added as an example the notion of the university as a place uhere

people gather to do unnecessary things. As a result, the

discipline declines into a profession, and the profession then

declines into a career. The all too obvious result of the uhole

process is dependence on quantitative measures of progress and

success. Bateson (Bateson, e i al., 1979, PP. 211-212) added some

parallel thoughts about education:

Uhat I uant is that uhile he's (i.e., a student) specializing in the Pliny's, or the front legs of a beetle, he also knous, or should knou/feel that this thing that he's specializing in is part of a much larger matter. . .Ualking requires tuo types of progression. Ue've been playing one side here in this room, and I uant to remind (you) that there is also the other side.

A feu other comments uere of fered by the audience and panel

members before Mary Catherine (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 214)

spoke the closing uords:

And ue should not nou sit here and pretend for another f i f t e e n minutes the room is rectangular, but the movement of the dance is not rectangular. The circle has rounded i tself o f f friends. Go in peace.

In so many uays the conference attempted to address that

uhich is unspeakable. The closer the panel members approached

pattern, uholeness, and aesthetics the more difficult i t became to

67

translate these ideas into uords. Yet, on several occasions,

Bateson and other panel members pointed to the essential

complementarity betueen the heart and the intellect. Much had

been said about the over-development of quantitative perception in

the modern uorld. This complementarity is best realized in

community. I t is in community uhere evocation in communication

buds out from deep respect in relationships. I t is in community

uhere the cycle of f e r t i l i t y is protected—life, death, and

rebi r th in relationship. I t is in community uhere the great

stories are told and re- to ld . I t is in community uhere health

emerges and is nurtured. And, i t is in community uhere healing and

re-membering take their appropriate place.

Discussion

Near the end of the f i r s t day of the conference several

audience members voiced their f rust ra t ion that the panel members

uere not directly addressing mental health issues in their

discussion. Rabkin attempted to explain that f rustrat ion is but a

prologue to the "thrustrat ion" of the creative act. thereby

suggesting that the audience should be patient. Houever, an

audience member persisted in his request that the panel get to the

focus (intended at least by the t it le) of the conference more

often. Bateson (Bateson, e i 2l-» 1979, p. 74) finally responded:

I have a uord to say to that. Maybe that 1 had you have tuo days of silence at the beginning to make a dif ference in uhat most of you call the tempo of our proceedings. But ue uill not be in a hurry to talk. Ue u[ irnot even feel that ue had to maintain continuous

68

talk. I mean, you knou, be silent. Nou the reasons for that—uell I uas thinking of us around the table—is in a sense a model of the thing ue're trying to talk about, uhich is a mental health thing, the creativi ty thing.

As i f rescuing her fa ther , Mary Catherine defended the panel

by suggesting that indeed they uere addressing mental health

issues though not directly discussing such things as "mental

health organizations, professional structures, etc." Mary

Catherine explained that in most places the mental health movement

had become enmeshed in a thoroughly quantitative sort of

accountability. Because of this limited focus, she added, "It 's

aufully hard to produce health in individuals uhen they themselves

are enmeshed in a society that's imposing very alien rhythms and

standards, and so on, on them" (Bateson, e i al., 1979,p. 74).

Uith Mary Catherine's comments in mind i t becomes clear uhy

Bateson suggested the possibility of even more silence for the

conference. Ue begin to understand, as Bateson said, that "the

uorld is continually being seduced auay by the shape of language"

(Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 93). Uith each attempt to explain ue

increase the chances of getting caught in the same traps of our

language. As some have resigned themselves to conclude, "Uhat

this finally means is that all our e f f o r t s to articulate the

nature of therapy uill be limited and partly erroneous" (Keeney,

1982, p. 433). At one point during the conference Bateson

(Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 103) summarized the difficulty of the

panel's endeavor:

69

I t 's this funny trick of the left brain, the intellectual brain, of trying to make sense of the abstractions that come out of here, uhich I believe are more like Pythagorean abstractions. I t 's that trick that becomes the pathology of civilization, and becomes the desire, you knou, to measure things instead of seeing patterns, and all the rest of i t , the uay that iceberg shous above the surface.

Ue are faced, therefore, uith the peculiar dilemma of

discussing the implications of this conference for the

relationship betueen aesthetics and mental health (and, in

particular, for the field of family therapy). Yet, as Bateson

reminded the panel and audience on several occasions, the

aesthetic is not only a matter of the heart but also of the

intellect. One of the f i rs t points that Bateson made at the

beginning of the conference uas that relationship is the primary

basis for all living things (Point 1 in Chapter 2). Instead of

seeing five individual fingers on the hand, Bateson sau four gaps

or relations betueen fingers. Again and again throughout the

conference Bateson pointed to the primacy of relationship. As

Bateson (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 93) stated during the morning

of the second day:

I f you look at your hand uith that in mind, that it is in fact not made of parts, but is made of relations betueen parts, you may discover that it's more beautiful than you thought it uas. This is a pathuay touards a considerable range, perhaps the total range, I don't knou, of aesthetics.

One certain implication of the primacy of relationship is

that ue in mental health must cease from our endless talk about

entities, objects, parts, etc. I t is quite easy to scan through

70

any therapy related journal and notice hou many tit les of articles

include specific entit ies (e.g., anorexia, self-esteem, or sexual

abuse). Uhile i t is of utmost importance to note differences (ue

cannot not drau distinctions), i t is imperative that above and

throughout our drauing of distinctions ue recognize the primacy of

relationship and uholeness.* Our preoccupation uith materializing

and objectifying our therapeutic endeavor uill never allou us to

experience "the pat tern that connects" each of us together. There

are several points made in the conference that should be noted as

particularly related to aesthetics and mental health. These

notions uill be listed in point by point fashion, uith a brief

discussion follouing each idea.

The System of Systems is Enclosed uithin Mystery

Early in the conference Berry introduced the concept of

"system of systems" as his means for pointing to the necessity of

a reliable accounting of both ecological benefits and deficits.

Berry, uho has lived his l i fe on the same land of his ancestors,

is all too painfully auare of the deterioration of both community

and land. For example, a major shift in agricultural thinking has

taken place in the last feu decades. Many have pushed for the

transformation of agriculture from an a r t into a science. As

Berry explained, "The difference they say is that the ar t of

agriculture is concerned only uith the hou of farming, uhereas the

science is interested in the uhy" (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 52).

71

In a nutshell, the hou deals uith qualitative questions, uhile the

uhy deals uith analytical and quantitative questions.

Here ue have the theme of the conference—size and

shape—revealed in the field of agriculture. Houever, agriculture

is part of the same language that embodies mental health, the

language that values objectivity and f inite accounting, as opposed

to concern for the qualitative and the infinite. For Berry, any

talk about an external accounting of ecology is much too simple

because the ultimate dependency and connection of each system uith

the others cannot be enclosed (i.e., one cannot be external to

i t ) . Berry (Bateson, e i al., 1979, pp. 54-55) explained further:

For the connection betueen systems, insofar as this is a human structure , are not given, or unconscious, or automatic, but involve disciplines. Persons are joined to families, families to communities, etc., by disciplines that must be deliberately made, remembered, taught, learned, and practiced. . . I t uould be suff icient for my purpose just to say that the system of systems is enclosed uithin mystery, in uhich some truth can be knoun but never all t ruths. Neither the knoun t ru th nor the mystery is internal to any system, and here, houever paradoxical i t may seem, ue begin to see the possibility of reliable accounting and of responsible behavior.

Ue begin also to see a reliable sort of accounting for our

therapeutic endeavors. All ansuers about outcome and

effectiveness in therapy must be uorked out belou a threshold of

humility and rest ra in t . The partial t ruths ue have come to

believe as complete t ruths must be constantly positioned uithin

the mystery of the system of systems. Here ue begin to see an

aesthetic vieu of therapy that yields responsible behavior.

72

Community is Dependent on Being in Place

As uith all previous groups uithin the domain called therapy,

family therapy has also sought to become distinct and separate

from other therapeutic divisions. Hence, our family therapy

netuork is our membership in our particular speciality. Further,

as Snyder pointed out, "it is typical of contemporary l i fe,

especially for urban people, that they measure their identity by

their netuork alone" (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 122). Houever, ue

have forgot ten that there are also such things as communities.

Instead, ue in family therapy (as simply a partial arc of our

occidental culture) tend to think solely in terms of membership in

our netuork as our uay of defining uho ue are as people. Uith our

attenuated sense of place, engulfed uithin the "necessity" of high

mobility, ue have l i tt le sense of uhat i t is to be part of a

community. Snyder concludes, "Consequently, i t is not part of our

contemporary experience, for the most of us, to ground ourselves,

to find sat isfact ion, or to participate meaningfully in any uay in

community l i fe" (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 122). Snyder (Bateson,

e i al., 1979, p. 123) described community l i fe uhile referr ing to

commitment in Buddhism:

The community of people uho are mutually committed to uorking together, even uhen they don't agree, over a long period of time. And, to supporting each other through thick and thin, just like they say you're supposed to do uhen you get married. Nou the community l i fe has the same invitation.

I t is important to understand fur ther , as Snyder (Bateson, e i

al., 1979, p. 122) noted, that "communities are places, and the

73

people in the community are the people uho live there, plus all

the animals and plants." I t then becomes clear that, for the most

part , ue in family therapy experience l i tt le in the uay of

community l i fe , substituting, instead, af f i l iat ion in our

speciality as our identity. One devastating, though thoroughly

unnoticed, tuist from this mis-identification is that the very

enterprises the community of people should be rightfully involved

uith (e.g., taking care of each other's mental uell being) have

been excerpted from the community by such mental health

organizations as our oun. As Rabkin concluded, "I think there's a

type of hubris, or uhatever you uant to call i t , trying to impose

mental health from above that uay and coming uith an incredible

lack of realization that there uas anything else there f i r s t "

(Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 127).

Stories are the only Language ue have for Talking about Relationships

Keeney (1983a) vieus stories as providing "a uay of building

double descriptions and enabling higher order patterns to be

discerned" (p. 195). By this Keeney points to the possibility that

stories provide meaning and structure for uhat ue do

therapeutically. That is, uhen therapist and family exchange

stories in a structure of feedback, "self-correction becomes

possible" (Keeney, 1983a, p. 195). Bateson similarly noted in the

conference that "the telling of a story brings diverse identity to

a relationship" (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 147).

74

Berry and Snyder both pointed to the essential oral tradit ion

of storytelling in community l i fe . In so doing, they remind us of

the importance of memorizing the story as i t is told and re- told.

Memorization in the oral t radi t ion ensures a focus on relationship

(i.e., betueen storytel ler and listener) rather than on content

(e.g., the printed uords on a page). Berry noted fur ther , "And

that seems to be really important because i f you have a uay of

speaking that 's based on memorability then you don't put things in

i t—by definition i t uon't contain things that aren't memorable"

(Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 159).

Bateson noted that stories tend to be experienced at several

d i f fe rent levels of mind. That is, because stories, like a r t ,

bridge the unconscious and conscious levels of mind, diverse

patterns come to the fore (though not necessarily recognizable at

the same instant). Bateson clarif ied, houever, that uhen

storytelling comes from a specific level, that is, uhen i t issues

from a purposiveness on the part of the teller, the story more

resembles a "faking made serious." Bateson described this sort of

story as an allegory, uhereby the teller has a specific purpose in

mind before he or she begins uith the telling. As Keeney has

indicated, therapy is a process of ueaving stories betueen

therapist and client. Yet, i t remains unclear uhether the

"stories" told by the therapist are but allegories, spoken to the

client uith a specific purpose in mind. And i f this is so, i t is

possible that our "faking made serious" is not part of the

75

communal t radi t ion of storytelling. Yet, one may question uhether

this matters i f the goals of therapy are met by so telling our

allegories. Is i t possible our "short-term" goals in therapy,

though positively achieved, only contribute to a dis-integration

of community l i fe? Recall that storytelling comes doun by some

kind of community and i t acts privately.

The only Reliable Standard for Mental Health is the Ability to Protect the Cycle of Fert i l i ty

Berry (1977, p. 123) once said, " I t is impossible to care for

each other more or di f ferent ly than ue care for the earth." Berry

has u r i t t en poignantly about the uncanny resemblance betueen our

behavior touard each other and our behavior touard the earth. Our

uillingness to exploit the earth has also become our uillingness

to exploit each other. For Berry, i t is logically impossible to

suggest that mental health is only a matter of somebody's mind.

For mental health ue must move outside, to some external standard.

This external mystery embodies a requisite variety of difference

and diversity.

Our occidental culture pushes constantly, houever, to gloss

over dif ference and diversity. Ue seek to simplify via

specialization all the necessities of our l i fe—from food

production and consumption to mental health.' As Berry (1977,

p. 138) states, "Ue lose our health—and create diseases and

dependencies—by failing to see the direct connections betueen

living and eating, eating and uorking, uorking and loving." For

76

the most part unknouingly, ue in mental health and family therapy

actively part icipate in and maintain the trend touard "diseases

and dependencies." The r ightful responsibility of the community

to care for the uell being of i ts members has been excerpted on

all f ronts . The standards ue support for mental health are not

based on, in Bateson's uords, "eternal fundamentals."

"Size and Shape in Mental Health" redirects our attention to

pat tern, quality, and aesthetics in mental health, and life

i tsel f . The implications of the conference for our uork in family

therapy may not necessarily be clear to all. Houever, ue cannot

escape the obvious, as Bateson (cited in Keeney, 1983a, pp.

197-198) noted in his position paper ur i t ten for the conference.

Many sequences are urong or painful, socially destructive or individually insane. These may need active intervention. But this is not our focus of attention. I hope that ue may examine some of the presuppositions and habits of thought uhich lie behind such social and individual pathologies. And also the presuppositions of health. In our social, individual and psychiatric adaptation— in our very ideas of "adaptation"—there is a syndrome arising out of imperfect balance-or-harmony betueen quantity and pattern. Uilliam Blake tells us "Bring out ueight and measure in a year of dearth" and hints that quantitative judgement has no useful function in a time of plenty. But ue in 20th century middleclass America, living in a matrix of unheard-of plenty, use ueight and measure at every turn and in every context, appropriate and inappropriate. Commercialism combines uith fashionable styles in scientif ic method to seduce us into an orgy and/or nightmare of quantity. A bland nightmare of homogenization. I hope that ue may focus not upon gloom uhich uould be easy, but upon understanding. I f indeed there is an over-development of quantitative perception, there must also be an under-development of perception and

77

understanding of quality and pattern. I t is to this lack that I hope ue may address ourselves—positively— attempting to remedy the ueakness or deficiency. A simplified parable may make the matter clearer. A square has "more" sides than a triangle and a doughnut (torus) has "more" holes than a solid. But these quantitative comparisons give no hint of the rich formal insights uhich topological mathematics uill build upon the contrasts of pattern. As our conversation bounces of f the quantitative touards pat tern and quality, ue shall inevitably ( I hope) encounter considerations of aesthetic. I hope that these may become the main theme of our discussion. Is there a uorld of determinism—an interlocking netuork of necessary truths—uithout uhich no pragmatic understanding of human events is complete? Does action—purposive action—become arid and pathogenic uhen such principles are ignored or contravened? Could ue, perhaps, at a venture, begin to make a list of such truths? About rhythm? Spatial pattern? Limits of organization? Modulations of form? Of utterance? Are there necessities of poetry, uithout uhich prose is pathogenic? I suggest as start ing points for thinking and discussion that attention to quantity rather than pattern leads us to ignore aesthetic necessities: In child rearing and family. In architecture and diet. In speech and rhetoric. In education. In athletics and games. In politics and leadership. In science. In the applications of science. In medical and psychiatric practice. In international a f f a i r s . In philosophy and religion. Even in a r t—poet ry . In every one of these fields of human activity—even in crime—there are problems of pattern, about uhich very l i t t le formal thought has been done. The result is a splitting of discourse betueen the pragmatic and the aesthetic, the structural and the functional, the eternal and the secular.

78

Notes

1. A copy of the transcript of the conference proceedings is available from the author.

2. One primary exception is the architectural uork of Frank Lloyd Uright. His emphasis on reflecting nature in the shape and space of his buildings alloued for a sense of connectedness uith the environment.

3. "Song of the Taste" can be found in Regarding Uave. a book of poems by Gary Snyder.

4. For an excellent example see Maranhao's (1984) cri t ique of a book uhich proposes the inane use of ethnicity as a delimiting indication of hou to approach families of d i f fe rent cultural backgrounds.

5. I t is important to drau a distinction betueen specialization in a mature ecosystem and specialization in human society. Snyder (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 210) explains:

"I'll just say this, the specialization in a rich or mature ecosystem is many species, many, many di f ferent species. Ue should avoid, ue must avoid drauing an analogy betueen that kind of specialization and the specialization in human society, uhich is of a d i f ferent order entirely. I t goes in the opposite direction, being a monoculture. . .And that's loss of diversity in human terms."

CHAPTER 4

AESTHETICS AND PRAGMATICS IN FAMILY THERAPY

One of the fields that has been most influenced by the ideas

of Gregory Bateson is family therapy. His uork in the 1950's on

the paradoxes of abstraction in communication resulted in the

classic paper, "Touard a Theory of Schizophrenia" (Bateson,

Jackson, Haley, 8. Ueakland, 1956). The double-bind hypothesis of

schizophrenia has played a major role in the foundational ideas

of family therapy. Bateson moved on from psychiatry and

psychotherapy in 1963, but his ideas and uritings, though not

directly addressed to the field of therapy, have important and

significant relevance for family therapy. Such is the case uith

regard to Bateson's call for an aesthetic preference in mental

health.

The relationship betueen aesthetics and pragmatics in family

therapy has been a topic of discussion throughout the history of

the f ield. Houever, the aesthetic/pragmatic debate coalesced and

appeared in tuo issues of Family Process in 1982. The structure

of this debate included presentations by several authors, cri t ical

reactions by several d i f fe rent authors, and a re-presentation by

the tuo of the original presenting authors. The articles uithin

the tuo issues of Family Process have once again been the focus of

cr i t ical examination in recent issues of the major family therapy

journals. This chapter uill examine in detail the elements of

79

80

this dialogue/debate, and suggest possible points of agreement

aiming touard Bateson's aesthetic preference.

The debate that unfolded in the pages of Family Process uas

i tsel f depicted as "a fundamental failure in the field of family

therapy" (Keeney, 1982, p. 431). The difference betueen

aesthetics and pragmatics uas discussed by the respective authors

as follouing a logic of negation, uhereby the distinction uas

presented in an e i ther /o r dichotomous fashion. And, as such, much

of the talk on either side of the dichotomy failed to make

substantive str ides, residing instead uithin the field of

political maneuvering. "The failure of our field revolves around

hou to talk about both sides (e.g., aesthetics/pragmatics) in a

uay that preserves the difference but protects the relation"

(Keeney, 1982, p. 431).

Houever, as uas previously discussed, Bateson (1975, p. 26)

uarned about the problems involved uith attempting to talk across

d i f fe rent logical type levels of mind:

To knou the real ansuers is aluays to suitch them over to that le f t brain, to the manipulative side. And once they've suitched over, no matter hou right they uere poetically and aesthetically, they go dead and become manipulative techniques.

Nevertheless, Bateson struggled for a more encompassing vieu

that uould embody the interface betueen the distinctions he dreu.

The more encompassing vieu of metaphor and the Eternal Verit ies is

clearly revealed in Bateson's final urit ings.

81

Keeney & Sprenkle (1982) suggest that their "ecosystemic

epistemology" is a uay of encompassing the different perspectives

of aesthetics and pragmatics uithin family therapy. They go on to

drau strict distinctions as to uhat pragmatic-based and

aesthetic-based therapists look like. Houever, they point out

that ecosystemic epistemology "arises from a position that is

responsive to issues of both pragmatics and aesthetics" (Keeney &

Sprenkle, 1982, p. 3). Allman (1982a) takes a much less

parsimonious stance uhen he describes the "pragmatic error" of

many in family therapy, uhom he describes as manipulative,

literal, and lacking in the capacity for play. Allman subjugates

the pragmatic, suggesting it "only emerges out of the aesthetic as

one of the multitude of possible contextual maps" (1982a, p. 47).

Allman characterizes effective family therapy as art, and posits

that pragmatics or "techniques are meaningful only if they serve

to transform aesthetic arrangements. . ." (1982a, p. 46).

It seems important, houever, to take a closer look at the

articles by Keeney 8. Sprenkle and Allman to expose the many useful

points they made. (Though there are some differences betueen the

tuo articles as Keeney, 1982, noted, there is enough compatibility

betueen so as to speak of the tuo together.) Though Keeney &

Sprenkle propose an ecosystemic approach, it is obvious from their

article that they place the perspective of the aesthetic at a

higher level of abstraction than the pragmatic It seems,

houever, that their use of the uord "higher" needs further

82

definit ion, possibly ouing to the typical understanding of

"higher" in physicalist terms. Keeney 8. Sprenkle uarn the reader

on several occasions that their paper is purposively biased in the

direction of the aesthetic. Regardless of this uarning, most

readers are likely to sense the same sort of subjugation of

pragmatics that Allman more directly states. I t may be helpful

(necessary?) to speak of aesthetics being d i f ferent from, but

connected to, pragmatics. As Bateson (1979a) clearly stated,

"Difference, being of the nature of relationship, is not located

in time or in space" (p. 109). I t is possible that the use of

"d i f ferent" in place of "higher" may more clearly reveal the

complementary connection that Keeney 8. Sprenkle allude to.*

Allman (1982b) defines aesthetics "as the dialectical

relationship betueen sensation and the restra ints of form and

content" (p. 419). The "ultimate error" for Allman is committed

uhen family therapists focus on form and content instead of on the

relationship betueen sensation and form and content. Allman

continues by noting that this relationship is indeterministic, a

unity via diversity. Keeney 8. Sprenkle, though, speak of the

relationship involving a commitment to practice. Houever,

practice is to be framed uithin the uhole ecology of uhich i t is a

par t . As Keeney 8. Sprenkle (1982, p. 12) indicate:

Thus, for an a r t i s t (or therapist) , the actions that arise from the practice of a skill have importance only in terms of i ts ecological function in the larger contexts of uhich the action is a pa r t—i ts e f fects on one's character and social context, as uell as the planet.

83

For Keeney 8. Sprenkle, the aesthetic is characterized by

holism and complexity, uhereas the pragmatic focuses on action in

economical and simple fashion. Allman, as mentioned earlier,

speaks of the "pragmatic error" of many, and i t is here uhere the

art icles by Keeney 8. Sprenkle and Allman d i f fe r dramatically.

Keeney 8» Sprenkle, albeit uith diff iculty, propose an epistemology

that focuses on the context of the relationship betueen the

aesthetic and the pragmatic. Allman, on the other hand, disposes

of the pragmatic and equates therapy uith a r t . Though Allman

repeatedly calls upon the name of Bateson as impetus for his

ideas, i t is nouhere evident that Bateson considered a r t a

pragmatic-less endeavor. "Uithout skill is no ar t" (Bateson,

1972, p. 144).

I t remains clear, houever, that the articles by Keeney 8.

Sprenkle and Allman do speak in unison in decrying the lack of an

aesthetic preference in family therapy. As Allman states, "Ue are

losing sight of our oun creative message that systems are not

'things' but metaphors" (1982a, p. 45). This cry is echoed by

Uhitaker (1982) in the only favorable reaction (i.e., published)

to the papers by Keeney 8. Sprenkle and Allman. Keeney 8. Sprenkle

(1982) expose a form of reductionism in family therapy "that is

primarily concerned uith reducing or simplifying phenomena for

practical purposes" (p. 2). Keeney 8. Sprenkle, throughout their

presentation, embody their oun solution to the problems inherent

in dualistic occidental language by continually presenting a

84

"dialectic ( that) encourages one to keep getting unstuck

continuously" (p. 7). An example of this dialectic is found in

their metaphoric/ l i teral presentation of a r t and technique. The

recursive dialectic is so presented that the reader is not alloued

to remain stuck at any point. In this sense, Keeney 8. Sprenkle

are speaking of "not one, not tuo," but of the relation betueen

ideas and action, the aesthetic and the pragmatic. Keeney 8.

Sprenkle end their presentation uith reference to the story of Job

from the Old Testament of the Bible, and an excerpt from the uork

of the author Isak Dinesen to point to the necessity of sacred and

ecological humility.

Allman (1982a) states that "the role of the therapist is to

find novel 'aesthetic solutions' for pragmatic problems so as to

enrich the family system sense of connectedness" (p. 51). Allman

calls on a r t and poetry to point the reader to the essential

creat ive unity in therapy. For Allman, family therapy is an a r t

form, and, as such, the family therapist must aluays respond to

the family's pragmatic problems uith novel aesthetic solutions.

As opposed to a pragmatic approach that uould only attend to

presenting concerns, Allman stresses the importance of the

"therapist 's ability to give l i fe to the meaning of a particular

family drama" (1982a, p. 52). Further, Allman proposes that

skillful family therapy must involve a playful dimension uhich

frames the mutual teaching of neu schemata. For Allman, the

85

family must grou in their ability to creatively accommodate to l i fe

uith continuous evolvement of neu meanings.

Tuo issues follouing the articles by Keeney 8. Sprenkle and

Allman there appeared in Family Process three crit ical reactions,

one sympathetic reply by Uhitaker (1982), and responses by Keeney

(1982) and Allman (1982b). Though someuhat d i f ferent in point of

focus, the three cr i t ical reactions, primarily ur i t ten by authors

associated uith the Mental Research Inst i tute , all respond uith

disapproval to the articles by Keeney 8. Sprenkle and Allman.̂

Coyne, Denner, 8. Ransom (1982) complain that "they are

propagandists, supersalesmen eager to persuade buyers to invest in

commodities available in their respective shops" (p. 393). Coyne,

et al. characterize the articles by Keeney 8. Sprenkle and Allman

as representing "the fashionable mind," uhereby an old idea is

associated uith everything bad and a d i f ferent idea is presented

as neu and promising. Coyne, e i al. thereby associate the

art icles by Keeney 8. Sprenkle and Allman uith a cosmetic

enterprise, and not "struggling uith substantive ideas" (p. 393).

Coyne, e i al. suggest that the pragmatic/aesthetic controversy is

a "vehicle(s) for studying the age-old problem of communication as

interpersonal influence" (p. 395). Coyne, e i al. conclude, "to

create such a dichotomy (i.e., betueen aesthetics and pragmatics)

and uorry over uhich uord is more appropriate is not an

intellectual pursuit but a preoccupation uith image and fashion"

(p. 395).

86

Uilder (1982) chooses to react almost exclusively to the

art icle by Keeney 8. Sprenkle. Uilder complains that nouhere in

the art icle does she "find any documentation uhatsoever to support

the claim that the dreaded pragmatists even, in fact , exist" (p.

398). Uilder continues by poking fun at Keeney 8. Sprenkle's use

of the phrase, "a more metaphorical uay," and vieus their use of

the phrase as an excuse to avoid making sense uith uhat follous

the phrase. In the end, Uilder bemoans Keeney 8. Sprenkle's

reference to Bateson for their presentation, since their "uork

neither carr ies his searching tone nor stands upon i ts oun merits"

(p. 400). Uilder sees Keeney 8. Sprenkle as only providing muddle

and fu r ther mystification of Bateson's thinking.

Finally, Uatzlauick (1982), uhile reflecting on his oun

individuation from "romantic therapy," accuses Keeney 8. Sprenkle

of associating uhat is nou called pragmatics uith precisely uhat

members of the Mental Research Inst i tute (and Bateson's group

according to Uatzlauick) rejected decades ago (i.e., the linear,

monadic, intrapsychic model of thinking and intervention).

Uatzlauick dismisses definitions of the "pragmatic error" by

stating, "As a principal author of Pragmatics of Human

Communication. I have yet to meet a 'pragmatic' therapist of that

kind" (p. 402). Uatzlauick concludes by suggesting that beauty

(or "the great harmony of nature") equally entails "untold

suffer ing of countless individuals and the indif ferent destruction

of entire species. . ." (p. 403). By this Uatzlauick indicates

87

that Keeney 8. Sprenkle and Allman have not carefully considered

that their aesthetic preference may actually be a tuo edged suord.

Keeney (1982) responds to his cri t ics by agreeing that the

art icle he urote uith Sprenkle failed to connect aesthetics uith

pragmatics. Keeney continues, "Our error uas to overemphasize

aesthetics and to neglect demonstrating i ts connection to

pragmatic decision-making in the course of therapy" (1982, p.

430). Keeney presents excerpts from conversations from his book.

Aesthetics of Change (1983a), as examples of hou distinctions

(such as pragmatics/aesthetics) can be seen as complementary.

Though he ends by calling for a uhole vieu uith uhich the family

therapy uould envision i ts uork, Keeney echoes Bateson and others

uhen pointing to the inherent limitations in talking about uhat

can only be rudely mentioned. "Uhat this finally means is that

all our e f f o r t s to art iculate the nature of therapy uill be

limited and partly erroneous" (Keeney, 1982, p. 433).

Allman (1982b), on the other hand, has diff iculty

acknouledging his cr i t ics. Instead, he labels the crit ic 's

responses as themselves revelations of the pragmatic error of

uhich he spoke. The bulk of Allman's response sets about to

"evolve a position that unifies pragmatics and aesthetics through

poetics" (1982b, p. 416). In various uays, Allman makes the point

that the pragmatic is an emergent from the aesthetic mind.

Houever, in several other places in his art icle, Allman r e f e r s to

the relationship betueen aesthetics and pragmatics as one of

88

balance, or as a dialectic. This difference betueen emergent

process and balance is never made clear in Allman's response,

though i t seems clear that he continues to subjugate pragmatics.

Allman (1982b) explains that "through a process of releasing

or surrendering to the unity of this beauty, ue help families

transform experiences of despair into openness" (p. 426). For

Allman, poetry is the embodiment of aesthetics and allous for many

arrangements of emergent process. Again, houever, i t remains

unclear uhat exactly, or generally, a search for the unity of

beauty uith a family in therapy uould look like. Allman is surely

on the mark in alluding to the structures of beauty (e.g.,

openness, complementarity, metaphoric language), houever, the

reader is not led to see hou the family therapist and family can

practically invest in the unity of beauty to promote desired

change. Once again i t seems clear that uhat is experienced in

relationship is most dif f icult to talk about in analytical

fashion.

Keeney (1983a) provides a fuller glimpse, houever, of uhat an

aesthetic base for family therapy might look like. Echoing

Bateson, Keeney states, "An aesthetic base for family therapy

arises uhen conscious and unconscious orders of mind provide

sel f -correct ive feedback" (p. 190). Keeney mentions several

notions of practical import concerning this recursive connection

betueen orders of mind. A respect for ecology is a natural

extension uhen a therapist "vieus and conducts himself as part of

89

a more encompassing mental system" (Keeney, 1983a, p. 190).

Keeney also points to the essential quality of practice in

therapy, but practice in a d i f ferent sense than occidental culture

uould define i t . "You incorporate the discipline of practice in

you, and you come out of the practice a d i f ferent sort of person"

(Bateson, cited in Keeney, 1983a, p. 193). Finally, Keeney

(1983a) suggests that the form of a story is the preferable

discourse for talking about therapy, providing "a uay of building

double descriptions and enabling higher order patterns to be

discerned" (p. 195).

In an earlier paper, Keeney (1981) outlined his vieu of the

"pragmatics of family therapy" that may arise out of ecosystemic

epistemology. He begins by suggesting that "it is useful for the

therapist to vieu symptoms as ecological metaphors" (p. 45).

Symptoms are not bounded uithin any one level of a system but

communicate about the relations betueen system levels. The

practical import for the therapist, according to Keeney, is that

therapy can be vieued as a "battle of metaphors" (p. 46). ( I t is

interesting that Keeney chose a pouer metaphor to describe a

meeting of metaphors, although this may be explained in the

footnote uhich dedicated the essay "to the pragmatic contributions

of Jay Haley to the field of human problem solving.") The

therapist must respond uith a form of metaphor congruent uith the

family's choice of metaphor.

90

Keeney (1981) continues by specifying the components of

therapy from an ecosystemic perspective. These six components,

houever, do not d i f f e r from commonly accepted practice in family

therapy, and as such, do not clearly indicate in uhat specific

uays "technique becomes tempered by aesthetic concern" (Keeney,

1981, p. 52). As Keeney himself later indicated, our e f f o r t s to

art iculate the aesthetics of family therapy aluays remain

piecemeal and simplistic. In the end, Keeney (1982, p. 432)

points again to the ideas of Bateson to indicate the more

encompassing vieu of an aesthetics of family therapy (quoted from

Mary Catherine Bateson, 1977, p. 3):

. . .a keystone of Gregory's use of cybernetics is that among the translations and analogical mappings i t makes possible is a restatement of the lucid computations of the heart . Thus, i t is essential that love and uisdom and sacred have cybernetic meanings. At the same time, Gregory urit ing or speaking is never only talking about these issues. He is also using these evocative uords to mobilize in his listeners that reasoning of the heart that the reason does not perceive. . .A scientist, a f t e r all, like a sacrament or a poem, "should not mean but be."

I t is interesting to note that the debate betueen aesthetics

and pragmatics in family therapy i tself is an example of

communication dif f icult ies that arise uhen a dichotomous

structure is imposed. That there is a difference betueen

aesthetics and pragmatics seems quite clear, as does the fact that

the tuo are also somehou related to each other. Keeney 8. Sprenkle

(1982) suggest their ecosystemic epistemology as a unifying idea,

though the aesthetic is still seen at a higher level of

91

abstract ion than the pragmatic. Allman (1982a, b) blasts the

"pragmatic er ror" of the field, and instead, posits the poetic

mind as the aesthetic preference enlivened. Coyne, e i al. (1982)

and Uilder (1982) dismiss the aesthetic presentations as ladened

uith unsound scholarship and sensationalism. Uatzlauick (1982)

considers the aesthetic argument as an extension of "romantic

therapy." From all these points, i t is also clear that the

dif ference has become a division betueen aesthetics and

pragmatics. The practical ramification of this change is that the

mutual dependence and sharing of difference has been overtaken by

the mutual estrangement of division.^

In te res t in the aesthetics/pragmatics debate has recently

been reneued by the appearance of several articles in the major

family therapy journals. Unfortunately, the mutual estrangement

of division betueen aesthetics and pragmatics has been maintained

uithin these art icles. As a uhole, the structure of these

articles take the form of cri t ical reaction, uith l itt le in the

uay of an attempt to exchange "dialogue" for "debate." All of the

articles have in common a concern uith epistemology. Though the

art icles, generally speaking, present l i t t le in the uay of neu

ideas, they do indicate that the questions about aesthetics and

pragmatics in family therapy continue to remain at the fore.

Guttman (1986) "examines the theoretical dilemmas uhich arise

from the polarization of family epistemologies into the pragmatic

and the aesthetic" (p. 13). Falzer (1986) contends that the

92

pragmatics of Uatzlauick and the aesthetics of Allman and Keeney

propose a confining, systematizing language that prevents us from

experiencing the mystical. Shields (1986) argues that the neu

epistemologies (uhich the author ident i f ies u i th the uork of

Allman, Keeney, and Dell) "are, in fac t , ueak theor ies" (p. 359).

Tomm (1986) responds to Shields' proposals by suggesting instead

that the fundamental problem of object iv i ty has yet to be dealt

u i th , and cannot be safely assumed to be an undeniable assumption.

Finally, Bogdan (1987) proposes that "some family therapists,

follouing Bateson, use 'epistemology' in a peculiar,

non-tradi t ional uay," uhich merely pollutes "the semantic

environment" (p. 27).

Guttman (1986) begins by exploring the value of the recent

reneued in teres t in process in family therapy, and the

accompanying "preoccupation u i th the so-called epistemologies of

family therapy" (p. 13). Guttman comes to the conclusion that

th is neu preoccupation u i th epistemology simply re f lects a pouer

struggle betueen various groups, each claiming to have the t rue

epistemology. Guttman claims that the probable reason fo r this

dilemma is the predominant use of the broad and abstruse

def in i t ion of epistemology handed doun from Bateson via Keeney.

Guttman in te rp re ts this def in i t ion as "the fundamental operation

uhich any theory of knouledge performs (uhich) is to drau a

dist inct ion betueen the knouable and the unknouable, betueen the

relevant and the i r re levant" (1986, p. 14). Guttman fu r t he r

93

concludes that the field of family therapy is muddled because,

follouing the definition above, i t has assumed that "systems

theory is synonymous uith epistemology, rather than recognizing

that systems theory is one type of epistemology" (p. 14). Guttman

proposes that fu r ther complications arise because the field is

bent on posing the dilemmas of theory in dichotomous language.

For example, Guttman notes that there is an ongoing argument

betueen those uho assert that only the relationships betueen

family members are knouable, and those uho contend that processes

occurring uithin the members of the family are knouable. Other

dichotomous arguments include: circularity vs. linearity (and the

related question of purposiveness); homeostasis or stability vs.

morphogenesis or change; and, hierarchy vs. non-hierarchy.

Guttman applies a t r i p a r t i t e division of epistemology to

three "meta-problems" uhich have arisen out of our logic of

negation. In discussing "truth as coherence," Guttman proposes

that the argument about the aesthetic vs. the pragmatic is

"probably a continuation of a centuries-old debate as to the

nature of man" (1986, p. 19). Guttman claims that Bateson's heirs

have divided into tuo lineages: those uho apply systems

principles to pragmatically solve uell defined family problems

(e.g., members of MRI); and, "those uho embrace purpose and define

the aesthetic realization of self as a legitimate goal of

therapists and of families (e.g., Allman)" (p. 19). Guttman has

erroneously concluded that the aesthetic concern implies "that

94

situations of existential anguish require, not the distant,

uninvolved stance of the strategic therapist , but an approach

based on existential 'being uith' the family" (p. 19). In

concluding that both points of vieu (i.e., aesthetic and

pragmatic) be accepted as parts of the uhole t ru th , Guttman

continues the same Cartesian logic that she cr i t ic izes. As Varela

has elegantly and simply stated, "Not one, not tuo." In

suggesting that "the most relevant epistemological cr i ter ion is

surely uhether a given theory produces useful treatment strategies

and desirable results" (p. 19), Guttman upholds the deplorable

technocracy present in family therapy today. The description of

theory or model in such uti l i tar ian fashion points to the

occidental foundation of such language. As Uendell Berry (1977)

has uarned, "The concept of 'model' here conforms very closely to

the model of the scientists and planners: i t is an exclusive,

narrouly defined ideal uhich a f fec ts destructively uhatever i t

does not include."

Guttman ends by optimistically suggesting that family therapy

"may be at the grouing edge of a far-reaching paradigmatic shi f t ,

uhich uill deeply a f f e c t our uorld vieu" (p. 21). In this

assert ion Guttman may uell be speaking a t ru th . Houever, in

stating that Bateson's idea about the unity of mind and nature is

a "rather grandiose dream," Guttman clearly reveals a thorough

misunderstanding of the paradigmatic shift she r e f e r s to.

Utilizing the uork of Thomas Kuhn, Guttman decides that family

95

therapy is stil l in a prescientif ic era, "uhere none of several

competing theories can claim sufficiently authori tat ive proof to

become the dominant paradigm" (p. 19). In suggesting

author i ta t ive dominance as the goal, i t is all too obvious that

Guttman, though espousing the benefits of systems theory,

continues uell uithin the modern social scientific tradit ion of

dualistic, Cartesian logic.

Bogdan (1987), along uith Guttman, unites disapprovingly of

family therapy's use of Bateson's definition of epistemology,

uhich Bogdan describes as "peculiar" and "non-traditional."

Bogdan claims that a significant minority of family therapists

have confused a therapist 's theory (or paradigm) uith a

therapist 's epistemology. Further, Bogdan claims that many of the

interests of the "so-called neu epistemologists have a distinctive

mentalistic or cognitive f lair" (1987, p. 27), uhich he states is

commonly (i.e., by most professionals uho are not family

therapists) connected uith the field of social psychology. Bogdan

asks, "Hou did 'epistemology' come to pick such apparently

irrelevant associations?" (p. 27).

Bogdan then proceeds uith his description of Bateson's

revision of classical terminology. He begins by noting Bateson's

debt to the uork of Russell, as uell as others, uho "refurbished

Kant's thesis that our knouledge of reality is 'constituted' by

the structure of the mind" (p. 28). Bogdan o f fe rs the completely

erroneous statement that "Russell had proposed that uhat ue

96

perceive is not objects in the uorld but a portion of our oun

brain act iv i ty" (p. 28). Recall that Bateson's definition of

epistemology involved the distinctions that ue make betueen

Pleroma and Creatura (cf. the Introduction). Further, note hou

Varela (1979, p. 275), in the tradit ion of Bateson, describes

epistemology:

Our "knouledge," uhatever rational meaning ue give that term, must begin uith experience, and uith cuts uithin our experience—such as, for instance, the cut ue make betueen the part of our experience ue come to call "ourself" and all the rest of our experience, uhich ue then call our "uorld."

Bogdan goes on to describe other factors that changed

Bateson's thinking about epistemology. I t is completely unclear,

houever, hou Bogdan came up uith such notions as: "He (i.e.,

Bateson) toyed uith the idea of calling the uhole shebang

'cognitive s t ructure '" (p. 29); or, "Bateson concluded from all

this that the distinctions betueen epistemology, ontology, and

psychology uere a r t i f i c ia l and pointless" (p. 29). Uhat uas

important for Bateson uas not the blurring of distinctions, but

the recognition of difference as information uithin the total

uhole of the system. In noting psychology's static and

quantitative naming of abstractions re ferr ing to patterns of

relationship, Bateson (1972) stated, "This is one of the

nonsensical contributions of psychology to a distorted

epistemology" (p. 140).

Af ter a br ief discussion about "real epistemology," Bogdan

gets to his main point: "Glamorous though i t may be, i t is

97

aufully hard to suallou the proposition that a theory of human

interaction (e.g., family therapy) can do uithout psychological

concepts, that is, concepts uhich refer to the mental processes of

individuals" (1987, p. 31). Bogdan claims to have tried "to

present Bateson's ideas about epistemology in a sympathetic

light," but from the content of his article it is all too clear he

has mis-connected "reading" uith "understanding." Bateson's

continual focus uas on exploring the "patterns that connect,"

rather than isolating the individual and creating useless concepts

such as the "self" (cf. Bateson's Introduction to his Steps to an

Ecology of Mind. 1972). Bogdan truly points to the "danger

associated uith family therapy's habit of appropriating

psychological concepts uhile calling them something else" (p. 34),

but for the urong reason. From Bogdan's article ue are led to

believe that only semantic differences separate psychology from

family therapy, and this may be, sadly, the only useful point made

in the article.

Shields (1986) proposes that the neu epistemologies need to

be critically analyzed on their oun terms, "that is, in terms of

philosophy and epistemology" (p. 359). Shields agrees uith Bogdan

uhen complaining about the field's loose and inappropriate use of

the term epistemology. Shields claims that the authors of the neu

epistemologies (he specifically identifies Keeney, Allman, and

Dell) have blindly accepted the philosophical position

traditionally labeled Idealism. Shields explains that

98

"ultimately, Idealism argues that ideas or mind are more real than

physical reality" (p. 360). Shields argues that the neu

epistemologies are actually only "ueak theories" because "most of

this l i te ra ture is ur i t ten so that i t is not empirically testable"

(p. 360), uhich Shields later claims to be a minimum requirement

for a scientif ic theory of family therapy.

To begin his argument. Shields attempts to define uhat he

claims are the "three areas of philosophy that provide the

foundation for the construction of scientific theories" (p. 360).

Shields states that ontology r e f e r s to a definition of reality.

Next, Shields distinguishes betueen subjective and objective kinds

of reality and methodologies, and classifies the neu

epistemologies as completely subjective theories uhich contain no

c r i t e r i a for objective testing. The author indicates that

metaphysics relates to "concepts used to describe uhat one thinks

is the nature of reality" (p. 361). Shields states that these

concepts are unprovable, and as such, should be kept to a minimum.

The author continues by providing his minimum list of metaphysical

concepts for a scientific theory of family therapy (e.g., "Human

existence is a physical reality," p. 361). Shields concludes by

noting tuo principles that govern the use of these concepts: the

lau of contradiction; and, formal linear logic. "Circular logic

does not produce knouledge of the empirical uorld" (Shields, 1986,

p. 361).

99

Lastly, Shields explores the notion of epistemology.

"Epistemology is the active process of correlating theoretical

constructs uith data derived through sense experience" (Shields,

1986, p. 361). Shields references the uork of Northrup uhen

proposing that differences in Eastern and Uestern uays of knouing

are solved by the method of "tuo-termed epistemic correlation."

The Uest has emphasized the theoretic component of reality, uhile

the East has emphasized aesthetic unity. According to Shields,

the problem of the division of uorld cultures is simply solved by

correlating theory uith sensory data. Shields states,

"Epistemology is not concepts or theories about the aesthetic

component of reality" (p. 362). Shields, in line uith Bogdan,

complains about the unfortunate e f fect of family therapy's

inheritance of Bateson's "practice of calling theory and paradigm,

'epistemology'" (p. 363).

Shields continues by critically analyzing the uritings of

Allman, Keeney, and Dell, as representative of the neu

epistemology. Follouing a br ief , rather distorted, presentation

of each of these three authors. Shields summarily dismisses their

uork as a group of untestable concepts only muddling the field of

family therapy. Shields' reactions to Allman and Keeney's notions

about aesthetics reveal a thoroughgoing misunderstanding of their

urit ings. For example, notice hou Keeney is dismissed in the

follouing (Shields, 1986, p. 365):

Keeney functions in the uorld of mental ideas; the only evidence he o f f e r s for his idea is more ideas. Idea

100

upon idea—this is the method of the philosophy of idealism. Ideas are not knouledge, and, thus, Keeney's uork is only a collection of untested ideas. Ecosystemic epistemology is not epistemology.

Recall Point 2 in Chapter 2 on the notion of difference—our

act of drauing a distinction. Bateson clearly revealed that all

ue have are ideas, and ideas about ideas. And, note fur ther that

a dif ference is intangible, and cannot be localized nor measured.

Shields' position places him squarely in the chasm of the

Cartesian-Neutonian tradit ion uhich dominates social science

thought. Ue read hou Bateson (1972, p. 250) described the

difference:

The difference betueen the Neutonian uorld and the uorld of communication is simply this: that the Neutonian uorld ascribes reality to objects and achieves i ts simplicity by excluding the context of the context— excluding indeed all metarelationships—a f o r t i o r i excluding an inf inite regress of such relations. In contrast, the theorist of communication insists upon examining the metarelationships uhile achieving i ts simplicity by excluding all objects.

I shall not venture into a description of the last portion of

Shields' paper since the t i t le of that section speaks for i tself

(i.e., "Touard minimum requirements for a scientific theory of

family therapy"). I have explored this paper, uith much

dif f iculty, primarily because i t is representative of the thinking

of a majority of those in the field of family therapy. Though

family therapy continues to rely (at the most in uord only) on

such ideas as systems, communication, paradox, and the like, the

field remains almost "totally detached from the netuork of

scientif ic fundamentals" (Bateson, 1972, xix). The predominance

101

of quantitat ive thought (e.g., "Hou can ue measure it?"), and the

exclusion of aesthetics, pat tern, shape, etc., in family therapy

reveals a ]ack of difference from the rest of social science.

As i f Shields' art icle uas not deplorable enough, Tomm's

(1986) response only adds to the muddle. Though claiming to speak

in support of the neu epistemologies, Tomm only continues the

political and semantic domination of "scientism" in family

therapy. Tomm (1986, p. 373) states: "He (Shields) has provided

a uell art iculated crit ique of the 'neu epistemologies' and has

laid some useful grounduork for one direction in uhich our field

could proceed." Shields' crit ique of the "neu epistemologies" is

naively stated, and the "grounduork" he has laid is exactly the

s t u f f upon uhich nothing meaningful can be built. Tomm could have

o f fe red a uorthuhile crit ique of Shields (and the uhole field

primarily) by patterning his response a f t e r Bateson's (cited in

Leeds 8. Dusek, 1981, xxix) reaction to sociobiology:

. . .(Sociobiology's) arguments seemed to me childish -and mainly built on false reif icat ion of one sort or another. . . .And so Uilson and most biologists are still determined to be blind to the existence of ideas, mind, rules, presuppositions, differences, breach of rules, logical types, metaphors, and so on. . .Uilson should read his Alice in Uonderland or Bertrand Russell's Principia and learn that the name of the thing is not the thing. . .A plague in all their houses.

Finally, Falzer (1986) argues in his article "that

epistemology and cybernetics provide an insufficient understanding

of families and family therapy and should be rejected as a

foundation for the field" (p. 354). Of all the articles revieued.

102

Falzer's o f f e r s the only serious challenge to family therapy.

Falzer's concluding call for "an approach that edifies rather than

systematizes" (p. 363) is a point uell taken. Houever, most of

the body of Falzer's art icle reveals a complete absence of

understanding of the uork uhich he crit icizes (i.e., Keeney,

Allman, and Bateson). For example, Falzer spends several pages

detailing the fundamental differences betueen Uatzlauick's

pragmatic approach and Keeney's aesthetic approach. Falzer

incredibly contends that Uatzlauick and his colleagues have

continually avoided the development of a language to systematize

family therapy. Falzer indicates that Uatzlauick and his

colleagues are auare "that Russell's logical system is incapable

of proposing a 'cybernetics of cybernetics' because ue are

prohibited from moving meta to the logical level at uhich meaning

in-forms rather than re-presents" (p. 355). Keeney and others,

according to Falzer, "have proceeded to forge a se l f - re ferent ia l

cybernetics—a system that is ecosystemic and is cast in the

tradit ion of Russell and Bateson" (p. 355).

Falzer speaks of Russell and Bateson in the same breath, but

never points to the fundamental distinction betueen them. Russell

(and Uhitehead) avoided the general insight that logical typing is

essential to human communication. "Logic, in uhich they (Russell

and Uhitehead) believed, uas to be salvaged from the tangles

created uhen logical types, as Russell called them are maltreated

in mathematical presentation" (Bateson, 1979a, p. 129). The

103

°PP°^^^Q °^ Russell's goal (i.e., to save logic from the paradoxes

of maltreated logical types) uas Bateson's lifelong investigation.

For example, Bateson's uork in cross-species communication led him

to conclude (1979a, p. 131): "The metarelations betueen

particular signals may be confused but understanding may emerge

again as t rue at the next more abstract level."

Falzer's main point, that Keeney and others (in the tradit ion

of Bateson) rely upon a hypostasis of logic, is ill-founded and

uithout substance. Falzer fur ther contends that, in contrast to

Keeney, Uatzlauick and his colleagues have heeded the uritings of

Uittgenstein, uho "alerts us to the dominance of logic and the

resultant subjugation of all i t encompasses, (and instead) compels

us to experience that region called 'the mystical'" (p. 363). In

contrast, Falzer (1986, p. 360) states the follouing about Keeney:

For ecosystemic epistemology, metaphors become both the means to represent patterns and the likeness of the patterns themselves—their mirror images. At best, a metaphor is only isomorphic uith i ts essentially unrepresentable re ferent . /

Further, in contending that Bateson's notions about the

relationship betueen mind and nature are founded on logic, Falzer

is completely in er ror . Every schoolboy knous that logic is a

poor model of cause and e f fec t (Bateson, 1979a). Bateson clearly

pointed to the difference betueen logic and metaphor (cf. Bateson

1980b, 1981a), and this is referenced as Point 9 in Chapter 2. As

Bateson (1981, p. 11) stated, "So i t becomes evident that metaphor

is not just pret ty poetry but is, in fact , the mode of connection

104

upon uhich the uorld has been built." Falzer makes no distinction

betueen classical logic (i.e., uhat he actually re fe rs to) and the

logic of metaphor.

I t is unfortunate that Falzer's entire argument is

i l l-defined because his point in favor of exploring the mystical

is essential. Bateson distrusted consciousness as a prime guide,

and, instead, sought to look aluays touard uholeness, pattern,

shape, the aesthetic, and the sacred. Bateson's goal of uedding

rigor and imagination should not be construed as an example of

classical logic. Bateson aluays sought to explore and name the

regularit ies and patterns he experienced and created. Houever,

uhat uas essential for Bateson uas adherence to the aesthetic

preference, "because l i fe rarely asks uhat is logically sound"

(1981a, p. 11).

As can be seen by the foregoing discussion, questions about

aesthetics, pragmatics, epistemology, and the like, continue to be

urestled uith by many in family therapy. The debate in the field

about pragmatics and aesthetics certainly reflects "one of the

fundamental issues in contemporary philosophy and in the

philosophy of science" (Allman, 1982b, p. 416). Unfortunately,

the "debate" has not moved into a "dialogue," uhere the "busyuork"

is replaced uith "relationship." On a more general level,

houever, the proponents on each side of the debate do agree

aesthetics and pragmatics are related in some fashion. Yet, as

Keeney (1982, p. 434) stated, "The field of family therapy

105

continues to uait for a uhole vieu—not aesthetic, not

pragmatic."

I t seems clear that most of the talk on either side of the

debate has said more about the confining structure of occidental

language, thfin about the recursive connection that surely exists

betueen aesthetics and pragmatics. Our culture persistently and

continuously seeks to quantify all that i t is of fered. The logic

of negation uhich underlies the debate betueen aesthetics and

pragmatics in the field of family therapy only points to the

analytical structure of our language. Is i t possible, houever, to

talk about that uhich cannot be categorically analyzed? Bateson

(1972, p. 13) explored one possible option uith Daughter in a

metalogue:

Daughter: Uouldn't i t be a good thing i f people gave UP uords and uent back to only using gestures?

Father: Hmm. I don't knou. Of course ue uould not be able to have any conversations like this. Ue could only bark, or meu, and uaves our arms about, and laugh and grunt and ueep. But i t might be fun—it uould make life a sort of ballet—uith dancers making their oun music.

Bateson believed that formal discourse about the problems of

pat tern in all fields of human activity (including family therapy)

is a necessary beginning i f ue are to stave of f the splitting of

discourse betueen the aesthetic and the pragmatic Yet, Bateson

uas also keenly auare of the possibility (or probability) that the

discourse uould i tsel f become only a method of exploration rather

than an aff i rmation (Boas, e i al., 1949). Bateson often pointed

106

to the difficulty of talking about such ideas as the aesthetic,

the sacred, and pattern. "Do not think as you have been taught to

think especially by language, in terms of those items uhich are

related but aluays think in terms of the relationship betueen

them" (Bateson, 1980a, p. 19).

Bateson has begun the discourse by offering an

epistemological foundation for understanding aesthetics in family

therapy. The overemphasis on techniques in the field has been

countered uith talk and concern about epistemology, aesthetics,

and the larger context of uhich ue are all a part. Keeney (1983a)

has stated, "An aesthetic base for family therapy requires that ue

have the courage to construct and encounter difference. In the

context of dialogue, ue find a truth of recursive connection" (p.

198). The next and final chapter uill explore the implications of

Bateson's aesthetics for family therapy.

107

Notes

1. Bateson (1979a) r e f e r s to hierarchy of orders of recursiveness, and speaks of jumping UP and doun logical levels. Naturally, uhat uas important fo r him uas the notion of d i f ference. I t follous then that his use of the metaphor of hierarchy in no uay entails subjugation of "louer" levels or elevation of "higher" levels. According to Heinz von Foerster, Uarren McCulloch uas one of the f i r s t to suggest the notion of "heterarchy." McCulloch (1945) examined the topology of nervous nets as one of many examples that indicate that preference is c ircular, and thereby revealing that values cannot be subsumed to be magnitudes of some one kind. On the cont rary , " f o r values there can be no common scale" (p. 92). O'Neill (1984) has recently explored possible s t ruc tu res f o r nonhierarchical organizations as a means of providing an al ternat ive to the problems that arise from superioi—subordinate relationship.

2. Coyne, Denner, 8. Ransom (1982) also cr i t ical ly react to an earl ier ar t ic le by Dell (1982) concerning the concept of homeostasis. Houever, no mention is made of Dell's thesis here since i t is not central to the discussion.

3. Uendell Berry (1977 p. 115) provides an excellent example of th is dist inct ion uhen describing the dis integrat ion of marriage as i t moved from dif ference to division.

" In modern marriage, then, uhat uas once a dif ference of uork became a division of uork. And in this division the household uas destroyed as a practical bond betueen husband and u i fe . I t uas no longer a condition but only a place. I t uas no longer a circumstance that required, dignif ied, and reuarded the enactment of mutual dependence, but the s i te of mutual estrangement. Home became a place fo r the husband to go uhen he uas not uorking or amusing himself. I t uas the place uhere the u i fe uas held in servitude."

CHAPTER 5

IMPLICATIONS OF BATESON'S AESTHETICS

FOR FAMILY THERAPY

I am, I think, rather more motivated in terms of aesthetics and shame than in terms of pouer, fears , th rea t , pain, etc.

Gregory Bateson

At the end of his last book. Mind and Nature. Bateson

mentioned the direction he uas taking in uhat uould have been his

next book, uhich he uas going to t i t le , "Uhere Angels Fear to

Tread." In Mind and Nature. Bateson laid out the foundational

points or ideas that he intended to be used for the purpose of

describing uholes rather than only parts. Bateson proposed that

the terminology to deal uith the aesthetic (and the pragmatic)

should be elaborated out of the ideas he presented (or similar

ideas). Bateson told his Daughter in his final metalogue (1979a,

p. 233): "This book had to be done f i r s t . Nou, a f t e r all the

discussion of mind and tautology and immanent differences and

so on, I am beginning to be ready for symphonies and

albatrosses. . ." Bateson uas, of course, re ferr ing to the

beauty in such things as a Beethoven symphony, or the Ancient

Mariner's sea snakes. For Bateson, the experience and exploration

of such beauty uas the only useful reply to crude materialism.

In his last published uorks, ue have a glimpse of the

direction Bateson uas taking in "Uhere Angels Fear to Tread."

Indeed, a footnote to his "Eternal Verit ies" (1981a) indicates

108

109

that Bateson had expected to develop the paper into a chapter

for his next book. Bateson has been cri t icized (e.g., Marcus,

1985) for being caught in a hermeneutic-empiricist bind. That is,

Bateson's early uorks (specifically Naven. 1936) have been seen as

reflecting Bateson's commitments to a tradit ion of scientific

empiricism that embodies the notion of objective representation.

This criticism may be partly valid, but tends to obscure the value

and generativity evident in Bateson's later uorks. Indeed, Naven.

especially as revealed in the second edition's (1958) epilogue,

can be seen as Bateson's early renderings of the foundational

ideas that later appeared in Mind and Nature. Further, criticism

of Bateson's early uork completely overlooks the seminal

transformation that took place during Bateson's encounters uith

cybernetics and information theory. And, also completely

overlooked is any exploration of the ideas and notions he played

uith during the last years before his death in 1980.

The purpose of this last chapter uill be to take a closer

look at Bateson's last published uorks, as they tend to

specifically focus on aesthetics. Follouing, implications of

Bateson's aesthetics for family therapy uill be re fe r red to via

the uorks of Gary Snyder, Uendell Berry, and Steve Tyler. Both

Snyder and Berry participated uith Bateson in the conference "Size

and Shape in Mental Health" (see Chapter 3). As becomes quite

clear from a reading of conference transcript, both Snyder and

Berry seemed intimately connected to Bateson's ideas. Their uork

no

embodies, in large par t , a continuation of Bateson's ideas and

thoughts. Steve Tyler, a post-modernist a f f i l ia ted uith cognitive

anthropology, uould more than likely be considered a potential

cr i t ic of Bateson's urit ings. Yet, as mentioned previously, this

criticism seems based on only part ial and incomplete readings of

Bateson's uork. On the contrary, Tyler's uork, and the

post-modern tradi t ion of uhich he is a part , seems to be a

possible natural extension of uhere Bateson uould be going uere he

still alive. Thus, more general notions of these three authors

uill be outlined and discussed as a forum for exploring the

implications of Bateson's aesthetics for family therapy. This

presentation is not intended to be definitive (as that uould be

inappropriate), but exploratory. Follouing Bateson, the notions

uill remain more general—the dialogic uorking out of them to be

in the hands of the reader, and family therapy as a uhole.

In "Men are Grass: Metaphor and the Uorld of Mental Process"

(1980b), Bateson acknouledges that in order for him to discover

and explore he must s t a r t from the position that "the entire

materialistic or mechanistic language is inappropriate for my use,

and I simply have to have the courage to discard i t" (p. 6). Our

mechanistic language, Bateson states, is appropriate for

description and reflecting back on things, but completely

inappropriate for reflecting foruard upon hou relations betueen

things are organized.

I l l

Bateson uas auare, for example, that there are "better" and

"uorse" uays of hou one classifies the inheritance of acquired

character ist ics. Daruin had avoided the mind/body problem by

leaving mental aspects out of his evolutionary theory. On the

other hand, Lamarck insisted that mind is immanent in living

creatures and can determine their transformations. Houever, the

Lamarckian hypothesis of the "inheritance of acquired

character ist ics" uas an er ror . In Mind and Nature. Bateson set

about to propose a sacred unity of the biosphere that uould be in

contradistinction to the er rors of both Daruin and Lamarck.

Bateson argued that the er rors of both Daruin and Lamarck uere

epistemological e r rors . Bateson (1979a) assumed that the

definition of mind resembles evolution in being a stochastic

process (as opposed to a deterministic process). Bateson

concluded that once ue are uilling "to accept the necessities that

follou from a clear vieu of human dilemmas" (1979a, p. 23), ue

uill then be imbued uith the tools necessary to understand

problems of order and disorder in the biological universe.

Returning houever to Bateson's start ing position in "Men are

Grass," ue see that uhat conscious thought proposes as a clear

vieu (i.e., materialistic classification of things), is actually

useless uhen ue acknouledge that in the unconscious there are no

things, no pigs, no coconut palms, no people, no books, no-thing.

As Bateson (1980b, p. 6) stated, "There are only ideas of pigs and

coconut palms, and people and uhatever." Even more to the point,

112

uhat ue have in the unconscious are relationships of ideas. Uhen

ideas, and ideas about ideas, are cri t icized as not being

knouledge, or as not being "real," ue face squarely the crude

materialism so rampant in social science. Indeed, Bateson himself

uas auare of hou easy i t is to fall back into "the idioms and

styles and concepts of mechanical materialism to escape the

incredible bareness—at f i r s t appearance—of the mental uorld"

(1980b, p. 6). I t is no uonder, then, uhy the uorld of poetry, of

pat tern, of aesthetics, and so on has been consistently denied

entrance into "scientific social science." The uorld of

materialism o f f e r s a complacent familiarity, uhile forever denying

the possibility of experiencing the eternal ver i t ies.

I t is uithin this dilemma that Bateson struggled to talk

about metaphor, the sacred, and aesthetics. In "Seek the Sacred"

(1980a), Bateson pointed to this dilemma uhile describing the very

peculiar protestant universe ue live in. Bateson recalled that

back in the fourteenth and f i f teenth centuries religious groups

uere burning each other at the stake for adhering to certain

propositions. The Catholics uere saying that the bread is. the body

and the uine is. the blood. On the other hand, the Protestants

uere proposing that the bread stands for the body and the uine

stands for the blood. Bateson questioned this apparent difference

that made them uilling to burn people or be burned themselves. He

explained that the "protestant, logical, straight foruard part of

the brain cannot accept (that) 'stands for' and 'is' are the same

113

thing" (1980a, p. 18). The unconscious part of the brain, the

part that dreams and contains no-things, is perfectly uilling to

accept the statement that "the bread is the body."

Bateson, houever, made i t clear that the unconscious, primary

process brain is not to be separated from the conscious brain. In

this regard, both Protestants and Catholics (metaphorically seen

as pragmatists and aestheticians) have damaged the sacramental by

excluding both possibilities as a uhole. As Bateson (1980a, p.

19) stated: "The damage is the taking apart . The sacredness is

the coming together." And Bateson pointed primarily to the uork

of a r t i s t s , poets, and storytel lers as those uho embody the coming

together of both conscious and unconscious levels of mind.

"Poetry provides uays of thinking about the complex levels of

relationship in the infinitely elegant and complex uorld of mind

in nature" (Opitz, 1984, p. 15). Bateson discovered in the uorld

of metaphor a language uith uhich he could experience pattern,

shape, and the aesthet ic Indeed, Gary Snyder (Bateson, e i al.,

1979) stated that poetry returns us to our language in an intense

uay, and, in so doing, pointed to the fact that poetry is part of

the unified language that preceded our mechanistic, materialistic

epistemology.

Bateson uas uell auare that classical logic, as evidenced in

the "syllogism in Barbara (see Point 9, Chapter 2), only accepts

such connections betueen objects as makes sense in materialistic

thinking. Therefore, since Socrates is a man, and all men die.

114

Socrates uill die. Houever, Bateson discovered (uith the help of

a suggestion from a revieuer of his uork) that most of his

thinking took the shape of the logic of metaphor. In metaphor,

connections are made uhich do not make sense in a classical logic

fashion. For example, since grass dies, and men die, men are

grass (another type of syllogism called "affirming the

consequent"). Classical logic makes "sense" but has no shape or

pat tern to i t . For example, consider our many attempts by the use

of s tat is t ics to convince people to discontinue some potentially

dangerous habit (e.g., smoking). The stat ist ics have no shape, no

pattern, and do not communicate to the uhole mind of the listener

or reader. On the other hand, consider the likelihood of change

uhen the story of one person uho has died from lung cancer is

heard by another person. As Uynne (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 154)

noted, "The story (or poetry, or a r t ) has shape uhereas the

stat ist ics don't." Mary Catherine Bateson beautifully noted that

ue put ourselves inside i t (i.e., story, poetry, or a r t ) because

i t has shape. Ue cannot put ourselves inside stat ist ics, or any

other facet of our mechanistic language.

Bateson (1980a) also realized, uith Snyder, that the language

and logic of metaphor reveals a unified language that brings

together the nou disparate levels of mind. Uords such as pattern,

shape, and aesthetic tend to be uhole, unified uords to uhich, as

Bateson indicated, "meaning is not internal." Bateson (1980a, p.

20) r e f e r r e d to this uholeness of metaphoric language:

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That giving oneself permission is very close to the sort of things ue are talking about that things like a r t and things like poetry and rhythmic prayer or uhatever are not in a uay discoveries in the l i teral etymological sense of the uord. They are uncoveries of that uhich one kneu before. Then sacredness has something to do uith this covering and uncovering deeper components.

Yet again, Bateson reminds us that the language of metaphor

is not about any identifiable relata, but aluays about

relationship. Consequently, the beauty of stories and poetry

becomes clearest uhen they are transmitted orally in relationship.

Bateson uould surely applaud the suggestion that in our

clinical uork in family therapy the family's healthfulness, as a

product of our joint uork together, is the poem itself

(Brueggemann, 1985). Unfortunately, ue in family therapy have

tended to assume that our uork/technique as applied to the

family's "problem" is the poem. Our uork must serve something

greater and higher than i tsel f i f i t is to have a moral

consequence. The more family therapy is vieued as essentially

technological, the more i t strays into amorality. "Society has

been blinded by the brilliance of technological advance to the

essentially human a r t of clinical practice" (Brueggemann, 1985, p.

371). Bateson uould also note, houever, that the language of

metaphor is not just pret ty poetry, not either good or bad logic,

but in fact is the "logic upon uhich the biological uorld has been

built. . ." (Bateson, 1980b, p. 11). In this regard, Bateson

points to the fact that the logic of metaphor is as much at home

116

in poetry, a r t , stories and the like, as i t is in the structure of

one's hand, or in the dif ference betueen numbers.

Bateson is uidely cited in family therapy, uith many

d i f fe rent authors claiming s t r ic t adherence to his ideas uhilst

of fer ing radically d i f fe rent suggestions. I t is unfortunate,

houever, that these suggestions (either supporting Bateson, or

requesting that ue leave him behind) tend to act in an unethical

fashion. That is, the suggestions (e.g., "Bateson's epistemology

is a semantic pollutant and should be disregarded") tend to

decrease the number of possible choices to those uho uould heed

them.* Heinz von Foerster 's (1981, p. 308) ethical imperative

states: "Act aluays so as to increase the number of choices."

Additionally, carrying the analogy of the poem fur ther , our uork

in family therapy, to the extent that i t solely functions in the

domain of the technological, can be seen more as a vulgar

fract ionation of complexity (or poetry gone sour). Von Foerster's

(1981, p. 308) aesthetical imperative states: " I f you desire to

see, learn hou to act." Houever, our "act" must emanate from a

sense of ethical relationship uith those families ue come in

contact uith i f our "act" is to have both practical and spiritual

consequences.

Bateson uas just beginning to ur i te about his explorations

into metaphor, aesthetics, pattern, shape and the like at the time

of his death. For those of us uho desire (or require) objective,

definit ive ansuers to our questions, Bateson's last uritings

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provide l i t t le help. Houever, Bateson's intention uas not to

provide ansuers, but to make the questions bigger. As Bateson

(1979a, p. 237) told Daughter in the last lines of his final

metalogue:

Daughter: And the next book? Father: Uill s t a r t from a map of the region uhere

angels fear to tread. Daughter: A vulgar map? Father: Perhaps. But I do not knou uhat uill

follou the map and enclose i t in some

uider and more diff icult question.

Family therapy has groun from infant stages to an upright

position in the last feu decades. Undoubtedly, the majority in

family therapy uould like to see this grouth trend continue to a

point of full maturity, uhere ue ualk completely on our feet . I t

can be argued, houever, uhether ue are actually standing on our

oun fee t , or simply borrouing the legs of the "beast" ue sought to

break auay from. In any case, as Bateson (Boas, e i al., 1949, p.

19-c) noted, i t seems clear that ue may have forgotten that

"perhaps the process of learning to ualk is more exciting than

ualking." I t is no uonder uhy Bateson ended his talk during the

conference "Size and Shape in Mental Health"—a conference uhose

particular focus uas to explore aesthetics in the field of mental

health—uith a recitat ion of the th i r ty-e ighth chapter of Job.

God comes out of the uhirluind and tells Job to be silent since he

knous nothing of the beauty and the mystery of the universe. "The

poets have knoun these things all through the ages, but the rest

of us have gone astray into all sorts of false reif ications of the

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'self and separations of the 'self and 'experience'" (Bateson,

1972, p. 463).

Gary Snvder

Gary Snyder uon the Pulitzer Prize for poetry in 1975. He

began urit ing poetry in the late 1940's, and continues today to

u r i te , uith his most recent collection entitled Lef t Out in the

Rain (1986). At the beginning of the conference "Size and Shape

in Mental Health" Snyder (Bateson, e i al., 1979, p. 4) described

himself as follous:

I'm Gary Snyder. I'm a North Pacific basin person, uhich is to say I knou the trees, the birds, and the ueather from the Rocky Mountains to Japan, but I don't knou anything on this side of the Rockies. I uorked a l i t t le at anthropology at one time, and then I uent into Far Eastern studies and I lived ten years in Japan, uorking in Zen Buddhist studies. I've been back in this country nou for ten years farming. I do forest ry , raising a family in the Sierra Nevada, and going out on the road as a hunter and gatherer periodically.

Gary Snyder, through his poetry and prose, speaks for

protection as against production, for stability as against grouth,

and for quality as against quantity. Snyder's uork continues a

tradi t ion of belief that the outer and inner l ife are aluays

connected, and that poetry is the voice of the universe reflecting

on this eternal connection. All of Snyder's uork "draus i ts

substance and forms from the broadest range of people's day-to-day

lives, enmeshed in the facts of uork, the real trembling in joy

and gr ief , thankfulness for good crops, the health of a child, the

uarmth of the lover's touch" (McLean, 1980, in the introduction to

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The Real Uork, x i i i ) . Snyder (McLean, 1980, p. 4) has described

his poetry as follous:

My poems, on one level, call the society's at tent ion to i t s ecological relationships in nature, and to i t s relationships in the individual consciousness. Some of the poems shou hou society doesn't see i t s position in nature. Uhat are ue going to do u i th this planet? I t ' s a problem of love, not the humanistic love of the Uest -but a love that extends to animals, rocks, d i r t , all of i t . Uithout th is love, ue can end, even uithout uar, u i th an uninhabitable place.

For Snyder, value lies in uhether a system enables oneself to

be in close personal responsibi l i ty and contact ui th the patterns

that naturally exist. For example, Snyder points to the fact that

most people don't knou uhere their uater comes from because i t is

supplied by devices outside our knouledge and understanding.

Snyder has chosen to connect to his place, in the San Juan Ridge

of Northern California, by truly loving and knouing the land and

people. As Snyder (McLean, 1980, p. 55) has said: "The pleasures

are numerous and the uork is hard, and one is l i teral ly less

alienated from one's uater, one's fuel, one's vegetables, and so

f o r t h . Those are fundamentals, those are ancient fundamentals."

And, in so describing these fundamentals, Snyder has (unknouingly)

heeded the uords of Bateson (1981a, p. 8), "As I see i t , the

proposit ions that Augustine uas interested in and uhich he called

the Eternal Ver i t ies are, in a sense, latent in Pleroma, only

uait ing to be labelled by some scientist." Or some poet!

Snyder vieus himself as very practical, though most of us are

accustomed to reserving the uork of the poet as accessible to all

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but a feu. But as Snyder (McLean, 1980, p. 159) says, "Biological

diversi ty , and the integr i ty of organic evolution is uhere I take

my stand," and this is inevitably the stand of the poet. The

aesthetic and the pragmatic are intimately connected in Snyder's

uork, and he invites us in like fashion to participate uith our

oun place. In the follouing poem, Snyder (1986, p. 161) speaks of

uhat history fails to mention.

"Uhat history fails to mention is"

Uhat history fails to mention is

Most everybody lived their lives Uith friends and children, played i t cool. Left truth 8. beauty to the guys

Uho tricked for bigshots, and uere fools.

Snyder points to the fact that ue are all intimately

connected in community, although ue have an ever-increasing

concern about being isolated. To the extent that ue remain

dependent on neus from the outside, ue do indeed experience

"isolation." Yet, "to serve mankind's interests uell and to make

the greatest possible development of the creative potential

available does not require either numbers of human beings or a

complex society" (Snyder, in McLean, 1980, p. 29). For Snyder,

the uay to serving mankind's interests uell is to return to the

earth, to get back in touch uith people, and to get into your

original mind before any books uere put into i t .

Reinhabitation r e f e r s to Snyder's concern and commitment to

a sense of place. Our occidental culture tends to reuard anyone

uho jumps at the chance for quick prof i t , especially as that

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entails constant migratory movement. Instead of staying put and

experiencing a sense of place, ue reuard those uho move constantly

and do feu things uell. "But the actual demands of a l i fe

committed to a place, and living someuhat by the sunshine green

plant energy that is concentrating on that spot, are so physically

and intellectually intense, that i t is a moral and spiritual

choice as uell" (Snyder, 1977, p. 65). Deeply connected to

Snyder's sense of place is a stand against consumption. This

consumption is epitomized, for example, by the fact that our tuo

biggest exports from Neu York Harbor to the rest of the uorld are

scrap paper and scrap metal. Affluence, comfort, and eternal

progress are the goals of this consumptive behavior that has

created a crisis situation of overdependence, rather than

interdependence. Ue hear Snyder (1970, p. 47) speak of our sad

condition in the follouing poem.

"The Trade"

I found myself inside a massive concrete shell lit by glass tubes, uith air pumped in, uith levels joined by moving sta irs .

I t uas full of the things that uere bought and made in the tuentieth century. Layed out in trays or shelves.

The throngs of people of that century, in their style, clinging garb made on machines,

Uere trading all their precious time for things.

In contrast to consumption, Snyder points to "the real uork."

Our occidental culture lives a dream that somehou ue're all going

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to get auay from having to do uork. Ue have even created the myth

that since ue nou spend more time in leisure than in uork, ue

require proper instruction concerning hou ue should best

experience our leisure time. But as Snyder notes, ue'll aluays do

uork, especially the uork ue desperately flee from—"to hoe in

the ground, or gather uild potato bulbs uith digging sticks, or

hand-adze a beam, or skin a pole, or scrape a hive" (Snyder, in

McLean, 1980, p. 81). Snyder (McLean, 1980) told a story about

uhen he uas uorking for a t ra i l creu up in Yosemite Park. The

uork involved long, hard hours clearing, maintaining, and creating

tra i ls . At f i r s t , he t r ied to exercise his mind (by thinking

about the reading he uas doing at night) uhile his body did the

uork on the t ra i l . Snyder discovered, houever, that this

mind-body splitting uas robbing him of something much greater.

"And that uas uhere I f i r s t learned the possibility of being one

uith uhat you uere doing, and not losing anything of the mind

thereby" (Snyder, in McLean, 1980, p. 8). Snyder's constant

metaphor (and reality) is the cycles of the earth i tself . As

opposed to consumption, Snyder (1983, p. 11) speaks of connecting

mind and body, soul and earth.

"On Top"

All this neu stuff goes on top turn it over turn it over uait and uater doun. From the dark bottom turn it inside out let it spread through, sift doun, even.

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Uatch i t sprout.

A mind like compost.

In response to the question of hou can our dependence on the

grouing technology be suitched around, Snyder (McLean, 1980, p.

88) responds, "All that can be said is that ue can balance that

out by the uork ue do for the community on the positive side."

Uithin family therapy, this question about balance is asked much

too infrequently. Ue find ourselves in family therapy oft times

feeling sad because, though ue're involved in a service uhich is

implicitly valid, i t is also intimately connected to the economic

grouth system uhich is gone aury. Ue in family therapy make up a

netuork of people uho speak the same language and more or less

agree uith each other (i.e., there are feu differences uhich make

a dif ference in family therapy discourse). But, as Snyder

reminds us, there is also the community, uho are the people in the

place that you live. Snyder (McLean, 1980, p. 90) continues:

The thing about a community is that you don't all agree uith each other and there are problems that you have to live and uork out over a long scale of time. I find for my uork and my oun spiritual grouth that the kind of l i fe that happens in community is, i f anything, more valuable than that of the netuork. Because the netuork really does encourage you to think you're important, but the community doesn't.

Family therapy is mostly involved uith tr iv ia l netuorking,

based on a hierarchic structure that proposes some to be "masters"

and others "novices." I f Richard Rabkin, and others, are correct

in their estimation that psychiatry is producing mental insanity,

uhat can be truthful ly said for family therapy? Uith family

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therapy's push touard credentialing, licensure, accreditation and

the like, i t seems clear ue must place ourselves uithin uhat

Snyder calls "global consciousness"—the imposition of a

not-so-benevolent technocracy on everything via a centralized

system. Ue must uork, on the contrary, as "family therapists" in

our oun communities touard "planetary thinking." Snyder (McLean,

1980, p. 126) explains planetary thinking:

Decentralist, seeks biological rather than technological solutions, and finds i ts teachers for i ts alternative possibilities as much in the transmitted skills of natural peoples of Papua and the headuaters of the Amazon as in the l ibraries of the high Occidental civilizations. /

Our sense of place is rightfully in our family and community,

and not primarily in our individual abstractions of our netuork.

"And poetry to be poetry has to speak from a deeper place than the

private individual" (Snyder, in McLean, 1980, p. 38).

Uendell Berry

Uendell Berry is a u r i te r and a farmer uho lives on the land

of his ancestors near Port Royal, Kentucky. Berry has ur i t ten

several novels, books of poetry, and many essays. Throughout his

urit ings. Berry (1981, ix) states:

Unconsciously perhaps from the beginning, and more and more consciously during the last sixteen or seventeen years, my uork has been motivated by a desire to make myself responsibly at home both in this uorld and in my native and chosen place. As I have slouly come to understand i t , this is a long term desire, proposing the uork not of a lifetime but of generations.

125

As a farmer. Berry, in his daily l i fe , as in his urit ing,

commits himself to labor in the soil. Like Snyder, Berry's

metaphor of l i fe and death is the cycles of f e r t i l i t y in the

ear th . An organic farm, an organic mind, or uhat have you "is not

one that uses certain methods and substances and avoids others; i t

is a farm uhose structure is formed in imitation of the structure

of a natural system" (Berry, 1981, p. 72). Our uholeness is only

possible as ue responsibly accept our partiality—"living rooted

in one's oun perpetual decay, allouing for connection, for the

cross-pollination that lets flouers bear their message from the

earth" (Elder, 1985, p. 61).

Gary Snyder (McLean, 1980, p. 124) has said of Uendell Berry:

Uendell Berry is a man uho does very high-quality uork and is also a uorking farmer and a uorking thinker, uho draus on the best of American roots and traditional mindfulness, like his Kentucky farming forbears, to teach us something that ue're not going to learn by studying Oriental texts.

To opt for quality, pattern, and aesthetics, as Bateson did,

is a universal experience. Long before our occidental mechanistic

uay of thinking took firm hold on this land, there uas something

like Oriental uisdom here. For Berry, "Ue are uorking uell uhen

ue use ourselves as the fellou creatures of the plants, animals,

materials, and other people ue are uorking uith. Such uork is

unifying, healing" (1977, p. 140).

In "Discipline and Hope" (1972 8. 1981), Berry exposes the

perverted politics of our culture and points instead to the only

meaningful value, " the l i fe and health of the uorld" (1981, p.

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217). Throughout his urit ings, i t is clear that Berry does not

separate moral values from other values. On the contrary, the

questions that Berry asks are ones that are in the tradit ion of

the discipline of Job—questions that are moral and aesthetic as

uell as practical (in the fullest and best sense). For Berry, the

aesthetic and pragmatic, moral and practical are intimately

connected. "A man uho produces a fact or an idea has not

completed his responsibility to i t until he sees that i t is uell

used in the uorld" (Berry, 1981, p. 185). Unfortunately, as Berry

tragically makes clear through many of his uorks, ue are a culture

bent on adhering to destructive divisions of body from soul, body

from earth , and body from mind. This division is evident in

religion, agriculture, and marriage, as Berry details in "The Body

and the Earth" (1977 8. 1981), but i t is also the case in all parts

of the psychotherapy uorld (including family therapy). A standard

of efficiency has almost universally replaced the standard of

quality. Instead of asking of a person uhat they can do uell, the

standard of efficiency asks them uhat they can do fast and cheap.

This standard of efficiency is accompanied by an obsession

uith obtaining immediate ends—an obsession "that is degrading,

that destroys our disciplines, and (that) drives us to our

inflexible concentration upon number and price and size" (Berry,

1981, p. 195). Echoing Snyder's uords about netuorks, Berry

(1981, p. 159) reveals the particular destructive force of

specialization:

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That IS, specialization has tended to drau the specialist touard the discipline that uill lead to the discovery of neu facts or processes uithin a narrouly defined area, and i t has tended to lead him auay from or distract him from those disciplines by uhich he might consider the e f fec ts of his discovery upon human society or upon the uorld.

Berry notes that our culture is totally focused on things,

and on the consumption of things, uithout respect for quality.

Further , Berry hits the academic institutions uhere they lie uhen

stating that academia no longer educates but only trains and

specializes. For example, "The careerist teacher judges himself,

and is judged by his colleagues, not by the influence he is having

upon his students or the community, but by the number of his

publications, the size of his salary and the status of the place

to uhich his career has taken him thus far" (Berry, 1981, pp.

193-194).

In "Standing by Uords" (1983), Berry concerns himself uith

the accountability of language. The tuo epidemic illnesses of our

time—the disintegration of community and the disintegration of

persons—are exactly of epidemic proportion, according to Berry,

because our language has broken the communion of the inuard and

the outuard. That is, our language is detached from its source in

communal experience by the fact that i t is arb i t rary in origin and

provisional in use. One need only read most texts in the social

sciences to experience the shapeless sentences contained therein—

"uords and things, uords and deeds, uords and people fail to

stand in reliable connection or f idelity to one another" (Berry,

128

1983, p. 62). Indeed, technical skills may be readily apparent,

but alone, uithout the larger disciplines of community and fa i th ,

they fa i l of their meaning and intended aim. And, as Berry notes,

the ultimate discipline is fa i th , the mystery of the system of

systems that causes a person to be the creature of his principles,

not his circumstances.

The disciplines of community and fa i th are evident uhen Berry

talks about poetry: "Once the poem is understood as serving a

t ru th outside and greater than i tself , the poet serves the poem

uith his or her uhole l i fe , not just uith 'talent,' observation,

ideas, verbal g i f ts , and so on" (1983, p. 100). The poem, any

uork of a r t , indeed everything exists for a harmony greater than

i tsel f . In the follouing poem, Berry (1985, p. 249) invites the

reader to sense the cycling of community, fa i th , uork, l ife,

death, and reb i r th .

"From the Distance"

1. Ue are others and the earth, the living of the dead. Remembering uho ue are, ue live in eternity; any solitary act is uork of community.

2. All times are one i f heart delight in uork, i f hands join the uorld r ight.

3. The uheel of eternity is turning in time, i ts rhymes, austere.

129

at long intervals returning, sing in the mind, not in the ear.

4. A man of fa i th fu l thought may feel in light, among the beasts and fields, the turning of the uheel.

5. Fall of the year: at evening a f ra i l mist rose, glouing in the rain. The dead and unborn dreu near the f i r e . A song, not mine,

s tu t tered in the flame.

Uendell Berry is standing by his uords in Lane's Landing,

Kentucky, f ive miles from uhere he uas born and raised. "The

Long-Legged House" (1969 8. 1981) is Berry's account of the Camp

uhere he uas born, reared, and returned to live uith his neu

bride. There he learned nature's most important lesson: "The

most important learning, that of experience, can neither be

summoned nor sought out" (1981, p. 71). One cannot hurry such

learning. The thing to do is to be attentively present. In this

country of marriage. Berry has been born in mind and spirit as

uell as in body. In contrast, our occidental culture has come to

expect too much from the technological domain outside ourselves.

The linear vision of our culture places i ts emphasis on the uaxing

side of the uheel of eternity—on production, grouth, quantity,

and possession. In contrast to the linear vieu, the cyclic vieu

is obedient to the natural processes of nature, patient in i ts

taking auay, and fa i th fu l to i ts returns. Our culture, our

130

systems, indeed our family therapy has been urong. As Berry (1981,

p. 98) eloquently states:

Ue have been urong. Ue must change our lives, so that i t uill be possible to live by the contrary assumption that uhat is good for the uorld uill be good for us. And that requires that ue make the e f f o r t to knou the uorld and to learn uhat is good for i t . Ue must learn to cooperate in i ts processes, and yield to i ts limits. But even more important, ue must learn to acknouledge that the creation is full of mystery; ue uill never entirely understand i t . Ue must abandon arrogance and stand in aue. Ue must recover the sense of the majesty of creation, and the ability to be uorshipful in i ts presence. For I do not doubt that i t is only on the condition of humility and reverence before the uorld that our species uill be able to remain in i t .

Steve Tyler

Steve Tyler may loosely be identified as a cognitive

anthropologist in terms of academic discipline. But, more to the

point, Tyler is a voice of post-modernism, and in particular, the

post-modernism of anthropology and ethnography. Before discussing

post-modernism, houever, one must examine the nature of modernism.

Much of Tyler's urit ing is in fact a juxtaposing of the perils of

modernism uith the evocation of post-modernism. Perhaps the

follouing passage from Tyler's The Said and the Unsaid (1978, p.

3) most succinctly reveals his critique of modernism:

All of the sciences of man signify and arise from the fractur ing of an organic uhole; all promulgate themselves as authentic replacements for i t ; and all substitute a spurious analytical total i ty for holistic unity. They are but fumbling e f f o r t s of one kind of consciousness to reconstitute the sundered unity of another kind of consciousness.

131

For Tyler (e.g., 1983), the fracturing of the organic uhole

has mainly been accomplished by the establishment of the visual

metaphor (i.e., seeing) as the privileged sensorial mode in

occidental culture. Further, and more debilitating, ue have

denigrated the veracity of the other senses, especially the

verbal /auditory. Intimately connected uith the elevation of the

visual metaphor is our exclusive focus on representation, and more

to the point, on representing "things." That is to say, our

modern mode of thought requires st r ic t distinctions betueen

observer and observed, betueen sign and signified, and betueen

text and uhat is r e f e r r e d to in text. As Tyler (1984a, p. 22)

explains:

There is aluays a constant uorld of things and a separate uorld of signs, and this defines the essential problematic as one of uords and things and leads us to overemphasize mimesis, description, and correspondence theories of t ru th , and tr icks us into thinking of language as i f i t uere a calculus uhere ue can abstract signs auay from their representational functions and t rea t them as "pure forms", focusing exclusively on their collocation. I t is the source, in other uords, of the major intellectual crimes of history.

Just as Berry and Snyder have argued against the linear,

mechanistic vision of our culture (i.e., modernism), so Tyler

speaks against our philosophical tradit ion of observation of

particulars and inductive generalization. Tyler's main area for

exposing the hegemony of Uestern culture is that genre of urit ing

knoun as ethnography. In claiming to be a representation of some

native l i fe , ethnography can be vieued as an intertextual

practice, seeking to set l i tera ture aside in favor of objectivity.

132

To accomplish this objective translation, the ethnographer employs

key concepts, appellations, and uords that point the reader to a

uhole litany of texts and commentaries. Tyler (1984a, PP. 9-10)

explains:

Ethnographers project their fragmentary and incomplete experience of exotic cultures onto a rhetorical format that creates the illusion of a comprehensive and coherent uhole, and readers, by prior acquaintance uith this form, fi l l in missing parts, creating in their imaginations uhat is not given but must be there by implications draun from the form itself .

The o f t cited role of the ethnographer as

"participant-observer" neither reveals the participation of the

native and ethnographer speaking together, nor the ethnographer's

s t r ic t observation unmediated by talk, but "signifies the

subordination of participation to observing and the use of

participation as a deception, as a means of establishing a

position from uhich to observe" (Tyler, 1984a, p. 14). Further,

Tyler suggests that the ethnographer sees the native only through

eyes bandaged uith texts, the native being both the sign and the

signified. And as such, "the ethnographer's text reveals a vision

of a uay of l i fe only inasmuch as i t takes auay the living

dialogue, for the le t ter of ethnography killeth" (Tyler, 1984a, p.

16).

In contrast, Tyler (1986) proposes that post-modern

ethnography is neither scientific (i.e., representational) or

political (i.e., persuasive) but is, as the prefix ethno- implies,

ethical. Instead of describing some knouledge or producing some

133

action, post-modern ethnography proceeds as an evocation—a

meditative vehicle for the transcendence of time and place. In

contrast to the modernist urge to pouer through knouledge,

post-modern ethnography presents a neu kind of holism that is

emergent rather than given. Joining uith Bateson, Tyler reminds

us that in a post-modern ethnography there are no "things." "A

post-modern ethnography is a cooperatively evolved text consisting

of fragments of discourse intended to evoke in both reader and

u r i t e r an emergent fantasy of a possible uorld of commonsense

real i ty. . ." (Tyler, 1986, p. 6). Tyler joins uith Snyder and

Berry in suggesting that poetry most clearly embodies a

post-modern ethnography, especially as poetry evokes memories of

the ethos of the community. Further, as ue "stand by our uords"

(cf. Berry, 1983) in poetry ue connect uith our place and are

provoked thereby to act ethically. Indeed, ue see in post-modern

ethnography, as in the uork of Snyder and Berry, that uhat someone

says and does—their uords and deeds—are far more important than

uhat one thinks.

The linear vision of scientific knouledge has failed to

produce a coherent system of knouledge, even though all d i f ferent

disciplines share the unity of a "rational" method. As science

has communicated better and better about i tself (i.e., scientific

methods), i t has less and less to say about the natural order of

things in the uorld. Tyler has classified uhat is done by those

uithin scientific modernism as "phony" uork. That is, "phony

134

uorkers (move) no-thing except symbols" (Tyler, 1984b, p. 8). In

contrast , Tyler points to the uork done in the uorld of antiquity

and most of the uorld ue choose to call underdeveloped as "real"

uork. As Gary Snyder (McLean, 1980, p. 82) says:

I f ue can live the uork ue have to do, knouing that ue are real, and i t 's real, and that the uorld is real, then i t becomes right. And that's the real uork: to make the uorld as real as i t is, and to find ourselves as real as ue are uithin i t .

Tyler fu r ther clar i f ies that "phony" uork can be t ruthfu l (as

in the "uill to truth"), but can never be honest. That is, "truth

is aluays part of a fable, of something told, a thing of uords

alone, but honesty is both uord and deed and that is uhy English

gives no agentive force outside the context of telling" (Tyler,

1984b, p. 13). The discourse of post-modernism facil i tates

mystery created in the negotiation of speakers and hearers seeking

to understand and be understood. Tyler suggests that uriting

turns attention to i tsel f apart from the uorld, or focuses on the

uorld uhile making i tsel f absent. The dualism of modernism folds

in on i tsel f , making either possibility an eventual impossibility.

The constitutive mode of oral discourse, houever, presents a unity

of sign and signified, of uord and uorld. Do ue give UP uriting

altogether? Tyler (1984b, pp. 24-25):

Post-modern urit ing rejects this modernist mimesis in favor of a urit ing that "evokes" or "call to mind" not by completion and similarity, but by suggestion and dif ference. The function of the text is not to be seen as depicting or revealing i tself in uhat i t says, but to be "seen through" by uhat i t cannot say, to shou uhat i t cannot say and say uhat i t cannot shou.

135

Bateson uas faced at the end of his l i fe uith the dilemma of

trying to explore the uorld of shape, pattern, and aesthetics

uithin a dominant epistemology of materialism. He had just begun

to explore the logic of metaphor, vieuing i t as the foundational

logic of the biological universe. Tyler has suggested that the

dilemma that faced Bateson uill soon give uay to the final

revolution of post-modernism. Perhaps, yet uhat seems more clear

is that family therapy (and each one of us) is faced uith the

realization that our scientific discourse is completely separate

from community and honesty. Ue have created an imagined community

of discourse from uhich a univocal narrative speaks of "truth" but

never in honesty. The uords, concepts, appellations, and the like

of family therapy merely redundantly point back on themselves,

never allouing the emergent mystery betueen speaker and listener

(or therapist and client) to occur.

Tyler has outlined our predicament and of fered the unifying

uord of post-modernism instead. He has spoken the uords and ue,

together as listeners, face the choice of responding in ethical

fashion. Gary Snyder and Uendell Berry, in their oun unique yet

similar uays, embody a kindred spirit in standing by their uords.

That is, the unity of uord and deed is realized in the

interconnection of their u r i t ten uork and life in their community.

The poetry of Snyder and Berry is not just "pretty" (cf. Bateson,

1980b) in i ts textual form, but returns us to our original ethos

in community. The "real" uork for family therapy begins uith the

136

end of our scientific discourse of "phony" uork. The implications

of Bateson's aesthetics for family therapy cannot be uritten in

completion and similarity, but only by suggestion and difference.

Ue end by returning to our beginning, as Slater (1974, p. 212)

says:

To reclaim ourselves and our environment ue need to drain energy from the narcissistic tumor that possesses us; to listen, sense, and be here; to retrieve uhat ue have cast off, to repossess uhat ue have projected onto others, to make uhole uhat ue have truncated; to move together in a reciprocal dance of integrity and grace. Ue keep searching for the stargate, but it is not hidden. Hovering delicately in the spaces betueen things, it has been there all the time.

137

Note

1. An example of a suggestion supporting Bateson that tends to act in an unethical fashion can be found in an article by Dell (1985). Dell makes the false assumption that Bateson, by using "epistemology" to include "ontology," has given epistemology priority over ontology. Houever, uhat uas central for Bateson uas the complementarity of ideas. Consequently, Dell supports Bateson but unethically undoes complementarity in favor of hierarchy.

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