LESSON PLANV1.0

Copyright © 2014 - Reid Kirby, All Rights Reserved.

If you have any suggestions or recommendation on how to improve this lesson plan, please contact the author at rkirby@eximdyne.com.

This lesson plan is for use in conjunction with The Sergeant: A Biological Missile textbook as student training material (ISBN: 978-0-9677264-5-8 ). The book may be purchased individually through Barnes & Noble, Amazon.com, and other online book retailers. Contact the author for special bulk sale discounts for classroom use, including guest lecturing if desired.

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OverviewStylized as a comic book, The Sergeant illustrates key concepts and provides a framework for approximating biological weapon effects. It is intended to be used as an entertaining educational resource for instructing researchers and ana-lysts on biological weapons through a tangible historical example in either a seminar or college course.

The comic book format was chosen deliberately to make the subject approachable. Comics have also been used as an effective medium in the United States Army, for example DA Pam 750-30 The M16A1 Rifle Operation and Preven-tative Maintenance (http://www.ep.tc/problems/25/index.html). Cartoonist Will Eisner illustrated what would be an otherwise dull topic into something that would be widely read by soldiers in the field, and was the illustrator for PS Magazine, an Army monthly periodical on preventative maintenance.

Rather than instruct on the nature of biological weapons using abstract and theoretical depictions, The Sergeant is a fictionalized DA Pam focused on every aspect of the M210 Biological Warhead for the MGM-29 Sergeant Missile. It is a self-contained publication which is historically authentic on how the United States Army would have conducted biological operations circa-1968. It is also technically accurate in that it will reproduce the weapon effects estimates United States military planners made during the 1960s. Its framework may be used to assess contemporary scenarios involving biological weapons, as many regional threats are at a comparable technology point (e.g., SCUD missile with cluster bomblet warhead filled with wet-type Anthrax).

AnticipatoryFrom 1943 to 1969 The United States had an active biological weapons program. While there were over two hundred biological weapon systems developed, only a small number of these reached the point of acceptance by the military establishment. One of these was the M210 Biological Warhead for the MGM-29 Sergeant Missile. It was a Standard A item for use on the nuclear battlefield containing 720 M-143 3.4-inch spherical bursting bomblets to inflict mass casualties with Tularemia (Rabbit Fever).

The M210 represented the state of the art of biological weapons in the 1960s. The Sergeant: A Biological Missile is a comic book styled fictionalized Army pamphlet that describes how the United States would have conducted biological operations with the M210 Biological Warhead in 1968. The relevance today is that of the nations which may attempt acquiring biological weapons; these are in technology terms comparable to the M210. Also, the approach to estimat-ing biological weapon effects can be applied to most any biological weapon system using self-dispersing bomblets.

Objectives1) Historically, that the United States had a biological weapons program from 1943 to 1969, its organiza-tional roles and national policies, and that the M210 biological warhead was a Standard A item that had not been procured.

2) Theoretically, the principles of war, targeting, capabilities, posology, and generalized effects of biological weapons pertinent to military operations.

3) Logistically, the stockpile-to-target-sequence of biological weapons and how to estimate weapon effects for specific scenarios to understand the elements influencing military planning.

4) Defensively, the protective actions available against biological weapons and influence on outcomes.

5) Alternatively, the synergy of biological-nuclear operations and possibilities of improved or alternative biological weapon technologies to biological weapon effects.

ScheduleIdeally, The Sergeant should be introduced into a curriculum as a workshop or lab exercise, with the book being dis-tributed at the onset of the presentation, or the day before. In this manner it can be integrated into cirriculum as a seminar, or over a week of course-work.

InstructionalA biological weapon is an integrated device consisting of agent (e.g., wet-type Tularemia), disseminaiton means (e.g., bursting bombletsr), and delivery system (e.g., missile warhead). It is a capability when there is also a platform to use it (e.g., a Sergeant missile), and a threat when there is a force trained and equiped to make use of it (e.g., a biological weapons establishment). The following is background information for use in lecture on the historical, theoretical, logistical, defensive, and alternative objectives of this lesson plan.

Historical – The United States began its biological weapons program in 1943 through cooperation with British and Canadian biological warfare researchers. The program had equal priority as the Manhattan Project, but did not com-plete safe-operation validation of its production facility in Vigo, Indiana before the Second World War ended. The 500-lb cluster bomb with its 108 4-lb bomblets for disseminating Anthrax was not available during the war.

In the years following the Second World War biological weapons were noted as important to the nation’s defense along with nuclear weapons in most policy papers. This was at a time when there was a scarcity of nuclear weapons, and interest dissipated as the nuclear arsenal grew. Even though there were over 200 biological weapon concepts, only the following gained any sort of acceptance by the military establishment:

• The M33 500-lb cluster bomb containing 108 M114 4-lb bomblets for disseminating Porcine Brucellosis (NX). 23,900 cluster bombs procured with production of NX and filling capabilities maintained from 1954 – C. 1962. USAF initially planned to use the M33/M114/NX in strategic bombing from B-50 bombers in combination with nuclear weapons, but plans switched to use against Soviet ground forces in combination with cluster bombs of Sarin (GB) throughout the so-called “Retardation Zone” in Europe when operational suitability tests indicated logistical problems. The war plans were canceled in 1954, and after 1958 there were no bombers in the USAF inventory to deliver.

• The M210 31-inch guided missile warhead containing 720 M143 3.4-inch bursting spherical bomblets for disseminating Tularemia (TT). The warhead was a Standard A item for the MGM-29 Sergeant missile in 1964. By 1968, without approved war plans calling for its use, the M210/M143/TT was rescinded and it

did not go into full-rate production.

• The Aero-14/B spray tank with M537 BW mod kit for disseminating Q Fever (MN) and Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (FX). There were 200 Aero-14/B spray tanks procured in 1955, but they required be-ing refurbished in 1961 and were not available for use as a biological weapon until after C. 1962. In 1967 6,400-gallons of MN and FX were procured as frozen pellets to support approved contingency plans, and by 1968 there was 4,400-gallons of MN and 3,950-gallons of FX frozen pellets in the stockpile to support these plans.

• The “Big Five” a series of minor biological weapons for use by Special Forces. This included the M1 Bio-dart to deliver either 1g Botulinum Toxin A (XR) or Saxitoxin (TZ) from a 7.62mm rifle, the M2 Separable Bullet to deliver a 15g aerosol puff of either XR or Anthrax (TR2) inside a room from a 7.62mm rifle, the M4 Disseminator to deliver 75g of Tularemia (ZZ) as a sabotage device, the M5 Depositor to deliver 150g of TR2 as an anti-convoy device, and the M32 Disperser for disseminating 700g of Tularemia as an off-target generator. These were procured C. 1964 to support unconventional warfare for unknown plans.

The Biological Program was under the auspices of the United States Army Chemical Corps until 1962 when the Army reorganized and moved its technical functions under the Army Material Command (AMC). The research, develop-ment, engineering, test and evaluation, and production of biological weapons were under the AMC’s Munitions Com-mand (MUCOM). The Commandant of the United States Army Chemical School became the Chief of Chemical under the reorganization and continued to represent the center for biological warfighting doctrine.

Prior to 1969 the formal policy concerning biological weapons was not well defined (see page 6 of The Sergeant). The National Security Council (NSC) began formal policy study of the chemical biological weapons programs on the in-sistence of Secretary of Defense Melvin Liard. After several months the NSC made its recommendations to President Richard M. Nixon, who on 25 November 1969 unilaterally declared the United States would not engage in offensive biological warfare. Following his decision, the stockpile of biological agents, weapons and facilities were destroyed. By 1975 an international prohibition against biological weapons took effect (the Biological Weapons Convention).

Theoretical – Review pages 7 – 19 of The Sergeant.

• Targeting. It may be useful to introduce the terms Counter-Value (e.g., cities), and Counter-Force (e.g., military bases). Because of the delayed rate-of-action of biological weapons, they are generally thought of as not suitable for tactical targets, but more for operational and strategic targets. In the 1960s the concept of CARVER was introduced as a maneuverist method of prioritizing targets for Special Forces. This was later taken up by the field artillery, and after 9-11 it was adopted as an analysis means to identify the most vulnerable aspects of the United States infrastructure by Homeland Security.

• Principles of War. Pages 8 through 10 of The Sergeant show the nine Principles of War accepted by the United States Army. Other nations have their own Principles of War. The Prussian General Carl Von Clausewitz is credited with introducing a scientific approach to military operations as a process of creating these principles. The Sergeant describes these principles as they relate to Biological operations. Appendix A of Joint Publication JP3-0 Joint Operations describes these principles in more detail (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf). In lecture, it may be of interest to introduce the principles of restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy, which were introduced for operations other than war (e.g., peacekeeping).

• Weapon Effects Concepts. Pages 11, 15, and 18 – 19 cover key concepts in biological weapon effects. Bi-ological weapons are used to attack productivity and a specific casualty rate is required to destroy specific types of targets. The envelope-of-action concept is important for understanding the time aspect of integrat-ing biological weapons into military plans. Make use of the term “G-Day”, a term used by the Chemical Corps for CB operations since the Second World War (G for either Gas or Germ). The delayed casualty

effect of biological weapons may contribute to the surprise, and biological aerosols are able to defeat targets normally protected by concealment or cover. Unlike most any other weapon system, biological weapons do not physically destroy targets and can be selected for a less than lethal effect – aspects that engender possibilities not previously considered by military planners. On the surface the less than lethal aspect is ap-pealing until it is quantified for a large area target (i.e., in the thousands if an M210 were used on a densely populated city with biological having a 2% fatality rate).

• Posology. One of the most important concepts of chemical biological weapons to understand is the posol-ogy (i.e., the science of dose and dosage). One page 12 of The Sergeant it is seen that biological weapons are area weapons, mass action weapons, and mass casualty weapons; corresponding to amount (quantity), extent (area), and degree (casualties) on page 17. These are inter-related, e.g., if the area is decreased, then the loading of agent on the target increases and so does the casualty rate. This relationship works because of posology as detailed on page 13, where the amount is the Quantity. The Quantity (Q0) translates into a casualty by covering half the target with a Dosage (D0), which in turn translates into an inhaled Dose (d0). On page 14 the Dose-Response relationship shows to indicate the probability of a casualty, so if a target receives a Q50, then half of it is covered with an ICt50, were on the average people throughout the target will breathe in an ID50 for an integrated 50% casualty rate for the target. Mathematically this is a transitivity, so that halving the Quantity translates to a halving of the Dosage, and conversely a halving of the Dose; and according to the Dose-Response for the independent action of biologicals represents a 30% casualty rate, changing the notation to Q30, ICt30, and ID30 respectively. The mathematical relationship is also surjective, meaning that there is more than one Dosage figure corresponding to a figure of Dose (e.g., different rates of breathing), and conversely there are multiple Quantity figures corresponding to a figure of Dosage (e.g., different field conditions).

Logistically – Review pages 16 – 17 and 20 – 47 of The Sergeant. The planning process on page 16 is how biological weapons were incorporated into war plans during the 1960s. Field Manual FM 3-10 Chemical Biological Weapons Employment, and its classified supplement for biological weapons FM 3-10A represented the doctrine, capabilities and weapon expenditure estimating methods for biological weapons available or expected to be available in three to five years. It was first published in 1962 and again in 1966. Commands were to perform detailed target analyses to deter-mine if the weapon systems should be incorporated in Operational or Contingency Plans (OPLANs or CONPLANs). The Chemical Biological Radiological Element (CBRE) was to lead the effort, using G2 (Intelligence), G3 (operations), G4 (logistics), and in the case of the MGM-29 Sergeant Missile the Fire Support Element (FSE) to propose how bio-logical weapons were to be included into war plans.

For estimating the logistics involved with the M210 for Tularemia (TT), it is necessary to use the Half-Life Estimate ta-ble (page 25), Source Strength Graph (page 26), Bomblet Density table (page 31) , and Weapon Effects Graphs (pages 42 – 47). By understanding the temperature-time influence of the stockpile-to-target-sequence to source strength, ac-counting for delivery and location errors in selecting a Height of Burst (HOB), and the influences of field conditions in selecting the proper Weapon Effects Graph and adjustment factors, it is possible to determine the number of warheads for a specific casualty rate, the casualty rate from a specific attack, and the maximum usable age of the M210 warhead.

Estimating weapon effects was derived from the work of Kenneth L. Calder of the BWL. He was a mathematician, formerly from Porton Down, England where he worked as Oliver Graham Sutton’s understudy on atmospheric diffu-sion. Sutton is credited with devising the Gaussian model for estimating atmospheric diffusion. Calder had developed a LaPlace transform model for estimating biological weapon effects from an area source (the bases of the Weapon Ef-fects Graphs in The Sergeant). Also critical to biological weapon effects is the science of aerobiology, which the BWL was a leading pioneer.

The reason that biological weapons are not to be used during unstable atmospheric conditions (page 34) is that those conditions are where there is biological aerosols are rapidly dispersed upward under strong sunlight and low winds, conditions having the least biological load on a target. What is not represented in The Sergeant is Open Air Factors

(OAF), an aerobiological phenomenon discovered in the 1970s in forests and cities where the decay rate was substan-tially higher in the open than in a closed chamber. It was later found to relate to the presence of highly reactive chem-icals in the air having a biocide effect. If the United States biological weapons program had continued, it is likely OAF would have been accounted for in a manner similar to Rainout using some benchmark of air quality.

Defensively – Pages 48 – 58 of The Sergeant cover biological defense. The United States selected biologicals which though highly infective, were also had a low contagion. Therefore, it was expected that using Tularemia would not re-quire quarantine, isolation, or have significant hazards after use which might impact military operations. It is interest-ing to note that to this day the preferred treatment for Tularemia is streptomycin. The Tularemia vaccine developed to protect United States forces had one draw-back that has hampered its consideration today – it can revert to a virulent strain for unknown reasons. Also, on the radiological battlefield, a live vaccine may turn into an infection. In general, the defensive material is for historical perspective and to depict the risks played in the conduct of biological operations. The distinction is that while a military force should have means for protecting against biological weapon effects, those that actually plan to use such weapons have the benefit of knowing the source strength and agent involved to make a more precise investment.

Alternatively – the material on pages 59 – 64 of The Sergeant represent an extension of the methodology in the book. The military establishment did not expect to use lethal biological weapons in anything short of a nuclear conflict. The Sergeant was a product of the United States Army’s Pentomic era, a time when the army was structured to fight on the tactical nuclear battlefield. As such, biological fires must be coordinated with nuclear fires to avoid a biological equivalent to “pre-initiation.” However, the radiological effects on the human immune system also create a synergistic effect for using biological and nuclear weapons together.

There was work to create a biological warhead for the Sergeant missile using 5.1-inch flettner rotor bomblets. These would have the advantage of greater area coverage and by using dry-type agents deliver more infective doses to the tar-get. While the biological program had explored a great many diseases as possible biologicals, the ones available from the X201 facility in the late 1960s was limited to Tularemia (SR), Anthrax (TR), Q Fever (LM), Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (DK), and Porcine Brucellosis (OZ) in wet-type formulations. Dry-type formulations were also available, but in far more limited quantities.

The same method for estimating weapon effects for wet-type Tularemia (TT) can be used, so long as the Source Strength can be estimated as detailed on page 25. What is missing is the influence of other storage temperatures on the source strength and the aerobiological decay rate. Each biological formulation has its own unique storage stabil-ities and aerobiological decay rates. For most purposes of comparison, an aerobiological decay rate of 0% to 5% per minute is reasonable, assuming no sunlight. If students can estimate weapon effects for these alternative agents, they can also make their own analysis to estimate the possible weapon effects of biologicals of more contemporary concern (e.g., Ebola).

The 1966 edition of FM 3-10 mentions the possibility of using entomological bomblets without further detail. Yellow Fever Mosquitoes (UT) were standardized as an A item in 1959, and there was a production facility constructed. How-ever, targeting studies in the early 1960s demonstrated that UT was not logistically feasible. Using the information on pages 63 and 64 it demonstrates this point.

AssessmentDiscussion – class participation in discussion using the information in The Sergeant is a basic means to assess student understanding of the material. There are three paradoxes which will reflect a deeper understanding of the material that should be considered:

a) Policy versus Capabilities. If the policy in 1968 did not permit the use of lethal biological weapons unless in retaliation, then how did the M210 conform to national policy? Tularemia (SR) is a lethal biological.

National policy may have permitted first-use of incapacitating biological weapons in a special emergency, but could SR be considered incapacitating due to the disparity of medical treatment available?

b) Scenarios versus Effects. Biological weapons like the M210 would have rendered substantial military ef-fects, even though they had logistical challenges and were highly sensitive to changes field conditions (cause and effect). What scenarios, if any, would have been politically reasonable for using such weapons (anteced-ents and consequences)?

c) Effects versus Reliability. Military commanders require weapons that are not only destructive, but also reliable and safe. Was the M210 reliable? What role does human testing play in validating weapon effects, and why would the more lethal Anthrax (TR) be an unreliable choice of biological? What role would con-tagion play in military selection of biological weapons?

Examination – A multiple choice exam may be given to test student’s working knowledge. The questions should be designed in a manner to not have specific correlation to material in The Sergeant, but involve a hypothetical scenario where the student must use The Sergeant to conceptually solve the problem. For example:

a) If the quantity of dry-type Ebola (Eb) necessary for inflicting 50% casualties to a target under some nominal field conditions (Q50) is 1 kg/km2, what would be a reasonable estimate of quantity necessary for inflicting 30% casualties?

a. 0.27 kg/km2

b. 0.3 kg/km2

c. 0.5 kg/km2

d. 0.8 kg/km2

The correct answer is “c” 0.5 kg/km2 based after the posological theory of CB weapons where the expected Q30 is half of the Q50.

Exercise – Students use the information in The Sergeant to complete a table of casualty effects (%) assuming four half-lifes weapon age:

HOB(feet)

Open Terrain Urban Terrain High Aerobiological DecayGraph A Graph B Graph C Graph D Graph E Graph F

25,00030,00035,00040,00045,00050,000

The table may be shortened to only a few HOBs and field conditions, or expanded to include other terrain features such as hilly, wooded, and jungle. A useful outcome would be to summarize the information into a more simplified table with Low and High HOB and percent casualties. An alternative, or for extra-credit, would be to compare Tula-remia (SR) against the other biologicals on page 62.

Writing – Students work individually or in groups to complete one of two possible writing assignments:

a) Target Analysis Paper. Prepare a detailed target analysis as outlined on Page 17 and using information in The Sergeant. Assume the Sergeant missile launcher is located at the school and the prevailing weather conditions associated with the month or semester of the course. Students are to select targets within range of the Sergeant assuming a commander’s vision to use the M210 to neutralize an enemy’s base of support in the region before ceasing the area and repurposing logistical facilities to support future operations. For extra credit students should analyze possibilities of items on pages 61 – 64 as recommendations.

b) Hypothetical Threat Assessment Memorandum. Students prepare a five page memorandum to a policy maker assessing the threat from a reported cruise missile comparable to the Tomahawk using 5.1-inch Flettner Rotar bomblets to deliver a dry-type militarized human prion biological (PrPmil). Students will need to make own assumptions on weapon characteristic and effects using information collected from public sources, including number of bomblets and coverage of each cruise missile. Students should make comparisons with other possible weapon systems for reference. The instructor may choose to change the weapon system and possible agent, supplying the information in a one-page faux intelligence report and lecturing on the style used in National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs).

ANNEX A - Parts of the Book

Theme Pages PurposeIn

trod

uctio

n

1 – 4Introduces the security situation in 1968, the sergeant missile, comparison of Biological, Nuclear, and Chemical warheads, and details of the M210 Biological Warhead.

5 – 6 Description of the roles and policies associated with biological weapons in the United States in 1968.

Doc

trin

e

7 – 12 The doctrinal characteristics of biological weapons in terms of targeting, principles of war, and capabilities.

13 – 15Introduces the fundamental operation of chemical biological weapons (posology), infectivity aspects of biological aerosols, biological casualties, and specific envelope-of-action for Tularemia casualties.

16 – 20 How biological weapons are incorporated into war plans, targeting, outcomes, timing, and logistics.

Logi

stic

s

21 – 23 Stockpile-to-target-sequence from production to deployment.

24 – 26 Influence of storage temperature on estimating source strength of biological weapons.

27 – 30 Stockpile-to-target-sequence from issuing to impacting target.

31 – 33 The area coverage requirements and bomblet density of the M210 warhead based on height of burst and accuracy.

Wea

pon

Effec

ts

Estim

ates

34 – 35 Atmospheric Stability influences on biological weapon effects.36 Aerobiology of wet-type Tularemia (TT).37 Influence of enemy protective action on biological weapon effects.

38 – 47Method and graphs for estimating biological weapon effects in terms of number of weapons, casualties, and weapon age for different field conditions.

Biol

ogic

al

Def

ense

48 Medical treatment, prophylaxis, and vaccination pertaining to Tularemia.49 – 54 Troop safety acceptable risks and minimum safe distance estimation.

55 – 58 Protective action, decontamination and retroactive hazards.

Nuc

lear

Co

mba

t

59 – 60 Using biological weapons with nuclear weapons.

The

Futu

re

61 – 64 Future enhancements, alternatives, and possibilities for the M210 warhead in 1968.

The

End

65 What actually happened in 1968, 1969, and 1975.