The Secular Israeli (Jewish) Identity: An Impossible Dream?

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13.TheSecularIsraeli(Jewish)Identity: AnImpossibleDream?

Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi

C ertain similarities can be observed in secularization processes across societies. Secularization is always gradual and relative, moving continually to a

pronounced decline in common religious beliefs and behaviors while maintaining many rituals surrounding rites of passage. Life cycle rites, directly tied to individual identity, survive even in highly secularized societies. Individual claims to identity labels (i.e. I am Catholic) often persist in the absence of any beliefs or behaviors. If religiosity is measured as a continuous variable, and an individual can be assigned a score of zero to 100 based on commitment to religious beliefs and rituals, secular individuals are those with scores at or close to zero.

The case of Israeli Jews who consider themselves secular is unique because of its historical background, particularly the formal involvement of the state of Israel in religious institutions. Zionism, and the State of Israel it created, represents one response to the process of secularization among Jews, which has been more radical than in any other religious group. Jewish secularization has been vigorous and thorough ever since it started in the eighteenth century. It meant that Jewish identity was maintained by individuals who completely stopped participating in the behaviors inherent in the Jewish religion. This transformation amounted to a conscious attempt to remake a religious community into a nationality.

Secularization in the Jewish case shows some universal features, together with uniquely Jewish aspects. If secularization is measured by distance from the historical dominance of religion, for Jews it has meant creating distance from the historical, rabbinic (Orthodox) Judaism created in the Middle Ages.

Pre-modern Jewry had caste-like qualities, united by rules of excluding impurity and preserving the integrity of endogamy. These rules were articulated in the Talmud (canonized around 700 CE) and its derivative literature of

158 SeculariSm & Secularity

rabbinical responsa, and led to the development of countless rituals during the subsequent centuries. Jewish communities across the medieval world, from Yemen to Germany, shared the same rules and could communicate easily and agree on the correct wording of a bill of divorce (the most important document in this tradition), the practice of ritual slaughter of animals for food, and menstrual taboos. There might have been slight differences of emphasis or practice between local communities but they all claimed to follow the Talmudic injunctions and maintained their loyalty to the letter and spirit of the Talmud.

Jewish secularization in the modern period was tied to the rise of liberal capitalism in Europe and the corresponding economic decline of most Jewish communities. Three hundred years ago European Jewry was a small, marginal group, completely outside the mainstream of social and cultural developments, a minority of outsiders. In 1800, there were about 1.5 million Jews in Europe, out of a European population of 100 million, and a world Jewish population of some 2.5 million.

The modernization of European Jews, which took place between 1780 and 1880, meant social and cultural dislocation on a massive scale. Emancipation for the Jews, the granting of citizenship and political rights, came against the background of the general European decline of religion and feudalism and the rise of secular nationalism, democracy, and socialism. The rise of the new bourgeoisie and the appearance of the ideals of equality, popular representation, and pluralism, which ran counter to religious traditions, made emancipation for excluded groups possible.

Entry into the modern world via the granting of emancipation meant the collapse of the internal Jewish consensus and society. Tearing down the figurative walls of the ghetto and the concrete limitations on participation in society brought about not just the weakening, but the destruction, of traditional community structures. “Jewishness” was separated from Judaism, with the result that most Jews today are such only in a sociological sense.

Secularized Jews were a European reality by the early 19th century, and a significant majority in Western Europe by its end. By that time, the process of secularization was making significant inroads into Jewish communities in Eastern Europe. Most sociological Jews today are “assimilated” and far removed from historic Judaism. In most cases, they have little idea what its traditions are. Less than 10 percent of world Jewry today preserves historical Judaism.

The Zionist vision, created under the impact of the Enlightenment and European nationalism and secularization, faces another kind of historical challenge among Israeli Jews. While about half of Israeli Jews are of European descent, the other half comprises individuals whose ancestors lived in the Islamic world.

15913. the Secular iSraeli (JewiSh) identity

Because that world has not experienced the Reformation or the Enlightenment, European secularization has affected it to a minimal degree, and religion has remained more powerful than secular nationalism. Thus, Israeli Jews of non-European descent are often more religious than their European counterparts.

The Role of the State

The State of Israel formally regulates the religious involvement of its citizens in many ways. The state maintains a list of recognized religions (16 at last count), and classifies all its citizens (and resident non-citizens) according to religious affiliation. Marriage and divorce can take place only within the (recognized) religious group. Religious conversions from one recognized group to another are registered and reported. Vital statistics are reported based on religion (e.g. “live births by mother’s religion”).

Israel defines itself as the state of the Jewish people, meaning about 13 million individuals, only about half of whom currently reside in Israel. Jews are viewed by the state not only as a religious group, but as a national group as well. Yet joining this national group is only possible through a religious conversion. Thus the boundaries of the Jewish group are maintained by the system of religious courts, as well as by civil authorities. Attempts to have the state recognize an Israeli nationality (as distinct from citizenship) have been rejected time and again by the courts, and this rejection is supported by a solid majority of the public.

The leadership of the state has always been totally non-observant. More-over, leaders of the religious parties, which almost always participate in governing coalitions, are always excluded from the really important decisions. They are never involved in discussions about war, or the economy, and do not even seem to aspire to be part of such fateful deliberations. Of all Israeli prime ministers since 1948, David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharett, Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir, Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Shamir, Ehud Barak, Binyamin Netanyahu, Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Menahem Begin, only the last ever attended synagogue services outside of fulfilling an official or ceremonial duty, and even he did so rarely. It is important to note also that Israel’s intellectual, literary, scientific, and artistic elite is also overwhelmingly non-observant.

But at the same time the political leadership shows reverence for traditional symbols of Jewish identity and especially identity boundaries. For example, the prime minister of Israel will not be seen, while on an official visit abroad, to be travelling on the Sabbath. Neither will the prime minister of Israel be seen driving a car on Saturday in Jerusalem, even though he will not be seen in a synagogue.

The state invests significant public resources in the maintenance of historical


Judaism. This is done by financing an expensive system of lifelong Talmudic learning, in which more than 100,000 individuals are involved. Such a large religious education system is unprecedented in Jewish history. In addition to the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox educational systems, there is a system of rabbinical courts, where the judges enjoy the same salaries and benefits as civil judges, and other systems that provide ritual purity for those who desire it, at state expense. Most ultra-Orthodox men and a fair number of Orthodox men are full-time religious professionals, creating a modern “priestly class.” These occupations include those making sure that any menstruating Orthodox woman can find a ritual bath close to home, and those engaged in support of the kosher dietary taboos. Raising pigs and selling pork to Jews and Muslims is forbidden by law, representing a symbolic victory of millennia of Jewish dietary taboos, but the non-observant can easily get around these limitations.

By law, Israeli Jews are not allowed to work on the Sabbath, and every year, businesses pay fines if they are caught employing Jews in economic activities. A business open on Saturday is immune if it can prove, with the help of government identity cards, that its employees are non-Jews. Those handing out the tickets for Saturday work are drawn from members of the Druze minority.

The whole enterprise of maintaining Orthodox traditions employs many thousands of civil servants, all Orthodox. Ultra-Orthodox parties, which currently hold 18 seats in the 120-seat Knesset, (and are openly non-Zionist), act to increase religion budgets, and have a vital interest in maintaining the system. However, they would not be able to do that without widespread public support for the idea that the state should invest in maintaining the system of Jewish Sabbath observance.

In Israeli society there is a clear, social line of division between two sub-cultures, the religiously observant and the non-observant. About 20 percent of the Jewish population continues to follow a historical Judaism where expectations for public behavior are quite clear. The nature of Judaism as a religion of practice makes this division both public and visible. Members of the two groups can identify each other immediately by distinctive cues, such as dress (for example, head coverings for Orthodox men and married women, and for the ultra-Orthodox black coats, long beards, side locks, etc.).

The taboos concerning the Sabbath in Orthodox Judaism serve as the best example of behavioral divisions. Traveling in motor vehicles on Saturday (except for a real life-saving emergency) is out of the question for members of the religious subculture, as is watching television or using the telephone. In addition to Sabbath observance, historical food taboos mean that intimate social contact between the observant and the non-observant is limited. An observant Jew will


not have dinner at the home of a non-observant family. In everyday discourse, finer distinctions are sometimes made. The varying

levels of religiosity among Israeli Jews are reflected in the following labels: Haredi, denoting the very Orthodox, Dati (literally religious) denoting Orthodox, Masorti (literally traditional) denoting those who are partially observant, and Hiloni (literally secular) denoting the non-observant. These Hebrew terms are widely used in everyday life, and in both the spoken and written language.

However, what should be kept in mind is that most non-observant Jews choose to take part in many Orthodox life-cycle rites. There is almost no support for the idea of civil marriage, and only slight support for the idea of civil burial. There is universal support for the idea of a religious conversion as the only way for non-Jews to become Jewish. Nevertheless, this issue is under constant discussion and debate in Israel. The non-observant claim that the rabbinical courts are too strict in their requirements for converts, and expect these courts to change their practices. The debate is provoked by so-called secular Israelis, who would like the conversion process itself to be “easy” or “liberal” while nonetheless agreeing that a religious conversion is the only way to join the “Jewish people.” Thus there can be no serious challenge to the monopoly principle that confers Jewishness on those undergoing the Orthodox rites of conversion, which are regarded as historically authentic. This is clear in the case of group conversions, when non-Jews or “lost tribes” from Ethiopia, Peru, or India, are recognized by the state as Jewish and only gain citizenship following Orthodox conversions.

According to Talmudic law anybody born to a Jewish mother is Jewish. This matrilineal rule is universally accepted in Israel. In Israeli identity discourse, as in Orthodox religious discourse, nobody can be half-Jewish, or of Jewish descent. Either you are Jewish or not. In the Israeli media, discussions of Jewish identity often take the form of reporting on the presumed Jewishness of well-known individuals around the world, and the list of great Jews is indeed interminable.

What is expressed when they are mentioned is justified pride in the achievements of a distant cousin, together with special glee in exposing those who have chosen not to call themselves Jews even if they had a Jewish mother. Thus, special pleasure is taken in outing Marcel Proust, who wrote in 1896: “...I am a Catholic, like my father and my brother, my mother is Jewish.”1 Israeli literary critics (who are self-described secularists; few Orthodox Jews read Proust) will not miss a chance to comment on what they regard as Proust’s denial of his true, objective, Jewishness. Israeli identity discourse, just like the classic anti-Semitic thinking, does not allow a choice in self-definition. It is not just the question of blood, but of the 23 maternal chromosomes.


Social Characteristics

Religiosity levels among Israeli Jews have been systematically measured in numerous surveys. Ben-Meir and Kedem2 have developed two indices, for religious beliefs and for religious observance (behavior). These indices were based on a 1970s survey of a stratified random sample of the urban Jewish population in Israel.

The belief scale starts with the belief in the immortality of the soul (29 percent agreement in the sample), then goes on to the belief in the coming of the Messiah (36 percent), to belief in the Jewish people as chosen (57 percent), and to the final item, belief in God (64 percent). Twenty-two percent did not drive on Saturday, and 44 percent reported keeping to the dietary separation between meat and milk. Seventy-four percent claim to fast on the Day of Atonement, 88 percent light Hanukka candles, and 99 percent take part in the Passover meal.

Since the Ben-Meir and Kedem3 benchmark study, there have been several additional surveys assessing observance level among Israeli Jews. According to Kedem,4 the levels of non-observance between 1962 and 1988 ranged from 22 percent to 32 percent of the Jewish population. Self-identification as a secular Israeli means a lower likelihood of religious belief and a much lower likelihood of religious observance.

The question of Jewish identity and self-definition is discussed quite often in the Israeli media, and the results of systematic surveys reported regularly. A 2004 survey showed that 81 percent of Israel’s population defined themselves as Jewish; 12 percent as Muslim; 3.5 percent as Christian (both Arab and non-Arab); 1.5 percent as Druze; 1.5 percent as Atheist; and another 0.5 percent as followers of other religions. Among Muslims living in Israel, 11 percent defined themselves as very religious; 49 percent as religious; 21 percent as not so religious; and only 18 percent as not religious at all. In terms of religiosity, among Israeli Jews aged 20 and over, 44 percent defined themselves as secular; 27 percent defined themselves as traditional; 12 percent as traditionally observant; 9 percent as Orthodox; and 8 percent as ultra-Orthodox.

The ideological gap between the elements of the population with a European Enlightenment heritage and those with a legacy of the Islamic world was clearly demonstrated in this survey. In 2004, there was a particularly high prevalence of the secular label, 63 percent, among native Israelis of European descent, compared to 33 percent among native Israelis of Asian origin, and 25 percent of native Israelis of North African origin. This was consistent with earlier surveys, which showed higher levels of observance among Mizrahim (Eastern Jews).5

In terms of income, secular Jews had the highest levels, followed by the Orthodox, the traditionally observant, and at the bottom the ultra-Orthodox.


Secular Jews also had the highest level of education, with 32 percent reporting higher education.

A 2005 survey by Ephraim Yaar for the Shmuel Neeman Institute for Advanced Study in Science and Technology at the Technion-Israel Institute of Technology in Haifa reported that 41 percent of secular Israelis believed in God (compared with 52 percent who did not). Sixteen percent of secular Jews believed in heaven and hell, and 23 percent agreed with the statement that “nature is spiritual or holy.” In a 2006 survey, 47 percent of the self-defined secular said they believed in God, but only 6 percent observed the Sabbath prohibitions.

Politics and Ideology

In terms of political attitudes, it is routinely reported that higher levels of religiosity among Israeli Jews are correlated with hawkishness and conservatism. This finding parallels those reported for religions all over the world.6 Thus, an April 2004 survey of attitudes toward the Sharon Gaza disengagement plan showed that while 85 percent of the ultra-Orthodox opposed disengagement, as did 67 percent of those defining themselves as “religious,” only 38 percent of the “traditional” and 17 percent of the “secular” opposed it.

To properly appreciate the connection between Israeli secular culture and Judaism, it is useful to examine the state education system. The state school system in Israel for Jews (there is a separate system for Arabs) is divided into two parallel sub-systems, one religious and the other “secular.” Children of the religious subculture (not the ultra-Orthodox), raised according to Jewish Orthodox beliefs and behaviors, attend state religious schools. There is also an independent orthodox system, which is state-financed, but directed by the ultra-Orthodox community.

What can be observed is that even the “secular” state schools follow a curriculum with large doses of Old Testament texts and Orthodox law. The stated rationale for that is that these are the building blocks of Jewish national identity, and without them such an identity will be totally devoid of content and meaning. The main difference between rabbinical Judaism and what is taught in Israeli state schools is the relative absence of the Talmud, which is perceived as an expression of Diaspora culture. In contrast, the state favors the Old Testament, representing a mythic, glorious, Jewish past rooted in the “Promised Land” in West Asia.

The Zionist conception of Jewish history offers a division into distinct periods. Jewish history is divided into periods of activity and heroism (ancient history and modern Zionism, before 135 CE, when the last rebellion against the Romans ended, and after 1880, when Zionist settlement in Palestine began),


and the long period of submission and passivity (between 135 CE and 1880 CE). Thus the years when there was no Jewish sovereignty should be largely erased from the collective memory.

Zionism, in rejecting rabbinical Judaism, started a “biblicalization” of Jewish history and identity. Biblical Hebrew and biblical mythology became the cornerstones of the new nationalism. The ancient Jewish past in the Holy Land was seen as marked by activism, pride, and a readiness to fight and die for national independence. The leap over the history of nearly 2000 years of rabbinical tradition and Diaspora experience, aimed at landing in a past of glorious national sovereignty, to be overshadowed only by future grandeur.

The reinterpretation of the Hebrew Bible started with nineteenth century Hebrew literature and the Haskalah (Jewish Enlightenment) movement, which discovered new heroes and new ideas in the ancient texts. Those who wanted to revive Hebrew found the Bible to be a source of classical Hebrew style, and a repository of great literature. Today’s interpretation of the Bible, as it is studied in all Israeli schools, is a direct continuation of the 19th-century approach.

Observing a so-called secular Israeli nursery school today will demonstrate that children as young as three are taught the Genesis story of the creation, the Exodus story, starting with the baby Moses in the bulrushes, and so on. These stories are taught every year in the same order, in connection with related religious holidays. In elementary school they are taught as the starting point of national history. Thus most non-observant adults in Israel believe in the historicity of the Old Testament texts.

Following 19th-century revitalization ideals, secular Israelis often claim that they represent a new, and still authentic, kind of Judaism, by trying to defend their historically recent conception. Orthodox Jews have no such problem. They don’t have to apologize because no one will ever doubt their Jewishness and their Judaism, which are historically authentic. If you claim to be Jewish you cannot gainsay these representatives of Jewish history and historical Judaism. Thus, in any debate about Jewish identity, and there are many of those in Israel, the secular side tends to be apologetic while the Orthodox side is confident and secure.

Those who describe themselves as non-observant among Israeli Jews choose to follow a pattern of minimal observance, which is still acceptable in terms of the medieval rules of the rabbinate. “Secular” Jews claim a Jewish identity and so inevitably follow the minimal requirements of Orthodox Judaism whereby divorce (more important than marriage) can be handled only by rabbinical courts. Beyond the minimal requirements, secular Jews also follow the rituals of circumcision for male infants, mezuzah (door amulet), and bar-mitzvah for


boys at age 13. As a result the Orthodox rabbinate still views them as worthy of Orthodox marriage and burial rites, because they are matrilineal Jews, whose lineage is not marred by an improper divorce. The Orthodox have agreed to a national consensus, which is rejected only by the ultra-Orthodox. The latter refuse to marry members of the secular sub-culture, just as they will not marry converts. This reasoning has to do with menstrual taboos, which make most Jews in the world today impure in their eyes.

Secular Jewish Israelis are highly offended when the authenticity of their Jewishness is challenged. This is done often enough, and easily, by Orthodox spokesmen. All it takes is for the particular rabbi to refer to secular Jews as “rabbit eaters” (referring to their non-observance of food taboos), or as “men having sex with menstruating women.” In 1999, Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef, the leader of the Shas ultra-Orthodox religious political party, described the justices of the Israel Supreme Court, as men who had sex with menstruating women. This caused a storm of denunciations from the secular camp. Yet the incident proved the power of ancient taboos, and the vacuity of the notion of Israeli secular Jews. If you are truly secular, why should you get upset over a factual description of your disregard for ancient taboos?

Israel is an ideological state, a state with a mission, and the mission is to revitalize Jewish identity in its ancient homeland. Most secular Jews in Israel are committed to this mission. Whether secular or observant, there is a national consensus around the overall Jewish identity label. Thus, so-called secular individuals who are distant from the Talmudic tradition still help to keep its spirit alive. Zionism is dedicated to preserving Jewish identity, though in a new form. However, it cannot betray its links to a historical Jewish identity, which can only in essence be religious.

EndnotEs

1. Hayman, Ronald. Proust: A Biography. (New York: HarperCollins, 1990) p. 108.

2. Ben-Meir, Yehuda and Peri Kedem. “Index of religiosity of the Jewish population of Israel.” Megamot, 1979, 24, 353-362. (Hebrew).

3. Ibid.

4. Kedem, Peri. “Dimensions of Jewish religiosity” Ed. Zvi Sobel and Benjamin Beit-Hal-lahmi. Tradition, Innovation, Conflict: Judaism and Jewishness in Contemporary Israel. (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1991).

5. Ibid.

6. Beit-Hallahmi, Benjamin, and Michael Argyle. The Psychology of Religious Behaviour, Belief and Experience. (London: Routledge, 1997).

The Secular Israeli (Jewish) Identity: An Impossible Dream?

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