The SDG’s, Domestic Resource Mobilization and the Poor · The SDG’s, Domestic Resource...

TheSDG’s,DomesticResourceMobilizationandthePoor

NoraLustigTulaneUniversityCGDandIAD

“Strategiesforeradicatingpovertytoachievesustainabledevelopmentforall”

UnitedNationsHeadquarters▪ NewYorkJune1-3,2016

• OnekeyfactortoachievingtheSDGswillbetheavailabilityoffiscalresourcestodeliverthefloorsinsocialprotection,socialservicesandinfrastructureembeddedintheSDGs

• Asignificantportionoftheseresourcesisexpectedtocomefromdomesticsourcesindevelopingcountriesthemselves

• Asistypicalwiththeseexercisesdesignedtoidentifyprioritiesandcommitmentswhichthegreatmajorityofcountriesendorse, theproposalsshyawayfromacknowledgingthatgoalshavetrade-offs

• Inparticular,thatraisingadditionalrevenuesdomestically(i.e.,raisingtaxes)forinfrastructure,protectingtheenvironmentorsocialservicesmayleaveasignificantportionofthepoorwithlesscashtobuyfoodandotheressentialgoods

2

• Whatistheextentoftax-basedredistributionacrosslowandmiddle-incomecountries?

• Towhatextentdofiscalsystemsleavethepoorworseoffintermsofconsumptionofprivategoodsandservices?

• Howfrequentlyfiscalsystemsmaybeinequalityreducingbutatthesametimeleavethepoorworseoffintermsoftheirpurchasingpowerofprivategoodsandservices?

3

• Empiricalresultsfor25countriesbasedonfiscalincidencestudiesfromtheCommitmenttoEquityInstituteforaround2010– Twolow-incomecountries:Ethiopia (Hilletal.,2016)andTanzania

(Youngeretal.,2016)– Ninelowermiddle-incomecountries:Armenia (YoungerandKhachatryan,

2016),Bolivia (Paz-Arauco etal.,2014),ElSalvador (Beneke,Lustig andOliva,2014),Georgia (Cancho andBondarenko,2016),Ghana (Youngeretal.,2015),Guatemala (Cabrera,Lustig andMoran,2015),Honduras(Castañeda andEspino,2015),Indonesia (Afkar etal.,2016),andSriLanka(Arunatilake etal.,2016)

– Tenuppermiddle-incomecountries:Brazil (HigginsandPereira,2014),Colombia (Lustig andMelendez,2016),CostaRica (Sauma andTrejos,2014),DominicanRepublic (Aristy-Escuder etal.,2016),Ecuador (Llerenaetal.,2015),Jordan (Alam etal.,2016),Mexico (Scott,2014),Peru(Jaramillo,2014),SouthAfrica (Inchauste etal.,2016),andTunisia(Shimeles etal.,2016)

– Fourhigh-incomecountries:Argentina (Rossignolo,2016),Chile(Martinez-Aguilaretal.,2016),Russia (Lopez-Calva etal.,2016),andUruguay (Bucheli etal.,2014). 4

CEQAssessment:Method• Comprehensivestandardfiscalincidenceanalysisofcurrent

systems:directpersonalandindirecttaxes(nocorporatetaxes);cashandin-kindtransfers(publicservices);indirectsubsidies

• Harmonizeddefinitionsandmethodologicalapproachestofacilitatecross-countrycomparisons

• Usesincome/consumptionpercapitaasthewelfareindicator• Allocatorsvary=>fulltransparencyinthemethodusedfor

eachcategory,taxshiftingassumptions,taxevasion• Secondarysourcesareusedtoaminimum

5

Higgins and Lustig. “Analyzing the Impact of Taxes, Transfers, and Subs idies on Inequality and Poverty.” and “The Commitment to Equity (CEQ)Assessment: Indicators.” Chapters 1 and 3 (respectively) in Lustig (editor) Commitment to Equity Handbook. A Guide to Estimating the Impact of FiscalPolicy on Inequality and Poverty, Tulane University and the World Bank, Fall 2016.

CEQAssessment:FiscalInterventions• Currentlyincluded:

– Directtaxes– Directcashtransfers– Non-cashdirecttransferssuchasschooluniformsandbreakfast

– Contributionstopensionsandsocialinsurancesystems– Indirecttaxesonconsumption– Indirectsubsidies– In-kindtransferssuchasspendingoneducationandhealth

• Workingon:– Corporatetaxes

6Higgins and Lustig. “Analyzing the Impact of Taxes, Transfers, and Subs idies on Inequality and Poverty.” and “The Commitment to Equity (CEQ)Assessment: Indicators.” Chapters 1 and 3 (respectively) in Lustig (editor) Commitment to Equity Handbook. A Guide to Estimating the Impact of FiscalPolicy on Inequality and Poverty, Tulane University and the World Bank, Fall 2016.

MARKETINCOME

DISPOSABLEINCOME

PLUSDIRECTTRANSFERSMINUSDIRECTTAXES

PLUSINDIRECTSUBSIDIESMINUSINDIRECTTAXES

CONSUMABLEINCOME

PLUSMONETIZEDVALUEOFPUBLICSERVICES:EDUCATION&HEALTH

FINALINCOME

CEQAssessment: IncomeConcepts

7

Higgins and Lustig. “Analyzing the Impact of Taxes,Transfers, and Subsidies on Inequality and Poverty.”in Lustig (editor) Commitment to Equity Handbook.A Guide to Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy onInequality and Poverty, Tulane University and theWorld Bank, Fall 2016.

FiscalIncidenceinCEQAssessments§ Accountingapproach

• nobehavioralresponses• nogeneralequilibriumeffectsand• nointertemporal effects• butitincorporatesassumptionstoobtaineconomicincidence(notstatutory)

§ Point-in-time§ Mainlyaverageincidence;afewcaseswithmarginal

incidence

8


Monetizingin-kindtransfers§ Incidenceofpublicspendingoneducationandhealthfollowedso-

called“benefitorexpenditureincidence”orthe“governmentcost”approach.

§ Inessence,weuseperbeneficiaryinputcostsobtainedfromadministrativedataasthemeasureofaveragebenefits.

§ Thisapproachamountstoaskingthefollowingquestion:Ø Howmuchwouldtheincomeofahouseholdhavetobe

increasedifithadtopayforthefreeorsubsidizedpublicserviceatthefullcosttothegovernment?

9


10

www.commitmentoequity.org

www.commitmentoequity.org

Threemainmessagesfromtheory1.Analyzingthetaxsidewithoutthespendingside,orviceversa,isuseless

Ø Taxescanbeunequalizingbutspendingsoequalizingthattheunequalizing effectoftaxesismorethancompensated

Ø Taxescanberegressivebutwhencombinedwithtransfersmakethesystemmoreequalizingthanwithouttheregressivetaxes(Lambert,2001)

Ø Transferscanbeequalizingbutwhencombinedwithtaxes,povertycanbehigher

11

Enami,Lustig andAranda.“AnalyticalFoundations:MeasuringtheImpactofFiscalPolicyonInequalityandPoverty.”Chapter4inLustig (editor) CommitmenttoEquityHandbook.AGuidetoEstimating theImpactofFiscalPolicy onInequality andPoverty, TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank,Fall2016.

2.AnalyzingtheimpactoninequalityonlycanbemisleadingØ Fiscalsystemscanbeequalizingbutpovertyincreasing

3.AnalyzingtheimpactontraditionalpovertyindicatorscanbemisleadingØ Fiscalsystemscanshowareductioninpoverty

(headcountratio,gaporsquaredgap)andyetasubstantialshareofthepoorcouldhavebeenimpoverishedbythecombinedeffectoftaxesandtransfers

12

Enami,Lustig andAranda.“AnalyticalFoundations:MeasuringtheImpactofFiscalPolicyonInequalityandPoverty.”Chapter4inLustig (editor) CommitmenttoEquityHandbook.AGuidetoEstimating theImpactofFiscalPolicy onInequality andPoverty, TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank,Fall2016.

DomesticResourceMobilizationandthePoor

Whatistheextentoftax-basedredistributionacrosslowandmiddle-incomecountries?

Moresocialspending,moreredistribution(Redistributiveeffect:reductioninGinipointsinx-axis)

14

ARG

ARM BOL

BRA

CHLCOL

CRI

DOMECU

SLV

GHAGTM

HNDIND

JOR

MEX

PER

RUS

ZAF

LKA

TZA

TUN

URY

0.00

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.10

0.12

0.14

0.16

0.18

0.20

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%

Red

istr

ibut

ive

effe

ct

Social spending

Lustig, N. “Fiscal Redistribution and Poverty Reduction in Low and Middle Income Countries.” Chapter 5 in Lustig (editor) Commitment to Equity Handbook. A Guide toEstimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality andPoverty,Tulane University and the World Bank, Fall 2016.

15

ARM

BOL

BRA

CHL

COL

CRI

ECUSLV

ETH

GEO

GHA

GTM

HND

IND

JOR

MEXPER

DOM

RUS

ZAF

LKA

TZA

TUN

URY

ARM

BOL

BRA

CHLCOL

CRI

ECUSLVETHGEO

GHAGTM

HND

IND

JOR MEX

PER DOM

RUS

ZAF

LKATZA

TUN

URY

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000GNI per capita (2011 PPP)

Primary spending/GDP Social spending/GDP

Linear (Primary spending/GDP) Linear (Social spending/GDP)

Primaryandsocialspending/GDPvs.GNIpercapita


16

ARM

BOL

BRA

CHL

COL

CRI

DOMECUSLV

ETH

GEO

GHA

GTM

HND

INDJOR

MEX

PER

RUS

ZAF

LKA

TZA TUN

URY

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

8%

9%


Education/GDP Linear (Education/GDP)Lustig, N. “Fiscal Redistribution and Poverty Reduction in Low and Middle Income Countries.” Chapter 5 in Lustig (editor) Commitment to Equity Handbook. A Guide toEstimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality andPoverty,Tulane University and the World Bank, Fall 2016.

Educationspending/GDPvs.GNIpercapita

Healthspending/GDPvs.GNIpercapita

17

ARM

BOL

BRA

CHL

COL

CRI

DOM

ECU

SLV

ETH

GEOGHAGTM

HND

IND

JOR MEXPER

RUS

ZAF

LKATZATUN

URY

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%


Health/GDP Linear (Health/GDP)


Directtransfers/GDPvs.GNIpercapita

18

ARM

BOL

BRA

CHL

COL

CRIDOM

ECUSLVETH

GEO

GHAGTMHND IND

JORMEX

PER

RUS

ZAF

LKA

TZA

TUN

URY

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%


Direct transfers/GDP Linear (Direct transfers/GDP)


19

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

Indonesia (2012)

Sri Lanka (2010)

Guatem

ala (2011)

Tanzania (2011)

Ethiopia (2011)

Ghana (2013)

Dom

inican Republic (2013)

Peru (2009)

Honduras (2011)

Ecuador (2011)

El Salvador (2011)

Armenia (2011)

Georgia (2013)

Mexico (2010)

Colombia (2010)

Jordan (2010)

Chile (2013)

Tunisia (2010)

South Africa (2010)

Bolivia (2009)

Costa Rica (2010)

Russia (2010)

Uruguay (2009)

Brazil (2009)

Argentina (2012)

OECD

(2011)

(ranked by social spending / GDP; GNI right hand scale)

Direct transfers Education Health Contributory pensions Other social spending GNI per capita (2011 PPP)

CompositionofsocialspendingasashareofGDP(circa2010)


CompositionoftotalgovernmentrevenuesasashareofGDP(circa2010)

20

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50% (ranked by total government revenue/GDP; GNI right hand scale)

Direct taxes Indirect and other taxes Social security contributions Other revenues GNI per capita (2011 PPP)



Towhatextentdofiscalsystemsleavethepoorworseoffintermsofconsumptionofprivategoodsandservices?

• InNOcountry,inequalityincreasesasaresultoftaxesandsocialspending

ØFiscalpolicyisalwaysequalizing

ØThemoreunequal,themorefiscalredistribution

22

23

0.0000

0.1000

0.2000

0.3000

0.4000

0.5000

0.6000

0.7000

0.8000

0.9000

Market incomepluspensions Disposableincome Consumableincome Finalincome

GiniCoefficient

Marketincome(plusallpensions)

Disposableincome Consumableincome

Finalincome


More unequal, more social spending/GDPNo “Robin Hood Paradox”

24

ARG

ARM

BOL

BRA

CHL

COL

CRI

DOM

ECU

SLVETH

GHA GTM

HNDJOR

MEX

PER

RUS

ZAF

TZA

TUN

URY

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80

Soci

al s

pend

ing

Gini market income plus pensions


25

ARG

ARM BOL

BRA

CHL COL

CRI

DOM

ECU

SLVETH

GEO

GHAGTM HNDINDJOR

MEX

PER

RUS

ZAF

LKA

TZA

TUN

URY

0.00

0.04

0.08

0.12

0.16

0.20

0.24

0.28

0.32

0.20 0.35 0.50 0.65 0.80

Red

istr

ibut

ive

effe

ct

Gini market income plus pensions

More unequal, more redistributionNo “Robin Hood Paradox”


• However,fiscalpolicycanbeequalizingbutpovertyincreasing(intermsofthepoor’sabilitytoconsumeprivategoodsandservices):Ø1.25/dayline:Ethiopia,Ghana,Guatemala,Tanzania

Ø2.50/dayline:Armenia,Bolivia,Brazil,Ethiopia,Ghana,Guatemala,Honduras,SriLanka,Tanzania

• Thisworrisomeresultstemsmainlyfromconsumptiontaxes

26Lustig, N. “Fiscal Redistribution and Poverty Reduction in Low and Middle Income Countries.” Chapter 5 in Lustig (editor) Commitment to Equity Handbook. A Guide toEstimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality andPoverty,Tulane University and the World Bank, Fall 2016.

27

FiscalPolicyandPovertyReduction


-0.2%-1.7%-3.3%-8.3%-10.3%-11.5%

-16.1%-16.5%-18.0%-18.5%

-24.9%-31.8%-33.9%-34.6%

-44.9%-45.5%-45.9%

-54.2%-56.4%

-69.6%-69.8%-70.7%

-88.2%

-97.0%

-36.3%

4.2% 2.4%

-12.7%-8.8%

-2.3%

-14.1%-14.1%

-24.6%

-7.5%

-15.7%

-35.0%

-53.8%

-37.8%

-22.7%

-53.8%

-23.0%

-42.7%

-76.4%

-66.2%

-54.2%

-82.0%-82.6%

-28.8%

-110%

-90%

-70%

-50%

-30%

-10%

10%

Tanzania (2011)

Guatemala (2011)

Bolivia (2009) Colombia (2010)

Mexico (2010) Costa Rica (2010)

South Africa (2010)

Georgia (2013) Average

(ranked by poverty reduction in %; poverty line $1.25 2005PPP/day)

Market income plus pensions to disposable income Market income plus pensions to consumable income

28

1.5% 1.1% 0.9%

-1.0%-1.8%-2.8%-3.3%-6.5%-7.0%-7.3%-7.7%-8.3%-10.1%-10.4%

-14.9%

-21.4%-24.0%-26.1%

-27.8%-28.5%

-35.9%-40.6%

-58.4%-61.0%

-71.4%

-20.7%

9.1%5.7%

3.1%

-2.9%

1.1%5.5%

0.5%

-0.2%

-9.0%

-4.4%

-25.2%

-0.8%

3.3%

-15.1%

-10.6%

-34.8%

8.1%

-22.2%

-35.1%-29.1%

-23.3%

-51.8%

-35.4%

-51.1%

-13.8%

-80%

-70%

-60%

-50%

-40%

-30%

-20%

-10%

0%

10%

(ranked by poverty reduction in %; poverty line $2.5 2005PPP/day)

Market income plus pensions to disposable income Market income plus pensions to consumable income

FiscalPolicyandPovertyReduction


Netpayersandnetreceiversincashterms(bydecile)

29

Ghana (2013)Argentina (2012)

Costa Rica (2010)El Salvador (2011)Guatemala (2011)

Peru (2009)Russia (2010)

Armenia (2011)Bolivia (2009)

Chile (2013)Dominican …

Ethiopia (2011)Honduras (2011)

Tunisia (2010)Uruguay (2009)

Brazil (2009)Sri Lanka (2010)

Mexico (2010)South Africa (2010)

Colombia (2010)Ecuador (2011)Georgia (2013)

Jordan (2010)Indonesia (2012)

Net receivers Net payers

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Lustig, N. “Fiscal Redistribution and Poverty Reduction in Low and Middle Income Countries.” Chapter 5 in Lustig (editor) Commitment to Equity Handbook. A Guide toEstimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality andPoverty,Tulane University and the World Bank, Fall 2016.


Howfrequentlyfiscalsystemsmaybeinequalityreducingbutatthesametimeleavethepoorworseoffintermsoftheirpurchasingpowerofprivategoodsandservices?

31

HigginsandLustig (2016)

Higgins and Lustig. 2016. Can a poverty-reducing and progressive tax and transfer system hurtthe poor?Journal of Development Economics 122, 63-75, 2016

FiscalImpoverishment(MarkettoConsumableIncome)

32

Country (Survey year)

Market Income plus

pensions Poverty

Headcount (%)

Change in poverty

headcount(p.p)

Market Income plus

pensions inequality

( Gini)

Reynolds-Smolensky

Change in inequality (▲Gini)

Fiscally Impoverished as % of population

Fiscally Impoverished as %

of consumable income poor )

Panel A: Upper-middle income countries, using a poverty line of $2.5 PPP 2005 per dayBrazil (2008-2009) 16.8 -0.8 57.5 4.6 -3.5 5.6 34.9Chile (2013) 2.8 -1.4 49.4 3.2 -3.0 0.3 19.2Ecuador (2011) 10.8 -3.8 47.8 3.5 -3.3 0.2 3.2Mexico (2012) 13.3 -1.2 54.4 3.8 -2.5 4.0 32.7Peru (2011) 13.8 -0.2 45.9 0.9 -0.8 3.2 23.8Russia (2010) 4.3 -1.3 39.7 3.9 -2.6 1.1 34.4South Africa (2010-2011) 49.3 -5.2 77.1 8.3 -7.7 5.9 13.3Tunisia (2010) 7.8 -0.1 44.7 8.0 -6.9 3.0 38.5Panel B: Lower-middle income countries, using a poverty line of $1.25 2005PPP per day.Armenia (2011) 21.4 -8.4 47.4 12.9 -9.2 6.2 52.3Bolivia (2009) 10.9 -0.5 50.3 0.6 -0.3 6.6 63.2Dominican Republic (2007) 6.8 -0.9 50.2 2.2 -2.2 1.0 16.3El Salvador (2011) 4.3 -0.7 44.0 2.2 -2.1 1.0 27.0Ethiopia (2010-2011) 31.9 2.3 32.2 2.3 -2.0 28.5 83.2Ghana (2013) 6.0 0.7 43.7 1.6 -1.4 0.1 0.8Guatemala (2010) 12.0 -0.8 49.0 1.4 -1.2 7.0 62.2Indonesia (2012) 12.0 -1.5 39.8 1.1 -0.8 4.1 39.2Sri Lanka (2009-2010) 5.0 -0.7 37.1 1.3 -1.1 1.6 36.4Tanzania (2011-2012) 43.7 7.9 38.2 4.1 -3.8 50.9 98.6

Higgins and Lustig. 2016. Can a poverty-reducing and progressive tax and transfer system hurt the poor? Journal of DevelopmentEconomics 122, 63-75, 2016

• Fifteenoftheeighteencountrieswithareduction inpovertyandinequalityduetothetaxandtransfersystemexperiencedvariousdegreesoffiscalimpoverishment.

• Intencountries—Armenia,Bolivia,Brazil,ElSalvador,Guatemala,Indonesia,Mexico,Russia,SriLanka,andTunisia—betweenone-quarterandtwo-thirdsofthepost-fiscpoorlostincometothefiscalsystem.

• Inthethreecountrieswheretheheadcountratiorose(Ethiopia,GhanaandTanzania),theproportionofthepoorwhowereimpoverishedbythefiscalsystemisstaggering(above75percent).

• InArmenia,Ethiopia,Indonesia,Tunisia,andRussia,between25and50%arestillfiscallyimpoverishedwhenthemonetizedvalueofeducationandhealthservicesareincludedastransfers

33Lustig.2016.“TheSDG’s,DomesticResourceMobilizationandthePoor,”backgroundpaperfortheExpertGroupMeeting:“Strategiesforeradicatingpovertytoachievesustainabledevelopmentforall,”UnitedNations,NewYork,June

Ø ExtremecaremustbetakenwithemphasizingdomesticresourcemobilizationtoachieveSDGs

ØMustassesstheimpactonthepooroftaxandsubsidyreforms,otherwiseonemaybetakingawayfromthepoormorethanistransferredtothem

Ø Impactonthepoorofincreasingtaxesrequirestheuseofadequateindicators;conventionalmeasuresofinequalityandpovertycanbeawfullymisleading

Ø FiscalImpoverishmentIndexfulfillsalltherequirementstoobtainanaccurateassessmentoftheimpactoffiscalchangesonthepoor

34Lustig.2016.“TheSDG’s,DomesticResourceMobilizationandthePoor,”backgroundpaperfortheExpertGroupMeeting:“Strategiesforeradicatingpovertytoachievesustainabledevelopmentforall,”UnitedNations,NewYork,June

References:• Enami,A.,N.Lustig andR.Aranda.“AnalyticalFoundations: MeasuringtheImpactofFiscalPolicyon

InequalityandPoverty.”Chapter4inLustig (editor)CommitmenttoEquityHandbook.AGuidetoEstimatingtheImpactofFiscal PolicyonInequalityandPoverty,TulaneUniversity andtheWorld Bank,Fall2016.

• Higgins,S.andN.Lustig.“AnalyzingtheImpactofTaxes,Transfers,andSubsidies onInequalityandPoverty.”and“TheCommitmenttoEquity(CEQ)Assessment: Indicators.”Chapters1and3(respectively)inLustig (editor)CommitmenttoEquityHandbook.AGuidetoEstimatingtheImpactofFiscalPolicyonInequalityandPoverty,TulaneUniversityandtheWorld Bank,Fall2016.

• --------- 2016.Canapoverty-reducing andprogressive taxandtransfersystemhurtthepoor? JournalofDevelopmentEconomics122,63-75, 2016

• Higgins,S.,N.Lustig,W.RubleandT.Smeeding.2015.“ComparingtheIncidenceofTaxesandSocialSpending inBrazilandtheUnitedStates.”ReviewofIncomeandWealth,Published OnlineMay24,2015,DOI:10.1111/roiw.12201

• Lustig,N.“FiscalRedistributionandPovertyReductioninLowandMiddle IncomeCountries.”Chapter5inLustig (editor)CommitmenttoEquityHandbook.AGuidetoEstimatingtheImpactofFiscal PolicyonInequalityandPoverty,TulaneUniversityandtheWorld Bank,Fall2016.

• ----------. 2016.“TheSDG’s,DomesticResourceMobilizationandthePoor,”backgroundpaperfortheExpertGroupMeeting:“Strategiesforeradicatingpovertytoachievesustainabledevelopment forall,”UnitedNations,NewYork,June.

• ---------- “InequalityandFiscalRedistribution inMiddleIncomeCountries:Brazil,Chile, Colombia,Indonesia,Mexico,PeruAndSouthAfrica.”Journal ofGlobalizationandDevelopment.Forthcoming.

• --------- “TheRedistributive ImpactofGovernmentSpending onEducationandHealth:Evidencefrom13DevelopingCountries intheCommitment toEquityProject”Chapter17in Gupta,Sanjeev,MichaelKeen,BenedictClements andRuuddeMooij, editors,InequalityandFiscalPolicy,Washington:InternationalMonetaryFund, 2015.

35

Teams and references by country:(in parenthesis: survey year; C=consumption & I=income)

1. Argentina (2012-13; I) Rossignolo, Darío. 2016. CEQ Masterworkbook, CEQ Institute, Tulane University (February 28, 2016)

2. Armenia (2011;I) Younger, Stephen D., and Artsvi Khachatryan. forthcoming. “Fiscal Incidence in Armenia,” in: Inchauste, G., Lustig, N. (Eds.), The Distributional Impact of Fiscal Policy: Experience from Developing Countries. World Bank, Washington, D.C (forthcoming)

3. Bolivia (2009; I): Paz Arauco, Verónica, George Gray Molina, Wilson Jiménez Pozo, and Ernesto Yáñez Aguilar. 2014. “Explaining Low Redistributive Impact in Bolivia.” In Lustig, Nora, Carola Pessino and John Scott. 2014. Editors. The Redistributive Impact of Taxes and Social Spending in Latin America. Special Issue. Public Finance Review, May, Volume 42, Issue 3. (September 22, 2014)

4. Brazil (2009; I): Higgins, Sean and Claudiney Pereira. 2014. “The Effects of Brazil’s Taxation and Social Spending on the Distribution of Household Income.” In Lustig, Nora, Carola Pessino and John Scott. 2014. Editors. The Redistributive Impact of Taxes and Social Spending in Latin America. Special Issue. Public Finance Review, May, Volume 42, Issue 3. (November 4, 2014)

5. Chile (2009, I): Ruiz-Tagle, Jaime and Dante Contreras. 2014. CEQ Masterworkbook, Tulane University (August 27, 2014)

6. Colombia (2010, I): Lustig, Nora and Marcela Melendez. 2015. The Impact of Taxes and Transfers on Inequality and Poverty in Colombia. CEQ Working Paper No 24, Center for Inter-American Policy and Research and Department of Economics, Tulane University and Inter-American Dialogue. Forthcoming.

36

7. Costa Rica (2010; I): Sauma, Juan and Diego Trejos. 2014. Social Public Spending, Taxes, Redistribution of Income, and Poverty in Costa. CEQ Working Paper No. 18, Center for Inter-American Policy and Research and Department of Economics, Tulane University and Inter-American Dialogue, January. (February 2014)

7. Dominican Republic (2006-2007, I) : Aristy-Escuder, J., M. Cabrera, B. Moreno-Dodson and M. E. Sánchez-Martín. 2016. “Fiscal policy and redistribution in the Dominican Republic.” CEQ Working Paper No 37, CEQ Institute. (forthcoming). Note: budgetary data was for 2013.

8. Ecuador: Llerena Pinto, Freddy Paul, María Christina Llerena Pinto, Roberto Carlos Saá Daza, and MaríaAndrea Llerena Pinto. 20Social Spending, Taxes and Income Redistribution in Ecuador. CEQ Working Paper No. 28, Center for Inter-American Policy and Research and Department of Economics, Tulane University and Inter-American Dialogue, February.

9. El Salvador (2011; I): Beneke, Margarita, Nora Lustig y José Andrés Oliva. 2015. El impacto de los impuestos y el gasto social en la desigualdad y la pobreza en El Salvador. CEQ Working Paper No. 26, Center for Inter-American Policy and Research and Department of Economics, Tulane University and Inter-American Dialogue, February. (March 11, 2014)

10. Ethiopia (2011; C): Hill, Ruth, Gabriela Inchauste, Nora Lustig, Eyasu Tsehaye and Tassew Woldehanna. forthcoming. “A Fiscal Incidence Analysis for Ethiopia,” in: Inchauste, G., Lustig, N. (Eds.), The Distributional Impact of Fiscal Policy: Experience from Developing Countries. World Bank, Washington, D.C (forthcoming)


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11. European Union (2011, I) : EUROMOD statistics on Distribution and Decomposition of Disposable Income, accessed at http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod/statistics/ using EUROMOD version no. G2.0.

11. Georgia (2013; I): Cancho, Cesar and Elena Bondarenko. forthcoming. “The Distributional Impact of Fiscal Policy in Georgia," in: Inchauste, G., Lustig, N. (Eds.), The Distributional Impact of Fiscal Policy: Experience from Developing Countries. World Bank, Washington, D.C (forthcoming)

12. Guatemala (2011; I): Cabrera, Maynor, Nora Lustig and Hilcías Morán. 2014. Fiscal Policy, Inequality and the Ethnic Divide in Guatemala. CEQ Working Paper No. 20, Center for Inter-American Policy and Research and Department of Economics, Tulane University and Inter-American Dialogue, October. (April 13, 2014)

14. Honduras (2011; I): Castañeda, Ricardo e Ilya Espino. 2015. CEQ Masterworkbook, CEQ Institute, Tulane University (August 18, 2015)

15. Indonesia (2012; C) : Afkar, Rythia, Jon Jellema, and Mathew Wai-Poi. forthcoming. “The Distributional Impact of Fiscal Policy in Indonesia,” in: Inchauste, Gabriela and Nora Lustig (Eds.), The Distributional Impact of Fiscal Policy: Experience from Developing Countries. World Bank, Washington, D.C (forthcoming)

16. Jordan (2010; C): Alam, Shamma A. , Gabriela Inchauste, and Umar Serajuddin. forthcoming. “The Distributional Impact of Fiscal Policy in Jordan,” in: Inchauste, G., Lustig, N. (Eds.), The Distributional Impact of Fiscal Policy: Experience from Developing Countries. World Bank, Washington, D.C (forthcoming)


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17. Mexico (2010; I):Scott, John. 2014. “Redistributive Impact and Efficiency of Mexico’s Fiscal System.” In Lustig, Nora, Carola Pessino and John Scott. 2014. Editors. The Redistributive Impact of Taxes and Social Spending in Latin America. Special Issue. Public Finance Review, May, Volume 42, Issue 3. (September 2013)

18. Peru (2009; I): Jaramillo, Miguel. 2014. “The Incidence of Social Spending and Taxes in Peru.” In Lustig, Nora, Carola Pessino and John Scott. 2014. Editors. The Redistributive Impact of Taxes and Social Spending in Latin America. Special Issue. Public Finance Review, May, Volume 42, Issue 3. (May 1, 2013)

19. Russia (2010; I): Lopez-Calva, Luis F. , Nora Lustig, Mikhail Matytsin, and Daria Popova. forthcoming. “Who Benefits from Fiscal Redistribution in Russia?,” in: Inchauste, G., Lustig, N. (Eds.), The Distributional Impact of Fiscal Policy: Experience from Developing Countries. World Bank, Washington, D.C (forthcoming)

20. South Africa (2010; I): Inchauste, Gabriela, Nora Lustig, Mashekwa Maboshe, Catriona Purfield and Ingrid Wollard. forthcoming. “The Distributional Impact of Fiscal Policy in South Africa,” in: Inchauste, G., Lustig, N. (Eds.), The Distributional Impact of Fiscal Policy: Experience from Developing Countries. World Bank, Washington, D.C (forthcoming)

21. Sri Lanka (2010; C): Arunatilake, Nisha, Gabriela Inchauste and Nora Lustig. forthcoming. “The Incidence of Taxes and Spending in Sri Lanka,” in: Inchauste, G., Lustig, N. (Eds.), The Distributional Impact of Fiscal Policy: Experience from Developing Countries. World Bank, Washington, D.C (forthcoming)


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22. Tunisia (2010, ???): Shimeles, A., A. Moummi, N. Jouini and N. Lustig. 2016. “Fiscal Incidence and Poverty Reduction: Evidence from Tunisia,” CEQ Working Paper No. 38, Commitment to Equity Institute, Tulane University. (forthcoming).

23. United States (2011, I): Higgins, S., N. Lustig, W. Ruble and T. Smeeding (2015), “Comparing the Incidence of Taxes and Social Spending in Brazil and the United States”, Review of Income and Wealth, forthcoming.

24. Uruguay (2009; I): Bucheli, Marisa, Nora Lustig, Máximo Rossi, and Florencia Amábile. 2014. “Social Spending, Taxes and Income Redistribution in Uruguay.” In: Lustig, Nora, Carola Pessino and John Scott. 2014. Editors. The Redistributive Impact of Taxes and Social Spending in Latin America. Special Issue. Public Finance Review, May, Volume 42, Issue 3. (August 18, 2014)


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Thankyou!

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The SDG’s, Domestic Resource Mobilization and the Poor · The SDG’s, Domestic Resource...

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