The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

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The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006

Transcript of The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Page 1: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

The Saddam Tapes

Intelligence Summit

Arlington, VA

February 18, 2006

Page 2: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Technical Points

• Audio was segmented to fit the number of words readable per Powerpoint slide.

• Translation was more literal than otherwise.

• [Unintelligible] can not be clearly heard. Words in italics are heard but not understood because they are local Tikriti dialect, Baath Party jargon, technical, etc.

Page 3: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Technical Points

• Some items are clear and unambiguous, and others are open to various interpretations. Some of the interpretations are the difference between bad and worse.

• The tapes need to be further examined by native Iraqi speakers.

Page 4: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Removal of Warheads

From Tape ISGC-2003-M0003997

Beginning of Tape

Page 5: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

I notice, sir, that the people’s resolution to serve the

battle is very high. They can not insult our resolve,

no matter the time.

This brings me to what I notice among them.

Despite the pressure of their surveillance, and our

not using all our capabilities in the missile area - the

time period is not important to them. What is the

time period going to be?

Page 6: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

For us, the factories mujzab [indistinct] in our

fields. The factories are present. How much

material do we have? How much equipment do

we have?

The factories remain, in the mind they remain. Our

spirit is with us. Four days ago there was the Said

Madari missile, three Hijaba missiles,

Page 7: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

We put them out from what was available from

what he have done a year ago, two years ago, and

five years ago. Based solely on the time period,

and they take note of the time period, they can’t

account for our will, which grows stronger with

each passing day.

Page 8: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

Allah willing.

Page 9: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

Sir, the groups of missiles whose equipment was destroyed, the warheads were removed on cattle trucks that were at the military industrial facility and at the National Communications [indistinct].

Page 10: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

Also, we would like to restart our activity in reforming some of the material that was destroyed, such as the advanced technology equipment. We also removed our active warhead groups from Assad Babel [Lion of Babylon].

Page 11: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Observations

• Missile warheads were removed prior to unilateral destruction by Iraq.

• The speaker does not sound defeated, but energized to continue fighting.

• The speaker suggests reforming the destroyed material into new weapon parts.

Page 12: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Observations

• Iraqis changed their story on warhead destruction to match emerging findings by UNSCOM. See Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Iraq Special Collection, Missile-Related Issues, Examples of Problems. http://cns.miis.edu/search97cgi/s97_cgi?action=View&VdkVgwKey=..%2F..%2Fcnsweb%2Fhtdocs%2Fresearch%2Firaq%2Fjn98msl.htm&queryzip=%22examples+of+problems%22&Collection=CNS+Web+Site

Page 13: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Observations

• Hijaba may not be the name of a missile, but refer to the hidden status.

• Said Madari may not be the name of the missile. Madari means “orbital” or “tropical.”

• Assad Babel is the name of a modified tank. It has a another meaning here. This is the only occasion where the term “active warhead group” is used.

Page 14: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Forewarning of UNSCOM Inspections

•Location on Tape ISGQ-2003-M0003997:– 06:32

•CONTEXT PRIOR TO EXCERPT:– Discussion by General Director of Hutin State

Establishment regarding reconstituting military industry.

Page 15: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

Thank you [indistinct] who is speaking on facility security?

Page 16: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

Sir, Allah willing, [indistinct] of course I am associated with this. We know everything located in the establishments and secure the gates against the enemy. Actually, sir, I have a point on the commission from the United Nations.

Page 17: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

Currently there are four groups visiting us; the biological, chemical, missile, and [indistinct]. Coincidentally, sir, we have an operations center working to track everything and of course they cooperate with us, a security and safety system.

Page 18: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

Sir I –the security system if for any facility in the military industrial organization. There is a security center in each facility, composed, sir, of military elements. We established a system, sir, on the model of military intelligence.

Page 19: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

After what happened at the military industrial organization, this was divided. We reconnected it, sir, incrementally. We reconnected each establishment to the operations center. This is protection for the army, protection for the establishments.

Page 20: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

It is called the Directorate [Amariyat] for Facility Security. We only protect the facilities from an operational standpoint. Administrative security falls under the Directorate [indistinct] of Military Operations.

Page 21: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

Actually, sir, regarding the UN commission, the four teams for biology, chemical, missiles, and nuclear. We – the four, sir, except the work with Petrochemical Three, your Excellency knows that there were some defects in unifying the actions.

Page 22: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

the remainder, Praise Allah and thanks, have excellent security practices. I can assure your Excellency that the workers are good, even though they are military. They have my outlook, and most of them are officers [indistinct]. The possibility exists that Ustaath Qusay will help us, according to the last meeting, and also Colonel Adel. All the channels, sir, are used against thievery.

Page 23: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Observations

2nd Armored BattalionSpecial Republican

Guards

Page 24: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Reconstitution of Muthenna Chemical Weapons Establishment

• Location on tape ISGC-2003-M0003997:– 09:17.40

• Context prior to the excerpt:– Saddam request a briefing on the rebuilding

of Muthenna Chemical Weapons Establishment. The briefer describes damage from the Gulf War.

Page 25: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

The establishment is made up of many facilities. The main facility is large, and is distinguished from other establishments by its geographic expansion. The other sites, we have four toxic sites; one of the sites is within other facilities.

Page 26: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

It is very specialized for filling and other things. There are other, new facilities, the- [indistinct] from the year seventy-seven – eighty-seven.

Page 27: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

The strange thing about Muthenna is that the bombardment focused on the workshop, even more than the main building at Muthenna, and the scientific library with the [indistinct].

Page 28: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

I didn’t note the remainder of the establishments, since their headquarters are better informed. Sir, the establishment, as a group of cadre, with the situation by the commission incapacitating the activities in the establishment from the viewpoint of inspections and photography, etc., you guidance to Colonel Laqdam, the deputy, and the brigadier general

Page 29: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

How is the technical side? Muthenna Establishment is still. . . the cadre surveyed for a building project in Bayji and in QaQa. With that, there were contributions on how to wrestle with the commission with a number of buildings in chloride. Little by little, we are presenting dubakheen in the building campaign.

Page 30: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

Right now, we have a very large building campaign in a number of main sites; three support sites, and the main location [indistinct] the building campaign despite the annoyance presented by the inspection teams.

Page 31: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

As Allah wills, we will infahaq as the Military Industrial Organization, in the sweet challenge, as we call it at Muthenna, that the other establishments rebuild and produce. We will rebuild ourselves and with others . . in anything that serves industry, medicine, or mobiles. This is our activity at the present time.

Page 32: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

There remains another conflict; how to save the materials from their hands, [indistinct] we have a plan with Deputy Laqdam, directed with your guidance, I mean. Allah willing, sir, Muthenna will stay –

Saddam HusseinDon’t be tusaghaneen about your materials .

Page 33: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

. this material can be used for security purposes, but they can confirm that it is used for civilian purposes. . not after confirming that we . . I don’t have any intention of producing in this area, and they don’t have any right to . . . it must go to fertilizer regarding the materials that are . . . they can be for civilian or military purposes before the final production.  

Page 34: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

As your Excellency knows, every two months there is a review of the Security Council Resolution Six Hundred and Eighty-Seven. I see that the qatar is still fighting to-

Page 35: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

Or not before the compliance.

Unidentified Male

This is correct, as – your Excellency provided, I mean each occasion

Page 36: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

They only want al-tisbuza in imagining that . . . if they cross the countryside it will come out of a corner of it. This is an occasion for them. I mean, you will follow up, and things will come to a stage, I mean we are more aware, more capable in vision, and in security, and in facilities,

Page 37: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

it is a sure thing that we will [unintelligible] incrementally. I mean, what is the relation to this thing called complying with resolutions in its meaning in the method of conduct for the resolution?

Page 38: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Observations

• Muthenna State Establishment was a widespread organization, and not just one site used to produce chemical weapons.

• The Iraqis started surveying other building sites for the organization shortly after the Gulf War.

• Briefer raises the issue of how to keep materials out of the hands of UNSCOM.

Page 39: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Observations

• Saddam points out a major advantage – keep the precursors for chemical weapons separated until needed and they can be explained away as having civilian use.

• Saddam is confident that Iraq will overcome the inspection program.

Page 40: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

UNSCOM Technical Advisor Betrays Knowledge of Hidden WMD Program/

Saddam’s Let UNSCOM Confirm False Estimate

• Location on Tape ISGC-2003-M0003997– 20:59:58

• Context Prior to Excerpt:– Briefer describes technical issues to be

resolves before UNSCOM inspections could end.

Page 41: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

Lastly, I conclude that this technical report, I mean from the Special Commission formed by the Security Council to ensure the execution of Resolution 687, was written to serve a political goal.

Page 42: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Speaker

We, as technicians, technicians we believe that we have arrived at a stage where all the technical mines, I believe this applies to all the four areas.

Page 43: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

The four technical and legal points, for nuclear, missile, chemical and biological, there are still obligations to 687.

Page 44: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

I wanted to show these to your Excellency, because the presence, although I don’t know anything about the topic of presence [laughs],  

Page 45: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

I mean, this means it treats these subjects. We swore that this was all true, and it would be beneficial for your Excellency, despite approving it, that you have the correct assessment of this report. And we -

Page 46: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

The teams that are now searching for them are not doing so to verify the facts as they are. They are doing so to create cover through any means possible, technically, I mean, even through umawiyat, but they write it up technically.

Page 47: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

The umawiyat are many, but they write it technically, politically, on how to be dignified . . . this is correct . . . I mean they are now more angry at us than before the hostility.

Page 48: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

Before the hostility, they had information and deductions that we were working in the direction we described, a dangerous direction. Now, we can confirm for them this false direction. I mean, according to the explanation.

Page 49: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

That is, there was a group of these guys and those guys, but this all ended, and with that, the thing they will confirm is our cover story. Good, this is the way it goes . . they are present.

Page 50: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

there isn’t anybody that is going to give away a card . . . well . . . this is - [indistinct] attempt in any se’a.

Page 51: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

This last point, sir, truly is a very important subject for them. This is not a deduction, they say there is intent. They say we are wink at the important things. I believe I told your Excellency this once,

Page 52: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

We must study how we can package this cover story so that we can have a program that won’t cause anxiety in the future, and not work in a program that will cause anxiety again.

Page 53: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

Let them wadfu us.

Unidentified Male

Let them wadfu us. [laughs] really, I mean, this issue, there is no end to it, definitely

Page 54: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

They would refuse, but they would not be able to pay [indistinct] the return is very high . . . not standard [laughs] . . .

Page 55: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Observations

• Subordinates described progress at “eliminating technical mines” to bring the inspection program to a close.

• Briefer laughingly states he “wouldn’t know anything about the presence [of WMD]”

• Saddam states Iraq will allow UNSCOM to confirm their erroneous pre-war assessments.

Page 56: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Observations

• The term aqoolna “our understanding, our thinking” occurs twice in this segment and is best translated “our cover story” in this context.

Page 57: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Electrical Needs for Uranium Enrichment Program

• Location on tape ISGC-2003-M0003997– 24:03:93

• Context Prior to Excerpt:– This is the beginning of Jaafar Dhia Jaafar’s

briefing. He was the head of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program.

Page 58: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Jaafar Dhia Jaafar

Sir, I have an observation; we might possibly speak a little about the electricity from al-Haritha station. I have two other observations, if you will listen to me, we can speak on them sir.

Page 59: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

Doctor bathroom, how do you say Doctor Jaafar, if one ruins something, he avoids that which he ruined, and it is [laughs], now with the electricity.

Page 60: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam HusseinI believe that th- we have four if we close the projects that were destroyed, in spite of the fact that they were destroyed. I surmise that we have gained, because they resorted to conducting the hostility without having experience, the electricity wasn’t running like this [laughs] . . . yes, doctor.  

Page 61: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Jaafar Dhia Jaafar

Sir, al-Haritha Station, near Basra, was one of the biggest stations destroyed during the period of hostility. We were thinking of using it for fission bombs and special bombs. 

Page 62: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

[All parties discuss the problem of demolishing and replacing one of the chimneys at the Haritha power plant. Excerpt restarts at 29:47:30]

Page 63: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Jaafar Dhia Jaafar

there are two other points on the building . . we have some issues, even the electricity. I believe that the other establishments are present, in that we are now beyond our building plan.

Page 64: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Jaafar Dhia Jaafar

I mean, there is technical and specialized equipment to build it, and at least until now, there is no detailed plan. We are going to need – we will possibly need imports so that we can rebuild.

Page 65: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Jaafar Dhia Jaafar

On the electricity, we have identified situations, sir , where we need imports so we can return the service, but this does not account for more than ten percent of total generating capacity.

[tape stops abruptly.]

Page 66: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Observations

• Jaafar Dhia Jaafar, head of the nuclear weapons program, was originally in charge of the concealment program, but flopped. Hence the joke from Saddam.

• Large amounts of electricity are needed for uranium enrichment, so power from a civilian electrical station for Shi’ite Basra was to be diverted for the nuclear weapons program.

Page 67: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Observations

• Saddam mentions “four” as being intact, but it is unclear whether this refers to nuclear weapons programs or electrical power stations. The descriptor used later is “projects,” which is tied to the weapons program. The term “stations” would refer to electrical power.

Page 68: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Observations

• Jaafar refers to rebuilding the nuclear weapons program, and the need for specialized imports.

Page 69: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

The Mother of All Battles is Continuing

• LOCATION ON TAPE ISGQ-2003-M0003922: 1:20:32

• APPROXIMATE TIME FRAME OF THE MEETING: Early 1992

• CONTEXT PRIOR TO THE EXCERPT: Saddam and his advisors, probably from the Revolutionary Command Council, are discussing the various books that were published after the First Gulf War.

Page 70: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

We, We have specific people. They are gathering the documents, books, and publications, to show our side. So just leave them, but hizrusna and the others write a lot, and they produce something sometimes right, sometimes wrong.

Page 71: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

But we, when we come out with a book, we are going to prepare The Solution.

Unidentified Male

We will narrow the field.

Page 72: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

Those who write books, on the Um al-Ma’arik attack, and cover all the angles, but this isn’t possible except by the leader, and I'm busy. So, let there be a plan, when I have a chance to write, I will write. I don’t say right or wrong, the name of hisrasna .

Page 73: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

[mumbles]

Saddam Hussein

Mmmm?

Page 74: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

I brought some of the –

Saddam Hussein

Hala thala [mumbling] Um al-Ma’arik, and I can write [unintelligible], until you have [unintelligible].

Page 75: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

And now, who will we get to write it? Comrade Tariq Aziz, the best writer, there, settled.

Okay, what will the Mother of All Battles cover, and who [unintelligible] all ways so that one can go [unintelligible] [mumbling]

Page 76: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

It is ongoing, the drama is continuing, for a while yet. It is not a matter of "we hit them on the second of August, and they embargoed us, then hit us on the sixteenth and seventeenth, and then it ended on the twenty eighth of February. No, it is not like this. This is ongoing.

Page 77: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Observations

• Saddam did not recognize UN Security Council Resolutions as ending the Gulf War.

• Saddam from interview with Dan Rather:– So we have not lost the war. And we were not

defeated. You know that the fighting that went on continued -- between us and Iran -- continued for eight years. Iran lost battles to us and we lost battles to them. But how do you calculate things? You measure things by the final results.

Page 78: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Observations

• If, by his own admission, Saddam was continuing the war, it was axiomatic to pursue it unconventionally after being beaten conventionally.

Page 79: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Decontamination at Hakim Bioweapons Facility

• Location on tape ISCG-2003-M0004244– Beginning through 2:36

• Approximate Date of Meeting:– After destruction of original Hakim bioweapons facility

in June 1996

• Overview:– An advisor to Saddam discusses the organization of a

unit to deal with biological weapon contamination from al Hakim Biological Weapons Factory.

Page 80: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male[tape begins abruptly in the middle of the sentence] They defend the Hakim Factory also. Hakim Factory, what is the organizational relationship, possibly there is [unintelligible] with a specific establishment. If there is a spread from Hakim Factory, where is the industrial, administrative relationship with the others,

Page 81: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

according to the evaluation of the experts that those areas are capable of being contaminated also. I believe [there should be] a plan for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction.

Page 82: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

Then, the question is, who is the person in this situation? What is the organizational relationship, and what is the relation in this subject to the Ministry of Defense?

Page 83: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

How was the relationship with the Ministry of Defense? Antashtu how much food provision and habiya al-khaliya. Is this from an order from the Ministry of Defense? Where does the order come from?

Page 84: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

What do you mean "Ministry of Defense?”

Page 85: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

Sir I. . . I believe that baytakun on this point, their [unintelligible] and their plan is to create a group of reasonable doubts which we have not yet seen. This point was dealt with by this round. The primary care was excellent.

Page 86: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Tariq Aziz

in biological

Page 87: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

Yes in biological. They were given excellent treatment. The reaction by the Iraqi technicians in the Thaka’ Area was as it was in truth, sir. My meaning is that the Thaka’ Area is at a khubf in how to [unintelligible].

Page 88: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

Then what is it with Ekeus, the next time. I would present to Mr. Leader that this will be one of the points to exploit for talil very powerful.

Page 89: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

The organizational structure, the relationship between this group and other institutes and factories. The people who will be working in the group, who are the scientists who will be with the group [sentence unintelligible].

Page 90: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

Do they operate on orders from the Ministry of Defense? These are some of the questions, Mr. Leader.

Page 91: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Observations

• Saddam later refers to Hakim as being destroyed, so this is another facility.

• The term jawla literally means round, or trip. In the context of primary care, it can refer to either an exercise or an actual outbreak of biological weapons.

Page 92: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Observations

Destruction of Hakim Bioweapons Facility

Page 93: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Tens, Hundreds Working in Missile and Chemical Fields

• Location on Tape ISCG-2003-M0004244– 07:07

• Context prior to the excerpt:– Tariq Aziz discussing with Saddam Hussein

the problems with explaining to UNSCOM the previous commercial relationships for military imports.

Page 94: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Tariq Aziz

They are enemies, the Special Commission is the enemy. Every day they come with things, but this is the summary sir. They are arranged. In the areas of missiles and chemicals, they are arranged.

Page 95: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

[unintelligible] five years.

Tariq Aziz

They Came, Of course, of course, there is work.

Page 96: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

Mulhi, five years.

Tariq AzizReally, the military industry group, may Allah help them, people, in tens, in hundreds, work daily for twenty hours, from the break of dawn, all of them for the sake of these issues.

Page 97: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Tariq Aziz

One day there came to me, Amer said it would affect us, from the first meeting, issues, “you have a relationship with Britain, Poland, Brazil, and . . . I don't know the fourth county. .

Page 98: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

Egypt

Tariq Aziz

And Egypt.

Page 99: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Observations

• Tariq Aziz inserts comments on ongoing WMD production into the middle of a brief on relations with UNSCOM.

• The term safat can come from a number of root words, and mean either “arranged, aligned, dispersed (by wind), liquidated, swallowed, clarified, settled.”

Page 100: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

The Iraqi Plasma Program

• Location on Tape ISGQ-2003-M0007379:– 02:06:27

• Context Prior to the Excerpt:– Introduction by a senior official before the

briefings by scientists from the Military Industrial Commission and the Iraqi Atomic Energy Agency.

Page 101: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

[unintelligible] reading on it,. . how , , , [unintelligible] ... plasma, what is it? . . [other speakers] SH - the specialists, yes, we are ready for this. Each one, each speaker, stand and speak into the microphone.

Page 102: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Doctor Thamir

Doctor Thamir Ma'aman Mawdud, from the the Theoretical Application Center, sir, the Military Industrial Commission.Plasma, really, is one of the applications used in the World's countries. an industrial application, used in materials, coating materials, and tardeeth.[He gives a general background briefing, then addresses the Iraqi Plasma Program.]

Page 103: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Doctor Thamir

• [Starting at 04:35:46] Iraq's National Laboratory for plasma started in the eighties, sir. as you know. We started with the sources of plasma. In 1981 we started to create sources of plasma, which were used in the Iraqi nuclear program.

Page 104: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Doctor Thamir

The source of plasma that we created, started in . . the first start, through research and development, then simple test production, the first batches, then tests done through mathematical systems, then the production we achieved in the advanced stages at the end of the Nineties.

Page 105: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Doctor Thamir

These plasma sources had - were used through - used in the beginning for specific production. We created plasma in the Eighties, and we started with the principles of building the. . .

Page 106: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Doctor Thamir

the. . .theoretical knowledge of plasma to broaden the capability at that time. We began to gain capability, and the Iraqi National Laboratory, we built competence, and we made experiments with plasma, arriving at mathematical measurements, and then production.

Page 107: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Doctor Thamir

Now, at present, after the 30 state aggression against us, some of the activities with plasma were threatened as a result of the tyrannical resolutions. Today, activity is restricted to qawaya tests and experimental and industrial measurements.

Page 108: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Doctor Thamir

Activity hasn't died in plasma because it is allowed in some of the tests which we use. Then, sir, according to what we have done in the Iraqi National Laboratory in building plasma activity, we have a very large industrial base.

Page 109: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Doctor Thamir

We have built a factory to produce plasma systems. We have built a number of factories with Military Industry, who produced specialized factories for us during this time. [Context after Excerpt: He discusses practical issues with working with a university plasma center.]

Page 110: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Amer Rashid al-Ubaydi

[After a discussion with a representative of the Ministry of Education regarding the role of the university plasma center.]

Sir, the summary, the truth is the applied activity is present and found in the industrial sector, and not only in the Military Industrial Commission, but in the Atomic Energy Agency, under Dr. Amer.

Page 111: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Amer Rashid al-Ubaydi

He is responsible for the plasma activity in Atomic Energy, he is competent for the activity. We in the Military Industrial Commission are present, but have less personnel than they do, that is, Dr. Thamir.

Page 112: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Amer Rashid al-Ubaydi

We don't feel that there is interference with the center, it if were permitted, within the understanding governing the scientific research in the university.

[He goes on to discuss the pros and cons of interaction with the university plasma center]

Page 113: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

[Beginning at 21:31:80] let the specialist brothers that are ready . . . Yes . . . go ahead.

Page 114: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Doctor Amer

Mr. Leader, I see from the people Ibn Awda to bring forth the event regarding plasma, and I believe it is necessary to add some subjects to what was discussed by Dr. Thamir -

Page 115: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

What is your name and your specialty?

Page 116: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Doctor Amer

Doctor Amer Abbas, Director of the Plasma Section in Atomic Energy.

Plasma started to be used in the Nineteenth Century, at the end of the Nineteenth Century, when there was a need to produce parallel tubes capable of passing electrical circuits within the range of amps to kilo amps.

Page 117: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Doctor Thamir

The need arose from the requirement to produce light. In that the power of use from plasma was in the area of producing light, and until now there is a relationship.

Page 118: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Doctor Amer

[murmurings]

light, light, illumination, light is one of the simple practical applications for plasma. After this, in 1950 approximately, it became possible, it was known, that plasma could be used to control nuclear fusion reactions, that is, control hydrogen bombs.

Page 119: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Doctor Amer

After that, the United States began a program called "Shermut." It was a closed program. In approximately the same year, The Soviet Union on its own, and Britain also, started similar programs. These programs are known to this day as TOKOMAK, as mentioned by Dr. Thamir.

Page 120: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

What’s the name?

Doctor Amer

TOCOMAK . . . TOCOMAK . . . from a Russian word, Mr. Leader. Beginning in 1950, and opening in 1956, was the first laboratory to use TOCOMAK.

Page 121: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Doctor Amer

[He discusses other commercial applications for plasma.]

[25:45:73] . . . . . . In the beginning of 2000, transfer became possible, through systems that are international intu, from what is called a sufriya system [unintelligible] the energy that goes in is the energy that goes out. What they call in English "break even."

Page 122: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Observations

• The main intent of the meeting appears to be determining the role of a "proposal center" that had been opened six months previous to the meeting. The topic also involves the relationship between academic aspects of plasma and practical application. In addition to controlling nuclear explosions, certain plasma discharges are used for nuclear weapon simulations.

Page 123: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Observations

• Two Programs and a University Center. Iraqis admitted to University Center, but stated practical program ended in 1988 for ISG report.

• Both briefers want to expand their capability beyond the original intent of nuclear weapons development.

Page 124: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Observations

• Iraqi press claimed new developments with the Nuclear Mujahideen in March and April 2002.

• The Guardian ran a story in September 2002 on illicit purchases by Iraq: “They carried a shopping list of high-specification machine tools, including diamond cutters, a powder-metal production line and a plasma-spray machine - all potentially components for nuclear weapons and a ballistic-missiles programme.”

Page 125: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Foreign Help to Answer UNSCOM, and Ideas for Attacking America

• Location on tape ISGQ-2003-M0004244:–10:07 through 15:32

• Context prior to excerpt:–Tariq Aziz was discussing how to

answer UNSCOM in order to close inspections for each of the specific areas.

Page 126: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Tariq Aziz

I said, the Brazilians, we don’t have anything to do with them, Egypt, I told them Egypt, Yeh?

Unidentified Male[unintelligible]

Page 127: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Tariq Aziz

qashmari, this was also the case sir. I answered them, and said this subject, and repeated it many times. The purchases of chemicals in 88, 89, and 90 are a remaining point. Also to be solved.

Page 128: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Tariq Aziz

I mean, there isn't anything remaining in missiles and chemicals, anything . . . critical, [unintelligible]. In the second meeting, they said on these subjects, the problem is the biological.

Page 129: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Tariq Aziz

Biological, in my estimation, I don’t want to get into explanations, in my estimation, we have a solution.

Unidentified Male

[unintelligible]

Page 130: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Tariq Aziz

We can.

Unidentified Male

What?

Page 131: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Tariq Aziz

We can, we can find a solution. But, on this subject the Russians and Brazilians must cooperate with us. I have asked General Amer and Riyadh that they get involved with [unintelligible] because the tangible thing is that the working gap, the factories that . . ah

Page 132: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

There must be doubts about them under the kathirat?

Page 133: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Tariq Aziz

Yes

Saddam Hussein

After the -

Page 134: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Tariq Aziz

Yes. I mean there is nothing big left on this subject, except for the doubts of the Americans, that Iraq can produce biological weapons and use them for terrorism.

Page 135: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

What is the –

Tariq Aziz

No, this sir.

Page 136: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

[unintelligible] official.

Tariq Aziz

Yes.

Page 137: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

They say that Iraq has such-and-such missiles and such-and-such whatever.

Tariq Aziz

No, this is not official, this is talk from Wafiq Samarrai, [unintelligible] Wafiq Samarrai

Page 138: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

No, other than this, other than this, before it . . . a while before it. I read a statement from one of the Americans –

Tariq Aziz

Yes but the Special Commission does not acknowledge it.

Page 139: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

Official.Tariq Aziz

They don’t acknowledge it . . . they don’t acknowledge it. Sir, they don’t talk about it, because the numbers of the missiles, to the limit of the missiles, were clear that the equipment we had was Russian, Soviet.

Page 140: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Tariq Aziz

We have missiles natatawayla Russian missiles that we bought. There are the clear lists of the Russian purchases, and the nabat of Russian remains, so we said check, they checked, and it was finished. This way, one hundred missiles, this is all our evidence. They can't say a -

Page 141: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

It is a pity that the war ended so quickly, otherwise they would have found them on Israel’s head.

Page 142: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Tariq Aziz

Well, on the subject of biological which still remains, the French and the Russians, if they help us, we can reach a solution, I mean, I don't think it is unlikely that [unintelligible].

Page 143: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Tariq Aziz

This talk that Iraq produces . . or uses for terrorism, this is an empty allegation. Somebody could say any country can –

Page 144: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

Terrorism is coming . . . with the Americans, two years ago, not a long while ago, with the English I believe, there was a campaign [unintelligible] with one of them, that in the future there would be terrorism with weapons of mass destruction . . . . . ..

Page 145: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

what is it that we . . . consider this technique . . and use people involved with smuggling. . there were stories on smuggling.

Page 146: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

But sir, germ warfare –

Saddam Hussein

Before a little, in 89, . . they said in the future they would see a car [unintelligible] a nuclear explosion in, for example, Washington . . or germ, or chemical.

Page 147: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Tariq Aziz

Sir, germ, biological, we can arrange a house, we can arrange a truck, with –

Page 148: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

This is coming, this story is coming, but not from Iraq . .

Tariq AzizSir, they can’t do it.

Saddam HusseinIt is coming from others.

Page 149: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Tariq Aziz

biological, this is simple to arrange. This is easy. With any biological [weapon], you can use a truck with germ . . and fill the water tank and kill [unintelligible]. And this not a country, it is not necessary to suspect a country, anyone can do it.

Page 150: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Tariq Aziz

Anyone can do it, an American, in a house near the White House. They would not have much reason, except the institutes. They have big institutes, like Hakim. [unintelligible] Hakim, and it is known that it was destroyed.

Page 151: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Tariq Aziz

They, if they can convince the others also, that this institute has the equipment, I don't think there would makayin [unintelligible]. There would be. [mumbling] Yes?

Unidentified MaleThe reaction?

Page 152: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Tariq Aziz

Yes, care with all the shibabish. I mean, if actually, there is going to be destruction, I think our position is not going to be strong. The others are going to say that this is true, the five are not going to accept –

Page 153: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

Yes, that is like all, enough of [unintelligible].

Unidentified Male[a speaker at a distance from the microphone raised concerns about such an attack]

Page 154: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Saddam Hussein

[unintelligible] I know that biological is the farthest thing away from there being a story. Wadiyan [friendly?], they ended it, their work and [unintelligible]

Page 155: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Unidentified Male

[Mostly unintelligible, but mentions a window and air conditioning].

Tariq Aziz

[mostly unintelligible sentence]

Page 156: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Observations

• Regarding an attack by others, Saddam can be referring to another country or group with plans to attack America, or to the use of proxies. Given the context and other evidence of collaboration with jihadists, the use of proxies makes more sense.

Page 157: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Observations

• When discussing the use of biological weapons, Tariq Aziz refers to the U.S. Bioweapons institute similar to Hakim (Fort Detrick) as a possible red herring.

• Stephen Hatfield, temporarily a subject in the Anthrax case, had previously worked at Fort Detrick.

Page 158: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Still to Come

• Briefings on Plasma Program for Nuclear Weapons Development.

• Hosni Mubarak – King Fahd Conspiracy Against Iraq, Getting Revenge.

• Saddam on Planting Fake Documents to Justify Invasion of Kuwait.

• Diversion of UNICEF and Red Cross Aid to Military Industrial Commission.

Page 159: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

Still to Come

• Jaafar on Retaining Nuclear Weapons Personnel Not Already Involved with Projects.

• Briefing on Obtaining Parts for Biological Weapons Program After the Destruction of the Hakim Bioweapons Facility.

• Hundreds, If Not Thousands, Of Other Tape Recordings Of Saddam’s Meetings.

Page 160: The Saddam Tapes Intelligence Summit Arlington, VA February 18, 2006.

General Observations

• Inspection programs do not work if the subject country has a desire to have weapons.

• The U.N. method of crisis management does not work. WWII is a much better model, especially to meet the threat of Jihad.

• Saddam waged a war against us, while we litigated a legal process against him.