ARIN XIMemphis, TN April 2003 ARIN DBWG Tim Christensen Authentication Update.
The RPKI & Origin Validation€¦ · ARIN ARIN APNIC APNIC UUNET UUNET PSGnet PSGnet UUcust UUcust...
Transcript of The RPKI & Origin Validation€¦ · ARIN ARIN APNIC APNIC UUNET UUNET PSGnet PSGnet UUcust UUcust...
The RPKI & Origin Validation
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RIPE / Praha 2010.05.03
Randy Bush <[email protected]> Rob Austein <[email protected]>
Steve Bellovin <[email protected]> And a cast of thousands! Well, dozens :)
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Routing is Very Fragile • How long can we survive on The Web as
Random Acts of Kindness, TED Talk by Jonathan Zittrain?
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Routing Mistakes • Routing errors are significant and have very high customer impact
• We need to fix this before we are crucified in the WSJ a la Toyota
• 99% of mis-announcements are accidental originations of someone else’s prefix -- Google, UU, IIJ, ...
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Why Origin Validation? • Prevent YouTube accident • Prevent 7007 accident, UU/Sprint 2 days! • Prevents most accidental announcements • Does not prevent malicious path attacks
such as the Kapela/Pilosov DefCon attack • That requires “Path Validation” and locking
the data plane to the control plane, the next steps, by my children
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This is Not New • 1986 – Bellovin identifies vulnerability • 2000 – S-BGP – X.509 PKI to support
Secure BGP - Kent, Lynn, et al. • 2003 – NANOG S-BGP Workshop • 2006 – ARIN & APNIC start work on
RPKI. RIPE starts in 2008. • 2009 – RPKI Open Testbed and running
code in test routers • 2009 – ISOC discovers problem
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The Goal • Keep the Internet working!!! • Seriously reduce routing damage from mis-configuration, mis-origination
Non-Goals • Prevent Malicious Attacks • Keep RIRs in business by selling X.509 Certificates
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Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI)
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RFC 3779 Extension
Describes IP Resources (Addr & ASN)
X.509 Cert
Owner’s Public Key
X.509 Certificate w/ 3779 Ext CA
SIA – URI for where this Publishes
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Being Developed & Deployed
by RIRs and Operators
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98.128.0.0/16
Public Key
98.128.0.0/20
Public Key
98.128.16.0/20
Public Key
98.128.32.0/19
Public Key
98.128.16.0/24
Public Key
98.128.17.0/24
Public Key
Cert/RGnet
Cert/Rob Cert/Randy
Cert/ISC Cert/PSGnet
Cert/ARIN CA
CA CA CA
CA CA
Certificate Hierarchy follows
Allocation Hierarchy
SIA
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That’s Who Owns It but
Who May Route It?
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98.128.0.0/16
Public Key
98.128.0.0/16
AS 42
EE Cert
ROA
Route Origin Authorization (ROA)
98.128.0.0/16 147.28.0.0/16
Public Key
Owning Cert CA End Entity Cert
can not sign certs. can sign other things e.g. ROAs
This is not a Cert It is a signed blob
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0/0
Public Key
98.0.0.0/8 AS 0-4000
Public Key
98.128.0.0/16 AS 3130
Public Key
PSGnet
ARIN
IANA
98.128.0.0/24
AS 3130
ROA
98.128.1.0/24
AS 3130
ROA
98.128.2.0/24
AS 3130
ROA
98.128.3.0/24
AS 3130
ROA
98.128.4.0/24
AS 3130
ROA
Too Many EE Certs and ROAs, Yucchhy!
Announces 256 /24s
PSGnet /16 Experimental Allocation from ARIN
CA
CA
CA
98.128.0.0/24
Public Key
EE Cert 98.128.1.0/24
Public Key
EE Cert 98.128.2.0/24
Public Key
EE Cert 98.128.30/24
Public Key
EE Cert 98.128.4.0/24
Public Key
EE Cert
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0/0
Public Key
98.0.0.0/8
Public Key
98.128.0.0/16
Public Key
PSGnet
ARIN
IANA
98.128.0.0/16-24
AS 3130
ROA
ROA Aggregation Using Max Length 98.128.0.0/16
Public Key
EE Cert
CA
CA
CA
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Allocation in Reality
My Infrastructure
Unused Static (non BGP) Cust
BGP Cust
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ROA Use
My Aggregate ROA
Customer ROAs
I Generate for ‘Lazy’ Customer My Infrastructure
Unused Static (non BGP) Cust
BGP Cust
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Running Code
And the Three RPKI Protocols
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LIR Back End
[Hardware] Signing Module
IR RPKI
Priv Keys
Private RPKI Keys
Issued ROAs
My Misc Config Options
Public RPKI Keys
ID=Me ID=Me
RPKI Engine
Resource PKI IP Resource Certs
ASN Resource Certs Route Origin Attestations
Internal CA Data
Internal CA Data
XML Object Transport & Handler
Business Key/Cert
Management
Private IR Biz Trust Anchor Internal
CA Data
Keys for Talking to
IR BackEnd
Certs Issued to
DownStreams
My Resources
My RightsToRoute
Repo Mgt
Up / Down Protocol
Up / Down Protocol
Publication Protocol
Internal
Protocol
Prototype of Basic Back End
Up/Down EE Public Keys
Biz EE Signing
Key
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Delegations to Custs
Big, Centralized, & Scary We Don’t Do This
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RPKI DataBase
IP Resource Certs ASN Resource Certs
Route Origin Attestations
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Distributed RPKI DataBase IANA IANA
ARIN ARIN APNIC APNIC
UUNET UUNET PSGnet PSGnet
UUcust UUcust
IIJ IIJ
A Player (CA) Publishes All Certificates Which
They Generate in Their Own Unique
Publication Point
SIA
SIA
SIA
SIA
Running Code
Repository
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RCynic Cache Gatherer
RCynic Gatherer Validated
Cache
Trust Anchor
(cynical rsync)
IANA IANA
ARIN ARIN APNIC APNIC
UUNET UUNET PSGnet PSGnet
UUcust UUcust
IIJ IIJ
SIA
SIA
SIA
SIA
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Reliability Issue Expensive To Fetch & Unreliable
RCynic Gatherer Validated
Cache
Trust Anchor IANA IANA
ARIN ARIN APNIC APNIC
UUNET UUNET PSGnet PSGnet
UUcust UUcust
IIJ IIJ
SIA
SIA
SIA
SIA
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UUcust
Reliability Via Hosted Publication
Reducing the Number of Publication Points Makes RCynic
More Efficient
Repository with
Multiple Publication
Points
IANA IANA
ARIN ARIN APNIC APNIC
UUNET UUNET PSGnet
PSGnet
UUcust
IIJ IIJ
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Mac
Publication Point
Issued ROAs
My Misc Config
Options
Public RPKI Keys
ID=Me
Internal CA Data
Keys for Talking to
IR BackEnd
Certs Issued to
DownStreams
Up/Down EE Public Keys
Front End GUI &
Management
RPKI Engine
Contract Out To Google
A Usage Scenario
Resources [OrgID]
My RightsToRoute
Delegations to Custs
User Web GUI
98% of an RIR’s Users 10% of an RIR’s IP Space
Up / Down Protocol
2% of an RIR’s Users 90% of an RIR’s IP Space
Publication Protocol
IR’s Database(s)
Internal
Protocol
Origin Validation
• Cisco IOS and IOS-XR test code have Origin Validation now
• Work continues daily in test routers • Compute load much less than ACLs
from IRR data, 10µsec per update! • Expect other vendor soon
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Global RPKI
RPKI -> Router
RCynic Gatherer
RPKI to Rtr
Protocol
Near/In PoP
BGP Decision Process
The Third Protocol (origin validation only)
Cache / Server
Object Security RCynic
Transport Security
ssh
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Typical Exchange
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Cache Router | <----- Reset Query -------- | R requests data | | | ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | C sends zero or more | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | Payload PDUs | ------ End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data | | and sends new serial ~ ~ | -------- Notify ----------> | (optional) | | | <----- Serial Query ------- | R requests data | | | ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | C sends zero or more | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | Payload PDUs | ------ End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data | | and sends new serial ~ ~
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IPv4 Prefix
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0 8 16 24 31 .-------------------------------------------. | Protocol | PDU | | | Version | Type | Color | | 0 | 4 | | +-------------------------------------------+ | | | Length=20 | | | +-------------------------------------------+ | | Prefix | Max | Data | | Flags | Length | Length | Source | | | 0..32 | 0..32 | RPKI/IRR | +-------------------------------------------+ | | | IPv4 prefix | | | +-------------------------------------------+ | | | Autonomous System Number | | | `-------------------------------------------'
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IPv6 Prefix
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0 8 16 24 31 .-------------------------------------------. | Protocol | PDU | | | Version | Type | Color | | 0 | 6 | | +-------------------------------------------+ | | | Length=40 | | | +-------------------------------------------+ | | Prefix | Max | Data | | Flags | Length | Length | Source | | | 0..128 | 0..128 | RPKI/IRR | +-------------------------------------------+ | | +--- ---+ | | +--- IPv6 prefix ---+ | | +--- ---+ | | +-------------------------------------------+ | | | Autonomous System Number | | | `-------------------------------------------'
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Global RPKI
Asia Cache
NoAm Cache
Euro Cache
in-PoP Cache
in-PoP Cache
in-PoP Cache
in-PoP Cache
in-PoP Cache
in-PoP Cache
in-PoP Cache
in-PoP Cache
in-PoP Cache
Cust Facing
Cust Facing
Cust Facing
Cust Facing
Cust Facing
High Priority
Lower Priority
Extremely Large ISP Deployment
Configure
router bgp 4128 bgp router-id 198.180.152.251
bgp rpki cache 198.180.150.1 42420 refresh-time 600
address-family ipv4 unicast
bgp dampening collect-statistics ebgp
redistribute static route-policy vb-ebgp-out
...
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Result of Check • Valid – A matching/covering ROA was
found with a matching AS number • Invalid – A matching or covering ROA
was found, but AS number did not match, and there was no valid one
• Not Found – No matching or covering ROA was found
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Policy Override Knobs • Disable Validity Check Completely • Disable Validity Check for a Peer • Disable Validity Check for Prefixes
When check is disabled, the result is “Not Found,” i.e. as if there was no ROA
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Defaults • Origin Validation is Enabled if you have
configured a cache server peering
• RPKI Poll Interval is 30 Minutes
• No Effect on Policy unless you have configured it
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An ISP’s ROAs # <prefix>/<length>-<maxlength> <asn> <group> # 64.9.224.0/19-24 15169 ARIN 74.125.0.0/16-24 15169 ARIN-3 72.14.192.0/18-24 15169 ARIN-3 72.14.224.0/24-24 36384 ARIN-3 72.14.230.0/24-24 36384 ARIN3 64.233.160.0/19-24 15169 ARIN-3 64.9.224.0/19-24 36492 ARIN 66.102.0.0/20-24 15169 ARIN-3 66.249.64.0/19-24 15169 ARIN-3 66.249.80.0/20-24 15169 ARIN-3 72.14.192.0/18-24 15169 ARIN-3 74.125.0.0/16-24 15169 ARIN-3 173.194.0.0/16-24 15169 ARIN-3 209.85.128.0/17-24 15169 ARIN-3 216.239.32.0/19-24 15169 ARIN-3 2001:4860::/32-64 15169 ARIN-3
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Good Dog! RP/0/1/CPU0:r0.dfw#show bgp 192.158.248.0/24 BGP routing table entry for 192.158.248.0/24 Versions: Process bRIB/RIB SendTblVer Speaker 132327 132327 Last Modified: Oct 2 01:06:47.630 for 13:33:12 Paths: (6 available, best #3) Advertised to peers (in unique update groups): 204.69.200.26 Path #1: Received by speaker 0 2914 1299 6939 6939 27318 157.238.224.149 from 157.238.224.149 (129.250.0.85) Origin IGP, metric 0, localpref 100, valid, external, \ origin validity state: valid Community: 2914:420 2914:2000 2914:3000 4128:380 Path #2: Received by speaker 0 ...
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Bad Dog! RP/0/1/CPU0:r0.dfw#sh bgp 64.9.224.0 BGP routing table entry for 64.9.224.0/20 Versions: Process bRIB/RIB SendTblVer Speaker 0 0 Last Modified: Oct 2 17:38:27.630 for 4d22h Paths: (6 available, no best path) Not advertised to any peer Path #1: Received by speaker 0 2914 3356 36492 157.238.224.149 from 157.238.224.149 (129.250.0.85) Origin IGP, metric 2, localpref 100, valid, external,\ origin validity state: invalid Community: 2914:420 2914:2000 2914:3000 4128:380
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Strange Dog! RP/0/1/CPU0:r0.dfw#sh bgp 147.28.0.0 BGP routing table entry for 147.28.0.0/16 Versions: Process bRIB/RIB SendTblVer Speaker 337691 337691 Last Modified: Oct 2 17:40:16.630 for 4d22h Paths: (6 available, best #1) Advertised to peers (in unique update groups): 204.69.200.26 Path #1: Received by speaker 0 2914 3130 157.238.224.149 from 157.238.224.149 (129.250.0.85) Origin IGP, metric 68, localpref 100, valid, external, \ origin validity state: not found Community: 2914:410 2914:2000 2914:3000 4128:380
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iBGP Hides Validity State
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iBGP Full Mesh
p p
p
valid invalid
unknown
which do i choose? why do i choose it?
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Unknown Beat Valid! r1.iad#sh ip bg 198.180.152.0!
BGP routing table entry for 198.180.152.0/24, version 324176!
Paths: (2 available, best #1, table default)!
Not advertised to any peer!
2914 4128!
129.250.10.157 (metric 1) from 198.180.150.253 (198.180.150.253)!
Origin IGP, metric 51, localpref 100, valid, internal, best!
Community: 2914:410 2914:2000 2914:3000 3927:380!
1239 2914 4128!
144.232.18.81 from 144.232.18.81 (144.228.241.254)!
Origin IGP, metric 0, localpref 100, valid, external!
Community: 3927:380!
Sovc state valid!
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MED Beat Valid r1.iad#sh ip bg 147.28.0.0!
BGP routing table entry for 147.28.0.0/16, version 142233!
Paths: (2 available, best #1, table default)!
Not advertised to any peer!
2914 3130!
129.250.10.157 (metric 1) from 198.180.150.253 (198.180.150.253)!
Origin IGP, metric 105, localpref 100, valid, internal, best!
Community: 2914:410 2914:2000 2914:3000 3927:380!
1239 3130!
144.232.18.81 from 144.232.18.81 (144.228.241.254)!
Origin IGP, metric 653, localpref 100, valid, external!
Community: 3927:380!
Sovc state valid!
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The Solution is to
Allow Operator to Test and then Set Local Policy
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Secure route-map validity-0!
! match rpki-invalid!
! drop!
route-map validity-1!
! match rpki-not-found!
! set localpref 50!
// valid defaults to 100!
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Paranoid
route-map validity-0!
! match rpki-valid!
! set localpref 110!
route-map validity-1!
! drop!
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After AS-Path route-map validity-0 ! match rpki-unknown!
! set metric 50!
route-map validity-1!
match rpki-invalid!
! set metric 25!
// valid defaults to 100!
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The Open TestBed
*ARIN ARIN
ISC
ISC
Google RGnet
RGnet JPNIC
JPNIC
Mesh Mesh IIJ IIJ
Cristel
Cristel
*APNIC APNIC
BWC
BWC
Trust Anchor
Trust Anchor
runs own RPKI to keep private key private and control own fate, but publishes at IIJ
until we get IANA to act as the parent
until we get IANA to act as the parent
* APNIC and ARIN are simulations constructed from public data
chocolate
Running Code
Repository
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Level(3)
Level(3)
runs own RPKI to keep private key private and control own fate, but publishes at ARIN
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The Big Speedbump
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But Who Do We Trust?
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http://news.cnet.com/2100-1001-254586.html
RPKI Full Implementation Available as Open Source
https://subvert-rpki.hactrn.net/
and there is a mailing list
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Work Supported By
• US Government
THIS PROJECT IS SPONSORED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY UNDER AN INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT WITH THE AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORY (AFRL).
• ARIN
• Internet Initiative Japan
• Cisco, Google, NTT, Equinix
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IR Back End
RPKI Engine
Internal Protocol
IR Back End
RPKI Engine
Internal Protocol
Simple Parent and
Simple Child
My Resources
Childs’ Resources
My Resources
Childs’ Resources
Up / Down Protocol
Registry Back Ends
Up / Down Protocol
Up / Down Protocol
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IR Back End
[Hardware] Signing Module
IR RPKI
Priv Keys
Private RPKI Keys
Issued ROAs
My Misc Config Options
Public RPKI Keys
ID=Me ID=Me
RPKI Engine
Resource PKI IP Resource Certs
ASN Resource Certs Route Origin Attestations
Stub Provided
to be Hacked
Internal CA Data
Internal CA Data
XML Object Transport & Handler
Business Key/Cert
Management
Private IR Biz Trust Anchor Internal
CA Data
Up/Down EE Public Keys
Keys for Talking to
IR BackEnd
Certs Issued to
DownStreams
My Resources
My RightsToRoute
Repo Mgt
Up / Down Protocol
Up / Down Protocol
Publication Protocol
Internal
Protocol Biz EE Signing Key(s)
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IR Back End
Signing Engine
IR RPKI
Priv Keys
Private RPKI Keys
Issued ROAs
Cust’s Preferences
Public RPKI Keys
Cust ID Cust ID
RPKI Engine
Stub Provided
to be Hacked
Internal CA Data
Internal CA Data
XML Object Transport & Handler
Business Key/Cert
Management
Private IR Biz Trust Anchor Internal
CA Data
Keys for Talking to
IR BackEnd
Certs Issued to
DownStreams
Resources [OrgID]
RightsToRoute [OrgID]
Repo Mgt
Up / Down Protocol
Up / Down Protocol
Publication Protocol
Resource PKI IP Resource Certs
ASN Resource Certs Route Origin Attestations
Internal
Protocol
Up/Down EE Public Keys
Biz EE Signing Key(s)
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Serial Query
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0 8 16 24 31 .-------------------------------------------. | Protocol | PDU | | | Version | Type | reserved = zero | | 0 | 1 | | +-------------------------------------------+ | | | Length=12 | | | +-------------------------------------------+ | | | Serial Number | | | `-------------------------------------------'
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End of Data
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0 8 16 24 31 .-------------------------------------------. | Protocol | PDU | | | Version | Type | reserved = zero | | 0 | 7 | | +-------------------------------------------+ | | | Length=12 | | | +-------------------------------------------+ | | | Serial Number | | | `-------------------------------------------'
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