The Role of Turkey in Global Energy_ Bolstering Energy Infrastructure Security

6
 Introduction Situated between main global energy suppliers and consumers, as well as being a significant stable power which bridges Europe and Asia, Turkey’s place in the global energy system is drawing greater attention from the internati onal communi ty . New discours e on Tur key’ s role as a regional ener gy hub, through fulfillin g new responsibilities under the terms of new international projects, is only adding to the a ttenti on it is receiving. Analysis of Turkey’s pla ce wit hin the global energy syst em oft en focuses on the issues of energy supply continuity as well as on the political implications of alternative energy route projects on regional and international levels. However , energy infrastructure security is often neglected in policy circles and in academ ic studies. Energy infrastructure security plays an integral , though often neglect ed role in overall energy secur ity . With respect to infrastructure, pipeline security is of particular im portance in Turkey . Consideration needs to be given to the specific context of political and security conditions in Turkey. Policy prescriptions of international actors —composed of regional oil & gas exporting countries and international energy companies—as well as advice from the energy sector are also imperatives requiring evaluation. Geopolitics, Turkey and Energy Security Turkey’s geographic location enhances its geostrategic value; it is situated between major oil and gas reserves with 70% of the worlds reserve lying to its East, North and South, and the world’s largest energy market lying to her West . Potential project development can easily transform Turkey into an energy hub. These projects include the addition of Kaz akh and Turkmen energy resources to the Baku-Erzurum route, the possibility of a natural gas pipeline to be extended to Israel and the Middle East, and the potential of Turkey to transit Caspian oil and gas by alternative routes. Given its unique position, Turkey´s objective of being an energy hub for “East-West” and “North-South” energy corridors is not just an ambition. It is expected that Turkey will transport 6-7% of the world’s oil by 2012 . Considering the fact that European gas supplies come primarily from Russia, the idea of having alternative non-Russian gas, namely Azerbaijani, Turkmen, Iranian and Iraqi gas via Turkey is daily becoming more impo rtant. In other words, the restructuring of alternative energy transportation routes is not a luxury but an obligation for European consumers as well as for Caspian and Middle Eastern gas and oil suppliers. In addition, Turkey’s large population and its growing econom y have made the country a significant regional energy consumer, thus increasing its involvement in these international projects not only as a transport country but also as a large end-consumer . Oil and Gas Pipeline Network  TUESDAY , 18 MAY 2010 00: 00 HASAN ALSANCAK The Role of Tu rkey in G lobal Energ y: B olstering Energ y In frastruct ure ... ht tp://ww w.en sec.org/index.php?view=article&catid=106:energ ysecu ri... 1 -> 6 06.01.2012 16:23

Transcript of The Role of Turkey in Global Energy_ Bolstering Energy Infrastructure Security

Page 1: The Role of Turkey in Global Energy_ Bolstering Energy Infrastructure Security

8/3/2019 The Role of Turkey in Global Energy_ Bolstering Energy Infrastructure Security

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-role-of-turkey-in-global-energy-bolstering-energy-infrastructure-security 1/6

 

Introduction

Situated between main global energy suppliers and consumers, as

well as being a significant stable power which bridges Europe andAsia, Turkey’s place in the global energy system is drawing greater

attention from the international community. New discourse on

Turkey’s role as a regional energy hub, through fulfilling new

responsibilities under the terms of new international projects, is only

adding to the attention it is receiving. Analysis of Turkey’s place

within the global energy system often focuses on the issues of

energy supply continuity as well as on the political implications of

alternative energy route projects on regional and international levels.

However, energy infrastructure security is often neglected in policy

circles and in academic studies. Energy infrastructure security plays

an integral, though often neglected role in overall energy security.

With respect to infrastructure, pipeline security is of particular importance in Turkey. Consideration needs to be given to

the specific context of political and security conditions in Turkey. Policy prescriptions of international actors —composed

of regional oil & gas exporting countries and international energy companies—as well as advice from the energy sector are

also imperatives requiring evaluation.

Geopolitics, Turkey and Energy Security

Turkey’s geographic location enhances its geostrategic value; it is situated between major oil and gas reserves with 70%

of the worlds reserve lying to its East, North and South, and the world’s largest energy market lying to her West. Potential

project development can easily transform Turkey into an energy hub. These projects include the addition of Kazakh and

Turkmen energy resources to the Baku-Erzurum route, the possibility of a natural gas pipeline to be extended to Israel and

the Middle East, and the potential of Turkey to transit Caspian oil and gas by alternative routes. Given its unique position,

Turkey´s objective of being an energy hub for “East-West” and “North-South” energy corridors is not just an ambition. It is

expected that Turkey will transport 6-7% of the world’s oil by 2012.

Considering the fact that European gas supplies come primarily from Russia, the idea of having alternative non-Russian

gas, namely Azerbaijani, Turkmen, Iranian and Iraqi gas via Turkey is daily becoming more important. In other words, the

restructuring of alternative energy transportation routes is not a luxury but an obligation for European consumers as well

as for Caspian and Middle Eastern gas and oil suppliers. In addition, Turkey’s large population and its growing economy

have made the country a significant regional energy consumer, thus increasing its involvement in these international

projects not only as a transport country but also as a large end-consumer.

Oil and Gas Pipeline Network

 

TUESDAY, 18 MAY 2010 00:00 HASAN ALSANCAK

Role of Turkey in Global Energy: Bolstering Energy Infrastructure ... http://www.ensec.org/index.php?view=article&catid=106:energysecuri...

6 06.01.2012 16:23

Page 2: The Role of Turkey in Global Energy_ Bolstering Energy Infrastructure Security

8/3/2019 The Role of Turkey in Global Energy_ Bolstering Energy Infrastructure Security

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-role-of-turkey-in-global-energy-bolstering-energy-infrastructure-security 2/6

Map Source

Energy Security and Pipelines

Crude Oil Pipelines

Currently, Turkey hosts numerous pipelines that extend across the country. These pipelines were pioneered by the

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) crude oil pipeline. Nearly 670 miles of the pipeline’s overall 1100 miles pass within Turkish

borders. The BTC pipeline is the first transnational pipeline that transports Caspian oil without crossing Russian soil. It

carries approximately one million barrels of crude oil per day and accounts for 1.2% of the world’s current daily oil needs.

In addition, the BTC pipeline has great importance for connecting the East-West energy corridor. In addition, BTC servesnot only as a pipeline, but also connects the related countries in terms of foreign policy and economics. It thus creates an

interdependent regional system which is key for regional cooperation and peace.

Another important transnational pipeline in Turkey is the Iraq-Turkey Crude Oil Pipeline (Kirkuk-Ceyhan). There are also

three domestic pipelines constructed for the transportation of crude oil from Turkey’s south-eastern region to domestic

points of consumption in the country. These are the Batman-Dörtyol crude oil pipeline, the Ceyhan-Kırıkkale crude oil

pipeline and the Selmo-Batman crude oil pipeline. There is also a NATO pipeline and the planned Trans-Anatolian crude

oil pipeline running from Samsun to Ceyhan, which is currently in the pre-construction phase. In 2009, the first draft of the

project was approved by the partners. 

Gas Pipelines

Parallel to these crude oil pipelines, there are also several inter-governmental gas pipelines in operation that pass over

Turkish soil. The Blue Stream gas pipeline between Russia and Turkey is one of the most important of these. The

Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) (South Caucasus Pipeline) and the Tabriz-Ankara gas pipelines are among others inoperation. The Turkey-Greece interconnector is yet another.

With regards to future project plans, Nabucco is the most well known. It was developed in the early 2000s to break

Russia’s monopoly on pipelines and to reduce Europe’s energy dependence on Russia. Its IGA (Inter Governmental

Agreement) was finally signed on 13th of July 2009 in Ankara. Today, Turkey has invited Russia to become a part of the

Nabucco project as an extension of its new cooperation policy. Russia, on the other hand, invited Turkey to be a member

of the South Stream project, which was initiated to compete against Nabucco. This indicates a dramatic change in

Turkish-Russian relations. Turkey’s multiple pipeline policy, which reflects Turkey’s multi-dimensional foreign policy, has

become one of the main pillars of Turkey’s goal of providing for both an East-West as well as a North-South energy

corridor.

As a result of these assessments, Turkey’s geostrategic position appears advantageous for the country. However, such a

role also implies considerable responsibilities regarding the protection of this critical energy infrastructure that serves not

only Turkey but the region and the world. Hosting a major energy corridor means that infrastructure that inhabits it must

be secure in order to provide for sustained and reliable energy transport.

Nabucco

Role of Turkey in Global Energy: Bolstering Energy Infrastructure ... http://www.ensec.org/index.php?view=article&catid=106:energysecuri...

6 06.01.2012 16:23

Page 3: The Role of Turkey in Global Energy_ Bolstering Energy Infrastructure Security

8/3/2019 The Role of Turkey in Global Energy_ Bolstering Energy Infrastructure Security

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-role-of-turkey-in-global-energy-bolstering-energy-infrastructure-security 3/6

Map source

Critical Energy Infrastructure and Security Challenges

Regardless of how one defines it, energy security always includes the protection of critical energy infrastructure as a

crucial element of the energy sector. It is accepted by experts that terrorist attacks and illegal tapping have important

economic implications on oil prices since a security related premium of between $1 - $25 per barrel or higher is factored inby traders (see Ali N. Koknar, ‘‘The Epidemic of Energy Terrorism’’, Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century,

California: Praeger Security International, 2009, p. 25) . Thus, terrorist sabotage and theft from oil facilities makes

economies more vulnerable to the rising price of oil.

Particularly in unstable regions, oil and gas infrastructure have become one of the most strategic targets for terrorists.

Much of this infrastructure is located above ground, and as such oil and natural gas pipelines and related facilities like

pumping stations, bloc valves, compressors etc. become exposed to terrorist attacks as high profile targets. Besides this,

political disturbances, economic crises and rising oil prices contribute to attract terrorist activities at energy facilities in

these regions.

Al-Qaeda argues that priority should be given to attacking oil facilities in the Middle East. After Osama bin Laden’s call for

attacks against oil in December 2004, and Ayman al-Zawahiri's repeat of the call in autumn 2005, the terrorist attack on

Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia’s giant oil processing facility, was the first direct attack by al-Qaeda. Even if the attack was

announced as a failed terrorist attack by official Saudi statements, on news of the attempted attack, the price of crude oil

leapt as much as 3.4%. The attack was not only proof of the vulnerability of Saudi oil but also the importance of oil as a

target of terrorist elements. The direct terrorist challenge to producers is not merely specific to the Middle East. For many

energy supplier countries, particularly Iraq, Colombia, Nigeria, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Russiaand Eurasian countries, the protection of critical energy infrastructure from terrorism has become the highest priority.

Energy terrorism in Turkey

Considering Turkey, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) has declared pipelines as legitimate targets. It is reported that since

Role of Turkey in Global Energy: Bolstering Energy Infrastructure ... http://www.ensec.org/index.php?view=article&catid=106:energysecuri...

6 06.01.2012 16:23

Page 4: The Role of Turkey in Global Energy_ Bolstering Energy Infrastructure Security

8/3/2019 The Role of Turkey in Global Energy_ Bolstering Energy Infrastructure Security

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-role-of-turkey-in-global-energy-bolstering-energy-infrastructure-security 4/6

2004, the PKK has attacked the Turkish section of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline at least 20 times and has also attacked the

Iran-Turkey gas pipeline several times since 2005 (see Ali N. Koknar, ‘‘The Epidemic of Energy Terrorism’’, Energy

Security Challenges for the 21st Century, California: Praeger Security International, 2009, p. 24). A top PKK member

stated in 2006 that they “reserved their option” to attack BTC pipeline in future. On August 5, 2008, the PKK claimed the

responsibility for an explosion at the BTC pipeline that disrupted flow of oil through the BTC pipeline for two weeks (see

Koknar, p.25), which resulted in an estimated 1.5 Billion US$ operational loss. Investigations are ongoing to identify the

exact reason or reasons for the incident.

Illegal Tapping in Turkey

Another major threat against pipeline security is illegal tapping. According to media reports, between the years 2003-2008,

411 illegal tap incidents, including attempts, have occurred on the BOTAS pipelines (Turkey’s state owned oil and natural

gas pipeline and trading company) in Turkey. In addition, several illegal tap incidents on the BTC pipeline have been also

been recorded between 2006 and 2008. There has been a considerable decrease in the number of these illegal tapping

incidents, thanks to proactive efforts by Turkey’s security forces, particularly the Gendarmerie, other related government

agencies, the private sector and advanced electronic security systems. Nevertheless, due to a number of other reasons,

such as the fact that Turkey has the highest refined oil product prices in the world, there is a considerable demand for

contraband oil in the market, which makes the risk of illegal tapping remain high.

Solutions

In light of the above, it is not difficult to assess that in the 21st century energy and energy security has become much more

critical than in previous decades. Unfortunately, contrary to the huge market value and importance of energy companies,current security measures and standards for oil & gas facilities, pipelines and nuclear energy plants are not as

sophisticated as they might be. With the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York and

the Pentagon in Washington, terrorists proved that current terrorism methods have reached the phase of “asymmetric

terror,” which means the targets themselves will be operative material of terrorist attacks. In doing so, terrorists

demonstrated maximum advantage in inflicting large scale damage with a low level of logistical requirements compared to

classic terrorist tactics.

The complicated nature of energy security challenges requires collaboration between government- and market-oriented

approaches to set up longer energy security agreements at national and international levels. In other words, strategic

alliances between government agencies and the energy sector can be one of the mitigation factors against energy

terrorism.

International Cooperation ( NATO, UN, EU and OSCE)

NATO, with its proven operational land, air and maritime capabilities, has a key role in the provision of critical energy

infrastructure protection. Since NATO’s capable stance as a means to provide energy security is obvious, it would be

correct to state that no energy security strategy can be formed and implemented without considering the capacity of NATO,especially for energy security in the resource-rich Caucasus, Caspian Basin, and Middle East. Considering its

responsibility for securing multinational pipelines, Turkey has to be proactive and to take concrete steps on energy

security within a NATO framework and to become one of the participants in determining a larger global energy security

agenda. While having a proactive stance and taking decisive action in NATO, Turkey should not exclude the EU

Role of Turkey in Global Energy: Bolstering Energy Infrastructure ... http://www.ensec.org/index.php?view=article&catid=106:energysecuri...

6 06.01.2012 16:23

Page 5: The Role of Turkey in Global Energy_ Bolstering Energy Infrastructure Security

8/3/2019 The Role of Turkey in Global Energy_ Bolstering Energy Infrastructure Security

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-role-of-turkey-in-global-energy-bolstering-energy-infrastructure-security 5/6

dimension from its macro level approach to energy security as well. As a European Union candidate, Turkey is required to

pay more attention to cooperation with the EU on regional security concerns in general, and on energy security and

counter-terrorism in particular, in order to protect its common interests with its European neighbors. The UN and OSCE

also can be considered as other major partners for the protection of critical energy infrastructure on a global level. In

addition to the EU, NATO, UN and OSCE, more concrete cooperation on energy infrastructure security can be considered

with related countries in pipeline projects such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia, Iraq, Iran, Kazakhstan and others.

Specialized State Protection Forces on Critical Energy Infrastructure

According to IGA (Inter Governmental Agreement) Article III and HGA (Host Government Agreement) -Article 12 of the BTCPipeline, “Turkish State Authorities are responsible to ensure the safety and security of the Rights to Land, the Facilities

and all Persons within the Territory involved in Project Activities and shall protect the Rights to Land, the Facilities and

those Persons from all Loss or Damage resulting from civil war, sabotage, vandalism, blockade, revolution, riot,

insurrection, civil disturbance, terrorism, kidnapping, commercial extortion, organized crime or other destructive events.”

Moreover, according to the Turkish State’s Law on Transit of Petroleum through Pipeline- No: 4586 (TPL)- Article 6,

“additional security of the pipeline and the facilities shall be provided by the relevant security forces of the State, provided

that the relevant public institute meets the expenses related to the required building, facility, tools, vehicle, equipment etc.”

These articles clearly show that the Turkish government is fully responsible for the protection of transit pipelines across its

territory.

To comply with these responsibilities, a reassessment of the energy security chapter of the Turkish National Security

Strategy paper can be re-prioritized to further strengthen the current status of energy security measures so that the issue

receives the attention it requires and deserves. Mitigation measures might be further reinforced by the establishment of anew institutional/organizational framework within the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (like the one in the US) or

within the Armed Forces, which will specifically deal with energy infrastructure security.

There are several examples of dedicated state security organizations for energy security throughout the world. For

example, the Saudi government, in collaboration with the US, began to establish the “Facilities Security Force” to protect

national oil facilities. Other countries, for example, Turkey’s partners in the BTC project—Azerbaijan and Georgia—have

established dedicated security departments, “Special State Protection Service” (SSPS) in Azerbaijan and a “Strategic

Pipeline Protection Department” (SPPD) in Georgia, specifically designated within their national administrations for the

protection of energy infrastructure and facilities.

Currently, more than 99% of the BTC pipeline passes through rural areas under Gendarmerie jurisdiction as one of their

security responsibilities. Establishment of a similar department within the Turkish Armed Forces that exclusively focuses

on critical energy infrastructure in close cooperation with other national security forces will solidify Turkey’s position as a

reliable energy corridor and increase the attraction of the country for further energy transportation projects.

Legal Framework

A convenient legal framework on energy infrastructure is a must-have requirement to protect these facilities from illegal

tapping and sabotage threats. In Turkey, the crime of theft (illegal tapping) from pipelines is subject to two different articles

of the Turkish Penal Code, which are Qualified Theft by the Turkish Penal Code (TPC) 142/3 and Qualified Damage to

Property by TPC 152.

The legal framework on energy infrastructure has been improved through several amendments to existent law. However,

several gaps in legislation still remain which may require a call for new legislation or additional amendments to existing law

in order to correct legal oversights.

Private Security Contractors (PSC)

The deterrence and prevention of terrorist attacks could also be advanced through professional private security

contractors for critical energy infrastructure protection. As an illustration, in 1997, BP’s OCENSA pipeline in Columbia was

blown up just once. This pipeline benefited from professional security management. At the same time the Occidental

corporation’s Cano-Limon-Covenas pipeline in Columbia was blown up 65 times. It did not benefit from private security

management. The fact remains that critical energy infrastructure security is not a well known topic among private

contractors in Turkey. Indeed there is a need to improve Turkish pipeline protection capacity.

Energy Security Technologies

In addition to hard-security measures, high security integrated electronic systems such as satellite monitoring, intelligentsurveillance, intrusion detection, CCTV, perimeter intrusion detection, SCADA, radar systems and rapid response

capabilities are becoming more and more sophisticated. Seeing them as more reliable and cost effective solutions, energy

producers and transit states are investing in them for the protection of energy infrastructure. These technologies were

introduced in Turkey for the first time with the BTC pipeline, which has employed the most advanced engineering

technologies available for its construction and protection in the early 2000s.

Role of Turkey in Global Energy: Bolstering Energy Infrastructure ... http://www.ensec.org/index.php?view=article&catid=106:energysecuri...

6 06.01.2012 16:23

Page 6: The Role of Turkey in Global Energy_ Bolstering Energy Infrastructure Security

8/3/2019 The Role of Turkey in Global Energy_ Bolstering Energy Infrastructure Security

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-role-of-turkey-in-global-energy-bolstering-energy-infrastructure-security 6/6

 

Community RelationsCommunity level measures not only include awareness building actions but also the provision of a

skilled work-force to fill the gap in the energy sector. It will be impossible to guarantee the full protection of the pipeline

itself or its facilities by only by focusing on military and hardcore aspects of pipeline protection. Involvement of

communities living along the pipeline route is a vital component of pipeline protection. A feeling of ownership over the

pipelines and a conviction of the positive impact of pipelines to their communities can encourage people to take an active

role in the protection of pipelines and to serve as a supporting resource to the government’s paramilitary protection units.

In this regard, social aspects of these energy projects and community-level projects support regional development of areas

where pipelines pass, and should also be taken into account at the national and regional levels by related public bodies.

While improving community awareness over pipeline security by creating a sense of ownership and by makingcontributions to the respective communities, it is also important to make sure that a qualified work force is generated in the

country to satisfy the needs of the energy sector.

Conclusions

Obviously, energy infrastructure is an attractive sabotage target. Therefore, it is important in mitigating threats to this

infrastructure for governments, international organizations such as NATO, the UN, the EU and the OSCE, as well as large

international energy corporations to cooperate in the development of new energy infrastructure security strategies. It is fair

to say that critical energy infrastructure security deserves much greater attention under the topic of global energy security,

especially in the area of security cooperation.

 

If Turkey wants to take an important role in the energy world, it should continue to focus on emerging trends in theprotection of energy infrastructure against terrorism and illegal tapping. Turkey needs an advanced national strategy on

critical energy infrastructure security to carry the country from being simply at the crossroads of energy routes to a key

player in the energy world. Turkey should be aware of the advantages and disadvantages of its own geographic position,

as well as of current and emerging security threats. Equipping itself with innovative and collaborative energy security

measures and encouraging cooperation with international actors may support Turkey`s position. If Turkey does so, and it

plays its energy security cards wisely by putting some significant solutions into practice, then one can truly expect Turkey

to be a regional energy hub, with regional energy companies settling and re-functioning their investment in Turkey’s

borders within a considerably short time period. To guarantee the prosperous future of being part of global energy, Turkey

should not miss its chance to gain a better understanding of energy security, and should initiate proactive cooperation on

energy security with her neighbors, the international community, as well as with leaders and representatives in the private

sector.

Within Turkey, all parties related to energy are responsible for coordinating their efforts to increase the visibility of the

sector and the critical issue of infrastructure security. In this way, necessary expertise can be developed, and

institutionalization of standards can emerge—both of which are key to the development of a sustainable system for energy

security. In doing this, Turkey will help itself immensely in advancing its position as an energy hub and in serving as a role

model for other parts of the world on energy infrastructure security.

Hasan Alsancak is a practicing i nternational energy security professional. The opinions expressed in this article are his 

alone. 

Role of Turkey in Global Energy: Bolstering Energy Infrastructure ... http://www.ensec.org/index.php?view=article&catid=106:energysecuri...