The Role of Media in Alleviating Sectarian Conflict:

An Exploration of Peace Journalism in Egypt

by

Aya Sharaby

B.A. (Journalism), Misr International University, 2013

Extended Essays Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in the

School of Communication

Faculty of Communication Arts and Technology

© Aya Sharaby 2018

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

Summer 2018

Copyright in this work rests with the author. Please ensure that any reproduction or re-use is done in accordance with the relevant national copyright legisla

ii

Approval

Name: Aya Sharaby

Degree: Master of Arts

Title: The Role of Media in Alleviating Sectarian Conflict: An Exploration of Peace Journalism in Egypt

Program Co-Directors: Yuezhi Zhao, Adel Iskandar

Adel Iskandar Senior Supervisor Assistant Professor

Yuezhi Zhao Program Director Assistant Professor

Date Approved:

August 28, 2018

iii

Abstract

Through looking at Muslim-Christian relations in Egypt, this research delves into the

dynamics that showcase media’s complicity in violence committed through denial of

existing sectarian problems and the reinforcement of status-quo inequities. It explores

how the model of Peace Journalism can be applied to foster more inclusion, as well as

mitigate conflict.

Keywords: sectarian conflict; Peace Journalism; Muslim-Christian relations; Egypt

iv

Dedication

To my mother Hala Shaker;

To my supervisor Adel Iskandar;

To my mentor Amr Khalifa;

and

To those who accept the “other”, no matter how different they may be.

v

Table of Contents Approval Error! Bookmark not defined.Abstract iiiDedication ivTable of Contents vIntroduction 1Tolerance, Citizenship, and Religion 2A Brief History of Sectarianism in Egypt 5Representation of Copts and Christian-Muslim Relations in the Media 9

Diversity 9Understanding Alienation 11

Strategies for Media Reform and the Peace Journalism Model 13Media’s Cognitive Effect on the Public 17

Research Methodology 18Case One: The Dragging of Souad Thabet in Upper Egypt 19

Al-Ahram’s Coverage 19Youm7’s Coverage 22

Case Two: The Displacement of Copts from Sinai 26Al-Ahram’s Coverage 26Youm7’s Coverage 29

Peace Journalism and Sectarian Conflict in Egypt 32Language 32Content 34

Pockets of Peace Journalism 40Limitations of Peace Journalism in Egypt 42Conclusion 43References 46

1

Introduction In May 2016, tens of men in the Upper Egyptian village of Al-Karm attacked seven

Christian houses, and burnt them down. They went into one specific home, dragged a

70-year-old woman out and paraded her through the streets, ripping her clothes off. The

mob attack is said to have resulted from a rumour that the grandmother’s son had an

affair with a Muslim woman (The New Arab, 2017).

Egypt is home to several marginalized ethnic and religious communities that are often

forgotten both by the state and the general public. Although they came into the limelight

more following the January 2011 Revolution, these communities have been suffering

exclusion and oppression under all regimes. The groups of Nubians1, Copts2, Bedouins3,

as well as religious minorities such as Baha’is4 and Shiites5 altogether form around 20

percent of Egypt's population (Salah, 2013). Egypt’s Christians get more media

exposure than other marginalized groups. However, it is still limited, and mostly in

relation to negative events. Living in a Muslim-majority country, the number of Egypt’s

Christians, called Copts from the country’s ancient name, has been a source of

controversy and politicization over the years. Between 8 and 15 million people,

estimates have served either the Coptic camp, the Islamists, or the state6. At times

regarded as “siblings” to the Muslim majority, or at times referred to as “visitors” to the

country, they are driven into their own communities, away from the public sphere and its

media. Concurrently, Islamist policies--the notion that public and political life should be

guided by Islamic principles--have effectively pushed them out of these realms. It is of

importance to note that state media not only lack sufficient representation of Copts, but

also ignore injustices committed against them. Egyptian state television ignored the

crackdown on a mostly Coptic Christian group of rights protesters outside its own

Maspero building in October 2011. Most of the dead had been killed by live ammunition

or crushed under the army’s armoured vehicles. State television then called upon “the

1 People living in southern Egypt who are descended from an ancient African civilisation (The Economist, 2016). 2 The largest Christian denomination in Egypt 3 The native inhabitants of Egypt’s desert domains (Ellis, 2018) 4 Those who belong to the Baha’i faith. See http://www.bahai.org/ 5 A branch of Islam which holds that Prophet Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law Ali is his rightful successor (Momen, 1985). 6 See Playing the Numbers Game: Copts and the Exercise of Power (Malak, 2013)

2

good citizens of Egypt” to go down to the streets and “support the Egyptian army against

the Copts.” While the state is one party to the maltreatment, the media forgo the role of

remedying the deeply rooted sectarianism in Egyptian society. Society itself is also

deeply complicit in this discrimination.

In Egypt, media have always been a tool for the ruling power to enhance its gains, barely

giving a platform to the general public, let alone to marginalized communities. This paper

explores how the Peace Journalism model can be applied within the Egyptian context to

foster more inclusion, as well as to mitigate conflict. It takes Muslim-Coptic relations as a

case study, looking into how media are complicit in the violence through the denial of

any existing sectarian problem and thereby reinforcing the status-quo.

Tolerance, Citizenship, and Religion

In current day politics, particularly in Western national contexts, commonly held ideas of

citizenship are derived from the theoretical framework of liberalism. The theory of

liberalism is based on two main pillars: the protection of each citizen from tyranny and

according equal rights for all. Liberals believe in religious tolerance, that religious

differences should not be a cause for discriminatory treatment (Spinner, 1994). For the

purposes of this paper, tolerance is defined in the liberal sense as "respect for people as

human beings, that is, respecting their choices freely (so long as they do not harm

others)” (Makari, 2007).

Makari distinguishes between legal citizenship and social citizenship, defining legal

citizenship as how citizenship is determined from a juridical perspective; it has merit with

respect to the courts and entitlement from the nation. On the other hand, social

citizenship is concerned with members of society including or excluding others and

allowing others to enjoy the rights to which they are entitled. In Egypt, Christians citizens

are unequal to Muslim citizens, whether legally or socially, as will be discussed below.

Dating back to the Ottoman rule of Egypt, the state has relied largely on “a millet system”

to determine social and political rights and legal status which "limits the right of

individuals to revise their conceptions of the good" (Kymlicka 1996). The term “millet”

was “traditionally used to refer to the confessional group to which one belonged… [that]

3

slowly came to incorporate the modern sense of minority to refer to nationally protected

religious groups” (Mahmood, 2012, p.425). This millet system has set up a structural

relationship between different communities of faith in the country and organized the

state’s patronage of each on that basis.

In addition to the millet system, for decades, unquestioned Islamic fundamentalism has

shaped Egyptians’ worldviews emerging from Al-Azhar,Egypt’s premier Islamic

institution for legal jurisprudence (sharia) and the oldest Islamic university in the world,

as well as radical groups and sheikhs (locally and regionally) belonging toto extremist

Salafi7 orders. This trend has resulted in deeply-rooted misconceptions and beliefs, used

to navigate through everyday lives, and manifested in daily interactions. Refusal to

accept the “other,” anyone having a different faith (or lacking one), has become

pervasive. One of the biggest societal conflicts resulting from this is an entrenched

sectarian divide between Muslims and Coptic Christians. The vast majority of Egyptians

rely heavily on religion in identifying themselves. Lisa Schirch (2001) highlights three

points with respect to identity and its role in conflict situations. First, people have a

human need to define themselves in relation to others. Second, people are prepared to

kill and die in defence of particular sociocultural identities. Third, people’s understanding

of the self is usually formulated upon how they perceive an adversarial “other.” Schirch

adds that "individuals and groups search for cognitive consistency by ignoring or

rejecting information that contradicts their worldview [...] in shaping perceptions of [...]

the 'other'" (p.150).

Contemporary Egyptian thought is characterized by non-violent bigotry and religious

supremacism, whereby “the normalization of notions of second-class citizenship, even

through non-violent ideologies or practices, creates a more permissive environment for

sectarian violence” (Hanna, 2016, para. 4). Every year, people reach out to Islamic

scholars for fatwa (edicts and rulings according to Islamic law) to make sure that it is not

sinful to extend holiday greetings to Copts. It is not uncommon to hear the phrase

“mseehy bas kowys” (“A Christian, but nevertheless a good person”), on the assumption

that Christians are an alien group of people whose intentions are unknown. Acceptance

of the choice of faith, if one wishes to convert from Islam, is almost non-existent. One

7 A more conservative Muslim movement. The name Salafi comes from as-salaf as-saliheen, the ‘pious predecessors’ of the early Muslim community (Stanley, 2005).

4

instance found a woman who chose Christianity over Islam slaughtered by her own

family (Abdel Rahman, 2017). The discovery of romantic involvement between a

Christian and a Muslim spirals into violence, in many instances leading to the burning

down of homes and churches. Tadros (2010) notes that a petty crime, or a dispute

between two citizens of different faiths such as an argument between a vegetable seller

and a customer can escalate into communal violence if one party is Christian and the

other Muslim. Sedra (2013) points out an increasing scarcity of Egyptian Muslims having

the experience of lived relationships with Copts.

Many Copts complain that they are rejected from job posts or denied promotions

because of their Christian identity. The perception that a Copt might never become

president, and that Copts are not appointed in prominent state positions that concern the

security of the country or as university presidents, is prevalent (Shenoda, 2011).

Additionally, differences in sociopolitical and socioeconomic levels affect the absence or

presence of tolerance in Egyptian society (Makari, 2007). The capital Cairo is a

“freewheeling megacity where sheer size dilutes prejudice,” hence violence is less

rampant (Walsh, 2017). In the villages of the less developed, and less central Upper

Egyptian city of Minya, where Christians comprise 30 percent of the population, rumors

of secret churches frequently result in Muslim mobs attacking Christians and burning

their homes. Ultraconservative clerics or politicians often spearhead such attacks.

Indeed, Tadros (2010) states that the Christian poor, the socially and politically

marginalized Copts living in deprived communities, suffer the “full force of sectarianism.”

Parvaz (2011) explains that discriminatory state policies have greatly defined the Coptic

community. Samuel Tadros (2016) went as far as saying that Egyptian laws are

designed to remind Copts of their second-class nature. Christians must follow Islamic

inheritance laws. An unofficial one percent quota (far less than the most conservative

estimates of Coptic proportion in the Egyptian population) for Christians is upheld in the

police, military, judiciary, and foreign service (Tadros 2016). Building Christian houses of

worship remains one of the main controversial policies. A law passed in 2016 stipulates

the authorization of the local provincial governor to build a church (after decades of

being an authorization in the hands of the country’s president on the basis of a 1856

Ottoman decree). Human Rights Watch (2016) denounced the law on the basis that it

5

does not include a method to appeal when a governor denies a permit, and that the

provision taking into account “security and public safety” could pave way for mob

violence to dictate the permission for church construction. Tadros (2016) describes

building a church as a “herculean task.” The same could be said about religious

conversion from Islam to Christianity (or any faith other than mainstream Sunni Islam). A

2015 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom report found that while Sunni

Muslims are the recipients of the majority of charges, those who end up being sentenced

to prison for blasphemy are mostly Christians, along with Shi’a Muslims, and atheists,

usually based on flawed trials (USCIRF, 2015). In addition, the state denies the

presence of sectarianism. At the dawn of every attack or violent incident, “the

government responds to what is at root a problem in political culture with half-hearted

sloganeering and heavy-handed security intervention” (Tadros, 2011). It’s regular

practice is forcing both parties into reconciliation sessions instead of punishing the

aggressor.

Furthermore, the education system has a hand in fostering discrimination. Textbooks

overlook the history of Copts and their contributions to Egypt. Christians learn a great

deal about Islam at school, while most Egyptian Muslims have no knowledge of the

Coptic faith or those who adhere to it (Tadros, 2016). Furthermore, the glorification of

Islamic battles and the spread of the faith particularly to Egypt, is a cornerstone of the

Egyptian religious curriculum.

A Brief History of Sectarianism in Egypt

Dating back to Ottoman Egypt, in the 16th century, discrimination against anyone who

didn’t conform to the mainstream Muslim tropes of the time was rampant. A Copt was a

Dhimmi—the Islamic term which means “protected person,”and was regarded as socially

and politically unequal to Muslims (Mahmood, 2012).

Prior to the 1952 coup which overthrew the Egyptian monarchy, the larger Coptic

community was represented by the descendants of powerful notable families, usually

lawyers and landowners. Gamal Abdel Nasser, one of the military leaders behind the

coup who became president and introduced socialist measures, was “loathe to

6

cooperate” with those who collaborated with the old regime (Sedra 2014). Instead, he

enshrined the hierarchy of the Coptic Church to be the exclusive representative of the

Christian community in both religious and social affairs. The recognition and resources

packaged into cooperation with the state made the relationship appealing to Church

leaders. Mahmood (2012) writes that this political system, intact till today, lies “at the

heart of the contested meaning of religious liberty in Egypt” and “as a result, the Coptic

Church tends to deploy a communitarian understanding of religious liberty that serves to

consolidate its authority over its followers” (para. 11).

Under the rule of President Anwar al-Sadat who followed Nasser, a rupture happened

between the regime and Church, and then Coptic Pope Shenouda was placed under

house arrest (Sedra, 2012). State-sponsored Islamization of politics intensified. Since

the 1970s, Islamists’ movements thrived, their influence outpouring into the public. The

state’s security apparatus blocked any political space that would allow the development

of non-governmental organizations and non-partisan initiatives, leaving the outreach of

Islamic groups uncontested (Tadros 2010). One key factor which aggravated the

Islamization of society was that Islamic associations provided “badly needed” services

which the government did not sufficiently offer (Makari 2007).

During Hosni Mubarak’s presidency before his ouster in 2011, it was evident that political

Islam had become a significant agent in the sociopolitical scene. With louder voices and

clear agendas advanced in professional syndicates, and consequently increased

prevalence in main elected posts, the rise of Islamists was one marker of the decades-

long process. Radical Islamist and militant activities, including attacks on Copts, notably

heightened in the 1990s (Makari 2007). Makari lists some of these religiously-motivated

attacks, such as burning a Coptic Orthodox church and the murdering Christians in

Dairut, in the Assiut province of Upper Egypt in January 1991; the axing of four

Christians to death in Tema, in the Upper Egyptian governorate of Assiut, and burning of

more than sixty homes, dozens of Christian-owned shops, and a church in 1992,

(Ibrahim in Makari); the killing of twenty-one Christians in Upper Egypt in the course of

one month in 1997 (Cyprus Weekly in Makari, 2007). To indicate the gravity of

sectarianism in the Egyptian society, Tadros (2010) points out that the sectarian attacks

of the 2000s were carried out “not by militants seeking to establish an Islamic state but

7

by ordinary townspeople.” This makes sectarianism exceedingly more serious than in

the 1970s, as it indicates that intolerance is “internally bred, not externally induced.”

Nevertheless, Egyptian society has had its moments of unity. Coptic Christians were a

vital part of the 1919 Revolution which led to Britain recognizing Egypt’s independence

in 1922, and a new constitution in 1923 (Nkrumah, 2017). In the 1940s and 1950s,

Copts were equal actors in the struggle against British colonialism, and in the devising of

the nationalist project (Mahmood 2012). Another defining moment would be the January

2011 revolution, which brought together millions of Egyptians in Tahrir Square, all calling

for economic reform, freedoms, and social justice. Sedra (2012) illustrates this best:

What was so captivating and exhilarating about Tahrir, and the comparable sit-ins across the country inspired by the revolution, is that they were public spaces in which dialogue across faiths, across generations, and across ideologies was not only possible but promoted. Indeed, what came across so powerfully from the multitude of images and videos taken during those 18 days in January and February 2011 was the pluralism of the demonstrations (para. 7).

One of the most iconic photographs from the Square was that of Copts joining hands

and encircling a group of Muslims to protect them while they pray. Following the uprising

in February 2011, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) took over. In October

of the same year, security forces clashed with Copts who were protesting an attack on a

church in Aswan. Dubbed the Maspero incident, 26 Copts were killed and more than 300

were wounded. SCAF denied responsibility for the use of violence. Reciprocating the

unity they showed in Tahrir Square, Muslims joined Christians in their protests against

SCAF (Parfaz, 2011).

In 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi was elected as president of Egypt.

During his year in power, discrimination against Copts was a daily practice. The

government did not adopt inclusive policies on a social level. He pushed through a

constitutional referendum that would enshrine Islamic principles as guidelines for

legislation. A heavily Islamist parliament pushed for a more marginalized role of

Christians and an negligent stance towards their views. In a 2016 lecture, at Christian

8

Solidarity International, Mariz Tadros (2016) explained that sectarianism intensified

partially because most Copts did not vote for Morsi; “they were against Islamist rule

because informally they had experienced the impact of Islamist political movements

creating divisions in their community.” During the Morsi presidency which lasted a year,

the elected parliament was 71.5% Islamist (BBC, 2012). There was an escalation of

rhetoric against Christians (largely because they did not vote for Morsi), a major break

with the Church, and a marked increase in attacks against Copts.

In June 2013, the military took over once again following demonstrations against the

Muslim Brotherhood regime. Karim Malak (2017) writes that:

[T]here was a conscious effort to incorporate Copts into the nationalist fold, make them feel like equals […] it suddenly became in vogue to attack those who previously wronged or discriminated against Copts, if it often occurred by forgetting how the military too wronged Copts, this was done to promote a secular idea surrounding the June 30th, 2013 regime change. [...] Yet this form of secular solidarity was hollow (p. 22).

In positioning the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch Pope Tawadros II at his side as he

announced the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated President Morsi’s ousting, the Minister of

Defence (who later became president) Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi was sending out a message.

“The implicit assumption in this display was that Pope Tawadros endorsed the coup on

behalf of the Coptic Christian community in Egypt” and was in line with the more than

half a century old partnership between Pope and State (Sedra, 2014, para. 6). This

hegemonic role of clerics ensures that the voices of middle-income and poorer Coptic

citizens are muted (Tadros, 2011).

A survey conducted in 2014 to discover reasons why people revolted against Morsi

found that the top third reason cited was a lack of security or not feeling safe. What is

notable here is how participants defined security; it was not a matter of seeing policemen

on the street, but a question of social cohesion, and feeling that one is part of the

community. Tolerance for those who express their faith differently, or have no faith, has

risen as an issue of security concern (Tadros, 2016). Hanna (2016) warns, “a society

that views and treats a segment of its population as less than fully equal is also [a]

society that produces violence and terrorism against it” (para. 6).

9

Representation of Copts and Christian-Muslim

Relations in the Media

Diversity

Diversity is an attribute of major importance in any robust media system. Fair and

balanced media thrive on the principles of inclusion, covering all sides of a story or an

issue, and guaranteeing enough representation for religious, ethnic, geographical and

socioeconomic minorities. There are many sides to diversity. While some tackle it in

terms of media ownership and structures, making sure the media are not concentrated in

the hands of the few (Doyle 2002; Einstein 2004), others focus on the diversity of media

content and the extent to which this content represents the different groups in society

(McQuail, 2007). The EU MPM Study (KU Leuven – ICRI et al. 2009) acknowledged that

media diversity or pluralism is a broad concept, which includes not only aspects of media

ownership and editorial freedoms, but aspects of political, cultural, geographical,

structural and content- related diversity as well.

A series of four studies about media diversity (content, societal, geographical, and

cultural perspectives) in Egypt over the course of two years were conducted by

American University of Cairo Professor of Journalism and Mass Communication Rasha

Abdulla. The analysis showed a “severe” under-representation of all minority and

marginalized groups in society. At the same time, the press coverage ignored important

issues of substance, and all issues related to inclusiveness and diversity as they relate

to women, children, the elderly, religious minorities and ethnic minorities. Only the voice

of the mainstream was emphasized in the press and on popular television talk shows,

while voices of marginalized groups echoed further down the spiral of silence.

One study (Abdulla, 2015) examined the coverage of two state newspapers and two

privately owned ones during Egypt’s first post-revolution parliamentary elections, the

process for which started in November 2011 and concluded during the following month.

Egypt, at the time, was ruled by the SCAF. For every 14.6 males interviewed or featured

in newspaper stories, only one female was featured. Abdulla links this to the overall

10

representation of women in the Parliament, which turned out to be as low as 2%. Other

minority voices were almost non-existent in the newspaper coverage. Only five people of

different ethnic backgrounds such as Bedouins or Nubians were identified within the

14,001 individuals featured in the stories. There were also a total of only 11 people

identified as persons with disabilities, 28 identified as elderly, five children, and only 416

individuals with recognizably Christian names (0.03%).

Egypt witnessed its most diverse media in terms of plurality of voices during the two and

a half years following the January 2011 revolution, not necessarily out of efforts to

enhance diversity as much as a result of the political power struggle in the country at the

time between the old regime, the revolutionary camp, and the Muslim Brotherhood

(Abdulla 2014). Even then, however, a series of reports issued by the civil society

showed a severe lack of diversity on most fronts, most notably on the demographic front

that led to a realization that the media suffered from a severe lack of diversity and was

not doing a proper job of informing the audiences of what mattered (Abdullah, 2014)..

“This is a very alarming issue since people use media messages to construct their social

reality and their perceptions of these groups in society,” Abdulla concludes (p. 234).

The 2014 Constitution includes an article that mentions media diversity and

inclusiveness, but leaves the specific regulation of which to potential media laws. Such

laws, however, have not been issued. Demographic diversity, therefore, has always

been under threat in Egypt.

According to Abdulla:

Following Mubarak’s downfall, each regime that came to power until most recently that of former head of the Egyptian military Abdel Fattah el-Sisi seems to have been more brutal on the media than its predecessor...these outlets remain in the service of the regime, not the people (2014, p.3).

Meanwhile, Aboulenein and Fahmy (2016) state that “sectarian attacks occur so

frequently in Egypt that they rarely attract wide publicity” (para. 6).

Throughout the decades, the Egyptian government has “repeatedly and forcefully”

renounced that sectarianism thrives in the country, a position echoed in the country’s

media. “This taboo on acknowledging sectarianism...has prevented serious and much-

11

needed discussion of problems in Coptic-Muslim relations” (Sedra, 2013, para. 9).

Whenever a big incident does make it to the media, official sources cite “foreign fingers”

that are attempting to agitate sedition. This serves to close the case as quickly as

possible, with the state proceeding to display Egypt as characterized by “national unity”

(Tadros, 2010), with a “perfectly pieced together social fabric” (Shenoda, 2011).

Aside from attacks deemed worth reporting, the media barely represent or discuss

Copts. In an article entitled “Reflections on the (In)Visibility of Copts in Egypt,” Anthony

Shenoda (2011) writes that Copts become a visible religious community only when they

are attacked. On the state’s typical responses to inter-religious clashes, he says:

“[It] hide[s] what has long been a problem that no one seems to want to address in Egypt: At best many Copts feel like foreigners and second-class citizens in their own country, at worst they feel invisible, as though they simply do not matter because they simply do not exist (Shenoda, 2011, para. 14).

On the other hand, Sedra (2012) points to the Islamists’ takeover of the Egyptian social

and cultural spheres, such as the stardom of “televangelists” like Amr Khaled, and more

recently Mostafa Hosni and Moez Masoud, and the expansion of conglomerates

focusing on “Islamic media” development. With this came the shrinkage of the public

sphere within which Egyptians of different faiths can come together.

On 4 March 2011, the Church of the Two Martyrs in Helwan was burnt down, which

sparked demonstrations in front of the State’s Radio and Television Building, named

Maspero. Paul Sedra (2011) remarks that the choice of place was deliberate: “The

Coptic protesters want their distinctive lives and concerns publicly acknowledged by

fellow Egyptians. This means inclusion, not separation.” They wanted to be visible to the

media, which often neglect them. What better place to shout this out loud better than the

national broadcasting building?

Understanding Alienation

Copts are pushed out, of, or alienated from, the Egyptian public sphere. The media,

being part of this public sphere, only uphold such alienation, furthering sectarianism in

society. Originally a Marxist term, Katherine Knoblotch (2014) looks into “alienation”--a

12

rejection of social institutions and processes--as an effect caused by the mediated public

sphere. She argues that the current communication structures limit the public’s capacity

to use communication for democratic empowerment. Five processes lead to such a

limiting setting: commodification, isolation, meaninglessness, normlessness, and

powerlessness. Some of these conditions can be seen within the Egyptian mediated

public sphere, both by public and private media, with varying degrees between urban

and rural areas, and between socioeconomic classes.

The second condition, isolation, is one of them. Isolation occurs upon preventing citizens

from being engaged in the production of public opinion, as well as isolating citizens who

do engage in the practice. The established capitalist system forces individuals out, and

curtails opportunities for diverse members of local communities to deliberate on public

affairs. Furthermore, media favour focusing on particular policies or events instead of

entire communities. Media disseminating like-minded discussion can escalate extremism

and group homogeneity, Knoblotch asserts, spurring polarisation, harming

heterogeneous groups’ capability to identify common interests, and dwindling individuals’

opportunities to learn from each other.

According to Knoblotch, media structures that produce one condition of alienation breed

other conditions. Henceforth, alienating communication structures reinforce a top-down

dynamic of opinion which allocates greater power over the generation of public opinion

to political professionals.

Against such alienation, the 2011 revolution brought about a unifying, pluralist euphoria.

Sedra (2012) describes it as “the cultural project of the revolution.” The historian says

that “as Egyptians from all walks of life came together to protest the status quo and

debate the country’s future, there was an explosion of creativity from which art, music,

and poetry flowed” (para. 7). Sedra suggests that the one major lesson that Tahrir

conveyed is Egypt’s dire need of public spaces for dialogue.

As an immediately available public sphere, prospects for media to capitalize on this

cultural project seem promising. Through applying the Peace Journalism model, media

can have a role in spreading tolerance and educating society about accepting the

“other.”

13

Strategies for Media Reform and the Peace

Journalism Model

Having critiqued the content and structures of the media, which (Des Freedman et al,

2016) name as a first step for media reform, this mainstream media is functionally

delegitimized. The delegitimization is derived from media’s commitment to support the

power structures to which they are tied, and over their inability to properly represent “our

lives as they are lived.” Keeble et al (2010) decry the lack of a “reflective, analytical,

ethical approach” in the “dominant journalistic culture” (p. 97).

Curran (2005) lists three main roles for the media: an independent watchdog over the

state, an agent for citizens’ information and debate, and to act as the voice of the people

to the state. Hackett and Carroll (2006) assert that media owners have influence over

“what political issues enter the public sphere, and how they are framed, so their political

interests have an unfair advantage.” With regards to reforming current media practices,

Hackett and Carroll call for looking for “what is not in the news,” and Des Freedman et

al (2016) suggest capturing the attention of mainstream media, and pressing for more

ethical forms of journalism. A model that brings it all together would be Peace

Journalism.

The foundations of Peace Journalism (henceforth PJ) lay in the peace studies of Johan

Galtung (Lynch 1998), where he laid out the differences between “peace/conflict

journalism” and “war/violence journalism.” The latter was described as the prevailing

mode of covering conflict in mainstream media. It produced discernible patterns of

inclusion and omission. War journalism dehumanizes the enemy, fixates on the visible

effects of violence, is propaganda-oriented, elite-focused, and victory-oriented. It

prioritizes official sources over “people sources,” event over process, and violence over

peace. PJ, however, gives a voice to the voiceless, targets exposing all cover-ups, and

puts a spotlight on the invisible effects of violence, such as trauma and damage to social

structures.

14

A landmark work concerned with PJ is Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick’s book

Peace Journalism (2005). Lynch and McGoldrick’s definition of PJ describes

“[W]hen editors and reporters make choices--of what stories to report and about how to report them--that create opportunities for society at large to consider and value non-violent responses to conflict [...] The model is a set of tools, both conceptual and practical, intended to equip journalists to offer a better public service (p. 5).

PJ is described as having four main pillars. The first is that it is peace/conflict-oriented,

meaning that it delves into conflict formation, and attempts to show a possibility for

prevention, or a ‘win-win’ outcome. PJ avoids a zero-sum game. Hence, it is neither a

victory nor defeat for either party of the conflict. Properly testing what a conflict is “all

about” requires “an awareness that causes are to be found not just in the conflict arena,

but also in the broader conflict formation” (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005, p.13). So are the

solutions or “exits.” In doing so, PJ partially prevents further escalation, explain the

authors.

The second is that it is truth-oriented, thereby exposing untruths from all parties.

“Dualism leads inexorably to Manicheism--us good, them bad--and to demonisation and

dehumanisation of the ‘Other’,” say Lynch and McGoldrick (2005). The absence of well-

defined policies [for interpreting developments in conflict] might enhance “self-

manipulation” whereby news editors give priority to “incoming items that fit their own

state-of-mind, psychological predispositions and news-value expectations, rather than to

accept evidence from the field” (Shinar and Stoiciu in Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005,

p.16). The PJ model shields audiences and journalists from being “oblivious to the way

realities are being created around us” (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005, p.16).

PJ is also people-oriented in that it puts the spotlight on all suffering, and directs

attention to people as peacemakers. It avoids the way mainstream media is elite-

oriented. “Official sources” in a country are often misconceived as neutral or passive,

and their statements result in reality-creation, discussion-shaping, and world-

construction, hence pointing out the authors. PJ would, therefore, include official sources

as part of the conflict but also go to alternative sources. It asks the right questions of the

right officials, and finds non-violent responses and recommendations, and presents them

in the public sphere.

15

Finally, it is solution-oriented, with resolution, reconstruction, and reconciliation at the

center of its focus.

With the notion of “War on Terrorism” in mind, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) observed

that the media’s military coverage feeds the very violence it reports. PJ traces the

connections between journalists, their sources, the stories they cover and the

consequences of their journalism–the ethics of journalistic intervention. It puts

responsibility on reporters glorifying state action, or continuously disseminating pro-

violence press releases.

The model uses the insights of conflict analysis and transformation to update the

concepts of balance, fairness, and accuracy in reporting. The claim that PJ produces

more accurate representations of conflict lies in its deliberate strategy to emphasize

backgrounds and contexts. In short, it links the conditions to the event. PJ explains why

the situation is what it is.

Refuting a major criticism directed towards PJ, (Shinar in Keeble et al, 2010) maintains

that the practice does not revolve around “good news” nor does it avoid hard questions,

but rather channels a “fairer way to cover conflict, relative to the usual coverage and

suggests possibilities to improve professional attitudes and performance; strengthen

human, moral, and ethical values...and provide better public service by the media” (p. 3).

Agency

An awareness of the possibilities of journalistic activities both within and outside the

corporate media is needed to bring about change (Hackett and Carroll, 2006). This is

crucial for a media environment such as Egypt’s, where it seems like the regime’s media

and the privately-owned allies have taken over to the extent of losing hope in a different

narrative. To emphasize the role of individual agency within corporate media, Hackett

(2006) draws on two models: Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) “hierarchy of influences”

and Bourdieu’s “outlook of the media” as a relatively autonomous field. The former

describes the media field's five layers of influence--the media workers with their roles

and ethics, the daily work routines inside a newsroom, the organizational imperatives of

16

profit-oriented and hierarchically-structured media institutions, the extra-media

influences such as governments, and lastly ideology (Hackett, 2007). Meanwhile,

Bourdieu (1996) states that the journalistic field is different from industries that aim to

maximize audience consumption. He believes that there is room for the deconstruction

and investigation of politics for the public good and acknowledges that individual

journalists are “active and creative agents.” Hence, Hackett stresses the “necessary role

for dedicated journalists to take the lead.”

Furthermore, Keeble (in Keeble et al, 2010) extends the definition of a journalist beyond

the ranks of the professionals to radical media activists, intellectuals, human rights

campaigners, and citizens. Their ideas would be delivered both within the dominant and

the alternative public spheres. Keeble also regards the internet and citizen journalism as

a means to challenge the mainstream media. He argues that audiences are no longer

passive consumers, but rather producers of written and visual media. He also stresses

the role of radical intellectuals, research centers, political activists, peace movements,

human rights organizations, and campaigners. Keeble notes that those who upload

images of police brutality on YouTube, or who report on opposition movements via

Twitter and other websites participate in the alternative media sphere. In doing so,

citizens and campaigners challenge the concentration of institutional and professional

media power and monopoly (Atton, 2009). Social networks are redictating the manners

of war and conflict reporting. With the spread of the internet and cell phones, social

networks fill the silences which suppression and censorship forged (Matheson and Allan,

2010).

It is crucial to note that Lynch’s proposal for a “global standard” to practicing PJ

bypasses the need for legislation and top-town governmental regulation (2014). It

provides a way around freedom of speech oppression, and the much needed holistic

media reform. It brings the role of agency to the forefront, as discussed above. Susan

Dente Ross (in Shinar and Kempf, 2007) says that no “revolutionary” changes are

needed for a transformation to PJ. It only calls for “subtle and cumulative shifts in seeing,

thinking, sourcing, narrating, and financing the news.”

17

Media’s Cognitive Effect on the Public

Media play a huge role in shaping today’s public opinion. Egypt is no exception, with

news articles, especially inflammatory ones, circulating rapidly, regardless of their

accuracy. A look into how media, through using the Peace Journalism model, could have

a positive cognitive effect on the Egyptian public, its opinion and its consciousness is

imperative for the study. Peace Journalism can become Egypt’s anti-“fake news.”

Cognitive and psychological effects of exposure to media falls under social

constructivism, as indicated by Scheufele (In Keeble et al, 2010). Gamson and

Modigliani (1989) describe a feedback loop between journalism and its audience, saying

that “media discourse is part of the process by which individuals construct meaning, and

public opinion is part of the process by which journalists… develop and crystallize

meaning in public discourse” (p.2).

Clifford G. Christians (in Keeble Et Al, 2010), the world’s leading authority in

communication ethics, notes that rather than being focused on peacemaking between

intergovernmental bodies, the ethical principle of nonviolence advocates peaceful

coexistence in community life. He states that Galtung’s PJ applies the principle, in a

manner concerned with positive peace- “the creative, nonviolent resolution of all

cultural, social, and political conflicts” (p.1).

PJ has a positive effect on the general public. It contributes to public understanding of

the wider world and to the vitality of community discussion (Lynch, 2014). Embedded in

pluralism and diversity, PJ prompts what Hall (1980) calls “negotiated” readings. It fulfills

media’s role in providing citizens with enlightened information and debates.

Research evidence indicates that framing characteristics used by the PJ model, notably

escalation and de-escalation, evoke distinctive cognitive responses (Shinar and Kempf,

2007). One study found the US television coverage of war in Iraq aggravated the

subjects’ sense of meaninglessness of death. It was not the images that triggered the

effect, but rather “political spin’ and “arbitrary realities,” thereby the context (Serlin 2006).

18

PJ, on the other hand, “represents a way of making news less potentially harmful to the

psychological health of its consumers” (Lynch, 2014).

Research Methodology

The research component of this study, which is an exploratory discourse analysis of

media sectarianism, delves into the coverage of two specific case studies in Al-Ahram

and Youm7 newspapers in Egypt. Al-Ahram (meaning “The Pyramids”), semi-

governmental publication, is the second oldest Egyptian newspaper, founded in 1875,

and the most widely circulated (Ipsos, 2013). Youm7 (meaning “seventh day”), a

privately owned newspaper, was established in 2008 as a weekly paper but has been

published daily since 2011. It is self-declared as a paper for all social classes as

opposed to “the political and financial elite.” These two papers have online platforms

which have a wide readership among Arabic speakers.

The study identified two cases which will be analyzed to identify the various narratives

associated with coverage of sectarian conflict.The first case is that of the 70-year old

Souad Thabet, who was hauled out of her house in the rural village of Al-Karm in the

Upper Egypt governorate Minya on May 20, 2016. A rumor circulating about a romantic

relationship between Thabet’s son and a divorced Muslim woman prompted the

woman’s divorcee to attack Thabet’s family and the houses of other Coptic residents in

the village (Mada Masr, 2017). This incident was chosen as it manifests sectarianism in

one of its ugliest forms, and because it got massive attention among public opinion. The

video of Thabet being stripped and dragged was posted online and went viral causes a

major uproar and public outrage. This in turn created pressure for media coverage and

government action. Using the keywords “Souad Thabet” “Sayedet Al-Karm” (The Al-

Karm woman) and “Sayedet Al-Minya” (Minya woman), this study looked into news

coverage for eight months since the incident took place in May 2016, with the first news

report being published on the 25th of the month. These terms were the most prevalently

used by the Egyptian media to refer to the incident which garnered a significant amount

of public attention.

19

The second case analyzed in this study is concerned with violent forced displacement,

which in Arabic is often referred to as tahgeer. In February 2017, more than 150 Coptic

families were forced to flee Al-Arish, in the northern region of the Sinai peninsula, to

other governorates after either having their beloved ones killed, or after receiving

threatening messages left on their doors or sent to their phone. The displacement of 150

families to seven governorates from the governorate of Northern Sinai is a sizeable and

landmark one (Al-Ahram, 2017). Alongside attacks on Coptic communities and places of

worship, forced displacements are likely the most prevalent form of violence against

Christian communities in Egypt and they are typically ignored in the media or do not get

as much coverage as other forms of violence. This particular case is exceptional,

perhaps because it played precisely into the states’ “War on Terrorism” narrative. The

keywords searched were “Al-Arish” and “a’aelat maseehya” (Christian families) covering

an eight month period starting on February 24th, 2017 when the crisis was first reported.

The analysis looked at both the language and the content of reporting on the two cases.

The focus was on news reports as they are what the Peace Journalism model is

concerned with, rather than editorials or other types of journalism. For verification

purposes and to ensure all articles are identified and analyzed, a comprehensive search

using both the newspapers' online database and Google News search engine were

compared to corroborate the data set.

Case One: The Dragging of Souad Thabet in Upper

Egypt

Al-Ahram’s Coverage

Al-Ahram, being mostly state-owned, is often conservative in its address of issues of

social strife. In the case of Souad Thabet, Al-Ahram adopted the typical line of denying

sectarianism, as Egyptian media have always done for decades. Throughout the 20

news reports it published about the incident, the newspaper chose to interview heads of

political parties that asserted and parroted the denial of sectarianism as an underlying

factor behind the attack. For example, Head of Al-Wafd Party Al-Sayed al-Badawi,

20

maintained that it is a criminal offense not a sectarian issue, while also calling it an

“isolated incident” (Anz et al, 2016).

The notion that there is an external factor rather than homegrown sectarianism igniting

episodes of violence is a recurring one in many of the reported statements. Minya’s

Governor, the highest gubernatorial official overseeing the site of the incident, initially

denied the incident. But following widespread coverage and public uproar, he later

blamed “foreign hands attempting a creating a schism” between Muslims and Copts.

This is consistent with a common pattern of coverage related to sectarian matters, where

state officials claim foreign intervention or “unidentified” meddlers responsible for the

social strife between religious groups. He also said that people are taking advantage of

the absence of Pope Tawadros II and Al-Azhar Grand Imam Ahmed El-Tayeb, as they

were both traveling abroad at the time, to conspire against Egypt’s national unity, and to

divide and destabilize society (Al-Ahram, 2016). In an interview with Pope Tawadros II a

few months after Thabet’s ordeal, the Pope himself assures the public that “the incident

represents a tone that is discordant with Egyptian society and the values of the Egyptian

nature” (Sadeq, 2017). One report went as far as quoting the mayor of the village where

the incident happened, Omar Ragheb, saying that the villagers feel that there is a

“scheme to damage Al-Karm’s reputation” (Al-Husseiny, 2016). So denial of

sectarianism is a trope that pervades most statements from the most senior government

officials to the most local and across the spectrum of Al-Ahram’s coverage.

Another evident trope that appeared in Al-Ahram’s coverage pertained to second-class,

protected “Dhimmi” status. While some reports referred to Copts as “siblings,” an

identified implying that they are brothers and sisters in the nation alongside Muslims. For

example, on for the politicians featured in the paper is the Head of Communications for

the Mostaqbal Watan Party Ahmed Sami who also said “Islam’s Prophet commanded us

to take care of Egypt’s Copts” (Anz et al, 2016). This tone that refers to Christians as

either siblings or a diminutive constituency needing protection demonstrate at best a

glaring paternalism and at worst a reminder that the status quo or the identity of society

is by default Muslim. Egyptians are expected to be Muslims and their “siblings” are the

Christians.

21

The sources who appeared in the news reports were predominantly the usual, elite

officials such as Head of Cabinet Sherif Ismail and Minya Governor Tarek Nasr, as well

as Church clergy. Indeed, Al-Ahram’s first report on the incident was the tale according

to Bishop Macarius of Minya, the highest Coptic church official in Minya (Hesham, 2017).

Only once did Al-Ahram talk to the family of the accused, getting their side of the story.

The Muslim woman’s former husband’s uncle confessed to wanting vengeance for their

disgrace, but did not know that matters would escalate and that there was a will to burn

houses (Al-Husseiny, 2016). Al-Ahram published another, longer report in which the

newspaper talked to villagers who oppose such vengeance, and others who described

accounts of Muslims coming to the aid of their Christian neighbours when the attacks

took place. What is worth noting is that the report was introduced as one distancing itself

“from the tranquilizers and official statements designed to contain the crisis” (Al-

Husseiny, 2016, para. 1).

Solutions offered in Al-Ahram’s reporting included the necessity to hold the offenders--

the mob which attacked Coptic homes--accountable through the rule of law. This

referenced a quote from President Al-Sisi asserting that those who committed this

wrongful act will be held accountable (Al-Ahram, 2016). One news story reported on how

the security forces organized daily search campaigns to arrest 10 suspects who had

fled. In addition, Bishop Rafael called for the dismissal of officials, such as the Minya’s

Governor, from their positions for having allowed such violence to escalate without

interfering. Other government officials called for “national unity.”

Al-Ahram’ coverage of Souad Thabet’s case, a a classical incident of sectarianism,

upheld the Egyptian media practice of negating the involvement of sectarian strife. It also

encouraged notions of guardianship over Copts, as opposed to them being equal to

Muslim citizens in Egypt. Pretences of perfect harmony and national unity was vividly

present in Al-Ahram’s news reports. The voice of Christians, other than church officials,

was non-existent.

22

Youm7’s Coverage

The issue of Souad Thabet was covered heavily in privately-owned Youm7, sometimes

up to four news pieces in one day at the peak of the story, with a total of 46 news reports

published.

At the beginning and shortly after the attack, the private media outlet did acknowledge

that it is a sectarian episode. Up until the second news report published by Youm7 about

the incident, it was described as a sectarian one (Allam, 2016). However, on Thursday,

26th May 2016, the day after the incident was reported in the media, another Youm7

article framed it as a criminal offence, with the headline generically quoting Al-Karm

village’s so-called “people” stating that what happened has nothing to do with religion

(Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). Friday’s cover story for the print edition, which was also published

online, was given a big manchette reading “The Minya Incident is Criminal and Not

Sectarian Sedition.”

“The Minya Incident is Criminal and Not Sectarian Sedition”

Similar to Al-Ahram, Youm7 mostly featured Church clerics as sources rather than

having spokespeople from the diverse Christian community. As is the case with Al-

Ahram, the first report that came out of Youm7 was merely a repetition of Bishop

Macarius’ tale (Allam, 2016). The only voice from the Christian side, other than Church

clerics, was republishing the old lady’s testimony recorded in the police investigation,

thereby vetted by the police and not a direct account (Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). It is not

23

clear if there was a news moratorium on interviews with her, if she refused to speak to

the media, or if the Church intentionally monopolized access to the victim. Youm7 did

publish the accused’s lawyer asking why the other side of the story is not being listened

to, but the newspaper never sought the information he was attempting to point to (Abdel

Ghaffar, 2016).

Youm7’s coverage followed the narrative that the violent incident does not represent the

nature of Egyptians, stressing national unity. It quoted President Sisi saying that “such

incidents do not reflect in any way the nature and traditions of the Egyptian people” who

“fought to spread peace” (vividly a military-oriented statement, and a securitized and

violent take on peace), who provide an ideal model for national unity (Al-Gali, 2016). The

paper reported on a call between Pope Tawadros II and the old lady Souad Thabet,

quoting the Pope asserting that “the incident is fleeting and will not affect the relationship

between Muslims and Christians” (Allam, 2016). One MP representing another region in

Minya proposed that “the nation's enemies” want to hinder its progress (Abdel Ghaffar,

2016). A report quoted Minya’s Governor saying that “invisible hands” are trying to

create a split between Muslims and their “Christian siblings”, who have been “one entity”

for thousands of years (Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). Yousry Al-Moghazi, a parliamentarian and

a member of the Egypt’s Support Coalition, condemned those with “foreign agendas” for

targeting Egypt’s stability (Saeed, 2016). Major General Saad Al-Gammal, head of a

political coalition called Egypt’s Support Coalition, even blamed the widely used

scapegoat term “terrorism” (often used to refer to the criminalized Muslim Brotherhood)

for trying to split ranks between Egyptians (Fakhri, 2016).

In a somewhat uncharacteristic manner, at least compared to Al-Ahram, Youm7 did

incorporate a quote from the former Minya deputy Ihab Ramzy denouncing the inaction

of security forces upon receiving a threat complaint from the old lady (Allam, 2016).

Besides this quote, Youm7 demonstrated various courses of action in response to the

incident in their coverage.The paper quoted Minya’s Governor reassuring that those who

were negligent and violators of the law will be held accountable (Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). It

also quoted Fady Youssef, a coordinator at the Coalition of Coptic Egypt, who called for

the dismissal of the governor and the Minister of Interior (Allam, 2016). One pastor

called for “radical solutions,” however his suggestion was the use of “an iron fist” against

the external extremist elements (Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). Mayor of Al-Karm, Omar Ragheb,

24

prevented those whose houses got burnt from leaving the village (a common official

practice that follows agreements agreements in reconciliation sessions) (Allam and

Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). Party members and MPs sent a delegation to contribute in solving

the crisis (Reda, 2016). So between calls for heavy-handed responses to perpetrators to

accountability from government officials, Youm7 represented a wider range of critical

perspectives than Al-Ahram, where mention of government responsibility or negligence

were absent.

Youm7 being a private newspaper often thrives on distribution, sales, and online traffic,

numerous reports aired on the side of sensationalism, showcasing tranquilizing

measures, such as how Abu Qurqas MP Ashraf Shawqi kissed the victim Souad

Thabet’s head (Abdel Ghaffar, 2016), and the invitation she received from parliament,

and having received given an award (Guirges and Abdallah, 2016), as well as being

presented with an Egyptian flag (Abdel Galil, 2016). These actions constitute an attempt

to soothe the anger and frustration caused by the attack as opposed to addressing the

root causes behind it.

One relatively progressive and different solution was also mentioned, albeit in relation to

gender violence rather than sectarianism. Hence, allowing the official rhetoric of framing

the incident as a criminal gender-based act of violence as opposed to one based on

sectarian and religious motivations. In fact, the Ministry of Justice’s Women and Child

Affairs Department decided to open an office for assisting women against violence

following this incident (Qassem, 2016).

As is the case in many reports that are seen as disruptive in Egypt, the militarization of

solutions is rampant. For instance, there was a report on Youm7 about the presidency’s

orders for the armed forces to reconstruct and restore all buildings and facilities affected

(Al-Gali, 2016), and another included the armed forces’ plan to remove the fire ruins

“amid hope for a going back to regular life” (Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). These are exemplars

of the primacy of the armed forces as saviour and resolver of quagmires in Egypt is

persistent even in cases of public sectarian strife.

While the default and typical “reconciliation sessions” often take place after such

incidents involving members of different faith communities, one of the reports from

Youm7 identifies a meeting held between Minya’s governor, Al-Azhar representatives,

25

Church representatives, a parliament delegation, Ministry of Interior officials, and

Thabet’s husband. Youm7 quoted one pastor refusing to call it a “reconciliation session”

(but practically speaking that is what it was) (Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). Bishop Raphael,

Secretary of the Holy Synod of the Coptic Church and Bishop of the Churches of Central

Cairo, refused the concept of reconciliation sessions and called for the rule of law

(Abdallah, 2016). This is a departure from the typical decorum which accepts the

“reconciliation sessions” as the formal means to resolve conflicts of sectarian nature.

Even former Secretary-General of the Arab League and former presidential candidate

Amr Moussa stressed that the constitution protects all citizens’ rights, including having a

safe life. He called for justice and also refused reconciliation sessions (Reda and

Abdallah, 2016). This appeal for justice and rule of law seemed more common in the

private Youm7 coverage than the governmental Al-Ahram reporting.

Despite these differences, this did not change the portrayal of the regime and its

President Sisi as the hero, a tone that rang extremely loud. Youm7 reported on how Sisi

refused to label Thabet through religion, referring to her as an “Egyptian woman,”

because “we are all one and we have equal rights and duties” (Hamdi and Al-Ghoul,

2016). Following Sisi’s speech, Youm7 wrote: “a state of optimism and satisfaction

prevailed among everyone in the village of Al-Karm in Minya governorate after the

president's apology to Souad Thabet" (Allam and Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). Many reports

included quotes parliamentarians, party members, and others praising the president’s

wisdom, and and applauding how he and the Pope handled the situation. Coptic MP

Margaret Azer referred to Sisi’s “good, humanitarian soul” (Arafa, 2016). Bishop

Macarius also praised the president’s interference (Allam, 2016). The MP of Abu Qirqas

region, where Al-Karm Village is located, stated Sisi’s apology “soothed our hearts”

(Allam and Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). Yousry Al-Moghazi, a parliamentarian and a member

of the Egypt’s Support Coalition praised Sisi, and how he is a president “for all

Egyptians,” as opposed to the Muslim majority only (Saeed, 2016). Hence, it is evident

that the untouchability of the executive branch is especially clear in incidents of sectarian

nature, whereby the President is often presented as resolver of such dilemmas.

Although Youm7 discussed the stripping of the elderly woman more extensively than Al-

Ahram, content and language differences between the two papers were stark. Youm7’s

reporting substantiated that the incident was alien to the Egyptian society, and that there

26

wasn't any discrimination based on religion. Aside from republishing Thabet’s

investigation testimony, the coverage excluded viewpoints and educated solutions from

the wider public, be it Christians or Muslims.

Case Two: The Displacement of Copts from Sinai

Al-Ahram’s Coverage

Compared to the case of Souad Thabet from Minya, the displacement of Copts from

Sinai garnered far greater coverage in Al-Ahram. The paper published 124 news reports

about the issue. This might be due to the perception of the incident as a graver ordeal

affecting a larger number of persons (150 families), or perhaps because of the

geographic location and parties involved, it served the regime’s “war against terror”

narrative. We cannot say with any certainty which is the driving force or intention behind

this coverage but we can say each of these or all of them combined.

When it comes to coverage depicting government support, it is often presented akin to a

gift, rather than an obligation. This is evident by the sheer amount of reporting on the

actions taken and the number of headlines featuring the government or government

officials offering a service or visiting a camp. For example, the paper reported on how

the Minister of Education Tarek Shawqi exempted the transferred students from paying

school fees (Shehata, 2017). Hassan et al (2017) wrote, “the State, with all it ministries,

has spared no effort to provide support for the incoming families.” There were multiple

news reports about the government providing apartments and jobs for the families (for

example see Ibrahim, 2017) and how officials were paying visits to the camps hosting

the displaced Coptic families. This information was not part of other news reports and is

unconfirmed, but appears to be “in accordance with the directives of President Sisi”

(Ibrahim, 2017 and Zalata, 2017).

Despite the aggrandizement of the services provided, the state downplayed the suffering

of the Coptic families. For one thing, they refused to call it what it is: tahgeer (forced

displacement). The Governor of Ismailia Yaseen Taher stated that “what happened with

the Christian siblings [emphasis added] coming from Sinai cannot be described as a

27

type of forced or organized displacement,” pointing out that the transfer was based on

decisions of individual Christian families and personal initiatives from the Evangelical

Church (Ibrahim, 2017). As well, Minister of Interior Magdy Abdel Ghaffar said “we did

not ask any of the citizens living in North Sinai to leave their homes” (Al-Ahram, 2017).

Instead, the paper used the phrase “incoming families” or “moving families,” completely

avoiding labeling it tahgeer.

Unlike the case of Souad Thabet, Al-Ahram actively spoke to the displaced Copts,

exposing stories about attacks on homes, murdered brothers, fathers, and family

members complaints of daily kidnappings, waking up to the sound of blasts, constant

sound of bullets, and not being able to leave their homes out of fear. Salah Salam,

president of the Human Rights Council in North Sinai, stated that 255 people have been

killed in Sinai, without specifying a time period (Selim and Al-Sherif, 2017).

The event and this type of victim-oriented coverage conveniently feeds the state’s “War

on Terror” narrative in Northern Sinai, a narrative it uses to solidify its grip and force the

“unification” of the public behind it. None of the news reports were devoid of the word

“terrorism.” All blame was placed on terrorism, and none was placed on members of the

civilian public who threatened their fellow Christian villagers or the government for

ignoring the conflict until it became the crisis that it was. “The more Egyptians unite, the

darker the terrorists' hearts become” read one report (Hassan et al, 2017). Head of

parliament, Ali Abdel Al, held that “these events aim at striking national unity” (Eissa and

Lasheen, 2017). Al-Azhar once again strongly condemned the terrorist attacks against

the Christian siblings in North Sinai, stressing that this is a crime against all Egyptians

(Al-Basheer, 2017). One parliamentarian was reported to say that terrorist acts “cannot

break Egyptian unity” and that they will “only increase our resolve to eliminating the

hotbeds of terrorism and remove it from its roots, thanks to the strength and

determination of our armed and police forces” (Ibrahim, 2017).

While Al-Ahram may have spoken to the displaced families, at no point did there appear

to be a contradiction between their interviews and state’s official discourse. As if

parroting the government’s narrative, they too decried terrorism which “wants to create a

chasm” between Egyptians and it will not be able to because of Egyptians’ unity. As with

the conflict itself, the media dealt with its resolution like it is for a temporary situation.

28

Headlines like “Compensation given to the people of North Sinai affected by terrorism”

(Selim and Al-Sherif, 2017) were published.

Due to the militarization of North Sinai because of an active insurgency, it was clear that

the armed and security forces were seen as the actors responsible for resolving the

situation that precipitated the displacements. Minister of Culture Helmy Al-Namnam

asserted that “what is happening in El-Arish is an interceptive, temporary phase, all of

which will end soon, thanks to our heroes from the armed forces and their ongoing

sacrifices” (Ibrahim and Bahig, 2017). Major General Alaa Abed, head of the

Parliament’s Human Rights Committee, asserted that Christians are part of Egypt’s

fabric, asking armed forces and the police to “avenge” them (Ibrahim, 2017).

Subsequently, all the solutions were extremely militarized.

An increased security campaign launched, upon the instruction of Minister of the Interior

Magdy Abdel Ghaffar, to “impose security control” on the city of Al-Arish and to

prosecute and arrest the “terrorist elements present in the midst of citizens” (Shouman,

2017). Military spokesman Tamer Rifai said that arrests of suspects come “as a

continuation of the efforts of the armed forces and the civilian police in raiding terrorist

strongholds and prosecuting the takfiri elements in the city of Arish” (Mostafa, 2017).

One report went as far as MP affirming that “terrorism taking its last breath” (Mobasher,

2017).

Using the same language by referring to Copts as “siblings,” Vice Admiral Mohab

Mamish, the chairman of the Suez Canal Authority, noted that the enemies “cannot

affect the unity of the Egyptians, especially after the June 30 revolution, which witnessed

the unity of all, and delivered Egypt to safe shores.” He further stated that “Every spot of

soil in this country belongs to all of you and these events have increased the cohesion

between the presidency, the army, the police, and the people” (Ibrahim, 2017). Most

noteworthy in this quote is the majority of actors being of the security forces and with the

civilian Egyptian public listed last on the list. This speaks further of the militarization of

society at large.

The militarization of media discourse of this incident was coupled with the continuous

attempt to frame the regime as the saviour of the Copts. Media coverage was

29

consistently punctuated with particular frames, even though violent attacks in Egypt have

mounted since the coup, especially on Copts. For example, Naji Assaad, Coordinator of

the Orthodox Church, said that “we feel like full citizens under the leadership of

President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, and that there is no difference between a Muslim and a

Christian” (Ibrahim, 2017). This suggests that the predecessors of President Sisi and

their governments treated Copts as lesser citizens. Coptic MP Margaret Azer, herself a

Coptic Christian, made it a point to note that “there has been targeting of the army,

police, and Copts in the Sinai” (Eissa and Lasheen, 2017). Putting them all in one

sentence within the context of the crisis only served to strengthen the mental link of

victimhood, sacrifice, and heroism in the mind of the reader.

Al-Ahram’s reporting on the coptic families’ flight vastly reflected the state’s wanting to

turn a blind eye to forcible displacement (as part of the larger issue of sectarianism) of

Copts in Egypt, while parallely using the crisis to serve its interests. The “War on Terror”

pretext has been used by the June 2013 military regime as a cover for extrajudicial

killings, the rounding up political opponents, and the violation of freedoms. All solutions

mentioned in conjunction with retribution for the victims of the displacement were violent,

militarized responses, and none looked at prevention of future conflict.

Youm7’s Coverage

Despite the differences in readership, ownership, and revenue generation between Al-

Ahram and Youm7, their news coverage (consisting of 119 published articles) of the

Coptic displacement from Sinai case was similar to Al-Ahram’s.

Youm7 also had excessive coverage of what the government provided for the forcibly

displaced Copts. The newspaper published an article every time a government or

military official visited the camps hosting the displaced families. Denial of forced

displacement and obfuscating the constant suffering of Copts was also the common

media practice here. The private media platform reported on Ismailia Governor Yasin

Taher saying that the families “are not considered forcibly displaced” since they can “go

back any time they want” to Al-Arish (Haragy, 2017). Labeling them “incoming” or

“moving” Coptic families, Youm7 quoted an official source without naming them having

said “the security services did not ask the Coptic citizens living in North Sinai to leave

30

their homes and go to the neighboring provinces” (Abdel Rady, 2017). Pope Tawadros II

himself is quoted saying that “the expression of displacement that has become common

in the media is totally unacceptable,” hoping that “these events are just a passing crisis,”

thereby refuting the fact that these families were either forcibly displaced or intimidated

into departure (Allam, 2017). Most reports referred to them as “incoming” or “moving”

Copts, while maintaining the usage of the phrase “Coptic siblings” in some (See Ragheb,

2017 as an example). By neutralizing the language, there is no perpetrator nor a

responsible government entity.

Despite this intransigent narrative that denies displacement, when the newspaper

interviewed the people who were displaced (none from those still in Al-Arish), they

recalled how they had received threats written on the doors of their homes or sent as

text messages to their mobile phones. They said that they “were forced to leave”

(Azzam, 2017).

The Church’s patronage over the Egyptian Christian community was depicted heavy-

handedly in Youm7’s coverage of the forced displacement. It reported that initially it was

the Anglican Church in Ismailia that invited the threatened families, rather than the

government interfering to help them (Haragy, 2017). Ghanem (2017) wrote that families

were settled “with the knowledge of” Ismailia’s Bishop Youssef Shoukri. Minister of

Manpower Mohamed Saafan visited the Church and showcased the job opportunities

they provided for the displaced Copts (Ragheb, 2017).

Meanwhile, Pope Tawadros II and the entire Church adopted the usual “national unity

under threat from an external factor” line. Youm7 was also quick to use the term

“terrorism.” It reported that families moved because of “terrorism attacks” (Wahba and

Ghanem, 2017). Terrorism was treated as foreign and not a product of local dynamics,

often referred as “imported from abroad” (Gomaa, 2017). The Pope insisted that “the

armed forces, police, state institutions and our Egyptian Coptic children, as well as

Muslims, are exposed to this violence” in Egypt (Allam, 2017). Bishop Daniel of Maadi

stated that Egypt’s Muslims and Christians coexist, and “if there is an ideological

deviation, it is an outsider” to society (Allam, 2017). Father Bolis Oweida, professor of

ecclesiastical law, also confirmed that terrorism “wants to hit Egypt by playing on the

strings of national unity,” but “so long as Holy Al-Azhar’s minaret reaches high into the

31

sky and embraces that of the Church, Egypt will be well.” Father Oweida failed to

mention the people themselves, finding it enough to speak about the institutions the

state has used to supposedly represent them (Mostafa, 2017). Furthermore, he asserted

that “Egyptians worship one God” (Mostafa, 2017), even though Egyptians do not see

belonging to different religions as the worship of one God, thus his statement did not

address the root problem of acceptance.

The militarized and security mentality was also overpowering in Youm7’s reporting. It

published a statement by the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs which disclosed that

the crisis is a serious development in Egypt’s “War on Terror,” delivering the message

that “all Egyptians should rally behind the military and police forces” (Middle East News

Agency, 2017). Three days after the first report on the “incoming” Coptic families came

out, Youm7 published an article with the headline “Security agencies avenge Copts’

blood in Northern Sinai,” discussing how the security apparatus conducted wide raids on

outlaws and extremists (Abdel Rady, 2017). Reports on raids and arrests in several

areas in North Sinai “to control the elements of takfiri8 groups and suspects who target

and intimidate civilians of North Sinai” continued (see AlQady, 2017).

Reports did not deviate from the “regime as a saviour” narrative particularly from Church

officials who seemed to find refuge in the patronage and protection of the state.

Orthodox Church cleric Nagy Asaad was quoted to have said that “despite the current

crisis, Egypt’s Copts feel safe and secure under the rule of President Abdel Fattah al-

Sisi” (Haragy, 2017). The Pope expressed his “trust in the state and President Sisi’s

efforts” to mitigate the crisis (Allam, 2017). Father Boulos Oweida asserted that

“terrorism’s hands will not reach Egypt like it did in Syria and Iraq” (Mostafa, 2017). The

Egypt’s situation is “better than Syria and Iraq” is a frequently-used adage by the state

and media in Egypt to implore the public to be thankful that their predicament is better

than other countries in the region that have broken out into full fledged conflict. It is often

articulated to suggest Egyptians should accept military governance as the only

alternative to outright social disintegration and terrorism.

8 Derived from the word kufr (impiety), takfiri is a term often used to describe a person or doctrine that perceives most other interpretations of the faith as kufr.

32

Although a private paper, Youm7 was very much in line with the state’s rhetoric in their

coverage of the displaced Sinai Copts. Yet again, the masquerade of unity between the

Church and Al-Azhar, and among Egyptians, was accentuated. The paper did not hold

the state accountable for neglecting the poor, underdeveloped area. It did not address

these conditions which help breed sectarianism and radical ideologies. Militarized

solutions were paraded, and the regime was depicted as bulwark of social stability the

guardian angel of Coptic rights.

Peace Journalism and Sectarian Conflict in Egypt

Before considering the possibility and applicability of a model like Peace Journalism (PJ)

to the context of Egyptian religious conflict, it is important to note the definitional

characteristics of the model as articulated by Lynch and McGoldrick (2005). They offer a

17-point plan as a condition for practicing PJ. They have been rearranged to group the

points related to language together, and those related to content together. Each of these

points is reflected on below in relation to the mediated coverage of sectarian conflict in

Egypt.

Language

1. PJ refuses distinctions between “self” and “other,” which lead to constructing the

sense that “another party is a ‘threat’ or ‘beyond the pale’ of civilised behaviour.” Such

descriptions justify violence.

To understand how the Egyptian state specializes in othering, one need not look further

than its utilization of conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories are used consistently in

the official press and government speeches to explain sectarian circumstances to avoid

acknowledging state failures or social problems that could be precipitating these

incidents. Usually the conspiracy theories involve perpetrators from who are external

forces, foreign meddlers, or local opposition. The exact identities are always intentionally

left vague to justify violence and or oppression towards a more diffuse and broad

constituency of state adversaries.

33

2. Language which victimizes a party, such as “devastated,” “defenceless,” “pathetic,”

and “tragedy,” should be avoided, as it disempowers and puts limitations on possibilities

for change. Coping mechanisms and solutions from the people should be included.

Terminologies implying Christian inferiority like “Christian siblings”, which are pervasive

in Egyptian media coverage, should not be used. Furthermore, in cases where the

perpetrators of the violence are seen as state enemies, the victimization of the parties

suffering is highlighted. In cases where state negligence or social strife are more

convincingly the cause behind the incidents, the victimhood of those suffering is

comparatively stripped away and the problem becomes one affecting all Egyptians, who

are themselves victimized using this language.

3. PJ refrains from inaccurately using emotive words such as “genocide,”

“assassination,” and “massacre.” It does not belittle suffering but is meticulous,

otherwise “you will beggar the language and help to justify disproportionate responses

which escalate the violence” (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005).

PJ within the Egyptian setting would attempt to more accurately and e more definitively

and proportionately explain the conditions, describe circumstances, and a consider the

most appropriate language to best represent the situation, with sensitivity to both

personal and collective predicaments. Furthermore, the state and media’s use of the

words associated with “terrorism” would cease to avoid leading to zero-sum solutions,

extreme acts of reprisal, and violent retribution. All of these further inflame the situation

and accentuate the likelihood of further violence.

4. & 5. Demonising adjectives like “vicious,” “cruel,”, “brutal,” and “barbaric,” as well as

labels Dlike “terrorist,” “extremist,” “fanatic,” “fundamentalist” are criticized as describing

one side’s view of the other. Their usage places the journalist on that side and

encourages the justification for the escalation of reactive violence. These words also

indicate that “the people labelled are unreasonable, which weakens the case for

reasoning (negotiating) with them” (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005, p.30). Lynch and

McGoldrick advise that description must be precise. They give the example of using

“bombers” or, for the attacks of September 11th, “suicide hijackers” in place of

“terrorists.” This choice both lessens partisanship and gives more accurate information.

34

Dehumanising perpetrators of violence or crime in the manner of the Egyptian media

does render them expendable. Labeling attackers as “outsiders” (or “takfiris” as Youm7

did with the second case) permits the state to launch violent attacks, leaving

perpetrators wanting more violence, and through reprisal against state counterattacks,

the Copts become targets again and suffer further. The vicious cycle only reinforces

sectarianism and does not solve the conflict. If war journalism's chief sin is emotionally-

imbued language, it is the clear goal of PJ to find precise language to describe the

challenges that lay before the Egyptian nation.

Content

6. PJ avoids writing about a conflict as if it is a tug of war between only two sides,

making the natural result a winning party and a losing one. Rather, it breaks down the

conflict into different small parties with varying goals, needs, and interests. In doing so, a

journalist paves the way for a spectrum of solutions.

In the Egyptian context of sectarian conflict, media should avoid framing the struggle as

one simply between bad Islamists and Copts, or between terrorists and the rest of Egypt.

This also means that the sole reliance on the government and state to serve as paternal

guardian of all Egyptians, the religious institutions (The Coptic Church and Al-Azhar) as

sole mediators, and the military as resolver is very problematic. The excessive binaries

in responsibilities and value judgment only render sectarianism a more retractable

problem.

7. It avoids handling a conflict like it is “only going on in the place and at the time that

violence is occurring.” It looks into how variables are linked together, and what

consequences they have in the present and the future. Questions like which

stakeholders are involved in the outcome, who benefits from the conflict, how they are

influencing it, and what lessons can be taken away, should be addressed.

This is possibly one of the most important concerns for coverage of sectarianism in

Egypt as it uncovers the complexities and nuances of the issue and how it involves so

35

many factors. Rather than blaming it on individuals or sporadic circumstances, it is

necessary for the journalistic coverage of sectarianism to demonstrate the social,

political, economic, cultural, religious, and educational developments in Egypt’s modern

history that have precipitated the meteoric rise of this phenomenon. Understanding and

relaying to the public the root causes and what contributes to sectarianism is more

beneficial at rooting out violent actions in relations to this issue. Writing that Copts were

“avenged” after a single violent attack or that “matters were back to normal and the

village is calm and nobody is talking about the incident.” (Abdel Ghaffar, 2016). This

gives the impression that these incidents are singular and unrelated to preexisting

conditions instead reducing them to one-offs that can easily be rectified by a modest

involvement from the state or or Church. Addressing the root causes of sectarianism

makes the media part of the solution.

8. A journalist ought to avoid merely writing about violent acts and depicting “the horror,”

excluding other elements in the situation. In doing so, they imply that the violence is only

explained by past violence, namely revenge. PJ suggests describing people’s conditions

that led to violence, such as being “blocked and frustrated” or suffering from deprivation.

Sinai and Upper Egypt, the sites of both the case studies of sectarian incidents analyzed

in this study, lack infrastructure and basic services such as healthcare and education. It

is, thus, not abnormal for radical ideologies to find fertile ground and flourish there. The

very services the government took pride in providing for the displaced families, and

those the media propagated for, should be discussed as essential needs in the villages

of both Upper Egypt and Sinai on a long-term basis. The current proposed quick fixes

and the parsing out of services on the basis of victimhood can only infuriate those left

behind, increasing the likelihood of more tension. They should be part of a development

strategy rather than a short-term remedy for only those experiencing suffering. As Lynch

and McGoldrick (2005) assert, fixing a problem requires diagnosis.

9. Instead of discussing the merits of violent acts or the observable effects of policies

alone, PJ seeks to report on the invisible outcomes such as the long-lasting

psychological damage and trauma which could make the people or groups affected

more violent.

36

In Egypt’s case, the state’s decades-long harsh policies and negligence of regions like

the Sinai contributed significantly to the radicalization and extremism of communities

there. Furthermore, each act of violence would be placed in its social and economic

context by showcasing what predicaments afflicted the community that may have

precipitated these incidents. The media, in step with the state’s approach, simply rallied

behind such policies, further alienating these communities. One example of this are the

acts of retribution or reprisal. The Head of the Parliament’s Human Rights Committee,

Alaa Abed, mentioned that terrorist groups targeted Copts because “the former’s leaders

have been killed” in a military mission in Al-Halal Mountain. He stated that “once police

and military forces take control, the terrorists feel weak and resolve to actions like

attacking Copts.” Although he did correlate violence with violence, he was denouncing it,

but rather to support security forces in their “war on terror” (Fakhry, 2017). Indeed, on

Monday 27 February 2017, the newspaper’s main story manchette read “The cleansing

of Mount Halal is behind the targeting of the Copts of Sinai” (Youm7, 2017). A peace

journalist would explain the dirty face of violence instead of its glorification with words

like “cleansing.”

10. PJ refrains from having parties define themselves through merely restating their

leaders’ usual demands or positions. Alternatively, it examines what people on the

ground want changed, and who speaks up for them other than political leaders. The

usual government and Church officials are always sourced in Egypt’s media, solidifying

and justifying the same old, violent response as course of action. A peace journalist

would include viewpoints of locals and activists, what people on the ground want

changed. In doing so, they “seek to invert the hierarchy of access” to the news, as Chris

Atton says (2002). Peace Researcher John Paul Lederach elaborates:

I have not experienced any situation of conflict […] where there have not been

people who had a vision for peace… Far too often, however, these same people

are overlooked and disempowered either because they do not represent “official”

power (Lederach in Keeble et al, 2010, p. 95).

11. The PJ model shies away from concentrating on what divides different parties, and

attempts to ask questions which shed light on areas of common ground.

37

Highlighting common history could contribute to a true sense of unity. Civil rights and

equality, rather than religious differences, should also be an area of discussion within the

Egyptian media. In addition, the regime that alleges that it seeks democracy and unity

as avenues for change has that in common with the social construct in a post

revolutionary Egypt, for both Muslims and Christians. Since it is one of the primary goals

of PJ, this could be a positive starting point for media. In a more direct manner, by

bringing the history of Copts out of obscurity and demonstrating the manner in which

they have contributed to Egyptian society, culture and life, there could be progress made

in overcoming their perception as “others.” Highlighting common understandings, values,

livelihoods, and aspirations among Egyptians of all backgrounds can disrupt the tone of

exceptionalism that pervades society and the media.

12. Reports should examine mutual problems and their consequences instead of

blaming one party for “starting it.”

Daily struggles, a lack of education, and conditions of poverty are suffered by both

Muslims and Christians, all fanning the flames of sectarianism in Egypt. Yet media

usually point fingers at the “extreme Islamists” for starting a crisis. Accusation and blame

is a classic symptom of journalism in Egypt specifically. Rather than creating enemies,

and wielding blame as a weapon, those fingers must be used constructively to build

bridges to solutions to rising sectarianism.

13. PJ avoids giving attention to one group’s disadvantages and concerns and not the

other, which leads to the division of “villains” and “victims” and as such the solution

would be punishing the bad party.

Preferential treatment is an endemic problem when it comes to the way in which the

Egyptian media write about various groups in society. Historically, Christians are

underrepresented and rarely interviewed or featured in the print press. In the few

instances where they are in the media limelight, it is in conjunction with crises or

sectarianism. As a sizeable community in Egyptian society, they are often rendered

politicized subjects. Their adversaries and perpetrators of violence against them are

perceived and represented by the media as terrorist and villains. This divisive

38

representation only entrenches greater animosity between them. Each is seen as a

victim of the other. PJ would challenge this by considering all parties as “equally

newsworthy,” thereby showing that both Christians and Muslims suffer the same

underdevelopment and the consequences this has on their education and learnt

relations.

14. Human rights abuses and wrongdoings from all sides should be reported, rather than

those conducted from one side only, all the while striving to find evidence that backs up

allegations of the misdemeanours.

An example of this is that while the government portraying itself as the saviour, the

media should highlight the amount of civilian casualties, destruction, and devastation

that accompany violence. In Sinai, between 1,200 and 2,000 homes have been

destroyed, hundreds of hectares of farmland razed, and 3,200 families forcibly evicted

since 2015 (Aziz, 2017). This was all done and justified by the government’s pursuit of

extremist insurgents. PJ would reject the military press releases which praise these

actions as well as the extremely common practice of extrajudicial killings.

15. Opinions or claims should not be depicted as fact. “This is how propaganda works,”

explain Lynch and Mcgoldrick (2005, p.30). Phrases like ‘“said to be,” “thought to be,”

and “it’s being seen as” do not reveal who is “doing the saying.” A reader should be told

who said what so that the journalist and their news service avoid implicitly endorsing the

allegations made by one side in the conflict against another.

In one report following the displacement of Copts from Al-Arish, Youm7 pointed to a link

between Muslim Brotherhood and Ansar Beit Al Maqdes, the militant group who are in

allegiance with ISIS in the Sinai (Arafa, 2017). By doing so, the newspaper hinted that

the Muslim Brotherhood, which were ousted from office by the coup in 2013 and are

often used as a boogeyman prop, are described as terrorists and implied as being

behind the attacks. This report was not evidenced, validated or corroborated. Instead it

served to point fingers at without documentation. No attempts at verification of

information can help transform reports into propaganda statements. In other examples of

this ambiguity, some reports in the Egyptian media generalize to all Copts and all

Muslims without specificity or context. The victims of violence are rarely agents to be

39

interviewed but rather subjects to be discussed by officials and clergy. Entire

communities and villages are referred to en masse. Sometimes headlines are so

hyperbolic, they will attribute quotes to whole families rather than persons. The PJ

approach would deem this very problematic and counterproductive in alleviating

sectarianism in coverage.

16. Writing about military victory or a ceasefire should not be equated to creating peace.

PJ looks into lingering matters, notably the needs of those afflicted by violence. It

attempts to emphasize what is required in order to eliminate motives for further violence,

what steps are being taken to resolve possible conflict nonviolently, and what is being

done to provide structural needs in the society and to construct a culture of peace.

This problem is an endemic one in the Egyptian media particularly during this period in

the country’s history. With the military at the helm of many governmental affairs,

militarized and securitzed solutions to many problems, including sectarianism, are the

new status quo. Whether it is the military’s pledge to defend Copts from attack or

rebuilding their places of worship and homes or repatriation and services, the military

should not be seen as a party in these incidents and certainly not replace the role of

civilian institutions. Alternatively, and in response to violence, the military has become

the go-to actor that is tasked with responding to any act of violence in the country.

Perpetrators of sectarian violence, when it serves the political objectives of the military-

dominated government, themselves become targets of state violence. Those who are

not deemed to be nemeses of the state, are spared the wrath of the armed forces.

Within the current Egyptian media, both governmental and private, the militarized

solutions are celebrated. Under the PJ model this must be discontinued and questioned

as counterproductive path to end conflict.

17. The PJ model dictates not to wait for “leaders on ‘our’ side” to propose solutions, but

digs for them in peace initiatives “wherever they come from.” Exploring peace

perspectives that are not in line with established positions could stimulate dialogue.

Egyptian media should make it a point to go beyond the official rhetoric and trace

peaceful discourse from organizations, peace activists, and local people who take

initiative or have propositions or opinions which could foster change in society. Agency

40

can play an important role in that all parties within the Egyptian society must begin to

look from within for solutions, rather than imploding discourse with destructive blame.

Pockets of Peace Journalism

Even though the coverage of both cases of sectarian conflict offered little to no non-

militarized, tangible, and long-lasting civic solutions for sectarian conflict in Egypt, there

were a small number of instances where some characteristics of PJ could be found in

the two newspapers. While these may be scarce and seemingly inconsequential, they

may be of potential if harnessed as techniques in the future.

In the case of Minya’s grandma, seven months after the incident, a report by Mohsen

Abdel Aziz (2017) in Al-Ahram, addressed many core issues of the sectarianism

question. It read:

Those who ask about the endemic terrorism in the villages of Upper Egypt need

to dig their feet in dusty roads and narrow streets, take a look at hospitals and

schools [...] where negligence resides. Poverty walks the streets on two

legs.[accessing a] football field is a distant dream, but the existence of cinema,

theater or even a cultural center is untenable[...] Even the music and

entertainment classes have disappeared from schools and made way for terrorist

groups and radical extremists to instill fanaticism and hatred in young

minds...And then we wonder after every sectarian incident why it happened ..

nothing will change in Egypt so long as the causes exist, and treatment is absent

[...] As usual, after every incident, the government gets angry, but the anger

quickly diminishes, after having merely just extinguished the flames without

paying attention to the fire beneath the ashes, which are always ready to flare

elsewhere.

Abdel Aziz listed that the illiteracy rate in Minya is 38%, tens of villages have no sewage

system, no cultural seminars, and no sports. Minya Governor Tarek Nasr expounded on

the matter of Minya in an interview (Al-Ahram, 2016), focusing on several areas. He

insisted that the responsibility of facing extremist ideas should not be placed on security

41

only, as was the case in the 1990s. “Security currently bears the errors of education,

culture and education,” he said. Nasr stressed the importance of culture, and sustainably

developing health services and infrastructure, including sewage systems, the

manufacturing industry, and the tourism sector. The governor invited investors to Minya,

“a promising governorate.” Lastly, he mentioned the role of media and houses of worship

in educating the public. Meanwhile, officials quoted in Al-Ahram maintained that “a

modern civil state is based on citizenship and law, and there is no difference between

any citizen and the other” (Al-Husseiny, 2016).

There were also a few instances of PJ in Youm7’s coverage. For example, Bishop

Macarius did state that Minya governorate suffers numerous problems ignored by

successive governments over the decades (Allam, 2016). Addressing the issue of

reconciliation sessions, the MP of Abu Qirqas region, where Al-Karm Village is located,

stated that religious institutions must stay away, as their interference is unhealthy (Allam

and Abdel Ghaffar, 2016).

The second case’s of Souad Thabet’s media coverage also saw some characteristics of

PJ as well.

Although alone in his opinion in the middle of denial on the platform, a legal expert

interviewed by Al-Ahram said that the incident was indeed considered a form of forcible

displacement: “what happened in El-Arish and Egyptian Christians having to exit and

move into safer areas as a result of their general feeling that there is a serious threat to

their lives and property embodied in the targeting, killing, slaughtering and burning of

innocent people” (Al-Ahram, 2017). This is truly exceptional and goes against the

paper’s pattern of avoiding the use of the word displacement as an attempt to avoiding

controversy.

Al-Ahram also reported on how Muslims hosted some of the Coptic families (Selim and

Al-Sherif, 2017). It also published a news story about a Muslim woman fully covered in

burqa who, “amid anticipation,” brought food and supplies into the church, promising to

cook lentils for Coptic religious fast (Hesham, 2017). Although such stories may appear

to serve “the national unity” theme, they are certainly not statist but rather pave the way

42

for acceptance, normalcy, and learning about the “other” religion. They are also

indications of humanist goodwill among citizens and serve as exemplars.

In addition, one MP, although in a half sentence at the very end of a report, mentioned

the necessity of facing terrorism with knowledge and education, nevertheless coupling

them with security (Eissa and Lasheen, 2017). This benevolent and forward thinking

approach to addressing “terrorism” as a social phenomenon rather than an exclusively

security situation exemplifies the PJ approach. During his visit to Ismailia governorate,

where most families and their children fled, Minister of Culture Helmy Al-Namnam said

that “these children are the future, and what we have seen from their artistic creations is

Egypt's soft power” (Ibrahim and Bahig, 2017).

In Youm7, Bishop Daniel of Maadi emphasized that the church's relationship with the

state is (ideally) based on the basic principles of the developed countries which is the

separation of religion from the state. He adds that when religion interferes with the state,

“this weakens religion and affect the state” (Allam, 2017). This can be seen as an implicit

critique of the state’s religious identity which is predominantly Islamic and thereby

perceives Christians and “others.” Such opinions in the media, particularly from Christian

clergy governed by the Coptic church are considered anathema. Most public

pronouncements from church officials are overly cautious and deny any institutional

discrimination against Christians.

Despite the grim nature of coverage of sectarian conflict particularly in these two cases

in the governmental and private news media, there were a handful of exceptional, albeit

infrequent, instances of peace journalism being inadvertently observed in both

newspapers. If built upon these examples can become a promising approach to the

address of highlight combustible situations such as sectarian violence.

Limitations of Peace Journalism in Egypt

Violation of freedom of speech remains the number one obstacle for all reporters and

attempt at challenging the norms of news reporting in Egypt. According to the Committee

to Protect Journalists (2017), Egypt is ranked the third worst jailer of journalists in the

43

world. An anti-terror law passed in 2015 criminalizes any reporting that strays from

official accounts. Ismail al-Iskandarani, a prominent Sinai researcher and journalist, was

arrested in December 2015 on charges of spreading false news and being a member of

the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. The charge of spreading “fake news” is currently a

powerful instrument in the hands of the government which they can use in draconian

ways to repress (Michaelson, 2018). Thus, deviation from the official line on any incident

related to violence is both a challenge and a risk.

In addition, initiatives offering alternative or peaceful solutions are rare. Non-

governmental organizations are being shut down, and activists are being silenced or

arrested. The new NGO law issued by Sisi in May 2017 “making it impossible for them to

function independently.” The law prohibits NGOs from conducting activities that “harm

national security, public order, public morality, or public health,” which are “vague terms

that can be abused to constrain legitimate activity” (Human Rights Watch, 2017).

The regime itself, and its President Sisi (himself the former Minister of Defence and

Head of Military Intelligence), are holistically militarized. Violence is a characteristic of

the state, and is most often initiated by it. Moreover, the violence a modus operandi for

military men, has effectively become a regime maintenance mechanism. Violence is not

an outgrowth but rather a tool that facilitates the very existence of the regime, with the

case in point being the very coup d’etat which brought the military complex to the

executive office. The use of that violence is given rhetorical cover by a war journalism

which constitutes a growing majority of the state and private media in Egypt. The need

for an interruption of this trend and the enshrinement of a new model of reporting which

can alleviate the impetus for violence could not be more urgent today.

Conclusion

War journalism is the prevailing mode of covering conflict in Egypt. This is explicitly

evident in the reporting of sectarian circumstances in the country. Omission or

marginalization in reporting is the norm; different parts of the story which deserve more

attention are routinely missed or systematically obfuscated. The media depict the state,

44

its military, and the Church as paternalistic over the larger Coptic community, thus

leaving Copts in need of salvation from these institutions. Neither public nor private

newspapers pave the path for tolerance and acceptance in the community, nor do they

present an exit for sectarianism in Egypt. Both failed to elaborate that violence begets

violence. This doesn't leave room for an open discussion about issues such as social

responsibility, policy, or education, which in turn provide alternative solutions and peace-

oriented methods to avoid future violence. The typical approach of turning backs on the

problems facing Christian Egyptians will not make them disappear.

With the revolution of 2011 opening the door for people to be more outspoken, and the

2013 military regime painting itself as a friend to Egypt’s Christians, the Coptic

community has become more outspoken. This is evident in their refusal of typical

reconciliation sessions and condemnation of security laxity and neglect. Nevertheless, it

was religious clerics, rather than lay people, who spoke in the name of the community.

They were consistent with the Church’s tone of supporting the state, alongside praise for

the president and the pope, regardless of the miniscule change in Copts’ affairs since

Sisi’s reign. The old practices of denying sectarianism and blaming external factors for

every violent incident saturate the media. All conflict resolution is short-lived and tainted

with securitization. A Copt is still portrayed as a second-class citizen. Even though

people complain about discrimination taking place for years, these tales of terror are not

reported until things escalate into violence and only when they serve to reinforce the

benevolence or messianic role of the state.

While Peace Journalism (PJ), the model examined in this study, was a product of, and

mainly addresses, wars, its concepts can be applied to other types of conflict with the

hope of helping alleviate them. Anchored on pluralism and diversity, this model would

have positive effects on the general public. It is designed to contribute to public

understanding of the wider world and to the vitality of community discussion. PJ looks

beyond immediate news impulses and considers the responsibility that journalism has to

support long-term solutions. While the media scene may not seem promising, this model

can be beneficial for many societal and political contesting parties in Egypt beyond

interfaith relations: LGBTQ+, women’s rights, political opponents such as the Muslim

Brotherhood, marginalized groups, and minorities. The diversity of voices in online

spaces and digital communities--begotten by the 2011 revolution--make the possibilities

45

of a novel Peace Journalism possible by making available alternative t forms of reporting

and a greater array of voices.

Even though there is a general sense of defeat among Egypt’s youth and

revolutionaries, the change the protests starting in 2011 promised can be fulfilled

through social change and a pluralistic Egyptian identity rather than a radical reform of

the state system. A few lines in a report, the odd article, a journalist truly believing that

they have agency, might seem like small steps, but given the status quo, they are giant

strides in the direction of a more peaceful future.

46

References Abdallah, R. (2015). Media Diversity in Egypt: Monitoring Newspapers and Talk Shows During

the First Post- Revolution Parliamentary Elections. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Abdallah, R. (2016, May 28). Sekerteer Al Mogama' Al Moqadas Yosheed Bi Ta'amol Al-

Anba Macarius Ma' Azmat Al-Minya. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2016/5/28/ -سكرتیر -المجمع -المقدس -یشید -بتعامل -األنبا -مكاریوس -مع

-أزمة المنیا /2736885

Abdel Aziz, M. (2016, December 29). Al-Minya.. Qora Al Daw' Wal Lahab. Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/News/202507/1151/630009/ -دنیا/المنیا -قرى

-الضوء واللھب -.aspx

Abdel Galil, H. (2016, May 27). Raees Lagnet Al-Tadamon Bel Barlaman: Saad'oo Sayyedat Al-Minya Li Zeyaret Al-Magles Lel 'Etezar Laha. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2016/5/27/ -رئیس -لجنة -التضامن -بالبرلمان -سأدعو -سیدة -المنیا -لزیارة

-المجلس لالعتذار /2736264

Abdel Ghaffar, H. (2016, June 2). Fi Ahdath Qaryet Al-Karm.. 20 Naeban Yaltaqoon Al Sayyeda Souad Thabet Bel Motraneya. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2016/6/2/ -فى -أحداث -قریة -الكرم 20- -نائبا -یلتقون -السیدة -سعاد 2745192/ثابت

Abdel Ghaffar, H. (2016, June 7). Nowasel Nashr Aqwal Al Seyyeda Souad Sahebat Waqe'at Al Ta'ari Wa Zawgaha Bi Qaryet Al-Karm Amam Neyabat Al-Minya. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2016/6/7/ -نواصل -نشر -أقوال -السیدة

-سعاد -صاحبة -واقعة -التعرى -وزوجھا بقریة /2751071

Abdel Ghaffar, H. (2016, May 26). Bel Video Wa Al Sowar.. Al Hodoo' Ya'ood Ila Qaryet Al-Karm Bel Minya. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2016/5/26/ -بالفیدیو -والصور -الھدوء -یعود -إلى -قریة -الكرم -بالمنیا

-واألھالى یؤكدون /2734910

Abdel Ghaffar, H. (2016, May 27). 'Odw Bi Beyt Al 'Aela Al-Masreyya Men Al-Karm Bel Minya: Ma Hadath La Yaqbalho Deen Wala Insaneyya. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2016/5/27/ -عضو -ببیت -العائلة -المصریة -من -الكرم -بالمنیا -ما -حدث 2735921/ال

Abdel Rady, M. (2017, February 25). Ba'd Hadeth Aqbat Al-Arish.. Masader: Qowat Infath Al Qanoon Tokafeh Al Irhab Wa Todared Flooloh. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2017/2/25/ -بعد -حادث -أقباط -العریش -مصادر -قوات -إنفاذ -القانون

-تكافح اإلرھاب /3118534

Abdel Rady, M. (2017, February 27). Al-Agheza Al Amneya Tath'ar Li Dema' Al Aqbat Fi Shamal Sina W Tadbot Al Moshtabah Behom. Youm7. Retrieved from

47

https://www.youm7.com/story/2017/2/27/ -األجھزة -األمنیة -تثأر -لدماء -األقباط -فى -شمال -سیناء-وتضبط مشتبھ /3120991

Abdel Rahman, A. (2017, April 13). Considering Converting to Another Religion in Egypt? Think Again. Raseef 22. Retrieved from https://raseef22.com/en/life/2017/04/13/thinking-converting-another-religion-egypt-think/

Abdulla, R. (2014). EGYPT’S MEDIA IN THE MIDST OF REVOLUTION(Rep.). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/files/egypt_media_revolution.pdf.

Aboulenein, A., & Fahmy, O. (2016, May 30). In Egyptian village, attack on Christian grandmother fuels anger. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-violence/in-egyptian-village-attack-on-christian-grandmother-fuels-anger-idUSKCN0YL1W9

Al-Anba Macarius Motran Al-Minya Wa Abu Qurqas: Al Mokhte' La Bodd An Yo'aqab.. Wal Kalema Al An Lel Qanoon Wal Qadaa'. (2016, June 2). Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/520276.aspx

Al-Anba Rafael Ta'leeqan Ala "Tagreed Sayyeda Maseeheyya Men Malabesiha": Ma Howa Al Hadath Al Wageb Ma'aho Iqalet Mohafez Aw Ay Mas'ool. (2016, May 26). Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/982754.aspx

Al-Gali, M. (2016, May 26). Al-Sisi Yowageh Bi Mohasabet Al-Motasabebeen Fi Ahdath Al-Minya Wa Eslah Al Monsha'at Al Motadarera. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2016/5/26/ -السیسي -یوجھ -بمحاسبة -المتسببین -فى -أحداث -المنیا

-وإصالح -المنشآت المتضررة /2735020

Al-Husseiny, H., & Al-Shahat, S. (2016, June 2). Hata La Yankashef Satr Masr: Al-Ahram Tatahara Haqeeqat Ma Gara Fi Qaryet Al-Karm. Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/520269.aspx

Al-Husseiny, H. (2016, May 27). Al-Ahram Dakhel Qaryat Al-Karm Bel Minya Shae'a .. Wal Motarabesoon Yoshe'loon Al Niran. Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/518136.aspx

Al-Husseiny, H. (2016, May 28). Ahali Al-Karm: Hasebo Al-Motawareteen Wa La Tathbaho Al Qarya. Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/News/181916/29/518217/ -المحافظات/أھالى -»الكرم« -حاسبوا

-المتورطین -وال -تذبحوا یةالقر .aspx

Allam, S., & Abdel Ghaffar, H. (2016, May 30). Bel Sowar.. Ba'd 'Etethar Al-Sisi L Sayedat Al-Minya: "Argo Ala Ta'khoth Ala Khaterha Memma Hadath". Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2016/5/30/ -بالصور -بعد -اعتذار -السیسي -لسیدة

-المنیا -جوأر -أال -تأخذ على /2740081

48

Allam, S. (2016, May 25). Asqf Al-Minya: Shae'a Bi Wogood Elaqa Bayn Maseehy Wa Moslema Wara' Ahdath Qaryet Al-Karm. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2016/5/25/ -أسقف -المنیا -شائعة -بوجود -عالقة -بین -مسیحى -ومسلمة

-وراء اثأحد /2733848

Allam, S. (2016, May 25). Ghadab Fi Al Awsat Al Maseeheyya Ba'd Harq Manazel Aqbat Wa Tagreed Mosenna Men Malabeseha. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2016/5/25/ -غضب -فى -األوساط -المسیحیة -بعد -حرق -منازل -أقباط

-وتجرید مسنة /2733909

Allam, S. (2016, May 27). Asqof Al-Minya Li "Al-Sisi": Shokran Li Tadakholokom Wa Ta'kidakom Ala Karmet Al-Mowaten Al-Masry. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2016/5/27/ -أسقف -المنیا -لـ -السیسى -شكرا -لتدخلكم -وتأكیدكم -على

-كرامة المواطن /2735701

Allam, S. (2017, March 1). Al Baba Tawadros 'An Aqbat Al-Arish: Ta'beer Tahgeer Marfoud Tamaman. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2017/3/1/ -البابا -تواضروس -عن -أقباط -العریش -تعبیر -تھجیر -مرفوض 3124927/تماًما

Al Masry Lel Sho'oon Al Kharegeyya: Ahdath Al-Arish Tatawor Khateer Fi Harb Masr Ala Al Irhab. (2017, February 26). Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2017/2/26/ -المصرى -للشئون -الخارجیة -أحداث -العریش -تطور -خطیر

-فى -حرب مصر /3120130

An Elusive Virtue, edited by David Heyd, 81-105. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS

FREEDOM(Rep.). (2015). Retrieved from http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/USCIRF Annual Report 2015 (2).pdf

Anz, M., Abu Al-Dahab, G., & Al-Morsi, A. (2016, May 26). Al-Qowa Al-Seyaseya: Ma Hadath Fi Al-Minya Gareema Akhlaqeyya.. Wa Lan Toather Ala Al Wehda Al Wataneyya. Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/News/181914/136/517961/ -متابعات/القوى -السیاسیة -ما -حدث -فى

-المنیا -جریمة أخالقیة ولن-- .aspx

Arafa, A. (2016, May 30). Al Naeba Margaret Azer: Al-Sisi Rafa' Al Rouh Al Ma'naweyya Li Sayyedet Al-Minya Wa Sayyedat Masr. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2016/5/30/ -النائبة -مارجریت -عازر -السیسى -رفع -الروح -المعنویة

-لسیدة -المنیا وسیدات /2740422

Arafa, A. (2017, February 27). Ba7eth: Safaqat Al Ikhwan Ma' Al Irhabeyyeen Fi Sina Bi 'Ahd Al-Ma'zoul To'aked Ertebatohom Bi Daesh. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2017/2/27/ -باحث -صفقات -اإلخوان -مع -اإلرھابیین -فى -سیناء -بعھد

-المعزول تؤكد /3120277

Atton, C. (2002) Alternative Media. London: Sage.

49

Aziz, S. (n.d.). De-securitizing counterterrorism in the Sinai Peninsula. BROOKINGS.

Aziz, S. (n.d.). De-securitizing counterterrorism in the Sinai Peninsula. BROOKINGS.

Azzam, M. (2017, February 17). Bel Sowar.. Port Said Tastadeef 5 Osar Qebteya Qadema Men Al-Arish. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2017/2/27/ -بالصور -بورسعید -تستضیف 5- -أُسر -قبطیة -قادمة -من

-العریش التضامن /3121821

Bel Video.. Mokalamat Al Baba Tawadros Li Sayyedat Hadeth Al-Minya. (2016, May 27). Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2016/5/27/ -بالفیدیو -مكالمة -البابا -تواضروس

-لسیدة -حادث المنیا /2736097

Curran, J. (2005). What Democracy Requires of the Media. In G. Overhosler & K. H. Jamieson (Eds.), The press. Egypt's Islamist parties win elections to parliament. (2012, January 21). BBC. Retrieved

from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16665748

Egypt's Islamist parties win elections to parliament. (2012, January 21). BBC. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16665748

Egypt drops investigation into mob attack on Christian woman. (2017, January 16). The New Arab. Retrieved from https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2017/1/16/egypt-drops-investigation-into-mob-attack-on-christian-woman

Egypt drops investigation into mob attack on Christian woman. (2017, January 16). The New Arab. Retrieved from https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2017/1/16/egypt-drops-investigation-into-mob-attack-on-christian-woman

Eissa, A., & Lasheen, S. (2017, February 27). Al- Barlaman Yodeen A7dath Al-Arish. Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/580935.aspx

ElDeeb, S. (2017, March 30). Bel Sowar.. Modeer Amn Al-Daqahleyya Yazoor Al Osar Al Maseeheya Al Qadema Men Al-Arish Ila Al-Mansoura. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2017/3/30/ -بالصور -مدیر -أمن -الدقھلیة -یزور -األسر -المسیحیة -القادمة

-من العریش /3168076

Ellis, M. (2018, July 20). THE BEDOUIN PEOPLE WHO BLUR THE BOUNDARIES OF EGYPTIAN IDENTITY. Zocalo Public Square. Retrieved August 7, 2018, from http://www.zocalopublicsquare.org/2018/07/20/bedouin-people-blur-boundaries-egyptian-identity/ideas/essay/

Ellis, M. (2018, July 20). THE BEDOUIN PEOPLE WHO BLUR THE BOUNDARIES OF EGYPTIAN IDENTITY. Zocalo Public Square. Retrieved August 7, 2018, from http://www.zocalopublicsquare.org/2018/07/20/bedouin-people-blur-boundaries-egyptian-identity/ideas/essay/

50

Fakhri, N. (2017, February 26). Bel Sowar.. Alaa Abed: Al Amn Yakshef Intema' Ba'd Irhabi Gabal Al-Halal Le Dowal Mogawra. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2017/2/26/ -بالصور -عالء -عابد -األمن -اكتشف -انتماء -بعض -إرھابیى

-جبل الحالل /3119375

Fakhry, N. (2016, May 28). A'da' Al Barlaman Yabhathoon Tashkeel Wafd Le Zeyaret "Sayyedet Al-Minya" Lemo'azateha. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2016/5/28/ -أعضاء -البرلمان -یبحثون -تشكیل -وفد -لزیارة -سیدة -المنیا

-لمؤازرتھا بكرى /2736539

Fi Howar Ma' Mohafez Al-Minya: Al-Qanoun Sayonafaz .. Sayonafaz.. Fa La Ahad Fawq Al-Qanoun. (2016, June 3). Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsPrint/520275.aspx

Freedman, D., Obar, J., Martens, C., & McChesney, R. W. (2016). Strategies for Media Reform: International Perspectives. New York: Fordham University Press.

Ghanem, S. (2017, February 24). Al-Ismailia Tastaqbel 38 Osra Maseeheyya Ba'd Tahdeedat Takfeereyyeen Bel Arish. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2017/2/24/ -اإلسماعیلیة -تستقبل 38- -أسرة -مسیحیة -بعد -تھدیدات

-تكفیریین بالعریش /3117300

Gohood Hokoomia Mokathafa Le Esti'ab Al Osar Al Wafeda Men Al-Arish. (n.d.). Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/580883.aspx

Guirguis, G., & Abdallah, R. (2016, May 30). Al-Anba Macarius: Asdeqa' Al Omam Al Motaheda Ekhtarat Souad Thabet Li Gaezat Al-Salam 2016. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2016/5/30/ -األنبا -مكاریوس -أصدقاء -األمم -المتحدة -اختارت

-سعاد -ثابت -لجائزة السالم /2739708

Hackett, R., & Carroll, W. (2006). Remaking Media. Oxford: Routledge. Hackett, R. (2006). Is PJ possible?. Conflict and Communication Online.

Hall, S. (1980). Encoding/decoding. London: Hutchinson.

Hamdi, S., & Al-Ghoul, M. (2016, May 30). Bel Video.. Al-Sisi: Waqe'at Sayedat Al-Minya La Taleeq Bi Masr Wa Mohasabat Gamee' Al-Motawareteen. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2016/5/30/ -بالفیدیو -لسیسيا -واقعة -سیدة -المنیا -ال -تلیق -بمصر

-ومحاسبة جمیع /2739622

Hanna, M. W. (2016). THE PREDICAMENT OF EGYPT’S COPTS. Public Orthodoxy. Retrieved from https://publicorthodoxy.org/2016/12/14/cairo-bombing-copts/

51

Haragy, G. (2017, February 24). Mohafez Al-Ismailia: Nastadeef 30 Osra Men Aqbat Al-Arish Wa B Imkanahom Al 'Awda Fi Ay Waqt. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2017/2/24/ -محافظ -اإلسماعیلیة -نستضیف 30- -أسرة -من -أقباط

-العریش -وبإمكانھم العودة /3117414

Haragy, G. (2017, March 1). Bel Sowar.. Mamish Wa Taher Yatafaqadan Mo'askar Al-Qersh Lel Etme'nan Ala Al Osar Al Qebteya. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2017/3/1/ -بالصور -ممیش -و -طاھر -یتفقدان -معسكر -القرش -لإلطمئنان

-على األسر /3124502

Hassan, H., Qotb, N., & Gamal ElDeen, H. (2017, March 6). 'Aqb Khoroogohom Men Al-Arish Hekayat Ma Ba'ad Al Raheel. Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/582121.aspx

Hassan, H., Qotb, N., & Gamal ElDeen, H. (n.d.). Hekayat Ma Ba'd Al Raheel 2.

Hesham, A. (2017, February 27). Bel Sowar.. Monaqaba Dakhel Al Kanisa Lel Osar Al Qadema Men Al-Arish: Ha'meloko 'Ads 'Ashan El Seyam. Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/1396224.aspx

Human Rights Watch. (2016, September 15). Egypt: New Church Law Discriminates Against Christians[Press release]. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/15/egypt-new-church-law-discriminates-against-christians

Human Rights Watch. (2017, June 2). Egypt: New Law Will Crush Civil Society[Press release]. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/02/egypt-new-law-will-crush-civil-society

Human Rights Watch. (2017, June 2). Egypt: New Law Will Crush Civil Society[Press release]. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/02/egypt-new-law-will-crush-civil-society

Ibrahim, S., & Bahig, Y. (2017, March 14). Wazeer Al Thaqafa: Ma Yahdoth Fe Sina Gomla E'teradeyya..Wa Ebda' Al Atfal Howa Qowatna Al Na'ema. Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/583396.aspx

Ibrahim, S. (2017, March 2). Mamish Khelal Zeyarataho Lel Wafedeen Men Sina: Al Erhab Fashal Fe Taqseem Al-Masryeen. Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/581434.aspx

Ibrahim, S. (2017, March 4). Khelal Zeyaret Lagnet Hoqooq Al Insan Bel Barlaman Lel Mohafza Mohafez Al-Ismailia: Nastadeef Osar Al-Arish Leheen Esteqrar Al-Awda'. Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/581732.aspx

Ibrahim, S. (n.d.). Al-Ismailia Togahez Shoqaq Al Wafedeen Men Al-Arish. Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/582181.aspx

52

Ibrahim, S. (n.d.). Lagnata Al Iskan Wal Tadamon Bel Barlaman Ma' Al Wafedeen Men Al-Arish. Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/581615.aspx

Keeble, R., Tulloch, J., & Zollmann, F. (2010). Peace Journalism, War, and Conflict Resolution. Peter Lang Publishing.

Kepel, G. (2000). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Éditions Gallimard, Harvard University

Press. Khater, A., & Youssef, S. (n.d.). Tasleem Al-Aqbat Wathaefahom Al Gadeeda Bel

Ismailia. Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/581816.aspx

Knobloch, K. R. (2014). Public Sphere Alienation. Routledge. Kymlicka, W. (1996). Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance. Toleration: An Elusive

Virtue.

Lynch, J., & McGoldrick, A. (2005). Peace Journalism. Stroud: Hawthorn Press.

Lynch, J. (1998). The Peace Journalism Option. Taplow: Conflict and Peace Forums.

Lynch, J. (2014). A Global Standard for Reporting Conflict. Routledge. M., R. (2016, September 19). Who are the Nubians? The Economist. Retrieved August

7, 2018, from https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2016/09/19/who-are-the-nubians

M., R. (2016, September 19). Who are the Nubians? The Economist. Retrieved August 7, 2018, from https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2016/09/19/who-are-the-nubians

Mahmood, S. (2012). Religious Freedom, the Minority Question, and Geopolitics in the Middle East. Comparative Studies in Society and History 2012;54(2):418–446.

Mahmood, S. (n.d.). Religious freedom, minority rights, and geopolitics. The Immanent Frame. Retrieved from https://tif.ssrc.org/2012/03/05/religious-freedom-minority-rights-and-geopolitics/

Makari, P. E. (2007). Conflict & Cooperation Christian-Muslim Relations in Contemporary Egypt. New York: Syracuse University Press.

Malak, K. (2013, January 25). Playing the Numbers Game: Copts and the Exercise of Power. Jadaliyya. Retrieved from http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/27903/Playing-the-Numbers-Game-Copts-and-the-Exercise-of-Power

Malak, K. (2017). The ‘Minority Question in Egypt’ and the Bounds of Nationalism: Testing the Limits of the Nation. Arab Reform Initiative.

Marwan: Taskeen 154 Osra Masreya Maseehya Ghadarat Al-Arish Fi 7 Moahafazat. (2017, March 1). Al-Ahram.

53

Matheson, D., & Allan, S. (2010). Social networks and the reporting of conflict. In R. L. Keeble, J. Tulloch, & F. Zollmann (Eds.), Peace journalism, war and conflict resolution (pp. 173-192). UK: Peter Lang.

Michaelson, R. (2018, July 27). 'Fake news' becomes tool of repression after Egypt passes new law. The Gaurdian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jul/27/fake-news-becomes-tool-of-repression-after-egypt-passes-new-law

Michaelson, R. (2018, July 27). 'Fake news' becomes tool of repression after Egypt passes new law. The Gaurdian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jul/27/fake-news-becomes-tool-of-repression-after-egypt-passes-new-law

Mobasher, B. (n.d.). Amer: Lagna Barlamaneya Tazoor Al-Arish Lel Woqoof Ala Haqeeqat Al-Awda'. Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/580956.aspx

Mohasabat Al-Mo'tadeen Ala Sayedat Al-Minya Mahma Yakon Adadhom. (2016, May 30). Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/519578.aspx

Momen, M. (1985). An Introduction to Shi`i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi`ism. New York: Yale University Press.

Mostafa, A. (2017, February 27). Al Qems Bolis Oweida: Masr Satathal Mowahada Bel Mahaba Wal Tasamoh.. Wa Na'bod Ilahan Wahedan. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2017/2/27/ -القمص -بولس -عویضة -مصر -ستظل -موحدة -بالمحبة

-والتسامح -ونعبد إلًھا /3120201

News Coverage Prepared for: The European Union to Egypt(Rep.). (2011). Ipsos. Retrieved June 20, 2018, from http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/egypt/documents/semc/20111120_en.pdf

Parvaz, D. (2011, November 27). Egypt's Copts view election with concern. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/11/2011112274857809334.html

Prosecution suspends investigations into assault of Coptic woman in Minya. (2017, January 15). Mada Masr. Retrieved June 20, 2018, from https://www.madamasr.com/en/2017/01/15/news/u/prosecution-suspends-investigations-into-assault-of-coptic-woman-in-minya/

Qassem, I. (2016, May 31). Al-Adl Taftah Maktab Mosa'ada Qanooneyya Li Monahadat Al 'Onf Dedd Al-Mar'a Bel Minya. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2016/5/31/ -العدل -تفتح -مكتب -مساعدة -قانونیة -لمناھضة -العنف -ضد

-المرأة بالمنیا /2740814

54

Ragheb, M. (2018, February 28). Al Qowa Al 'Amla: Taleem 40 'Aqd 'Amal Lel Aqbat Al Mohadereen Sina Bel Ismailia. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2017/2/28/ -القوى -العاملة -تسلیم 40- -عقد -عمل -لألقباط -المغادرین

-سیناء سماعیلیةباإل /3123195

Reda, M., & Abdallah, R. (2016, May 27). Amr Moussa Yodeen Hadeth Al-Minya Wa Yotaleb Bi Sore't Tatbeeq Al Qanoon. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2016/5/27/ -عمرو -موسى -یدین -حادث -المنیا -ویطالب -بسرعة -تطبیق 2736123/القانون

Reda, M. (2016, May 26). "Mostaqbal Watan" Yoshakel Wafdan Men Nowaboh Wa A'da'oh Lel Mosahama Fi Hal Azmet Sayedet Al-Minya. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2016/5/26/ -مستقبل -وطن -یشكل -وفدا -من -نوابھ -وأعضائھ -للمساھمة-فى حل /2735145

Sadeq, A. (2017, January 4). Al Baba Tawadros Fi Howaraho Lel Ahram: Farhat Milad Al-Maseeh Akbar Men Ay Hozn Wa Al Raees Awfa Bi Wa'daho Wa Tam Tarmeem Al-Kanaes. Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/1367448.aspx

Saeed, R. (2016, May 27). Na'eb: Al-Mogtama' Al-Masry Bi Kol Tawa'efaho La Yaqbal Ma Ta'aradat Laho Sayedat Al-Minya Men Ihana. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2016/5/27/ -نائب -المجتمع -المصرى -بكل -طوائفھ -ال -یقبل -ما -تعرضت 2736205/لھ

Sedra, P. (2011, March 10). Why Coptic Protest Is Good for Egypt [Web log post]. Retrieved from http://thawrathoughts.blogspot.com/2011/03/why-coptic-protest-is-good-for-egypt.html

Sedra, P. (2011, March 10). Why Coptic Protest Is Good for Egypt [Web log post]. Retrieved from http://thawrathoughts.blogspot.com/2011/03/why-coptic-protest-is-good-for-egypt.html

Sedra, P. (2011). Sectarianism and the Revolution. Jadaliyya. Retrieved from http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/24494/Sectarianism-and-the-Revolution

Sedra, P. (2012, September 9). Islamists Took Over Years Ago. Jadaliyya. Retrieved from http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/27034/Islamists-Took-Over-Years-Ago

Sedra, P. (2012). Copts and the Power over Personal Status. Jadaliyya. Retrieved from http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/27530/Copts-and-the-Power-over-Personal-Status

Sedra, P. (2012). Time to Reject the Language of Coptic Victimhood. Jadaliyya. Retrieved from http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/26844/Time-to-Reject-the-Language-of-Coptic-Victimhood

55

Sedra, P. (2013, August 18). From citizen to problem: The new Coptic tokenism. Mada Masr. Retrieved from https://www.madamasr.com/en/2013/08/18/opinion/u/from-citizen-to-problem-the-new-coptic-tokenism/

Sedra, P. (2013). Has Citizenship Got a Future in Egypt? Jadaliyya. Retrieved from http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/28401/Has-Citizenship-Got-a-Future-in-Egypt

Sedra, P. (2014, May 23). Quick Thoughts: Paul Sedra on the Pope’s Visit to the Middle East. Jadaliyya. Retrieved from http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/30702/Quick-Thoughts-Paul-Sedra-on-the-Pope’s-Visit-to-the-Middle-East

Selim, A., & AlSharif, H. (2017, February 27). 55 Osra Qebtya B Sinai Tastadeefahom 'Aelat Moslema. Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/580948.aspx

Selim, A., & Al-Sharif, H. (2017, March 16). Ta'weed Ahali Sina Al Modareen Bel Erhab. Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/583679.aspx

Serlin, I.A. (2006). Psychological Effects of the Virtual Media Coverage of the Iraq War. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Shehata, N., Ibrahim, S., Negeela, B., Zamzam, H., Khater, A., & Youssef, S. (2017, February 27). Al-Ra'ees Al-Sisi Yowageh Bi Tawfeer Shoqaq Sakania Mogahaza Lel Osar Al Wafeda Men Shamal Sina Ila Al-Ismailia. Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/580941.aspx

Shehata, N. (2017, March 11). Al Ta'leem: E'faa' Al Tolab Al Mohawaleen Men Al Masroofat Al Deraseyya. Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/583213.aspx

Shenoda, A. (2011, May 18). Reflections on the (In)Visibility of Copts in Egypt. Jadaliyya. Retrieved from http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/24007/Reflections-on-the-InVisibility-of-Copts-in-Egypt

Shinar, D., & Kempf, W. (2007). Peace Journalism: The State of the Art. Berlin: Regener.

Shoemaker, P. & Reese, S. D. (1996). Mediating the Message: Theories of influences on mass media content (2nd edition). White Plains, NY: Longman.

Shooman, M. (2017, March 4). Al Shorta Tolaheq Al-Anaser Al-Erhabya Bel Arish. Al-

Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/581691.aspx

Stanely, T. (2005, July 15). Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism. The Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved August 7, 2018, from https://jamestown.org/program/understanding-the-origins-of-wahhabism-and-salafism/

56

Stanely, T. (2005, July 15). Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism. The Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved August 7, 2018, from https://jamestown.org/program/understanding-the-origins-of-wahhabism-and-salafism/

Tadros, M. (2010, March 5). The Sectarian Incident That Won't Go Away. Middle East Research and Information Project. Retrieved from https://www.merip.org/mero/mero030510

Tadros, M. (2010, October 13). Behind Egypt's Deep Red Lines. Middle East Research and Information Project. Retrieved from https://www.merip.org/mero/mero101310

Tadros, M. (2011, January 11). A State of Sectarian Denial. Middle East Research and Information Project. Retrieved from https://www.merip.org/mero/mero011111

Tadros, M. (2016, June 14). Egypt’s Post-Arab Spring Transition: The Challenges of Social Pluralism. Speech, Zurich. Retrieved from http://middle-east-minorities.com/events/egypts-post-arab-spring-transition-the-challenges-of-social-pluralism/

Tadros, S. (2016, December 17). The Actual War on Christians. The Atlantic. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/12/egypt-copts-muslim-christian-isis/511007/

The website for more information on Bahai’ faith can be found at http://www.bahai.org/

W. A. and Modigliani, A. (1989). Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach. American Journal of Sociology. The University of Chicago Press

Wahba, M., & Ghanem, S. (2017, March 11). Bel Sowar.. Wazeerat Al Tadamon Tosalem Al Osar Al Qebteya Al Montaqela Men Al-Arish 48 Shaqqa Bel Ismalia. Youm7. Retrieved from https://www.youm7.com/story/2017/3/11/ -بالصور -وزیرة

-التضامن -تسلم -األسر -القبطیة -المنتقلة -من العریش -48/3139013

Walsh, D. (2017, April 28). A Hidden Church in Cairo Pins Its Hopes on Good Will From the Pope’s Visit. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/28/world/middleeast/cairo-pope-churches.html?smid=tw-share

Youm7. (n.d.). Retrieved June 20, 2018, from https://www.youm7.com/AboutUs

Zalata, S. (2017, March 5). 6 Tawgeehat Lel Ra'ees Khelal Egtema'ho Ams Bi Ra'ees Al Wozaraa' Wa Kibar Al Mas'ooleen. Al-Ahram. Retrieved from http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/581978.aspx