The Role of Italian Fighter Aircraft in Crisis Management Operations ...

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Vincenzo Camporini, Tommaso De Zan,Alessandro Marrone, Michele Nones,

Alessandro R. Ungaro

THE ROLE OF ITALIANFIGHTER AIRCRAFT INCRISIS MANAGEMENTOPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS

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V. Camporini, T. D

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The IAI Research Papers are brief monographs written by one or more authors (IAI or external experts) on current problems of inter-national politics and international relations. The aim is to promote greater and more up to date knowledge of emerging issues and trends and help prompt public debate.

A non-pro�t organization, IAI was founded in 1965 by Altiero Spinelli, its �rst director.The Institute aims to promote understanding of international politics through research, promotion of political ideas and strategies, disse-mination of knowledge and education in the �eld of foreign policy.IAI main research sectors are: European institutions and policies; Italian foreign policy; trends in the global economy and internationa-lisation processes in Italy; the Mediterranean and the Middle East; defence economy and policy; and transatlantic relations.

Italian combat aircraft have played an increasing important role in the international missions in which Italy has participated in the post-Cold War era – from the First Gulf War to Libya, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan. This participation has been a signi�cant tool of Italy's defense policy, and therefore of its foreign policy towards crisis areas relevant to its national interests (from the Western Balkans to the Mediterranean), as well as towards its most important allies within NATO and the EU. This IAI publication analyses the role of these military capabilities in recent operations and their prospects for the future. In fact, a number of trends can be inferred from the operational experience in ten international missions, in which Italy deployed more than 100 combat aircraft in more than 13,000 sorties, clocking up 36,000 �ight hours. These trends are considered in light of the recent developments in the doctrine of Air Power, as well as possible future scenarios for the use of combat aircraft in crisis theaters. The aim of the analysis is to understand the needs of the Italian Armed Forces – the Air Force and Navy in particular – which will have to replace a substantial portion of their current combat �eets in the near future due to the gradual obsolescence of the aircraft in service – an operational necessity linked to the inevitable political decisions regarding the options available in the �eld of military procurement for maintaining the capabilities required so far for international missions. In this context, the study looks into the acquisition of F-35 aircraft, also considering the industrial aspects of a multinational program that will produce more than 3,000 units for over 12 countries.

Vincenzo Camporini is Vice President of IAITommaso De Zan was intern in the Security and Defence Programme at IAIAlessandro Marrone is Researcher in the Security and Defence Programme at IAIMichele Nones is Head of the Security and Defence Programme at IAIAlessandro R. Ungaro is Research Assistant in the Security and Defence Programme at IAI

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N. 16 The Role of Italian Fighter Aircraft in Crisis Management Operations: Trends and Needs, Vincenzo Camporini, Tommaso De Zan, Alessandro Marrone, Michele Nones, Alessandro R. Ungaro, 2014

ISSN 2239-2122

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IAI Research Papers

The Role of Italian Fighter Aircraft in Crisis Management Operations:

Trends and Needs

Vincenzo Camporini, Tommaso De Zan, Alessandro Marrone, Michele Nones, Alessandro R. Ungaro

Edizioni Nuova Cultura

SeriesEditorNatalinoRonzitti _________________________ First published in March 2014 by Edizioni Nuova Cultura For Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) Via Angelo Brunetti 9 - I-00186 Roma www.iai.it Copyright©2014EdizioniNuovaCultura‐RomaISBN:9788868123291Cover:byFrancescaMinnocciGraphicComposition:byLucaMozzicarelli Theunauthorizedreproductionofthisbook,evenpartial,carriedoutbyanymeans,includingphotocopying,evenforinternalordidacticuse,isprohibitedbycopyright.

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Table of Contents

ExecutiveSummary........................................................................................................................9Preface...............................................................................................................................................23ListofAcronyms.............................................................................................................................271. Italy’sparticipationincrisismanagementoperations:fighteraircraft’s

role................................................................................................................................................31

1.1. Iraq(1990‐1991)........................................................................................................311.2. Bosnia‐Herzegovina 1993‐1998 .......................................................................351.3. Kosovo(1999)..............................................................................................................421.4. Afghanistan(2001‐2014)........................................................................................471.5. Libya(2011)..................................................................................................................531.6. TheroleofItalianfighteraircraftincrisismanagementopera‐

tions...................................................................................................................................592. Currentandfutureairoperations:doctrineandtrends......................................65

2.1. AirPower:doctrine’sfundamentals...................................................................652.2. Trendsfromtherecentoperationalexperience............................................69

3. Scenariosofpossiblefutureairoperations...............................................................73

3.1. Establishing and enforcing a No‐Fly Zone: “Protect Turians”scenario............................................................................................................................74

3.1.1Strategiccontext...............................................................................................74 3.1.2Missionobjectives............................................................................................75 3.1.3Criticalfactorsoftheoperationalenvironment.................................76 3.1.4Adversary’scapabilitiesandCourseofAction....................................76 3.1.5 Air Component’s Course of Action and required capabi‐

lities........................................................................................................................773.2. Air support to land‐basedoperation: “Stability inBanon” sce‐

nario..................................................................................................................................80 3.2.1Strategiccontext...............................................................................................80 3.2.2Missionobjectives............................................................................................81

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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3.2.3Criticalfactorsoftheoperationalenvironment.................................82 3.2.4Adversary’scapabilitiesandCourseofAction....................................83 3.2.5 Air Component’s Course of Action and required capabi‐

lities........................................................................................................................83 4. ThemilitaryneedsofItalianArmedForcesandtheF‐35programme.............87

4.1. Firstkeyquestion:doesItalianparticipationincrisismanage‐mentoperationsservenationalinterests?........................................................88

4.2. Second key question: what kind of air capabilities does Italyneedtoparticipateincrisismanagementoperations?..............................95

4.3. Thirdkeyquestion:whatprocurementoptionsareavailabletoacquirethiskindofaircapabilities?..................................................................101

4.4. Forthkeyquestion:itisbettertobuyF‐35“off‐the‐shelf”ortoparticipateinthemultinationalprocurementprogramme?................110

5. TheF‐35programmeandItaly:theindustrialperspective.................................115

5.1. Thebestvalueformoneyapproach.................................................................1155.2. TheItalianparticipationintheprocurementprogramme....................121

Conclusions..................................................................................................................................129Bibliography.................................................................................................................................131AnnexI.Listofinterviews......................................................................................................145

TablesandFiguresFigure1.ItalianAirForceactivitiesininternationalmissions.............................13Figure 2. Participation of Italian fighter aircraft in international mis‐sions:achronology................................................................................................63Table1.Internationalmissions 1990‐2013 :anoverview.....................................61Table2.Italiancontributiontointernationalmissions 1990‐2013 ..................62Table3.F‐35’sacquisitionplans.........................................................................................116

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Theresearchteamwouldliketothankseveralpeoplefortheircontribu‐tion to thisResearchPaper: theGen. StefanoCont CapoUfficioper laPoliticaMilitare,MinisterodellaDifesa forthefruitfulandconstructiveexchangeofviewsonthecontentofthisstudy;theGen.RobertoNordioComandanteComandoOperazioniAeree,PoggioRenatico andtheCol.StefanoGensiniandLeut.Col.FabrizioPiermarioli,aswellastheentireSezioneStatisticaoftheStatoMaggioreAreonautica,fortheirextremelyusefulsupportonfindingdataonItalianAirForce’scapabilitiesincrisismanagementoperations; theGen.LucioBianchi CapodelCentroPoli‐funzionaleVelivoliAerotattici,Cameri , forthevaluableopportunitytovisittheCameribaseanddiscussaboutitsfutureperspectives,andtheEng.Stranda AleniaAermacchi forkindlyguidingusinsidethefacility.Aspecialthanksgoestothepeopleinterviewedforthisresearch,whosefrank, interestingandwell‐informedthoughtshave fed theelaborationof this study.A listof interviewswitha shortbiographyof each inter‐viewedpersonis includedintheAnnexIof thisResearchPaper.Obvi‐ously, the authors bear the entire and exclusive responsibility for thecontentof thisstudy.Thisresearchhasbeencarriedoutwith thesup‐portofLockheedMartin.

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Executive Summary

ThisResearchPaperconsiderstheroleofItalianfighteraircraftinmis‐sions abroad in the post‐Cold War period, the current Air Power’strends and doctrinal evolution, aswell as possible future scenarios ofcrisismanagementoperationsinthe“EnlargedMediterranean”envisag‐ingtheuseoffighteraircraft.Onthebasisofsuchanalysis,theneedsofItalianmilitaryconcerningfighteraircraftareoutlined,andthepossibleprocurementoptionstosatisfythemarediscussed.Thelastchapterad‐dresses the Italian participation in the F‐35 procurement programmeanditsindustrialaspects.

ThefirstchapterisaimedtooutlinetheroleofItalianfighteraircraftincrisismanagementoperationsthatoccurredinthelast24years.Sev‐eralmissions abroadhavebeen considered: theFirstGulfWar in Iraq1991 , the NATO operations in Bosnia‐Herzegovina 1993‐1998 , inSerbiaandKosovo 1999 andAfghanistan 2001‐2014 ,aswellasthemultinational air campaign inLibya in2011,which cameunderNATOcommandafterthefirstphase.

IntheFirstGulfWar,underaUNmandate,theUSleda“coalitionofthewilling” including35 countries to conductOperationDesert StormaimedatfreeingKuwaitterritoryoccupiedbyIraq.Thebulkofairsor‐ties was flown by the US 89,1% , while a non‐marginal contributionwasprovidedbytheUK,SaudiArabia,Kuwait,FranceandItaly.Inpar‐ticular, Italy deployed 8 Tornadowhich flew 2,326 sorties during the40‐day long air campaign. The military operation ended when IraqwithdrewitsforcesfromKuwaitandacceptedtheceasefireconditions.

Between1993and1998,underUNmandate,NATOundertooksev‐eraloperationstodealwiththecivilwarinYugoslaviaandparticularlyin Bosnia‐Herzegovina. They included: Operation Sharp Guard in sup‐

THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS

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portofmaritimeembargotocombatants 1993‐1996 ;OperationDenyFlight aimed to enforce aNo‐FlyZone NFZ overBosnia‐Herzegovina1993‐1995 ;OperationDeliberate Force to protectUN‐declared “safeareas”bytargetingBosnianSerbmilitarycapabilities 1995 ;OperationJoint Endeavour 1995‐1996 a peace‐keeping ground mission withconsiderableairsupportincludingfighteraircraft;finallyOperationDe‐liberateGuardtosupportOperationJointGuard 1996‐1998 .Italycon‐tributedtoallmissionsbydeployingTornado,AMXandAV‐8B,conduct‐ing5,023sortiesandflyingfor11,973hours.Italyalsoprovidedthemil‐itarybasesandthelogisticssupportindispensabletoconducttheseop‐erations.ThesetofNATOcrisismanagementoperationswasinstrumen‐taltoforcethevariousYugoslavpartiestosigntheDaytonAgreementin1995,andtoenforceitinthefollowingyears.

OnMarch 1999 NATO undertook Operation Allied Force, aimed toputanendtothearmedrepressionofKosovarminoritiesconductedbytheSerbianmilitaryandparamilitaryforces.Theaircampaignlastedfor78dayswithintensebombingagainstSerbiantargets.Italycontributedwithapproximately50aircraft, includingF‐104,Tornado,AMX, reach‐ingup1,072sortiesand2,903hoursof flight.Overall, thequantitativeandqualitativeeffortof the Italian forceswashighlyregarded,as Italywas the third largest European contributor of aircraft and the fourthlargestEuropeanintermsofnumberofairsorties.Inparticular,Torna‐dowereutilizedforSuppressionofEnemyAirDefence SEAD tasks.AsalreadyhappenedfortheoperationsinBosnia‐Herzegovina,Italianmili‐tarybasesandlogisticssupportprovedtobeessentialtoconducttheaircampaign.TheoperationendedinJune1999withamilitaryagreementbetweenNATOandSerbiawhichenvisagedthecompletewithdrawalofSerbian forces fromKosovo.TheUNSecurityCouncilresolution1244/1999pavedthewayforthesubsequentNATOpeace‐keepingmissioninKosovo.

Since2001,theUnitedStatesstartedoperationEnduringFreedominAfghanistan, with the contribution of several European countries com‐prising Italy, toundermine terrorist activities fromgroups linked toAl‐Qaeda. Concerning the aerial component, the Italian contribution wasmainly effectuated by AV‐8B deployed on the Garibaldi aircraft carrierfrom 2002 to 2006,which carried on Intelligence, Surveillance andRe‐

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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connaissance ISR andCloseAirSupport CAS operations,amountingto328sortiesand860hoursof flight. In themeanwhileandstarting from2001, the International Security Assistance Force ISAF has been de‐ployedinAfghanistanunderaUNmandate, inordertoactivelysupporttheestablishmentofapeacefulandstableAfghanstatethatwillnotcol‐ludewithAlQaedaorotherterroristgroupsthreateningNATOmembers.InAugust2003,NATOtookoverthecommandofISAFandextendedtheareaofoperationtocovertheentirecountrywiththecontributionoffiftyNATOmembersandpartners. Italyhasparticipated to ISAFsince2002.ItalianGeneralMauroDelVecchiotookcommandofthewholeISAFoper‐ationbetween2005and2006.Sincetheestablishmentof ISAFRegionalCommandsin2006,ItalyhasmaintainedtheRegionalCommandWest.Asof February 2014, Italy had 2,165 units on the ground, ranking fourthamongcontributingnations.Concerningaircapabilities,in2007theJointAirTaskForcewasestablishedinKabulaspartoftheRegionalCommandWest.Asof31stDecember2013,thefighteraircraftdeployedbyItaly,in‐cludingTornado,AMXandAV‐8B,conductedatotalof3,301airsortiesintheatre,and8,477flighthours.MostsortiesconcernedISRactivities,butfighteraircraftwerealsousedforCAStogroundtroopsengagedwithin‐surgents.TheISAFmissionissettolastuntiltheendof2014,whenthetransition of security responsibilities to Afghan national security forcesandcivilianauthoritieswillbecompleted.

ThereasonsthatledsomeNATOcountriestoplanandconductapro‐longedaircampaigninLibyain2011arestillacontentiousissueandanobject of studies and analysis. InMarch 2011 theUN Security Councilresolution1973authorizedtheuseofforce,includingtheestablishmentof aNFZ toprotect civiliansandcivilianareas targetedby theGaddafiloyalistforces.On19MarchtheUS‐ledoperationOdysseyDawnstartedwithFrenchandBritishmilitarysupport.On31March,NATOformallyassumedcommandoftheOperationUnifiedProtector,whichlastedun‐til31October2011.Bothoperationsresulted intheestablishmentandenforcementofaNFZovertheentireLibyanterritory,aswellasintar‐getingofLibyangovernment’smilitaryandparamilitaryforces.Themil‐itaryoperationendedwiththecollapseoftheLibyangovernment,with‐out,nonetheless,any follow‐upNATOmission tosupport thestabiliza‐tionofthecountry.Italianmilitarycontributionwasthree‐fold.First,ina


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chronologicalorder,theItalianNavyledtheNATOnavaloperationtoen‐forcetheUNarmsembargo.Second,theuseofmilitarybasesintheItal‐ian territory was crucial to carry on operations, which could not havebeenpossiblewithoutsuchalargefootprintclosetotheoperationalthea‐tre.Third,andmostimportantlyforthefocusofthisstudy,Italianaircraftconductedabout7%ofthetotalalliedmissionsintheLibyanskies.ThebulkofcommittedItalianaircapabilitieswerefighteraircraftincludingF‐16,AMX,AV‐8B,EurofighterandTornado.Theseaircraftexecuteddiffer‐enttypesofmissions,suchasSEAD,DefensiveCounterAir DCA ,Offen‐siveCounterAir OCA ,StrikeCoordinationandReconnaissance SCAR and ISR activities. The Italian armed forces totalled 2,113 sorties flownand7,255 flighthoursduringoperations inLibya,being this the largestaircampaignItalianAirForcehasbeenengagedinsinceWorldWarII.

Considering the aforementioned 10 air operations,1 Italy has de‐ployeditsfighteraircraft90%underUNSecurityCouncilmandate,and80%underNATO’s chainof commandandcontrol.This insight showsnot only Italy’s deep integration and commitment to those organiza‐tions,butalsothestronginfluenceofaglobalizedinternationalsystemwhich requires the management of crises by the whole internationalcommunity. Moreover, Italy’s operational participation in missionsabroad envisaging the use of Air Power has grown in qualitative andquantitativetermsoverthelast24years.

Italy’s use of fighter aircraft in the post‐ColdWar period has gonehandinhandwithdevelopmentsoccurredinAirPower’sdoctrine.ThesecondchapterofthisResearchPaperoutlinesthedoctrinefundamen‐talsandtrendsstemmingfromtherecentoperationalexperience,withtheaimtounderstandcurrentandpossiblefuturewaystoutilizeairca‐pabilities,includingfighteraircraft.AirPowerisdefinedasthecapacityto project power in the air to influence people’s behaviour and thecourse of events. Coupled with increasingly capable technology, AirPowerisaflexible,rapid,24/7availabletooltoinfluencetheoperating

1DesertStorm,DenyFlight,SharpGuard,DeliberateForce,DecisiveEndeavour,De‐

liberateGuard,AlliedForce,EnduringFreedom,UnifiedProtector,andInternationalSe‐curityAssistanceForce ISAF .

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Figure1.ItalianAirForceactivitiesininternationalmissions

environment.Asaresult,AirPowercanbeconsideredasaforcemulti‐plierfordeployedlandandmaritimemilitaryforces.

Overall, it ispossible to identify fourmainroles inwhichAirPowerfinds its concrete application: Control of the Air; Intelligence, Surveil‐lance,TargetAcquisition,Reconnaissance ISTAR ;Engagement;AirMo‐bility.Thefirstthreerolesareparticularlyrelevantinrelationstofighteraircraft.AchievingControlof theAirmeansbeing free tousea specificvolume of airspace in a given period of time for one’s own purposes,whiledenyingitsusetoothers,ifnecessary.Thankstotheacquisitionofinformation, ISTARactivities contribute toplanningactivitiesanddeci‐sionmakingduringallairoperations’phases. It improves theability togain and maintain information superiority, and aims to achieve Situa‐tionalAwareness,thatishavingafullcomprehensionoftheoperationalsituationintheatre.IntermsofEngagement,AirPowerroleincludesvar‐ioustypesofstrikemissions,withmaritimeandterrestrialtargets.

Inthiscontext,someimportanttrendsseemtoemergefromairop‐


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erationsconductedintheselatest24years.First,therecentoperationalexperience has raised awareness at the political‐strategic level thatcomplexairoperationsrequiretheavailabilityofallaircomponentstoperform the four Air Power’s roles, and that air capabilities aremoreandmoreintertwinedamongeachother.Second,ISTARisnotprovidedonlybydedicatedplatforms,suchastheRemotelyPilotedAircraftSys‐tems RPAS ,butby anumberof sensors and systemsembedded in awideandcomplementaryrangeofaircraft,includingfighter.Third,Con‐troloftheAirshouldnotbetakenforgranted:inLibya 2011 ,Kosovo1999 andIraq 1991 thepriorityofthefirstdaysofoperationswasstill to ensure coalition’s Control of the Air by destroying opponentcommandandcontrol structures,mostof itsairdefence fixedsystemsandcombataircraft.Fourth,withregardtoEngagement,theuseofPre‐cisionGuidedMunitions PGM hasexponentiallygrownfromtheFirstGulfWar to theLibyacampaign. In the future, theneed toattack indi‐vidual targets accurately will continue to be paramount, especially tolimitthenumberofcollateraldamagesinhighlypopulatedareas.

Building on the analysis of previous crisismanagement operations,as well as on trends and doctrinal evolutions of Air Power, the thirdchapterofthisResearchPaperpresentstwoscenarios,showinghowaircapabilities,inparticularfighteraircraft,maybeusedincrisismanage‐mentoperationsinthe2015‐2025timeframe.Inthefirstscenario,itisexposedhowairoperationsareundertaken to establishandenforceaNFZ,whilethesecondoutlineshowairoperationssupportlandopera‐tions.Eachscenariohasbeenredactedon thebasisof thesamestruc‐ture,which includesthe followingelements:StrategicContext;MissionObjectives;CriticalFactorsof theOperationalEnvironment;AdversaryCapabilities and Course of Actions; Air Component Course of ActionsandAssociatedCapabilities.

Despite thisResearchPaperdoesnotaddress the likelihoodof thesetwoscenarios,itisassumedthattheyareatleastpossibleexamplesofairoperationsEuropeancountriessuchasItalymay join inthefuture.Asamatter of fact, Italian fighter have been deployed in different contexts,that is inan interstatewar Gulf , incivilconflicts Bosnia‐Herzegovina,KosovoandLibya andinafailedstatewithsometypicalconnotationsofinsurgencyandcivilwar Afghanistan . Indeed,armedconflictswillstill

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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beafeatureoftheinternationalsecurityenvironmentinthemedium‐longterm,withconflictareasparticularlyconcentratedinAfrica,MiddleEastandEastandSouthAsia.Thephenomenonof“failedstates”willalsore‐mainonthesceneforlong,especiallyifthelevelofviolenceintheafore‐mentionedregionswillnotdecrease.Inthiscontext,itispossibletoimag‐inethe futureemploymentof fighteraircraft inthoseregions,either forcombatorstabilizationpurposes.AsonemightarguethatNATOwillnev‐ergo“thatoutofarea,”onemightreply thatprobablyat the endof theColdWarnonewouldhaveexpectedtoseeNATOrunningpeace‐keepingoperationsinKosovofirstandinAfghanistanlater,orcarryingonmilitaryinterventionsintheBalkansandinLibya.

Theanalysisofpastoperationalexperiences,AirPower’strendsandpossible futurescenariosofairoperationsposeanumberofkeyques‐tionsthatshouldbeaskedtoItalianpolicy‐makers,includingcivilianau‐thorities – in primis the Parliament and the Government – and thearmedforces.Therefore,thefourthchapterofthisResearchPaperaimstoaddresssuchquestions,todiscusstherelatedprocurement’sneedsoftheItalianmilitary,andfinallytoassesswhethertheF‐35procurementprogrammemightbeabletosatisfythoseneedsornot.

ThefirstkeyquestioniswhetherItalianparticipationincrisisman‐agementoperationstogetherwithEuropeanandNorthAmericanalliesdoesservenationalinterests.Thechangesoccurredintheinternationalcontextmakenational interestsaffectedbycrisis,risksandthreatsoc‐curringwellbeyondterritorialborders.Globalizationandeconomicin‐terdependencehaveobviouslyplayedafundamentalroleinthisregard.TheItalianparticipationincrisismanagementoperationsinthelast24yearshascontributeddirectlyor indirectlytoprotectandpromotena‐tional interests. For example, the stabilization of Bosnia‐Herzegovina,Kosovoand,generallyspeaking,theWesternBalkanswasaclear,directnationalinterest.Sincetheearly1990s,Italyhadsufferedboththeflowsofillegalimmigrantsfromtheseregionsandtheemergenceofillicittraf‐fics or the development of organized crime. For that reason, interna‐tional missions, including those conducted through Air Power, havebeeninstrumentaltopacifyandstabilizeageographicalareaextremelyclosetotheItaliansoilandlinkedtoItaly’seconomicsystem.

Italianparticipationinothermissionsabroadhasservednationalin‐


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terests inamore indirectway.For instance, theactiveparticipation inNATOoperationsrepresentsaninvestmentinakindof“insurancepoli‐cy”forItaly’snationalsecurity.Italydoesnothavesufficientcapabilitiestoprotectaloneitssecurityinterests.Ineffect,theystretchwellbeyondnationalbordersand include: safe trade routes in the “EnlargedMedi‐terranean,”energysuppliesfromNorthAfrica,MiddleEastandCentralAsia,bordercontrolintheMediterraneaninrelationtoillegalimmigra‐tionandmaritimesecurity.Anactive,reliableandstableItalianpartici‐pationinallNATOmissionsisinstrumentaltogainthenecessarycredi‐bility topush theAlliance todealwith thepurposesof Italian interna‐tionalagenda.Furthermore,being thesecrisismanagementoperationssetupandledbyinternationalorganizations,itallowsItalytosharese‐curity risksandcosts, toextend its intervention’s range toprotectna‐tional interests, and to enhance inter‐allies solidarity. Finally, Italianparticipationinmissionsabroadisalsoamannertomaintainstrongre‐lationswithitsmainsecurityally,theUS.Beingsurroundedbyunstableregions–fromWesternBalkanstotheSouthernMediterraneanshores–andunableasa“middlepower”toshapetheeventsintheseregionsonits own, Italy has traditionally relied on “asymmetric alliances” withstronger partners such as the US to address common security con‐cerns. Italianparticipation in crisismanagementoperations foreseeingtheuseofAirPowerdoesnotguaranteepersétheprotectionofItaly’snationalinterests.Suchprotectiondepends,amongotherthings,bythecapacityoftheItaliangovernmenttomakethebestofthemilitarycon‐tributionprovidedvis‐à‐vistheallies.Inthisregard,Italy’sparticipationinmissionsabroad,whichalsoincludesairoperations,isafundamentalenablerforItaliandefenceandforeignpolicy.

IfitisassumedthatmaintainingthecapacitytoprojectAirPowerincrisis management operations does serve Italian defence and foreignpolicy,andultimatelyItaly’snationalinterests,thesecondkeyquestioniswhatkindofaircapabilitiesareneeded.Asamatteroffact,thefighteraircraftfleetusedsofarwillbephasedoutinthenextdecade.Thereisthusanunavoidableneedtoreplace253aircraftbelongingtothreedif‐ferentline‐ups,including18AV‐8BoftheNavy,136AMXand99Torna‐dooftheAirForce.Manyofthemhavebeenbuiltinthe1980s,oreveninthe1970s,andasfarastheirlife‐cyclereaches35/40years,theycan‐

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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not guarantee safety conditions to the aircrew anymore. Besides, oneshouldconsiderthat,althoughRPASarelikelytocomplementfutureairfleets, theywill not yet replacemanned fighter aircraft completely. Inthisregard,to identifyItalianfutureaircapabilities’needs,several les‐sonscanbelearnedfrommissionsconsideredinthisstudy.Firstofall,interoperabilityconstitutesacrucialrequirement,sinceItalianaircraft–bothfromtheAirForceandtheNavy–havealwaysoperatedwithinin‐ternationalcoalitions.Second,thecapacitytoconnectfighteraircrafttootherplatforms,fromunitsonthegroundtothecommandandcontrolcentresisfundamental:theaircraftshouldbe“net‐centric,”thatisbeingfullyabletogatheranddisseminate informationfromandtotheothernodesofthenet.Athirdcrucialneedistheradarlow‐observability alsocalled “stealthness” , as itgreatly reduces thechancesofanaircraft tobeshutdownbytheopponentairdefencesystem.Finally,thefactthatall considered crisismanagement operations have takenplace beyondnational territory makes “deployability” at strategic distance anotherfundamentalneedforaircapabilities.

If it is assumed that keeping the capacity to project Air Powerthrough crisismanagement operations does serve Italian defence andforeignpolicy,andultimately Italy’snational interests; if it isassumedthatcurrentItalianfighteraircraftfleetneedstobereplacedbyaircraftwhichshouldbeinteroperable,net‐centric,low‐observableanddeploy‐able;thenthenextkeyquestionforpolicy‐makersiswhatprocurementoptionsareavailabletoacquirethekindofaircapabilitiesneededbyIt‐aly.Intheory,afirstoptionistodevelopaEuropeanprocurementpro‐grammebringingtogetherthemainEuropeancountriesintermsofde‐fencecapabilities,namelyFrance,GermanyandtheUK,aimedtodevel‐opa5thgenerationfighteraircraft.Suchaninvestmentshouldhavebeendone inthemid‐1990s inordertodelivera fightercapabilityby2020.Yet,thishasnotoccurred,eitherbecauseEuropeancountriespreferredtoinvestinnationalprocurementprogrammes,likeFranceforinstance,orbecausetheypreferredtocutthedefencebudgetandsobenefitfromtheso‐called“peacedividends”,asGermanydid.Astodaythereisnopo‐liticalwillinEuropetoinvestinthiskindofprogramme,suchprocure‐mentoptionremainsoffthetablebecauseofthechoicesmadebymajorEuropeancountriesback in the1990s.A second theoreticaloption for


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Italy, in order to obtain needed air capabilities to replace old ones,wouldbetodevelopandbuildaground‐attackversionoftheEurofight‐er, the fighteraircraftdesignedbyGermany, Italy,SpainandtheUKinthe 1980s,with a full 5th generation strike capacity.Again, this optionshouldhavebeenundertakenatmaximumintheearly2000s, throughsignificantEuropeanjointinvestmentsinresearchanddevelopmentac‐tivities,aimingtomodifyanaircraftwhichwasnotoriginallydesignedtofulfilsuchaground‐attackrole.GiventhatmembersoftheEurofight‐erconsortiumwere andare notwillingtoundertakethispath,there‐forethisoptionisoffthetabletoo.

ThethirdandlastoptiontosatisfyItalianmilitaryneedsintermsofair capabilities is to acquire F‐35 aircraft. It has been estimated thatmorethan3,000F‐35unitswillbeprocured,2,443of themfor theUSarmed forces, and the rest for other 12 countries Australia, Canada,Denmark,Italy,Israel,Japan,theNetherlands,Norway,Singapore,SouthKorea,TurkeyandtheUK .Thiswillpermithighlevelofinteroperabil‐itytothosecountriestakingparttotheprocurementprogram.TheF‐35presentsall theadvanced features typicalof5th generation fighterair‐craft:itisequippedwithsensorsandcomputingcapacityfordatafusioninanet‐centricperspective; its lowobservability isensuredbyanum‐berofelements, includingitsairframe’sdesign,theconfigurationof itsinternalbayswhereweaponsarestoredandaspecifictypeofpainting.Moreover, theF‐35 internal bays avoid thatweapon’s systems locatedontheexternalsidewoulddamageaircraft’saerodynamic, itsspeedormanoeuvrability; in turn, this diminishes fuel consumption while fa‐vouring the aircraft range and deployability. The latter is greatly aug‐mentedbythepresenceofaspecificversionoftheF‐35 F‐35B capableofverticaltake‐offsandlandingfromaircraftcarriers,forinstancefromItalianCavourcarrier.ThisisparticularlyimportantforItalyinordertomaintainNavy’saircapabilities,sofarguaranteedbyAV‐8Baircraft.

If it isassumedthattheF‐35istheonlyavailableoptiontoprocurean interoperable, net‐centric, low‐observable and highly deployablefighter aircraft to satisfy Italy’s military needs to participate in crisismanagementoperations,thelastkeyquestionforpolicy‐makersregardshowtoacquirethisaircraft.Inprinciple,twowaysareavailable:eitherto participate in the procurement programme, or to buy F‐35 “off‐the‐

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

19

shelf”thatisonthemarketplace.Fromamilitarypointofview,partici‐pating in the procurement programme generates several positive out‐comes.First,itbooststhe“operationalsovereignty”–thatisthepossibil‐ity to have platform, weapons’ system and ISTAR’s functions at yourcomplete disposal,without relying on third parties for technology, up‐dates, security of supply of various components – which is clearly re‐duced,ifnotdepleted,incaseof“off‐the‐shelf”acquisitions.Second,ital‐lows Italianpilots to start as soon aspossible their trainingwithpart‐ners’aircrews–particularlyUSones–thusenjoyingimmediatebenefitsintermsofinteroperability.Eventually,theconstructionoftheFinalAs‐sembly and Check Out FACO of Cameri, as part of the procurementprogramme,impliesthattheItalianMinistryofDefencewillnothavetospendmoretobuildanotherfacilitytomaintainandupgradethe90F‐35ItalyhascommitteditselftobuyfortheAirForceandtheNavy.Indeed,FACOisalreadysettobecometheMaintenanceRepairOverhaulandUp‐grade MRO&U centerforF‐35basedinEurope.Regardingthetimelineof F‐35’s acquisition and its related cost, Italy has chosen to wait thesixthtrancheofLowRateInitialProduction LRIP tobuyitsfirstaircraftat the costof around130milliondollar,way less in comparison to the230milliondollarofthefirstaircraftproduced.Thecostatthefullrateproductionisestimatedtodecreaseat85milliondollarperunit.

ThefifthandlastchapterofthisResearchPaperdiscussestheindus‐trialaspectsoftheF‐35multinationalcollaborationandtheItalianpartic‐ipation in the procurement programme. Italy participation in the F‐35programme began in 1998when the left‐wing government decided toinvest 10milliondollar in theConceptDemonstrationPhase. In 2002,theItalianright‐winggovernmentconfirmedthischoicebycommitting1,028 billion dollar in the System Design and Development Phase. In2007, the left‐wing government signed the bilateral Memorandum ofUnderstanding MoU withtheUSfortheProduction,Sustainment,andFollow‐onDevelopmentPhase,withaninvestmentof904milliondollar.In2009,theItalianParliamentapprovedtheacquisitionof131F‐35.Atthe same time, Italy decided to build the FACO/MRO&U facility atCameri.In2012,theItaliangovernmentreducedtheoverallfleetnum‐berofF‐35 from131to90 60F‐35Aand30F‐35B .Since Italy is in‐volvedintheF‐35programmeasLevel2partner,sharingroughly4%of


20

the total cost, it has limited opportunities to influence aircraft’s re‐quirements.

The F‐35 entails a radical change of theway to envisage amultina‐tionalprocurementprogrammeinthedefencefield.Infact,itisbasedontheprincipleof“bestvalueformoney”,whichimpliesacertaindegreeofcompetitionamongsupplierstoofferthebestprice/qualityratiototheprimecontractor–LockheedMartin.ThisisquitenewconsideringItal‐ianindustry’spastexperienceinprogrammesbasedonthe“justeretourprinciple”,wherebycost‐sharedividedamongparticipatinggovernmentsmustequalthework‐shareamongnationalindustriescomposingthein‐dustrial consortium. Nevertheless, it has been considered necessary toapplythesetwoconcepts–competitionandbestvalueformoney–withcertainflexibilitytoavoidto“overstress”thesupplychain.Forinstance,LockheedMartinforeseesthepossibilityofsigningagreementswithtwodifferentsuppliersofagivenitem,as itdeemsstrategictohavingmorethan a single supply source – the so‐called “strategic second sources”method.ThisisthecaseoftheFinmeccanicacompanyAleniaAermacchithathasa“strategicsecondsource”statusfortheF‐35wings.

Themajority of supplier agreements with LockheedMartin have aone‐yearterm,astheUSgovernmentdecidesthenumberofF‐35tobepurchased year by year, influencing the production planning of theprime contractor. Such amanagement system seems tooverstress thesupplychainand itdoesnotencouragesub‐contractors toadopt long‐term investments plans, because it has to take on its own the risk tomakeinvestmentswithouttheassurancethatthevolumeofproductionwillbeguaranteed in thenextyears.Anothercritical issueregards thelackof Italian industries’participation indevelopmentand integrationphases, characterized by a greater use of high technologies. Obstaclesaremainly,butnotonly,duetoUSregulationsuchastheInternationalTrafficinArmsRegulation ITAR ,aswellastoAmericanNationalDis‐closurePolicy.

Around90 Italian companies are involved in the procurement pro‐gramme,andsofarthecontractsawardedtotheItalianindustrieshavereachedanoverallvalueof715milliondollar.Ofthisamount,565mil‐liondollararerelatedtotheFinmeccanicagroup,mainlythroughAleniaAermacchi,whichisresponsiblefortheconstructionofmorethan1,200

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

21

wings.Theterm“wings”includesboththetwosemi‐wings–morethan2,400units–andthecentralcellof theaircraftholdingthemtogether,beingthis30%oftheentireairframewithsignificantengineeringchal‐lenges.ConcerningSmallandMediumEnterprises SMEs ,theyprovedtobeflexibleandadaptableinofferingthebestvalueformoneywithintheF‐35programme.However,theysufferedmorethanlargercontrac‐torstheone‐yearcontractsapproach,thispracticediscouragingthemtomakelong‐terminvestments.

Theprocurementprogrammepresentspotentialrevenuesaround10billiondollarforItalianindustries,butthiswilldependontheabilitytoexploit the infrastructurescreated– firstand foremost theCameriFA‐CO/MRO&U–tobuildcomponentsandtoprovidemaintenance,supportand upgrade, in particular regarding avionics and electronics. TheCamerisiteincludes:aFACOfacilitytoassembletheItalianF‐35AandF‐35B variants, the F‐35A procured by Netherlands, and potentially theaircraft to be procured by other European partners such as DenmarkandNorway; awing construction facilitywhich serves the entire pro‐curement programme; the aircraft test facility aimed at testing low‐observable performance, and the related final paint facility; buildingsaimedtosupportF‐35operatingby theUSandallies inEurope.Beingthe only FACO outside US territory, Cameri represents a fundamentalasset for the entire F‐35 global production and maintenance system.Maintenancewillalsointroducesignificanttechnologicaldevelopmentsandinnovationbecauseitwillgohandinhandwiththeplatform’sup‐gradeandrevisionthroughoutitswholelife‐cycleof30/40years.

Asawhole,theItalianparticipationintheprocurementprogrammepresentsprosandcons,opportunitiesandchallenges.Inotherpastpro‐grammes,basedonthejusteretourprinciple,negotiationslargelyendedwhentheagreementoncost‐shareandwork‐sharewasreached.Thisisnot the case of the F‐35 programme. The new procurement approachbasedonthebestvalueformoneyprinciplehasimposedontheItalianindustrytobecomemorecompetitiveandtotakemorerisksinmanag‐ing its own investments. It also requires the Italianmilitary and gov‐ernment to assist the industry in this regard, bymaking an additionaland constant effort in negotiatingwithUS counterparts on technologytransferandotherrelevantaspectsoftheprocurementprogramme.

23

Preface

MilitaryexpendituresseldomenjoyapopularpositionwithintheItalianpublic debate, except for experts andpractitioners including the armedforcesanddefenceindustry.Therefore,therecentandstillharshpolemicsononeofthemostimportantItaliandefenceprocurementprogrammesofthelastyearsarenotsurprising.Though,itisrathersurprisingthatthesecontroversies have basically regarded just one specific programme, al‐mostomittingotherswhicharefinanciallymoredemanding.

Inanycase,theaimofthisstudyisnotthatofanalysingthereasonsbehindvariouspolemics.Ourpurposeisratherthatofgraspingthecorereasons which led Italy to find a future replacement for the currentfighteraircraftoftheAirForceandNavy,equippedwithTornado,AMXandAV‐8Baircraft.Furthermore,weevaluatethewaytosatisfymilitaryrequirementsbytaking intoaccountoperational, logistic, technologicalandindustrialaspects.Theanalysisisconductedbymaintainingareal‐istic approachwith regard toboth international scenarios and thena‐tionalandEuropeanindustrialcontext.

Westarted fromanhistoricaloverview inorder tohavea concreteideaoftheactionofItalianfighteraircraftduringthepost‐ColdWarpe‐riod.Itisacomplexandstillon‐goinghistoricalphase,characterizedbyhigh levelofuncertainty.Thisrequiresanextraordinary flexiblemind‐setfrompolicy‐makers,whichinturnimpliestheavailabilityoflikewiseflexiblepolicytools–includingmilitaryones.Inthiscontext,AirPowerhasproventoplayacrucialrole.First,itenablesothermilitarycompo‐nentstofullyexploittheirpotentialities,withoutworryingaboutanyairthreat.Second,insomecases,AirPoweralonehasledtodesiredpoliti‐calachievements,suchasthesigningoftheDaytonAgreementafterthe1995 air campaign in Bosnia‐Herzegovina, or the Military Technical


24

Agreements after the 1999 air campaign in Kosovo, which providedgroundforcestheabilitytooperateinapermissiveenvironment.RecenthistoryshowstheimpossibilityofrenouncingtoControltheAir.

Theproverbsaysthatgeneralstendtolosethenextwarbyusingthestrategies used in the previous one – even if those were successful.Therefore,weputacreativeefforttoidentifypossiblefuturescenariosofairoperationsnotthataffectedbypreviousoperationalexperiences–while takingadvantageof them.These scenariosdemonstrate that thefull availability of Air Power is necessary to ensure security, mobilityand logisticssupport togroundandmaritime forces,aswellas thatofcivilian organizations whose action is necessary to manage any crisiswhichoftenandtragicallytakesplaceinourneighbourhood.

Fromanoperationalpointofview,Italianfighteraircraftaregradual‐lybecomingmoreandmoreobsolete,soItalyneedstohandletheissueofreplacingthecurrentfleet.Welookedatallpossibleoptionstosolvethis problem, which can ensure adequate timing, sustainable costs aswell as interoperabilitywith thenecessary andpotential partners andallies.Operationalneedsshouldbeconsideredtogetherwiththeoveralleconomic situation in Italy, both inbudgetary terms and froman eco‐nomic‐industrialpointofview.Consequently,wedevotedaspecific fo‐custotheindustrialaspectsoftheprocurementprogramme,inordertotest itscompatibilitywithcurrent technologicalcapacitiesandoccupa‐tionaltrendswithinthecountry.ThedecisiontojointheprogrammefortheproductionofF‐35aircraftseemstobe theonly feasibleoption. Infact, developing a ground attack version of the Eurofighter Typhoonwouldpresent technical uncertainties hard to solve,which imply veryhigh costs anduncertain timing, andEuropeanpartners seemsnot in‐terested to do it. Moreover, because of the way the Eurofighter pro‐grammeisconceived,choosingthispathmeansthatonly21%oftheen‐tirework‐sharewillbecarriedoutinItaly,whereasGermany,SpainandUKwillbenefitfrom79%oftheinvestment.

The ItalianF‐35choicerequirespoliticalandmilitaryauthorities topay attention to any single phase of the procurement programme, in‐cludingthelogisticsupportinthelongterm,inordertoprotectnationalinterestsfrombothanoccupationalandtechnologicalpointofview.Inother words, they must avoid any subjection towards the US govern‐

PREFACE

25

ment, as well as towards the prime contractor Lockheed Martin. ThestrategicvalueoftheF‐35programme,alsoconsideredasabindingfac‐torinthecontextoftransatlanticsecurity,makesitacentralelementinthe relationshipwith the American government. It is in such compre‐hensiveperspectivethatthisprogrammeshouldbeevaluated.

VincenzoCamporiniVicePresidentofIAI

27

List of Acronyms

AAR Air‐to‐AirRefuellingACE AlliedCommandEuropeAI AirInterdictionAPOD AerialPortsofDebarkationASUW Anti‐SurfaceWarfareASW Anti‐SubmarineWarfareATO AirTaskingOrderBLF BanonLiberationFrontBNDF BanonNationalDefenceForceBVR BeyondVisualRangeC2 CommandandControlC4I Command,Control,Communications,Computersand IntelligenceCAS CloseAirSupportCBG CarrierBattleGroupCDP ConceptDemonstrationPhaseCNO ComputerNetworkOperationsCoA CourseofActionCOAC COmbinedAiroperationCentreCOMAO COmbinedAirOperationsCSAR CombatSearchandRescueCSDP CommonSecurityandDefencePolicyCTOL ConventionalTake‐OffandLandingDCA DefensiveCounterAirECM ElectronicCounterMeasuresECR ElectronicCombatReconnaissanceEO EarthObservation


28

EW ElectronicWarfareF2T2EA Find,Fix,Track,Target,Engage,AssessFACO FinalAssemblyandCheckOutFMS ForeignMilitarySalesGoB GovernmentofBanonHARM HighSpeedAnti‐RadiationMissileHN HostNationIADS IntegratedAirDefenceSystemICT InformationandCommunicationTechnologiesIED ImprovisedExplosiveDeviceIFOR ImplementationForceIO InformationOperationsISR Intelligence,SurveillanceandReconnaissanceISTAR Intelligence,Surveillance,TargetAcquisition, ReconnaissanceITAR InternationalTrafficinArmsRegulationJATF JointAirTaskForceJFACC JointForceAirComponentCommandJFC JointForceCommandJPO JointProgrammeOfficeKLA KosovoLiberationArmyLRIP LowRateInitialProductionPhaseMANPADS MAN‐PortableAir‐DefenceSystemsMoU MemorandumofUnderstandingMRO&U MaintenanceRepairOverhaulandUpgradeNAEW NATOAirborneEarlyWarningNEC NetworkEnabledCapabilityNFZ No‐FlyZoneOCA OffensiveCounterAirPGM PreciseGuidedMunitionsPNT PositionNavigatingandTimingPSFD Production,Sustainment,andFollow‐onDevelopment (Phase)RoE RulesofEngagementRPAS RemotelyPilotAircraftSystemRS RepublicofSari

LIST OF ACRONYMS

29

RSS ReformofSecuritySectorSA SituationalAwarenessSAM SurfacetoAirMissileSAR SearchAndRescueSCAR StrikeCoordinationAndReconnaissanceSDA SariDemocraticArmySDB SmallDiameterBombSDD SystemDesignandDevelopment(Phase)SEAD SuppressionofEnemyAirDefensesSTOVL ShortTake‐OffandVerticalLandingTACP TacticalAirControlPostTAR TacticalAirReconnaissanceUNAMA UnitedNationAssistanceMissioninAfghanistanUNFB UNForceinBanonUNSC UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilWEU WesternEuropeanUnion

31

1. Italy’s participation in crisis management operations: fighter aircraft’s role

ThischapterisaimedtooutlinetheroleofItalianfighteraircraftincri‐sismanagementoperationswhichoccurredinthelast24years.Severalmissionsabroadhavebeenconsidered:theFirstGulfWarinIraq 1990‐1991 ; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO operations inBosnia‐Herzegovina 1993‐1998 ,SerbiaandKosovo 1999 ;theinter‐nationalmissionsinAfghanistan 2001‐2014 ,andfinallythe2011mul‐tinationalaircampaigninLibya,whichcameunderNATOcommandaf‐terthefirstphaseofairoperations.1Thefollowingparagraphssumma‐rizeforeachmissionthemotivationsandgoalsofthemilitaryinterven‐tion,andexplaintheroleofItalywithrespecttocoalitionallies.

1.1 IRAQ (1990-1991)

IraqinvadedKuwaiton2August1990.Thiswastheculminationoflongstandingtensionsbetweenthetwostates.Inparticular,SaddamHussein

1Inthepost‐ColdWarperiodtheItalianarmedforcesengagedinmanyotherinter‐

nationalmissions,includingthreelarge‐scalechallengingonesinSomalia,LebanonandIraq. Insomecases, i.e. in Iraq in2003‐2006, theyenvisagedalso theutilizationofaircapabilitiessuchashelicopters,RemotelyPilotedAerialSystems RPAS ,andairliftca‐pabilitieslikeC‐130J.Inparticular,theAV‐8BaircraftwereusedinSomaliain1995tosupporttheredeploymentItalianandcoalitiontroops,andin2006operatedinfrontofLebanoncoasttomonitornavalcommercialtraffic.Allthesemissionsabroadhavenotbeenconsideredinthisstudy,becauseitfocusesoncrisismanagementoperationsfea‐turingasubstantialuseoffighteraircraft.


32

hadaccusedsomeGulfstatesof“stabbingIraqintheback”byproducingmoreoil than thequotasagreedwithother statesbelonging to theOr‐ganization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC and thus de‐creasing world oil price.2 After the invasion, international diplomaciesbegantoworktofindapoliticalsolutiontothecrisis.Despitetheeffort,no agreement was reached and the UN Security Council UNSC ap‐proved resolution678/1990, authorizingUNmember‐states to “useallnecessarymeans”ifIraqhadnotcompliedwithpreviousUNresolutions– i.e. resolution661/1990– andwithdrew itsmilitary forces fromKu‐waitby16January1991.SaddamHussein’sregimedisregardedtheulti‐matumandon17JanuaryaUS‐ledcoalitionbegantobombIraqimilitaryinstallationsinIraqandKuwait.3OperationDesertStormhadstarted.

Thefirstgoalof theUS‐ledcoalitionwastorestore international lawthathadbeenviolatedbyIraqiaggressionofKuwait.Theinterventionoc‐curredincompliancewiththeUnitedNationsChart–inparticularChap‐ter VII, art. 51 –which recognizes the right of individual and collectiveself‐defence if an armedattackoccurs against aUNmember, aswell aswithUNSCresolutions661/1990and678/1990,whichprovidedanevenbroadermandate than self‐defence. Furthermore, themilitary interven‐tionwas alsomeant to avoid the diffusion of political instability in thePersianGulf,thisregionbeingextremelyimportantforworldeconomyasamajorsourceofoilproduction.AsstatedbyUSSecretaryofStateJamesBaker in November 1990, “Iraq’s invasion and occupation of KuwaitthreatenedtheeconomiclifelineoftheWestandthatUSeffortstocontainSaddamHusseinweretoprotectUSjobs.”4Likewise,arobustmilitaryre‐sponsefromtheinternationalcommunitywouldhavediscouragedIraqtocarryonanexpansionistandaggressivepolicytowardsSaudiArabia,oneofthemainUSalliesintheregiontogetherwithIsrael.5

Sincethebeginningof the intervention,35countries “theCoalitionoftheWilling” wereengagedinoneformoranotherinOperationDe‐

2ClydeR.Mark,ReneeStasio, “Iraq‐KuwaitCrisis:AChronologyofEvents July17,

1990‐May6,1991”,inCRSReportforCongress,No.91‐14F May1991 .3Ibid.4Ibid.5Ibid.

1. ITALY’S PARTICIPATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: FIGHTER AIRCRAFT’S ROLE

33

sert Storm,6 although onlyUS, UK, Saudi Arabia, France, Italy, Kuwait,andBahraincontributedintermsofairassetstotheoperation.Contri‐butionisintendedasthenumberofairsortiesflownbyacertaincoun‐tryinrelationtothetotalofthecoalition seetablebelow .TheNorthAtlanticAllianceOrganization NATO wasengagedwithinthecoalitionaswell:ontherequestoftheTurkishgovernmenttheAlliedCommandEurope ACE MobileForce Air wasdeployedtoprotectTurkeyfrompossibleIraqiretaliations,andItalyprovidedacellof6F104‐Gfromthe28th squadron, which successfully completed their deterrencemissionwithoutanyrealengagement.

SincetheUSprovidedtheoverwhelmingmajorityofmilitarycapabili‐ties, the coalition strategy reflected American objectives and concerns.TheUSadministrationledbyGeorgeBushinsistedthatthecoalitionpri‐mary objectivewas to freeKuwait andnot to pursue regime change inIraq,aslookingforthistypeofgoalwouldhavestrainedrelationshipwiththe Arabworld andwithWestern stateswithin the coalition.7 In doingthat, two important relatedobjectivesweremade clear from thebegin‐ning: avoiding another Vietnam type of experience and minimizing asmuchaspossiblecasualtiesamongWesterntroops.TheVietnamWarhadhadastrongimpactonAmericanapproach,withPresidentBushpromis‐ingtheAmericanpublicopinionthatanymilitaryactionwouldnothavebeen“anotherVietnam”andaskingthemilitarytodefuseatanycostan‐othersimilarquagmirescenario.Moreover, casualties shouldhavebeenkeptbelowaminimumthresholdtoensurepublicopinion’ssupport fortheentiredurationofthewar,thuspreventinganymanifestationofpub‐licdisapprovalwhichcouldhaveplayedinfavourofSaddamHussein.

All this was translated into amilitary strategy aiming to the rapid

6Albania,Australia,Bahrain,Bulgaria,Croatia,CzechRepublic,Denmark,Egypt,Es‐

tonia, Ethiopia,Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Kuwait, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania,Macedonia,Netherlands,Oman,Palau,Poland,Portugal,Oman,Palau,Poland,Portugal,Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, United Arab Emir‐ates,Turkey,UK,USA.ForadetaileddescriptionoftheircontributionseeJesseLorenz,“TheCoalitionoftheWilling”,June2003,http://www.stanford.edu/class/e297a/The%20Coalition%20of%20the%20Willing.htm.

7LawrenceFreedmanandEfraimKarsh,“HowKuwaitWasWon:StrategyintheGulfWar”,inInternationalSecurity,Vol.16,No.2 Fall1991 ,pp.5‐41.


34

achievementofairsuperiority,theinterdictionofsupplylines,andafi‐nal fast andmobile desert campaignbased onmanoeuvre rather thanattrition.8 After a five‐weeks long intense bombing campaign, whichdeeply weakened Iraqi military forces, the land operation to liberateKuwaitcitybeganon23February.Onlythreedayslater,BaghdadradioannouncedthewithdrawalofallIraqiforcesfromKuwaitincompliancewithUNSCresolution660/1990.9

InthecontextofOperationDesertStorm,Italydeployed8Tornadofighterof6th,36thand50thWings to thePersianGulf sinceSeptember1990.Their firstmissionwastodefendItalianNavalForcesthatwereoperating in the region, enforcing the international embargo put inplacebyUNresolution661/1990.10OperationLocustastartedfromGi‐oia del Colle military basis on 25 September and had its operationalheadquarterinAlDhafraAirBase,intheUnitedArabEmirates.Italianmilitaryoperationsstartedon17January,whentheItaliangovernment,with the support of the Parliament, decided to upgrademissions andtasksoftheItalianAutonomousFlightDepartmentinthePersianGulf,allowing its units to conduct war operations for the first time sinceWorldWarII.

Inthenightbetween17and18January,ItalianTornadocarriedouttheirfirstmissionorderedbytheInter‐AlliedAirCommand.Duetotheprohibitive meteorological conditions, the eight Tornado fighter‐bomber,except forone,missed thewindowof theair‐to‐airrefuelling.Theonlyaircraftthatwasabletorefueldecidedtocontinuethemissionalone.Intheprocessofdisengagement,afterhavingsuccessfullyhitthetarget,aTornadowasshotdownbytheIraqiairdefencesystemandPi‐lotMajorGianmarcoBelliniandhisnavigatorCaptainMaurizioCoccio‐lonehadtoejectfromtheaircraft.Later,theywerecapturedbytheIraqiforcesandwereimprisoneduntiltheendofthewar.Fromthenon,Ital‐

8Foraninsiderperspectiveontheaircampaign,seeMarioArpino,IltargetinginDe‐

sertStorm,speechdeliveredattheconferenceon“L’Aerocooperazioneneiteatriopera‐tivi”,Rome,27June2013.

9ClydeR.Mark,ReneeStasio,“Iraq‐KuwaitCrisis…”,cit.10 “I Tornado nel Golfo Persico:Operazione Locusta”, inRivistaAeronautica, n. 6/

1990,pp.26‐29.


35

ian Air Force successfully completed 31missions, including those be‐tween24and27February,when land forcesbegangroundoperationsand freed Kuwait city from Iraqi occupation.When all UN resolutionswereacceptedby the Iraqi governmenton28February,waractivitiesstopped. Three days later, Major Gianmarco Bellini and Captain Mau‐rizioCocciolonewerereleasedbytheIraqigovernmentandflewbacktoItaly.Bymid‐March,thetenTornadoslefttheGulfandwentbacktoGi‐oiadelColle,wheretheywerewelcomedbytheMinisterofDefenceandthe highest military representatives.11 Overall, the number of sortiesflown by Italian fighter aircraft during Operazione Locusta – from 25

September 1990 to 16 March 1991 – was 2,326, with 4,503 flighthours.12OPERATIONDESERTSTORM

Generalinformation(August1990‐February1991)

CoalitionForces(maincontributors)13

ChainofCommand UNSecurityCouncilResolution

US,UK,SaudiArabia,Ku‐wait,France,Italy,Bahrain

UnitedStates Yes

Italiancontribution (September1990‐March1991)

Aircraft Sorties FlightHours

8Tornado 2,326 4,503

1.2 BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (1993-1998)

In theearly1990scivilconflictserupted inSlovenia,CroatiaandBos‐nia‐Herzegovina,materializing the fears of the “YugoslaviaBreak‐up”,

11 ItalianAir Force, Operazioni Internazionali, Iraq 1990 , http://www.aeronautica.

difesa.it/Operazioni/Internazionali/Pagine/LaguerrainIraq.aspx.12DataprovidedbytheItalianAirForce’sstatisticaldivision.13JesseLorenz,TheCoalitionoftheWilling,cit.


36

whose first symptoms should be traced back to the 1980s with thedeathofYugoslavia’sunifyingleaderTito.Hisdeathmarkedthebegin‐ning of an intense economic decline and rising ethnic nationalismamongthesixrepublicscomposingYugoslavia.14Furthermore,theendoftheColdWarandthenoveltyoffreemultipartyelectionsopenedupnewpossibilitiesforpopulistleadersinsearchforpower,whoexploit‐ed ethnic tensions to enhance their political role. After the Slovenianand Croatian declarations of independence 25 June 1991 , Bosnia‐Herzegovina, comprisingmainly of Muslims 40% , Serbs 30% andCroats 17% ,decidedtofollowthesamepathanddeclareditsownin‐dependenceinMarch1992.BecauseofthefearofbeingdominatedbytheMuslimmajorityinaunifiedcountry,SerbsdidnotendorseBosni‐an declaration and heralded the creation of “the Serbian Republic ofBosniaandHerzegovina.”TheregularityofkillingsinSarajevoandoth‐erprovincesofEasternBosniamadeviolence escalatingbymid‐AprilandMay1992.

International community’s efforts to manage the conflict startedsoon,withtheEUandtheUNimposingeconomicsanctionsonthebel‐ligerents.In1993,theUNSCdeclaredsomecitiesinBosnia‐Herzegovinatobe “safeareas,”15allowingNATOtoprotect civilianswith theuseofforce in these cities. Intense fighting continued throughout 1994,withthe Bosnian Serb protagonist of shelling safe areas on repeated occa‐sions and causing the deaths of thousands of civilians.16 The turningpointsof thecrisisoccurred in July1995,when8,000BosnianMuslimweremassacredbytheBosnianSerbtroopsinSrebrenica. Inthepres‐enceof aUNultimatumandpreviousUNSC resolutions,NATOstartedOperationDeliberateForceon30August1995.Thisoperationwascon‐ductedby16NATOalliesandresultedintwoweeksofintensebombing,

14 For this paragraph see Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Bosnia‐Herzegovina,

http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id 20.15 UN Security Council Resolution 816/1993, 31March 1993, http://www.un.org/

en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol S/RES/816 1993 .16UnitedNations, Past peacekeeping operations:UnitedNationsProtectionForce‐

Former Yugoslavia, September 1996, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprof_b.htm.


37

mainly directed towards Bosnian Serb command and control installa‐tionsandammunitionfacilities,17involvingatotalof3,515airsorties.18According to the US Defense Department, Operation Deliberate ForceprovedtobeeffectiveinhelpingtoliftthesiegeofSarajevo,savinglivesandcontributinggreatly topavetheway foranegotiatedsettlement.19The settlement, namely the General Framework Agreement for Peace,was signedon21November1995at theUSAirForcebase inDayton,Ohio.NATO air operation and the followingDayton agreement can beconsidered“theresultofapurposefulU.S.strategyofcoercivediploma‐cyputintoplacefromearly1994onward.”20Thisstrategycomprisedofseveral elements, includingmilitary, economicanddiplomatic typesofintervention:maintenanceofeconomicsanctionsagainstSerbianleaderSlobodanMilosevic,covertarmingofBosnianMuslimandCroattroops,limitedairstrikesasaformofwarning,andtheapplicationofdecisiveuseofforcethroughairpower,finallypairedwithagroundoffensivebyCroatandMuslimforces.Hence,thiscoercivediplomacywasaimed“tobreaktheSerbparty’sterritorialdominanceinsideBosnia‐Herzegovinaand create a balance on the ground propitious to a negotiated out‐come.”21 In the implementationphase, a strongNATO ImplementationForce IFOR replacingUNtroopswasdeployedinBosnia‐Herzegovinatoverifytheexecutionoftheagreement’smilitaryprovisions,whiletheHighRepresentativeoftheInternationalCommunityinBosniaandHer‐zegovina,namelyCarlBildt,wasappointedtosupervisetherealizationof the civilian elements of Dayton.22 In 1996, the Stabilization Force

17NATOAlliedCommandOperation,NATO’sOperations1949‐Present,http://www.

aco.nato.int/resources/21/NATO%20Operations,%201949‐Present.pdf.18RyanC.Hendrickson,“CrossingtheRubicon”,inNATOReview,No.3/2005 Sum‐

mer 2005 , http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/Combating‐Terrorism/Crossing‐Rubicon/EN/index.htm.

19 Global Security, Military Operations, Operation Deliberate Force, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/deliberate_force.htm.

20R.CraigNation,WarintheBalkans 1991‐2002 ,Carlisle,StrategicStudiesInsti‐tute, August 2003, p. 193, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/dis‐play.cfm?pubID 123.

21Ibid.22UppsalaConflictDataProgram,Bosnia‐Herzegovina,cit.


38

SFOR replaced IFOR, and later continued its peace‐keeping missionunderNATOcommanduntil2004andthenunderEUcommand Opera‐tionAlthea .

In thiscontext, Italycontributed toallNATOmissionsconducted inBosnia‐Herzegovinautilizingavastvarietyofplatformsincludingfight‐eraircraft.

OperationDenyFlight, lasting from12April 1993 to 20December1995,wasaimedathinderinganymilitaryoperation intheskiesoverBosnia‐Herzegovina by enforcing a No‐Fly Zone NFZ , in compliancewith UNSC resolution 816/1993. For the first time in NATO history,OperationDenyFlightfeaturedacombatoperationinwhichfourBos‐nianSerbfighter‐bomberwhereshutdownbyAlliedaircraftpatrollingtheNFZ.23 For almost three years, Italy took part toDeny Flightmis‐sionswithTornadoandAMXfighteraircraft,whichcollected543sor‐ties and 1,288 flight hours.24 In addition, Italy provided an extremelyvaluable logistical support toNATOunitsdeployedon Italianmilitarybases.

Likewise, Italian armed forces also contributed to NATOOperationSharpGuard from12April1993 to20December1995, tosupportUNmaritimeembargoaimingtostopweapons’importationbythecombat‐ants. In the operation, 8 Tornado reinforced Italian Maritime Units’presence in the Adriatic Sea, racking up 230 sorties and 267 flighthours.25

From30Augustto20September1995,theItalianAirForcewasem‐ployedalsoinOperationDeliberateForce,26with8Tornado,6AMX,oneBoeing707Tanker,oneC‐130andfourG‐222.27Asstatedbefore,Oper‐

23NATOAlliedCommandOperation,NATO’sOperations1949‐Present,cit.24ItalianAirForce,OperazioniInternazionali, Jugoslavia 1999 ,http://www.aero‐

nautica.difesa.it/Operazioni/Internazionali/Pagine/Jugoslavia.aspx.25DataprovidedbytheItalianAirForce’sstatisticaldivision.26Bombingsbeganbetweenthe30andthe31AugustwithOperationDeadeye.The

operationpausedbetween the1and the5Septemberand then restartedagainunderthenameof“OperationDeliberateForce”, followingtheBosnianSerbfailedattempttocomplywithUNresolutions.

27HellenicResourcesNetwork,OperationDeliberateForce.SummaryData,15No‐vember1995,http://www.hri.org/docs/nato/summary.html.


39

ation Deliberate Force was initiated with the intent to protecting UN“safe areas,”which cameunder attack byBosnian Serbianmilitias de‐spiteUNSC resolutions. Inparticular,Alliedaircraftwere tasked tohitanyartillery i.e.tank,mortar,etc enteringa40kmlargecirclearoundthe cities.28Of the totalof3,515sorties flown,2,470werepenetratingsorties,includingattackson48BosnianSerbiantargets,whereasofthe1,026bombsdropped,708werePrecisionGuidedMunitions PGM and318 non‐precision munitions. Italian fighter conducted 26 sorties,amountingto41flyinghours.29

From6December1995to20December1996,Italyalsoparticipatedin Operation Decisive Endeavour in support of NATO Operation JointEndeavour. In this operation, Italy backed NATO’s first peace‐keepingmission,theImplementationForce IFOR ,whichwastoimplementthemilitary aspects of the Dayton Agreements. Italy contributed with 8Tornadoand6AMX.The fighteraircraftdeployedamounted for1,250sortiesand3,150flighthours.30

Finally, followingtheendofOperationJointEndeavour, theItalianAir Force was involved in Operation Deliberate Guard in support ofOperation JointGuard 21December1996‐11 June1998 . In thisop‐eration, Italian aircraft carried out 2,974 sorties and 7,227 hours offlight.31

Overall, Italy provided the indispensable logistical footprint forNATOoperationsinBosnia‐Herzegovina,withapeakof350alliedair‐craft hosted in the basis of Rimini, Piacenza, Ghedi, Brindisi and Vil‐lafranca.32

28Interviewdated11December2013.29DataprovidedbytheItalianAirForce’sstatisticaldivision.30ItalianAirForce,OperazioniInternazionali,Jugoslavia 1999 ,cit.31DataprovidedbytheItalianAirForce’sstatisticaldivision.32Interviewdated11December2013.


40

OPERATIONDENYFLIGHT

Generalinformation(April1993‐December1995)

CoalitionForces33 ChainofCommand UNSecurityCouncilResolution

Belgium,Canada,Denmark,France,Germany,Italy,theNetherlands,Norway,Spain,Turkey,UKandtheUS

NATO Yes

Italiancontribution (April1993‐December1995)34


Tornado,AMX 543 1,288

OPERATIONSHARPGUARD

Generalinformation(June1993‐October1996)


Belgium,Canada,Denmark,France,Germany,Italy,theNetherlands,Norway,Spain,UKandtheUS

NATO Yes

Italiancontribution (April1993‐December1995)36


8Tornado 230 267

33 Hellenic Resources Network, NATOOperationDeny Flight, 15 September 1995,

http://www.hri.org/news/misc/misc‐news/1995/95‐09‐15.misc.html; Canadian Forc‐es‐DirectorateofHistoryandHeritage,OperationsDatabase:DenyFlight,http://www.cmp‐cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh‐dhp/od‐bdo/di‐ri‐eng.asp?IntlOpId 158.

34ItalianAirForce,Operazioniinternazionali:Jugoslavia 1999 ,cit.35 NATO‐IFOR, NATO/WEU Operation Sharp Guard, 2 October 1996, http://www.

nato.int/ifor/general/shrp‐grd.htm.36ItalianAirForce,Operazioniinternazionali:Jugoslavia 1999 ,cit.


41

OPERATIONDELIBERATEFORCEGeneralinformation(August1995‐September1995)


US(65.9%),UK(9.3%)France(8.1%),theNether‐lands(5.6%),Spain(3.4%),NATO,NAEW(2.7%),Tur‐key(2.2%),Germany(1.7%),Italy(1%)

NATO Yes

Italiancontribution (August1995‐September1995)

Aircraft38 Sorties39 FlightHours

8Tornado,6AMX 26 41

OPERATIONDECISIVEENDEAVORINSUPPORTOFJOINTENDEAVORGeneralinformation(December1995‐December1996)



NATO Yes

Italiancontribution (December1995‐December1996)

Aircraft41 Sorties FlightHours

Tornado,AMX 1,250 3,150

37GlobalSecurity,MilitaryOperations:OperationDeliberateForce,cit.; JohnA.Tir‐

pak, “Deliberate Force”, in Air Force Magazine, Vol. 80, No. 10 October 1997 ,http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/1997/October%201997/1097deliberate.aspx.

38HellenicResourcesNetwork,OperationDeliberateForce.SummaryData,cit.39DataprovidedbytheItalianAirForce’sstatisticaldivision.40CanadianForces‐DirectorateofHistoryandHeritage,OperationsDatabase:Deci‐

sive Endeavor, http://www.cmp‐cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh‐dhp/od‐bdo/di‐ri‐eng.asp?IntlOpId 154.

41ItalianAirForce,Operazioniinternazionali:Jugoslavia 1999 ,cit.


42

OPERATIONDELIBERATEGUARDINSUPPORTOFJOINTGUARDGeneralinformation(December1996‐June1998)



NATO Yes

Italiancontribution(December1996‐June1998)



1.3 KOSOVO (1999)

Another civil war erupted in Yugoslavia in June 1998 in Kosovo, aSouthernprovinceofSerbia.Severalcausescanbeattributedtotheini‐tiationofhostilities.“Theneighboureffect”playedcertainlyamajorrolein theonsetof violence, as thepreviouswars in the region spread re‐gionalinstability,whichincreasinglyfedtheraisingnationalismsoftheKosovarandtheSerbianethnicitiesinKosovo.Moreover,sinceSerbianindependence in1878, tensionsbasedonethnicaffiliation fuelledmis‐perceptionsandbrutalitiesbetweentheAlbaniansandtheSerbs.43Thelatter also depicted the territory of Kosovo as “the holy land”, wheretheir ancestrieshad fought the renowned “BattleofKosovo” and fromwhere the Kosovar had to be expelled.44 In this already troublesomecontext,politicalandeconomicgrievancesalsotriggeredastrongsense

42CanadianForces‐DirectorateofHistoryandHeritage,OperationsDatabase:Delib‐

erateGuard,http://www.cmp‐cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh‐dhp/od‐bdo/di‐ri‐eng.asp?IntlOpId159.

43ChristopherCviic,Reviewof“Kosovo1945‐2005”,inInternationalAffairs,Vol.81,No.4 July2005 ,pp.851‐860.

44Michael E. Salla, “Traveling the Full Circle: Serbia’s ‘Final Solution’ to the KosovoProblem”,inJournalofMuslimMinorityAffairs,Vol.18,No.2 October1998 ,pp.229‐240.


43

ofresentmentamongtheKosovarpopulation.Intheend,SerbianPresi‐dent SlobodanMilosevic suspended in1990 the constitutional amend‐mentwhichhadgivenKosovoequalautonomywiththeotherrepublicsinYugoslavia.

SkirmishesbetweentheKosovoLiberationArmy KLA andtheSer‐bian troopsbegan in1996,althoughanopencivilwareruptedonly in1998, after the killing of 56 Albanians in the village of Prezak, in theDrenicaregion.45Theviolentescalationoftheconflictmountedconcernintheinternationalcommunity,whichsoughttoregulateitbyimposingsanctions and an arms embargo on Serbia.46 The US made MilosevicagreeonaceasefireinOctober1998,butthesituationcrashedsoonand,after themassacreof45civilians inRacak, theceasefirewasdeadandgone.47InJanuary1999,aconferencewasheldatChâteaudeRambouil‐let France by the Contact Group US, Russia, UK, France, Italy andGermany withthepurposeofsittingKosovarandSerbstogetheratthesame table to negotiate a solution to the dispute. After fifteen days ofconsultation,theKosovaracceptedthefinalsettlementproposedbytheContactGroup.However,sinceNATOwouldhaveenjoyedfreeaccesstothe entire territory of Serbia during the implementation, the Serbiangovernmentdecidednottosigntheagreement.

Afterthefailureofdiplomatictalks,NATOdecidedtointervenemili‐tarilyintheconflict,inspiteoftheabsenceofanadhocauthorizationbytheUNSC.Kosovo’saircampaign,namelyOperationAlliedForce,beganonMarch24andconsistedof78daysofintensebombing.AccordingtoNATO, theaircampaignwas launched“tohalt thehumanitariancatas‐trophethatwasthenunfoldinginKosovo.Thedecisiontointervenefol‐lowedmorethanayearoffightingwithintheprovinceandthefailureofinternational efforts to resolve the conflict by diplomaticmeans.”48 Indoingso,NATOmeantalsotoavoidthedestabilizationofSouthEastern

45 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Serbia Yugoslavia , http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gp

database/gpcountry.php?id 171.46Ibid.47HowardClark,CivilResistanceinKosovo,LondonandSterling,PlutoPress,2000.48 NATO, The Kosovo Air Campaign, 5 March 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/el/

natolive/topics_49602.htm.


44

Europe and stop the displacement of refugees in neighbouring coun‐tries. Finally, the credibility of the Alliancewas at stake too, once thethreatoftheuseofforcehadbeenwavedduringtheentirenegotiationprocess. These goals were developed into a military strategy whichaimedtoforcetheSerbianforcesoutofKosovo,tostoptherepressionof the Kosovars and to minimize Western casualties and the loss offriendlyaircraft.49Inthefirstdaysofthewar,NATOconcentrateditsef‐fort in destroying Serbian air defense system. Nonetheless, after tendaysofaircampaign,resultswerefarfrombeingenthusiastic,asSerbi‐andefenceshadnotbeenseriouslydamagedbyNATO’smissilesandMi‐losevicdidnotappeartobemorewillingtonegotiate.50AtthebeginningofApril,NATOdecidedtomodifyitsstrategyandstartedtotargetSer‐bian economic and strategic lines of communication and to cut off itsenergy supplies. Furthermore, NATO began to cooperate with KLAtroopson the ground to challenge the Serbsdirectly inKosovo.51Thischange in strategy brought the expected results, as “costs associatedwithintensedailybombingeffortsandthegradualaccrualofcostsovertime”52 forcedMilosevic to accept the final settlement. Besides the aircampaign, themediationrolebythe internationalcommunitywasalsoessentialtoterminatetheconflict,53asmilitaryactionanddiplomaticef‐forts were strictly intertwined. The civil war officially terminated inJune1999, following theMilitaryTechnicalAgreementbetweenNATOand Serbia 9 June 1999 and the UN Security Council resolution1244/1999. Since 1999, theNATOKosovo force KFOR has been de‐ployedinKosovowithpeace‐keepingandstabilizationpurposes,backed

49DanielL.BymanandMatthewC.Waxman,“KosovoandtheGreatAirPowerDe‐

bate”, in International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 Spring 2000 , pp. 5‐38, http://belfer‐center.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/428;SusanH.AllenandTiffanyVincent, “BombingtoBargain?TheAirWar forKosovo”, inForeignPolicyAnalysis,Vol.7,No.1 January2011 ,pp.1‐26.

50IISS,“NATO’scampaigninYugoslavia”,inStrategicComments,Vol.5,No.3 April1999 ,pp.1‐4.

51Ibid.52SusanH.AllenandTiffanyVincent,“BombingtoBargain?…”,cit.53Ibid.SeealsoEfirdBrianetal.,“NegotiatingPeaceinKosovo”,inInternationalIn‐

teractions,Vol.26,No.2 2000 ,pp.153‐178.


45

upbyanEUoperation–EULEXKosovo–tosupportthedevelopmentoftheKosovarState’snewinstitutions.

InOperationAlliedForce, from24March to10 June1999, Italy in‐tervened with approximately 50 aircraft, including F‐104, Tornado,AMX, and AV‐8B. In particular, Tornado and AMX platforms achieved1,022sortiesand2,828flighthours,54whereas6AV‐8BdeployedontheCavour carrier realized 50 sorties for 75 flight hours.55 Overall, thequantitative and qualitative effort of the Italian forces was highly re‐garded, as Italy was the third largest contributor of aircraft and thefourthlargestforthenumberofairsorties,excludingtheUS.56LiketheirGerman counterparts, the Italian Tornados, in the Electronic CombatReconnaissance ECR version, were “the shooters,”57 generally de‐ployedinSuppressionofEnemyAirDefenses SEAD missionsandem‐ployingAGM‐88HighSpeedAnti‐RadiationMissile HARM missilestotargetSerbianobjectives.Usually, Italianaircrafthadtopenetrateene‐my air space, locate radars and Surface‐to‐AirMissiles SAM systemsanddestroy them.Thesemissionswereconductedatnightandduringtheday,inthehardestmeteorologicalconditions,withtheoverallscopetoachieveairsuperiorityandallowbomberaircrafttohitstrategicob‐jectivesafterwards.58TheAMXaircraftalsohadanimportantroleintac‐ticalsupportandbattlefieldAirInterdiction AI .59Althoughperformingwell also in the presence of possible attacks, AMX usually conductedmissionswithinconsistentSerbthreatandabove15,000feetofaltitude.Departing fromthe ItalianbasesofGioiadelColleandAmendola,Tor‐nadoandAMXdidnotparticipateinoperationsagainstSerbseconomicandstrategictargets,suchasenergyplantsandtheBelgradetelevisionstation, which raised criticisms about the use of force against non‐

54DataprovidedbytheItalianAirForce’sstatisticaldivision.55Interviewdated14March2014.56 JohnE.Peters et al., EuropeanContributions toOperationAlliedForce. Implica‐

tions for Transatlantic Cooperation, Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 2001, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1391.html.

57Ibid.58“50°stormo:GhostWeasel”,inRivistaaeronautica,n.1/2000,pp.35‐47.59AndreaNativi,“Jugoslavia:unamaratonamilitareperlaNATO”,inRID:Rivistaita‐

lianaDifesa,n.7/1999,pp.26‐33.


46

military targets. Italian fighter carried onmissionsmainly to obstructSerbianmilitary forces threatening theAlbanianpopulation inKosovo.InrelationtotheNavy’saircraft,ItalianAV‐8Bwereinitiallyexploitedtoprotect national maritime units deployed in the Adriatic sea, eventhough they were later used in air‐to‐surface engagement operations,thankstotheirinfraredtargetingtechnologies.60Finally,F‐104alsogavea contribution to NATOmission, especially in some emergency situa‐tionswhentheyhadtosubstituteothercountries’aircraft.61

Additionally,other Italian andallies aircapabilitieswereemployedtoprotectItaly’snationalterritoryfrompossibleretaliationfromtheSer‐bianmilitary, i.e.throughmissileorairattacks,byconductingDefensiveCounterAir DCA sortiesontheItalianeasternborder.Actually,Italyhasbeenone of the very fewNATOmembers exposed to these risks in thepost‐ColdWarperiod,becauseofitsgeographicalproximitytotheopera‐tionaltheatre–andparticularlywiththeSerbianmilitarycapabilities.

OPERATIONALLIEDFORCEGeneralinformation(March1999‐June1999)


US(80%),France(6%),UK(5%),Italy(3%),theNeth‐erlands(3%),Germany(2%)

NATO No

Italiancontribution(March1999‐June1999)

Aircraft63 Sorties FlightHours

22Tornado,6AMX,6F‐104ASA,6TornadoIDS,4TornadoECR/IDS,4F‐104ASA,6AV‐8B

1,072 2,903

60Interviewdated14March2014.61Ibid.62JohnE.Petersetal.,EuropeanContributionstoOperationAlliedForce,cit.63Ibid.


47

1.4 AFGHANISTAN (2001-2014)

The terrorist attacks in New York andWashington on 11 September2001 caused a strong military response by the US administrationheaded by George W. Bush, appealing to the right of self‐defenceagainsttheperpetrators.Thisright,acknowledgedbyArt.51oftheUNChart,waslaterrecognizedandreaffirmedbyresolutions1368/2001and1373/2001,whichwereissuedbytheUNSCfollowingthemassa‐cre of the World Trade Center. In particular, resolution 1368/2001called“onallstatestoStatestoworktogetherurgentlytobringtojus‐tice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist at‐tacks and stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting orharbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these actswillbeheldaccountable.”64

Operation Enduring Freedom begun on 7 October and took placeprimarilyinAfghanistan,wheretheTalibanregimehostedandsupport‐edAlQaeda,aterroristorganizationledbyOsamaBinLaden.AccordingtoUSintentions,theoperationwasaimedtodestroyAlQaedaterroristtraining camps and infrastructures, capture its leaders and ensure thecessationofterroristactivitiesinAfghanistan.65Sevencountriesactivelycontributedtotheoperation:Australia,Canada,France,Germany,Italy,NorwayandtheUnitedKingdom,whileseveralothercountriesofferedtheirmilitarycooperationandsupport.66ThroughtheuseofAirPowerandspecialforcesinsupportofAfghanopposition,theUSanditsalliesmanaged to overthrow the Taliban regime from Kabul and began acountry‐widecounter‐terrorismcampaign targetingAlQaedaaffiliatedcombatants. In February 2007, the commands of Operation Enduring

64UNSecurityCouncilResolution1368/2001,12September2001,http://www.un.

org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol S/RES/1368 2001 .65GeorgeW.Bush,AddresstoaJointSessionofCongressandtheAmericanPeople,20

September 2001, http://georgewbush‐whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920‐8.html.

66Belgium,Bulgaria,CzechRepublic,Denmark,Estonia,Grecia, Japan, Jordan,NewZealand,NorwayPakistan,Poland,Portugal,Romania,Slovakia,Slovenia.USDeptofDe‐fense‐OfficeofPublicAffairs,InternationalContributionstotheWaragainstTerrorism,14June2002,http://2001‐2009.state.gov/coalition/cr/fs/12753.htm.


48

Freedom and of International Security Assistance Force ISAF wereunitedunderthesameUScommander.

Following the UN Security Council Resolutions 1378/2001 and1386/200167ofDecember2001,ISAFwasdeployedinKabultoassisttheAfghanTransitionalAuthority inpartnershipwiththeUnitedNationAs‐sistanceMission inAfghanistan UNAMA .OnAugust 2003,NATO tookover ISAF’s command, and gradually extended the area of operation tocovertheentirecountrybytheendof2006.Indoingso,forthefirsttimeinitshistory,NATOactivatedart.5oftheWashingtonTreatyoncollectivedefencetoinitiateamilitaryintervention.FiftycountrieshavejoinedIS‐AF, includingmembers andnon‐membersof theAtlanticAlliance. Since2007, the mission has been under American command,68 with the USproviding between two thirds and three quarters of ISAF troops.69 Thestrategyandthecharactersofthemission,aswellasthetasksfulfilledbyISAF,havechangedinthelast13yearsmainlyaccordingtoUSdecisions.However,theultimategoalofthemissionhassubstantiallyremainedthesame: toactively support theestablishmentof apeaceful andstableAf‐ghanstatethatwillnotprovideanyhelptoAlQaedaoranyotherterror‐istgroupsthreateningNATOmembers.70Political,diplomatic,economic,military and intelligence efforts have been undertaken to achieve thisgoal.Concerningthemilitaryefforts,particularlyfrom2008to2013,ISAFhasfocusedontwotypesofactivities:ononehand,tocounteranypossi‐bleTalibaninsurgencybyundertakingcombatoperationsandpatrolac‐tivities;ontheotherhand,tobuildupAfghannationalsecurityforcesbytrainingandequippingthem.ISAF’smandateisgoingtoexpirebytheendof2014, andNATOhasalreadyset thedeploymentofmissionResoluteSupport to continue training Afghan security forces without combattasks ,whichishoweverexpectedtorelyonlessunitsthanISAF.

67FurtherUNSCResolutionshaverenovatedtheISAFmandateinAfghanistanover

the years: 1413/2002, 1510/2003, 1563/2004, 1623/2005, 1659/2006, 1707/2006,1444/2006,1746/2007,1817/2008,1890/2009,1917/2010,2041/2012,2069/2012.

68NATO‐ISAF,History,http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html.69 NATO‐ISAF, Troop numbers and contributions, updated 1 April 2014, http://

www.isaf.nato.int/troop‐numbers‐and‐contributions/index.php.70Ibid.


49

ItalycontributedtoOperationEnduringFreedomfrom18November2001 to 3December 2006.71 The ItalianNavy sent a task force in thePersianGulfincludingtheGaribaldiCarrierwiththreesupportfrigates,fromwhich8AV‐8Bandadozenofcombathelicoptersoperated,withatotal of 1,400military personnel in theatre.72 In the first phase of theoperation, theAlliance aircraft couldnot use any terrestrial airport tostart or continue their missions. Indeed, in the meantime diplomaticagreementswerebeingsignedtoallowWesternaircrafttobedeployedfromtheregion,tacticalaircraftdeployedoncarriersweretheonlyfea‐siblesolutiontokeepexecutingmissionsandproduced75%ofground‐attacksforalongtimesincethemissionhadstarted.Inthisfirstperiod,aircraftwereaskedtorealize6to8hourslongmissionstoreachobjec‐tives locatedup to1,500km from the carrier, at night andduring theday.Thishasbeenmadepossiblethankstoair‐to‐airrefuellingfromal‐lied tankers.73 In thisphase, theGaribaldi carriers remainedat sea for87days,withoutanytechnical layover,sailingmorethan20,000milesintheIndianOceanandpermittingAV‐8BtooperateintheAfghanthea‐tre,giventheabsenceofterrestrialsupport.74TheItalianfighteraircraftfulfilledtaskssuchasairinterdiction,suppressionofenemyairdefence,CloseAirSupport,airdefence, interceptionofsuspectaircraft,recogni‐tion,monitoringofseatrafficandcommunicationlines,seainterdictionand fleet protection.75 During this operation, 328 sorties have beencompleted, for a total of 860 flight hours.76 The Italian Navy AV‐8Bsshowed a full interoperability with the rest of the coalition platformsandcarriedonmissionsin“combinedpackets”withAmericanandEng‐

71ItalianChamberofDeputies‐ResearchService,“LamissioneISAFinAfghanistan”,

in Documentazione e ricerche, No. 20 28May 2013 , http://documenti.camera.it/leg17/dossier/Testi/DI0030.htm.

72ItalianSenate,ComunicazionidelGovernosull’impiegodicontingentimilitariitalianiall’esteroinrelazioneallacrisiinternazionaleinattoeconseguentediscussione,7Novem‐ber2001,http://www.senato.it/leg/14/BGT/Schede/ProcANL/ProcANLscheda6814.htm.

73Interviewdated14March2014.74Ibid.75ItalianSenate,ComunicazionidelGovernosull’impiegodicontingentimilitariita‐

lianiall’estero…,cit.76Interviewdated14March2014.


50

lishsimilarvehicles.Lateron,theyhavealsooperatedautonomouslyingroups of 2/4 aircraft, performing CAS and recognitionmissionswithinfraredprecisionmunitionssystems.77

WithrespecttoISAF, Italyhasbeenpartof themissionsince its in‐ceptionandhasincreaseditsmilitarycontributionsfromafewhundredtroopsin2002tonearly4,000in2009,inlinewiththerestofcontribu‐tions from other NATO members. General Mauro Del Vecchio tookcommandofthewholeISAFbetween2005and2006,whileItalyhasledtheRegionalCommandWestsinceitsestablishmentin2006.AsofFeb‐ruary2014,Italyhad2,165unitsontheground,rankingfourthamongcontributing nations.78 Italian troops have been deployed mainly be‐tweenKabulandthewesternregion,intheHeratandFarahprovinces.Concerningaircapabilities,in2007theJointAirTaskForce JATF wasestablishedinKabulaspartoftheRegionalCommandWestandtheAirComponent of ISAF. Comprised entirely of Italian personnel, the TaskForce’sfirstaimistocoordinatethoseItalianassetsthatareunderthedirectcontrolofNATOoperations.Theimportanceofthepresenceofaircapabilities inAfghanistanstems fromtheextensionandgeographyoftheterritory,whichNATOrequiredtoprotectwithanumberofforcesofalltypes.79Asof2013,JATFwasarticulatedinthreeTaskGroups,eachofthemhavingdifferentplatformsattheirdisposal:AMX “BlackCats” ,C‐130JandC‐27JJEDI “Albatros” andPredatorMQ1C “Astore” .80

InNovember2008,followingaNATOrequesttoimproveaerialsur‐veillanceoftheAfghanterritory,4TornadosleftItalytoreachtheGer‐manbaseofMazar‐eSharif,establishingthe“TaskGroupDevil.”Torna‐dosweredeployedtorunIntelligence,SurveillanceandReconnaissance

77In2004eightpilotsfromtheItalianNavyhavebeenawardedoftheUnitedStates

AirMedalfortheirvaluablecontributiontoOperationEnduringFreedom.78NATO‐ISAF,Troopnumbersandcontributions,cit.79 Italian Air Force, Operazioni internazionali: Afghanistan 2002 ‐ Joint Air Task

Force JATF , http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/Operazioni/Internazionali/afghanistan/Pagine/JointAirTaskForce JATF _ENG.aspx.

80ItalianAirForce,News:Herat:AMXconduconoazionidisicurezza,26September2013, http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/AfghanistangliAMXitalianiporta‐noatermineloperazioneBallpark_260913.aspx.


51

ISR activities,81providingonethirdofallphotographicmaterialinthedigital formatamong forcesresponsible for IRSmissionsand thusbe‐comingthefirstsupplierforthequantityandqualityofthematerialde‐livered.82Thisresultwaspossiblethankstoanewreconnaissancesys‐tem,namely thepodRecceLite,able to transfer inreal time ISR infor‐mation to stations on the ground, and to the support of Remotely Pi‐lotedAerialSystems RPAS ,83suchasthePredatorsMQ1C.BytheendofDecember2009,Tornadosachievedmorethan350sorties,amount‐ingtoabout900hoursofflightsandcovering800targets.84AMXvehi‐clesfromthe52ndand31stWingsofAmendolareplacedTornadosinthesameyear,arriving inHerat inNovember tocarryoutsimilar ISRactivities.85

ItalianAMXaircraftwerealso involved in operations such as thosenamed Shrimps Net in August 2012 and Ballpark in September 2013.During Operation Shrimps Net, Black Cats Task Group conducted 16missions,eitherTacticalAirReconnaissance TAR orCloseAirSupportCAS ,totallingmorethan45flighthours.86OperationBallpark,coordi‐natedandconductedentirelybyJATF,aimedatensuringoptimalsecuri‐ty conditions against ImprovisedExplosiveDevice IED or attacks bythe insurgents along one of the main Afghan highways, the HighwayOne.Inthiscontext,AMXreactedagainsthostileforcesoperatingalongthe highway, exploiting images from Predators and information from

81GregoryAlegi, “QuattroTornado italiani partiranno lunedìper l’Afghanistan”, in

DedaloNews,19November2008,http://www.dedalonews.it/it/?p 16935.82 Italian Air Force, Operazioni internazionali: Afghanistan 2002 ‐ Joint Air Task

Force JATF ,cit.83RPASplatformsarealsoknownasUnmannedAerialVehicles UAV orUnmanned

AerialSystems UAS ,andultimatelywiththename“Drones”.84ItalianAirForce,News:RientratalabandieradiGuerradel6°Stormo,15Decem‐

ber 2009, http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/Rientro_Bandiera_Guerra_Ghedi.aspx.

85 ItalianAirForce,News:QuattrocacciaAM‐XgiuntiadHerat,4November2009,http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/AM‐X_Herat.aspx.

86 Italian Air Force, News: Conclusa l’operazione ‘Shrimps Net’, 20 August 2012,http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/Conclusal%E2%80%99operazioneShrimpsNet.aspx.


52

troopsontheground.87Inadditiontotheseoperations,AMXwerealsoemployed inmore“assertive” typeofmissions, for instancewhentheytargetedandhittwocommunicationsystemsusedbyinsurgentsinthedistrictofBakwainDecember2012,88orwhentheydestroyedthreean‐tennatowersusingGPS‐guidedmissilesintheprovinceofFarahinApril2013.89UntilMay2013,AMXvehicleshavebeenengagedinmorethan2,400 sorties in day and night operations, covering 6,300 targets andphotographing several kilometers of the Afghan territory.90 On thewhole,untilDecember2013,Italianfighterhavecontributed3,031sor‐tiesand8,447flighthourstoISAFmission.91OPERATIONENDURINGFREEDOM

Generalinformation(2001‐2006)

CoalitionForces ChainofCommand UNSecurityCouncilResolution

Italy,France,Netherlands,UK,US

UnitedStates Yes

Italiancontribution(November2001‐December2006)


AV‐8B 328 860

87ItalianAirForce,News:Herat:AMXconduconoazionidisicurezza,cit.88 ItalianAirForce,News:Afghanistan:AMXdistruggonoantennedeiribelli,7 July

2012,http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/AMXdell%E2%80%99Aeronauticadistruggonodueantennedeiribelli.aspx.

89ItalianAirForce,News:Durocolpoallecomunicazionidegliinsorti,30April2013,http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/Afghanistandurocolpoallecomunicazionidegliinsorti_300413.aspx.

90 ItalianAirForce,News:Afghanistan:7000oredivolopergliAMX,6May2013,http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/ContinualaserieditraguardioperativiRCW.aspx.

91DataprovidedbytheItalianAirForce’sstatisticaldivision.


53

OPERATIONISAF

Generalinformation(2001‐ongoing)

CoalitionForces ChainofCommand UNSecurityCouncilResolution

Italy,Germany,France,TheNetherlands,UK,US92

NATO Yes

Italiancontribution(2002‐ongoing)



1.5 LIBYA (2011)

Thereasons that ledsomeNATOcountries toplanandconductapro‐longedaircampaigninLibyain2011arestillacontentiousissueandanobject of studies and analysis by experts and jurists.93 France, the UKandtheUShadaleadingpoliticalroletoinitiatethemilitaryoperation,notwithstanding their different perspectives and political intents. TheUS military effort certainly was indispensable to launch the multina‐tionaloperationandconductthefirstphaseofthecampaigninLibya.Inthewarmupoftheoperations,13morenationsdecidedtojointhecoa‐lition,thoughsomeofthem–includingItaly94–wereparticularlyscep‐ticalaboutitslong‐termimplicationsonLibya’sstability.95Althoughthetime is not yet sufficiently ripe to draw final considerations, it seems

92Since2001around50countriescontributedtothemission.Butonlyfewcountries

providedaircapabilitiesrelevant for the focusof thisstudy.Formore informationseeNATO‐ISAF,Troopnumbersandcontributions,cit.

93See,amongothers,NatalinoRonzitti,“NATO’sInterventioninLibya:AGenuineAc‐tiontoProtectaCivilianPopulation inMortalDangeroranInterventionAimedatRe‐gimeChange?”,inTheItalianYearbookofInternationalLaw,Vol.21,2011,pp.3‐21.

94 “Libia: il “Colle”sostiene ibombardamenti.Berlusconi: ‘con laLegaè tuttoapo‐sto’”, in Corriere della Sera, 26 November 2011, http://www.corriere.it/politica/11_aprile_26/napolitano‐libia‐frattini_a17bffc4‐6fea‐11e0‐9dd7‐595a41612a44.shtml.

95 IanBlack,“Concernedneighbourswarnagainst foreigninterventioninLibya”, inTheGuardian,2March2011,http://gu.com/p/2nfan/tw.


54

thatthehumanitarianrationale,whichhascharacterizedtheinitiativeatthe UN Security Council level, was an important factor, especially intermsoflegitimacyintheeyesofthepublicopinion.Howeverthiswasnot the unique element, andmaybe not even themost important one,explainingthemilitaryintervention.96

Officially, the military operations were undertaken in response toeventsoccurredduringtheLibyanrebellion,whichcameinthecontextof awiderunrest in theMiddleEast andNorthAfrica.The insurgencystarted after a series of protests and revolts against the regime ofMuammar Gaddafi in February 2011, partly inspired by the uprisingsthat brought down the governments of Libya’s neighbours, Egypt andTunisia.Theprotests,particularlyintheBenghaziarea,escalatedintoanarmed rebellion that spread across the country with the objective tooverthrowtheincumbentgovernment.

This situationcaused thereactionof theUNSecurityCouncilon26February,which passed an initial resolution establishing an arms em‐bargo,asset freezeandtravelbanagainstGaddafiandotherhigh‐levelmembersof theregime,whilealsoreferringthematter to the Interna‐tionalCriminalCourtforfurtherinvestigation.97On17March2011,theUNSC adopted resolution 1973,which authorized the use of force, in‐cludingtheestablishmentofaNFZ,toprotectciviliansandareastarget‐edbytheGaddafiloyalistforces.98

With respect to the military intervention, the UNSC Resolution1973/2011:

AuthorizedMemberStates,actingnationallyorthroughregionalorganizations or arrangements, to take all necessarymeasuresto protect civilians and related populated areas under attack,including Benghazi. The resolution specifically excluded theestablishmentofaforeignforceoranyotherforminanypartoftheLibyanterritory.

96MarioArpino,“L’ItalianelleoperazioniinLibia”,inAffarInternazionali,6Decem‐

ber2011,http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID 1925.97 Resolution 1970/2011, 26 February 2011, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/

view_doc.asp?symbol S/RES/1970 2011 .98Resolution1973/2011,17March2011,http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_

doc.asp?symbol S/RES/1973 2011 .


55

CalledMembers States of the Arab League to cooperate in theimplementationoftheestablishedmeasures.

AuthorizedtheestablishmentofaNFZ inLibyanairspace.Thatflight ban would not apply to flights that had as their solepurposehumanitarianaid,theevacuationofforeignnationals,toenforcingthebanor“otherpurposesdeemednecessaryforthebenefitoftheLibyanpeople.”

Authorized Member States to take all necessary measures toenforcecompliancewiththebanonflightsimposed.

InordertoimplementtheUNSCResolution1973,on19MarchaUS‐ledoperation, named Operation Odyssey Dawn, started with French andBritishsupport.Thegoalwastwofold:1 preventingfurtherattacksbyloyalist forces on Libyan citizens and opposition groups, especially inandaroundBenghazi;2 degradingtheloyalist forces’capabilitytore‐sisttheNFZauthorizedbytheUNSCresolution.99Inthemeanwhile,po‐liticalnegotiationsstartedtoshifttheoperationfroma“CoalitionoftheWilling” to aNATO integratedmilitary command.On23March,NATOassumedcommandofmilitaryoperations to enforce theUNarmsem‐bargo.Thetransferofcommandresponsibility for theNFZwasagreedon24March,whilethedecisiontotransfercommandandcontrolforallmilitaryoperations inLibyawastakenon27March.Asaresult,NATOformallyassumedtheresponsibilityofthere‐namedOperationUnifiedProtectoron31March2011.OperationUnifiedProtectorendedon31

October2011,afterthecollapseoftheloyalistforcesandLibyanincum‐bentgovernment.100Asof2013,neitherNATO,norEUstabilizationmis‐siononthegroundhasfollowedtheaircampaign.

Italy’scontributiontooperationsinLibyahasbeenthree‐fold.First,ina chronologicalorder, the ItalianNavy, including theNavyAviation,ledNATOnaval operation to enforce theUN arms embargo, including

99USDeptofDefense,DoDNewsBriefingbyViceAdm.GortneyfromthePentagonon

Lybia Operation Odyssey Dawn, 19 March 2011, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid 4786.

100 Italian Air Force, News: Task Group Air di Trapani Birgi, 31 August 2011,http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/RaggiuntidueimportantitraguardiperilTaskGroupAirBirgi_310811.aspx.


56

operationsinLibyancoastalwaterssubjecttomilitarythreatsfromloy‐alistforces.

Second,theuseofmilitarybasesontheItalianterritorywascrucialtocarryontheairoperation,whichcouldnothavebeenpossiblewith‐outsuchlargefootprintclosetotheoperationaltheatre.AsithappenedduringNATOmissionsintheWesternBalkans,thisimpliedtheriskofretaliationbytheLibyanloyalistforcesagainstItaly,asitwasagainoneofthefewNATOmembersgeographicallyclosetotheoperationalthea‐tre.ItalsoimpliedasignificantItalianeffortintermsofmanpowerandeconomic resources. The Italian air bases involved inmilitary opera‐tionswereAviano,Amendola,Decimomannu,GioiadelColle,Panteller‐ia,Sigonella,andTrapani.Overall,4,800militarypersonnelhavebeencommitted toprovidea setofactivitiesandservices, fromair traffic’scontroltotechnicalassistanceontheground.Inparticular,Trapanimil‐itarybasishosted14%ofthetotalcoalitionsorties.Italy’salsoprovid‐ed the operation with “operational planners,” as they contributed toNATO command and control structure at all levels. Moreover, ItalyhostedtheJointForceCommand JFC inNaples,whilecontributingatthetactical levelwiththeCombinedAirOperationCentre5 COAC inPoggioRenatico.

Third,giventhefocusofthisstudy,itisparticularlyimportanttolookaftertheactiveparticipationofItalianaircapabilitiestobothOperationOdysseyDawnandthenOperationUnifiedProtector.Overall,Italianair‐craftconductedabout7%ofthetotalAlliedmissionsinLibyanskies,ac‐countingforthelargestItalianAirForceoperationafterWorldWarII.101The bulk of committed Italian air capabilitieswere fighter aircraft in‐cludingF‐16,Eurofighter,TornadoandAMXbasedinTrapaniundertheBirgiAirTaskGroup, aswell asAV‐8Bdeployedon the Italian carrierGaribaldi.TankerssuchasKC‐130JandKC‐767AaswellasPredatorsBcontributedtotheairpackages.102

Italianfighteraircraftexecuteddifferenttypesofmissions,including:

101 Italian Air Force, Operazioni Internazionali, Libia 2011 , http://www.aero‐

nautica.difesa.it/Operazioni/Internazionali/Pagine/Libia 2011 _eng.aspx.102Ibid.


57

a Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses SEAD . The Italian AirForcewastheonlyairforce togetherwiththeAmericanone tocarry out this type of mission, employing Tornados ECR fromPiacenzaAirbase’s 50thWing.These aircraft are equippedwithparticularsystemsabletolocateairdefenceradaremissionsandto neutralize them by delivering air‐to‐surface AGM‐88 HARMmissiles. These activities coerce opponents to deactivate theirsystems and allow friendly forces to enter the zone of theoperationstoconducttheirownmissionwithoutthepossibilityofbeinghitbytheenemy.103DuringSEADoperations,Tornadosoperateas“FirstInLastOut,”astheymustbethefirstaircrafttoreach the centre of gravity and the last to leave in order toprotect friendly forces from the beginning until the end of themission.104

b DefensiveCounterAir DCA .DCAactivitiesconsistofpatrolandair defence operations, which were performed by F‐16 fighteraircraft from the 37thWing and Eurofighters from the 4th and36thWings. Inparticular, F‐16andEurofightersweredeployedin support ofNFZover Libya todefendAllied aircraft fromairand ground attacks, as well as to maintain air superiority.105Moreover,Eurofighterswereemployedtosafeguard“HighValueAirborne Assets,” hence to escort tactical aircraft deployed inparticularmissions.106

c Offensive Counter Air OCA and Strike Coordination AndReconnaissance SCAR . The OCA envisaged air‐to‐surfaceattacks on prearranged ground targets, while SCAR aimed at“dynamic” targets in areas with high concentration of enemy

103Ibid.104 Italian Air Force, News: Unified protector: le capacità di attacco dell’AM, 6 June

2011,http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/UnifiedProtectorlecapacit%C3%A0diattaccodell%E2%80%99AeronauticaMilitare_060611.aspx.

105Ibid.106 ItalianAir Force,News:Unified Protector: 1000oredi voloper l’Eurofighter, 15

June 2011, http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/operazioneunifiedprotectorl%E2%80%99f2000%E2%80%9Ctyphoon%E2%80%9Draggiungele1000oredivolo.aspx.


58

assets.Thesetypeofmissions,withasubstantialcontributionofAV‐8B,wereledbothbyTornadoIDSfromthe6thWingandAMXfromthe32ndand51stWings.AlltargetswereassignedbyNATO,afterverificationofcompliancetotheguidelinesestablishedbythe political authority. Italian fighter launched more than 550GPSandlaserguidedmissiles,includingGBU‐12,16,24,32,38,48, EGBU‐24, and long range Storm Shadow cruise missile,havinga96%strikeaccuracy.107

d Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance ISR . Thesemissionswere conducted by Tornado IDS initially, then by AMX fighterandAV‐8BwiththesupportofRPASsuchasPredatorsB.Duringthese missions, Italian aircraft were tasked to acquire thenecessary information on the ground to be used during airoperations. In particular, Italian forces exploited the RecceLiteelectronic pods technology employed on Tornado and AMX torealizemorethan340,000high‐resolutionpictures,whichwerecrucialforintelligenceactivities.108

ItalianAirforcefighterconductedoverall1,695sortiesand6,254flighthours.109Missionsweredistributedaccordingtothefollowingpercent‐ages:DCA38%,ISR23%,OCA14%,SEAD8%,SCAR5%.110The8AV‐8Bof theNavy carried out first DCAmissions andOCA later, resulting in418sortiesand1,001flighthours.111OperatingfromtheGaribaldicar‐rier,AV‐8Bwerebasedatasafetydistanceof100milesfromtheLibyanshores,butclosertoaircraftoperatingfromItalianlandbasesandthusworkingalsowithoutair‐to‐airrefuelling.Overall,fighteraircraftoftheItalianArmyperformed2,113sortiesfor7,255flighthours.112

107Ibid.108Ibid.109DataprovidedbytheItalianAirForce’sstatisticaldivision.110ItalianAirForce,Operazioniinternazionali:Libia 2011 ,cit.111Interviewdated14March2014.112DataprovidedbytheItalianAirForce’sstatisticaldivision.


59

OPERATIONUNIFIEDPROTECTOR

Generalinformation(March2011‐October2011)


US(27%),France(21%),UK(11%),Italy(7%),Can‐ada,Denmark,UnitedArabEmirates,Turkey,Qatar,Sweden,Belgium,Spain,TheNetherlands,Norway,Jordan,Greece

NATO Yes

Italiancontribution (March2011‐October2011)


F‐16,Eurofighter,AV‐8B,Tornado,AMX

2,113 7,255

1.6 THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS

In the last 24 years, Italian fighter have been deployed in different cir‐cumstances:inaninterstatewarlikeintheGulfwar,incivilconflictslikeinBosnia‐Herzegovina,KosovoandLibyaandinafailedstatewithsometypicalconnotationsofinsurgencyandcivilwarlikeinAfghanistan.

Considering the aforementioned 10 air operations,114 Italy has de‐ployed itsaircraft90%followingaUNSecurityCouncil resolutionand80%underNATO framework.This insight showsnotonly Italy’sdeepintegrationandcommitmenttothoseorganizations,butalsothestronginfluenceofaglobalized internationalsystemwhichrequires theman‐agement of international crisis by thewhole international community.

113 Italian Air Force, Operazioni internazionali: Libia 2011 , cit.; Mario Arpino,

“L’ItalianelleoperazioniinLibia”,cit.114 Desert Storm, Deny Flight, Sharp Guard, Deliberate Force, Decisive Endeavour,

DeliberateGuard,AlliedForce,EnduringFreedom,UnifiedProtector,andInternationalSecurityAssistanceForce ISAF .


60

Indeed, Italyhasdevoted to internationalmissions approximately100fighter aircraft, performedmore than 13,000 sorties and flied around36,000hoursinoperations.

Italy’s operational participation in missions abroad has grown inqualitativeandquantitativetermsoverthelast24years.StartingfromaminoralthoughimportantcontributiontoOperationDesertStorm, Ita‐ly’sposturewasraisedinBosnia‐Herzegovina,KosovoandAfghanistanlater.Finally, it increasedsubstantially in the latestoperation inLibya,where it conducted 7%ofNATO air sorties and provided theAlliancewithcrucialcommandandcontrolactivities,aswellaslogisticfootprint.Hence, anddespite aneconomic situationwhichhas left little roomofmanoeuvringforforeignpolicyconsiderations,Italyhasnotrenouncedto dealwith important security issues – although events and interna‐tionalconstraintsseemtohaveshapedItalianinterventionsmorethanaclearnationalstrategy.

Intheend,Italianfighteraircrafthaveprovedtheirgreatversatility,performingawidevarietyoftasksindifferentconditionsandregionsoftheworld.TheFirstGulfWarepitomizedseveralshortfallsandgaps,forexample in terms of technologies, which have been successfully ad‐dressed in the following two decades. In particular, Italian Air Forcepursued an improvement of Precision Guided Munitions PGM , Elec‐tronic Warfare Systems EWS , Air‐to‐Air Refuelling AAR , infraredsensors,weapons systems like AARMmissiles, night vision, radio andcommunicationsystemsup toLink16.115 InKosovo,and then inLibyaevenmore, theprogress achievedby Italian air capabilitieshavebeenprovenby the increasedqualityandquantityof its allocatedcontribu‐tionstocrisismanagementoperations.ThishasbeenepitomizedbythefactthatItalianAirForcehasbeentheonlyEuropeanpower,asidefromtheAmericans,tohaveconductedSEADmissionsinLibya,116andthatithas been one of themost effective suppliers of photographicmaterialprovided in ISR activities in Afghanistan.117 The Italian Navy has also

115Interviewdated11December2013.116ItalianAirForce,Operazioniinternazionali:Libia 2011 ,cit.117 ItalianAirForce,Operazioni internazionali:Afghanistan 2002 ‐ JointAirTask

Force JATF ,cit.


61

soughttoimproveandupgradeitsaero‐tacticalcomponent,forinstancethanks to theacquisitionof thePODLitening II, inorder toacquireanautonomoustargetingcapacity,whosebenefitshavebeenevidenttoIta‐lyanditsalliesinthecontextofOperationEnduringFreedom.118

Table1.InternationalMissions(1990‐2013):anoverview

Operation CoalitionForces ChainofCommand

UNSecurityCouncil

Resolution

DesertStorm1990‐1991

US,UK,SaudiArabia,Kuwait,France,Italy,Bahrain

UnitedStates

Yes

DenyFlight1993‐1995

Belgium,Canada,Denmark,France,Germany,Italy,theNetherlands,Norway,Spain,Turkey,UK,US

NATO Yes

SharpGuard1993‐1996

Belgium,Canada,Denmark,France,Germany,Greece,Italy,theNether‐lands,Norway,Portugal,Spain,Turkey,UK,US

NATO Yes

DeliberateForce1995

US 65.9% ,UK 9.3% France8.1% ,theNetherlands 5.6% ,Spain 3.4% ,NATO,NAEW 2.7% ,Turkey 2.2% ,Germany 1.7% ,Italy 1%

NATO Yes

DecisiveEndeavour1995‐1996


NATO Yes

DeliberateGuard1996‐1998


NATO Yes

AlliedForce1999

US 80% ,France 6% ,UK 5% ,Italy 3% ,Netherlands 3% ,Germany 2%

NATO No

EnduringFreedom2001‐2006

US,UK,Italy,France,theNetherlands UnitedStates

Yes

ISAF2001‐2014

US,UK,Italy,Germany,France,theNetherlands,Canada

NATO Yes

UnifiedProtector2011

US 27% ,France 21% ,UK 11% ,Italy 7% ,Canada,Denmark,UnitedArabEmirates,Turkey,Qatar,Swe‐den,Belgium,Spain,theNetherlands,Norway,Jordan,Greece

NATO Yes

118Interviewdated14March2014.


62

Table2.Italiancontributiontointernationalmissions(1990‐2013)

Operations Aircraft Sorties Flyinghours

DesertStorm 8Tornado 2,326 4,503

DenyFlight 4Tornado,4AMX 543 1,288

SharpGuard 8Tornado 230 267

DeliberateForce 8Tornado,6AMX,AV‐8B 26 41

DecisiveEndeavour Tornado,AMX 1,250 3,150

DeliberateGuard Tornado,AMX 2,974 7,227

AlliedForce 22TornadosECR/IDS,6AMX,6F‐104ASA,6TornadoIDS,4TornadoECR/IDS,4F‐104ASA

1,072 2,903

EnduringFreedom AV‐8B 328 860

ISAF 4Tornado,4AMX,AV‐8B

3,031 8,477

UnifiedProtector F‐16,Eurofighter,Tornado,AMX,AV‐8B

2,113 7,255

Total64Tornado,20AMX,6F‐104,F‐16,AV‐8B,Eurofighter

13,893 35,971


63

65

2. Current and future air operations: doctrine and trends

Italy’suseoffighteraircraftinthepost‐ColdWarperiodhasgonehandinhandwithdevelopmentsinAirPowerdoctrine.Thischapteroutlinesdoctrine’s fundamentals and trends stemming from the recent opera‐tional experience,1 in order to understand current andpossible futurewaystoutilizeaircapabilitiesincludingfighteraircraft.

2.1 AIR POWER: DOCTRINE’S FUNDAMENTALS

Intheory,AirPowerdoctrineevolvesbyconsideringbestpracticesre‐sultingfromoperationalexperiences,aswellasinnovationsintechnicalandconceptualterms,andbyradicalchangesoccurringintheinterna‐tionalsystem.2

1 This chapter partly draws from the extensivework conducted by IAI, Fondation

pour la Recherche Stratégique FRS and Royal Aeronautical Society RAeS , in 2012within the IAI‐led research project “Landscaping – Identifying themismatch betweenrequirementsandplannedcapabilities:AirOperations”.

2Formoredetailedinformationseealso:NATOAlliedJointPublication,JointAirandSpace Operations Doctrine, 2002; NATO Allied Joint Publication, Joint Operations Doc‐trine, 2010; Christopher Harper, “Challenges for NATO Air & Space Power”, in JAPCCJournal,No.14 Autumn2011 ,pp.33‐37,http://www.japcc.org/publications/journal/Journal/20111014_‐_Journal_Ed‐14_web.pdf;EUMilitaryStaff,Draftconcept forAirOp‐erationsinsupportoftheEUCSDP,2011;USAirForce,AirForceBasicDoctrine,Organi‐zationandCommand.AirForceDoctrineDocument1,14October2011,http://www.au.af.mil/au/cadre/aspc/l002/pubs/afdd1.pdf; Denis Mercier, “Thinking about Air andSpace Power in 2025: Five Guiding Principles”, in Air & Space Power Journal, Vol. 26,No.3 May‐June2012 ,pp.16‐30;JohnD.Jogerst,“AirpowerTrends2010:TheFutureis


66

AirPowerisdefinedasthecapacitytoprojectpowerfromtheairtoinfluencethebehaviourofpeopleorthecourseofevents.Itisanessen‐tialelementinalmostallmilitaryoperations,whichexploitsallaspectsoftheEarth’satmospheresuchasheightandreachoverbothlandandsea.Thesekey characteristics, coupledwith increasingly capable tech‐nology,makesAirPower a flexible, rapid, 24/7 available tool to influ‐ence the operating environment – thus ensuring Air Power’s “virtualpresence” throughout the entire operation, thanks to its extreme de‐ployability.Asaresult,AirPowercanbeconsideredasamultiplierforcefordeployedlandandmaritimemilitaryforces.

Furthermore, the utilization of air capabilities is not limited to anyparticularkindofoperation,asAirPower’skeycharacteristicspermittoachieve strategic, operational or tactical results, in a joint or separatefashion,rangingfromdiplomaticwarningstotheactualuseofforce.Theflexibility,reachandabilitytoconcentrateforcemakeAirPowerabletoconcurrentlyconductorsupportdifferentlinesofoperationagainstdif‐ferent targets.Moreover, Air Power can be switched fromone role orobjective to another, within or between operational theatres. Conse‐quently, it can be rapidly adapted to meet evolving operational re‐quirements. In addition, Air Power provides the means to take ad‐vantageofbothfriendlystrengthsandopponentweaknesses.Infact, itmaydirectsymmetricalactionswheretheopposingforcesandfriendlyforcesaresimilar, i.e.airdefenceversusairattack,or itmayutilize itsstrengthsagainsttheopponent’svulnerabilities, forexamplebyattack‐ingCommandandControl C2 architectureand/or critical infrastruc‐turessuchasenergygrids.

AlthoughbeingpredominantlydeliveredbyAirForce,AirPoweralsoincludesaerialcapabilitiesprovidedbyotherservices,evenbycivilianaviation.Atthesametime,AirPowerismadenotonlybyplatformsandweaponsystems,but itcruciallyreliesontrainedpersonnel,aswellas

Closer ThanYouThink”, inAir& Space Power Journal, Vol. 23,No. 2 Summer 2009 ,pp. 101‐102, http://faculty.nps.edu/nlmiller/docs/sum09.pdf; Basilio Di Martino, “AirPowerandTechnology:ATentativeApproachtotheYear2025andBeyond”,inRUSIDe‐fence Systems, 23 June 2010, pp. 56‐60, https://www.rusi.org/publications/defence‐systems/ref:A4C221670ABFA3.

2. CURRENT AND FUTURE AIR OPERATIONS: DOCTRINE AND TRENDS

67

oninfrastructurestooperatefrom,andsparepartsvitaltomaintainitsuseeffectivelyandefficiently.

Overall, it ispossibleto identifyfourmainroles inwhichAirPowerfinds its concrete application: Control of the Air; Intelligence, Surveil‐lance, Target Acquisition, Reconnaissance ISTAR ; Engagement; AirMobility. The first three roles are particularly relevant in relation tofighteraircraft.

AchievingControloftheAirmeanshavingthefreedomtouseaspe‐cificvolumeof airspacewithina givenperiodof time for itsownpur‐poses,while,ifnecessary,denyingitsusetoothers.3Thiscontrolisab‐soluteincaseofAirSupremacy.InthecaseofAirSuperiority,itratherimpliesthedegreeofdominanceintheairbattle‐spacethatpermitstoconductmilitaryoperationsatanygiventime,withoutprohibitiveinter‐ferencebyopposingair forces.AirParity is the lowest levelofcontrol,meaningcontrolof theskiesonly in theairspaceabove friendlytrooppositions.Vice‐versa,AirDenialismaintainingalevelofoperationsthat,althoughconcedingAirSuperioritytotheopponent,preventstheenemytoachieveAirSupremacy.OperationstoachieveControloftheAirmaybeoffensive OffensiveCounter‐Air and/ordefensive DefensiveCoun‐ter‐Air,which includes air andmissile defence .OffensiveCounterAirOperationsaimtoobtainControloftheAirbydestroying,degradingordisrupting the air capabilities of the adversary that is Suppression ofEnemy Air Defenses SEAD . Defensive Counter‐Air DCA consists ofactive and passive actions aimed to protect friendly forces and non‐combatantpersonnelintheatre.

ISTARmissionscontributetoallintelligenceproductsbysupportingplanning activities and decision making of all air operations’ phases.They improvetheability togainandmaintain informationsuperiority,andaimtoachieveSituationalAwareness SA thatishavingafullcom‐prehensionof theoperational situation in theatre.Forexample, ISTARair capabilities are, together with space Earth Observation EO sys‐tems,themainimageryintelligenceprovider.Bycombininghighsensor

3OneofthefirstandmostimportantauthorstheorizingtheimportanceoftheCon‐

troloftheAirdoctrinehasbeentheItalianGiulioDouhetinhisstudyIldominiodell’ariaTheAirSupremacy ,publishedin1921.


68

imagery,hype‐spectralsensorsandall‐weatherradarsensors,aircapa‐bilitiesovercomethelackofpersistenceexperiencedforexamplebyob‐servation satellites. Air capabilities also complement naval and landfixed and mobile sensors by providing stand‐off interception of high‐frequencysignalseitherforcommunicationintelligenceorforelectronicintelligence.

IntermsofEngagement,AirPowerroleincludes:deepattack,groundattack,andinformationoperations.4Deepattackisaimedatdisruptingordestroyingvital targets suchasC2 infrastructures, industriesofde‐fence, command and control elements, war production resources, de‐ployedforcesorkeysupportinginfrastructures.Inparticular,adeepat‐tackseekstodisruptanenemy’sstrategyandabilityorwilltowagewar.Groundattacksoperationsintendtoachieveandmaintainaspecificde‐gree of control of the battlefield by targeting enemy ground forcesand/or infrastructures supporting them, or by using air psychologicaleffects. These operations are subdivided in Air Interdiction AI andCloseAirSupport CAS .AIencompassesairoperationswhichaffecten‐emy potential before it can retaliate against friendly surface forces,whileCASimpliesEngagement insupportof landforcesalready facingtheiropponents.Similarly,withcounter‐seaoperations,suchasforex‐ample Anti‐Surface Warfare ASUW , Anti‐Submarine Warfare ASW andAerialMining,theobjectiveistoattainandmaintainthedesiredde‐greeofmaritimesuperioritybythedestruction,disruption,delay,diver‐sion, or other neutralization of threats in themaritime environment.5Finally, InformationOperationsarenon‐kineticmeasures,6 takento in‐fluence,affectordefendinformation,systemsanddecision‐makingpro‐cess.Amongtheso‐calledInformationOperations,ElectronicWarfareisoneofthemostextensivelycarriedoutanditseekstocontroltheelec‐

4 UKMinistry of Defence, British Air and Space Power Doctrine AP 3000 , 4th ed.,

2009, http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/9E435312_5056_A318_A88F14CF6F4FC6CE.pdf.

5USAirForce,CounterseaOperations.AirForceDoctrineDocument3‐04,26Octo‐ber2010,https://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd3‐04.pdf.

6Ingeneral,theterm“non‐kinetic”referstotheabilitytocreateeffectsthatdonotrelyon explosives or physical momentum e.g., directed energy, computer viruses/hacking,etc .


69

tromagnetic spectrum, both to enable friendly‐force operations and todenyanenemythesamedegreeof freedom.ElectronicWarfareisalsoconductedasapartofSEADkineticoperationsaimingtoachieveCon‐troloftheAir.

Finally,theprovisionofAirMobilitypermitsglobal,regionalandlo‐caldeploymentofmilitaryandcivilianpersonnelandmateriel.Airmo‐bilityactsasafundamentalenablertomoveandsustainforcesinsever‐aloperationsanditcanberealizedthroughAir‐to‐AirRefuelling AAR ,Airlift, Aero‐medical Evacuation, Airborne Operations, Aerial DeliveryandSpecialAirOperations.Intheend,itshouldberemindedthatAirliftandAAR–necessarytoensureAirMobility–requiretheachievementoftheControloftheAirbyfriendlyforces.

2.2 TRENDS FROM THE RECENT OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Asmentionedbefore,AirPower’sdoctrinealsotendstoevolvefollow‐ingpracticesresultingfromoperationalexperience.Inthisperspective,sometrendsseemtoemergefromairoperationsconductedinthepost‐ColdWarperiod.

Firstofall,recentmissionsabroadhaveraisedawarenessatthepo‐litical‐strategiclevelthatcomplexairoperationsrequiretheavailabilityofallaircapabilitiesnecessarytoperformthefourAirPowerroles,andthat air capabilities aremore andmore interlinked amongeachother.Forexample,thepreciseEngagementofaselectedtargetonthegroundisthelaststepinachainofactions,whichincludesthepreliminaryCon‐troloftheAir,ISTARfindingsandtherelatedAirMobility.

Second, ISTARimportancehas increasedevermoreanditnowrep‐resents an essential factor in allmilitary operations. An emerged firstkey trend is that ISTAR is not provided only by dedicated platforms,suchasRPAS,butbyanumberofsensorsandsystemsembedded inawide and complementary range of air platforms – obviously includingfighteraircraft–aswellassatellites.Anothertrendisthattheprocessofcollection,analysisanddisseminationisincreasinglyimportant.Ontheonehand,augmenteddataflowneedsgreatercapabilitiesofdataman‐


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agement, processing, storage and sharing. On the other hand, humananalysisisvital:itisworthlesstoincreasethenumberofsensorsandtomake disseminationmore rapidly if this is notmade compatiblewithhumanprocessingcapacity.

Third,ControloftheAirshouldnotbetakenforgranted.Airopera‐tions inAfghanistanhaveshownpoorlyorganizedortotallyabsentairdefencesystems,butinbothLibya 2011 andKosovo 1999 casesthepriorityofthefirstdaysofoperationswasstilltoensurecoalition’sCon‐troloftheAirbydestroyingopponentcommandandcontrol C2 struc‐tures,mostof itsairdefencefixedsystemsandcombataircraft.There‐fore,SEADcapabilityandothersurvivability issueswilldemandatten‐tionandsubstantialinvestments.ThealternativeistoacceptasituationofAirSuperiorityorevenAirParity implyingsignificantrisk foralliedaircrews. This is particularly true as non‐European powers, includingChinaandRussia,are investing inaircapabilities,andevenopponentslackingadvancedcapabilitieswillhavetheabilityto imperilControloftheAirthroughtheuseofshortrangeairdefence–includingMANPort‐ableAir‐DefenceSystems MANPADS ,whichcancontestControloftheAirbelow10,000feet.7

As farastheEngagement isconcerned,atrendworthtomention isrelated to theuseofPrecisionGuidedMunitions PGM .TheirusehasexponentiallygrownsincethefirstGulfWar,whentheyhadbeenintro‐ducedasasmallpercentageoftheoverallsetofammunition,toairop‐erations inLibya,where theyhasbeenextensivelyusedduring theaircampaign roughly 7,600 PGMwere fired in sevenmonths . This alsoreflectsachangeinthepoliticalandethicalmilieu,whichinfluencestheplanningandconductofairoperations:thosekindsofengagementthatcouldbeeffective,butmightinvolveacertainnumberofciviliancasual‐ties–notnecessarilyahighnumber inabsoluteterms–arenotpoliti‐callyacceptableanymorebyEuropeangovernmentsandpublicopinion.In the future, theneed toattack individual targetsaccuratelywill con‐tinuetobeparamount.

7USDeptofState,AddressingtheChallengeofMANPADSProliferation,2February

2012,http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/183097.htm.


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ThisissueappliesalsotoCAS.Inthiscontext,AirPowerrepresentsastrategic advantage but it can become a strategic vulnerability if notemployedwithrestraintandprecisioninoperationswherethesupportoflocalpopulationiscrucialtosucceed,asanopponentcouldeasilyex‐ploit collateral damages caused by the use of Air Power. CAS requirescloseair‐landintegration,clearlydefinedproceduresanddetailedinte‐grationofAirPoweractionswithfiringandmovementbyfriendlyforc‐es,fortargetingguidanceandtoavoidfratricide.Proceduresarepartic‐ularlyimportant,butthereisalsoaninteroperabilityissuewithregardtodigitalCAS:differentnationalproceduresandtechnologiesmayham‐perthisrole–aswellasothers.Inthiscontext,AirPowercontribution,often in joint missions and to support relatively small and mobilegroundunits,willcontinuetorequireevengreaterall‐weathercapacity,precision,range,andrapiditywithregardtothesensor‐to‐shootercycle.

Finally,inrelationtoAirMobility,adecisivetrendregardstheissueof operating at a strategic distance, in particular for European armedforces. There is a lack of air capabilities able to project Air Power, asdemonstrated by European countries during the operation in Libya,where theoperational theatrewasrelativelyclose to the Italianbases.Eachoptionwhichhasbeendesigned to solve the issue, likemoread‐vancedfighteraircraft,forwardbases,carriers,AARandstrategicairlifthasrevealeditsownlimitationssofar.Asaresult,onlyabalancedmixoftheseoptionscanmitigatesuchadeficiency.

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3. Scenarios of possible future air operations

Thefutureisnotpredictableandthischapterdoesnotaimtodoso. Itratherpresentstwoscenariosinordertopointouthowaircapabilities,inparticular fighteraircraft,maybeused incrisismanagementopera‐tionsinthe2015‐2025timeframe.Thetwoscenariosare:first,airoper‐ationstoestablishandenforceaNFZ;second,airsupporttoland‐basedcrisismanagementoperations.Eachscenariohasbeenbuiltaccordingtothe same structure, which includes the following elements: StrategicContext; Mission Objectives; Critical Factors of the Operational Envi‐ronment;AdversaryCapabilitiesandCourseofActions;AirComponentCourseofActionsandAssociatedCapabilities.

Thelikelihoodofthesescenariosisnotaddressed,butitisassumedtheyareatleastpossibleexamplesoffuturejoinedairoperationsbyEu‐ropeancountries,includingItaly.ThestartingpointisthatItalianfighterhave been deployed in different crisis management operations in thelast twodecades, andarmedconflictswill stillbea featureof interna‐tionalsecurityuntil2050 andprobablybeyond ,withconflictcountriesconcentrated inAfrica,Middle East andEast and SouthAsia. Also, thephenomenonof failedstateswillprobably remainon the internationalscene for a long time, especially if political violence in Africa and theMiddleEastisnotlikelytodecrease.1

Againstthisbackdrop,itispossibletoimagineafutureemploymentof fighter in those regions, either for combat and/or stabilizationpur‐poses. As onemight argue thatNATOwill never go “that out of area,”

1FundforPeace,TheFailedStatesIndex,http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings‐2013‐

sortable.


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onemight reply thatprobably at theendof theColdWarnonewouldhaveexpectedtoseeNATOrunningpeace‐keepingoperationsinKosovofirst and inAfghanistan later.Additionally,while aNATOnavalopera‐tionisalreadyfullyoperationalintheHornofAfrica,ifthethreatofter‐rorismraisesinthenextyears,carefulanalystswouldnotbecompletelysurprisedtonoticeafurtherengagementofthealliesinthearea.More‐over,astherecentcasesofFranceinterventionsinMali2andtheCentralAfricanRepublic3demonstrate,NATOisnottheonlyframeworkunderwhichoperationsrequiringtheuseoffighteraircraftmaybemanaged.Inaddition,UN‐sponsoredmissionsintheshortterm,orEUonesinthelong run,might request the level of Air Power necessary to dealwithcomplex in securityissues.

3.1 ESTABLISHING AND ENFORCING A NO-FLY ZONE: “PROTECT TURIANS” SCENARIO

Thefollowingscenarioisonlyahypotheticalcontingency,yetsufficient‐lyrealistictodrawimplicationsforthekindofaircapabilitiesthatmightberequiredinthefuture.

3.1.1 Strategic context

Turia is country in the North African littoral inhabited by 30 millionpeopleoveralargeterritoryofmorethan2millionsquaredkilometers.The population is largely concentrated in the coastal areas. The gov‐ernmentofTuriahasbeguntouseAirPowerasameantooppressingasegmentofitsownpopulation,theRegtura.Thisminorityhasadistinctethnicbackgroundandhasbecomeincreasinglystridentinitsdemandsofself‐determination.TheareainwhichthemajorityofRegturaisbasedisrelativelyrichinmineralsandisregardedasaninalienableportionof

2 “France confirms Mali military intervention”, in BBC News, 11 January 2013,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world‐africa‐20991719.3“FrenchtroopsinCentralAfricanRepublicto“avoidcarnage”,inBBCNews,11De‐

cember2013http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world‐europe‐25327976.

3. SCENARIOS OF POSSIBLE FUTURE AIR OPERATIONS

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thenationalterritorybytheTurianState.Therulinggovernmentthere‐forecannotaffordtorelinquishtheterritoryandhasinstitutedaharshpolicecrackdown,escalatingintowidespreadhumanrightsabuses.Ac‐tionagainst theminoritygrouping isbelieved to include theuseofairassets for a variety of purposes including police deployments, recon‐naissance,crowdsuppressionandtargetedassassinations.

Theinternationalcommunitydeemsnecessarytointerveneforava‐rietyofreasons–includingbutnotlimitedtothefactthatahumanitari‐andisasteristakingplacewiththousandsofpeoplekilledorinjuredanddozensof thousandsof refugeesdirected towardsbothneighbourandEuropean countries. Peace‐keeping ground forces cannot be deployedfor legal and political motivation, but action is considered essential.Therefore,theUNSecurityCounciladoptsaresolutiontoestablishaNo‐FlyZone NFZ inordertoprotectTuriansfromairthreats,andcallstheinternational community to act. TheUS had deployed part of their aircapabilities in thePacificarea,where theAmericanadministrationbe‐lievemorecompellingsecurityinterestsareatstake.Asaresult,theUShasacquiesced toprovideplatformsandhighly technologicalassets tobegintheoperation theso‐called“enablers” andtherestofthesignifi‐cant air capabilities required for the operation inTuria, but Europeancountrieswillmakeasubstantialandprolongedcontributiontoestab‐lish and enforce aNo‐Fly Zone. The operationwill take place throughNATOintegratedmilitarycommand.

Thescenariotakesplaceroughly2,500kmfarfromEuropeanairba‐ses,thatmeanswithinrangeofforcesthatcouldbebasedandsupport‐edfrombaseslocatedinEurope,withsupplementingcarrierforces.

3.1.2 Mission objectives

AccordingtoUNmandateissuedbytheSecurityCouncil,inthisscenariothe Mission Statement for the Joint Force Air Component CommandJFACC istoestablishandenforceaNFZovertheentireTuriaterritoryinordertotheprotectcivilianpopulationfromgovernment’suseofAirPower.

Accordingly,JointForceCommander’sintentistodisrupttheairca‐pability of the Turia regime, its capacity to ill people, and then to act


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firmlyanddecisivelytoeffectthelevelsofprotectionenvisagedbytheinternationalcommunityandtheUNSCResolution.

As a result, the twomainobjectives are: first, to achieveControlofthe Air by suppressing Turia government’s air capabilities, IntegratedAirDefenceSystems IADS ,CommandandControl C2 structures;se‐cond,toenforcea24‐hoursNFZforaperiodofseveralmonths.

3.1.3 Critical factors of the operational environment

Forthisscenario,twocriticalfactorshavetobeconsidered.Ontheonehand,thelargesizeofTurianterritory,whichmakesparticularlyexpen‐siveanddifficulttoeffectivelyenforcetheNFZalloverthecountry.Ontheotherhand,thenecessitytokeepairoperationswithinthestrictlim‐itsenvisagedbyUNmandateandaccordingtoitslegalbasis,inordertomaintain legitimacy in the eyes of domestic public opinion and Alliedpoliticalcohesion.

3.1.4 Adversary’s capabilities and Course of Action

ThemilitarycapabilitiesofTuriangovernmentwillbelargelycomposedbyantiquatedlegacyplatforms,withsomemodernequipmentincludingrotary‐wingsplatforms.Air‐defencesystemswillberelativelyeffective,includinganumberofSAM.Thearmedforceswillbeprimarilyconsti‐tutedbyconscriptandparamilitaryforces,althoughacoreofrelativelytrained professionals will be in place and the command and controlnetworkwillworkquitecomprehensivelyacrossallservicebranches.

Given the gapwith Allied air capabilities, the Turian government’sCourse of Action CoA will rely on an asymmetric strategy aimed atweakeningthepoliticalcohesionoftheAlliedcoalition–considereditscenterofgravity.Suchstrategywillsee,forexample,civiliansforcedtobepresentnearby likelymilitary targets forNATOairoperations.Thiswillbedoneinordereithertopreventtheengagementofsuchtargetsbecauseofstrictrulesofengagement RoE ,ortoblamecollateraldam‐agespossiblycausedby theoccurredEngagement in theeyesofEuro‐peanandNorthAmericapublicopinion.


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3.1.5 Air component’s Course of Action and required capabilities

Althoughthishasbeenconceivedpredominantlyasanairoperation,theinternationalcommunityhassetupajointheadquarterincasethesitu‐ationdevelopstothepointthatwidermilitaryoperationsarenecessary.GiventheoftenindecisivenatureofNFZ,thecoalitionmustbewillingtoconsideritasanenduringoperationcarriedout24/7.RulesofEngage‐mentwillbeparamounton thisoperation, includingair‐to‐air engage‐mentsalongwithkeyair‐to‐groundprecisionattacks.Phase1Thefirstphasewill involvethesetupofmission’sheadquarterandthecoalitionorderofbattle,alongwithanassessmentofthethreatposedtotheRegturaethnicminority.SincePhase1, theheadquarterswillneedto have timely and accurate intelligence assessments based on openlysharedmaterial.TheJFCneedstohaveclearlyagreedRulesofEngage‐mentandmustbeawareofthescopeofnationalcaveat.

Itwillbesetupacommand,control,communication,computingandintelligence C4I architecturerelyingonrobustnetworkenabledcapa‐bilitiestointegrateallairandjointoperationelements.SpaceassetswillalsobeintegratedintheC4IinordertosupportplanningandconductofoperationsthroughEarthObservation EO ,PositioningNavigationandTiming PNT andsatellitecommunications.Coincidentwiththis,theairplannerswillneedtoestablishthelikelychallengeingainingControloftheAir toenable theirownairoperations.This is likely to involve thefull panoply of intelligence gathering, dissemination andpooling capa‐bilities.Phase2This phase will first involve the establishment of Control of the Airagainst potential air and ground threats. Itwill include EW and SEADtasks,aswellasair‐to‐airengagement.Thecommandandcontrolcapa‐bilitiesrequiredinPhase1willbeutilizedalsoinPhase2.Itwillbevitaltoensure suitable communications, especially from the joint andcom‐binedheadquartertoairassets.


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RequiredcapabilitiesforISTARpurposesinclude:

- ISTAR capability to providewide area coverage on a continualbasisthroughamixofspaceassets,fighteraircraftandClassIIIRPAS, supplemented by further RPAS to pin point specifictargetsasrequired;

- ISTAR capability to support Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage,Assess F2T2EA dynamictargetingcycleinthetheatre;

- Intelligence gathering, dissemination and pooling capabilitieswillbeheavilyusedalsoduringthisphase,particularlyfordatamanagement,processing,storageandsharing;

- ResponsiveandrobustSpacecollectioncapabilitiesforrealtimesurveillanceandtargeting.

RegardingEngagement,itwillbenecessary:

- CapabilitytoconductavarietyofComputerNetworkOperationsCNO againstAdversaryaircapabilitiesandC2networks;

- RPAScapabilitytobeusedseparatelyand/orjointlywithfighteraircraftforEW;

- Fighter aircraft and combat RPAS capability to perform SEADand ensure Control of theAir against potential air and groundthreats;

- CapabilityforBeyond‐Visual‐Range BVR air‐to‐airfighting;- Airsurveillancecapability.

ConsideringUNSCmandate,Alliedpublicopinion’sconcernsandadver‐sary’sCoArelyingonasymmetrictactics,precisionattackswillbevitalcapabilities throughout theentireoperation.Thiswill includeboth theuse of a range of all‐weather Precision Guided Munitions PGM , en‐compassingSmallDiameterBombs SDB andsmallblastradiusweap‐ons to limit collateral damages, and the capability for assessing battledamagealsothroughRPASandSpaceassets.Theywillbeusedthroughtheaircampaigntoeliminateadversarygroundbasedfacilitiessuchasradars,missilesitesandC2centerswithminimumcollateraldamage.

Inordertoprotectaircapabilities,spaceassetsprovidingSAwillbenecessary.Given thecostandcomplexityofenforcingaNFZ in there‐gion,ideallytheAlliedforcewillrequireacarriergroup,fromwhereairassetswillbedeployed,availablefortheentiredurationofthemission.


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Phase3ThisphasewillmainlyconsistofenforcingtheNFZovertheentireTuri‐anterritory. Itwillbeenduringandwill involvecounteringair threatsagainsttheethnicminorityontheground.ThismaybesupplementedbyattacksonkeyenemyC2nodes.

Air operations might vary from mounting non‐kinetic interdictionanddeterrenceoperationsona24/7basis to shortperiodsof intensekineticactivity.Rapidand flexibleresponsewillbeakeyrequirement,basedonsoundandaccurateintelligenceandrapiddecisionmakingtoallowengagementwithadversarialforceswherenecessary.

A centralminimum requirementwill be the ability to operate sus‐tained24/7operationstopreventortodeteradversarialfixedwingac‐tivity.Inprinciple,NATOEuropeanmemberswillhavesufficientaircrafttomountaNFZmission,albeitsomeoftheplatformshavelimitedornoall‐weather24‐hourscapability:theissuewillberathertheirreadiness.This need to be an enduring operation and the participating nationsmustassure theirpresence for the longhaul.Thishas implications forsustainabilityandforthe“roulement”offorces.

ThesameC2and ISTARcapabilitiesneeded forPhase2willbeuti‐lizedalsoforPhase3,althoughthenumberofsortieswillbelikelylowerthaninthepreviousphasebecausetheAdversarymilitarycapabilities,andparticularly air capabilities andC2networks,will be severelydis‐rupted. Required capabilities for engagement will include a sufficientcombat aircraft capability to ensuremore than 100 daily sorties. AARcapabilitywillbevitaltoenableNFZpolicingoverawidearea.Theca‐pabilitytolimitcollateraldamagesasmuchaspossiblewillcontinuetobe required, inter alia through the use of SDB and small blast radiusbombs,aswellastheabilitytoassessbattledamages.

Europeancountrieswill struggle tosupport suchanoperationonalongduration,namelymorethansixmonths.EnforcingaNFZwouldin‐evitably implyabilityandawillingness toescalate toamoreactiveki‐netic engagement scenario. Its absence could seriously undermine thecredibilityoftheNFZ,encouragingtheadversarytosimplywaitforAl‐lieddeterminationandresourcestowane.


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3.2 AIR SUPPORT TO LAND-BASED OPERATION: “STABILITY IN BANON” SCENARIO

Again, the following scenario is only an hypothetical contingency, yetsufficientlyrealistictodrawimplicationsforthekindofaircapabilitiesrequired.

3.2.1 Strategic context

AcountrycalledBanonintheEastMediterraneansea isavictimofanethnic and religious internal conflict supported by a Northern neigh‐bouringstate,theRepublicofSari.Theframeworkoftheaircampaignistypicallytailoredtomatchacounterinsurgencyenvironmentinsupportofanincumbentgovernment.Inthisscenario,Europeanaircomponentis deployed to support amultinational ground force committed to im‐plementaUNResolution.AsubstantialnumberofEuropeancountriescontribute to aUN‐mandatedmultinational force.TheUNback the in‐terventionandprovidelegitimacythroughamandatebasedonthe“Re‐sponsibility to Protect” the civilian population,while the Arab Leaguealsosupportsandcontributestothemultinationalforce.ThereisUSdi‐rect support to the air campaign, but for a variety of political reasonslargepartoftheburdenhastobeshoulderedbyEuropeans.TheNATOcommandandcontrolarchitectureandproceduresareinusetomanagethemilitaryoperations.AnEUcivilianmissionistaskedforSecuritySec‐torReform SSR ofBanon.

The Banon Liberation Front BLF backed byRS government is in‐creasingitsinfluenceinBanon.BLFisanon‐stateactorwhichreliesonroughly9,000combatants,operatingalongtheborderdeepintoBanonterritoryfromSarisanctuaries.Theypracticeparamilitaryandterroristactivities.Theirplannedcampaignconsistsofraidingvillagesandsmalltownsandtocleanotherethnicorreligiousgroupsfrom“liberatedter‐ritories.”Ingovernmentcontrolledareas,theBLFperformsterroristac‐tivities such as assassination of Banon citizens, random bombings, at‐tacks on official buildings or governmental representatives. There aredozensofthousandsofdisplacedpeople,andamassiveflowofrefugeestowardsbothneighbourcountriesandEurope.


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The Banon National Defense Force BNDF is a very weak regularforceof35,000menshowingnoabilitytostoptheguerrillaandtheethniccleansing in the Northern region of Banon. Except two elite battalions,mostpartofthetroopsareilltrained,poorlyequippedandunderpaid.

The SariDemocraticArmy SDA is 45,000men strong.Almost en‐tirelyoperational,theregularforcescandeploytwobrigadessupportedby field artillery and Special Forces. The Sari Air Force is air capablewith around 25 fighter/bomber jets, 10 training/bomber jets, 3 cargoplanesand12helicopters,including6attackand6transport.Aneffec‐tiveairdefensesystemprovidesprotectionoftheSariRepublicthroughmissilesandheavyartillery,whileDozensofMAN‐PortableAir‐DefenceSystems MANPADS areavailabletoregularandirregularforces.

TheUNForceinBanon UNFB is8,000menstrongandisreadytobedeployedonshortnoticetoprotectthesovereigntyofBanon,assistthe Government of Banon in restoring a safe and secure environmentandprovidesupporttoNGOsandinternationalorganizationsmanaginghumanitarianactivities.Theairoperationstakeplaceatabout3,500kmfromEuropeanairbases.

3.2.2 Mission objectives

The Joint Force Air Component Command JFACC is deployed in theEastMediterraneanonaprojectionandcommandshipnearby theRe‐publicofBanon’scoasts.AccordingtotheUNmandateissuedbytheSe‐curityCouncil, JFACCmissionstatement is: toassist theGoBtodefendthe territorial integrity of Banon; to support the deployment of theUNFB, torestoreasafeandsecureenvironmentand toexecuteanon‐combatantevacuationonshortnotice 72hours ,ifnecessary.

The operation may be divided in two phases. In the first one, theCommander’sintentistorapidlydeployacapable,credible,visibleandsustainableaircomponentinorderto:demonstratetheUNFBresolvetoenforcetheUNResolution;assisttosetconditionstodeteranyforeignaggression;preventdeteriorationof thehumanitariancrisis.ThemaineffortatthisearlystagewillbeestablishmentoftheNFZintheareaofoperations;supporttoUNFBuntiltheachievementofafulloperationalcapability;evacuationofnon‐combatantforeigncitizensifrequired.


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Thisimpliesto:

1. Secure airbases andAerialPorts ofDebarkation APOD in theRepublicofBanon;

2. CombatSearchandRescue CASR activities;3. Establish a NFZ along the international border with RS with

associatedsurveillancecapabilities;4. Establishairdefenceinareaofoperations.

Then, in the second phase, the main effort will be expanding the en‐forcementof theUNResolutionandcounteringhostile forces through‐out theRepublicofBanon, giving toBanonGovernment thenecessarytime and support to achieve internal stability. Developing a self‐sustainedBanonNationalDefenceForcewillbe thekeytoensurethatthisstabilitywillberemnant:theCommanderwilltrytoachieveitbyastrongpartnershipandcombinedplanningandoperationswithUNFB,the EU RSSMission and the Government of Banon. The second PhasewillfocusonsupportingtheUNFBandhastheobjectivesto:

1. AssurefullmobilityofUNFBandBNDF;2. ProtectandsupportdirectlyUNFBandBNDFonrequest;3. AssisttheciviliandeploymentofBanonandinternationalorgani‐

zations’representatives;4. Opposeinfiltrationandfreedomofmaneuverofhostileelements

inBanonterritory;5. Deterfurtheraggressions.

3.2.3 Critical factors of the operational environment

Atpolitical level, ithas tobeconsideredaweak legitimacyof theGov‐ernmentofBanonintheNorthernregionandapoorBanonstateagen‐cies’capability.ArabLeaguediplomaticeffortsfocusonapeaceprocessbetween theRepublicof Sari andBanon, thereforenomilitary retalia‐tionisallowedintheSariterritory.

Inthetheatre,intheshorttermthemilitarybalanceofforcefavourstheBLFanditssupporterfromtheRepublicofSari,becauseofanaccu‐rateknowledgeoftheregion,afavourablesupportofindigenouspopu‐


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lation and a porous border. Military operations will have significantnegative impact on economic growth and activities. Likewise, evacua‐tionofforeignpersonnelcoulddeprivethecountryofinvaluablecompe‐tences.Besides,destructionorseizureofcriticalassetsincludingoilrigsandkey industrial facilitiescouldhit theBanonsocialstability.Moreo‐ver, economic and industrial facilities are not adequately linked byroadsandrailways, thusmaintainingoperationalground linesof com‐municationisdifficult.Therefore,airmobilityisofcriticalimportance.

Finally,internationalpublicopinionisnotconcernedwiththeevolu‐tioninthefield,exceptincaseofmediacoverageofahumanitariandis‐asteroroperationalcasualties.Thesupportwillbehardtomaintaininthemid‐term.

3.2.4 Adversary’s capabilities and course of action

TheRepublicofSari,awareofthepoliticalriskofaninvasionofBanon,wouldopt for an attrition strategy todelaying thepolitical peacepro‐cessandupholdingthe“LiberationCampaign”ledbyBLF.

TheinitialdeploymentofUNFBisunopposed,whereasallinitiativestorestoring a safe and secure environment are strongly denied. A doublelineofoperationsisdeveloped:aparamilitary/terroristcampaignintheNorthernregion;aterroristcampaigninthebigcitiesofBanontodestabi‐lizetheGovernmentandcreateconditionsforacoup.Thehighvaluetar‐getofhostileforcesshouldthenbe:UNFBunitsinplace;innocentpeopleharassedintargetedareastocreateconditionsformass‐migration;sabo‐tageofinfrastructuresinkeyeconomicfacilities;BanonNDFoutpostsandpolicestations;officialbuildingsand/orrepresentatives.

3.2.5 Air component Course of Action and required capabilities

Phase1The JFACC is included in a layer ofmultinational C2 structures and issufficient to provide C2 framework for a non‐combatant evacuation.Furthermore, ithasanAirTaskingOrder ATO of100sortiesperdaytoestablishandenforceaNFZandtheprojectionofacompositesquad‐


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ron foramonth.At thisstage,signal intelligenceandelectronic intelli‐gencecapabilitiesarerequiredtomonitorthedispositionandthestatusof air defence systems along theborderwith theRepublic of Sari. Im‐ageryintelligenceassetsprovidedbysatellitesandrecce‐podsmakead‐ditionaldataavailableforsurveillanceofBLFmovementswithinBanon.ThecoreofthemissionistheactivationofaNFZalongtheinternationalborder,whoseactivationencompasses:

Earlywarningandpermanentsurveillanceofairspaceprovidedby AWACS for long range monitoring of Republic of Sari airbases;

FighterCombatAirPatrol; DefensiveElectronicWarfare.

The NFZ layout should demonstrate a strong commitment. Regardingtheprotectionof theheadquarter, twooptionsareavailable.ACarrierBattleGroup CBG isprobablythelessriskyoptionconsideringthelowlevelofthreatinbluewater.However,theCBGavailabilitycouldnotbeassured,at leastpermanently.ThesecondoptionreliesonahardenedairbaseinBanon,closetothecapitalcityRutbei.Theneededcapabili‐ties includeAirengineersandAirSpecialForcescapabilities,defensiveEW.DeployabilityandAirMobilityarekeyissues,sincethejointopera‐tionsareais3,500kmfarfromEuropeanairbases.Thenon‐combatantevacuation is a priority. Critical capabilities include long range airliftand related air tankers for insertion of air engineers elements, specialforces,fewsupporthelicoptersforCombatSARandplatformsforair‐to‐airrefuelling.ThequalityofBanoninfrastructuresislow.Consequently,thebulkoflogistics,intermsofmodernairnavigationandadaptationtomilitarystandardswillbechargedonthemultinationalforce.Phase2Inthisphase,themission’stasksconsistof:

- establishing a coherent C2 architecture with UNFB and HostNation HN ;

- providingintelligence;- assuring increased mobility in theatre, including medical

evacuation;


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- deliveringfiresupport–i.e.CAS–onrequest;- assistingtheRSSoftheHN,forinstancebytrainingandequipping

anewBanonAirForce.

Three chains of command have to be intermingled: NATO, UNFB andHN.ThepurposeistogetacommonpictureandplanningprocessintotheCombinedAirOperationCentre CAOC .Commandandcontrolar‐chitecturemustbeflexibleenoughtoprovideaquickresponseattacti‐callevel.Theapportionmentofassetsandmissionassignmentsmustbepreciselycoordinatedwithgroundforcesand,inordertofollowtheflu‐idevolutionofthetacticalsituation,mustbeorganizedtoallowaneasyand rapid en‐route re‐tasking of the aircraft. Required capabilities in‐cludeTacticalAirControl Post TACP network in groundunits, rapidengagementwithswiftchainofF2T2EA.

It isalsorequiredapermanent ISR function:combinationof fighteraircraftandbothClassIIIandClassIIRPASmonitoringremoteterrain,keyareasandfriendlyforcesallacrosstheareaofoperations.Supporttothegroundmanoeuvreswillvaryaccordingtothephaseofthestabil‐itycampaignledbytheHNandUNFB.However,aircomponentwillplayadirectactionrolethroughanti‐surfaceactionsincludingCASwithdis‐criminatestrikes,interdictionandpsychologicaloperationsandinfoop‐erationsinsupporttogroundforces.

Thus,somespecificcapabilitieswillberequired:

- PrecisionstrikeshouldbeassuredbyPGMsandacombinationof low cost weapons provided by attack helicopters. Visualidentification of target is the key condition to reduce risks ofcollateraldamagestoanacceptablelevel.

- AARcapacity is critical tomaintaina significant fighteraircraftandhelicoptersloiteringcapacityforaprolongedperiodoftime.

ThebestcontributionofAirPowertothejointforceprotectionreliesona flexible and responsive system of mission tasking: reconnaissance,mobility,direct support, increase the confidenceof friendly forcesandcripplethemoraleofinsurgents.Re‐establishingasafeandsecureenvi‐ronmentimpliesadualroleforAirPower:firstly,providingsecuritytofriendly forces andHNAuthorities; secondly, limiting insurgents’mili‐taryoptions.


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Required capabilities also include airmobile units Army Aviation ,with heavy medium helicopters and tactical airlifts to support BanonGovernment’sstabilityoperationsbyprovidingtransporttopoliceforc‐es, national and international agencies’ personnel for election pro‐gramme,humanitarianassistanceandmedicalevacuationmissions.

Finally, theaircomponentwillcontribute to theSSR’seffortsof theHNthroughtrainingandtheprovisionofnewequipmenttotheBanonAirforce,whosecreationisenvisagedtoassuringtheControloftheAiralsointheaftermathofthepeacekeepingmission.

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4. The military needs of Italian Armed Forces and the F-35 programme

Asithasemergedinthefirstchapter,Italyhasdeployedmorethan100fighteraircraftin10internationalcrisisoperationsinthelast24years,flyingmorethan13,000sortiesandtotalling36,000flighthours.

Theuseofaircapabilitiesformissionsabroadislikelytocontinueinthe next future, although it is not possible to exactly foresee where,when,andhowmany fighteraircraftwillbeusedby Italy.The secondchaptersummarizesdoctrine’sfundamentalsandtrendsstemmingfromoperationalexperienceinordertoshedsomelightonpossiblewaystouseAirPower.

Inthisregard,thethirdchapterprovidespossiblescenarios,wherebyfighteraircraftmaybeusedfordifferenttasks,rangingfromthosenec‐essarytoestablishandenforceaNFZtoothersinsupportofgroundop‐erations. These scenariosmay well take place in regions surroundingEurope,suchasNorthAfrica,MiddleEastandthe“enlargedMediterra‐nean,”1whereItaliannationalinterestsaremostlyatstake.

Such analysis poses a number of key questions for Italian policy‐makers,includingcivilianauthorities–inprimistheParliamentandtheGovernment–andthearmedforces.ThischapteraimstoaddresssuchquestionsandtherelatedprocurementneedsofItalianmilitary,aswellastoassesswhetherandhowtheF‐35procurementprogrammesatis‐fiestheaforementionedneeds.

1 For adefinitionof “EnlargedMediterranean” see for example: ItalianMinistryof

Foreign Affairs, Rapporto 2020: le scelte di politica estera, April 2008, p. 57,http://www.esteri.it/mae/doc/Rapporto2020_SceltePoliticaEstera_090408.pdf; ItalianMinistryofDefence‐DefenceGeneralStaff,IlconcettostrategicodelCapodiStatoMag‐giore della Difesa, March 2005, http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASMD/CONCETTOSTRA‐TEGICO/Pagine/default.aspx.


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4.1 FIRST KEY QUESTION: DOES ITALIAN PARTICIPATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

OPERATIONS SERVE NATIONAL INTERESTS?

ThefirstkeyquestioniswhetherItalianparticipationincrisismanage‐ment operations together with European and North American alliesdoesservenational interests.This isprimarilyapoliticalquestionthatdeserves apreliminary clarification on the international security envi‐ronment.

Inthepost‐ColdWarperiodthedirectthreatofmilitaryinvasionofItalianterritoryhasgreatlydecreasedincomparisonwithpreviousdec‐ades. Even if this threat has become highly unlikely, it would be ex‐tremelydangerous torule itoutasapossiblecontingency in the long‐term:attheendoftheday,intheearly20thcentury,EuropeancountriesdidnotexpectWorldWarItooccur,andthishasparadoxicallybeenoneofthereasonswhyitdid.Incontrast,duringtheColdWar,NATOcoun‐triesandtheSovietblocdidexpectanotherconflicttoeruptinEurope,andthisisoneofthereasonswhyitdidnot.Inotherwords,inthese‐cond half of 20th century deterrence prevented armed conflicts in Eu‐rope.Therefore,itisworthyforNATOmemberstomaintaintheneces‐sarymilitarycapabilities–includingaircapabilities–inordertodeterthataneventualescalationofpoliticalclashesintheinternationalarenawouldrevertintoanopenmilitaryconfrontation.ThecrisisoccurredinUkraine between2013 and2014has been a strong reminder that theuseofmilitaryforceinEuropeisstillanoptionforsomeregionalactorsin order to pursue their political goals. Something similar occurred intheFirstGulfWar,whenItalyjoinedthewarcoalitionledbytheUStoputanendtotheIraqinvasionofKuwait.It isnotbyaccidentthatthefirstNATO“coretask”,reaffirmedinthe2010StrategicConcept, is thecollectivedefenceofmemberstatesagainstanythreatofaggression.2

2The2010StrategicConcepthasestablished threecore tasks forNATO:collective

defenceaccordingtoArt.5,crisismanagementoperationsbeyondAlliedterritories,andcooperativesecuritythroughinteraliapartnerships.NATO,NewStrategicConcept,No‐vember2010,http://www.nato.int/strategic‐concept/Index.html.

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Havingsaid that,after theendof theColdWar, themainactivityofItalianmilitaryhasnotbeen territorialdefence. Ithas ratherbeen theparticipationincrisismanagementoperationsbeyondnationalborders.Oneof themainreasonsof thisshiftwerethechangesoccurred intheinternationalsecurityenvironment,whichmakesecurityinterests–andgenerally speakingnational interests – affectedby events, crises, risksandthreatsoccurringwellbeyondcountry’sborders.Globalizationandeconomicinterdependencehaveobviouslyplayedafundamentalroleinthis regard. The analysis of such changes is beyond the scope of thisstudy.Thebottom line is that in the last24yearsmilitary capabilitieshavebeenused inmissionsabroad todefend Italian security interestsandnationalinterestsinanewandunexpectedway.Asmentionedbe‐fore,nobodyin1989wasexpectingNATOtointerveneinYugoslaviatohaltacivilwar,althoughtheAlliancediditwithairandgroundopera‐tions fewyears later.Similarly, itwasnotexpectedthat2001terroristattacks–andlateronterroristbombingsinMadridandLondon–wouldhavepromptaninternationalefforttofightterrorism,includingthroughmilitarymeanssuchasthoseemployedbyNATOforonedecadeinAf‐ghanistan.Finally,stillinearly2000s,itwasnotexpectedthatEuropeanNavieswould have countered piracy in theRed Sea and IndianOceanthroughNATOandEUmissionsOceanShield3andAtalanta.4Recentse‐curitystrategiesadoptedbyinternationalorganizations–suchas2010NATOStrategicConceptor2003EuropeanSecurityStrategy5–aswellasthosebytheUS,FranceandtheUK,dotaskarmedforcestoperformabroad spectrum of missions, predominantly within a coalition ratherthanalone,againstavarietyofthreatsandinawiderangeofcrises.ThisinternationalsecurityenvironmentexplainstheimportanceofmissionsabroadforEuropeancountriessuchasItaly.

3NATOMaritimeCommand,OperationOceanShield,http://www.mc.nato.int/ops/

Pages/OOS.aspx.4EUNavalForceSomalia,http://eunavfor.eu.5Alreadyin2003,theEuropeanSecurityStrategyfocusedonsecuritythreatsdiffer‐

entfromterritorialdefence,suchasterrorism,statefailure,proliferationofweaponsofmass destruction, regional instability and organized crime, and set as priority for EUmemberstatesthecapacitytoacttroughcivilianandmilitarymissions.


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Inthiscontext,Italianparticipationincrisismanagementoperationsinthelast24yearshascontributeddirectlyorindirectlytoprotectandpromote national interests. For example, the stabilization of Bosnia‐Herzegovina,KosovoandgenerallyspeakingtheWesternBalkanswasaclear,directnational interest,because, since theearly1990s, Italyhadsufferedfromboththeflowofillegalimmigrantscomingfromthesere‐gionsandthecreationofafavourableenvironmentforinternationalor‐ganizedcrimeandillicittraffics.Crisismanagementoperations, includ‐ingthoseconductedthroughAirPower,havebeeninstrumentaltopaci‐fy and stabilize an area extremely close to Italian national territory.Oncestabilized, countries in this regionbecame or ratherarebecom‐ing partofbothEUandNATO6andhaveprovidedeconomicopportuni‐tiesforItalianeconomyintermsofexportandinvestments.

Italianparticipationinothermissionsabroadhasservednationalin‐terestsinanindirectway.7Forinstance,theactiveparticipationinNATOoperations,particularlytheeleven‐year longISAFoperationinAfghani‐stan,hasbeenaninvestmentinakindofAllied“insurancepolicy”forIta‐ly’snationalsecurity.DuringtheColdWar,theAtlanticAlliance,andtheUSinparticular,hasbeentheonlysecurityguaranteeItalyhad,thisbe‐ing a sort of invisible “shield” or “umbrella” vis‐à‐vis the Soviet threat.SincetheendoftheColdWar,this“shieldrole”hasevolvedintoan“in‐surancepolicy”incasetheinternationalsecuritycontextwoulddeterio‐rateagain.ThecurrenttransitionoftheinternationalsystemfromaUShegemony towards an uncertain and unstablemulti‐polar equilibrium,with emerging or re‐emerging powers that do not necessarily shareWestern interests andvalues,pushes Italy to considermaintaining this“insurance policy” evenmore worthy. Participation in NATOmost im‐portantmissions, suchas those inAfghanistanandKosovo, isaway tomaintainasolid,cohesiveandcrediblemilitaryAllianceandtokeeptheinvestmentmadeinthe“insurancepolicy”fornationalsecurity.

6SloveniaandCroatiahavealreadybecomemembersofNATOandEU.Albaniahas

joined NATO too. Other Western Balkan countries are either candidate to join bothNATOandEUortheyareexpectedtobecomecandidateinthenextyears.

7ThisappliesalsotootherimportantmissionsabroadsuchasthoseinLebanonorSomalia,whicharebeyondthescopeof thisstudysince theydidnotenvisagedasub‐stantialuseoffighteraircraft.


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This isparticularly true for Italy,a “middlepower”8whichdoesnothavesufficientcapabilitiestoprotectitssecurityinterestsalone–withtheonly relevantexceptionofAlba’s crisismanagementoperation, ledbyItalyin1996withtheendorsementofUNSC,torestoresecurityandstability inAlbania. In fact, Italyhasnational interestswell beyond itsborders: safe trade routes in the “EnlargedMediterranean,” stretchingtotheRedSeaandtheIndianOcean;energysuppliesfromNorthAfrica,theMiddleEastandCentralAsia;maritimesecurityandbordercontrolintheMediterraneaninrelationtoillegalimmigration;ageneralinter‐estininternationalfreetradeandopennessofforeignmarketsforItal‐ianexport.Yet,suchinterestscannotbeprotectedbyItalyalone–nei‐therbyanyotherEuropeancountryactingonitsown.Asaresult,ItalianactiveparticipationininternationalorganizationssuchasNATO,theEUandtheUN,aswellasininformalforasuchasG8andG20,isawaytopress its allies and the international community to deal with securitychallenges that are intertwinedwith Italiannational interests.9 Inpar‐ticular, an active, reliable and stable Italian participation in all NATOmissions,includingthoselessdirectlyconnectedwithnationalinterestssuch as ISAF, is instrumental to gain the necessary credibility to pushtheAlliancetodealwithkeyItaliansecuritypriorities.Moreover,beingcrisismanagementoperationssetupandorganizedunderinternationalorganizations’ frameworkallowsItalytosharetheirrisksandcosts, toextendtheinterventionrangetoprotectitsnationalinterestsandtoen‐hance inter‐allies solidarity.10 Vice‐versa, a “free rider” approachwithregard to operational burden sharingwould inevitably weaken Italy’spositionwithinNATOandotherinternationalorganizationsanditsabil‐itytoinfluencetheallieswithrespecttoItaliandefenceandforeignpol‐icygoals.Thisappliesalso,toacertainextent,toItaly’sroleintheUN.In

8OntheItaly’sstructuralconditionas“middlepower”inthepost‐ColdWarperiod

see,amongothers,GiampieroGiacomelloandBertjanVerbeek eds ,Italy’sForeignPol‐icy in theTwenty‐First Century. TheNewAssertiveness of anAspiringMiddlePower,Lanham,LexingtonBooks,2011.

9See,amongothers,StefaniaForteandAlessandroMarrone eds. ,“L’Italiaelemis‐sioni internazionali”, in Documenti IAI, No. 12|05 September 2012 , pp. 27‐28,http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iai1205.pdf.

10Ibid.,p.44.


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fact,ItalianparticipationinUN‐mandatedmissions,includingforexam‐plethoseinIraqandBosnia‐Herzegovina,hasbeenoneofthemainar‐gumentsusedtofosterItalianpositionwithinthenegotiationontheUNSecurityCouncil’sreform,inordertopreventadifferentsettlementthatwouldhaveincludednewpermanentmembers,butleftItalyoutofUN’sapicalbody.

This approach is linked to Italian traditional effort to be part of thecoregroupsofcountriesdealingwithsecurityissuesaffectingItaly’sna‐tional interests. The condition of “middle power”makes it difficult forItalytomaintainitsstatusvis‐à‐vismorepowerfulcountries.Thisisoneofthemainreasonswhy,sincetheendofWorldWarII, Italiangovern‐ments have constantly sought to join any form of enhanced security‐related cooperation: EuropeanDefence Community,Western EuropeanUnion,NATO,EUinstitutionsandmissionsdealingwithCommonSecuri‐tyandDefencePolicy CSDP ,uptothevarious“contactgroups”estab‐lishedduringYugoslavia’sbreakupinthe1990s.TheratioisthatifItalyispartof thecoregroup, Italianchancesto influencethegoalspursuedbysuchgroupincrisisaffectingnationalinterestsaregreaterthanifItalyoperatesoutof it.Thishasbeenoneof thereasons Italyhaschosen tojoinoperationsOdysseyDawnandUnifiedProtectorin2011,despiteofItalianscepticismontheireffectsonLibyansecurityandstability–scep‐ticismwhichhasprovedtoberightinthefollowingyears.Whether2011airoperationsinLibyahavecontributedtoupholdItaly’snationalinter‐estsremainsanopenquestion.However,sincethemilitaryinterventionbyotherWesterncountriesbecameinevitableatthattime,Italianpartic‐ipation in the multinational and then NATO air campaign has at leastbenefited Italy’s positionwith respect to the newly established Libyanleadership.This,inturn,hasprovidedwiththebasisforarenewedbilat‐eral cooperation on important Italian priorities such as border controlandmaritimesecurity,immigrationmanagementandenergysupplies.

Finally,participation incrisismanagementoperations isalsoawaytomaintainstrongrelationswithItaly’smainsecurityally,theUS,con‐sideredsincetheendofWorldWarIIthebedrockofEuropeanandItal‐iansecurity.Beingsurroundedbyunstableregions–fromtheWesternBalkanstotheSouthernMediterraneanshores–andnotableasa“mid‐dlepower”toshapeeventsintheseregionsonitsown,Italyhastradi‐


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tionallyreliedon“asymmetricalliances”withstrongerpartners suchastheUS toaddresscommonsecurityconcerns.11Moreover,thebilateralrelationwithWashingtonhasbeendeliberatelypursuedbyRomeasaleveragetoenhanceItaly’sstatusvis‐à‐visstrongerEuropeancountriessuch as France and Germany. Despite the disappearance of the Sovietthreat,thistwo‐foldapproachintherelationswiththeUShascontinuedinthe1990sbecauseofinternationalcrisesintheBalkansandtheMedi‐terranean,aswellasbecauseofthekindofrelationshipswithotherEUmembers.12Furthermore,the2001terroristattacksshiftedUSnationalsecurityprioritiesfromEuropetotheGreaterMiddleEastandmadeEu‐ropeanalliesincreasinglyvaluedbyWashingtonintermsoftheirpoliti‐calandmilitarycontributiontoUS‐ledcrisismanagementoperations,13suchasthoseinAfghanistan.Asaresult,theItalianparticipationinmis‐sionsabroadhasbecomeafundamentaltoolforItaliandefenceandfor‐eignpolicywithrespecttotheUSally.14

Obviously,themilitaryparticipationincrisismanagementoperationsenvisaging the use of Air Power does not guarantee per sé the directprotectionofItaly’snationalinterests.Neitheritensuresdirectandpos‐itive effects on Italian credibility vis‐à‐vis important allies, Italy’s rolewithinmultilateralorganizations suchasNATO,UNorEU,orbilateralrelationswiththeUS.Indeed,suchprotectionofnational interestsandpositiveeffectonItaliancredibilitydepend,amongotherthings,onthecapacity of Italian governments – and of the country as a whole – tomakethebestofthemilitarycontributionprovidedbyItaly.15Inthisre‐

11See,amongothers,“L’Italiae latrasformazionedelloscenario internazionale”, in

AlessandroColomboandGianniBonvicini eds. ,Lapoliticaesteradell’Italia.Edizione2012,Bologna,IlMulino,2012,pp.9‐25.

12LeopoldoNuti,“TheRichestandFarthestMaster isAlwaysBest:US‐ItalianRela‐tionsinHistoricalPerspective”,inDavidM.Andrews ed. ,TheAtlanticAllianceUnderStress,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2005,p.189.

13CeMiSSandRAND,ChangingU.S.DefensePolicyandtheWaronTerrorism:Impli‐cationsforItalyandforUS‐ItalianRelations,Gaeta,Artistic&Publishing,2002,p.46.

14ForadetailedcomparisonofItalian,FrenchandBritishcontributiontoUS‐ledmil‐itaryoperationsseeJasonW.Davidson,America’sAlliesandWar.Kosovo,Afghanistan,andIraq,NewYork,PalgraveMacmillan,2011.

15Interviewdated11December2013.


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gard,participationinmissionsabroadisafundamentalenablerforItal‐iandefenceandforeignpolicy,despitebeingnotsufficientwithoutafulland stable diplomatic and political commitment. In the future, the ef‐fectsofthiscontributionwilldependoncircumstances,aswellasontheabilityofItaliangovernmentstoexploitthisvaluabletool.Forsure,giv‐ingup theability toparticipate inmissionsabroad throughAirPowerwouldhamper this possibility, having a negative impact on Italiande‐fenceand foreignpolicy,and thuson Italy’sability toprotectandpro‐motenationalinterestsintheinternationalarena.

Inordertomaintainsuchatool,acertainlevelofdefencespendingisnecessary.Sincetheearly2000s,Italyhasallocatedanaverageof0.9%ofGDPperyeartothedefencefunction,16roughlyhalfofwhathasbeenspent in the sameperiod– inabsolute terms–byEuropeancountriessuchasFrance,GermanyandtheUK.TheItaliandebateondefencemat‐ters includes critics ofmilitary spending, particularly in times of eco‐nomic crisis.Forexample, inFebruary2013, left‐wingpoliticalpartiesand pacifist groups have put forward the “Agenda for Peace and Dis‐armament.”17 The initiative proposed to dismantle large defence pro‐curementprogrammesand re‐allocate the related funds to socialpoli‐ciestosupportemploymentandprotecttheenvironment.Thisdecisionwouldimplyanegativecascadeeffectwhichisoftenunder‐evaluatedbythe Italiandebateondefencematters. In fact, the first effectwouldbethereductionof Italy’sability toprotectnational interests throughde‐fence and foreign policy, which in turn would have a significant andnegativeimpactonItaliansocietyandeconomy.

16 The term “defence function” includes all expendituresnecessary to perform the

specificsetoftasksassignedtoArmy,Navy,Air,Forceandjointcomponent,aswellastechnical and administrative personnel of DefenceMinistry. See AlessandroMarrone,ElenaCesca,AlessandroR.Ungaro,DefenceBudgetsand Industry:TablesandGraphs,July2013,http://www.iai.it/pdf/Economia_difesa/Tabelle‐grafici‐EN.pdf.

17SEL,Agendaper lapacee ildisarmoper laprossima legislatura,February2013,http://www.sinistraecologialiberta.it/wp‐content/uploads/2013/02/SELDisarmoPAce12Feb.pdf.


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4.2 SECOND KEY QUESTION: WHAT KIND OF AIR CAPABILITIES DOES ITALY NEED TO PARTICIPATE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS?

IfitisassumedthatmaintainingthecapacitytoprojectAirPowerincri‐sismanagementoperationsdoesserveItaliandefenceandforeignpoli‐cy,thesecondkeyquestioniswhataircapabilitiesareneededinthisre‐gard. Particularly,AirMobility is a crucial role tobeperformedby aircapabilities. Nonetheless, Air Mobility is not the focus of this study,whichisratheronEngagement,ISTARandControloftheAirroles.

Inthelast24years,theEngagementrolehasbeenperformedbyItal‐ianmilitarythroughfighteraircraftsuchasTornado,AMX,F‐16,F‐104and AV‐8B. Some of them, mainly Tornado, have been used togetherwithEurofightertogainandmaintainControloftheAirinLibya 2011 andKosovo 1999 .Asamatteroffact,thefighteraircraftfleetusedsofarbyItalyinmissionsabroadisbeingphasedoutorwillbephasedoutinthenextdecade.Asstatedin2012bytheItalianNationalArmamentDirector, there is an “unavoidable requirement for the replacement of253aircraftbelongingtothreedifferentlineups:18verticaltake‐offair‐craftAV‐8Bof theNavy,136AMXand99Tornadoof theAirForce.”18Themainreason is thatmanyof themhavebeenbuilt in the1980soreven in the1970s,and, as faras their life‐cycle reaches thirtyor fortyyears,theycannotassurehighsecuritystandardsfortheaircrew.Theireffectivenessalsodecreases,astheyareneitherdesignedtoreachcer‐tain performances, nor adaptable to incorporate new technologies.Moreover, maintaining an ageing aircraft in service beyond a certaintimelinebecomesmoreandmore inefficient andexpensivebecauseoftwomain reasons. First, when a kind of aircraft is not produced any‐moreworldwide theavailabilityof spareparts tomaintainand fix the

18ItalianChamberofDeputies‐DefenceCommittee,AudizionedelSegretariogenera‐

ledellaDifesaeDirettorenazionaledegliarmamenti,generaledisquadraaereaClaudioDebertolissullostatodiavanzamentodelprogrammad’armamentoJointStrikeFighter,5December 2012, p. 4, http://documenti.camera.it/_dati/leg16/lavori/stencomm/04/audiz2/2012/1205/pdf001.pdf.


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fleetinservedecreasesandtheircostincreases.Tomakejustallbutonecomparison,itislikewhathappenswiththesparepartsofavintagecar“autod’epoca” .ThisisparticularlythecaseofTornado,AMXandAV‐8B.ThisisoneofthemainreasonstheUKisplanningtoanticipatetheacquisition of F‐35 and the phasing out of its ageing fighter aircraft:maintaining old platforms soon will cost to the British military morepoundsthantheacquisitionofnewones.19Inaddition,themoreanair‐craftbecomesoldandobsoletethemoreeffortsarerequiredtorealizeapossibleupgrade,both in termsof timeandeconomic investments.Tosumup,ifItalywantstomaintainitsabilitytoparticipateincrisisman‐agementoperations involving theuseofAirPower, itwouldbeneces‐sary toprocurenewfighteraircraft toreplace thecurrentageingplat‐forms–whichwillbeinevitablyphasedoutinanycase.

In this context, a clarification is neededwith regard toRPAS.Theiruse has exponentially increased in the last decade, mainly for ISTARpurposes,butalso forEngagement, includingCloseAirSupport forex‐ampleinAfghanistan.MilitaryoperationsinLibyahaveprovedthepo‐tentialityofcombineduseofRPASandfighteraircraft.Inthe2015‐2025timeframe,RPAS contribution to airoperations is expected to grow inquantitative and qualitative terms because these platforms provide avaluable combination of endurance, connectivity, flexibility, autonomyand efficiency.20 Particularly, endurance is increased as human limita‐tionsdonotapply: forexample,themaximumnumberofhoursapilotcan fly permission through amanned aircraft is extended by aircrewturnoverinthecontrolroompilotingtheRPAS.Moreover,thefactthatRPASdonotputaircrews’lifeatriskdoeseasesomepoliticalconcernsincreasinglydiffusedinWesterncountriesregardingtheuseofAirPow‐er.However,RPASarelikelytocomplementbutnottoreplacemannedfighteraircraftbecauseofanumberofreasons.Infact, fromapoliticalpointofview,Europeanauthoritiesandpublicopinion–includingItal‐

19Interviewdated13December2013.20 Alessandro Marrone, Alessandro R. Ungaro, “The Evolution of AGC: Power and

Technology”,inClaudioCatalano ed. ,Globalcommons:threatoropportunity?,Roma,Finmeccanica ResearchDepartment, October 2013, pp. 19‐26, http://www.finmeccanica.com/documents/10437/7958427/body_FIN_OP_Global_Commons_V2.pdf.


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ianones–aremuchlessateasethanAmericanstohavecombatRPASoperatingwithoutamaninthecockpit,eveniftheyareremotelypilotedfromthecontrolroomandarenotfullyautonomous.Furthermore,Eu‐ropeanshaveissuedstrictrulesofengagementconcerningmilitaryop‐erations, and are likely to establish comparably severe limits to theweaponscarriedonbyRPASandtheirrelease,particularlywithregardto automatedweapons’ release.21 Fromamilitary point of view,RPASwillnotbeabletoreachtheperformancesofa5thgenerationfighterair‐craft in terms of speed, manoeuvrability and survivability. Therefore,theywillnotbecapabletoreplacefighteraircraftinthemostdemand‐ingtasksconcerningControlof theAirandEngagementroles. It isnotbyaccidentthatthemajorproducersworldwideofRPAS,theUSandIs‐rael, have decided to procure on a large scale a 5th generation fighteraircraftsuchasF‐35:theyplantohaveabalancedfleetofmannedandremotely piloted aircraft. The future of Air Power, at least until the2030‐2040timeframe,willlikelyseeacomplementaryutilizationof5thgenerationaircraft andRPAS,withalmostnopossibilityof a completereplacement ofmanned platforms by remotely piloted ones.22 The re‐quirementtomaintainfighteraircraftcapabilityregardsallmajorEuro‐peancountries.Withouttheavailabilityofstrategicbomber–whichtheUShavemaintained–theonlywayforEuropeanstocontinueperform‐ing air‐to‐ground attacks is through this kind of aircraft,whose rangecanbeextendedbyair‐to‐airrefuelling, long‐rangeweaponssystems23and/orforwardbasing–alsothroughcarriersiftheaircraftareabletolandontheseships.

Having said that, it isworth considering Italianneedsderived fromthe considered internationalmissions in terms of air capabilities, par‐ticularlyfighteraircraft.Firstofall,interoperabilityiscrucialsinceItal‐ianaircapabilitieshavealwaysoperatedwithincoalitionpredominantlycomposed by NATOmembers. Most of the time the US had a leadingrole,although inBosnia‐HerzegovinaandLibyaAmericanrolewasnotasdominantasinAfghanistan,KosovoandIraq.WhileinmostcasesUK

21Ibid.22Interviewsdated10December2013and21January2014.23Interviewdated21January2014.


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andFrancehavebeenmajor contributors, countries likeGermany, theNetherlands, Canada, Denmark and Norway have assumed relevantrolesinsomeoperations.AlsofromaUSperspective,operatingwithinacoalitionresultswaymoreconvenientandefficientthanoperatingonitsown because it allows to share an operation’smilitary, economic andpoliticalcosts.24AccordingtoNATOofficialdefinition,interoperabilityis“the ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently toachieveAllied tactical, operational and strategic objectives.”25 In otherwords, it refers to the ability to jointly operatewith allies in terms ofplatforms, systems, technologies, communications, tactics, procedures,trainingandlogistics.Therearevariousaspectsandlevelsofinteroper‐ability.Obviously,havingthesameaircraftwiththesamesystems,tech‐nologies and communications, including the same cockpit anddisplay,allows reaching the highest level of interoperability in crisismanage‐ment operations, but also in terms of training and logistics. Themorethe aircraft are interoperable, themore effective is their joint deploy‐mentintheoperationaltheatre.

Second, it is fundamental the capacity to connect aircraft to otherplatformssuchasfighterorRPAS,aswellastounitsoperatingontheground,andtocommandandcontrolcentreswherevertheyarelocated–i.e.intheoperationaltheatreorinthehomeland.Theexponentialin‐novationexperiencedinthe last twodecades intheInformationCom‐munication Technology ICT field has radically changed the wayseconomiesandsocietieswork.Obviously,themilitaryhasbeeninvest‐edbythischangetoo,forcingNATOarmedforcestoexploitnewpoten‐tialities to connect through the cyberspace single elements in the air,land,seaandspacedomains. In2002,at theNATOSummit inPrague,some important stepswere taken in this direction, such as the allies’commitment to acquire a set of core capabilities including aNetworkEnabled Capability NEC to implement such a transformation pro‐gress.ThroughNEC,NATOplannedtocombinediversetraditional,pro‐cedural, technical, organizational and human elements from different

24Interviewdated10December2013.25NATOStandardizationAgency,NATOGlossaryofTermsandDefinitions,Edition

2013,http://nsa.nato.int/nsa/zPublic/ap/aap6/AAP‐6.pdf.


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agencies intoa singlenetwork,with theobjectiveof enabling interac‐tion toachieveandmaintainsignificantstrategicsuperiority.26Aplat‐formisconsidered“netcentric”whenit is fullyabletogatheranddis‐seminateinformation–andorders–fromandtotheothernodesofthenet.Thisiscrucialinordertolettheaircraftexploitingnotonlytheda‐ta gathered from its own sensors, but also the huge amount of datamadeavailablebyavarietyofsensorsmanagedbyanumberof inter‐connectednodes. This include satellite imagery, information gatheredbySpecialForcesonthegroundorothermannedaircraft, intelligenceprovidedbyRPAS,andsofarandsoon.

ThisinturncreatesamuchbetterSA,thataccordingtoNATOofficialdefinitionisthe“theknowledgeoftheelementsinthebattle‐spacenec‐essary tomakewell‐informeddecisions.”27Thismeansa complete, ac‐curate and real‐time knowledge of the operational theatre includingfriendly,opponentandotherelementspresentbothintheairspaceandonthesurface onthegroundoratsea .AnefficientSAisthenecessarypre‐conditiontoachieveanumberofgoals.First,itallowsapreciseen‐gagementoftargets,whichreducestheriskofcollateraldamagesatthelowest possible level, whichmeans amore limited number of victimsamong non‐combatants in the operational theatre. This is becoming amoreandmore importantpoliticalcaveatposedbycivilianauthoritiesto military operations, because of a number of reasons including theabilityofoldandnewmediatospreadimmediatelyworldwide imagesandvideosof collateraldamagesand the sensitivityofWesternpublicopinioninthisregard.Moreover,suchSAgreatlyincreasestheaircrewcapacity to detect, pre‐empt and counter threats, thus augmenting thesurvivability of the aircraft and its chances to come back home fromeachmission.AlreadyduringKosovoaircampaignin1999thishasbeenastrictrequisiteimposedbythepoliticalauthoritiestothemilitaryop‐eration,and thiswill likelybeabindingconditionalso in theplanningandconductoffuturecrisismanagementoperations.

26MicheleNonesandAlessandroMarrone eds. ,“ThetransformationoftheArmed

Forces: the Forza NEC Programme”, in IAI Research Papers, No. 6 October 2012 ,http://www.iai.it/content.asp?langid 2&contentid 804.

27NATOStandardizationAgency,NATOGlossaryofTermsandDefinitions,cit.


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A third crucial need is the radar low‐observability of the platform.The aircraft survivability depends on a number of elements, includingspeed, manoeuvrability and SA. In this context, the radar low‐observability – the so‐called “stealthness” – assumes a particular im‐portance, as it greatly decreases the chances of an aircraft to be shutdownbyopponent’sairdefencesystems,anditsaircrewtobekilledorimprisoned.28Specifically,AirObservabilitydependsonanumberoffac‐tors:theairframe’sdesign,whichmayreducetheradarsignature;spe‐cific paintings applicable to the aircraft’s surface; the fact that aircraftreliesonnet‐centriccommunicationtoexchangedataanddoesnotre‐quirepilotstoflyclosetoeachother,ortocommunicateviaradiowhichcouldbedetectedbyopponent’ssystems.29

Finally, the fact that all considered crisis management operationshave taken place beyond national territory, and even at strategic dis‐tance like in IraqandAfghanistan,makesdeployabilityanother funda‐mentalneedforItalianaircapabilities.Thedeployabilityofaircapabili‐ties can increase proportionally to a number of elements, including:range of the platform, capacity to carry onmore fuel, ability to utilizeair‐to‐airrefuelling,andthecapacitytotakeoffandlandoncarriers,aswell asonbasiswith limited infrastructures and/orairways.Deploya‐bilityalsodependsonthesupportpackagerequiredbytheaircraft,forexample in termsof logistics: themore logistic support is needed, thelesstheplatformisdeployable.Withregardtocarriers,ithastobeno‐ticedthattheItalianNavyhastoreplacetheageingAV‐8Bcurrentlyop‐eratingfromthecarrierCavour,whichareexpectedtobephasedoutby2020.WithoutaircraftabletolandverticallytheverysameutilityoftheCavourasacarrierwouldbequestioned,andthedeployabilityofItalianAirPowerwouldbereduced.

28On 18 January 1991, oneof the ItalianTornado participating to FirstGulfWar

wasshutdownbyanIraqiairdefencesystem,andtheaircrew–theMajorGianmarcoBelliniandtheCaptainMaurizioCocciolone–hadtoejectfromtheaircraftwhileitwascrashing.TheyhavebeencapturedbyIraqiarmedforces,tortured,andkeptprisonersfor44days.TheywerereleasedonMarch3rd,afterIraqwasdefeatedandacceptedtheceasefire.



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The importance of interoperability, net‐centric or network enabledcapabilities,deployabilityor“expeditionary”characterofmilitarycapa‐bilities, hasbeen recognizedby anumberof officialdocuments issuedby the Italian Ministry of Defence and/or by single services, such as:Concetto Strategico del Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa 2005 ,30DottrinaMilitareItaliana 2011 ,31DocumentoProgrammaticoPlurien‐nale per la Difesa per il triennio 2013‐2015 2013 ,32 Verso il 2018 –Lineeguidaediindirizzostrategico 2013 .Infact,theneedofinterop‐erable, net‐centric, expeditionary armed forces, including air capabili‐ties,ispartofthetransformationtheItalianmilitaryexperiencedinthelasttwodecades,asaresultofthechangesintheinternationalsecuritycontext,aswellasoftheoperationalexperienceinmissionsabroad.Alt‐hough the requirements for the fighter aircraft scheduled to replaceTornado,AMXandAV‐8Bhavebeendevelopedinthe1990s,thefollow‐ingoperationalexperienceinKosovo,AfghanistanandLibyahasfurtherconfirmedthecharactersofsuchrequirements.33

4.3 THIRD KEY QUESTION: WHAT PROCUREMENT OPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE TO ACQUIRE THIS KIND OF AIR CAPABILITIES?

If it isassumedthatkeepingthecapacitytoprojectAirPowerthroughcrisis management operations does serve Italian defence and foreignpolicy,andultimatelyItaly’snationalinterests;ifitisassumedthatcur‐rentItalianfighteraircraftfleetneedstobereplacedinthenextdecade

30ItalianMinistryofDefence‐DefenceGeneralStaff,IlconcettostrategicodelCapodi

StatoMaggioredellaDifesa,cit.31 Italian Ministry of Defence‐Defence General Staff, La dottrina militare italiana,

2011, http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/Staff/Reparti/III/CID/Dottrina/Pagine/Dottrina_Militare_Italiana.aspx.

32 ItalianMinistryofDefence,DocumentoProgrammaticoPluriennaleper laDifesaper il triennio2013‐2015,April2013,http://www.difesa.it/Content/Documents/DPP_2013_2015.pdf.

33Interviewdated21January2014.


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by manned aircraft which should be interoperable, net‐centric, low‐observableanddeployable; then thenextkeyquestion forcivilianandmilitarypolicy‐makersiswhatprocurementoptionsareavailabletoac‐quirethekindofaircapabilitiesneededbyItaly.

In theory,a firstoption is todevelopaEuropeanprocurementpro‐grammebringing together Italy andothermainEuropean countries inthefieldofdefence–namelyFrance,GermanyandtheUnitedKingdom– to develop and produce a 5th generation fighter aircraft. On the onehand,ifthishadbeendone,itwouldhaveprovidedthehighestlevelofoperational sovereignty34 andproduced concretepositive consequenc‐es,suchasaccesstonewtechnologies,updatesorupgrades,andbettersecurity of supply, aswell as the greatest technological and industrialreturnonEuropean industries.35On theotherhand, thisoptionwouldhaveimpliedhighercosts,becauseEuropeangovernmentsshouldhaveborneontheirownalltheresearchanddevelopmentcostswithoutrely‐ing on US investments, and without enjoying the decrease of unitarycostsbroughtbythelargenumberofaircraftproducedbyatransatlan‐ticprogramme.Inanycase,suchaninvestmentshouldhavebeendoneinthemid‐1990sthroughanimmediateandsignificantEuropeanfund‐ingofresearchanddevelopmentactivities,inordertodeliverafightercapability by 2020‐2025. In fact, twenty/twenty‐five years have beenthetime‐spanneededbyotherlarge‐scaleandhigh‐techEuropeanpro‐

34 The definitions of “operational sovereignty” vary according to the subject ana‐

lyzed.Forexample,fromanindustrial/technologicalperspective,thetermindicatestheability to use the respective armed forces’ capabilities with appropriate governmentcontrolandwithout thirdpartyconstraints. It isunderstoodtorelyonaccess to tech‐nologyanddefinition fordevelopment,configurationmanagement,andupgrade andsecurityof supply foravailabilityassurance ,dealingwithglobalizationof thesupplychain.Similarly,afurtherdefinitionmoreclosetoaplatformperspectivecanbededuct‐edbyquotingtheUKGeneralSirKevinO’Donoghue:“operationalsovereigntyistheabil‐itytousetheplatformanditsweaponssystemanditsISTARsystemsinthewaywe,theUK,wishtoatthetimeandplaceofourchoosing”.HouseofCommons‐DefenceCommit‐tee,DefenceEquipment2009,ThirdReportofSession2008‐09 HC107 ,http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmdfence/107/8112501.htm.

35MicheleNones,GiovanniGaspariniandAlessandroMarrone,“EuropeandtheF‐35JointStrikeFighter JSF Program”, inIAIQuaderni.EnglishSeries,No.16 July2009 ,p.8,http://www.iai.it/content.asp?langid 2&contentid 143.


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curement programmes, such as Eurofighter, from the beginning of re‐searchactivitiestothedeliveryofthefirstoperationalaircraft.Europe‐ans countriesdecidednot tomakesuchan investment, eitherbecausethey preferred to allocate resources in a national procurement pro‐gramme, like France, or because they opted to cut defence budget toharvesttheso‐called“peacedividend,”likeGermanyandothers.Todaythere is no politicalwill in Europe to undertake this path, and even ifEuropean countrieswill decide to reinvest in this kind of programme,thefirstaircraftwouldnotbeavailablebefore2035.Insum,thisoptionis off the table because of the choicesmadebymajorEuropean coun‐tries back in the 1990s. Military procurement is a long‐term process,therefore certain choices have to bemadewell before capability gapsarises.

Theoretically,asecondoptiontoobtaintheaircapabilitiesneededbyItalytoreplacetheoldoneswouldbetodevelopandbuilda5thgenera‐tion, ground‐attackversionofEurofighter, the4th generationair‐to‐airfighter aircraft developed by Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK in the1980sandacquiredinthe2000s.Thiswouldhavehadpositivebenefitsintermsofoperationalsovereignty,industrialandtechnologicalreturn.Moreover,iftheEurofighterfleetcurrentlyusedforair‐to‐airsuperiori‐tywouldhavebeen coupledwith aground‐attackversionof the sameaircraft, interoperabilitywithinItalianaircapabilitieswouldhavebeenevengreater.ThisoptionhasbeensubjectofdebateinItalyinJanuary2014,whenagroupofprogressivelaw‐makersoftheItalianParliamentputforwardtheideatoreducethenumberofF‐35tobeprocuredandincreasethenumberofEurofighterasapossiblewaytorealizebudget‐ary savings and to support European and Italian defence industry.36Previously, the Italian participation to the F‐35 programme has beencriticised by other columnists supporting the continuation of the Eu‐rofighterprogramme.37However,thechoicetomakeEurofighterafully‐

36AlbertoCustodero, “Costano troppo,megliogliEurofighter: ilPdvuoldimezzare

l’acquistodegliF35”, inRepubblica,1February2014,http://www.repubblica.it/politi‐ca/2014/02/01/news/f35_pd_dimezza_acquisto‐77429492.

37GianandreaGaiani,“F‐35:Chihapauradimettercilafaccia?”,inAnalisidiDifesa,15July2013,http://www.analisidifesa.it/?p 4374.


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fledged ground attack aircraft should have been taken in the early2000s, throughsignificantEuropean joint investments in researchanddevelopmentactivities,aimingtomodifyanaircraftwhichwasnotorig‐inallydesignedtofulfilsucharole.Again,thishasnotbeendonebyEu‐ropeans,while the aforementioned absence of politicalwill in EuropehasbeenepitomizedbythereductionanddelaysaffectingthepurchaseofEurofighter’s3rdtranche.Evenifsuchapoliticalwillmaterialize,theresultswouldnotbeavailablebefore2025.Besides,inrecentyearstheUKhasmadeaninvestmenttodevelopaground‐attackversionofpartofitsEurofighterfleet,mainlyinordertofilltheexistinggapuntiltheF‐35willbeprocured,albeitwithcontestedresults. In fact, it isunlikelythatamodifiedversionofa4thgenerationaircraftcouldreachthesameadvancedtechnologicallevelensuredbya5thgenerationaircraft,forin‐stance in termsof low‐observability, networkenabled capabilities anddata fusion.38TheEurofighterwasdesigned in the1980s toperformacertain role andwithout the “open architecture” indispensable topro‐ceed to a further transformation or to plug new systems in – whichwouldhaveimpliedsignificantinvestmentsanduncertainresultsinre‐gard to the attainable technological level.39 A high technological levelwillberequiredinfutureairoperationsinordertoensurethesurviva‐bilityoftheaircraft.40Assuch,AirForcesthatwilloperateunderacer‐taintechnologicalthresholdarelikelytobeexcludedbythecoregroupofcountriesrunningmissionsabroad.Thereasonisthatthepresenceintheatreofaircraftwithoutlowobservabilityfeaturescouldendangertherestof lowobservableplatformsby signalling toenemyradars theairsortie.41 Inanycase,asamatterof fact,alsothisoptionisoff thetablebecause of the decisionsmade by European countries in the last twodecades.42

ThethirdandlastoptiontosatisfyItalianmilitaryneedsintermsof

38Interviewsdated10November2013,10December2013,11December2013,23

January2014.39Interview21January2014.40Interviewdated10December2013.41Interviewsdated10November2013and11December2013.42Interviewdated10November2013.


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fighteraircraft istoacquireF‐35.TheF‐35isasupersonic,single‐seat,single‐engine, fighter bomber. Three different variants are being pro‐duced: a Conventional Take‐Off and Landing version CTOL, F‐35A ; aShortTake‐OffandVerticalLandingversion STOVLF‐35B ,fittedwithauniquepropulsionsystemthatallowsittooperatefrommedium‐sizedshipsandlimitedairstrips,drawingupontheexperiencegatheredwiththeAV‐8B;aCarrierVersion CV,F‐35C ,deemedtotakeofffromcon‐ventionalaircraftcarriersequippedwithCatapultAssistedTakeOffButArrestedRecovery CATOBAR .It isestimatedthatmorethan3,100F‐35aircraftwillbeprocured,2,44343ofwhichfortheUSAirForce,NavyandMarineCorps,andtherestforother12countries:Australia,Canada,Denmark,Japan,Israel,Italy,theNetherlands,Norway,Singapore,SouthKorea,Turkeyand theUnitedKingdom.Thatmeans that theF‐35willbecomeinthenextdecadethefighteraircraftmostusedworldwide,andthe “backbone of next generationNATOoperations.”44 FromaUSper‐spective,theF‐35asmultiroleaircraftwillreplaceF‐16,F‐18andotherageingfighteraircrafttocarryontasksincluding:deepattack;CloseAirSupportwithgreataccuracy;thewholerangeof ISTARtasks; jammingandelectronicwarfaretasks;complementingF‐22fighter,whichispro‐ducedinlimitednumbers,toensureairsuperiority.45

The F‐35 presents the advanced features typical of 5th generationfighteraircraft.First,itisaplatformequippedwithsensorsandcompu‐tingcapacityfordatafusioninanet‐centricperspective.Thatmeansthepilotdoesnotreceiveseparatedatafromdifferentsources,whichhehastomentallycombineintoacoherentpicture:heratherdirectlyreceivesa single, integratedandaccuratepicturewithall dataalreadyverified,correlatedand fused.46According to testingpilots, thisdata fusion isa

43USGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,F‐35 JointStrikeFighter:Programhas im‐

provedinsomeareasbutaffordabilitychallengesandotherrisksremain,17April2013,http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653857.pdf.

44JAPCC,“F‐35,TheBackboneofNextGenerationNATOOperations”,inJAPCCJour‐nal, No. 18 Autumn‐Winter 2013 , pp. 74‐78, http://www.japcc.org/publications/journal/Journal/2013‐09‐23‐JAPCC_Journal_Ed‐18_web.pdf.

45Interviewdated10December2013.46Ibid.


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leapforwardintermsofSituationalAwareness.47BecauseofF‐35’snet‐centriccharacter,informationcanbeimmediatelysharedwithotherF‐35 through Link 16 data‐link. Thismeans that every aircraft providesthepilotagreaterSituationalAwarenessthankstobothitssensorsuite˗whichincludesradar,infraredsensors,electro‐opticalcamera,electron‐icwarfaresystems˗andthoseofotheraircraft flyingindifferentpartsof the battle‐space. Data fusion from different sensors also increasescyber‐security of air operations, because if one sensor is disrupted,jammed or spoofed, reliable data can be provided by other sensors.48The increasedrangeofsensors, theirnet‐centriccharacter,data fusionandthefactthatthesamepictureisprovidedtoallpilotsflyingF‐35in‐creaseboththesurvivabilityoftheaircraftandtheprecisionofengage‐ment thanksalsotoPrecisionGuidedMunitions thusreducingtheriskofcollateraldamages.Thesecondcharacterofa5thgenerationaircraftliketheF‐35isitslowobservability.Thisisensuredbyanumberofel‐ements,forexample,thedesignoftheairframeandthefactthatweap‐onsarestoredininternalbays,whichreduceaircraft’sradarsignature.A specific painting also reduces aircraft’s observability, while the factthat informationcanbesharedwithoutradiocommunicationpreventscommunicationstobecapturedbyenemyradars.Thelowobservabilityhasthepotentialitytoradicallychangetacticsandwaystoconductairoperations,asdemonstratedbythefirstpilots’training.49

Moreover,F‐35’sinternalbays–whereweaponsarelocated–allowgreaterspeedandmanoeuvrabilityduringmissionswhentheaircraftisloadedupofmissilesandotherweapons,because theplatform’saero‐dynamics is not affected by additional external volumes. This, in turn,reduces the fuelconsumption,while increasingaircraft rangeandper‐sistence.Thatmeansalso theF‐35needs lessair‐to‐air refuelling than4th generation aircraft, thus ensuring greater deployability in crisismanagementoperations.Deployabilityisalsoimprovedbythefactthatthe F‐35 requires less support packages than 4th generation aircraft,since it is amultirole platform able to perform simultaneously ISTAR,

47Interviewdated19November2013 a .48Interviewdated19November2013 b .49Interviewsdated19November2013 b and10December2013.


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electronic warfare and Engagement, with high survivability.50 At thesametime,interoperabilityamongthethreeF‐35variantsisensuredbythehighdegreeofcommonalities, inparticularregardingcockpit,mis‐sions systems, engine, communication systems and pilot’s helmets.51Themaintenanceandrepairactivitiesalsobenefitfromthishighdegreeof commonalities, because inmost cases the same spare parts can beusedforallthreevariantsoftheF‐35.TheverysamefacttheF‐35willreplacethreedifferentaircraftoftheItalianNavyandAirForces Tor‐nado, AMX andAV‐8B with three differentmaintenance and logisticsrequirementswillreducethecosttooperateandmaintainthemthroughtheir life‐cycle.Thanks to thesignificantcommonalitiesamong thedif‐ferentversionsoftheF‐35,thepresenceofbothF‐35AandF‐35Bwithinthe Italian fleet should not represent a problem, also because the AirForce is already used to different versions for example of Tornados –namely ECR and IDS versions.52 Interoperability among US andNATOallieswillbegreaterforthosecountriesacquiringF‐35becausetheair‐craftarethesame,producedbythesameassemblylines.Theonlymaindifferencewill regard the software, as single nations require differentsoftware, forexample, to fitdiverseweaponssystemsproducedbyna‐tionalindustries.Yet,thisdoesnotcreateaproblemintermsofinterop‐erability or maintenance because the software’ upgrade is more eco‐nomicandaffordablethanchangesinthehardware53–asithappensforcivilianinformationandcommunicationtechnology.

Net‐centric and low observability featuresmake the F‐35 differentfrom advanced 4th generation aircraft such as Eurofighter and Rafale.TheF‐35isinfacta5thgenerationmultiroleaircraft,whosehighsurviv‐abilityandinteroperabilitymakeitsuitabletobedeployedfortasksindistanttheatres.54

In conclusion, among the three theoretical possibilities, the F‐35 is

50Interview19November2013 a ,10December2013,11December2013.51Interviewdated19November2013 a .52Interviewdated6December2013.53Interviewdated19November2013 b .54MicheleNones,GiovanniGaspariniandAlessandroMarrone,“EuropeandtheF‐35

JointStrikeFighter JSF Program”,cit.,pp.9‐10.


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the only available option for Italy to procure an interoperable, net‐centric,low‐observableandhighlydeployablefighteraircraft.

This option has been debated in Italy, particularly since 2012, anddifferentcriticshavebeenraisedbythoseopposingtheprocurementofthisaircraft.55AfirstcriticregardsthehighcostoftheF‐35incompari‐sonwithother fighteraircraft,withdifferentestimatesairedbydiffer‐entsources,suchasthenewscirculatedonJune2013thateachF‐35tobe acquired by Italy will cost 155million.56 Some of these critics arebasedonin‐correct,partialorolddata.Infact,asexplainedinthenextchapterontheF‐35programmeandItaly, theunitarycostofeachair‐craft decreases over time, because the overall non‐recurrent costs aresubdivided into greater number of produced units – as it happens tootherlarge‐scalecivilianproductions.WhilethefirstF‐35AprocuredbytheUSdidcost215milliondollar,thefirstF‐35tobeacquiredbyItalywill costaround130milliondollarand thepricewill furtherdecreasedownto85millioninthenextphaseoffullrateproduction.

Asecondkindofobjectionaffirmsthatsuchan“enormousandpro‐longedprocurementprogrammeisunabletoguaranteepeaceandsecu‐ritybecauseitisdesignedforaglobalcontext theColdWar differentfromtoday’sone.”57However,thisprogrammebegunseveralyearsafterthe collapse of the Soviet Union, taking into account the uncertaintiesandchangingcharacterofthecurrentinternationalsystem.Indeed,theF‐35 is not designed with the primary purpose to perform air‐to‐aircombat,likepreviousUSplatformssuchastheF‐22.TheF‐35isratherdesignedtobeamulti‐rolefighter,withprimaryair‐to‐groundcapacityandtheabilitytocontributetoair‐to‐aircombat.58Thatmeansitisbuilt

55ForananalysisofthecriticsonF‐35procurementprogrammeseeMicheleNones,

“IlcaproespiatorioF‐35”,presentationholdattheconferenceorganizedbytheItalianCentreforAeronauticalMilitaryStudies“GiulioDohuet”on14May2013,http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/News/Pagine/IlCaproEspiatorioF‐35.aspx.

56LuigiGrassia, “F35,pienodiguaimadifficiledaeliminare”, inLaStampa,27 June2013, http://www.lastampa.it/2013/06/27/italia/cronache/f‐pieno‐di‐guai‐ma‐difficile‐da‐eliminare‐2tnKEoVCydUAtDlmwAKoaK/pagina.html.

57CampagnaTaglialealiallearmi,CacciaF‐35Laveritàoltrel’opacità,18February2014,http://www.disarmo.org/nof35/docs/4642.pdf.

58Indeed,Canada,theNetherlandsandNorwaywilluseF‐35aircraftalsoforair‐to‐


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to fulfil thekindsof tasksexperienced in internationalmissions in thelast24years,suchassuppressionofenemyairdefenceand/orprecisestriketoestablishandenforceano‐flyzone,CloseAirSupporttogroundtroops deployed in the operational theatre subject to ground‐basedthreats,andISTAR.

A third groupof criticsdenounces the technical problemsoccurredduring the F‐35 procurement programme, for example regarding theaircraft’s software, engine and helmets. Again, some of the critics arebased on in‐correct or partial data. For example, the fact that the air‐craft’sdesignmakes itmoredifficult for thepilot to seedirectlyback‐wardsbymovinghishead59isnotarealissuebecause,asmentionedbe‐fore, the pilot receives straight in the helmet an integrated picture ofbothimagesanddatacomingfromthesixcamerasmountedindifferentpartsoftheaircraft,aswellasfromothersensorspositionednotonlyonhisaircraft,butalsoonotherF‐35ordifferentplatformspartofthemili‐tarynet.Incontrast,othercriticsarewell‐groundedandbaseduponre‐altechnicalproblemsoccurredduringtheprogramme.Thekeyissueiswhether these realproblemsare anormalpartof the research,devel‐opmentand testingactivities,as forany technologicallyadvancedpro‐curement programme, or they are so exceptional tomake the aircraftnotworthytobeprocured.Attheendoftheday,threeofthemosthigh‐tech armed forces in theworld – American, British and Israeli ones –have chosen to buy an overall number of 2,600 F‐35,while other 556aircraft are set to be procured by technologically advancedmilitariessuch thoseofAustralia, Canada,Denmark, Japan,Netherlands,NorwayandSouthKorea.Thisdemonstratesthat,despiteitstechnicalproblems,the F‐35 represents the next Air Power’s military and technologicalfrontier, a frontier which NATO members and partners seem deter‐minedtoexplore.

airoperations.

59GianlucaDiFeo,“F‐35:tuttalaverità”,inL’Espresso,26June2013,http://espres‐so.repubblica.it/attualita/cronaca/2013/06/26/news/f35‐tutta‐la‐verita‐1.55939.


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4.4 FORTH KEY QUESTION: IT IS BETTER TO BUY F-35 “OFF-THE-SHELF” OR TO PARTICIPATE IN THE

MULTINATIONAL PROCUREMENT PROGRAMME?

If it isassumedthattheF‐35istheonlyavailableoptiontoprocureaninteroperable,net‐centric,low‐observableandhighlydeployablefighteraircraft to satisfy Italy’smilitaryneeds toparticipate incrisismanage‐mentoperations,thelastkeyquestionforpolicy‐makersregardshowtoprocureit.Inprinciple,twooptionsareavailable.Ontheonehand,onemightbuyit“off‐the‐shelf,”thatmeanstobuytheaircraftinthemarket‐placewhen it is alreadydevelopedandproducedona large scale – inItalianitwouldbesaid“chiavi inmano.”Ontheotherhand,onemightparticipateinitsdevelopmentandproduction,investingintheresearchanddevelopmentphasesandinvolvingnationalindustries.

Fromamilitarypointofview,participatingfromthebeginningintheprocurementprogrammebringsthreemainpositiveeffects.First, ital‐lowstoreceivethefirstaircraftalreadyin2016andtoproceedwiththereplacementoftheageingfleet–Tornado,AMX,AV‐8B–withoutexpe‐riencingcapabilitiesgap.Thisensurestokeeptheabilitytoparticipateinmissionsabroad in the2015‐2025timeframe,and tonotspend fur‐therfundstoleaseaircrafttofilleventualgaps,ashappenedwiththeF‐16intherecentpast.Second,participationinthedevelopmentandpro‐ductionoftheaircraftincreasestheoperationalsovereignty,60whichisnear‐zeroincaseofthe“off‐the‐shelf”acquisition.Thatmeansinteraliabeingmoreable tooperate,modifyandupgradetheaircraftaccordingtonational needs and timeline. Third, being a fully‐fledgedpart of theprogrammeallows Italianpilots to start sooner rather than later theirtraining with American and other aircrews, with obvious benefits intermsofinteroperabilitywithUSandmajorNATOpartners.

On the other hand, participation in the procurement programmebringstwomoreadditionalcosts.First,ItalyalsocontributedtotheF‐35researchanddevelopmentactivitiesby investing1,028millioneuro in



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2002.61Second,thebuiltupoftheFinalAssemblyandCheckOut FACO ofCamericosted775millioneuro.62Bothfundscouldhavebeensavedby acquiring F‐35 “off‐the‐shelf.” However, the Italian military wouldhave needed to build a proper capacity formaintenance, upgrade andlogisticstooperatethefleetof90F‐35–bothCTOLandSTOVLversions–forthenextthreeorfourdecadesinanycase.ThecreationofCameriFACOaspartoftheprocurementprogrammemeansthatItalianMinis‐tryofDefencewillnotspendfurtherbudgettobuildaredundantfacili‐ty,astheFACOisalreadysettobecometheMaintenanceRepairOver‐haul andUpgrade MRO&U centre for Italian F‐35. This prevents theexpensive duplication experienced in past procurement programmes,whentherewerebothanindustrialfacilityfortheFACOandamilitaryfacilityfortheMRO&U.Hence,thisensuresamoreeffectiveandefficientmanagementof theaircraft through its entire life‐cycle.63Byusing thesamefacilityfortheentireItalianfleetofF‐35,significantsavingscanbemade, while a more rapid replacement of spare parts can also be fa‐voured.64SincetheF‐35isexpectedtoremaininservicefor35‐40years,thiswouldbeasignificant improvement in theway fundsarespent indefenceprocurements, somethingwhich couldnot happen if Italy hadbought F‐35 “off‐the‐shelf.” Moreover, having the FACO within theCamerimilitarymulti‐functionalcenterforaero‐tacticalaircraftdoesal‐lowthearmedforcestobetterknowtheplatformalreadyduringtheas‐semblyphases,thusincreasingoperationalsovereignty.65

A third issue concerningwhether participating in the procurementprogramme or buying F‐35 “off‐the‐shelf” regards the timeline of air‐craft’s acquisition and its related cost. As in any procurement pro‐gramme, theF‐35’s cost curvedecreasesover timeand thenstabilizesitself.Thevery firstaircraftaremoreexpensivebecause theybear the

61Nothwithstandingtherisingcostsoftheresearchanddevelopmentactivities,Ital‐

iancontributiondidnotincreaseastheUnitedStatestookchargeoftheseextracosts.62 ItalianChamberofDeputies‐DefenceCommittee,ProgrammapluriennalediA/R

n. SMD 02/2009…, 25 March 2009, http://documenti.camera.it/leg16/resoconti/commissioni/bollettini/pdf/2009/03/25/leg.16.bol0157.data20090325.com04.pdf.

63Interviewdated6December2013.64Interviewdated21January2014.65Interviewdated6December2013.


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cost,delaysandproblemsoccurredinthedevelopmentandproductionphases of a new platform. Then, the so‐called “learning curve”makesproductionmoreefficient,andtheincreasenumberofaircraftproducedperyearbringsunitarycostsdown–asithappensincivilianproductiontoo.This isoneof thereasonsF‐35production isstructuredaccordingtoseveralLowRateInitialProductionPhases LRIP ,beforemovingtothefullrateproduction.ThebillofthefirstaircraftproducedbythefirstLRIP LRIP1 andacquiredbytheUSwasaround215milliondollar.Incontrast, the cost of the aircraft being produced by the sixth LRIPLRIP6 , which is going to be acquired by the US, the UK and Italy,shrinkstoaround130milliondollar–asimilarcosttoalessadvanced4th generation fighter aircraft. According to Lockheed Martin’s officialestimates, the F‐35 aircraft produced by the full rate production willcost about 85 million dollar. This is important because each countrypaystheaircraftprocuredtheexactcostofeverydifferentLRIP,whichmeansdifferentcostsovertime.ItalyhaschosentostartbuyingF‐35atLRIP6inordertobalance,ontheonehand,theneedtoavoidcapabilitygaps since ageing aircraftwill inevitablyphasedout, and on theotherhand, the goal to save money by paying a lower price in comparisonwiththefirstfiveLRIPs.IfItalyhadprocuredF‐35“off‐the‐shelf,”itmayhaveenteredLRIP8orLRIP9thussavingfewdozensofmillionsofeuro.However,inthiscase,itshouldalsobeconsideredthecoststomaintaininuse theageingTornadoandAMX fleet formoreyears, and/or costsassociatedwith leasingotherplatforms to fill eventual capabilitygaps.Inthepast,Italyfacedasimilarchoiceafterdecidingtoextendthelifeofthe ageing Starfighter: the delays of the Eurofighter programme re‐quired gap fillers identified initially in theTornadoADV’s leased fromUK whichwasbyfarmoreexpensivethanenvisaged andlaterinF‐16leased from theUS. The expendituresmade to lease these aircraft didnotentailanybenefitintermsofindustrialandtechnologicalreturnsforItaliandefenceindustry.

Fromadefenceindustrialpolicy’spointofview,66themaindifference

66ForadetailedhistoryofItalianaeronauticindustryseeGregoryAlegi,Involoda

100anni.Lastoriadell’industriaaeronauticaitalianadal1913adAleniaAermacchi,No‐vara,DeAgostini,2013.


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between participating in the procurement programme and acquiringaircraft“off‐the‐shelf” is that industrialreturn,technologytransferandcreationofqualified jobs ismuch lower in thesecondcase than in thefirstone.InItaly,theNationalArmamentsDirector SegretariatoGener‐aleDifesa/DirezioneNazionaleArmamentiSGD/DNA hasthemandatetosafeguardandsupportItaliandefenceindustrybyLaw.67TheNation‐al Armaments Director, in liaisonwith single technical services arma‐mentoffices,underthepoliticalauthorityoftheMinistryofDefence,hastraditionally worked to conduct a defence industrial policy coherentwiththeoperationalneedsofthearmedforces.

Asmentionedbefore,Europeansdidnotinvestinafollow‐upoftheEurofighterinthe1990sand2000s.Atthesametime,theUSofferedtomajorEuropeanalliesthepossibilitytojointheF‐35procurementpro‐gramme.Fromadefenceindustrialpolicy’spointofview,theItaliande‐cisiontojointhismultinational,US‐ledprogrammemadesensebecauseof twomainreasons.First, itallowedenjoyingapositive industrial re‐turnintermsofproductionandmaintenance, inlinewithpreviousex‐periences.Thisreturnalsoinvolvesadvancedtechnologies,forexamplewithregardtothemachinerynecessarytoworkontheaircraftandtherelated know‐how.68 Above all, it provided the opportunity to partici‐pateinthedevelopmentactivities,aswellas intheproductionandas‐semblyphases.ThiswasauniqueopportunitytolettheItalianindustryworknotonlyon4thgenerationaircraftbutalsoon5thgenerationones,whichisatechnologicalleapforwardwithsignificantandpositiveindus‐trialeffects.69

Besidestheprimarymilitaryrationaletoreplaceageingandobsoleteaircraftwithnewones,andthesecondaryindustrialrationale,twootherreasonsmotivatethechoicetojointheF‐35procurementprogramme.70

67Art.41oftheLegislativeDecreeNo.66of15March2010:Codicedell’ordinamento

militare G.U.No. 106of8May2010 ,p. 66, http://www.normattiva.it/uri‐res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto‐legislativo:2010‐03‐15;66.

68Interviewdated23January2014.69Interviewsdated21January2014and23January2014.70 AlessandroMarrone, “Italy and the F‐35: Rationales and costs”, in International

Journal,Vol.68,No.1 Winter2012‐13 ,pp.31‐48.


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First, it is a multinational programme envisaging the participation ofeight Allied countries, including seven NATO members and three EUmembers. Themultinational rationale is important as far as joint pro‐curements not only ensures greater interoperability, but also contrib‐utes toshare thecostsofprogrammeswhicharesimplyun‐affordableon a national basis. Finally, it enhances defence andpolitical tieswithpartnercountries.Theforthrationaleistransatlantic.Asmentionedbe‐fore,theUSisstillItaly’smainallyinthedefencefield.Infact,whiledur‐ingtheColdWaritrepresentedthebedrockofEuropeanandItalianse‐curity,also in thepost‐ColdWarperiod theUShas led themajorityofcrisis management operations in which Italy was involved, from IraqandBosnia‐HerzegovinatoKosovoandAfghanistan.Inthiscontext,thedefenceprocurement cooperation ispartof awider transatlantic rela‐tion,whichovertheyearshasbeenconsideredbydifferentItaliangov‐ernmentoneoftheprioritiesofItaly’sdefenceandforeignpolicy.71

71On the linkbetweenpolitical,diplomaticanddefencecooperationbetween Italy

and the US in the post‐ColdWar period see, among others, Alessandro Marrone andAlessandroR.Ungaro,“TherelationsbetweenUnitedStatesofAmericaandItalyinthepost‐ColdWarperiod:adefenseindustrialperspective”, inCahiersdelaMéditerranée,2014, forthcoming .

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5. The F-35 programme and Italy: the industrial perspective

This chapterdiscusses the industrial aspectsof theF‐35multinationalprogrammeandItalianparticipationinit.

5.1 THE BEST VALUE FOR MONEY APPROACH

TheF‐35isamultinationalprocurementprogrammeledbytheUSwitheightparticipatingcountries:Australia,Canada,Denmark,UnitedKing‐dom, Italy, theNetherlands,Norway andTurkey.Moreover, Israel andJapanhaveselectedtheF‐35AthroughtheForeignMilitarySales FMS processastheyarenotfullyF‐35partners.SouthKoreahasalsodecidedtopurchase40F‐35,withdeliveriesscheduledfrom2018to2021inthecontextof theF‐X III competition.1Finally, Singapore is considering topurchase theF‐35 in thenear future to replace theF‐16 fighter fleet.2Overall,theJSFprocurementvolumeiscurrentlyestimatedtobemorethan3,000F‐35aircraft,2,4433 for theUSAirForce,NavyandMarineCorps and the rest distributed according to partner’s procurementplans.4

1AndreaShalal‐Esa,“S.KoreaorderwoulddriveF‐35per‐planecostlower”,inReuters,

26 November 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/26/lockheed‐fighter‐korea‐idUSL2N0JB24120131126.

2“Singaporesaysin‘noparticularhurry’tobuyLockheedF‐35jets”,inReuters,12December 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/13/us‐lockheed‐fighter‐idUSBRE9BC02J20131213.

3USGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,F‐35JointStrikeFighter…,cit.4 Lockheed Martin, F35 Fast‐Facts, February 2014, https://www.f35.com/assets/


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Table3.F‐35’sacquisitionplans

Customer PlannedAircraft

USAirForce 1,763 F‐35A

USNavy 260 F‐35C

USMarineCorps 340 F‐35B/80 F‐35C

UKRoyalAirForce/RoyalNavy 138 F‐35B

Turkey 100 F‐35A

Australia 100 F‐35A

Italy 60 F‐35A/30 F‐35B

Canada 65 F‐35A

Norway 52 F‐35A

Japan 42 F‐35A 20optional

SouthKorea 40F‐35A

Netherlands 37 F‐35A

Denmark 30 F‐35A

Israel 19 F‐35A

Total 3,156

Withinthisprocurementvolume,416F‐35areexpectedtobedeliveredtoNATOcountries,withanestimated49aircraftoperatinginEuropeby2018.5Thefactthatseveralnewcountries,besidestheninemembersoftheprocurementprogramme,havedecided to acquire the F‐35 in lastyearsconfirmstheappealoftheaircrafttotheglobalmarketplace.

In addition, the overall volume of F‐35 is likely to increase in the2020‐2030 timeframe through FMS process, outside the perimeter ofprocurement’s partner countries. In fact, since a significant share ofworldwidefighterfleetshastobereplacedinthenextfuture, itcanbeassumedthattheF‐35will likelybeoneofthepreferredchoicesmadebygovernmentstomodernizetheirairfleet–asitisalreadyhappeninginsomeAsia‐Pacificcountries.TheF‐35isindeedlikelytorepeatinthe

uploads/downloads/13567/f‐35fast_factsjfebruary2014.pdf; AnthonyDeutsch and An‐dreaShalal‐Esa,“Dutchtopurchase37F‐35fighterplanes‐sources”,17September2013,in Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/17/us‐dutch‐fighter‐f‐idUSBRE98G09I20130917.

5“F‐35,TheBackboneoftheNextGenerationNATOOperations”,cit.

5. THE F-35 PROGRAMME AND ITALY: THE INDUSTRIAL PERSPECTIVE

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nextdecadestheworldwidediffusionexperiencedbytheF‐16,particu‐larly–butnotonly– inthoseUSalliedcountriesalreadyfamiliarwiththeF‐16.Themore governmentspurchaseF‐35, themorebenefits re‐ceive partner countries like Italy: production unitary costs decreasethankstolargerprocurementvolumes;sustainmentcostsareexpectedtoshrinksincetherewillbemoresparepartsproducedanddistributedworldwide;6upgradingcostscanbesharedbymorecountriesandthusbecominglessexpensive;7thecomponentsproducedbynationalindus‐triesinvolvedintheprogramme,suchasAleniaAermacchi,willincreaseinordertosupplyF‐35ordersbynewcustomers.

TheF‐35programmeentailsaradicalchangeofthemindsetandwayto envisage a multinational procurement programme in the defencefield.Infact,comparedtoothermajorinternationalcollaborations suchasTornado,Eurofighter,A400MandMeteor ,itisbasedontheprincipleofthebestvalueformoneyandnotontheprincipleofjusteretour.Theprocurementprocedure is indeedquitedifferent fromthepast.First,aparticipating country formulates its national requests in terms of air‐craftrequirements,volumeandvarianttotheF‐35JointProgrammeOf‐fice JPO .Then,theJPOformulatesanoverallrequesttotheprimecon‐tractorLockheedMartin.Sucharequestindicatesthenumberofaircrafttobuildforeachvariant,thebasicaircraftrequirementsandthespecificintegrations to the basic configuration requested by individual coun‐tries. Lockheed Martin manages independently the subcontracts withAmericanandEuropeansuppliers,whichprovidetheirproductsorser‐vicestotheprimecontractorresponsiblefordeliveringtheaircraftun‐derthetermsprovidedbytheJPOcontract.Similarly,Pratt&WhitneyistheprimecontractorforF‐35’sengineandtheintegrationofitsrelatedsystems.TheteamisalsocomposedbyRolls‐Royce,whoisresponsiblefor the vertical lift system for the STOVL aircraft, and HamiltonSundstrand,inchargeoftheelectronicenginecontrolsystem,actuationsystem, gearbox and health monitoring systems. Other companies inpartner countries participate on an equal access basis in the supplies’

6Interviewdated6December2013.7Interviewdated10December2013.


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competitionsmanaged by the US prime contractors; bids are selectedaccordingtotheirbestprice/qualityratio.Therefore,inordertobeen‐gagedintheF‐35programmetheItaliandefenceindustrialbasehashadto accept the challenge of the best value formoney approach. This isquitenewwithrespecttoItalianindustry’spastexperienceinmultina‐tionalprogrammebasedon juste retourprinciple,whereby cost‐sharedivided among participating governments must equal the work‐shareamongnationalindustriescomposingtheindustrialconsortium.

Althoughassessing international collaborations indefenceprocure‐ment projects is not an easy task, economic theory might offer someguidelines. First, an international programmehas to offer cost‐savingswith respect to an equivalent national programme, and ideally also incomparisonwiththeleastexpensivealternative,thatisbuying“off‐the‐shelf.”Suchcollaborationshave toensure thatclubmembershipbene‐fitsareatleastequaltothecostsofmembership.Second,anefficientin‐ternational programme shouldallocateworkon thebasis of compara‐tiveadvantagedeterminedbycompetition.Intheory,nosinglecountryhastherighttoashareofthedevelopmentandproductionworkbasedontheamountofitsfinancialcontributiontotheprogramme–whichisratherthekeyassumptionofthejusteretourprinciple.Finally,accord‐ing to theeconomic theory, inorder tobemoreefficientandeffective,themultinational programme has to bemanaged andmonitored by auniqueprimecontractor.Theprimecontractorshouldbeboundbyanincentive‐contract with the public authority establishing rewards andpenaltiesincaseofgoodorpoorperformancesbythecompany.8

TheF‐35programmeseemstosubstantiallyreflectthisapproach,asopposedtopastandtraditionalcollaborationsindefenceprojects.9Evenatthebeginningoftheprogramme,duringthedesignanddevelopmentphases of the F‐35, two companies – Lockheed Martin and Boeing –were in competition to acquire the contract. The two competitorshadselectedpartnercompaniesandsuppliersonthebasisoftheirtechnical

8KeithHartley,“OffsetsandtheJointStrikeFighterintheUKandtheNetherlands”,in

JurgenBrauerandJ.PaulDunne eds. ,ArmsTradeandEconomicDevelopment.Theory,Policy,andCasesinArmsTradeOffsets,LondonandNewYork,Routledge,2004,p.134.

9Ibid.


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expertise and competitiveness rather than on geographical criteria.Then,thecontracthasbeenawardedtoLockheedMartinona“winnertakesall”basis, thuswithoutcompensatingBoeingwithanyadditionalorextraprocurements.

Participating countries benefit from the investment made throughtheirfinancialcontributiontoF‐35inadifferentwayratherthanauto‐matic work‐share/cost‐share principle. First, their industries are al‐lowed to bid for work on the programme.Moreover, partner govern‐mentshavepriority inF‐35deliveriesandaccesstotechnicalandper‐formancedatarelatedtotheaircraft,andtheirrepresentativesarepost‐edintheJPOalongsidewithAmericans.Additionally,theyareexemptedfrompayingaResearch&Developmenttaxonanypurchase.Theseben‐efits are greater than the alternative option of buying “off‐the‐shelf,”thatisdirectlybuyingtheaircraftinthecommercialmarketplace.

However,itisnecessarytospecifysomeelementsinordertoprovideapictureascompleteaspossibleof theF‐35project.Ontheonehand,adopting an approachbasedon competition andon the best value formoneyis,undoubtedly,aninnovativeaspect.Fromamanagementper‐spective,thesetwoinnovativepillarsintendedtomaketheprogrammemoreefficientbyacontinuousanddetailedmonitoringofcosts,andbyavoiding duplication and unnecessary expenditures during the entirelifecycleof theproduct.Nevertheless, costsare subject to increasenotleast because developing and testing cutting‐edge technologies maypresent unexpected costs, and/or unexpected delays, which turn intofurther costs.10 For sure, containing costs is in the interest of all part‐ners, in primis the US, which bears the overwhelming burden of re‐search,development,designandproductionexpenditures.

Ontheotherhand,itseemsnecessarytoapplythesetwoconcepts–competitionandbestvalueformoney–withacertainflexibilitytoavoidto “overstress” the supply chain. In order to correctly understand thispoint,somepreliminaryclarificationsareneeded.Ingeneral,theprimecontractor handles contractual relationshipswith American and Euro‐peansuppliersthroughoneofthefollowingthreeprocedures:

10Interviewdated23January2014.


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1. LockheedMartincansetamaximum levelof expenditure foragiven component, system or service, and the supplier initiallyselected maintains the contract as long as its price remainsunderthatceiling.

2. LockheedMartincanopentoallindustryplayersthebiddingfora certain supply, and assign the contract to the companyprovidingthebestvalueintermsofcostandquality.

3. Lockheed Martin can sign agreements with two differentsuppliers of a givenproduct as it deems strategichavingmorethanasinglesupplysourcetoprovideit˗theso‐called“strategicsecondsources”method.

ThelatteristhecaseofAleniaAermacchi,aFinmeccanicacompany,thathas “strategic second source” status for F‐35’s wings after LockheedMartin.TheItalianindustrywillcontinuetoprovidewingsaslongasitcan keep their price lower or equal to that of the units produced byLockheedMartin.Ifthe“secondsource”priceincreasescomparedtotheone provided by the first source, Lockheed Martin could re‐open thecompetitiontoseekanothersupplierofferingbestvalueforthatspecificproduct.Thisapproachmay leadthe“secondsource”companytopro‐duceforawhilewithnegativemargins inordertoremaincompetitiveandmaintainthecontract,whilethe“learningcurve”makestheproduc‐tionprogressivelymoreprofitable.

Themajority of supplier agreements with LockheedMartin have aone‐yearterm,becausetheUSgovernmentdecidesthenumberofF‐35tobepurchasedyearbyyear.These contracts are expected to shift tofive‐year term with the start of the full rate production. In any case,LockheedMartinwillcheckfromtimetotimewhetheritssuppliercon‐tinues to offer the best value available on themarket for that specificproduct or service. A system based on one‐year contracts seems tooverstress the supply chain and does not encourage the supplier toelaborateandadoptlong‐terminvestmentsplan,becausethecontractorhastobeartheriskofmakinginvestmentscompletelyonitsown–i.e.inmachineriesorhumanresources–withoutanyassurancethatthevol‐umeofsupplieswillcontinuebeyondthenextyear.

Anothercritical issueconcernsthelackofItalianindustries’partici‐pation in the development and integration activities, which entail the


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mostsignificantandsensitive technologies.This issuehasalsoappliedtootherEuropeanindustrialpartnersoftheF‐35programme,beingthe“transatlantic technology transfer”ofdefenceprocurementsoneof themostcontested issueatgovernmentalandindustrial levels.11DemandsfromEuropeansuppliersfaceobstaclesmainly,butnotonly,duetoUSregulationssuchastheInternationalTrafficinArmsRegulation ITAR and theNationalDisclosure Policy. Therefore,morework needs to bedonewithintheF‐35cooperationtoaddressthisissue.12

5.2 THE ITALIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCUREMENT PROGRAMME

There are three levels of international participation in the F‐35 pro‐curement, which reflect each country’s financial stake in the pro‐gramme.Ranking inoneof these levels influences theamountof tech‐nology transfer and subcontracts open for bid to national companies,the number and importance of positions hold by national representa‐tivesintheJPO,aswellastheorderinwhichcountriesreceiveproducedaircraft.SinceItalyisinvolvedintheF‐35programmeasLevel2partner–thesamelevelofNetherlands–withroughly4%sharingof thetotalcost, it has limited opportunities to influence aircraft’s requirements.TheUnitedKingdomisaLevel1partnerwith10%ofcost‐share,whileAustralia,Canada,Denmark,Norway,andTurkeyareLevel3partners,eachhavingonetotwopercentofcost‐share.

Italy’sparticipationintheF‐35programmebegunin1998whentheleft‐winggovernmentdecidedtoinvest10milliondollarintheConceptDemonstrationPhase CDP .In2002,theItalianright‐winggovernment

11AlessandroMarrone,“Cooperazionetransatlanticanelladifesaetrasferimentodi

tecnologiesensibili”,inIAIQuaderni,No.30 June2008 ,http://www.iai.it/content.asp?langid 1&contentid 122.

12Forthesakeofcompleteness,itshouldbenoticedthattheissueoftechtransferaf‐fectsalsoEuropeanprocurementprogrammes,wherebydifferentindustriespartoftheconsortium struggle to not release all high‐tech information to governments of othercountrieswheretheirindustrialcompetitorarebased.Interviewdated21January2014.


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confirmedthechoicetakenin1998bycommitting1,028billiondollarintheSystemDesignandDevelopment SDD PhaseandbysigningtheUS‐Italy relatedMemorandumofUnderstanding MoU . In 2007, the left‐winggovernmentsignedthebilateralMoUfortheProduction,Sustain‐ment,andFollow‐onDevelopment PSFD Phase,withaninvestmentof904milliondollar.Twoyears later, in2009 the ItalianParliament ap‐provedtheacquisitionof131F‐35,including69F‐35Avariantsand62F‐35Bvariants.Atthattime,ItalyalsodecidedtobuildtheFinalAssem‐blyandCheckOut FACO andMaintenance,Repair,OverhaulandUp‐grade MRO&U facility at Cameri, with an investment of 775milliondollar. In 2012, due to the decision to adopt wide‐ranging austeritymeasures, the Italiangovernmenthasreduced theoverall fleetofF‐35from131to90 60F‐35Aand30F‐35B .

Thedeliveryof Italian aircraftwill be completedby2027,with thefirst34F‐35acquiredby2020.ThisdeliveryschedulehasbeentailoredexpresslybytakingintoaccountthereplacementofTornadoandAMX.Thelatterwillbereplacedbefore2020,whileTornadowillcontinuetooperate until 2027. Therefore, some Tornado will be maintained andprogressivelyphasedoutuntilthelastF‐35willcomeintoservice.13

AccordingtothemostrecentfiguresaboutItaly’sengagementintheF‐35programme, 90 Italian companies are involved and the contractsawarded to the Italian industries have an overall value of 715milliondollar.14 Within this volume, 565 million dollar are related to theFinmeccanica group,15 mainly through Alenia Aermacchi, which is re‐sponsiblefortheconstructionofmorethan1,200F‐35wings,notonlyfor the Italian fleet,butalso for theninepartnersof theprogramme.16

13ItalianChamberofDeputies‐ResearchService,“IlprogrammaJointStrikeFighter

F35 ”,inDocumentazioneericerche,No.22 31May2013 ,http://documenti.camera.it/leg17/dossier/Testi/DI0011.htm.

14ItalianChamberofDeputies‐DefenceCommittee,Audizionedell’AmministratoreDe‐legatoeDirettoreGeneralediFinmeccanica,16October2013,http://documenti.camera.it/Leg17/resoconti/commissioni/stenografici/xhtml/04/indag/c04_arma/2013/10/16/resoconto.0008.html.

15Ibid.16AleniaAermacchi,LockheedMartinandAleniaAeronauticasigncontractforinitial

productionofF‐35wings,25September2008,http://www.aleniana.com/node/80.


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Theterm“wings”includesboththetwosemi‐wingsandthecentralcelloftheaircraftholdingthemtogether,thatis30%oftheentireairframe,presenting significant engineering challenges. The programmehas po‐tentialrevenuesfor10billiondollar,17butthiswilldependonthecapac‐itytoexploitandusetheinfrastructurescreated–firstandforemosttheCameri FACO/MRO&U – to build components and to provide mainte‐nance,supportandupgrade,inparticularforavionicsandelectronics–forboththeEuropeanF‐35andtheUSaircraftbasedinEurope.Becauseof these reasons, and the very same nature of the procurement pro‐gramme based on best value formoney principle, providing definitivefigures and numbers about the industrial returns of the F‐35 pro‐grammeisquitecomplicatedandtoacertainextentincomplete.Havingsaidthat,arecentreportcarriedoutbytheadvisorybranchofPricewa‐terhouseCoopers PwC estimatesthattheItalianparticipationintheF‐35procurementprogrammewillgenerateanaddedvalueof15,8billiondollarfortheItalianeconomyduringtheentire2007‐2035timeframeanditwillsupportthecreationofmorethan6,300jobs.18

ConcerningSmallandMediumEnterprises SMEs inthedefenceandaerospace sector, they proved to be flexible and adaptable in offeringthebestvalue formoneywithin theF‐35programme.19However, theysuffermorethanlargersuppliersthefactthatcontractsaregrantedonlyonone‐yearbasisandtheyarethusdiscouragedtomakelong‐termin‐vestments in machineries, technology and human resources, whichwould greatly benefit their competitiveness. Moreover, Italian SMEssometimes lack the necessary information and technical/legal assis‐tancetobecompetitiveintheF‐35procurementbiddingprocess.20Fur‐

17Ibid.18“F‐35, per l’Italia benefici da 15 miliardi”, in Il Sole 24 Ore, 19 February 2014,

http://www.banchedati.ilsole24ore.com/doc.get?uid finanza‐FM20140219024EAA.19Interviewdated23January2014.20Inaddition,SMEsintheaerospaceanddefencesectordosuffercommonproblems

ofItalianeconomy:delaysinthepaymentbypublicauthoritiesandprivateItalianprimecontractors,lowlevelsofpublicfundingforresearchanddevelopmentactivities,inade‐quategovernment’sexportsupport,hightaxationandanumberofbureaucraticobsta‐cles.Formoredetailssee,amongothers,AlessandroMarrone,“Piccoleemedieimpresenelmercatodelladifesa”,inAffarInternazionali,16April2013,http://www.affarinterna


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thermore, the participation of SMEs to such a complex programmeshouldbefacilitatedthroughasystemofglobalauthorizationsallowingthetransferofpartsandcomponentsdirectedtotheAmericanandEu‐ropeancompaniesparticipatingintheF‐35procurement.

A distinguishing feature of Italian participation in the F‐35 pro‐gramme is the aforementioned FACO/MRO&U Cameri facility. CamerifacilityisanItalianAirForcebasethathasservedaslogisticshubinthelast decades, where Tornados and then Eurofighters have been andcontinuetobe maintainedandrepaired,ensuringasoundbackgroundof technical skills amongmilitary and industrial teams.Within thepe‐rimeter of the base, under the direction of Alenia Aermacchi, 22 newbuildingshavebeenconstructedwiththeaimtosupporttheF‐35pro‐gramme,21coveringaround140,000squaremeters.22Thankstotheuti‐lizationofamilitaryairfieldandtothegoodcoordinationamongdiffer‐entbureaucraciesandwiththeprivatesector,ittookonlyfouryearsbe‐tweenthedecisionstobuildtheFACOanditsindustrialuse–whichisarelatively short period for Italian standards in terms of major publicworks.AleniaAermacchihasbeguntobuildwingscomponentsforUSF‐35alreadyin2011,notwithstandingtheCameri facilitywasstillpartlyunder construction, thanksalso to additional buildingsmadeavailablebytheItalianmilitary.23

In particular, Cameri facility is composed by different and comple‐mentaryelements:

1. AFACOfacilitytoassembletheItalianF‐35AandF‐35Bvariants,theF‐35AprocuredbyNetherlands,andpotentiallytheaircraftto be procured by other European partners such as DenmarkandNorway;asofDecember2013, twoItalianF‐35Aarebeing

zionali.it/articolo.asp?ID 2291.

21RobbinLaird,“TheItalianWayofProcuringtheF‐35:ShapingaEuropeanBaseforthe Global Fleet”, in Second Line of Defense, 1 November 2013, http://www.sldinfo.com/?p 58473.

22Interviewdated6December2013.23 The industrial park is owned by the armed forces,which rent it to Alenia Aer‐

macchi to a fixedprice accordedby the StatePropertyAgency. Interviewdated6No‐vember2013.


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assembled in the FACO assembly line, which can reach amaximumoftwoF‐35assembledpermonth.

2. A wing construction facility serving the entire procurementprogramme and not only Italian and Dutch customers. It canbuildamaximumofsixwingspermonth.

3. The aircraft test facility aimed at testing low‐observableperformances,andtherelatedfinalpaintingfacility.

4. Other buildings aimed to support F‐35 operating in Europe bytheUSandallies.Since theMediterraneanand theMiddleEastcontinuetobeafundamentaloperationalareaforUSandNATOmembers,theCamerifacilitycanprovideanessentialsupporttotheF‐35fleetoperatingthere.

Inotherwords,theCamerifacilityisalreadysettohostbothFACOandMROUactivities,becauseinthelongterm–thatis2025‐2045period–maintenanceactivitieswill likelybringsignificantvolumeof contracts.Maintenanceisalsoplannedtoinvolvesignificanttechnologiesbecauseit is linkedwith upgrade. For example, at the timewhen the softwarewillneedtobeupgradedregularly,theF‐35openarchitecturewillalsoallow to plug new sensors, systems orweapons in. The expected longlife‐cycleoftheplatformsandthepaceoftechnologicalinnovationmeanthatmaintenancewillbea regularandsubstantialactivity, inorder topreservetheplatformtechnologicallyadvancedincomparisonwithop‐ponents’airdefencesystems.24ThechallengeforItaly isto involvetheItalianmilitary and industry in themost technologically advanced as‐pects of F‐35 platform, that is software, electronics and avionics, inwhichtheUShavebeenmorecautioustotransfertechnologyandopenbidstoEuropeanpartners.TheintegrationoftheMeteormissileswillbeanopportunityinthisregard.

BeingtheonlycurrentFACOfacilityoutsideUSterritory,Camerirep‐resentsa fundamentalassetof theF‐35globalproductionandmainte‐nance system. Considering the time and funding necessary to set upsuchafacility,plusthedifficultytogettheAmericanendorsementtoitsconstruction, Italyhasachievedavaluableassetandacompetitivead‐

24Interviewdated6November2013.


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vantagewithrespecttootherpartnersoftheF‐35procurement,aswellastocurrentandfuturecustomers.Infact,iftheyarelocatedinEuropeor in its neighbourhood – i.e. theMiddleEast – they are likely to findmoreconvenient,effectiveandefficient,toutilizetheItalianfacilityra‐ther than seeking tobuild anewoneon theirnational territory.25Un‐surprisingly, already in 2006 Italy and the Netherlands signed anagreement that identifies two important areas of cooperation. On theonehand, tobuild and test theF‐35aircraft acquiredby Italy and theNetherlands in an Italian facility – the Cameri facility – as a startingpoint for a futurehigh‐levelmaintenance and repair capability for thefighter.26Ontheother,aMRO&Ufacilityfortheengineandsomeaircraftequipment, to be established in the Netherlands, whichwillmaintain,repair,overhaulandmodifysuchpartsfortheplatformsacquiredbythetwo countries.27Against this backdrop, contactshave alreadybeen es‐tablishedwith theNorwegianMinistryofDefence.28TheCameriFACOrepresents a long‐term investment made by the Italian military, andgenerallyspeakingbythewholegovernment, inordertoensureacer‐tainamountofwork‐shareforItaliancompanieswithinthenewandun‐certainframeworkofthebestvalueformoneyprinciple.Itimplieddiffi‐cultnegotiationswiththeAmericancounterparts,whichweresuccess‐fully completed.29 Today Cameri represents a unique asset owned byItalianarmedforces,managedbyAleniaAermacchiinclosecooperationwiththemilitarycounterpart.

As a whole, the Italian participation to the F‐35 procurement pro‐grammepresentsprosandcons,opportunities andchallenges.Fromamilitarypointofview, theprocurementofF‐35 is followinga timelinewhichdoesnotseemtocreatecapabilitygaps,itkeepscostsatsustain‐able level and it dilutes them overmore than a decade. Moreover, asmentionedbefore,theCamerifacilityissettoensureefficiencyandcost

25Interviewsdated6December2013and10December2013.26MicheleNones,GiovanniGaspariniandAlessandroMarrone,“EuropeandtheF‐35

JointStrikeFighter JSF Program”,cit.27Ibid.,p.74.28Interviewdated6December2013.29Interviewdated21January2014.


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savingsinthemaintenance,repairandupgradeactivities,whichwillre‐paytheinvestmentmadebytheMinistryofDefence.

From an industrial point of view, part of the expectations of largecompanies and SMEswith regards to thework‐share of the F‐35 pro‐curementhavebeendisappointed.Themostcontestedissueshavebeenand continue tobe technology transfer fromAmerican counterparts,involvement in the industrial activities with greater engineering andtechnologicaladdedvalue likeelectronicsandavionics ,shortdurationof contracts and uncertainty about their annual renewal. At the sametime, the participation to the F‐35 programme is providing contractsandopportunities in termsof technologicalprogress,which cannotbeofferedbyanyotheravailableprocurementoptionabletomeet Italianmilitaryrequirements.

Thenewprocurementapproachbasedon thebestvalue formoneyprinciplehasimposedtotheItalianindustrytobecomemorecompeti‐tiveandtotakemorerisksinrelationtoitsowninvestments.Italsore‐quirestheItalianmilitaryandgovernmenttoassisttheindustryinthisregard,bymakinganadditionalandconstanteffortinnegotiatingwithUS counterparts on technology transfer and other aspects of the pro‐curementprogramme.Inotherpastprogrammes,basedonthejustere‐tourprinciple,negotiationslargelyendedwhentheagreementoncost‐shareandwork‐sharewasreached.ThisisnotthecaseoftheF‐35.TheCamerifacilityrepresentsakeyopportunityintermsofbothqualityandquantityofthework‐shareinordertoensurevaluableandtechnologi‐callyadvancedsuppliestoItaliancompaniesandSMEs.Thisshouldap‐plytotheproduction,maintenance,repairandupgradeofthewholeF‐35 fleetbased inEurope.Theverysamenatureof this innovativepro‐curementprogrammedoesnotallowanyoneeithertobesatisfiedwiththe good investments made in the past – such as the build up of theCameriFACO/MROU–ortowaitforsomepositivedevelopmentstooc‐curontheirown.Resultsneedtobeachievedbyajointeffortbythemil‐itary,thegovernmentandtheindustry–eachonewithinitsrespectiveroleandcompetencies–stepbystep,negotiationbynegotiation,bidbybid,contractbycontract.

129

Conclusions

Thisstudytriedtofulfiladifficulttask:tolinktheoperationalandpolit‐icalelementsofItaliandefencepolicy,bytakingintoaccountalsoitsin‐dustrialaspects.

Thecomprehensionoftheoperationallevelbythepoliticalauthorityis crucial. This should include the understanding of what tasks havebeenperformedbyItalianaircapabilitiesduringmissionsabroadinthelast two decades, the requirements for the next fighter aircraft deter‐mined by the current international security context, the recent opera‐tional experience and the relevant technological innovation. Such un‐derstandingisimportantpersé,butitisevenmoreimportanttoinformdecision‐makerswhoareresponsibleof takingdecisionssuchas thosenecessary to maintain Italy’s ability to join international missions toprotectandpromotenationalinterestsatstake.

These decisions have operational effects, because they are aboutwhichfighteraircrafthastobeprocured,howmanyandthroughwhichtimeline.Buttheyareneitheronlyoperationalnoronlytechnical.Theyare primarily political, because they are about spending the limitedbudget allocated to defence policy in order to achieve certain results.Themainresultatstake is tomaintainItaly’scapabilitytoact throughmilitarypower,particularlyAirPower.Thesearenotabstractdecisions,becausesincetheFirstGulfWarItalyhasutilizeditsfighteraircraftfor22 out of the last 24 years –meaning that Italianmilitary pilots havebeenflyingfor22yearsoveroperationaltheatresinIraq,WesternBal‐kans,AfghanistanorLibya.Therefore,thedecisiononwhichfighterair‐craftwillbeusedbyItalianarmedforcesinthenextthirty‐fortyyearsisratheraconcreteone.

These decisions do not influence only the current and future effec‐tivenessandefficiencyof Italianmilitary.Theyalso influence the rela‐tionswithothermajorEuropeancountries,aswellaswiththeUS.They


130

affect the position of ItalywithinNATOand, to a lesser extent,withintheEUandUN,asfarastheseinternationalorganizationswillcontinuetodealwith crisismanagementoperations.Ultimately, thesedecisionsinfluence Italiandefenceand foreignpolicies,andthus thenational in‐tereststhatsuchpoliciesaresupposedtoprotectandpromote.

Whateveritwillbedecidedinthisregard, it is importantthatthesedecisions are taken by understanding the operational level, includingthemilitaryrequirementsthatprocurement’sprogrammearemeanttosatisfy. It isalsoparamount to take thembyassessing theirsignificantand lasting impacton the relationswith Italy’smainallies, andon theItalian defence and foreign policy. Finally, it is fundamental that deci‐sionsaretakenbyhavingafullunderstandingoftheindustrialaspectsconnected to the programme: in major European countries such asFrance,GermanyortheUK,letasidetheUS,thedefenceandforeignpol‐icy is linkedwith theeconomic, industrialandcommercial interestsofFrench,GermanorBritishsocieties.Thisisnottosaydefenceindustrialpolicyisthemaingoalofdefencepolicy.Thisisrathertosaythatsinceamilitaryneed isdefined, tomake thebestof it in termsofnational in‐dustrialreturnisacommonpraxis–orevenaduty–inmajorEuropeancountries. That is one of the reasons this study on Italian fighter air‐craft’sroleincrisismanagementoperationshasdevotedonechaptertothe industrial aspects of Italy’s participation to the F‐35 procurementprogramme.

Inconclusion,bybridgingthegapbetweentheoperationalandpolit‐ical levels, andby taking intoaccount the industrial aspects of thede‐fenceprocurement, this studyaimed to stimulateamoreconstructive,in‐depth, and systematic debate in Italy on defencematters. A debatenotlimitedonlytothereplacementoffighteraircraft,butincludingalsopurposes,roleandrequirementsoftheItalianarmedforces.

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Annex I – List of interviews

MARIOARPINO,formerlyChiefoftheAirCoordinationUnitinSaudiAra‐biaduringtheFirstGulfWar,servedasAirForceChiefofStaff 1995‐1999 andChiefofDefenceStaff 1999‐2001 .GIUSEPPEBERNARDIS, formerHeadof4thDepartmentof theGeneralAr‐mamentDirection/DefenceGeneralSecretariatchargedoftheCoordina‐tion of Procurement Programmes, served as Air Force Chief of Staff2010‐2013 .LUCIOBIANCHI,formerChiefofBusinessDevelopmentattheOrganisationConjointedeCoopérationenmatièred’Armement OCCAR ,istheChiefof Multipurpose Aero‐Tactical Aircraft Centre Centro Polivalente Ve‐livoliAerotattici,Ce.Po.V.A. inCamerisinceNovember2012.CLAUDIODEBERTOLISservedasViceChiefoftheCabinetoftheMinistryofDefencein2006,andhasbeenSecretaryGeneralofDefenceandNation‐alArmamentsDirector 2011‐2013 .DOMENICOESPOSITOhasbeentheGeneralDirectorof theGeneralDirec‐torate for Air Armaments ARMAEREO within the Italian Air Forcesince2009.BILLIEFLYNNservedintheCanadianarmedforcesfor23yearsinavarie‐tyofpositions,hasworkedasprojectpilotforAirbusEADSandcurrent‐lyholdsthesamepositionatLockheedMartin.Hehasaccumulatedover4,700flighthoursinmorethan70typesofaircraft.CRAIGA.FRANKLINisCommanderoftheUS3rdAirForceand17thExpe‐ditionaryAirForce,atRamsteinAirBase,Germany,whereheisrespon‐sible forplanning,deployment,employment, supportingand redeploy‐mentofUSAFassets.


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GIORGIOGOMMA,RearAdmiral,sinceSeptember2013heisCommanderofItalianNavyAviation.GIUSEPPELUPOLI, formerDirectorof the1st“AircraftMaintenance”UnitinCameri Novara ,heisnowworkingattheDirectorateforAirArma‐ments ARMAEREO ,inparticularontheF‐35programmewithaspecif‐icfocusontheFACOactivity.KEVINMCCORMICKworksasaStrategicPlanneratLockheedMartinAer‐onauticsCompanywithintheF‐35AirCombatAnalysisUnit.STEHENO’BRYAN is theVicePresidentofProgramIntegrationandBusi‐nessDevelopmentatLockheedMartinCorporation’sAeronauticsCom‐pany.HeisresponsibleforleadingcoordinationacrossF‐35JointStrikeFighterbusinessactivities.STEFANOVITOSALAMIDAistheChiefofthe4thDepartment Logistics oftheItalianAirForce,whilefrom1999to2002servedastheItalianNa‐tionalDeputyintheF‐35JointProgrammeOfficeinWashington.GLADSTONETHOMASistheDirectoroftheF‐35AircraftFinishingFacility,atLockheedMartinAeronauticsCompanyinFortWorthTexas.

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