The Role of Incentives in Measuring Cognitive and Non ...€¦ · non-cognitive skills in...
Transcript of The Role of Incentives in Measuring Cognitive and Non ...€¦ · non-cognitive skills in...
Intro Design Methods Results Subgroup Conclusion Appendix References
The Role of Incentives in Measuring Cognitive
and Non-cognitive Skills: Experimental
Evidence from Primary Schools in Shanghai
Yuanyuan Chen, Shuaizhang Feng, James J. Heckman,and Tim Kautz
HCEO Measuring and Assessing SkillsMarch 3, 2017
This draft, March 2, 2017
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Outline
1 Introduction
2 Experimental Design and Data
3 Analytical Methods
4 Main Results
5 Subgroup Analyses
6 Conclusion
7 AppendixChen, Feng, Heckman, and Kautz Shanghai Incentives 2 / 67
Intro Design Methods Results Subgroup Conclusion Appendix References
There is a growing interest in non-cognitive skills but measurement remainsan issue
1 A growing body of evidence shows the importance ofnon-cognitive skills in predicting life outcomes (Almlund et al.,2011)
2 Interventions have been shown to improve life outcomesthrough non-cognitive skills (Kautz et al., 2014)
3 Policy-makers are interested in expanding programs to developnon-cognitive skills but require reliable measures
4 One commonly used taxonomy is the Big Five (Openness,Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, andNeuroticism), often collected through self-reports
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Impact of an “intervention” on math performance and self-reported Big Five
−.2
−.1
0.1
.2.3
Impa
ct (s
tand
ard
devi
atio
ns)
Math score(2016)
Openness(self)
Conscientiousness(self)
Extraversion(self)
Agreeableness(self)
Emotional Stability(self)
Treatment 1 Treatment 2p<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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More about the “intervention”
Both treatments cost less than $1 per student
Took less than five minutes to deliver to a classroom
The projected rate of return is huge
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What is this intervention?
Right before a math test and Big Five survey, fourth-gradersreceived di↵erent instructions
Treatment 1 (“Honor incentive”): Receive a certificate ofhonor if the math test score in the top 10% of the school interms of overall performance or improvement
Treatment 2 (“Financial incentive”): Receive 50 Yuan(⇡$7.5) if the math test score in the top 10% of the school interms of overall performance or improvement
Self-reported Big Five was administered directly after the mathtest
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Impact of an “intervention” on math performance and self-reported Big Five
−.2
0.2
.4Im
pact
(sta
ndar
d de
viat
ions
)
Math score(2016)
Openness(self)
Conscientiousness(self)
Extraversion(self)
Agreeableness(self)
Emotional Stability(self)
Honor Incentive Financialp<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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All measures are based on a behavior
Figure 1: Determinants of Task Performance
Task Performance
Effort
Character Skills
Cognitive Skills
Incentives
Non-CognitiveSkills
Test ScoresSelf-ReportsOther Behaviors
Source: Kautz et al. (2014).
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Past studies establish the importance of incentives in cognitive testing
A series of studies show that IQ scores can be improved bygiving children candy or other incentives (Almlund et al., 2011)
Borghans et al. (2008) find that incentives a↵ect the timespent on IQ tests and people with higher levels of EmotionalStability and Conscientiousness are less a↵ected by incentives
Segal (2012) shows that coding speed scores can be influencedby incentives and that people with higher levels ofConscientiousness are more intrinsically motivated
We found no experimental studies that focus on the e↵ect ofthe situation on measures of non-cognitive skills
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Main research questions
1 To what extent do cognitive skill measures depend onincentives or other aspects of the situation in a school setting?
2 Do di↵erent types of students respond di↵erently?
3 Do di↵erent incentives (monetary vs. non-monetary) workdi↵erently?
4 Could self-reports of non-cognitive skills be inadvertentlya↵ected by incentives?
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Key findings
The incentives had little e↵ect on overall test scores but didimprove scores for better students
The honor treatment had a large and statistically significante↵ect on self-reported Big Five measures
Students in the “honor” treatment also rated their peers betterin terms of Big Five (particularly females)
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Why did the honor incentive but not financial incentive a↵ect reporting ofthe Big Five?
Somehow shifted the students’ frame of mind
Elicited more social-desirability bias by causing them to think ofpublic recognition
Other ideas?
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These results suggest caution in interpreting evaluations based onself-reports
Self-reported non-cognitive skill measures are used inpolicy-evaluation and school accountability
A meta-analysis of interventions with mostly short-term (lessthan 6 month) follow-ups found e↵ect sizes of 0.22-0.27 acrossfive domains and 0.57 for another (Durlak et al., 2011)
The honor incentive had impacts of approximately 0.10-0.20standard deviations
Interventions could plausibly have a similar psychological e↵ectas the honor incentive
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Outline
1 Introduction
2 Experimental Design and Data
3 Analytical Methods
4 Main Results
5 Subgroup Analyses
6 Conclusion
7 AppendixChen, Feng, Heckman, and Kautz Shanghai Incentives 14 / 67
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Designed to maximize power and minimize contamination
1 Within schools, ranked students by fall math test scores andrandomized triplets of students with the same scores into thecontrol group, the honor treatment, or the financial treatment
2 On test day, separated students into classrooms based ontreatment status
3 Students completed the math test and self-report of Big Five
4 Students returned to original classroom and assessed the BigFive of a peer
5 Two weeks later, teachers assessed their own students’ Big Five
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Survey description
Approximately 1,900 fourth-grade students from 19 di↵erentschools in Shanghai
1st wave of survey administered in Fall 2015
2nd wave of survey administered in Spring 2016
3rd wave of survey will be administered in Spring 2017
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The data include a rich set of demographics, cognitive skills, andnon-cognitive skills
Demographic variables: gender, parental education, familyincome, rural hukou, Shanghai hukuo, private school, age
Cognitive skills: IQ, pre-intervention math test, math grades,Chinese grades, English grades
Non-cognitive skills : Big Five (self, peer, teacher reports),group-leader status, 1-3 rating of daily performance (teacherreport), 1-3 rating of punctuality (teacher report), 1-3 rating ofdiscipline (teacher report)
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The experiment achieved baseline equivalence between the treatment andcontrol groups
Assess baseline equivalence using 30 di↵erent pre-programvariables
Of the 90 pairwise tests between groups, only 4 of them arestatistically significant at the % level
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The distribution of p-values follow a distribution consistent with baselineequivalence
0.2
.4.6
.81
p−va
lues
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1Quantiles of the Uniform Distribution
p−values Uniform Distribution
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Outline
1 Introduction
2 Experimental Design and Data
3 Analytical Methods
4 Main Results
5 Subgroup Analyses
6 Conclusion
7 AppendixChen, Feng, Heckman, and Kautz Shanghai Incentives 20 / 67
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Estimation model:
Yis = ↵ + �honorT honoris + �financialT financial
is + �Xis + "is .
Yis : outcome for student i in school sT honor
is : indicator for honor treatmentT financial
is : indicator for financial treatmentXis : covariates (including school fixed e↵ects)"is : error term, allowing for heteroskedasticity
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Main specification
To increase precision, control for background and abilitymeasures (and school fixed e↵ects)
Demographic variables: gender, parental education, familyincome, rural hukou, Shanghai hukuo, private school, age
Cognitive skills: IQ, pre-intervention math test, math grades,Chinese grades, English grades
Non-cognitive skills : Big Five (teacher reports), group-leaderstatus, 1-3 rating of daily performance (teacher report), 1-3rating of punctuality (teacher report), 1-3 rating of discipline(teacher report)
Results are similar with no controls or various combinations ofcontrols
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Outcome measures
To reduce measurement error, we apply a factor model to eachgrouping of items in the Big Five traits separately and predictfactor scores (similar results if using means of items)
All outcomes are standardized so that they are mean zero andhave a standard deviation of one
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Outline
1 Introduction
2 Experimental Design and Data
3 Analytical Methods
4 Main Results
5 Subgroup Analyses
6 Conclusion
7 AppendixChen, Feng, Heckman, and Kautz Shanghai Incentives 24 / 67
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Impact on math performance and self-reported Big Five (Full Sample)
−.4
−.2
0.2
.4Im
pact
(sta
ndar
d de
viat
ions
)
Math score(2016)
Openness(self)
Conscientiousness(self)
Extraversion(self)
Agreeableness(self)
Emotional Stability(self)
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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No one item within the Big Five drove the results
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Distribution of impact on individual Big Five items
Percentage of positive estimates (honor): 88%
Percentage of positive estimates (financial): 56%
02
46
Den
sity
−.3 −.2 −.1 0 .1 .2 .3Impact (Likert scale, 1−5)
Honor Financial
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Distribution of p-values associated with impacts on individual Big Five items
0.2
.4.6
.81
p−va
lues
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1Quantiles of the Uniform Distribution
p−values (Honor) p−values (Financial)Uniform Distribution
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There are some gender di↵erences in the impacts on test scores
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Impact on math performance and self-reported Big Five (Males)
−.4
−.2
0.2
.4Im
pact
(sta
ndar
d de
viat
ions
)
Math score(2016)
Openness(self)
Conscientiousness(self)
Extraversion(self)
Agreeableness(self)
Emotional Stability(self)
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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Impact on math performance and self-reported Big Five (Females)
−.4
−.2
0.2
.4Im
pact
(sta
ndar
d de
viat
ions
)
Math score(2016)
Openness(self)
Conscientiousness(self)
Extraversion(self)
Agreeableness(self)
Emotional Stability(self)
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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Consider the impact of the treatments on how students ratedtheir peers in two ways
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Impact on how treatment groups are assessed by peers (Full Sample)
−.4
−.2
0.2
.4Im
pact
(sta
ndar
d de
viat
ions
)
Openness(peer)
Conscientiousness(peer)
Extraversion(peer)
Agreeableness(peer)
Emotional Stability(peer)
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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Impact on how treatment groups assess peers (Full Sample)
−.4
−.2
0.2
.4Im
pact
(sta
ndar
d de
viat
ions
)
Openness(other)
Conscientiousness(other)
Extraversion(other)
Agreeableness(other)
Emotional Stability(other)
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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Impact on how treatment groups assess peers (Males)
−.4
−.2
0.2
.4Im
pact
(sta
ndar
d de
viat
ions
)
Openness(other)
Conscientiousness(other)
Extraversion(other)
Agreeableness(other)
Emotional Stability(other)
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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Impact on how treatment groups assess peers (Females)
−.4
−.2
0.2
.4Im
pact
(sta
ndar
d de
viat
ions
)
Openness(other)
Conscientiousness(other)
Extraversion(other)
Agreeableness(other)
Emotional Stability(other)
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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Intro Design Methods Results Subgroup Conclusion Appendix References
Outline
1 Introduction
2 Experimental Design and Data
3 Analytical Methods
4 Main Results
5 Subgroup Analyses
6 Conclusion
7 AppendixChen, Feng, Heckman, and Kautz Shanghai Incentives 37 / 67
Intro Design Methods Results Subgroup Conclusion Appendix References
Some subgroups responded di↵erently to incentives
Better performing and better behaved students performedbetter on the math test in response to incentives
The patterns were less consistent when examining self-reportedBig Five outcomes
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Impact on math test scores by subgroup based on non-cognitive measures
−.3
−.2
−.1
0.1
.2Im
pact
(sta
ndar
d de
viat
ions
)
Group leader Punctuality Performance DisciplineYes
No
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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Impact on math test scores by subgroup based on cognitive measures
−.1
0.1
.2Im
pact
(sta
ndar
d de
viat
ions
)
IQ Math test Math gradeHigh
Low
High
Low
High
Low
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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Impact on math test scores by subgroup based on Big Five (part 1)
−.05
0.0
5.1
.15
Impa
ct (s
tand
ard
devi
atio
ns)
Openness Conscientiousness ExtraversionHigh
Low
High
Low
High
Low
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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Impact on math test scores by subgroup based on Big Five (part 2)
−.05
0.0
5.1
.15
Impa
ct (s
tand
ard
devi
atio
ns)
Agreeableness Emotional StabilityHigh
Low
High
Low
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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Outline
1 Introduction
2 Experimental Design and Data
3 Analytical Methods
4 Main Results
5 Subgroup Analyses
6 Conclusion
7 AppendixChen, Feng, Heckman, and Kautz Shanghai Incentives 43 / 67
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Conclusion
Self-reported measures are susceptible to unintended biases
Standardizing for aspects of the situation will be important forpolicy evaluation and school accountability
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Outline
1 Introduction
2 Experimental Design and Data
3 Analytical Methods
4 Main Results
5 Subgroup Analyses
6 Conclusion
7 AppendixChen, Feng, Heckman, and Kautz Shanghai Incentives 45 / 67
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Correlations between cognitive and non-cognitive measures
IQ
0.37 Math Test 15
0.35 0.71 Math Test 16
0.13 0.29 0.28 Chinese GPA
0.35 0.61 0.61 0.33 Math GPA
0.29 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.61 English GPA
0.20 0.33 0.36 0.27 0.27 0.31 O (Teach)
0.17 0.33 0.34 0.27 0.31 0.36 0.76 C (Teach)
0.12 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.76 0.58 E (Teach)
0.09 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.12 0.18 0.56 0.64 0.49 A (Teach)
0.02 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.15 0.45 0.58 0.43 0.75 ES (Teach)
0.23 0.29 0.30 0.21 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.40 0.21 0.18 0.15 Leader
0.27 0.42 0.43 0.32 0.43 0.43 0.56 0.64 0.40 0.29 0.22 0.50 Performance
−0.03 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.07 0.22 Punctuality
0.02 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.21 0.27 0.47 0.12 0.34 0.28 0.22 0.40 0.21 Discipline
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Correlations between Big Five from teacher- and self-reports
O (Teach)
0.76 C (Teach)
0.76 0.57 E (Teach)
0.56 0.64 0.48 A (Teach)
0.45 0.58 0.43 0.75 ES (Teach)
0.23 0.14 0.23 0.04 0.01 Big O (Self)
0.21 0.27 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.58 Big C (Self)
0.21 0.11 0.24 0.06 0.02 0.64 0.51 Big E (Self)
0.13 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.51 0.55 0.52 Big A (Self)
0.07 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.28 0.42 0.28 0.40 Big ES (Self)
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Low-performing students showed the most improvement
−100
−50
050
100
Impr
ovem
ent i
n sc
ore
0 20 40 60 80 1002015 math score
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Distribution of di↵erences in math test scores for students above themedian on the 2015 test
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4D
ensi
ty
−40 −30 −20 −10 0 10 20 30 40Difference in math scores
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Distribution of di↵erences in math test scores for students below themedian on the 2015 test
0.0
1.0
2.0
3D
ensi
ty
−40 −30 −20 −10 0 10 20 30 40Difference in math scores
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Impact on individual items of Openness to Experience
−.2
−.1
0.1
.2Im
pact
(1 to
5 s
cale
)
Orig
inal
Crio
us a
bout
diffe
rent
thin
gs
A de
ep th
inke
r
Activ
e im
agin
atio
n
Cre
ativ
e
Like
s ar
t and
spo
rts
Pref
ers
rout
ine
wor
k
Like
dee
p an
d ca
refu
lth
inki
ng, f
ull o
f ide
as
Inte
rest
ed in
art
Soph
istic
ated
in a
rt,m
usic
, or l
itera
ture
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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Impact on individual items of Conscientiousness
−.1
0.1
.2.3
Impa
ct (1
to 5
sca
le)
Doe
s a
thor
ough
job
Som
ewha
t car
eles
s
Rel
iabl
e w
orke
r
Tend
s to
be
diso
rgan
ized
Lazy
Pers
ever
es u
ntil
the
task
is fi
nish
ed
Doe
s th
ings
effi
cien
tly
Mak
e pl
ans
and
follo
wth
roug
h w
ith th
em
Easi
ly d
istra
cted
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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Impact on individual items of Extraversion
−.1
0.1
.2.3
Impa
ct (1
to 5
sca
le)
Talk
ativ
e
Res
erve
d
Full
of e
nerg
y
Enth
usia
sm
Tend
s to
be
quie
t
Asse
rtive
per
sona
lity
Som
etim
es b
esh
y an
d in
hibi
ted
Out
goin
g an
d so
ciab
le
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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Impact on individual items of Agreeableness
−.2
−.1
0.1
.2Im
pact
(1 to
5 s
cale
)
Find
faul
t with
oth
ers
Hel
pful
l to
othe
rs
Qua
rrels
with
oth
ers
Has
a fo
rgiv
ing
natu
re
Gen
eral
ly tr
ustin
g
Col
d an
d al
oof
Con
side
rate
and
kind
to o
ther
es
Som
etim
es ru
de to
oth
ers
Coo
pera
te w
ith o
ther
s
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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Impact on individual items of Neuroticism
−.2
0.2
.4Im
pact
(1 to
5 s
cale
)
Dep
ress
ed
Rel
axed
Can
be
tens
e
Wor
ried
Emot
iona
lly s
tabl
e
Can
be
moo
dy
Keep
s ca
lm in
tens
esi
tuat
ions
Ner
vous
eas
ily
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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Impact on math test scores by subgroup based on demographics
−.1
0.1
.2Im
pact
(sta
ndar
d de
viat
ions
)
Income AgeHigh
Low
High
Low
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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Impact on math performance and self-reported Big Five (Full Sample),mean scores
−.4
−.2
0.2
.4Im
pact
(sta
ndar
d de
viat
ions
)
Math score(2016)
Openness(self)
Conscientiousness(self)
Extraversion(self)
Agreeableness(self)
Emotional Stability(self)
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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Impact on math performance and self-reported Big Five (Full Sample), nocontrols
−.4
−.2
0.2
.4Im
pact
(sta
ndar
d de
viat
ions
)
Math score(2016)
Openness(self)
Conscientiousness(self)
Extraversion(self)
Agreeableness(self)
Emotional Stability(self)
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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Intro Design Methods Results Subgroup Conclusion Appendix References
Impact on math performance and self-reported Big Five (Full Sample),basic demographics
−.4
−.2
0.2
.4Im
pact
(sta
ndar
d de
viat
ions
)
Math score(2016)
Openness(self)
Conscientiousness(self)
Extraversion(self)
Agreeableness(self)
Emotional Stability(self)
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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Intro Design Methods Results Subgroup Conclusion Appendix References
Impact on math performance and self-reported Big Five (Full Sample),basic demographics and ability
−.4
−.2
0.2
.4Im
pact
(sta
ndar
d de
viat
ions
)
Math score(2016)
Openness(self)
Conscientiousness(self)
Extraversion(self)
Agreeableness(self)
Emotional Stability(self)
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
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Intro Design Methods Results Subgroup Conclusion Appendix References
Impact on math performance and self-reported Big Five (Full Sample),basic demographics, ability, and school fixed e↵ects
−.4
−.2
0.2
.4Im
pact
(sta
ndar
d de
viat
ions
)
Math score(2016)
Openness(self)
Conscientiousness(self)
Extraversion(self)
Agreeableness(self)
Emotional Stability(self)
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
Chen, Feng, Heckman, and Kautz Shanghai Incentives 61 / 67
Intro Design Methods Results Subgroup Conclusion Appendix References
Female students had higher levels of cognitive ability
−.2
−.1
0.1
.2.3
Mea
n
IQ score 2015 math test score Chinese grade Math grade English grade
Male Female+/− Standard error
Chen, Feng, Heckman, and Kautz Shanghai Incentives 62 / 67
Intro Design Methods Results Subgroup Conclusion Appendix References
Female students had higher levels of Big Five personality
−.4
−.2
0.2
.4M
ean
Openness to Experience(teacher)
Conscientiousness(teacher)
Extraversion(teacher)
Agreeableness(teacher)
Neuroticism(teacher)
Male Female+/− Standard error
Chen, Feng, Heckman, and Kautz Shanghai Incentives 63 / 67
Intro Design Methods Results Subgroup Conclusion Appendix References
Female students had higher levels of other non-cognitive measures
0.2
.4.6
.81
Mea
n
Group leader High performance(teacher)
High punctuality(teacher)
High discipline(teacher)
Male Female+/− Standard error
Chen, Feng, Heckman, and Kautz Shanghai Incentives 64 / 67
Intro Design Methods Results Subgroup Conclusion Appendix References
Impact on how treatment groups are assessed by peers (Males)
−.4
−.2
0.2
.4Im
pact
(sta
ndar
d de
viat
ions
)
Openness(peer)
Conscientiousness(peer)
Extraversion(peer)
Agreeableness(peer)
Emotional Stability(peer)
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
Chen, Feng, Heckman, and Kautz Shanghai Incentives 65 / 67
Intro Design Methods Results Subgroup Conclusion Appendix References
Impact on how treatment groups are assessed by peers (Females)
−.4
−.2
0.2
.4Im
pact
(sta
ndar
d de
viat
ions
)
Openness(peer)
Conscientiousness(peer)
Extraversion(peer)
Agreeableness(peer)
Emotional Stability(peer)
Honor incentive Monetary incentivep<0.05 (vs. Control) p<0.10 (vs. Control)+/− Standard error
Chen, Feng, Heckman, and Kautz Shanghai Incentives 66 / 67
Intro Design Methods Results Subgroup Conclusion Appendix References
Standard error inflation factor for treatment T (Cameron and Miller,2015):
⌧T ⇡ 1 + ⇢T⇢"�Ns � 1
�.
⇢T : within-cluster correlation of Tis
⇢": within-cluster correlation of "Ns : average cluster size
Chen, Feng, Heckman, and Kautz Shanghai Incentives 67 / 67
Intro Design Methods Results Subgroup Conclusion Appendix References
Almlund, M., A. Duckworth, J. J. Heckman, and T. Kautz (2011). Personality psychology andeconomics. In E. A. Hanushek, S. Machin, and L. Woßmann (Eds.), Handbook of theEconomics of Education, Volume 4, pp. 1–181. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Borghans, L., H. Meijers, and B. ter Weel (2008, January). The role of noncognitive skills inexplaining cognitive test scores. Economic Inquiry 46(1), 2–12.
Cameron, A. C. and D. L. Miller (2015). A practitioners guide to cluster-robust inference.Journal of Human Resources 50(2), 317–372.
Durlak, J. A., R. P. Weissberg, A. B. Dymnicki, R. D. Taylor, and K. B. Schellinger (2011).The impact of enhancing students’ social and emotional learning: A meta-analysis ofschool-based universal interventions. Child Development 82(1), 405–432.
Kautz, T., J. Heckman, R. Diris, B. ter Weel, and L. Borghans (2014). Fostering andmeasuring skills: Improving cognitive and non-cognitive skills to promote lifetime success.OECD.
Segal, C. (2012, August). Working when no one is watching: Motivation, test scores, andeconomic success. Management Science 58(8), 1438–1457.
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