The Road to Authoritarianism, The Greek Army in Politics, 1935-1949

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T he R oad to A uthor itarian ism : The

G reek A rm y in P o lit ic s 1935-1949

b y

ANDRE GEROLYMATOS

Perhaps it was not unusual that the junta in 1967 chose to

remove King Constantine, in reaction to his attempted counter-

coup against them, but the fact that in 1974 the right-wing

colonels decided to abolish the monarchy raises some interesting

questions about the allegiance and composition of the Greek offi-

cer corps in the post-Civil War period. What made this elimina-

tion of the crown remarkable was that after the Second World War,

certainly at the end of the Civil War, the officer corps had been

purged of any suspected left-leaning and or republican-minded

officers resulting in what appeared to be a homogeneous body

committed to authoritarianism and monarchism, anti-commu-

nism and anti-liberalism. Yet, this organization supported a small

group of colonels and a few senior officers who wanted to end

monarchical rule in Greece, an institution that as officers they had

sworn to uphold.

The antecedents of the military intervention reach back into

the turbulent years of the 1920s and 1930s and can even be traced

to the first decade of the modern Greek state during which the

army intervened in the

political affairs of the Greek state. In 1843

the Athens garrison, led by General Kalergis forced the first king

of Greece, Othon I, to grant a constitution. Although the

monarch had agreed to do so at the beginning of his reign, he only

agreed to act accordingly after the prospect of military force. In

August 1909, a secret society of Greek officers, the Military

ANDRE GEROLYMATOS

is

Chair of Hellenic Studies

at Simon Fraser Uni-

versity. His books include Guerrilla Warfare and Espionage in Greece-

1940-1944 Espionage and Treason in Classical Greece

and

The. Balkan

Wars.

7



League, forced another king of Greece, George I, to grant a series

of popular reforms and bring to pow er Eleftherios Venizelos, one

of Greece s most successful politicians.

This event has been ably covered by Victor Papacosmas, while

Thanos Veremis has provided an in depth analysis on the inter-

vention of the Greek Army in politics up to and after the period

of the Colonels junta. How ever, the focus of this study is to con-

sider the transformation of the Greek military during and a fter the

Second World War from a body honeycombed with factions of

diverse loyalties into a unified body committed to authoritarian

rule and ultima tely one indifferent to the m onarchy.

Prior to the Second W orld W ar the Greek officer corps was rid-

dled with factions and secret societies and had not evolved into a

single and ideologically cohesive body.

3

During the interwar

period, groups within the officer corps had become integral par-

ticipants in the turbulent political changes that shaped the Greek

state in the 1920s and 1930s.

4

It is important to note, however,

that the Greek officer corps did not intervene in the political

upheavals after the First World War as a unified body but was

divided along professional and political lines.

According to Thanos Verem is this deviation of the traditional

role of the officer corps occurred after certain important changes

took place in Greek society. Greek officers began to participate in

the political arena because their social structure was altered by

political and social changes that transpired between 1912-1923.

An increase in the military academy's admissions and the intro-

duction of free tuition in 1917 opened up a military career to the

less advantaged c lasses, while at the same time it discouraged the

sons of more prominent members of Greek society from joining its

ranks. Between 1911-1919, in response to the Balkan W ar (1912-

1913), Greek participation in the First World War and the inter-

vention in Asia Minor, the Greek army expanded considerably,

necessitating a substantial increase in the officer corps. M ost of the

new o fficers came from the reserves as well as from promotions in

the field. The new add itions owed their status and rank to Venize-

los and they represented a distinct entity within the academy

trained pre-war body of officers. 5 The division of Greek society

into supporters of Venizelos, and his advocacy of Greece s entry

into the First World War on the side of the Entente contrasted to

those who followed Constantine I and his policy of neutrality. The

8

OURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA



officer corps also reflected this division, which was further com-

pounded by the eventual victory of Venizelos in 1917 and the

expulsion of Constantine.

The officer corps that had been increased to meet the demands

of war, contracted after the First World War and the Asia Minor

catastrophe creating competition not only for promotion but also

for professional survival in the post-war army. 6 The fear of early

retirement made most officers vulnerable and ultimately suscepti-

ble to political intervention as they opted to follow the fortunes of

the pro-Venizelos forces or those of the monarchy in the interwar

period. As a result the struggle between the Venizelist liberals and

Royalist conservatives also co-opted the Greek, officers into their

political rivalry and infighting. Some officers were motivated by

loyalty to the monarchy and others to the Venizelist cause, while

most joined one side or the other simply in order to protect their

careers.?

Accordingly, during the inter-war period, the officer corps and

the Greek military in general, mirrored the divisions in Greek

society between the Venizelist and Royalists. These divisions

within the officer corps, except for a small number of higher-rank-

ing officers, did not represent distinct political entities or factions

of officers devoted to a specific political cause. Instead, the armed

forces were honeycombed with loose groupings of officers who

gravitated to the Venizelists or Royalists depending on their alle-

giance to senior military commanders who themselves were affili-

ated with a particular political party. Consequently, the fortunes of

the officers were directly affected by the outcomes of the coups in

the 1920s and 1930s, which were mounted by the supporters of

monarchy or those of Venizelos. In the process these loyalties

undermined the stability of the Greek state. As Leonidas Spais

later reflected in his memoirs, the minuet of party factions, com-

bined with greed and acrimonious partisan politics led the coun-

try to the great 1922 disaster in Asia Minor.

8

One of the results of the Great Disaster was that the army

acquired a taste for power. In late September 1922, a few army

units that had been evacuated from Turkey reached Athens, and

with little resistance took over Greece and proclaimed a new

order. 9

The principal leaders of the coup and members of the sub-

sequent Revolutionary Committee included Colonel Stylianos

Gonatas, Colonel Nikolaos Plastiras and Captain Nikolaos Phokas.

T he R oad to A uthoritarianism



For the sake of appearances and under pressure from the British

and French, the colonels setup a puppet government led by S.

Krokidas. A short while later that government was replaced by one

headed by Colonel Gonatas, dropping any pretence of civilian rule.

On 26 September the military issued an ultimatum to the gov-

ernment demanding, among other things, the removal of King

Constantine, who agreed to leave Greece, which he did on 30 Sep-

tember (he died in Palermo, Italy one year later). His eldest son,

George, who had replaced Constantine for a short time, went into

exile in 1924 when Greece became a republic. Following the exile

of Constantine the Revolutionary Committee ordered the arrest of

six politicians, one prince, one general and an admiral.'° Ulti-

mately, only the general and five of the politicians were chosen to

pay with their lives for crimes against the state.

The execution of the Six, however, was an aberration and tan-

tamount to a blood feud between the royalists and Venizelists.

Although coups and countercoups were part of the shuffleboard of

Greek politics, they were relatively bloodless affairs. Mass killing,

torture and harsh imprisonment grew out of the cult of ideology

and fear that plagued Greek society during the civil wars in the

1940s. Prior to 1922, the wrong end of a political conspiracy usu-

ally meant loss of office and influence and the inability to com-

pensate the followers of one party with rewards from the

government's largess. However, these shifts in fortune were tem-

porary and rectified by the next election or coup. Albeit strong

emotion and some degree of violence often accompanied major

shifts in the power politics of the country, but the prospect of death

as punishment for political failure represented a finality that few

were prepared to countenance.

Regardless of these sentiments and wishful thinking, the army

(more specifically the officer corps), desperately needed to distance

itself from the defeat in Asia Minor. As was the case with the mil-

itary of the other Balkan states, the army officers saw themselves

as the embodiment of the nation and the protectors of the state.

Any stigma of defeat or humiliation had to be deflected and con-

signed to unscrupulous politicians or to the Great Powers. Conse-

quently, the Greek military invoked a stab in the back apologia

to explain their part in the 1922 defeat and to preserve the role of

the army as the guardian of Greece. The revolution of 1922 not

only forced the abolition of the monarchy but also heralded a new

10




era of direct intervention

by the army in the making and unmak-

ing of governments. Each coup, whether successful or not, was fol-

lowed by a purge of the armed forces.

During the 193 0s the officer corps underwent several more

purges that further deepened the ill will between conservative roy-

alists and the liberal Venizelists— labels that still had less to do

with any particular ideological bend than commitment to the

leader of a political faction. The end result for most officers facing

defeat in a coup was forcible retirement and a dramatic loss in

income. Since most Greek officers relied on their salaries and did

not have private means of support, the end o f a military career

meant certain poverty.

For example, in the attempted coup of 193 3 , forty officers were

removed, but after the 1935 coup attempt another 1,500 more

were cashiered. By1940, as a result of the coups and attempted

coups, approximately 4 ,500 officers had been forced to retire early

or had left the armed forces as a result of court-martials. As a group

these men represented a significant percentage of the officer corps,

which in April of 1940 was just over 5 ,000 professional officers

and another 10,000 in the reserves.

2

In

the earlier coups of the 1920s those officers forced out of the

army cam e from the ranks of the monarchists, but in the attempted

coups of 1933 and 193 5 , the axe fell on mostly republican officers

so that by 1940 almost all anti-monarchists had been forced into

retirement.

13

As a result, control of the armed forces reverted to

royalist officers, who, in conjunction with some mem bers of the

Populist Party (the traditional party of the royalists), began to

clamor for the restitution of the monarchy. In 193 2, the Populists

had disavowed their allegiance to the crown, but as George Dafnis

observed, their rejection was superficial and three years later (in

193 5 ), they reasserted their support for George 11.

14 After the

Populist victory at the polls immediately following the March

193 5 coup attempt, tremendous pressure was placed on Panagio-

tis Tsa ldaris, the Populist prem ier, to bring about an imm ediate

restoration of the monarchy.

Tsaldaris had promised a referendum on the issue of the

monarchy, but following the landslide victory in the 193 5 general

election many in his party, and primarily those senior army offi-

cers, demanded that he abolish the republic and invite G eorge II

to return to Greece.

15 W hen Tsaldaris refused, his government was


1



promptly overthrown by the military. General George Kondylis,

one of the conspirators, replaced him and upon assuming office

declared the end of the republic and advanced the da te for the ref-

erendum on the monarchy to 3 Novem ber 1935 . The results of the

plebiscite were outlandish even to the most credulous supporters

of the monarchy, out of 1,492,992 votes cast only a paltry 3 4,45 4

opposed the return of George 11.

16

The reinstatement of George II did not heal the fissures of

Greek society, and the elections of 1936 showed this clearly by

producing a parliament divided almost evenly between the L iber-

als and Populists along w ith fifteen Communist deputies who held

the balance of power. Both major parties initiated talks with the

Com munists, and the Liberals actually managed to reach an agree-

ment with them, but these efforts at political compromise were

stillborn. W hen news of a possible Liberal-KK E coalition leaked

out, Alexander P apagos, the minister of army affairs, with the sup-

port of the chiefs of the air force, navy, and gendarmerie, informed

the king that the armed forces would not countenance a govern-

ment that included Communists.

17

In the absence of a majority government or coalition, a care-

taker governmen t headed by C onstantine D emertzis administered

the country. Unfortunately, Demertzis died in April and Ioannis

M etaxas, the deputy premier and the leader of a small right-wing

party, succeeded him as head of the government. The death of

Demertzis had been preceded by the dem ise of a number of other

prominent political figures including: Kondylis, Venizelos, Tsal-

daris, and A lexander Papanastasiou, which at this critical juncture

deprived the country of som e its most influential and ex perienced

leaders. The coincidence between the deaths of these individuals

and the labor unrest sweeping over Greece provided an opportu-

nity for Metaxas, with the support of the king, to gain control of

the state. The Workers' Federation had declared a twenty-four-

hour general strike for 5 August. On 4 August, M etaxas persuaded

the king to suspend certain articles of the constitution and declare

martial law in order to avert a Communist revolution.

8

In effect,

on 4 August 1936, King George II gave Metaxas the authority to

establish a dictatorship that lasted even beyond M etaxas death in

January 1941, until the exiled king reinstated the constitution in

February 1942.

M etaxas inherited an army com manded by predominantly roy-

12




alist officers and an officer corps that for the first time in the his-

tory of Greece was ideologically homogeneous.

19 Consequently, by

the beginning of the Italian invasion the Greek armed forces,

purged of most men who had Venizelist sympathies, now provided

the main prop for the monarchy and the Metaxas regime. Subse-

quently most professional Greek officers, including those who

retained their commissions as well as those in retirement or forced

into the reserves had become politicized. Those who kept their

rank had a vested interest in the survival of the monarchy but those

who were drummed out of the service anticipated the day when

the next coup would restore their commission and salary.

Despite the purges and the efficiency of the Metaxas security

services, small groups of professional officers established anti-dic-

tatorship cells within the army. In March 1938, E. Tsellos formed

the ME0

(M ist iki Epanastatiki Organo sis)

whose goal was the

removal of the dictatorship by force. The military membership of

the organization included primarily lower ranking officers but also

several colonels and two generals (General Achileas Protosygkel-

los and General Platis, the deputy chief of the General staff).

20

Another cell that represented a group of slightly lower rank-

ing officers had been formed in 1933 but remained dormant

between 1933-1940. However, both organizations kept close con-

tact with the KKE, and although they achieved little success

against the Metaxas regime, during the occupation some of their

members played an active role in the resistance and assisted in the

organization of ELAS.

21

The royalist dominated officer corps after the 1935 coup, no

longer followed the political leaders of any party but had them-

selves become the power-brokers and potentially could impose

their will on who was to govern. 22 The Venizelists who had been

compelled to leave the armed forces filled the ranks of the main

opposition groups to the monarchy and Metaxas. A number of

them formed secret organizations, while others joined British

secret organizations that would eventually amalgamate into the

Special Operations Executive (SOE), which began to organize

embryonic clandestine networks in Greece. Until Metaxas refused

to accept Mussolini's terms in October 1940, the British Foreign

Office harbored deep suspicions of the Greek dictator.

23

Although foreign office officials did not approve of the SOS's

activities, the British Government was convinced that sooner or


3



later Greece would be overrun by the Axis and plans for an even-

tual resistance were essential. Since the Metaxas regime was deter-

mined to remain neutral, the British intelligence services and

particularly the SOE viewed the Venizelist officers, the commu-

nists and other revolutionary groups as ideal recruits for a network

of underground cells that would spring to life after Greece was

occupied.

24

Another consideration was that if Metaxas brought

Greece into the Axis alliance, then the same groups would be used

to organize resistance against the dictatorship.

The SOE's plans for resistance activity in an occupied Greece

gathered additional momentum and more recruits after the out-

break of hostilities on 28 October 1940. When Metaxas decided

to reject Mussolini's ultimatum, the British ceased to plan for

organized opposition to him and concentrated instead on the likely

prospect that the Axis would overrun Greece. Effectively, the

British still relied on the Venizelist faction for recruits as well as

on other organizations opposed to the Metaxas regime. One con-

tributing factor was that the ideological division between the

Venizelists and the Royalists deepened during the war when only

3,000 of the former were recalled to active duty. Another 1,500,

mostly those of higher rank were kept from participating in the

war and many of them gravitated to the embryonic cells being

organized by the British intelligence services. 25

Colonel Evripidis Bakirdzis, a leading Venizelist officer who

had been implicated in several inter-war coups, was an early link

between British intelligence and the Venizelist groups opposed to

Metaxas and later served as an important contact between the

emerging resistance organizations and the Special Operations

Executive.26 For such officers the Axis occupation represented sim-

ply a change of authoritarian rule and offered the opportunity for

the establishment of a patriotic front against the occupation forces

that could also be used in the post-occupation period. Effectively

these men and women were optimistic for an allied victory partly

out of conviction and partly out of necessity. Consequently, resist-

ance meant not only resistance to the occupation but also meant to

reshape the post-war Greek political landscape. The royalist fac-

tion, on the other hand, confronted the occupation of Greece as a

cohesive and ideologically united group loyal to the monarchy and

to the social status quo. However this group, as was the case with

the Venizelist officers, had to deal with the prospect of resistance.

14




The government of George II had made no plans for the organ-

ization of a resistance movement to carry on the struggle after the

government went into exile. From the beginning of the occupa-

tion, royalist officers who wished to fight were encouraged by the

government of George II to join the Greek armed forces in the

Middle East. About 2,500 did, while others followed the lead of

General Papagos and other senior royalist officers and abstained

from joining the forces of the Greek Government-in-exile or par-

ticipating in any resistance activity. However, many royalist offi-

cers refused to remain idle and followed the example of the

Venizelists who had early on begun to join the resistance organi-

zations forming in the fall and winter of 1941-1942. As a result,

both EDES and ELAS acquired a considerable number of profes-

sional officers.

27

In the case of ELAS, there were approximately 600 royalist

officers, 1,200 former permanent officers who were essentially

Venizelists, and 2,000 lower ranking reserve officers. For EDES it

is more difficult to identify the percentage of royalist officers at

least in the early stages of the occupation. One constant factor,

however, is that in the later years of the occupation when EDES

units were dispersed by ELS and reformed (1943-1944), replace-

ments came from the ranks of the royalist officers. This was further

facilitated by the reconciliation between Napoleon Zervas, the

head of EDES and George II in March of 1943.

28

This surprising

move by Zervas, whether motivated by pressure from the British

or was outright opportunism, discredited the Venizelist cause. As

a result, EAM-ELAS became the sole organization to continue to

oppose the monarchy, thus attracting many fervent Venizelists

who, abandoned EDES after Zervas' reconciliation with the king.

Indeed, the dynamics of the resistance movement and the

political aspirations of those in and out of occupied Greece had

wreaked havoc with the Venizelist faction of Greek officers. Effec-

tively, they fell into three categories—die-hard republicans who

joined ELAS since EDES had ceased to represent their political

sentiments. Another faction, especially those who suffered at the

hands of ELAS, during the dispersing of their guerrilla bands,

found refuge or sought revenge by joining the Security Battalions

organized by the Rallis puppet government in 1943 under the

control of the Nazis.

29 By the end of the occupation, at least 1,000

professional officers were serving in the Security Battalions, most


5



of who had been members of the Venizelist faction.

3

° The last

group of republican officers feared communism more than the

king and followed the example of Zervas by making their peace

with the monarchy.

3

In contrast, the situation of the officers in the ELAS units con-

tinued to remain constant. Furthermore, the presence of well-

respected Venizelist officers such as Stefanos Sarafis, in ELAS as

well as other well-known republican officers such as Bakirdzis,

Mandakas, and A. Othonaios attracted many Venizelists and other

professional officers from the armed forces. Consequently, by the

end of the occupation the Greek officer corps had re-aligned polit-

ically as a result of their wartime experience. The royalist-

Venizelist schism had been replaced by fear of communism.

Meanwhile, the Left versus Right division that emerged with such

deadly force during the occupation came to dominate the political

discourse in Greece during and after the occupation. Indeed, the

label of right or left determined the professional fate of the

Greek officer corps in the period after liberation.

After the December crisis of 1944, all officers affiliated with

ELAS or any other left-wing organization were essentially barred

from re-admission into the new National Army. The armed forces

were now the prerogative of those officers who fought with Zervas,

remained inactive during the occupation, supported the monarchy

throughout the course of the uprisings of the Greek armed forces

in the Middle East, and the officers who served in the Security Bat-

talions. The latter were released from detention in order to support

the British and Greek forces fighting against ELAS during the

December events. 3 2

During this period the officer corps was once again honey-

combed with secret leagues and associations. The structure of these

organizations was shadowy, and some only represented a loose col-

lection of officers with common professional interests.

3 3

To a great

extent these factions were a reaction to constant political inter-

vention in the armed forces in the aftermath of the post-Varkiza

period. For almost a decade few governments held power for more

than a year and some for only a couple of months. The succession

of governments only served to highlight the insecurity felt by the

officers in the new National Army regardless of their pre-war affil-

iations. Royalist officers who had sat out the occupation feared

those who had joined the resistance or fought in the Middle East.

16




The most vulnerable group were the former Venizelists who

had recanted and accepted the monarchy as the price for re-admis-

sion into the armed forces. Although during the 1946 government

of Plastiras many former republicans had been reinstated, the short

tenure of Plastiras brought back the old professional insecuritis.

34

At the same time, the royalist faction saw many of its senior com-

manders lose their posts to former republicans and they responded

by forming secret organizations to protect themselves from retire-

ment or dismissal.

Ultimately, the most influential group was the Sacred Associ-

ation of Nationalist Officers (IDEA), formed in late 1943 by the

merger of ENA (Enosis Neon Axiomatikon)

3 5

and Triaina. The

goals of IDEA were to keep its members form politics and defend

the nation. Triana, on the other hand was created as a clandestine

organization during the occupation and beyond that little is know

about it or who had established it. IDEA quickly expanded within

the officer corps and eventually spread its tentacles throughout the

army.36

In the summer of 1946, IDEA intervened on behalf of the

officers who had served in the Security Battalions and managed to

have them reinstated in the army.

37

However, little effort was

made to address the issue of professional officers who had fought

with ELAS during the occupation. Initially, 221 officers who had

served in ELAS were given appointments in the new army but they

were soon placed on the inactive list.

38

Many of the officers

excluded from the armed forces bore the brunt of the white ter-

ror that inflicted Greece in the aftermath of the Varkiza Agree-

ment. A year later some of them took up arms and helped to create

the Democratic Army, but hundreds of these former professional

officers ultimately languished in detention and internal exile.

39

The Communist force, unlike the National Army,

4° eventually

established a cohesive officer corps that included some professional

officers as well as experienced guerrilla commanders with consid-

erable skills at partisan warfare. Although some of these guerrilla

commanders had served as reserve officers in the Greek army, many

had become officers during the occupation. Some were graduates

of the ELAS military school in the mountains, while many others

had earned their rank as a result of direct military experience in

the field.

4

The National Army, on the other hand, entered the civil war

riddled with factionalism and subjected to political intervention


7



that extended to the operational level. For ex ample, many units

were committed to defend static positions in order to protect a

region represented by a influential politician.

42

Although well

supplied and possessing considerable more firepower, the National

Army was no match for the mobility and hit-and-run tactics of the

Democratic Army. Most of the officers who commanded the units

of the new National Army lacked experience in counter-insur-

gency warfare and a large number had seen little action during the

occupation. On the other hand, officers who had such experience

from fighting in the guerrilla units of ELA S w ere excluded from

the National Army and remained in detention camps for the dura-

tion of the civil war.

43

The failure of the National Army to destroy the Com munist

forces, for almost the duration of the civil war, compelled the

British and later the Americans to intervene and re-organize the

Greek officer corps and bring it beyond the reach of the political

leadership. Adm iral Petros Voulgaris, prime m inister at the time,

initiated the process in June 1945 and gave the British M ilitary

M ission (BMM ) executive authority over the organization of the

Greek armed forces. 44

The mechanism established by the British and followed by the

Americans by which to intervene directly in the military affairs of

Greece, was the Supreme Military Council that included the head

of the BMM as a non-voting member. However, the other mem-

bers of the council were given to understand that the chief of the

British Military Mission would prevail in military affairs. After

the implementation of the Truman doctrine in 1947 , the Am eri-

cans followed the British example and supported the independ-

ence of the Greek military from political intervention and

ultimately from political contro1. 45

Despite these changes and considerable military aid from the

United S tates the National Army was not able to defeat the com-

munist forces. The U S military advisors ultimately were forced to

intervene directly in the overall strategic and tactical planning of

operations. Furthermore, the Americans opted for greater control

of the Greek armed forces and made every effort to distance it from

Greek politicians. The American advisors succeeded in establish-

ing direct links with the Greek officer corps bypassing the Greek

political establishment. More significantly, the US military advi-

sors and the recently created CIA also developed close ties with

18




IDEA, which by the end of the civil war had come to dom inate the

Greek officer corps.

46

The end of the Greek civil war and the onset of the Cold W ar

had convinced the US Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff that Greece was not in

a position to defend herself from aggression by any of the com-

munist Balkan states or the Soviet Union without massive Amer-

ican support. The US relegated Greece to the role of a tripping

wire that would alert NATO of a W arsaw Pact invasion of South-

eastern Europe. In this strategic construct, the primary function of

the Greek army was to provide security against an internal threat.

The U S only altered Greece strategic status in the 1960s but for

fifteen years the Greek army was essentially equipped and trained

primarily for internal security.

47

Effectively, security meant that

the mission of the military was to prevent communists or any left-

wing o rganization from gaining control of the state. Part of this

task included a political role for the army in that it undertook to

support covertly anti-communist organizations. In effect, US pol-

icy toward Greece reflected the attitude of the officer corps and

IDEA, which had already defined the duty of the military as the

guardian of the state from internal as well as ex ternal forces.

In the period after the Civil W ar, IDEA became a dominant

force in the Greek army and a rallying point for officers disaffected

with the propensity of the monarchy to favor officers close to the

palace. The secret organization, consequently, shifted its loyalty to

General Alexandros Papagos and believed that he would be able to

counter the influence of royal family in matters of promotion.

Papagos was a hero of the Greek-Italian W ar and responsible for

the defeat of the Democratic Army. Although Papagos had been a

devoted supporter of the monarchy, the king resented the growing

influence of the general and relations between the two had become

strained.

48

In 195 1 Papagos resigned as head of the army over a

disagreement with the king, but a year later he ran for o ffice and

won a resounding victory in the 195 2 elections. Thanks to the sup-

port of Papagos mem bers of IDEA assumed key positions in the

army and in KY P (Kratiki Y peresia Pliroforion)

49

, Greece s intel-

ligence service.

A significant number of IDEA members had also served in the

Security Battalions during the occupation and prior to the Second

W orld War had been followers of Venizelos and opponents of the

monarchy , but they had quickly pledged their loyalty to the king


9



in the post-liberation period. Some of these former Venizelists had

through opportunism or fear found refuge in the Security Battal-

ions, others had opted for the m onarchy as less ideologically odi-

ous than communism. Although the puppet Prime Minister

Ioannis Rallis had been tried as a collaborator after the occupation,

all charges with respect to the Security Battalions had been dis-

missed. The court ruled that Rallis did not break any Greek laws

because the aim of the battalions had been to maintain law and

order and internal security.

50

Thus in chaotic post-war Greece, the

court provided a fig leaf of anti-communism and nationalism for

the former mem bers of the liberal-Venizelist factions to mask their

collaborationist past.

The former officers of the Security Battalions quickly

expanded their control of IDEA and as the secret organization

expanded its influence in the army, it also advanced the careers of

the former collaborationists. For example, Colonel Gerakinis, an

officer in the Security B attalions, was appointed deputy director of

the military academy. Some such as colonels Papathanasopoulos

and Plytzanopoulos were relatively well known, but many more

remained anonymous and became the backbone of the 1967

junta. 5 1

The m antra of these officers was the notion of national-mind-

edness

(ethnikophrones),

a concept that defined less an ideology than

the self-proclaimed struggle against communism and opposition

to all individuals and organ izations of the left.

52 Over the next fif-

teen years IDEA and its offshoots, such as the National Union of

Y oung O fficers led by the future dictator, George Papadopoulos,

tightened their grip on the officer corps and in 196 7 took over the

Greek state. On 21 April 1967 these officers took over the Greek

state and soon re-discovered their antimonarchism that they had

conveniently abandoned in exchange for reinstatement in the

army.

Notes

'George Finlay,

History of the G reek R evolut ion, 2 V ols.

(London: Zeno, Vol.

2), offers a detail description of the crisis between Othon I and the Athenian

garrison led by General Kalergis.

20




ZS. Victor Papacosmas,

T he M ilitary in G reek Politics , the 19 09 C oup d'e 'tat

(Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1977); Thanos Veremis,

T he M ilitary

in Greek Politics: from Independen ce to Dem ocracy

(New York: Black Rose Books,

1997).

3

Thanos Veremis and Andre Gerolymatos, The Military as a Sociopoliti-

cal Force in Greece, 1940-1949,

Journal o f the H el lenic D iaspora,

Vol. 17.1,

1991, pp. 105-107

4Thanos Veremis,

of epem v aseis tou Ell inikou s tratou s t in polit ik i 1 91 6-19 39

(Athens: Hexantes 1977, passim, provides an excellent account of the history of

the Greek officer up to the Metaxas dictatorship. For a theoretical examination

of the subject see: George Dertilis,

Koinonikos metaschematismos, kai stratiotiki

epem v asi , 7880-1 909 ,

Athens 1977, passim. On the period after 1936 and the

occupation see: Andre Gerolymatos,

G uerrilla W arf are and Espionage in G reece ,

1940

1944

(New York: Pella, 1992),

pp. 321-334;

J.L. Hondros, Too

Weighty a Weapon: Britain and the Greek Security Battalions, 1943-1944,

Journal of the H ellenic D iaspora,

Vol. XV, Nos. 1 and 2 (1988), pp. 33-48; Andre

Gerolymatos, The Role of the Greek Officer Corps in the Resistance,

Journal of

the Hellenic Diaspora,

Vol. XI, No. 3, (Fall 1984), pp. 69-79; Hagen Fleischer,

The Anomalies in the Greek Middle East Forces, 1941-1944,Journal

of the Hel-

lenic D iaspora,

Vol. V No. 3, (Fall 1978), pp. 5-36.

'During the Balkan wars a new category of officers, reserve officers, was cre-

ated in the officer corps. According to Veremis ( The Military in Greek Poli-

tics, pp. 36-37), reserve officers had been granted regular commissions and by

1920 formed the largest group of officers in the Army lists. However, they were

not accepted as equals by the academy trained officers and hence, out of profes-

sional necessity and because they acquired their commissions when Venizelos

was prime minister they tended to remain loyal to the liberal leader and opposed

to the monarchy.

6

Thanos Veremis and Andre Gerolymatos, The Military as a Sociopoliti-

cal Force, pp. 103-105.

7

Veremis and Gerolymatos, The Military as a Sociopolitical Force, pp.

104-105; Nikos Mouzelis,

Politics in the Semi-Periphery

(London: Macmillan,

1986), p. 98.

'The disruption in the chain of command by the replacement of experi-

enced officers in the armed forces in Asia Minor with less qualified royalist com-

manders, according to L. Spais, was a contributing factor to the defeat of the

Greek army in Turkey (Leonidas Spais,

Peninda C hronia S tra t io t i s

(Athens:

Melissa 1970), pp. 144-145).

°On 28 September, part of the main army (12,000) marched into the cap-

ital in good order (Michael L. Smith,

Ionian V ision: Greece in A sia Minor, 191 9-

1 9 2 2

(London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd), p. 314).

wThe court-martial was concluded with guilty verdicts on 27 November

1922 and the executions followed the next morning. The court martial board

consisted of ten officers headed by General Othonaios.

'

Upon arrival in Athens, the leaders of the coup ordered the arrest of Dim-

itris Gounaris, Nikolaos Theotokis, Petros Protopapadakis, Nikolaos Stratos

and Admiral Michael Goudas, who they planned to execute immediately and

then declare a general amnesty. They also had arrested Prince Andrew, one of


1



Constantine's younger sons. After protests from the British and French ambas-

sadors, they decided to wait. Subsequently they arrested Georgios Baltazzis

General Hatzianestis and Xenephon Stratigos. All were found guilty, six con-

demned to death and two (Goudas and Sratigos sentenced to life imprisonment,

but released after a few years).

Gerolymatos, The Role of the Greek Officer Corps, pp. 70-71; and

notes 3-6.

13

The purge of royalist officers in 1922 was followed by the dismissal of

1,500 republican officers because of the unsuccessful coups of 1933 and 1935

(Andre Gerolymatos, The Role of the Greek Officer Corps in the Resistance,

Journal of the H ellenic D iaspora

Vol. XI, No. 3 (Fall 1984), p. 71, note

7 ).

'George Dafnis,

I Ellas Metax i D io Polem on 1 923 -1940 ,

2 vols. (Athens;

Ikaros 1974), Vol. 2, p. 369. Dafnis attributes the Populist victory to the strong

backing of the middle class. He points out, however, that this support did not

translate into endorsement of the monarchy, but rather the rejection of the Lib-

eral party.

A critical factor in the victory of the Populists was the boycott of the elec-

tions by the Venizelists.

'

6

According to the American ambassador, Lincoln MacVeagh

(Ambassador

M acV eagh R eports : G reece , 1933 -1947 ,

ed. J. 0. latrides (Princeton: Princeton

University Press 1980), p. 60), the number given for the monarchist vote was

higher by a margin of 400,000 votes than the total vote cast by all parties in

any previous election. Hagen Fleischer

(Stem m a kai S w ast ika

(Athens: Papazisis

1988, p. 54) adds that the Danish ambassador in Athens commented that the

entire process was a farce and the greatest comedy performed on the European

scene for a long time.

J.S. Koliopoulos,

G reece and the B ri ti sh Con nect ion 1 935-1 941

(Oxford:

Oxford University Press 1977), p. 40.

mMetaxas confided in his diary that the country was on the eve of a com-

munist revolution. Communist propaganda, he wrote, had already infiltrated

the civil service and threatened to paralyze the state, and it had started eroding

the discipline of the armed forces (Ioannis Metaxas,

T o Prosopiko ton lm erologio,

ed. C. Christidis (Athens: Ekdosis Gkobosti) [Vols. 1-2, 1896-1920,], P. M.

Siphnaios [Vol. 3, 19211, P. Vranas (Vol.

4,

1933-19411, pp. 222-223, 4 August

1936, Athens 1951-1964).

19

Thanos Veremis,

T he M ili tary in G reek Polit ics ,

p. 132.

21

Gerolymatos, The Role of the Greek Officer Corps, p. 70, note 2.

21

Gerolymatos, The Role of the Greek Officer Corps, p. 70, note 2.

22

Metaxas, in particular, was aware that the Officer Corps could challenge

his position as the dictator of Greece and placed considerable emphasis on estab-

lishing reliable security services (Gerolymatos,

G uerrilla W arf are and Espionage,

p. 31). However, during the short period of the 4th of August Regime King

George II exercised considerable influence over the armed forces whose mostly

royalist officers looked to him as the legitimate head of state as well as the pri-

mary guarantor of maintaining their professional careers (Veremis and Geroly-

matos, The Military as a Sociopolitical Force, p. 105).

23

Sir Sydney Waterlow, the British Ambassador to Athens, attempted to

convince King George II to remove Metaxas but met with little success (Athens

22




Telegram No. 185, 6 October 1938, FO 371/22362). Metaxas for his part con-

fided in his diary that the British did not like the dictatorship and he feared

British intrigues against his regime (Ioannis Metaxas, Imerologio, Vol. 7, p. 359,

Sunday 19 March 1939).

24

This policy of using political revolutionaries and groups opposed to their

own governments was not exclusive to SOE's activities in Greece but based on

a broader concept that such groups were by their very nature ideally suited to

participate in clandestine (Gerolymatos,

G uerrilla W arf are and Espion age,

p. 132-

135).

25

Gerolymatos, The Role of the Greek Officer Corps, p. 71

'Another important consideration for the continued, and almost exclu-

sive, employment of opponents of the Metaxas regime by the SOE after the

occupation was that the representatives of the British organization in Athens

had little or no contact with the intelligence services, ministries, or individuals

close to the Greek government. Consequently, after the fall of Greece and the

rapid withdrawal of the British military and intelligence forces from the main-

land, there was no opportunity or time to establish contacts with the agencies

and individuals that represented the monarchy and the Metaxas regime and

cooperate with them in the organization of clandestine networks that would

operate after the Axis occupation (Gerolymatos,

G uerrilla W arf are and Espionage,

pp. 54-55).

27

According to Veremis and Gerolymatos

(T he M ilitary as a S ociopolitical

Force,

pp. 105-106), One important factor that led many of the Greek officers

to follow different resistance organizations and clandestine groups was the

breakdown of legitimate political authority in Greece. The puppet regimes

established by the Germans had little credibility thus most officers did not have

any allegiance to what was an illegitimate government. In the ensuing vacuum

of genuine authority many Greek officers were left free to follow a course of

action motivated by patriotism, a spirit of defiance against the Axis forces in

Greece or their own political beliefs. Some joined the Greek forces in the Mid-

dle East; others followed the guerrilla bands in the mountains, while some opted

to enlist in the Security Battalions of the Rallis puppet government our of fear

of communism, revenge, or simple self-interest.

Gerolymatos, The Role of the Greek Officer Corps, pp. 74-76.

29

Andre Gerolymatos, The Security Battalions and the Greek Civil War,


Vol. XII, no. 1 (Spring 1985), p. 19.

3

°Gerolymatos, The Security Battalions, pp. 20-21.

31The same conditions applied to the Greek armed forces in the Middle

East, particularly after the mutinies in 1943 and 1944. Republican officers

either accepted the monarchy or were purged, while others ended up in prison

camps in the Middle East.

32

Veremis and Gerolymatos, The Military as a Sociopolitical Force, p.

114, and note 41.

Veremis and Gerolymatos, The Military as a Sociopolitical Force, p.

115.

34Dispatches of Lincoln MacVeagh, ed. Y. Chouliaras and D. Georgakas,


12.1 (1985), p. 48.

Union of Young Officers.


3



36

0n the creation and organization of IDEA see: Karigianis,

1 9 4 0 - 1 9 5 2 ,

T o D ram a tis Ellados: Epe kai A thliotites,

(Athens: n.p. 1963), pp. 206-207.

37Karagianis, 1 940-1 952 , T o dram a t is Ellados ,

p. 234; EN. Grigoriadis,

Em phil ios Polem os, 1 944-1 949,

Vol. 10 (Athens: Neokosmos 1975), pp. 90-92.

38Gerolymatos, The Security Battalions, pp. 23-24 and note 34; NARS

RG 226 L 57536.

39David Close and Thanos Veremis, The Military Struggle, 1945-1949,

T he G reek C ivi l W ar 1 943-1950: Studies of Polarization,

ed. David Close (London

and New York: Rutledge, 1993, pp. 99-100; Stefanos. Sarafis,

ELA S G reek R esis-

tance A rm y (London: Merlin Press 1980), p. lxxvii; George Alexander,

The Pre-

lude to the T rum an D octrine: Bri tish Policy in G reece-1944-1947,

(Oxford: Oxford

University Press 1982), pp. 161-162, Tsakalotos, 40 Chronia Stratiotis tis Ella-

dos, Vol. 1, p. 47; Markos Vaphiadis,

A pomnim onevm ata, Em phil ios ,

5 Vols.

(Athens: Diphros 1992), Vol. 1, pp. 128-129.

°The term National Army was used during the course of the Civil War

and found in most primary documents of the period. It is not certain who came

up with this designation of the government forces but it was a clever use of

words and subtle propaganda similar to the acronym of ELAS (which means

Greece) used by the left during the occupation. For the sake of historical con-

sistency National Army will refer to the government forces and Democratic

Army for those of the communists.

41David Close and Thanos Veremis, The Military Struggle, pp. 103-104;

Vaphiadis, Apomnimonevmata,

Vol., 5, p. 146.

42

Verernis and Gerolymatos, The Military as a Sociopolitical Force, p.

120.

43

Close and Veremis, Military Struggle, pp. 104-105; Harry Truman

Library, President's Secretary File, SR-10, BOX 259.

Veremis and Gerolymatos, The Military as A Sociopolitical Force, pp.

116-118.

45Y.P. Roubatis,

T angled W ebs : T he U.S . in Greece , 1 947-1967

(New York:

Pella 1987), p. 74.

46

Veremis and Gerolymatos, The Military as a Sociopolitical Force,

pp.122-123.

47Roubatis,

T angled W ebs, pp. 72-79; p.p.125-127; p. 131.

48There was also the persistent rumor that Papagos was the illegitimate son

of King Constantine.

49

State Information Service.

5

°Gerolymatos, The Security Battalions, p. 25.

”Triandafilos Ath. Gerozisis,

T o S o m a A x i o m at ik o n k a i e T h e s i t o n st i

S y gchrony i Ell in ik i K oinonia , 1 821 -197 5

(Athens: Ekdoseis Dodoni, 1996), pp.

824-825

52Solon Grigoriadis,

Dekenvris-Emphil ios , 1944-1949

(Athens: Kapopoulos

1984), p. 189, writes that the fear of the left and anti-communism surpassed

the pre-war political schism and that the opposition to EAM-ELAS-KKE was

extended to include all individuals and organizations who did not identify with

the political ideology, such as it was, of the right-wing and the monarchy. Those

who did defined themselves as

ethnikophrones,

a term which during the occu-

pation defined not only those who supported the monarchy but included con-

24




servative republicans. The ideology of the

ethnikophrones, writes, Grigoriadis

manifested itself as fear of the left and developed greater impetus after the

December 1944 uprising and the Varkiza Agreement. According to Th.

Tsakalotos,

(50 Chronia Stratiotis,

Vol. 1, 1960, p. 399) a pre-war republican but

a post-war monarchist, opposition to communism transcended any other polit-

ical sentiments amongst the officer corps (Veremis and Gerolymatos, The Mil-

itary as a Sociopolitical Force, p. 116).

T he R oad to A uthori tarianism

5

The Road to Authoritarianism, The Greek Army in Politics, 1935-1949

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