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The Road Not Taken

ost of us have seen the aban-doned two kilometers of buslanes along Queen Rania Street.

They are part of an ambitious 32-kilome-ter network of bus rapid transit (BRT).The Amman BRT project, known in Ar-abic asAl-Baas Al-Saree, has been a hottopic in the media and among the resi-dents of Amman. Much has been said onthe project and where it stands today, buttruly understanding this particular issuerequires taking a step back and lookingat the bigger picture.

From Roundabouts To Rapid TransitUrban transport planning, in its compre-hensive and multi-modal context, has

never really been part of the public dis-course and policymaking in our part ofthe world. Some would even argue thatthis is the case for other forms of plan-ning, be they physical or otherwise, butthe absence of proper transport planninghas been especially palpable in our oil-rich region.

MIt is not hard to make out how this long-standing approach to doing things (or notdoing them) has manifested itself in Am-man. The city today is marred by count-less bridges and tunnels. Sidewalks are,for the most part, ineffective, and pedes-

trian crossings are virtually non-existent.Public transport is in disarray, with over

70% of the eet comprising of smallservice taxis or Coaster buses, many ofwhich are individually owned and oper-

ated. With the rapid population growththe city has experienced, the size of our

eet of large buses remained constantbetween 2000 and 2010, after which anadditional 116 buses were introduced.Meanwhile, car ownership levels in thecity are increasing by an alarming 10%to 15% per year, even among house-

holds with fairly low levels of income.At the same time, more than half of thecitys population is under the age of 25;add to that the increasing rate of femaleparticipation in the labor force, and whatyou get is nothing short of an explosion

in future transport demand that no roadwidening, bridge or tunnel would beable to accommodate.

So, how did we get here? Firstly, we

have been relying for too long on cheapoil from our neighbors, so buildingroads and importing more cars was theway to go, not just in Amman, but atthe national level as well. Secondly, theinstitutional set-up was not designed togive the right incentives for policymak-ers at the municipal and national levelsto think more systemically.

In Amman, trafc engineering and op-erations tasks, in addition to spatial andland-use planning, fell under the respon-

sibilities of the Greater Amman Munici-pality (GAM), while public transportplanning and regulation was under adifferent entity working at the nationallevel, the Land Transport RegulatoryCommission. Coordinating both func-tions was not easy across different bu-reaucracies.

Today, things have changed. We no lon-ger have access to cheap oil or at leastnot to the same extent as we did prior tothe 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. PrimeMinister Awn Khasawneh recently reit-erated this point in an interview on Jor-

In three years of political turmoil and economic drift, Jordan has seen plentyof error. The decision to kill the Amman Bus Rapid Transit system is one such

mistake. Hazem Zureiqat looks at the projects inception. What went wrong

and where do we go from here?

The city today [Amman] is marred by countlessbridges and tunnels. Sidewalks are, for the most part,

ineffective, and pedestrian crossings are virtuallynon-existent. Public transport is in disarray

Rendering of GAMs solution for the Press Tunnel. The BRT lanes will

run on a raised structure above the tunnel and will then pass the inter-section at street level. A BRT station will be located at the intersection.

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dan Televisions 60 Minutes. The pre-mier cited the large number of cars thatenter the Kingdom each year, addingthat meeting the energy bill has becomeJordans primary economic challenge.

The weak institutional set-up thesecond reason listed above has beenaddressed and we now have the rightframework to think and plan in a more

integrated fashion. In 2007, planningand regulation of public transportationwithin Amman became part of GAMsresponsibilities, and today GAM hasone integrated Transportation PlanningDepartment that deals with all modesof transport, from private cars to pub-lic transportation and pedestrians. Moreand more, decision makers and staff atGAM are becoming well aware that theproblem in Amman is about movingpeople and goods, not just cars, and that

our transport system needs to be morebalanced and multi-modal and should beplanned accordingly all while takinginto consideration changes in land useand zoning.

The question becomes then: what hashappened since the institutional changesof 2007? GAM developed a Transportand Mobility Master Plan (TMMP) thatoutlined the citys mobility needs for the

period leading up to 2025. The study in-volved conducting a survey of around10,000 households to assess their trans-port behavior. That survey, along with

extensive trafc and public transport datacollection across the city, created a richdatabase that formed the basis of the Am-man transport model, a powerful plan-ning tool that integrates transport, landuse and socio-economic data.

As the outcomes of the TMMP beganto emerge, it became clear that the cityneeded a higher order, namely a morerapid public transport mode. Several op-tions were analyzed, and BRT emergedas the preferred option for Amman due

to its low cost, effectiveness and relativeease of implementation given the cityshilly terrain. BRT is a term used to de-scribe public transport systems in whichbuses run on a segregated right-of-way,essentially offering a service similar tothat of trains (but, clearly, at a fractionof the cost). A BRT lane in Amman can

accommodate more than three timesthe number of people in a regular traf-c lane. BRT was rst implemented inCuritiba, Brazil in 1974, and has sincebeen successfully constructed in over

120 cities worldwide. Often cited as oneof the most successful examples, theBRT system in Bogot, Colombia, hasa current capacity of 45,000 passengersper hour in each direction, which ishigher than the capacity of most metrosystems worldwide.

Amman BRT And The Perfect StormIn early 2009, GAM commissioned acomprehensive study to develop theBRT scheme for the city. The studyaimed to rst validate the BRT networkdeveloped under the TMMP and then todevelop the complete service and op-

erations plan for the system (in terms ofnumber of buses required, frequenciesof service, etc.). This would be followedby estimating the demand and revenueforecasts and operating costs; preparing

an economic feasibility study and an en-vironmental impact assessment; and -nally, developing the detailed engineer-ing designs for the infrastructure, frombus lanes to stations and terminals. Focusgroups were held to obtain a better un-derstanding of the problems people facewhen using different modes of transport.

An additional survey was carried out atthe University of Jordan, one of the keynodes along the BRT network, to ascer-tain what students felt they needed in anew public transport system.

As the economic and nancial appraisalof the BRT began, work on developingthe infrastructure design was undertakenin parallel. It was clear at the outset thatthe engineering design of a 32-kilometernetwork of exclusive bus lanes would bea challenge given the large number of

grade-separated intersections (i.e. inter-sections with multiple levels) in Amman.Starting that process early on was, there-fore, essential. As is the case with suchcomplex projects, an iterative approachwas adopted, so designs were constantlydiscussed and revised as work on otherstreams progressed.

Contrary to what many seem to believe,intersections such as the Press Tunneland Sports City were tackled early on.Alternative solutions were analyzed

based on various criteria, such as thelevel of BRT priority, accessibility to

BRT is a term used to describe public transport

systems in which buses run on a segregated right-of-way, essentially offering a service similar to that oftrains (but clearly, at a fraction of the cost).

After conducting a thorough nancial audit for themunicipality, the AFD and GAM signed a creditfacility agreement under which the AFD wouldprovide a $166 million loan to GAM to fund the

construction of infrastructure for the Amman BRT.

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passengers, construction costs and im-pact on trafc during both constructionand operations.

Throughout this entire process, theFrench Development Agency (AFD)was heavily involved in the appraisal ofthe project to ensure its feasibility, both

economically and nancially. After con-ducting a thorough nancial audit for themunicipality, the AFD and GAM signeda credit facility agreement under whichthe AFD would provide a $166 millionloan to GAM to fund the construction ofinfrastructure for the Amman BRT. Thiswas a soft loan that was offered directlyto GAM with no sovereign guaranteefrom the Government of Jordan. It dem-onstrated AFDs faith in the project andin GAMs ability to pay off the loan indue course.

After detailed designs were completedfor some sections along the BRT net-work, GAM began tendering out con-struction works. Construction of therst two kilometers along Queen RaniaStreet began in July 2010, and was com-

pleted the following year.

As the rst package of BRT was beingconstructed, there was an unexpected turn

of events. In May 2011, some members ofparliament called for the BRT to be sus-pended. Some said it was a failure whileothers deemed it unsuitable for Amman.At the end of following month, then primeminister Marouf Bakhit formed a ministe-rial committee to reassess the project. Dur-ing the same period, a number of media

outlets, including a prominent daily news-paper, attacked the project as a corrupt andfailed endeavor. The Audit Bureau, whichhad previously offered its seal of approvalalong various stages of the project, issueda report saying the BRT was not feasi-ble. Not surprisingly, since the report wasissued by an entity whose responsibilitiesnever included preparing feasibility stud-ies, the report lacked the basic elementsof such studies and was erroneous inmany respects, according to technical staffat GAM.

Meanwhile, the ministerial committeeconducted a comprehensive review overthe course of two months, looking attechnical, nancial and environmentalaspects of the project. It issued a verypositive assessment of the scheme andclearly stated that there was no evidenceof corruption. This assessment was sentto the Cabinet of Ministers, which issueda very brief, weasel-worded decision on

The Audit Bureau, which had previously offered itsseal of approval along various stages of the project,issued a report saying the BRT was not feasibale.

September 10, 2011, to temporarily sus-pend all construction works on the proj-ect pending further independent review.As of the date of this writing, this reviewhas yet to take place.

It is difcult to frame such a bizarreturn of events within a rational con-

text. Developments across the re-gion took policymakers in Jordan bysurprise. The decision-making pro-cess, already distorted at the time dueto the lack of political reforms, became

even more crippled. A haphazard ghtagainst corruption put everyone and ev-erything under question, creating an envi-ronment in which decision makers optedfor stalling or adopting a more populistapproach rather than performing theirmanagerial duties as public ofcials.

The Amman BRT and perhaps GAMas an institution were easy targets. Thebiggest losers in all of this, however,are the people of Amman. Our ability tomove around the city is at stake, and weshould not remain silent.

Hazem Zureiqat is a transport consultantworking for Engicon, a multidisciplinary

engineering consulting frm based inAmman. Prior to joining Engicon,

he was part of GAMs core transport planning team. Zureiqat can bereached at mail@hazem.me or on Twitterat @hazem

Feature

Rendering of the BRT station by the University of Jordan. This is theonly underground station along the 32-km network.