The Road Back to the Nuclear Brink · 2017-06-22 · Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide 3 Arsenals:...
Transcript of The Road Back to the Nuclear Brink · 2017-06-22 · Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide 3 Arsenals:...
The Road Back to the Nuclear Brink
HansM.Kristensen,Federa0onofAmericanScien0sts
Ma7hewMcKinzie,NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil
UnitedNa0ons,NewYork,NY
June21,2017
www.fas.org
Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide 2
Briefing Overview
Thisbriefingisgivenintwoparts:
1.Kristensengivesanoverviewofthethestatusandtrendsofnuclearforcesandhowthemissionofnuclearweaponsisevolving.
2.McKinziegivesanoverviewoftheeffectsofnuclearweaponsuseandsummarizesthefindingsandconclusionsoftheirrecentstudy(withTheodorePostol)ofwarheadfuzemoderniza0onsintheUSarsenal.
www.fas.org
Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide 3
Arsenals: Status
Enormousreduc0onssincepeakof64,500stockpiledwarheadsin1986(70,300ifincludingre0redwarheads):
~55,000warheadstockpilereduc0on;~48,000+warheadsdismantled;~5,500+re0redwarheadsawai0ngdismantlement
Trend:paceofreduc.onsisslowing
www.fas.org
4
Today:~9,600warheadsinstockpiles(~14,900ifcoun0ngre0redwarheadsawai0ngdismantlement)
USandRussiapossess93%ofglobalinventory;eachhasmorethan4.mesmorewarheadsthanrestofworldcombined;150mesmorethanthird-largeststockpile(France)
Decreasing:US,Russia,Britain
Increasing:China,Pakistan,India
Steady:France,Israel
Emerging:NorthKorea
Arsenals: Status
Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
www.fas.org
5
Modernizations: Global Situation UnitedStates:Acerextensiveweaponslife-extensions,embarkeduponcompletereplacementofarsenalandindustryinfrastructure.Producinglife-extendedwarheads,planningnewwarheads.Increasingweaponscapabili0es.Reducingoverallsizeofarsenal.
Russia:Inmiddleofmoderniza0onofSoviet-eraweaponstonewersystems.Re-producingwarheadsandplanningnewones.Increasingweaponscapabili0es.Reducingoverallsizeofarsenal.
China:Infinalphaseofmoderniza0onfromearlyweaponstomoreefficienttypes.Producingwarheads.AddingMIRV.Increasingweaponscapabili0es.Increasingsizeofarsenal.
France:Infinalphaseofmoderniza0onofweaponsandinfrastructure.Researchingnext-genera0onalweapons.Producingwarheads.Increasingweaponscapabili0es.Arsenalsizesteady.
Britain:Inearlyphaseofmoderniza0onofweapons.Researchingnext-genera0onalweapons.Producingwarheads.Increasingweaponscapabili0es.Reducingsizeofarsenal.
Pakistan:Inmiddleofmoderniza0ontonewerandmorediversearsenal(Triad)andindustry,includinglonger-rangemissilesandshort-rangetac0calnuclearweapons.Producingwarheads.Increasingsizeofarsenal.
India:Inmiddleofmoderniza0ontonewerandmorediversearsenal(Triad)andindustry,includinglonger-rangemissiles.Producingwarheads.ExploringMIRV.Increasingsizeofarsenal.
Israel:Possibleupgradeofweapons.Arsenalsizeissteady.
NorthKorea:Rapiddevelopmentofseveraltypesofmissilesandplagorms.Conduc0ngnucleartes0ngandproducingwarheads.Increasingsizeofarsenalbutopera0onalstatusisunclear.
Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
6
Mission: War Planning and Trends
Allnuclear-armedstatesareproducingandrefiningnuclearstrikeplans.
US,Russia,France,Britainvariousdegreeofcounter-forcestrategywithweaponsonalert.
China,Indiahaveno-first-usestrategybutpossiblyincreasingreadiness.
Pakistanloweringthresholdwithtac0calweapons.
Prominenceofnuclearweaponsinlimited,regionalscenariosisincreasing.
USemphasizingregionalinmoderniza0onprogramsandopera0ons.
Russiausingexplicitthreatsofuse,modernizingshort/medium-rangeweapons.
Pakistanfieldingtac0calnuclearweapons.
Refinementofweaponstoincreaseaccuracyandreduceradioac0vefallout.
Mostmoderniza0onprogramsseektoincreasea7ackaccuracyandefficiency.
UShasstrategytobuildlower-yieldweaponstoreducefalloutofa7acks.
RussiareplacingsomeSoviet-erawarheadswithloweryields.
Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
www.fas.org
7
• Prolifera0onconcernand9/11a7ackstriggeredbroadeningofnotonlyconven0onalbutalsonuclearplanningto“regionalstates”armedwithWMD
• Terminologychangedfromdeterring“nuclear”adversariestodeterring“WMD”adversaries
• OPLAN8044Revision03includedexecutablestrikeop0onsagainstregionalproliferators
• BasedonNSPD-14(2002)• Effect:missionprolifera0on(domorewithless);planmorecomplex
Mission: War Planning and Trends (US example)
Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
www.fas.org
8
• OPLAN8010-12(July2012):StrategicDeterrenceandForceEmployment.
• Includesfourtypesofnucleara7ackop0ons:o BasicA7ackOp0ons(BAOs).o Selec0veA7ackOp0ons(SAOs).o EmergencyResponseOp0ons(EROs).
o Directed/Adap0vePlanningCapabilityOp0ons.• TherearenolongerMajorA7ackOp0ons(MAOs)inthestrategicwarplan.
• Directedagainstsixadversaries:Russia,China,NorthKorea,Iran,Syriaand9/11-typeWMDscenario(Iranhasprobablybeendropped).
• BroaderplanthanSIOP;includesconven0onal,cyber,missiledefense.
• Geographiccommands(EUCOM/PACOM)alsohaveregionalnuclearplans.
Source:STRATCOMOPLAN8010briefingslideobtainedbyFASunderFOIA
Mission: War Planning and Trends (US example)
Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
www.fas.org
9
Mission: War Planning and Trends (Others) Russia:HasweaponsonalertbutmorebasicstrategicwarplanthanUS.Greaterrelianceonnon-strategicnuclearweaponstocompensateforlesseffec0veconven0onalforces.Occasionaldirectnuclearthreats.Rumoredincreasedroleoflimiteduse(“escalate-to-deescalate”)butothersaysrumorsexaggerated.
China:No-first-use,counter-a7ackstrategy.Increasingweaponsaccuracyandresponsiveness.Discussingscenariosforwhenweaponsshouldbeusedandhowsoon.Noofficialchange.
France:Hasweaponsonalert.Hasadjustedwarheadloadingonsubmarinestoallowpoten0aluseofmorelimiteduseagainstregionaladversaries.Increasingrangeandaccuracyofweapons.
Britain:Hasweaponsonalert.HasreducedwarheadloadingbutisupgradingwithmoreefficientUSweaponstechnologies(warheadfuze).
Pakistan:Fieldingtac0calnuclearweaponsintendedforuseinscenariosshortofstrategicweapons.
India:Developingmissilesthatarecapableoflaunchingquicker.
Israel:Possiblefieldingsea-basedcruisemissiles(unclear).
NorthKorea:Strategyunclearbutfrequentlyissuesthreats.Developingmobileweaponsandmissilethatcanbelaunchedmorequickly.
Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
www.fas.org
USandRussiahaveincreasedprominenceofnuclear-capablebomberopera0onsinrecentyears.RussiawithflightsaroundEuropeandAsiaandoffUnitedStates.UShasreinstatedpolarexercises,increasedNorthernEuropeandPacificopera0ons,ac0vatedOPLANforEUCOM
ExercisePolarGrowlonApril1,2015sawdeploymentoffourB-52sovertheNorthPoleandNorthSea.Thebomberswentallthewaytotheirlaunchpointsforair-launchedcruisemissiles. ExercisePolarRoaronAugust1,2016sawdeploymentofsix
bombers(4B-52and2B-2)overtheNorthPacific,NorthPole,NorthSea,andBal0cSea.Thedeterrenceexerciserequired24tankers.
10
Mission: War Planning and Trends
Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
NewandResurgentDangersfromNuclearWeaponsManagementoftheUSNuclearArsenalandUSGovernmentCapacityonArmsControlandNonprolifera.on• Riskofnuclearweaponsusesomewhereinthenextfouryears:HowwilltheTrumpadministra0onmanageacrisisinvolvingnuclearweapons?
• ShicfromzeronuclearweaponsasaUSpolicygoal• ExpansionofUSnuclearweaponsmoderniza0on-newnuclearweaponsandnewnuclearmissions
• USfundingforarmscontrolandnonprolifera0onprogramsatrisk,includingfortheCTBTO;poten0alforareturntoexplosivenucleartes0ng
• MissiledefenseissuesandNATOnuclearweaponspolicy
ArmsControlWorkbytheUnitedStatesandRussia• WithdrawalfromNewSTART/withdrawalfromINF• Strategicstabilitytalks-extendingtheSTARTprocess
RegionalNuclearThreats:AsiaandtheMiddleEast• IranandthefutureoftheJCPOA• ThreatofnuclearconflictontheKoreanpeninsula• DangerofnuclearwarbetweenIndianandPakistan
11Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
EffectsofaNuclearExplosion
12Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
Nuclear Targeting: Cities PercentageofPopula0onKilledandInjuredasaFunc0onofPeakOverpressure
13Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
14Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
Correla.onBetweenHeightofBurstandNuclearEffects
Level1.Countriestargeteachother’snon-strategictargetswithnuclearweapons–forexample:troopforma0ons,militarygarrisons,conven0onalmissileandairbases,conven0onalnavalbases,missiledefensesystems,nuclearweaponsproduc0onfacili0esortac6calnuclearweaponssites:escala0on;poten0alforfalloutonpopula0oncenters.
Level2.Countriestargeteachother’sstrategicnuclearweaponsdeterrent,includingcommand,controlandcommunica0onstargets:severeescala0on,targetsinci0es.
Level3.Countriestargeteachothersci.esdirectly.
ThreeBasicLevelsofNuclearTarge.ngandNuclearConflict:
Majorthemes:NuclearWarPlanning;NuclearTarge0ng;CommandandControlofNuclearForces;PromptLaunch;Delega0on
15Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
16Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
(GraphicsbyTheodorePostol)
17Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
How US nuclear force modernization is undermining strategic stability: The burst-height compensating super-fuze Hans M. Kristensen Matthew McKinzie Theodore A. Postol
h7p://thebulle0n.org/how-us-nuclear-force-moderniza0on-undermining-strategic-stability-burst-height-compensa0ng-super10578
18Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
Findingsandconclusionsofrecentstudyofwarheadfuzemoderniza.onsintheUSarsenal:
19Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
Increasedcapabilitycomesfrommodifica.onoffuzeratherthannuclearwarheaditself
20Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
Howtheoldwarheadwouldperform:
Howthenewwarheadperforms:
21Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
22Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
HistoryandStatusofSuper-FuzeDevelopment:
Colonel General Viktor Yesin (ret.), candidate of military sciences and Russian International Affairs Council expert with
The information published by U.S. experts that the Americans are carrying out profound modernization of their nuclear munitions in order to improving their effectiveness is nothing new to the Russian military and political leadership. This circumstance has been taken into account in forming and implementing the Russian defensive plan. Russia is taking effective measures to maintain missile and nuclear parity with the United States, both in terms of perfecting its strategic offensive weapons and in terms of developing the capability of its missile defence system, including the missile warning systems. In particular, in 2016 Russia completed the programme to establish complete radar coverage of the country’s borders, with a detection range capability of up to 6,000 kilometres for ballistic targets. Russia has also started deploying a new uniform space-based detection and combat command system, which is expected to be fully deployed by 2020.
With all these factors taken into consideration, it can be argued that Russia has the capability to promptly detect a nuclear missile attack and respond appropriately. As has been repeatedly stated at the highest military and political level, the missiles currently deployed as part of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces are capable of overcoming the missile defences of any enemy in the foreseeable future. To ensure continued confidence in the reliability of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and its missile defence systems, relevant funds are planned to be allocated for research and development as part of the state arms programme for 2018–2025, which is currently under development. These research and development efforts will allow Russia to have weapons systems on a par with the best foreign equivalents.
23Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
RussianReac.onsh7p://russiancouncil.ru/en/analy0cs-and-comments/analy0cs/US-Nuclear-Warheads-Scary-Moderniza0on/
MajorGeneralVladimirDvorkin,chiefresearcherattheCentreforInterna6onalSecurityatPrimakovNa6onalResearchIns6tuteofWorldEconomyandInterna6onalRela6onsundertheRussianAcademyofSciencesandRussianInterna6onalAffairsCouncilexpert
First.W76warheadshavebeeninservicewithTridentIImissilesforover30yearsnow,so,fromthepointofviewofsafetyandreliability,itisnotsurprisingthattheyarebeingupgraded.Thefusingmethodthatisbeingimplementedhasbeenknownforaround20years.Inessence,basedonthetargetmisses0mate,attheendoftheac0vetrajectorylegthemissileselectsthewarheaddetona0onmethod:ifthemissileisundershoo0ng,thewarheadisdetonatedbythecontactfuseonimpactwiththesurface;ifitisovershoo0ng,thewarheadisdetonatedmid-airattheclosestpointtothetarget.TheUnitedStatesisretrofiungvirtuallyallitsICBMandSLBMwarheadsthiswayaspartofupgradeprogrammes,andRussiaismostlikelydoingthesame.
Second.TheW76hasayieldofaround100kilotonsandis,therefore,classedasalightwarhead.Suchwarheadsarenotintendedtobeusedagainsthardtargetssuchasmissilesilos,andwillnotbeusedforthatpurpose,despitetherela.velyinsignificantimprovementintheirkillingaccuracythankstotheupgradedfusingmethod.Itwouldbemuchmoreefficienttoengagehardtargets,suchasmissilesilos,withW88warheads,whichyieldover400kilotonsandarealsousedwithTridentIISLBMs.ThewarheadsofMinutemanIIIICBMsalsofitthebill.Therefore,theUnitedStateswillnot“freeup”asignificantpor0onofitsarsenalforuseagainstothertargetsofthepoten0alenemy.
Third.ThereisnoneedforanymeasurestobetakeninresponsetotheW76moderniza0onprogramme.Russiafollowsitsownscheduleforreplacingobsoleteweaponssystemswithinitsstrategicnuclearforces,andisintroducingnewstrategicsystemsinlinewiththeNewSTARTtreaty,whichensuresguaranteednucleardeterrence.
Fourth.ThetemporaryincompletecapabilityoftheRussianspace-basedmissilewarningsystemcomponentwouldinnowayaffecttheretaliatorystrikecapability,seeingasthedecisiontolaunchsuchastrikemayjustaswellbebasedoninforma0onfromthesecond,radar-basedmissilewarning0er,whichRussiahasnoproblemswith.
24Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
RussianReac.onsh7p://russiancouncil.ru/en/analy0cs-and-comments/analy0cs/US-Nuclear-Warheads-Scary-Moderniza0on/
25Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
26Kristensen/McKinzie, 2017 | Slide
QUESTIONS?
Foraddi0onalinforma0on:
Federa0onofAmericanScien0sts(h7ps://www.fas.org)NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil(h7ps://www.nrdc.org)