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The Risks of Stowaways
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Transcript of The Risks of Stowaways
16 BEACON
LOSS PREVENTION
Stowaways pose a threat to the vessel, its crew and – as highlighted by recent terrorist attacks– national security. Financial costs are often substantial, with potential fines against both theMaster and the owners adding to the burden. How do you stop stowaways getting on board andhow will ISPS help?
There have been many reports in recentyears regarding stowaways. For example:
The News (Monrovia) (www.allafrica.com,8 April 2004):"Four teenagers believed to be Liberiansare reportedly being treated for malnutritionafter an incredible sixteen-day voyage toArgentina inside a ship’s anchorcompartment".
Debka Mideast News, 14 June 2002:"Container Stowaway Terrorists Stealinto America. In the two last monthsbetween 75 and 125 operatives of thefundamentalist terror network al Qaedaare known to have illegally penetratedthe United States, mostly throughAmerican ports."
Xinhua news report Beijing, 24 March 2004: "Chinese police captured a total of 5,286stowaways and 444 human traffickers ina five-month campaign from October2003 to March this year". Humantraffickers are not confined to China. TheXinhua News Report of 24 March 2004goes on to state "the police in north-eastern Jilin Province arrested eighthuman traffickers, including one fromthe US and two from the Republic ofKorea".
It’s a lucrative business, with humantraffickers making substantial sums.CNN news reported on 14 January 2000that Chinese gangs were thought to"generate $10 billion a year in organisedcrime."
Threat leading to the vessel and crewA stowaway or group of stowaways canpose a physical threat if they becomeviolent. Assuming the stowaway(s) can becontained in a cabin, if they cannot bedischarged quickly at a convenient port,and they have to remain on board thevessel for a substantial period of time,this can also cause psychologicaldistress to the rest of the crew.
In a recent case handled by Skuld, sixstowaways entered the vessel at Doualain December 2003. The stowaways hid inthe trunk of cargo crane no. 4 and werediscovered several days after leavingport. Advice was sought from fifteencountries on the vessel’s sailing scheduleas to whether the stowaways could bedischarged in any of their ports. Of thecountries approached, the only ones thatseemed positive were Dakar, Ivory Coastand Portugal (with limitations). The sixstowaways were confined in a cabin,causing inconvenience to the crew and
the Master. Every time the vessel camenear a port, the stowaways wouldbecome agitated and rowdy. The expense to the owners inmaintaining the stowaways, makingenquiries to have the stowawaysdischarged at various locations andappointing guards where necessary wasconsiderable. In addition, the crew wasdistressed and was working in anenvironment where they felt physicallythreatened by the stowaways.
After two months, in February 2004, thesix stowaways were successfullydischarged from the vessel at Dakar andthereafter repatriated.
There is also a further risk to the crewthat should be considered. A stowawaycould have an illness and by coming intocontact with the crew, could pass thatillness on (see also article on p.11).Xinhua news reported on 5 June 2003"Fevered stowaway deported after beingcleared of SARS at Tianjin port."
By Nicola Mason, Vice President, Deputy Head of Skuld’sHong Kong syndicate
The risks of stowaways
Handle with care – stowaways can infect crew members
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BEACON 17
Potential for terrorismA headline in the Boston Globe on 26March 2004 read, "FBI denies linkbetween terrorist, LNG tankers". Thearticle referred to an accusation thatterrorists had entered Boston asstowaways on LNG tankers from Algeria.Although the FBI concluded that thestowaways had no terrorist links, thisdoes highlight the danger fromstowaways if their motive is terrorism.
Even where the stowaways are not foundto have any terrorist motives, they canstill present difficulties to members ifthey come from designated high-riskareas. In early 2001, well before the 9.11terrorist attacks in the USA, two Iraqistowaways were disembarked at a port in
the USA. The US Immigration Authoritiesdetained them in a federal prison. Acharge of USD 100 per day was leviedagainst owners for the stowaways. Thestowaways are still in detention and,given the present political climate, arenot expected to be released in the nearfuture.
Costs involvedThe stowaway represents a financialburden to both owner and charterer. Inthe present market, where owners have a better bargaining position, they maynegotiate clauses into their charter-parties that place liability for the cost ofstowaways on charterers, or share thecost burden depending on how thestowaway got on board.
If a stowaway cannot be discharged atthe next convenient port, he will have tobe maintained on board the vessel withfood, clothing and water. This results inextra overtime for the crew if they have toact as guards. Most ports require theMaster to declare that a stowaway is onboard the vessel. Some ports mayrequire that guards be employed on thevessel to ensure that the stowaway doesnot escape.
Fines may be levied against both theMaster and the owners. Depending onthe location, the fines could besubstantial.
The South African Immigration Authorityhas a pure fine (non-refundable) ofaround Rand 2,500 (about USD 300) per
stowaway. Should the Master of thevessel fail to declare the presence of astowaway, a further non-refundable fineof Rand 10,000 (about USD 1,200) will beimposed. In Australia, under section 229of the Migration Act, a maximum penaltyof AUD 10,000 (about USD 6,700) can belevied regardless of whether thestowaway escapes or remains on thevessel. It is an offence to bring a non-citizen that does not hold a visa into thecountry.
How to stop stowaways getting on boardHigh risk areasSouth Africa, Morocco, Tanzania, Algeria,West Africa, Eastern Europe, Colombiaand China are high-risk areas wheretotal vigilance is required.
Container shipsThere is an organised criminal industrydedicated to the trafficking of humans.Container vessels are vulnerable tostowaways and extra care must be taken.• Examine empty containers and soft-
top containers. If the container hasholes on the top or sides, this may bean indication that the cargo is human
• Where the vessel is required to remain at port longer than usual and receivescargo during that period, enquiriesshould be made and a detailed inspectioncarried out of the containers received
• The crew should focus attention on theseals to ascertain whether they havebeen tampered with, look unusual orare missing
A stowaway from the Dominican Republic, injured in ascuffle with crew members on the Cypriot-flagged cargoship Columbia One, is lowered off the ship in Miami
Pho
to: C
ourt
esy
of t
he U
.S.C
oast
Gua
rd
Photo: Scanpix
60592_Beacon-mai-2004 18.05.04 10:44 Side 17
Photo: C
ourtesy of the U.S.C
oast Guard
18 BEACON
60592_Beacon-mai-2004 18.05.04 10:45 Side 18
BEACON 19
• Consider whether to employ private guards, especially at sensitive ports
GenerallyCheck the cargo stow thoroughly,storerooms, cabins, crane cabins,Master’s houses, engine room bilges,forecastle, anchor chains and chainlockers.
StevedoresStevedores in poor countries are alsolikely stowaway targets. Thus, checkstevedores’ identity and the number ofstevedores for each shift, possiblyretaining their identity cards until theshift ends.
Know who is coming on boardMake sure that only authorised personnelgain entry to the vessel. Check and,where possible, retain and record theidentity documents of each personentering the vessel. If the identitydocuments look suspicious, contact yourP&I representative, since there have beenreports of stowaways posing as authorisedagents and visitors to gain access.
If you find a stowaway on board Remember to use caution. The stowawaymay be armed and dangerous. Notify theMaster immediately. Always have morethan one crew member approach thestowaway. This is for the crew’s ownsafety and to protect the crew/ownersagainst false accusations of crewbrutality.
• Disarm the stowaway and remove drugs and other items that could cause injury to the stowaway or the crew
• For the vessel’s safety, place the stowaway in a secure area/cabin with limited secure portholes
• The stowaway should be given food and water and be treated humanely
• Get as much information from the stowaway as possible
What information should you get?Identity details and travel documents ifavailable.
Ask the stowaway his age, nationality,family history, how and when he boardedthe vessel, if he had help from anyone,last employment or education if any, etc.Any information, if not false or misleading,may help identify where the stowaway isfrom.
Photograph the stowaway and e-mail tothe club/owners. This allows the club tostart the process of identifying thestowaway and getting him disembarkedat the next possible port.
The ISPS Code The ISPS (International Ship and Portfacility Security) Code will come into forceon 1 July 2004. For a detailed analysis ofthe Code please refer to separate articlesin this issue of Beacon and in issue no. 2,2003.
As the provisions of the Code apply to thesecurity of both ships and the portfacilities, there is a debate whether thiscode will alleviate the problem of stowaways.Historically, criticism was levied atGovernments and port facilities for aperceived inadequacy in securityarrangements and the prevention ofaccess by unauthorised personnel to port facilities and vessels.
Does ISPS affect stowaways?Under the ISPS Code, contractingGovernments will have to approve shipand port facility security plans. Indeed,one of the functional requirements of theCode is to prevent unauthorised access toships, port facilities and their restrictedareas. Measures taken by all parties tocomply with the Code should at leastassist in eradicating the ‘opportuniststowaway’. However, it may be moredifficult, to eradicate the possibility ofstevedores who decide to stowaway. Itmay also be difficult to eliminate thestowaways that enter a container vesselon board a container, as greater checkswill be needed at the place of stuffing thecontainer, which may not necessarily bethe same as the port facility.
ConclusionThis writer, an eternal optimist, hopesthat with time and the measures taken by all relevant parties to comply with theISPS Code, the problem of stowaways will be relegated to the history books.
The U.S. Coast Guard prepare to search a suspiciouscontainer for stowaways
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