The risk of derailment and collision, and safety systems ... · The risk of derailment and...

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1 The risk of derailment and collision, and safety systems to prevent the risk Tomohisa Nakamura Transport Safety Department East Japan Railway Company International Railway Safety Conference in Hong Kong 5 October, 2010

Transcript of The risk of derailment and collision, and safety systems ... · The risk of derailment and...

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The risk of derailment and collision, and safety systems to prevent the risk

Tomohisa Nakamura Transport Safety Department East Japan Railway Company

International Railway Safety Conference in Hong Kong 5 October, 2010

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JR Group Map

JR East

JR Hokkaido

JR Central

JR West

JR Shikoku

Tokyo Osaka JR Kyushu

JR Freight

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( As of 1 April 2010 ) Employees 60,190 Working line-kilometers 7,526.8 km Stations 1,705 Passengers carried About 16 million/day Trains operated 12,761/day Units of rolling stock 13,173

Nagano

Shinkansen lines ( Under construction )

Sendai

Niigata

Tokyo

Morioka Akita

Hachinohe

Shinjo

Conventional lines

The Shinkansen

The Shinkansen

Shin-Aomori

Outline of JR East

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Contents

1. Causes of derailments and collisions that occurred in thepast and countermeasures for these accidents

2. The cause of the Fukuchiyama-Line derailment, and new countermeasures for this accident

3. Trend in the number of accidents since our establishment

4. Conclusions

1. Causes of derailments and collisions that occurred in thepast and countermeasures for these accidents

2. The cause of the Fukuchiyama-Line derailment, and new countermeasures for this accident

3. Trend in the number of accidents since our establishment

4. Conclusions

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The Mikawashima accident (occurred on 3 May in 1962)

Mikawashima Station

the up main railway track

the down main railway track

the down sub railway track

(The first accident) A freight train ran through a red signal. Next, the locomotive and freight train derailed on the down main railway track and derailed cars were obstacle to movement on the down main railway track.

(The second accident) A down passenger train collided with the derailed cars. Next, this down passenger train derailed on the down main railway track and derailed cars were an obstacle to movement on the up main railway track.

(The third accident) An up passenger train collided with the derailed down passenger train. Next, this up passenger train derailed.

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confirmation

If the motorman does not confirm warning within 5 seconds, emergency brake works.

warning

The train speed

Preceding Train

Step 1 ATS wayside coil transmits “ the red signal sign” by analog frequency.

Step 2 Warning rings to driver's cab.

ATS wayside coil

Step 3 The motorman confirms warning within 5 seconds.

Red signal for Danger

Automatic Train Stop (ATS)

continuing to operate

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The Higashi-Nakano accident (occurred on 5 December in 1988)

the up main railway track

the down main railway track

Tokyo metropolitan area is operated many trains. Therefore, there are a lot of signals. Warning very often rang to the motorman’s cab and the motorman very often confirmed warning, too. As a result, the motorman failed to brake and this accident occurred.

ATS wayside coil

Warning

1. ATS wayside coil transmitted “ the red signal sign”. 2. The motorman confirmed warning and continued to operate.

4. The motorman failed to brake. 3. Next train ran through a red signal.

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The train speed

Brake pattern

Step 2 Continuous brake pattern for red signal

Preceding Train

Step 1 ATS wayside coil transmits “the distance to the red signal” by digital message.

ATS wayside coil

Red signal for Danger

Automatic Train Stop Pattern (ATS-P)

Train stops in front of red signal

Step 3Service brake works

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Contents

1. Causes of derailments and collisions that occurred in thepast and countermeasures for these accidents

2. The cause of the Fukuchiyama-Line derailment, and new countermeasures for this accident

3. Trend in the number of accidents since our establishment

4. Conclusions

1. Causes of derailments and collisions that occurred in thepast and countermeasures for these accidents

2. The cause of the Fukuchiyama-Line derailment, and new countermeasures for this accident

3. Trend in the number of accidents since our establishment

4. Conclusions

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An apartment house

Tokyo Osaka

JR East

The Fukuchiyama-Line accident (occurred on 25 April in 2005)

This accident occurred on 25 April in 2005, on the Fukuchiyama Line of JR West in Amagasaki City, Hyogo Prefecture near Osaka.

JR West

・ Commuter train was running on a right-hand curve. ・ 5 cars of the 7-car train were derailed. ・ The first and second cars slammed into a building along the railroad and crashed. ・ 106 passengers and the motorman were killed and 562 passengers were injured.

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Frequency of occurrence

(Average per year)

(Number of accidents)

Average casualties per accident

Falling fromPlatform

Being caughtby the door

Operation during signal failure

Signal passed at danger

Wind

Falling rocks

Level crossing

Track maintenance work

Rain

Rail trouble

Earthquake

0.01

0.1

1

10

100

1 10 100 1000

Before The Fukuchiyama Line derailment accident

●:Average value of JR group■:Value for JR East

Excessive speed

After The Fukuchiyama Line derailment accident

Excessive Speed

(Number of person)

Analysis of risk based on result

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D C B AMaximum estimated damage ranking

Contact with rolling stock on station platform

Wheel-climb derailment, sand,

and gravel

Level crossing derailment

Major earthquake in the Tokyo

metropolitan area

Low-speed derailment

Derailment due to excess speed

Frequency of occurrence

Our risk evaluation

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Amendment of the law

After Fukuchiyama-Line derailment occurred, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport revised the technical standards.

・ We must install the systems to prevent excessive speed at curves, junctions, line terminals and so on.

・ These are required to be installed on major rail lines by the end of June 2011 or the end of June 2016, depending on the line’s train speed and frequency.

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Nagano

Takasaki Mito

Omiya

Tokyo Tokyo

Nagano

Takasaki Mito

Omiya

Tokyo Tokyo

Installation-line of the ATS-P or ATC* systems

Countermeasures taken by JR East

ATS-P systems had been installed on 2,321.6 km of railway line. ATS-P systems cover 95 percent of JR East’s traffic volume. * ATC・・・Automatic Train Control ( ATC systems had been installed on 156.8 km of railway line. )

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Step 1 ATS wayside coil transmits “the distance to the junction” by digital message.

Step 1 ATS wayside coil transmits “the distance to the curve” by digital message.

New countermeasures for Fukuchiyama-Line accident The following is new countermeasures to prevent excessive speed

Junction

Curve

Train reduces speed for the curve

Train reduces speed for the junction

The train speed

Brake pattern

Step 2 Continuous brake pattern for the curve and the junction

ATS wayside coil

Step 3Service brake works

ATS wayside coil

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New countermeasures for Fukuchiyama-Line accident

The following is the progress of new countermeasures to prevent excessive speed along with amendment of the law.

TargetInstallations as of

the end of fiscal 2009(ended March 31, 2010)

Planned completion

Curves 1,470 locations 1,470 locations Completed(the end of March 2010)

Junctions 1,896 locations 1,083 locations the end of June 2016

Line terminal 131 locations 105 locations the end of June 2016

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Contents

1. Causes of derailments and collisions that occurred in thepast and countermeasures for these accidents

2. The cause of the Fukuchiyama-Line derailment, and new countermeasures for this accident

3. Trend in the number of accidents since our establishment

4. Conclusions

1. Causes of derailments and collisions that occurred in thepast and countermeasures for these accidents

2. The cause of the Fukuchiyama-Line derailment, and new countermeasures for this accident

3. Trend in the number of accidents since our establishment

4. Conclusions

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Trend in the number of accidents since our establishment

165 164 160136 142

121 11196

121136

92113

137 134

210

168

240 247

287

315

152

376

209

0

100

200

300

400

87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

( Number of accidents )

( Fiscal year )

The number of accidents has decreased by about 70 percent in 23 years

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Contents

1. Causes of derailments and collisions that occurred in thepast and countermeasures for these accidents

2. The cause of the Fukuchiyama-Line derailment, and new countermeasures for this accident

3. Trend in the number of accidents since our establishment

4. Conclusions

1. Causes of derailments and collisions that occurred in thepast and countermeasures for these accidents

2. The cause of the Fukuchiyama-Line derailment, and new countermeasures for this accident

3. Trend in the number of accidents since our establishment

4. Conclusions

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Conclusions

・Our ATS system is exactly the history of the railway system safety.

・We not only take these countermeasures but also try to evaluate potential risks that can cause very great damage in the future.

・We take countermeasures for high priority risks.

・We think that this risk management will improve the railway system safety.

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Thank you for your attention !!