The risk of derailment and collision, and safety systems ... · The risk of derailment and...
Transcript of The risk of derailment and collision, and safety systems ... · The risk of derailment and...
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The risk of derailment and collision, and safety systems to prevent the risk
Tomohisa Nakamura Transport Safety Department East Japan Railway Company
International Railway Safety Conference in Hong Kong 5 October, 2010
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( As of 1 April 2010 ) Employees 60,190 Working line-kilometers 7,526.8 km Stations 1,705 Passengers carried About 16 million/day Trains operated 12,761/day Units of rolling stock 13,173
Nagano
Shinkansen lines ( Under construction )
Sendai
Niigata
Tokyo
Morioka Akita
Hachinohe
Shinjo
Conventional lines
The Shinkansen
The Shinkansen
Shin-Aomori
Outline of JR East
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Contents
1. Causes of derailments and collisions that occurred in thepast and countermeasures for these accidents
2. The cause of the Fukuchiyama-Line derailment, and new countermeasures for this accident
3. Trend in the number of accidents since our establishment
4. Conclusions
1. Causes of derailments and collisions that occurred in thepast and countermeasures for these accidents
2. The cause of the Fukuchiyama-Line derailment, and new countermeasures for this accident
3. Trend in the number of accidents since our establishment
4. Conclusions
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The Mikawashima accident (occurred on 3 May in 1962)
Mikawashima Station
the up main railway track
the down main railway track
the down sub railway track
(The first accident) A freight train ran through a red signal. Next, the locomotive and freight train derailed on the down main railway track and derailed cars were obstacle to movement on the down main railway track.
(The second accident) A down passenger train collided with the derailed cars. Next, this down passenger train derailed on the down main railway track and derailed cars were an obstacle to movement on the up main railway track.
(The third accident) An up passenger train collided with the derailed down passenger train. Next, this up passenger train derailed.
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confirmation
If the motorman does not confirm warning within 5 seconds, emergency brake works.
warning
The train speed
Preceding Train
Step 1 ATS wayside coil transmits “ the red signal sign” by analog frequency.
Step 2 Warning rings to driver's cab.
ATS wayside coil
Step 3 The motorman confirms warning within 5 seconds.
Red signal for Danger
Automatic Train Stop (ATS)
continuing to operate
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The Higashi-Nakano accident (occurred on 5 December in 1988)
the up main railway track
the down main railway track
Tokyo metropolitan area is operated many trains. Therefore, there are a lot of signals. Warning very often rang to the motorman’s cab and the motorman very often confirmed warning, too. As a result, the motorman failed to brake and this accident occurred.
ATS wayside coil
Warning
1. ATS wayside coil transmitted “ the red signal sign”. 2. The motorman confirmed warning and continued to operate.
4. The motorman failed to brake. 3. Next train ran through a red signal.
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The train speed
Brake pattern
Step 2 Continuous brake pattern for red signal
Preceding Train
Step 1 ATS wayside coil transmits “the distance to the red signal” by digital message.
ATS wayside coil
Red signal for Danger
Automatic Train Stop Pattern (ATS-P)
Train stops in front of red signal
Step 3Service brake works
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Contents
1. Causes of derailments and collisions that occurred in thepast and countermeasures for these accidents
2. The cause of the Fukuchiyama-Line derailment, and new countermeasures for this accident
3. Trend in the number of accidents since our establishment
4. Conclusions
1. Causes of derailments and collisions that occurred in thepast and countermeasures for these accidents
2. The cause of the Fukuchiyama-Line derailment, and new countermeasures for this accident
3. Trend in the number of accidents since our establishment
4. Conclusions
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An apartment house
Tokyo Osaka
JR East
The Fukuchiyama-Line accident (occurred on 25 April in 2005)
This accident occurred on 25 April in 2005, on the Fukuchiyama Line of JR West in Amagasaki City, Hyogo Prefecture near Osaka.
JR West
・ Commuter train was running on a right-hand curve. ・ 5 cars of the 7-car train were derailed. ・ The first and second cars slammed into a building along the railroad and crashed. ・ 106 passengers and the motorman were killed and 562 passengers were injured.
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Frequency of occurrence
(Average per year)
(Number of accidents)
Average casualties per accident
Falling fromPlatform
Being caughtby the door
Operation during signal failure
Signal passed at danger
Wind
Falling rocks
Level crossing
Track maintenance work
Rain
Rail trouble
Earthquake
0.01
0.1
1
10
100
1 10 100 1000
Before The Fukuchiyama Line derailment accident
●:Average value of JR group■:Value for JR East
Excessive speed
After The Fukuchiyama Line derailment accident
Excessive Speed
(Number of person)
Analysis of risk based on result
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D C B AMaximum estimated damage ranking
Contact with rolling stock on station platform
Wheel-climb derailment, sand,
and gravel
Level crossing derailment
Major earthquake in the Tokyo
metropolitan area
Low-speed derailment
Derailment due to excess speed
Frequency of occurrence
Our risk evaluation
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Amendment of the law
After Fukuchiyama-Line derailment occurred, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport revised the technical standards.
・ We must install the systems to prevent excessive speed at curves, junctions, line terminals and so on.
・ These are required to be installed on major rail lines by the end of June 2011 or the end of June 2016, depending on the line’s train speed and frequency.
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Nagano
Takasaki Mito
Omiya
Tokyo Tokyo
Nagano
Takasaki Mito
Omiya
Tokyo Tokyo
Installation-line of the ATS-P or ATC* systems
Countermeasures taken by JR East
ATS-P systems had been installed on 2,321.6 km of railway line. ATS-P systems cover 95 percent of JR East’s traffic volume. * ATC・・・Automatic Train Control ( ATC systems had been installed on 156.8 km of railway line. )
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Step 1 ATS wayside coil transmits “the distance to the junction” by digital message.
Step 1 ATS wayside coil transmits “the distance to the curve” by digital message.
New countermeasures for Fukuchiyama-Line accident The following is new countermeasures to prevent excessive speed
Junction
Curve
Train reduces speed for the curve
Train reduces speed for the junction
The train speed
Brake pattern
Step 2 Continuous brake pattern for the curve and the junction
ATS wayside coil
Step 3Service brake works
ATS wayside coil
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New countermeasures for Fukuchiyama-Line accident
The following is the progress of new countermeasures to prevent excessive speed along with amendment of the law.
TargetInstallations as of
the end of fiscal 2009(ended March 31, 2010)
Planned completion
Curves 1,470 locations 1,470 locations Completed(the end of March 2010)
Junctions 1,896 locations 1,083 locations the end of June 2016
Line terminal 131 locations 105 locations the end of June 2016
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Contents
1. Causes of derailments and collisions that occurred in thepast and countermeasures for these accidents
2. The cause of the Fukuchiyama-Line derailment, and new countermeasures for this accident
3. Trend in the number of accidents since our establishment
4. Conclusions
1. Causes of derailments and collisions that occurred in thepast and countermeasures for these accidents
2. The cause of the Fukuchiyama-Line derailment, and new countermeasures for this accident
3. Trend in the number of accidents since our establishment
4. Conclusions
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Trend in the number of accidents since our establishment
165 164 160136 142
121 11196
121136
92113
137 134
210
168
240 247
287
315
152
376
209
0
100
200
300
400
87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
( Number of accidents )
( Fiscal year )
The number of accidents has decreased by about 70 percent in 23 years
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Contents
1. Causes of derailments and collisions that occurred in thepast and countermeasures for these accidents
2. The cause of the Fukuchiyama-Line derailment, and new countermeasures for this accident
3. Trend in the number of accidents since our establishment
4. Conclusions
1. Causes of derailments and collisions that occurred in thepast and countermeasures for these accidents
2. The cause of the Fukuchiyama-Line derailment, and new countermeasures for this accident
3. Trend in the number of accidents since our establishment
4. Conclusions
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Conclusions
・Our ATS system is exactly the history of the railway system safety.
・We not only take these countermeasures but also try to evaluate potential risks that can cause very great damage in the future.
・We take countermeasures for high priority risks.
・We think that this risk management will improve the railway system safety.