Contents:

Abstract.......................................................................................................................................6Introduction.................................................................................................................................71. Democratization in society with strong cleavages................................................................9

1.1. Donald L. Horowitz: Model of integrative and exclusive Majoritarianism...............121.2. Arend Lijphart: Consociational democracy...............................................................141.3. Steven I. Wilkinson: Relationship between party competition and a state’s response to anti-minority polarization and violence............................................................................17

2. Electoral systems in India and its analysis in the context of Horowitz and Lijphart’s concepts.....................................................................................................................................19

2.1. Electoral systems – basic description........................................................................192.2. Electoral systems – theoretical understanding...........................................................21

3. Affiliation of the main political parties by the religion cleavage.......................................233.1. Parties with secularism affiliation..............................................................................24

3.1.1. Secularism in Indian Context...............................................................................243.1.2. Congress party and United Progressive Alliance.................................................253.1.3. Leftist parties.......................................................................................................26

3.2. Parties with Hinduism affiliation...............................................................................273.3. Parties with Islamic (Muslim) affiliation...................................................................293.4. Parties with other mostly regional or specific community affiliation........................313.5. The characteristics of the main relevant political parties in India.............................32

3.5.1. Indian National Congress.....................................................................................333.5.2. Bharatiya Janata Party..........................................................................................333.5.3. Communist Party of India (Marxist)....................................................................353.5.4. Bahujan Samaj Party............................................................................................373.5.5. Samajwadi Party..................................................................................................38

4. Analysis of the election on the federal level in relation to the main religious disorder and clashes in the context of Horowitz, Lijphart.............................................................................39

4.1. Indian federalism based and minority autonomy.......................................................394.2. Horowitz’s majoritarism............................................................................................424.3. Lijphart’s Indian Puzzle.............................................................................................51

5. Analysis of the election results in regions with large and frequent religious conflicts in Indian States in the context of Wilkinson.................................................................................56

5.1. Gujarat case study......................................................................................................605.2. Orissa case study........................................................................................................655.3. Uttar Pradesh case study............................................................................................695.4. Kerela case study.......................................................................................................745.5. Rajasthan case study..................................................................................................815.6. Maharashtra case study..............................................................................................855.7. Bihar case study.........................................................................................................895.8. Wilkinson’s hypothesis and its modification and alternative explanation.................94

Conclusion................................................................................................................................97Sources and Literatures.............................................................................................................99

List of Tables..........................................................................................................................103List of Figures.........................................................................................................................105List of Figures.........................................................................................................................105List of Diagrams.....................................................................................................................106List of Abbreviation................................................................................................................107

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Appendix 1 – Political map of India – Union States and Territories......................................108Appendix 2 – Structure of Indian population.........................................................................109

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Abstract

The work has evaluated the hypothesis that government without minority electorates’

requirement does not protect the minorities against violence, riots and aggression from

majority. There is a critical view on Indian political system which has been evaluated and

compared with Lijphart’s theory of consensual democracy and Horowitz theory of

Majoritarism. Some significant points which support division and clashes in Indian societies

have been found. These points are evaluated by the two mentioned theoretical approaches.

The other evaluated theoretical assumption in this work is based on Wilkinson hypothesis

which describe relationship between party competition and a state's response to anti-minority

polarization and violence. Wilkinson supports Lijphart and Horowitz assumption of office

holding and proportional representation. Without that the riots and violence against minorities

have bigger intensity. The work has compared selected cases of governments’ and parties’

behaviour in particular Indian states using Wilkinson’s and Varshney’s data and enlarged

them by new data collection based on Times of India records. There is a link between

minority support (as well as proportional representation) for government increasing its fair

behaviour and minority protection from government. However, there are also some deviations

from this hypothesis which need explanation. The numbers of riots and deaths as a one

measurement of their intensities compare the party and government behaviour in particular

cases. The number of parties in government and their core electoral support indicates the

intensity as well as quantity of communal violence in India. This work has enlarged the

hypothesis and the cases of moderate Multipartism with bipolar spectrum have been included

Wilkinson’s assumption.

3

Introduction

India is a country of many religions which have coexisted for several centuries. This

coexistence could be generally characterised as peaceful, but also has some historical and

ideological clashes, which have generated problems in both the past and present time. The

nationalism and its ideology have brought new troubles to the political and common life of

many religious communities in many parts of India. The identity of Indians with the Indian

state has been eroded by these clashes and the Indian political system as well as the main

political parties have to cope with these challenges.

The main challenge and also the topic of this work is to study the religious clashes and

Hinduism’s and Muslim’s nationalism. These religious cleavages have brought problems such

as terrorism and community riots. This work will analyse these problems of Indian religions

in political life. The main goals of this thesis are:

1. Thesis will find the highlighted points of Lijphart and Horowitz theoretical approach of

problem solving of electoral democracy in divided Indian society and find which of these

points have any practical connection in India similar to those.

2. Willkinson’s hypothesis of the impact of number of the parties in the political system on

India states government minorities’ policy. Practical cases show how strong is the

influence of Majoritarism election system on ethnic policy.

These goals will be following by verification of two main hypotheses which have been

analysed in this text. The hypotheses are:

1. Hypothesis has based on comparison of Indian real political system with the theoretical

approach of Lijphart and Horowitz. The ethnic disorder is produced by the system gaps

which do not follow the Lijphart’s and Horowitz’s ideal model and recommendation.

2. The number of parties in Indian state governments has strong influence on the number of

ethnic disorder. If the government depends on minorities’ votes or secular and minority

parties, the number of ethnic violence is lower. If the government depends on majority

population the number of death in violence increases.

There is a statistical comparison of a number of death and number of ethnic violence in

selected Indian states.

The work uses selected case studies of Indian states - Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala, Orissa,

Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Bihar. They were selected because together they constitute most

4

of the examples which are possible to find in India relating to our study. Gujarat and

Rajasthan are examples of two parties competition, Kerala is an example of a peaceful state

with secular party system as oppose to the violent Gujarat. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are

examples of states with successful state parties having tremendous influence in federal level

and with different level of responsibility. Gujarat, Maharashtra and Orissa gave the examples

of increasing level of violence with growing electoral success of nationalistic parties in

different environment. These examples together complete the scale of potential example of

party competition in India. The deeper explanation of case studies selection is explained in

chapter 5.

Main goals will be enriched by description of Indian secularism as well as by concept of

Indian (Hinduism) nationalism – Hindutva ideology. There will be also an analysis and

description of main political parties in India (mainly on federal level) and their affiliation to

religion.

5

1. Democratization in society with strong cleavages

The third wave of democratization brought tremendous discussion about the role of electoral

system in reproduction of democratic system. Many scholars such as Lijphart, Horowitz,

Reynolds or Reilly discussed their ideal concept of electoral system in divided societies and

compared the practical cases from real political world. Their works introduce also their

normative view on ideal election system, however, their researches are based on practical

cases. This work has focused mainly on popular normative attitude to this problem presented

by Lijphart and Horowitz. The fundamental base of these case studies is built on consensus

that first-past-the-post (FPTP) system is not the best electoral design for divided societies with

strong multi-ethnical cleavages. Westminster’s model of democracy does not generate inter-

ethnical cooperation and increases the probability of mono-ethnical majority in legislative

assembly and government. The minorities have then lower chance to enunciate its interest in

normal political way. (compare with Chytílek 2007: 145-146) Horowitz and Lijphart

described their views on the ideal electoral model for divided societies.

The evaluation of the electoral system plays an important role for understanding the

“practice” of politics. Its role is significant, because electoral system helps determine how

many parties a country has, how cohesive they are, who forms the government, and how long

the government cabinets tend to last. Electoral system is expressed in electoral laws and their

impact depends on the way politicians and voters make use of these laws. At times, flawed

electoral laws can undo democracy or lead to staleness. (Taagepera 2007: 1)

However, as also Horowitz wrote “no electoral system simply reflects voter preferences or the

existing pattern of cleavages in a society or the prevailing political party configuration. Every

party shape and reshapes these features of the environment, and each does so in different

ways…The best electoral system is the one that straightforwardly and most accurately reflects

the preferences of voters.” (Horowitz 2003a: 3) There are also six significant goals which

Horowitz defined as the potential best way to achieve the functioning electoral system in

divided societies. The choice must also be geared to the pre-existing features of the political

environment, since the functioning of electoral mechanisms varies with the context. Here are

the six Horowitz’s possible goals:

1. proportionality of seats to votes;

2. accountability to constituents;

3. durable governments;

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4. victory of the “Condorcet winner”;

5. interethnic and inter-religious conciliation;

6. minority office holding. (Horowitz 2003a: 4)

Chapter 1.1. will discuss these six point in detailed perspective as well as Horowitz model of

integrative and exclusive Majoritarianism which give normative recommendations for ideal

system for divided societies. Then this theoretical perspective will be compared with Indian

reality.

Arend Lijphart, the other scholar, who tried to find ideal electoral system for society with

strong ethnical, religious cleavages in his article The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A

Consociational Interpretation defined the Indian model of ethnical divided society and

function saying that the Indian experience does not resemble ethnically accommodative

consociation democracy. For one, the structures of majoritarianism excluded elements of

proportionality and autonomy central to consociationalism; for another, the partition of India

was a partition against consociationalism and for the construction of a majority and unitary

state. Lijphart’s effort to understand the ‘puzzle of Indian democracy’ in the form of a

‘consociation interpretation’ misunderstands religious ‘encapsulation’ as autonomy, tactical

political accommodation within the Congress as elite power-sharing, and linguistic pluralism

within meta-Hindu areas as developed federalism. In an ideal consociational system minority

rights are entrenched, guaranteed and backed by a minority veto. (Singh 2000: 46)

Consociationalism is meant to apply where cleavages are deep and unmediated by multiple

memberships. To manage conflict in such societies, Lijphart argues, requires using four

mechanisms of governance: segmental autonomy, a grand coalition of governing elites,

proportional representation and mutual vetoes. Consociations are systems characterized by

these four distinguishing features. (Eisenberg 2006) Look at the precondition of consensual

democracy as Lijphart called in Indian concept “the Indian puzzle”:

A) Grand coalition governments include representatives of all major linguistic and

religious groups.

B) A minority veto with regard to vital minority rights and autonomy.

C) Proportionality in political representation and civil service appointments.

D) Cultural autonomy for linguistic and religious groups.(Lijphart 1996: 258)

The issue of ideal model of consociationalism, consocional or consensual democracy (in this

work will be used as synonym) will be discussed in detailed perspective in chapter 1.2.

7

Lijphart also defined his normative evaluation of electoral system in divided societies based

on mentioned consociationalism which will be discussed also in the same chapter. Lijphart’s

theoretical perspective with his practical description of Indian political system will be

critically evaluated from the present Indian perspective. He also presented his ideal model of

“one size” power sharing or consensual democracy which should give the best fit for dividing

societies (Lijphart 2004: 99) and have been described also in chapter 1.2. The Indian model of

consensual democracy will be discussed in chapter 2 and 4.

Table 1 offers the overview of theoretical approaches to designing of electoral systems and

gives also the abstract of their functioning. This work has focused mostly on Lijphart and

Horowitz model.

Table 1 Models of democracy for divided societies

Characterisations characterisation and goal of electoral system

mechanical effect of electoral system

strategic effect of electoral system

implication for dividing societies

Exclusive majoritarism

Westminster model of democracy

FPTP system support artificial majorities

Strong Strong supporting exclusion of some minority group

Consensus model (Lijphart)

great coalition, proportional representation (proportional electoral system), proportionality in sources allocation, multilateral veto, segmental autonomy

proportional electoral system, goal is the most realistic vote transformation to the seats

Weak Weak function of electoral system in allocation process is neutral, moderation is duty of political elites in great coalition (seat-pooling)

Integrative consensual model (Reynolds)

parliamentalism, great coalition, federalism, proportional electoral system – STV

STV electoral system support crosscutting cleavages

Weak Medium connection between consensual practices on the level of elites (seat pooling) and interethnic appeals through vote pooling in constituencies

Inclusive majoritarism (centripetalism, integrative majoritarism) (Horowitz, Reilly)

presidentialism, alternative voting system, federalism

alternative voting, the goal is to enforce interethnic appeals in heterogenic constituencies

Strong Strong strong support of interethnic appeals through vote pooling or constituency pooling

Source: Chytílek 2007: 146

8

Chapter 1.3. describes another view on communal violence which focuses more on existing

examples of election results than on normative approaches of electoral design. Moreover,

there is a strong link between normative approaches of Lijphart and Horowitz. Their ideal

models predict the output of the electoral system and number of parties in government which

is important for Wilkinson hypothesis.

1.1. Donald L. Horowitz: Model of integrative and exclusive Majoritarianism

One of the leading theorists of democratic institutional design, Donald L. Horowitz,

emphasizes how powerful the electoral system can be in shaping the character of a democracy

and how vexing the choices can be. There are numerous ways that voter preferences can be

aggregated in order to determine which parties get how many seats in parliament. Every

electoral system has biases and no system merely passively translates “individual wishes into

a collective choice.” Horowitz identifies six above mentioned possible aims of an electoral

system, some of which directly conflict with one another. (Diamond and Plattner 2006: X).

First goal of Horowitz is the normative goal of proportionality – the closest possible matches

for the relative party shares of the vote. It could be call also as “fairness”. (Diamond and

Plattner 2006: X) Scholars and decision makers are inclined to judge electoral systems by

their ability or inability to produce proportional results. (Horowitz 2003a: 4) Horowitz

emphasized that this is not one of the most important goal among the other six.

Accountability to constituents should show that the elections to representative bodies

assume some degree of accountability of legislators to those who elect them. Generally the

electoral systems which limit the power of central party leaders to choose candidates produce

more responsive representatives. This shows the sovereignty of the voter to choose the

candidates. When central party leaders have power to select candidates, the voter’s

sovereignty to choose the candidates, rather than just to choose among candidates, is thought

to be impaired. Horowitz said that possibilities to choose among candidates (such as in open

list in proportional representation) can have perverse consequences, especially in multiethnic

societies. (Horowitz 2003a: 5)

Durable government is a third goal. An electoral system is not able to represent the

idiosyncratic opinions of every voter. Nevertheless, according to Horowitz, some systems

make it possible for many shades of opinion to be represented, sometimes so many that the

legislature ends up being fragmented, with no party having anywhere near 50 % of the seats.

9

In these particular cases are coalition governments necessary. Where the legislature is

garmented, it may be difficult to put together durable coalitions. Other electoral design may

force parties to aggregate the diverse opinions in a society for the sake of electoral success.

Where this happens and diverse opinions are represented within parties rather than across

parties. The reduction in the number of parties makes it more likely that durable governments

can be formed. And durable governments are thought to be desirable as they promote policy

consistency and responsibility and may avoid the instability that can result during interregna

or from the creation of fragile, unpredictable coalitions. (Horowitz 2003a: 5-6)

As a forth goal Horowitz mentioned a Victory of the Condorcet winner. The Condorcet

winner is the candidate who would receive a majority of the vote in a paired or head-to-head

contest with each and every other candidate. Winner is obviously the more popular candidate,

whose victory ought to be preferred. However, there are obstacles to this outcome and some

electoral systems can disfavour the Condorcet winner and it could be wanting. Horowitz has

chosen the system of alternative vote as an electoral design that does a good job at picking the

Condorcet winner. (Horowitz 2003a: 6)

Interethnic and interreligious conciliation is fifth goal of Horowitz institutional design.

Electoral systems that produce proportional result or accountability to constituents or durable

governments may or may not foster interethnic conciliation. Important question is whether a

given system provides politicians with electoral inducements for moderate behaviour, that is,

for compromises with members of other ethnic groups for the sake of electoral success.

Electoral systems that allow politicians to be elected without behaving moderately may make

post-electoral conciliation more difficult. For interethnic conciliation, the question is how the

electoral system affects the pre-electoral calculations of parties and politicians. (Horowitz

2003a: 6-7) The necessity to engage in what Horowitz calls “vote-pooling’ in order to win

elections and maintain coalitions is what forces politicians to moderate their demands and

offer protection to minorities. (Wilkinson 2004: 7)

As a last but not least goal for multiethnic successful societies is requirement of minority

office holding. It gives rise to attempts to achieve proportionality between votes and seats,

except that proportionality in that respect is party proportionality rather than group

proportionality. Creation of homogeneous constituencies could mean not only more minority-

dominated constituencies but also more constituencies in which majority-group voters

dominate and in which majority-group candidates do not need to worry about minority

10

support or minority interests. (Horowitz 2003a: 7-8) Horowitz put stress on importance of

majority interest in minority votes also in earlier mentioned goals.

Horowitz and also Australian political scientist Ben Really examined to what extent electoral

systems can “encourage cooperation and accommodation among rival groups, and therefore

work to reduce the salience of ethnicity.” Both scholars preferred vote-pooling mechanisms,

which “make politicians reciprocally dependent on votes from groups other than their own.“

Such systems give an advantage to moderate candidates who reach across the divides of party

and ethnicity to appeal for the second and lower-order preferences of the voters, and who

thereby exhibit a “capacity to represent groups other than their own.” Horowitz evaluated this

system through his mentioned six goals. The potential electoral design see in alternative vote

and see also the value of the single transferable vote (STV), in which voters rank a larger

number of candidates in multimember districts. The advantage of STV is that it is a fairer,

more proportional system than AV, better able to represent minorities. The disadvantage,

Horowitz stressed, is that the low threshold for election in a district “provides few incentives

to inter party agreements to transfer votes,” and thus generates “weaker incentives to

compromise” than alternative vote (AV), under which a candidate must ultimately gather

enough lower-order preferences to win a majority of votes in the district. (Diamond and

Plattner 2006: XII-XIII)

1.2. Arend Lijphart: Consociational democracy

Consociational, consensual or consensus democracy described by Arend Lijphart is in his

words “kind of democracy can be seen as an institutional arrangement that is able to produce

as much consensus as possible in countries, such as ethnically and religiously divided

societies, where a spontaneous consensus is in short supply.” (Lijphart 1998: 100) Lijphart

used the term consociational democracy in his book Democracy in Plural Societies published

in 1977. In this book, he emphasized “consociational” democracy as a solution for states

where traditional majoritarian democracy might not work due to deep ethnic, linguistic, or

religious cleavages. (Lijphart 1977) Later he advocates “consensus democracy” in his book

Patterns of Democracy as the ideal governance type for any country. It is not ideal type just

for deeply divided states. (Lijphart 1999a)

The crucial decisions by political leaders are to establish power-sharing in some of the deeply

divided societies. The power-sharing systems that were set up in some societies (such as

11

Switzerland in 1943, Austria in 1945, Malaysia in 1955, Belgium in 1970) have the same

general pattern: an inclusive government consisting of representatives of all of the important

rival groups; as much autonomy for these groups as possible; proportionality in representation

and appointments; and a formal or informal minority veto power with regard to the most vital

and fundamental matters. (Lijphart 1998: 101-102) Lijphart (1998: 102) argued that set power

sharing systems were “invented and re-invented time and again because of its compelling

logic: it was the most rational choice to be made in the circumstances of potential or actual

civil strife. The moral is that pure rational-choice decisions can and do occur.”

The important part of consensus in society Lijphart found in consisting of the types of

executive power, executive and legislative relations, party system, electoral system, and

interest group system. Democracies that have either broad governing coalitions or minority

cabinets that are dependent on the shifting support of legislative majorities (instead of one-

party majority governments) also tend to have relatively strong legislatures (instead of

dominant, and even domineering, executives), multiparty systems (instead of two-party

systems), proportional election systems (instead of plurality or majority electoral systems),

and corporatist or coordinated interest group systems (instead of free-for-all competitive

pluralism among interest groups). These are the democracies that Lijphart call consensus

democracies, and the democracies characterized by the contrasting cluster of traits are the

majoritarian democracies. Elections by proportional representation allow or encourage

multiple parties to form and to gain representation in parliaments, and multiparty systems

make it more likely that either coalition or minority cabinets will be formed. (Lijphart 1998:

103-104)

Lijphart disagree with Horowitz and his concept of “one size fits all” recommendation

regarding power sharing rules and institutions while the optimal model should be adapted

according to the particular features of the country at hand. Lijphart disagree that everything

depends on these characteristics. (Lijphart 2004: 99) He offer his own way and outlined nine

areas of constitutional choice and provide own recommendations in each area. He called “one

size” power sharing model.

Lijphart found as one of the most important choice is the legislative electoral system, for

which three broad categories are proportional representation (PR), majoritarian systems, and

intermediate systems. For divided societies, ensuring the election of a broadly representative

legislature should be the crucial consideration, and PR is undoubtedly according to Lijphart

the optimal way of doing so. (Lijphart 2004: 99-100) Lijphart argued that consensus

12

democracies clearly outperform the majoritarian democracies. The reason for this is partly

structural, because consensus democracies generally use proportional representation (PR) as

their electoral systems. PR makes it much easier for minorities and women to be elected, and

PR also boosts voter turnout in two ways: by minimizing the wasted-vote problem, it makes it

more attractive for voters to vote, and by making it more attractive for parties to campaign in

areas where they are relatively weak, such stronger party efforts will also stimulate turnout.

However, an alternative or additional explanation would be cultural: consensus democracy

itself and what I have just called its "consequences" may both be argued to spring from a

general cultural inclination toward a strong community orientation and social consciousness.

And indeed, the consensus democracies are the kinder and gentler democracies: they are more

likely than majoritarian democracies to be welfare states, to be protective of the environment,

to have less punitive criminal justice systems (as measured by their rates of incarceration and

use of the death penalty), and to be more generous with foreign aid. The moral of this story is

another victory for cultural explanation. (Lijphart 1998: 105-106) The Lijphart’s trust in

proportional representation will be significant for critical approach of Indian electoral system

in other part of this work. However, Lijphart also put the stress on guidelines with PR. A

particular type selection within PR system can be significant especially for new democracies

and it is also about creating much or less distance between voters and their representatives.

(Lijphart 2004: 100-101) The distance could enlarge or reduce the possibilities for minorities’

representation. Earlier mentioned Horowitz’s thought said that possibilities to choose among

candidates (such as in open list in proportional representation) could have perverse

consequences, especially in multiethnic societies. (Horowitz 2003a: 5)

For dividing societies is important choice also the selection between parliamentary or

presidential government. In countries with deep ethnic and other cleavages, the choice

should be based on the different systems’ relative potential for power sharing in the executive.

As the cabinet in a parliamentary system is a collegial decision-making body – as opposed to

the presidential one-person executive with a purely advisory cabinet – it offers the optimal

setting for forming a broad power-sharing executive. Presidential election is necessarily

majoritarian in nature. (Lijphart 2004: 102-103) As well as selection of the head of the state

is important part of Lijphart theoretical approach.

Lijphart agrees with Horowitz that sharing of executive power and group autonomy are

two key ingredients for successful democracy in divided societies and denominated them as

two "primary characteristics" of consociational democracy. Power-sharing means the

13

participation of the representatives of all significant groups in political decision-making,

especially at the executive level; group autonomy (or nonterritorial autonomy) (Lijphart 2004:

105) means that these groups have authority to run their own internal affairs, especially in the

areas of education and culture. (Lijphart 1999b) Elite bargaining in democratic system has its

own arrangement of mutual checks and balances. To the extent that elected representatives

participate in the bargaining process, they are a channel through which popular desires, goals,

and values enter into governmental decisions. Political and bureaucratic elites in democratic

countries are powerful, far more powerful than ordinary citizens can be; but they are not

despots. (Dahl 1998: 113-114)

Cabinet stability problem, according to Lijphart, should not be overestimated. The vast

majority of stable democracies have parliamentary rather than presidential or semi-

presidential forms of government. This is argument against others which says that cabinets

depending on majority support in parliament can be dismissed by parliamentary votes of no-

confidence which can lead to cabinet instability and, as a result, regime instability. (Lijphart

2004: 103)

The choice between federalism and decentralization is important for divided societies with

geographically concentrated communal groups. Lijphart believes that a federal system is a

good way to provide autonomy for these groups. He also recommends an existence of second

(federal) legislative chamber with strong power. The shape of federalization should be

designed by country to country. (Lijphart 2004: 104-105)

Power sharing beyond the cabinet and parliament is essential. Broad representations of all

communal groups suppose to be also in the civil service, judiciary, police as well as military.

This aim can be achieved (but not necessary) by instituting ethnic or religious quotas.

(Lijphart 2004: 105-106)

1.3. Steven I. Wilkinson: Relationship between party competition and a state’s

response to anti-minority polarization and violence

The essential question is what determines ethnic violence breaks out and whether the state

will protect minorities or not? One response can be found in Wilkinson hypothesis that

democratic states protect minorities when it is in their governments’ electoral interest to do so.

It was also described on some cases in Indian states in theses “The Religious Clashes in India

and Their Impact on Election Results“. Specifically, politicians in government will increase

14

the supply of protection to minorities when either of two conditions applies: when minorities

are an important part of their party’s current support base, or the support base of one of their

coalition partners in a coalition government; or when the overall electoral system in a state is

so competitive – in terms of the effective number of parties – that there is therefore, a high

probability that the governing party will have to negotiate or form coalitions with minority

supported parties in the future, despite its own preferences. The necessity to engage in what

Horowitz calls “vote-pooling’ in order to win elections and maintain coalitions is what forces

politicians to moderate their demands and offer protection to minorities. We can call it “the

prospect of vote pooling with profit”. In India, vote pooling moderates even the behaviour of

nationalist parties that have no minority support, as long as these parties are forced to form

coalitions with parties that do rely on minority votes. (Wilkinson 2004: 7-8)

On the other hand, politicians in government will restrict the supply of security to minorities

if they have no minority support and the overall levels of party competition in a state would

be low. Figure 1 shows the model of the parties’ competition and its impact on government

policy making in the field of minorities and religious groups. As it is showed in model A –

three or more parties prevent the riots or community violence and care more about minorities.

15

Figure 1 The theoretical relationship between party competition and a state's response to antiminority polarization and violence (ENVP = effective number of parties1)

Source: Wilkinson 2004: 139

2. Electoral systems in India and its analysis in the context of Horowitz and

Lijphart’s concepts

2.1. Electoral systems – basic description

India is a constitutional democracy with a parliamentary- federal system of government, and

at the heart of the system is a commitment to hold regular, free and fair elections. These

elections determine the composition of the government, the membership of the two houses of

1) The formula for the effective number of parties is ENPV = 1/Σv i2 , where vi is vote share of the ith

party. This widely used measure weights parties with a higher vote share more heavily than those parties with a very low vote share, thus providing a better measure of the “real” level of party competition than if we were to simply count the total number of parties competing in a state. (Wilkinson 2004: 7) For this work will be used the formula for effective number of parties in assembly: N=1/Σsi

2, si seat share of the ith parties in assembly. (Šedo 2006: 87) This formula stresses more on party sharing in assembly and do not count with lost votes. This is more useful if the system use FPTP electoral system.

16

parliament, the state and union territory legislative assemblies, and the Presidency and vice-

presidency.

The country has been divided into 543 Parliamentary Constituencies, each of which returns

one Member of Parliament to the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Parliament. The size and

shape of the parliamentary constituencies are determined by an independent Delimitation

Commission, which aims to create constituencies and has roughly the same population,

subject to geographical considerations and the boundaries of the states and administrative

areas. (Election Commission of India)

Delimitation is the redrawing of the boundaries of parliamentary or assembly constituencies

to make sure that there are, as near as practicable, the same number of people in each

constituency. In India boundaries are meant to be examined after the ten-yearly census to

reflect changes in population, for which Parliament by law establishes an independent

Delimitation Commission, made up of the Chief Election Commissioner and two judges or

ex-judges from the Supreme Court or High Court. However, under a constitutional

amendment of 1976, delimitation was suspended until after the census of 2001, ostensibly so

that states’ family-planning programs would not affect their political representation in the Lok

Sabha and Vidhan Sabhas. This has led to wide discrepancies in the size of constituencies,

with the largest having over 2,500,000 electors, and the smallest less than 50,000. (Election

Commission of India)

Parliament has two chambers – The House of the People (Lok Sabha) and The House of the

States (Rajya Sabha). Lok Sabha has 545 members (Constitution of India, Chapter II, Article

81a), 543 members elected for a five year term in single-seat constituencies and 2 members

appointed to represent the Anglo-Indian community. The two unelected members are a relic

from the past. The special dispensation of nominating two members of European or Eurasian

blood was created as a transitory arrangement, at the time of Independence in 1947, to protect

the interests of the departing ruling class. The 543 members are elected under the plurality

('first past the post') electoral system.

The House of the States has 245 members, 233 members elected for a six year term, with one

third retiring every two years. (Constitution of India, Chapter II, Article 80) The members are

elected by legislators of the state and union (federal) territories. The elected members are

chosen under the system of proportional representation by means of the Single Transferable

Vote. The twelve members are to be nominated by the President in accordance with the

provisions of clause as given in the Constitution of India, Chapter II, Article 80.

17

The State Assemblies have been divided into federal Parliamentary Constituencies, each of

which returns one Member of Parliament to the Lok Sabha. The size and shape of the

parliamentary constituencies are determined by an independent Delimitation Commission,

which aims to create constituencies and has roughly the same population, subject to

geographical considerations and the boundaries of the states and administrative areas.

(Election Commission of India)

2.2. Electoral systems – theoretical understanding

Indian electoral system took the basic electoral law for Lok Sabha and State Assemblies from

British tradition and its Westminster model of Parliamentarism. However, selected FPTP

system has operated differently.

Indian electoral system with a single member district voting does not determinate the same

outcomes as FPTP system in the UK. According to Duverger law the FPTP system should

support two party system. However, Indian reality shows something different. The party

system on federal level produces from 1990s multi-parties when in the period before the

characteristic was party system with predominant party, which was INC. The last two decades

are characterised by multi coalition government and by multi-parties.

Indian party system could be characterises as a puzzle (Lijphart used this word for his

description of Indian political system) of many party subsystems, which exist on the level of

states of Indian union. Electoral concentration corresponds to party systems in particular

Indian states. Federal party system is more puzzles of these states’ party structures, which

mutually linked to each other. However, state level does not have always two party system

formats as could be awaited according to FPTP and Westminster model (like in Great

Britain). As an example could be mentioned Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Kerela, West Bengal etc.

On the other side, it is possible to find almost pure two party system on state level in Gujarat.

Indian party system has its anomalies, which do not reflect Duvergen’s or Sartori’s principles.

Electoral concentration in India does not always follow traditional Indian cleavages

(languages, religious, etc.), but system could be also described as multi-level political and

party system of particular Indian states, which has its own conservancies on federal level. It

is difficult to say that on the federal level is possible to find electoral concentration, but it is

mostly state party system, which has its own specific differences from federal level.

According to Strmiska, Indian political and party system does not have any theoretical

18

background, which is able to substantiate the strength of electoral system to party system.

(Chytílek 2004: 45) It is not really possible to implement Sartori’s principles on the federal

level.

If we look at the Horowitz and Lijphart concept, we can see that they see in Westminster

model and in its FPTP electoral system disadvantage for minority. The reductive effect of

FPTP eliminates the minority votes (also Muslims) and its representatives. It means that in

society where Hindus have majority is not possible for minorities (Muslims) gain the

parliamentary seats or to have successful own party. Without the strong concentration of

voters it is not possible to elect own minority representative. However, secular parties (such

Congress) usually gains the minority votes and give a profit from such divided constituencies

where do not exist big concentration of minority votes. The example of Gujarat state shows

how the minority representation in assembly could be suppressed. Similar situation is also on

the federal level. The example of Gujarat was selected, because the state has faced strong

communal violence in past two decades. The number of Muslims in Gujarat is around 9 %.

Nevertheless, it was only 3.2 % of candidates of INC (2.7 % of all elected candidates) in 2007

but it is bigger number compare to BJP. Gujarat has also very strong religious and community

cleavage between Muslims and Hindus. The Muslim minority is underrepresented and main

reason is the effect of FPTP. This is also one significant explanation which supports bi-

partism in Gujarat. The BJP is a party with strong affiliation to nationalism and ideology of

Hindutva and INC opposes to this concept with its idea of secularism. This cleavage cannot

be marginalised because FPTP increases it. Lijphart and as well as Horowitz see the FPTP as

the way which increase communal disharmony due to under representation of minorities and

cleavage increasing.

The other example is Kerala where is strong Muslim community and in northern part of this

state is strong concentration of voters in some constituencies and the local Muslim party -

Muslim league is able to gain majority of votes. On the other hand state Jammu and Kashmir

shows that parties count with strategic electoral behaviour of voters. There is a party which

makes a profit from Hindu minority. Hindus know that BJP cannot be elected and prefer

secular Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party (JKPDP) which has chance to be elected and will

protect their interest. These examples also show that FPTP system in India produce strategic

behaviour among electorates and minorities. They try to vote according the religious

cleavages, the parties which have chance to win and protect their interest. However, this does

not solve the problem of under representation of minorities and low level of vote pooling.

19

Reservation of seats policy for religious minorities for parliamentary election does not exist

on federal level. However, there are seats which are reserved for scheduled caste and

scheduled tribe. Moreover, these backward communities have also special quotas for

government services and higher education. This does not exist on religious base. There are

some cases, which follow also the religious way. For example, the state Andhra Pradesh uses

the reservation seats also for religious communities. However, the reservation of seats for

minorities in election (Muslims) cannot solve the main problem with the effort to marginalize

the community (religious) cleavage. There is no support of inter-ethnic appeals through vote

pooling or constituency pooling as Horowitz mentioned in his work. There is also no active

effort for the moderation by political elites to achieve the consensus or great coalition (seat-

pooling) which is advantage of consensual system described by Lijphart.

Table 2 Muslims in Gujarat Assembly elections (winners/candidates)

Year Congress

ontestants

BJP Independents won1980 9/9 0/0 01985 7/10 0/0 01990 2/6 0/0 01995 3/10 0/1 11998 4/7 0/1 02002 3/5 0/0 02007 5/6 0/0 0

Source: Najiullah 2008

3. Affiliation of the main political parties by the religion cleavage

Indian political parties do not always follow the religious cleavages. Even in British India

when the Hindu-Muslim communal divide was sharp and deep, only Muslim League and the

Hindu Mahasabha and the Akali Dal followed the religious division in the society. The largest

party INC was not a Hindu Party. After independence, Muslim League (party with this name

still exist in Kerala) left for Pakistan, most Indian Muslims joined Congress or other secular

parties. The other parties of the right and the left in India today are not communal parties with

strong communalist politics as its main profile. They project themselves as secular parties.

Secularism is the national creed. However, there are some differences of understanding of

20

secularism and pressure on its importance. BJP is a party of “Hindutva”, but even this party

claims to be for “positive secularism” and its membership is open to all. Its minority basting is

practical political behaviour. These dissimilarities are described in following chapters which

make the division among Indian parties’ affiliation to secularism.

3.1. Parties with secularism affiliation

Among the main political parties, which exist in India, the secular parties have power in states

with a higher level of the education. As example the states of West Bengal, Kerela or

Tamilnadu and Haryana. These states have different levels of industrialisation and

urbanisation. The level of religious or ethnic minorities is also different, but generally, it is

possible to say that there are large groups of Muslims. Especially states of Kerela and West

Bengal have more than Indian average percentage of Muslims in their population. If we look

at table 8 (p. 60), there are states with generally lower level of religious or ethnic violence

compared to other states with similar level of Muslim population. How can this result be

explained?

3.1.1. Secularism in Indian Context

Indian scholar Mehta described secularism in two dimension: 1) as a term directly concerned

with the value of individual liberty. Those who advocate the disentanglement of the state from

religion as far as is possible are motivated by a concern for freedom. (Mehta 2004: 73) 2) As

a term of communal harmony, secularism as respect for all religions, and secularism as a

project for giving different groups their own space to collectively define their identities. This

secularism is even less motivated by a concern for individual liberty. It is motivated by the

high ideals of peace, sometimes solicitude for pluralism, sometimes a genuine piety towards

the diversity of society. This definition of secularism does not make freedom as a central

value. This version of secularism is not averse to using state power to advance religious ends

provided some kind of parity between different communities is maintained. So, as per this

view, it is all right for the state to ban practices offensive to Hindus so long as it does the

same for Muslims, and so forth. In deed, it could be argued that the parity model, has

dominated Indian secularism. While, the state is not itself religious, its involvement in

religious activity is vast. This state can subsidize religious pilgrimages for Muslims, and ban

cow slaughter for Hindus. (Mehta 2004: 74)

21

Chatterji described concept of the secular state as following:

1. The state guarantees of conscience in matters of religion to all citizens.

2. There is no discrimination between individuals on grounds of religion. This would

imply that there is equality before the law and positions of authority are open to all.

3. The state is not concerned with and, therefore, does not interfere in matters of

religion. (Chatterji 1995: 91)

This is a definition above and applies to the Christian religion. The question arises as to

whether the same principle cannot be invoked in the case of the Indian religions – Hinduism,

Islam (Indian Islam), Buddhism and Sikhism? (Chatterji 1995: 92) The secularism in Indian

context has been understood differently.

Firstly, secularism in India (according Dr. Radhakrishran – formed vice-president of India)

“does not mean irreligion or atheism or even stress on material comfort. It proclaims that it

lays stress on universality of spiritual values which may be attained by a variety of ways.” It

tries to build up a fellowship of believers not by subordinately individual qualities to the

group mind but by bringing them into harmony with each other. This fellowship is based on

principle of diversity in unity which alone has the quality of creativeness. Secondly,

secularism in Indian concept means an equal status for religious. (Chatterji 1995: 103)

Concept of Indian secularism described by Chatterji as well as second definition given by

Mehta brought many challenges for India. Secularism, which is based on equal status for

religious and state religious subsidizing, is difficult for maintenance in situation when the

political system is divided to two groups – religious nationalist and secularist. Also the

challenge could be finding in electoral system which could not give chance for religious

group proportionality. Nationalism (Hindutva ideology represented by party in government)

and lack of proportional representation could bring privileges for majority religion. For

nationalists it could be difficult to maintenance secularism and to be neutral to the religious

groups; especially in situation when the main electoral support comes from majority.

3.1.2. Congress party and United Progressive Alliance

A similar situation is in the states where the Congress party lead the government, but the

problem is in strict secular politics, which is sometime not followed by INC. INC has marked

as a Brahmanical party, which is dominated by Hindu elites and Brahmans. However, there is

secular affiliation characterisation.

22

Secular affiliation could be also evaluated by the number of cross religious supporters in

election. Diagram 1 and 2 shows the gain of main political groups or parties among different

religious groups. INC (with coalition partners’ support) is only one party in election of 1996

and 1998 which were able to recruit their voters across different religious minorities. Muslims

and Christians who are out of Hindutva understanding of Hindu nation preferred Congress.

BJP with its partner do not have support among religious communities. Vice versa, BJP focus

more on Indian religious group where their support is strong – mainly Hindus. The Congress

had its strength among the Muslims and the dalits. (Heath and Yadav 2006: 135)

Congress party has tried to follow the Indian way of secularism in governing and its political

programme. Secularism is part of the ideology of the party. In the Congress programme it is

possible to find some points about minorities and its positive discrimination approach.

“The Congress believes in affirmative action for all religious and linguistic minorities. The

Congress has provided for reservations for Muslims in Kerala and Karnataka in government

employment and education on the grounds that they are a socially and educationally

backward class. The Congress is committed to adopting this policy for socially and

educationally backward sections among Muslims and other religious minorities on a national

scale. The Congress also pledges to extend reservations for the economically deprived

persons belonging to communities that are at present not entitled to such reservations.

The Congress will adopt all possible measures to promote and maintain communal peace and

harmony, especially in sensitive areas. It will enact a comprehensive law on social violence in

all its forms and manifestations, providing for investigations by a central agency, prosecution

by Special Courts and payment of uniform compensation for loss of life, honour and property.

The Congress commits itself to amending the Constitution to establish a Commission for

Minority Educational Institutions that will provide direct affiliation for minority professional

institutions to central universities. Special steps will be taken to spread modern and technical

education among women in minority communities particularly.” (INC 2004)

3.1.3. Leftist parties

In introduction of this chapter are mentioned states which have been active secular parties

such as CPI(M) or INC which have a great deal of political power. In West Bengal and Kerela

the main power in government is the Communist party – CPI(M) and has been for almost 40

years (they have had strong power in both state parliaments and governments from 1977 in

23

West Bengal and respectively in Kerela in 1970). This party insists on secularism and

supporting the minorities in their cultural life and education. Strict secularisation and non-

discrimination of all religious and ethnic groups help avoid politically motivated intolerance

among religious communities and unwanted political support of religious cleavage on the side

of government policy making. The connection between the number of religions riots and

secular policy making can probably be found in West Bengal or Kerela (CPI(M) and coalition

government) where the lowest number of riots and violence exists (see table 8, p. 60).

Diagrams 1 and 2 also support the secular affiliation of Communist parties in India. CPI(M)

and CPI were part of LF in 1996 which had bigger gains among religious group than among

Hindu. However, the support among Hindus was similar to other communities. Alliance LF

where also Indian communist parties took part gain the profit from their secular politics and

the support among Muslim population were higher than among other groups.

One successful example of relatively peaceful state under communist party government is

West Bengal. The relative absence of violence against minorities and the lowest castes and

classes in West Bengal has not earned the CPI(M) the credit it deserves. An ‘absence’ by

definition constitutes an invisible achievement, especially because West Bengal has had a

tradition of harmonious caste and ‘communal’ relations since the partition in 1948, quite

independently of the CPI(M) actions. However, there is little precedent of historical basis for

some of the most virulent communal conflicts that have occurred elsewhere in India in the

recent period. (Basu 2006: 345-346)

3.2. Parties with Hinduism affiliation

Since the rise of the Indian national movement, three competing themes about India –

territorial, cultural, and religious – have fought for political dominance. The territorial notion

is that India has a “sacred geography,” enclosed between the Indus River, the Himalayas and

the seas and emphasized for 2,500 years since the time of the Mahabharata. The cultural

notion is that ideas of tolerance, pluralism, and syncretism define Indian society. India is not

only the birthplace of several religions – Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism – but in

its history, it has also regularly received, accommodated, and absorbed “outsiders” – Parsis,

Jews, and “Syrian” Christians (whose reached India before Europeans). In the process,

syncretistic forms of culture have emerged and become part of India. The third religious

notion is that India is originally the land of the Hindus, and it is the only land that the Hindus

24

can call their own. India has nearly all of Hinduism’s holy places and its holy rivers. A great

deal of diversity may exist within Hindu society: a faith in Hinduism brings the various

practitioners together. India thus viewed is a Hindu nation. (Varshney 2002: 60-61)

In political discourse, the territorial idea is called “national unity” or “territorial integrity,” the

cultural idea is expressed as “political pluralism”, and the religious idea is known as

Hindutva, or political Hinduism. (Varshney 2002: 61) The recognition of Hinduism as a meta-

ethnicity has been an essential component of Indian nation and state-building and has called

for radical revision of the experience of Indian democracy since 1947. It does not conform to

secularized majoritarianism (where the state encourages acculturation and assimilation but

allows ethnic groups to maintain ethnicity in the private sphere, for example the USA). Indian

democracy subordinated secularism to the ‘nationalism of the Hindu majority’. (Singh 2000:

45-46)

BJP is the biggest and main party which supports the ideology of Hindutva and Hindu

nationalism. In last Lok Sabha election this ideology went to the backcloth and the main

election topics was economic growth. The present topic before new Lok Sabha election is the

Jammu-Kashmir issue due to 2008 disorder in this state as well as the discussion around US-

India Nuclear deal which also divided political spectrum out of secular – anti-secular.

However, the ideology of the BJP is based on Hindutva. In BJP political manifesto is the

emphasis on the Indian nationalism and ideology of Hindutva. (BJP 2004)

The victory of BJP ideology of Hindutva was the decision of the Indian Supreme Court. In a

judgment the Supreme Court ruled that no precise meaning can be ascribed to the terms

'Hindu', 'Hindutva' and 'Hinduism'; and no meaning in the abstract can confine it to the narrow

limits of religion alone, excluding the content of Indian culture and heritage. This gave the

hallmark of legitimacy to the main stream of Indian nationalism ideology. (Kudláček 2006:

24-25, compare with Indian Supreme Court decision from December 11th, 1995 in case of the

election of the Maharashtra Chief Minister, Mr. Manohar Josuu2)

Shiv Sena (meaning Army of Shiva, referring to Shivaji) is a right-wing political party. The

Sena's ideology is based on the concepts of 'Bhumiputra' (Marathi for "Sons of Soil") and

Hindutva or Hindu nationalism. However, in recent times, the Sena has laid more emphasis on

2) The unanimous view expressed by the three Judges regarding Hinduism and Hindutva are based upon the views expressed earlier by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in a few cases. For example, in Shastri Yagna Purushadji case (1966(3) SCR 242) and in Sridharan case (1976 SCR 478). (Bharatiya Janata Party)

25

Hindutva. (Kudláček 2006: 25) Shiv Sena was part of BJP leaded government (1999-2004)

and has been coalition partner in National Democratic Alliance leaded by same party.

Hindutva and Hinduism politics are the main ideological attributes of NDA and coalition

partners of BJP. This is also the characteristic which give NDA the dimension of opposition

to UPA and INC.

3.3. Parties with Islamic (Muslim) affiliation

Indian Muslim nationalism refers to the political and cultural expression of nationalism,

founded upon the religious tenets and identity of Islam, of the Muslims of the Indian

subcontinent. Some prominent Muslims politically sought a base for themselves, separate

from Hindus and other Indian nationalists, who espoused the Indian National Congress.

Muslim scholars, religious leaders and politicians founded the All India Muslim League in

1906. Muslims comprised 25 % to 30 % of (pre-partition) India's collective population. Some

Muslim leaders felt that their massive cultural and economic contributions to India's heritage

and life merited a significant role for Muslims in a future independent India's governance and

politics. (Kudláček 2006: 25)

Parties which support Muslim communities and their rights mostly cooperate with INC,

because its secular politics affiliation supports these communities and give to Muslims the

advantages in the powerful opposition of Hindu nationalism and Hindutva. Now these parties

are in coalition with INC in the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) in the present ruling

coalition of political parties in India. (UPA was formed after the 2004 Lok Sabha elections).

Other parties try to cooperate with other secular parties such as CPI(M). Indian Union Muslim

League is an Islamic nationalist political party in India. The chief support base of the party is

northern Kerala where there is strong concentration of Muslims. Muslims make majority of

voters in some constituencies in Kerala which give them advantage in FPTP system to have

strong electorate support. All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (All India Council of the

Union of Muslims) is a political party in India that was formed to represent the Muslim

population of Andhra Pradesh. The stronghold of AIMIM is the old city of Hyderabad and

Muslim dominated areas of Andhra Pradesh, though it has its units in some parts of

Mahrashtra and Karnataka also. All India Muslim Forum is a Muslim political party in India.

The president is Nihaluddin and the general secretary is Dr. M. K. Sherwani. The Forum is

26

staunchly opposed to the Hindutva nationalism of BJP. The Forum has collaboration with

Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation. (Kudláček 2006: 25-26)

Diagram 1 Support for main political parties in 1996 election according to religion3

26,2

28,9

8,4

7,4

3,7

25,4

35,3

3,1

25,3

10,1

1,2

25,0

39,9

3,02,05,60,0

49,5

48,3

14,3

16,7

2,45,6

42,7

26,5

6,0

12,0

2,44,8

48,3

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

relig

ious

gro

up v

otin

g

Hindu Muslim Christian Sikh Others

INC+ BJP+ NF LF BSP Others

Source: Prakash 2006: 145

3) 1996 Election:INC+ = INC + All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK)BJP+ = BJP + Samata + Shiv Sena + Haryana Vikas PartyNF = Janata Dal + Samajwadi PartyLF = CPI (M) + CPI + Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) + Forward Block (FBL)

27

Diagram 2 Support for main political parties in 1998 election according to religion4

25,6

37,4

17,4

3

16,6

35,1

6,8

34,4

1,3

22,4

42,1

9,1

18,6

0,4

29,8

21,9

39,8

18

10,2

10,1

26,4

10,5

3,9

10,5

26,4

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

rilig

ious

gro

up v

otin

g

Hindu Muslim Christian Sikh Others

INC BJP+ UF BSP Others

Source: Prakash 2006: 146

3.4. Parties with other mostly regional or specific community affiliation

Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj Party are parties which are out of the main stream

affiliation. They are regional parties based in Uttar Pradesh, but BSP have tried to enlarge

their base to other Indian states. The electoral base is among underprivileged groups of Indian

society as has been already mentioned lower. The main support has been found among

Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes and they also try to find the electoral among other

religious minorities (Muslims), which can give them the voting advantage. (compare with

Chandra 2004: 148-149) However, the main base of BSP is in state of Uttar Pradesh, but the

party’s influence is in federal politics as well. The Uttar Pradesh generates high number of

4) In the election 1998:BJP+ = BJP + Samata + Shiv Sena + Haryana Vikas Party + AIADMK + Akali Dal + Trinamool Congress + Lok Shakti + Biju Janata Dal + TDP (NTR)UF = Janata Dal + SP (Mulayam) + Telugu Desan Party (TDP (N)) + AGP + Tamil Maanila Congress (TMC) + Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) + Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (MGP) + CPI + CPI(M) + RSP + FBL

28

seats for BSP in Lok Sabha. The Congress Party historically gains the support from Scheduled

Castes, but BSP took its place in Uttar Pradesh. BSP loudly identified itself as a champion not

of the nation as a whole, but of Bahumaj5 Samaj and the Scheduled Castes in particular.

(Chandra 2004: 151) Uttar Pradesh has around 21 percent of SCs in its population.

India's primary opposition party prior to the BJP was fragmented into several regional parties.

The Samajwadi Party believes in democratic socialism and opposes the unrestricted entry of

multinational companies into India. (Samajwadi Party Mumbai web) Samajwadi Party is

primarily based in Uttar Pradesh, where it bases its support largely on OBCs and Muslims.

Other mostly regional parties such as Janata Dal (United), Shiromani Akali Dal or Biju Janata

Dal are also part of NDA (the BJP led ruling alliance). Their affiliation could be also defined

as a Hinduistic. There are many other more or less successful Janata parties. Anti-secularism

is not significant part of their identity and some of Janata parties could be also pro-secular as

well as pro-hindu. Some Janata parties such as Rashtriya Janata Dal are part of pro-secular

UDA. However, these parties notify their self as adherents of Janata movement from 1970s

and Janata Party.

3.5. The characteristics of the main relevant political parties in India

This chapter characterises the political programme and political base of main political parties

in India. For as much as the number of political parties in India is enormous and their success

in different by the states, this work will focused mostly on two present biggest parties. These

parties lead also two main alliances in the country. Moreover, there is also mentioned Left

Front which is mixture of communist and socialist parties. For all that there will be only study

of Communist Party of India (Marxist) which have been successful in West Bengal and

Kerela and is the biggest and leading party in Left Front. Bahujan Samaj Party and Samajwadi

Party have been selected because their electoral success is perceptually similar to CPI(M) in

both last election. The electoral gains in last two federal elections were bigger than 4 % which

is limitation for this selection. These five parties are the biggest parties in India. Relative to

existing alliances there will be also characteristic of these alliances programme according to

their leaders.

5) Bahujan literally means majority. It means majority of the castes in Hindu society (including untouchable) who are not Brahmins, Kshatriya or Vaishya. (Chandra 2004: 148)

29

3.5.1. Indian National Congress

Indian National Congress (also known as the Congress Party, abbreviated INC) is a major

political party in India. Created in 1885, the Indian National Congress became the nation's

leader in the Independence Movement, with over 15 million Indians involved in its

organisations and over 70 million participants in its struggle against the British Empire. After

Independence in 1947, it became the nation's dominant political party. In the 14th Lok Sabha

(2004-2009), 145 INC members, the largest contingent amongst all parties, serve in the house.

The party is currently the chief member of the ruling United Progressive Alliance coalition

government supported by the Left Front. (Indian National Congress web)

Congress party has tried to follow the secular attitude in governing and its political

programme. Secularism is part of the ideology of the party. In the Congress programme it is

possible to find some points about minorities and its positive discrimination approach. This

has been described in previous chapter 3.1.2. The minority support which Congress has is

strong. Dalit and other minorities were more likely to vote for the Congress than the BJP and

allies in almost all States in last election. Only West Bengal, Assam and Uttar Pradesh have

different affiliation of their voters. (Sings and Saxena 2008: 221) The cleavage which makes

the party different is in their attitude to minorities and more important to unprivileged groups

in Indian society. Congress is traditionally more popular for those groups. However, Congress

also follows its Gandhi’s heritage.

The economic programme is in present on the right mainstream. The support of liberalisation

of the economy is very strong. Both main relevant parties and alliance support liberal

principles of free market. The market oriented economy is dominant in INC from the

beginning of 1990s. In 1950s, 60s, 70s was INC more pro-socialist oriented economy with

mixture central planning and of free market. The international politics of INC is pro-western

and pro-American. There is strong cooperation with the USA in “War on Terror”.

3.5.2. Bharatiya Janata Party

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), literally meaning Indian People's Party, created in 1980, is

one of the two major national political parties in India. It projects itself as a champion of

socio-religious cultural values of the country's Hindu majority, conservative social policies

and strong national defence. Its constituency is strengthened by the broad umbrella of Hindu

nationalist organizations, informally known as the Sangh Parivar (League of Indian nationalist

30

organizations), where the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh6 play a leading role. Since its

inception, the BJP has been a prime opponent of the Indian National Congress. It has allied

with regional parties to roll back the left-of-centre tendencies formerly endorsed by the

Congress Party, which dominated Indian politics for four decades. The ideological rallying

cry of the BJP is Hindutva, literally "Hinduness," or cultural Hindu nationalism. (Kudláček

2006: 21)

As was mentioned in chapter 3.2. the main concept of the ideology on which BJP has been

built is Cultural nationalism, which is called Hindutva. The BJP wants to take its inspiration

from the history and civilisation of India. For this party means “Indian nationhood stems from

a deep cultural bonding of the people that overrides differences of caste, region, religion and

language. We believe that Cultural Nationalism for which Indianness, Bharatiyata and

Hindutva are synonyms -- is the basis of our national identity”. (BJP 2004) The BJP really

helps the Supreme Court decision about Hindutva that it is not a religious or exclusivist

concept. It is inclusive, integrative, and abhors any kind of discrimination against any section

of the people of India on the basis of their faith. (BJP 2004)

It has also been written in the BJP Vision document 2004 that BJP “appeals to the religious

and social leaders of the Hindu and Muslim communities to speed up the process of dialogue

and bring it to an amicable and early fruition. We hope that these efforts will succeed in

heralding a new chapter of amity in Hindu-Muslim relations and fortify national integration“.

(BJP 2004) Generally it is possible to say that BJP is a conservative political organisation. It

sees itself as rising to the defence of indigenous culture, and Indian religious systems which

include Hinduism, Jainism, Sikhism and Buddhism. To many Hindu nationalists, Bharat is a

Hindu Rashtra, literally a Hindu nation. According to BJP, this definition does not exclude

Muslims, Christians, or other minorities. Hindu Rashtra is portrayed as cultural nationalism

and Hinduism as the entire complex system of culture, history, faith and worship that have

evolved in India over the past 5,000 years. In the political language of Hindu nationalists, all

the people of India, their culture and heritage are "Hindu," which literally means "inhabitant

of the land of the river Sindhu," the modern-day Indus. The BJP has been accused of being a

xenophobic, racist, and fascist organization by its opponents. Its supporters, on the other hand,

argue that it is no more than a conservative, nationally-oriented party which does not wish to

polarise the country on communal (religious) grounds. (Kudláček 2006: 28) BJP has

6) The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (Sanskrit, "National Volunteers' Union"; also known as the Sangh or the RSS) is a Hindu nationalist organization in India.

31

promoted and supported an anti-terrorist law, which they feel in its present form could be

misused to harass minority groups such as Muslims. (Satish 2002)

The economic programme is in populist right mainstream. The support of liberalisation of the

economy is in practical way similar to INC. Both main relevant parties and alliance support

liberal principles of free market. However, there is also populist orientation of the policy

making. The BJP is against foreign capital which is against traditional groups’ interest. The

economic philosophy of the party stood on three pillars: economic development or growth,

social stability or harmony, and self-reliance or swadeshi. Operation experience from BJP

governance showed that BJP continued with on-going policy of economic reforms started by

INC. This was a paradox in BJP’s economic policy. Traditionally a party of small traders and

entrepreneurs, the BJP would not like to subject this community to on onslaught of the

international big brand names. However, party showed its willingness to continue with the

reform process to achieving higher economic growth. (Ghosh 2000: 286-305)

The international politics of BJP is pro-western and pro-American and anti-Muslims. There is

an agreement with strong cooperation with the USA in “War on Terror”. However, the BJP is

not open to the cooperation with the West which could be against Indian national

independence. Example is the new “Nuclear Deal” agreement with the USA from 2008 with

which the BJP strongly disagree. Anti-Nuclear Deal position goes together with the economic

approach which “based on a self-reliant approach.” Also BJP and NDA want to be „at the

forefront of defending the interests of Indian kisans7 by bringing about a coalition of

developing countries against such unjust practices of developed countries.“ (BJP Vision

Document 2004) The economic approach goes together with nationalism (cultural

nationalism) which is promoted by BJP and NDA.

3.5.3. Communist Party of India (Marxist)

The CPI(M) was formed at the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of India held in

Calcutta from October 31 to November 7, 1964. The CPI(M) was born (as they declared) in

the struggle against revisionism and sectarianism in the communist movement at the

international and national level, in order to defend the scientific and revolutionary tenets of

Marxism-Leninism and its appropriate application in the concrete Indian conditions. The

CPI(M) declare its self as the leading Left party and it is committed to build a Left and

7) Kisans - Farmers

32

democratic front which can present a real alternative to the existing bourgeoisie-landlord

policies. (CPI(M) 2006)

CPI(M) declares the party policy and party behaviour as the right communist party in India

with the right Marxist ideology. However, the practical policy is mostly similar to socialist

parties. The background of their programme is on social and economic bases. CPI(M) gives

the special stress on social problems of the Indian society. They are on the side of untouchable

people and also as a secular party they are again caste system. It means that it is not really

popular party among higher class and higher castes. Especially, if it is compared to BJP or

other parties supporting Hindu religion and ideology. The party is mostly supported by rural

people and workers. This is also one of the reasons why the party is very successful in rural

areas and states such as Kerela, Tripoli or West Bengal. (Kudláček 2006: 22)

CPI(M) is a communist party traditionally on the side of secularisation of society and politics.

In religious issues and ethnic and religious violence, this party sees the problem with social

and economic background. They see the problem in lack of equal opportunities and in

discrimination.

A passage is written in the CPI(M) programme about the attitude to this problematic issue: “In

conditions of capitalist exploitation the guaranteed rights to the minorities provided in the

Constitution are also not implemented. There is the lack of equal opportunities and

discrimination against the Muslim minorities both in the economic and social sphere.

Communal riots and violent attacks against the Muslims have become a permanent feature.

The RSS and its outfits constantly instigate hatred against the minorities and they target the

Christian community also. This fosters alienation and insecurity among the minorities, which

breeds fundamentalist trends and weakens the secular foundations. Minority communalism

isolates the minorities and hampers the common movement of all oppressed sections. Defence

of minority rights is a crucial aspect of the struggle to strengthen democracy and secularism.”

(CPI(M) 2006) As stated in the programme mentioned, the CPI(M) wants to solve the

question of Muslim and other minorities group by invoking strong secular policy.

The economy programme background is in left side of political spectrum. In present time, it is

not communist central planning economy which dominates to the CPI(M). It is more social-

market economy which is more similar to socialist parties. The support of liberalisation of the

economy is only in the way which cannot have bad impact of the lower social groups. The

CPI(M) support the welfare programme against poverty. There is strong focus on rural and

agriculture policy. Party wants to “defend the interests of the country against the depredations

33

of imperialism.” (CPI(M) 2006) The international politics of CPI(M) and Left Front is neutral

to the West and more anti-American. There is bigger support of Russia and China. Example

could be the new “Nuclear Deal” agreement with the USA with which the CPI(M) strongly

disagree. CPI(M) also disagree with USA activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

3.5.4. Bahujan Samaj Party

The BSP was formed in 1984 by Kanshi Ram who has remained party leader ever since till

his death in 2007. The party emerged from Kanshi Ram's earlier activity promoting the

interests of Scheduled Caste government employees. Although the BSP is recognised by the

Election Commission as a national party it effectively functions on certain North Indian states

only. On 11 th May 2007 the Uttar Pradesh BSP was elected as the first single majority party

since 1991 with Mayawati as leader in the party.

BSP’s ideology is based on the argument that the majority are oppressed by the select upper

class. It aims to change this using the government power. (Indian elections web) The BSP is

the political party with the stated goal of serving the traditionally lower castes of Indian

society, including Sudras (the fourth Varna) and Dalits (Untouchables). BSP is the party

formed to represent religious minorities, those at the bottom of India's caste system.

The founder of this party was Kanshi Ram, who wanted to mobilize members of his “own”

ethnic category for the forwarding of his political goals. The principal salient categories that

he could identify as his own were Ramdassia, Chamar8, Punjabi, Sikh and Scheduled Caste.

Of these, the Scheduled Caste category was the only one that had a nationwide membership.

His motivation for entering politics, furthermore, had to do specifically with the grievances of

the Scheduled Castes. However, the population of Scheduled Castes is not sufficient to bring

about a victory in the struggle for power either at the centre or in any of the Indian states.

Kanshi Ran resuscitated the term “Bahujan”9 which literally means “majority” and

popularized it. As he said: “Bahujan Samaj is comprised of Scheduled Caste, Scheduled

Tribes, Other Backward Classes and converted minorities.” (Chandra 2006: 144-148)

Chandra says that the specification of the groups, on which BSP has targeted their political

programme, has been based on ethnical principle. The term Scheduled Tribe refers to tribal 8) Ramdassia – the Sikh’s Chamar occupational caste in Punjab; Chamar – (from the Sanskrit Charmakara) is a prominent occupational Dalit caste in India. Chamars were traditionally engaged in profession such as Leatherworking and Shoemaking. Chamars are among the biggest castes in India. 9) Kanshi Ram defined this term as an inscriptive category consisting of a collection of subordinate ethnic categories, hitherto considered separate, that constitute a majority of the Indian population.

34

populations that are eligible under the Indian Constitution for affirmative action in

government employment, education, and representative institutions. Scheduled Tribes make

up 8 percent of the population of India. The term Other Backward Classes (OBCs) refers,

misleadingly, to a collection of subordinate caste categories identified by the

government/appointed Mandal Commission as backward and therefore deserving of

affirmative action in government employment. Although the census does not collect data on

the population of OBCs, as they are now called, they are estimated to make up 52 percent of

the Indian population. Finally, the term converted minorities refers to India’s religious

minorities Muslims, who make up 12 percent of the Indian population; Christians, who make

up 2.34 percent; Sikhs, who make up 1.94 percent; and Buddhists, who make up 0.76 percent.

The BSP refers to the Bahujan Samaj as constituting 85 percent of the population of India.

The 85 percent figure, while not precise underlines its claim to speak for the majority of the

Indian population. (Chandra 2006: 148-149)

The problem of BSP is that many voters from these groups have political preferences in other

political parties and while ethnic and social groups focus on dividing any efforts of the party’s

popularising among these communities. Uttar Pradesh is only one state where BSP gains

wide-ranging support from its target group.

3.5.5. Samajwadi Party

The Samajwadi Party is one of several parties that emerged when the Janata Dal (People's

Party) broke up. The Samajwadi Party believes in democratic socialism and opposes the

unrestricted entry of multinational companies into India (Samajwadi Party Mumbai web).

Samajwadi Party has the strongest support in Uttar Pradesh. The electorates consist mostly

from OBCs and Muslims, particularly Mulayam Singh Yadav's10 (party supreme) own

Yadav11 caste. SP is known for its socialist philosophy and is also on the side of populism. It

is possible to see on Samajwadi Party’s slogans “Equality and Prosperity of all” and their

opposition against communal forces. Another Samajwadi Party’s populist motto is “SP is

10) Mulayam Singh Yadav (born November 22, 1939) is a politician in Uttar Pradesh, India. He has been repeatedly elected to the Uttar Pradesh legislative assembly since 1965 and is the current chief minister of the state.11) Yadav is a Hindu caste which is referred to in ancient Hindu scriptures. They are among the few surviving ancient Indo-Aryan kshatriya (Kshatriya is the title of the princely military order in the Vedic society. They are the warrior and ruling caste, in the varna system) clans known as panchjanya (Panchjanya, meaning five people, is the common name given to five most ancient vedic kshatriya tribes).

35

against favours of a confederation of India-Pakistan-Bangladesh.”. The Party opposes wild

entry of international companies to India. The party believes that agriculture, small and

middle industry is the strength of Indian economy and assistance should be given to these

sectors. All of these populist proclamations support the Indian nationalism and socialism

background of politics. The main agendas for the last elections in 2004 was provision for

reservation in jobs, medical and technical institutions; reconstitution of the Shanti Suraksha

Bal; remove illiteracy amongst Muslims; creating more employment opportunities and

removing poverty. (Samajwadi Party Mumbai web)

The advantage of SP in last election in 2004 was that SP has strong support of the Yadav

community. Its avowed objective of battling communal forces and Yadav's determination to

defeat them has won it a large Muslim following as well, especially in Uttar Pradesh. The

Samajwadi Party can bank upon the Yadavs, but has now to compete with the BSP and

Congress for the support of Muslims and Thakurs. SP has the election base built on minorities

(also Muslims) and Schedule caste. It means that they have similar potential among voters as

BSP has, but SP compared to BSP tries to find support among higher classes (owner of small

and middle businesses) as well as higher castes. Although it could divide their potential as the

party which support minorities as a socialist party.

4. Analysis of the election on the federal level in relation to the main religious

disorder and clashes in the context of Horowitz, Lijphart

4.1. Indian federalism based and minority autonomy

Indian federalism as an important aspect of the state constitution will be described in this

chapter. Federalism play important role in Indian politics and has also strong impact on

minorities and cleavages in India. This is the reason why this chapter interested in this area a

bit deeply. Federalism is an important factor for both theories of Lijphart and Horowitz.

Horowitz talks about federalism and Lijphart a bit widely about segmental autonomy.

Segmental autonomy automatically does not mean federal constitution. However, Lijphart

also put the stress on importance of federal political system. Lijphart believes that a federal

36

system is a good way to provide autonomy for minorities. (Lijphart 2004: 104) Federalism

supposes to give the minorities’ autonomy and freedom from central (majority) government.

Indian federalism is characterised by union of states. The position of the states under the

Indian constitution according to Prof. Majeed can be summed up as follows:

- The Constitution does not grant to any State the right of secession.

- The states do not have any priori rights, but only such rights as have been expressly

granted to them by the constitution. Even the residuary rights vest in the union

government. In the concurrent field of powers it is the union law which prevails over a

state law in the event of a conflict between the two.

- There is a single unified Judiciary for the whole country and an integrated Civil Service

under the supervision and control of the All Indian Services.

- The governors of states are appointees of the union government and besides being the

constitutional head of the state they are also the eyes and ears of the union in the state.

- The constitution guarantees individual rights and rights of certain groups, such as

scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and minorities, but not of state as such. It does not

concede even the right of equal representation to the states in the upper house of the union

parliament. (Majeed 2005: 6)

The executive power of the union extends to giving of such directions to a state as may appear

to be necessary for that purpose. However, this does not empower the union to interfere in any

matter pertaining to the exclusive concern of a state. The union can issue a direction only

where some action of a state government is likely to prejudice the exercise of the executive

power of the union. (Majeed 2005: 6-7) The federalism is based mostly on language principle.

There is no real federalism or special autonomy based on religious and given to religious

groups. Indian federalism follows language and cultural autonomy and there is less autonomy

for religious minorities. The function of federalisation in India cannot follow minorities’

interest. This federalisation cannot give any particular segmental autonomy to minorities

inside India as Lijphart or Horowitz described. However, there is also no concentration of

religious group which can follow the state boundaries. Only Kashmir and Punjab could be

characterised as states with religious demarcates. Religious groups are characterised as

communities on local level inside of urban or rural area. Indian union has reorganized its units

on the basis of either one or two or the combination of four structural principles of state

formulation:

- Preservation and strengthening of the unity and security of India;

37

- Linguistic and cultural homogeneity;

- Financial, economic and administrative considerations;

- Successful working of the national plan. (Singh 2005: 9)

For Indian “constitution fathers” only a strong centre could effectively drive economic

development and ensure equality across territorial jurisdictions, religions, languages, classes

and castes. Later was it realised that federalism could help solve conflicts rooted in

territorially base ethnic, religious, linguistic, and other characteristics. Since 1989, coalition

governments at the centre, proliferating regional and state parties across the country, and

liberalisation of the economy, have served to decentralise the federal political system in many

respects. In a very limited sense, Indian federalism can be called asymmetrical because there

are still special provisions for Kashmir and northeast states such as Nagaland and Maghalaya.

(Majeed 2005: 8) Except few cases, there is no real religious division of power and religious

group do not have reservation of seats in regional (state) assemblies. There is departure from

the rule in example of mentioned state Andhra Pradesh with its reservation of seats for

religious group. However, as was mentioned before, the reservation of seats is not the right

way for Horowitz and Lijphart who do not support FPTP system for dividing societies.

Federal politics in India has changed with developing of multipartism. India historically

developed phases of one-party dominant systems at the national but subsequently turned into

multi-party systems with increasing politicization and assertion of regional and ethnic

identities. The effects of proportional representation are seen even under plurality electoral

system due to the complicating third factor of social and regional diversities. It is widely

accepted that proportional representation lead to a multi-party system. (Singh and Saxena

2008: 156) Multipartism in India context cannot work as a good system for consensual

democracy in Lijphart’s theoretical context. Figure 2 and other electoral results show that

many constituencies have been challenged by two-party competition. Some states as

Rajasthan, Gujarat etc. have tendency to be pure bipartisan. Only few states and some

constituencies gave chance more than two main party groups.

Party system is perhaps the most important intervening variable that significantly influences

the working of a federal political system. The centralized phase of Indian federation was

spanned the era of the dominant party system. This feature of the party system was clearly

reflected in the working of all organs of the government. Autonomy of states was somewhat

overshadowed by the rule of the same party in New Delhi as well as in almost all states. (Sing

and Saxena 2008: 156-157) This overly centralization was challenged by new multipartism in

38

1990s and beginning of new millennium. Coalition and minority governments have increased

the autonomy of the federal parliament as well as that of state governments that was ever the

case under one-party majority governments. This trend of greater federalization of the

political system is likely to continue. (Singh and Saxena 2008: 158) However, this does not

increase the communal harmony because federalism is not based on religious minorities. The

division will not find the solution as Horowitz or Lijphart described. Religious communities

cannot get autonomy in this federal shape of boundaries.

According to Horowitz India as the federation, do not follow the power division and power

sharing of government among religious cleavages. The main cleavage, on which the Indian

federation was based, is linguistic principal. There are some states which have also the

religious identity as Punjab. However, there is also strong linguistic root in Punjabi language.

Autonomy of religious minorities is not supported by federalism as Lijphart recommended in

his theoretical approach. He also recommends an existence of second (federal) legislative

chamber with strong power, which can also give better representation for minorities.

However, this does not exist in Indian case, because the second chamber is a chamber of the

Indian states more than Indian minorities and religious communities. In spite of that, the

Upper House is able to better representation of minorities or support proportionality as well as

support crosscutting cleavages due to STV electoral system for this chamber (compare with

Reynolds: 2002). Nevertheless, the Rajya Sabha does not give a trust to the federal

government which is a priority right of Lok Sabha. State level assemblies consist only from

one chamber with FPTP system arrangement.

4.2. Horowitz’s majoritarism

How Horowitz’s six goals for successful political system in divided societies are fulfilled in

Indian context has been described in this chapter. The first goal proportionality of seats to

votes is not in India achieved. If we look at Indian party system we can see that this is

multipartism. From the beginning of 1990s the party system has transformed from dominant

party system to multipartism. (compare with Singh and Saxena 2008 or Saxena 1994: 31-43)

or Arora 2003: 83-99) From the 1989 breakpoint we can see in India coalition or minority

governments. Nonetheless, the Indian party system is mostly product of federalism and

territoriality. It could be called as multi-level party system, because there are many relatively

independence party systems in different Indian states and they coexist together with federal

39

level. The FPTP electoral system produce parties which have many times concentrated voters

background in particular territories and states of India. The example is CPI (M) which has

strong electoral in West Bengal and Kerela but in other state their voting gains are not as

much strong. The similar successes have parties like BJP and BSP in Uttar Pradesh or

Shivsena in Maharashtra or SP in Orissa. Deep observation shows that the electoral outcomes

produce mostly two party competitions in constituencies. These electoral rivalries produce in

many state bipartism. The examples could be Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Himachal

Pradesh, Karnataka, Delhi, Assam and there could be also included Jammu and Kashmir and

other states are more or less far to this characteristic. (Indian Election Commission, compare

with Singh and Saxena 2008: 177-179) On the other side, there are also some examples which

do not support Duverger’s or Sartori’s axioms for FPTP electoral system also on the state

level of election competition and the FPTP does not produce two candidates competition. The

deviation is in Uttar Pradesh where in some electoral constituencies could be possible find

three or four parties which allocated similar percentage of votes. Election in Uttar Pradesh is

the example when FPTP generates multipartism on the state level of electoral competition

(see figure 2, p 47). (compare with Chytílek 2007: 50-51) These UP’s electoral competition

outcomes have negated Duverger’s and Sartori’s axioms for FPTP.

The electoral competition in India could be also characterised as bipolar plus one minor left

stream. Two main streams have been produced since 1999 respectively 2004. One stream is

National Democratic Alliance (NDA) leaded by BJP and another one is United Progressive

Alliance (UPA) leaded by Congress. The minor Left Front is mainly represented by CPI (M)

plus other small leftist parties which are out of two main alliances. The results of election in

1999 and 2004 according to this division are shown in table 3 and 4.

However, the electoral system gives small chance for minorities and communities which do

not have electoral concentration in particular constituencies. Horowitz assumption of

proportionality of seats to votes is not fulfilled for many minorities, because FTPT do not

produce real proportionality. This is example of religious groups such as Muslims. Linguistic

or ethnic cleavages could be more followed as shows the examples of Tamilnadu, Bihar, Uttar

Pradesh, Orissa and Punjab. Punjab could be also example of religious concentration of Sikh

electoral community. These examples show regional parties’ success. They have relatively

strong position in the federal Lok Sabha due to voters’ concentration in states where the main

parties’ bases are. They are for example BSP and SP in Uttar Pradesh, Shiromani Akali Dal

in Punjab as well as Shivsena in Maharashtra and BJD in Orissa.

40

Examples of Jammu and Kashmir and North-eastern states have been excluded due to validity

of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (Act 28 of 1958, from 11th September, 1958)

which gave special power to the security forces against putative terrorist. The number of

deaths and causalities has been misrepresented.

The over representative of winners has certainly become a serious defect in the Indian system.

It has been further aggravated by the FPTP voting system, with a single non-transferable vote

and single member constituencies, which India copied from Britain. It was argued that a

proportional or list or any such alternative voting system would throw up too many parties.

Chopra (2003: 170-171) noted that the reasoning was understandable but it backfired. In

practice it has meant a distortion: A party can obtain a far higher share of seats than of votes,

because any party can win a constituency with a minority share of the vote if no other party

has polled one vote more. If a party wins many seats in this way it can have a much higher

share of seats than of votes.

41

Table 3 Election results for Lok Sabha in 1999

Alliance Party % of votes SeatsNational Democratic Alliance   36,7 270

Bharatiya Janata Party 23,8 182Janata Dal (United) 3,1 21Shiv Sena 1,6 15Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 1,7 12Biju Janata Dal 1,2 10All India Trinamool Congress 2,6 8Pattali Makkal Katchi 0,7 5Indian National Lok Dal 0,6 5Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 0,4 4Jammu & Kashmir National Conference 0,1 4Shiromani Akali Dal 0,7 2Rashtriya Lok Dal 0,4 2Lok Shakti 0,0 0

 

Indian National Congress 28,3 114Communist Party of India (Marxist) 5,4 33Telugu Desam Party 3,7 29Samajwadi Party 3,8 26Bahujan Samaj Party 4,2 14All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 1,9 10Rashtriya Janata Dal 2,8 7Nationalist Congress Party 2,3 8Communist Party of India 1,5 4Revolutionary Socialist Party 0,4 3All India Forward Bloc 0,4 2Muslim League Kerala State Committee 0,2 2Akhil Bharatiya Lok Tantrik Congress 0,2 2Janata Dal (Secular) 0,9 1Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation 0,3 1Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha 0,2 1All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimen 0,1 1M.G.R. Anna Dravida Kazhagam 0,1 1Kerala Congress 0,1 1Kerala Congress (Mani) 0,1 1Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya) 0,1 1Peasants and Workers Party of India 0,1 1Shiromani Akali Dal (Simranjit Singh Mann) 0,1 1Himachal Vikas Congress 0,1 1Manipur State Congress Party 0,1 1Sikkim Democratic Front 0,0 1Independent 2,7 6

Total - 543Source: Election Commission of India

42

Table 4 Election results for Lok Sabha in 2004

Alliance Party % of votes SeatsNational Democratic Alliance   33,0 181

Bharatiya Janata Party 22,2 138All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 2,2 0Janata Dal (United) 2,6 8Nationalist Trinamool Congress 2,1 2Shiv Sena 1,8 12Shiromani Akali Dal 0,9 8Biju Janata Dal 1,3 11Nagaland People's Front 0,2 1Mizo National Front 0,0 1

United Progressive Alliance   35,4 218Indian National Congress 26,7 145Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 1,8 16Nationalist Congress Party 1,8 9Rashtriya Janata Dal 2,2 21Lok Jan Shakti Party 0,6 4Telangana Rashtra Samotni 0,6 5Pattali Makkal Katchi 0,5 6Jharkhand Mukti Moucha 0,5 5Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 0,4 4Indian Union Muslim League 0,2 1Republican Party of India (Athvale) 0,1 1Jammu and Kashmir People's Democratic Party 0,0 1

Left Front   7,7 59Communist Party of India (Marxist) 5,7 43Communist Party of India 1,4 10Revolutionary Socialist Party 0,4 3All India Forward Bloc 0,2 3

Others Bahujan Samaj Party 5,3 19Samajwadi Party 4,3 36Telugu Desam Party 3,0 5Janata Dal (Secular) 1,5 3Rashtriya Lok Dal 0,6 3Asom Gana Parishad 0,5 2Jammu and Kashmir National Conference 0,1 2All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen 0,1 1Kerala Congress 0,1 1Sikkim Democratic Front 0,0 1National Loktantrik Party 0,1 1Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya) 0,1 1Indian Federal Democratic Party 0,1 1Bharatiya Navshakti Party 0,1 1

Total - 543Source: Election Commission of India

43

Figure 2 Territorial election results for the Lok Sabha election in 2004

Source: Indian elections web

Accountability to constituents is defined by FPTP electoral system where the voters are

independent to select the candidate. The personality of the candidate play important role in

this system as well as the party membership. The party is the authority who selects the

candidate for particular constituencies. However, we can see that parties also find the seats

runners who are more vote-able. The Gujarat example in table 2 (p. 23) shows that ethnicity

or religious affiliation play important role. There should be stressed that Horowitz said that

44

BJD - Biju Janata DalBJP - Bharatiya Janata PartyBSP - Bahujan Samaj PartyCPI – Communist Party of IndiaCPI (M) – Communist Paty of India (M)DMK - Dravida Munnetra KazhagamINC – Indian National CongressJD(U) – Janata Dal (U)LJNSP - Lok Jan Shakti PartySHS - ShivsenaNCP – Nationalist Congress PartyRJD - Rashtriya Janata DalSAD - Shiromani Akali DalSP - Samajwadi Party

possibilities to choose among candidates can have perverse consequences, especially in

multiethnic societies. (Horowitz 2003a: 5)

If we talk about victory of the “Condorcet winner”, in Indian concept we can talk about

advantages and disadvantages of FPTP system for the Lok Sabha elections. The reason for

selection of FPTP electoral system was in Indian context the extreme pluralist society with

many cleavages which can generate very fragmented election results and representation in

lower house of the parliament. However, the Condorcet winner asks for the victory among all

electoral alternatives. On the other side, the selected electoral system for Upper House, which

is STV, follow the rules of the Condorcet winner. In spite of it, this work focuses more on

Lok Sabha as a house of parliament which generate the constitution of Indian federal

government. There is observing that selected FPTP electoral system generally does not

follow the axiom of Condorcet winner. (compare with Chytílek 2007: 49)

Inter-ethnic and inter-religious conciliation and durable governments can be possibly

found in Indian modern political history. The Congress party was based on inter-religious

membership from its beginning. However, for inter-ethnic and inter-religious conciliation, the

question is how the electoral system affects the pre-electoral calculations of parties and

politicians. (Horowitz 2003a: 6-7) The necessity to engage in what Horowitz calls “vote-

pooling’ in order to win elections and maintain coalitions is what forces politicians to

moderate their demands and offer protection to minorities. (Wilkinson 2004: 7) This is not

easy to find in real Indian politics due to Congress government and its one party dominance in

Indian politics during 1950s, 1960s, 1970s as well as in 1980s. The Janata Party and its Janata

Movement at 1970s and 1980s and its cross-national government would not be defined as a

coalition or multi-religious movement in its basic. However, there are some significant

changes from 1990s and at the beginning of millennium. From this period Indian government

is based on coalition of parties across state, federal and regional parties represented in the Lok

Sabha. The coalition government lead by BJP is hardly possible to be denominated as inter-

ethnic or inter-religious conciliation power. Also the BJP leaded governmental and electoral

coalition National Democratic Alliance is set up from mostly on Hinduism based parties. The

part of the coalition is also Nagaland Peoples’ Front as a pure regional party, but not out of

inter-religious group of Hindutva ideology. On the other side, by Congress leaded coalition

United Progressive Alliance consists from Muslim parties or regional parties supported by

Muslim such as Indian Union Muslim League and Jammu and Kashmir People's Democratic

45

Party. Regardless, they do not have big value in this coalition and their representation in Lok

Sabha is marginal (see tables 3 and 4). As Horowitz also wrote in his theory, the FPTP system

does not create inter-ethnic and inter-religious conciliation due to its main majority principle

when the winner wins everything. However, Indian elections also produce high number of

MPs with criminal charges among every major political party. (see Sing and Saxena 2008:

221)

Durable government is in last two decades in India very difficult to construct. The

multipartism across the whole country gives very difficult negotiation position for parties and

they make labile compromises among Indian ethnic, regional as well as religious parties. A

qualitatively new phase in Indian politics was ushered in with the advent of the multi-party

system in 1989 elections which have continued ever since. With no clear majority for any one

party during two decades, the coalition and minority governments have been the rule, with

decisive role played by some major regional parties. (Singh and Saxena 2008: 158-159)

Minority office holding is in India connected on federal level with All India Services –

divided to Indian Administrative Service and Indian Police Service. This system and

institution is heritage after British Empire. Tables 5 and 6 shows that the Muslim minority is

discriminated in the selection process for the Indian Civil (Administration) Services. The

proportion of new administration staff is lower that the percentage of Muslim in Indian

population.

Table 5 Indian Administrative Service from 1971 till 1980

IntakeYear Total Muslims Sikhs Christians1971 87 1 (1.14%) 4 (4.59%) 5 (5.74%)1972 142 1 (0.7%) 6 (4.85%) 4 (2.81%)1973 124 3 (2.41%) 5 (4.03%) 7 (5.64%)1974 141 1 (0.7%) 9 (6.38%) 4 (2.83%)1975 129 2 (1.55%) 5 (3.87%) 7 (5.42%)1976 138 5 (3.62%) 9 (6.52%) 10 (7.24%)1977 158 10 (6.32%) 4 (2.53%) 13 (8.22%)1978 134 10 (7.46%) 6 (4.47%) 13 (9.70%)1979 117 3 (2.56%) 8 (6.83%) 7 (5.98%)1980 124 1 (0.80%) 5 (4.03%) 3 (2.41%)Total 1294 37 (2.86%) 61 (4.71%) 73 (5.64%)

Source: Dr. Gopal Singh Report on Minorities, 1983, p.31 and Najiulah 2008

46

Table 6 Muslims in Indian Administrative Services since 1981

Year Total intake Muslims1981 126 1 (0.79%)1982 167 5 (2.99%)1983 235 1 (0.43%)1984 233 6 (2.58%1985 214 4 (1.87%)1986 216 6 (2.78%)1987 178 5 (2.81%)1988 249 15 (6.02%)1989 246 13 (5.28%)1990 298 9 (3.02%)1991 217 8 (3.69%)1992 157 3 (1.91%)1993 147 2 (1.36%)1994 131 2 (1.53%)1995 91 8 (8.79%)1996 81 3 (3.70%)1997 76 3 (3.95%)1998 55 1 (1.82%)1999 56 2 (3.57%)2000 93 6 (6.45%)Total 3266 103 (3.15%)

Source: Najiullah 2008

Table 7 Representation of OBCs/SCs/STs in the Service of the Central Government in 1979

Class I (total N = 174021) Class II (total N = 912925)SCs/STs OBCs SCs/STs OBCs18.33 % 12.27 % 50.56 % 25.63 %

Source: Singh and Saxena 2008: 192

Table 7 shows that the OBCs / SCs / STs are more represented in governmental offices than

Muslim community (see tables 5 and 6). However, there are also some disproportionalities

advanced by higher castes of Indian Hindu society. These disadvantaged groups of Indian

society do not have proportional representation in higher position of Indian government

(Class I) in spite of reservation policy of Indian state. There is evidence that the higher

position and also lower position are under representative by OBCs and on the other hand over

representative by SCs/STs in lower level of governmental bureaucracy. Total average number

47

of SCs, STs and OBCs try to respect the reservation policy. Scheduled tribes make up 8

percent of the population of India. Although the census does not collect data on the population

of OBCs, as they are now called, they are estimated to make up 52 percent of the Indian

population. (Chandra 2006: 148)

The conclusion, of comparison of Horowitz’s theoretical approach according to Indian

context which have been done in this work, shows that Indian political system does not reflect

ideally any goal from the six defined. In Indian context it is problematic, because if one goal

reflects religious cleavage than on the other side could damage the other socio-political

cleavage in Indian society. As an example could mentioned the minority office holding goal

where India follow the socio-economic and cultural cleavage among Hindu society (reflect

ST/SC), but do not respect the religious cleavage. The similarities could be find in electoral

system and in reservation seats policy advantaged ST and SC, but any religious group. The

right to be represented is damaged by FPTP electoral system especially in the context of

religious communities’ representation.

4.3. Lijphart’s Indian Puzzle

If we look at the points above in chapter 1 which basically characterised Lijphart’s concept of

consensual democracy and compare it with the situation in India we can find some analogy,

but also some dissimilarity. This system comes near to a system of two main parties. As stated

in Lijphart’s definition of consensual democracy, we need to find the similarities from points

of A) grand coalition governments, B) existing of minority veto, C) proportionality in

representation, D) cultural autonomy.

It is also possible to find (A) grand coalition in India, but it is not the coalition which can

include parties supported by different communities. Especially on the federal level the parties

make the alliances, which oppose each other. Now, we can find National Democratic Alliance

(NPA) and United Progressive Alliance (UPA), which are from two main blocs – nationalism

versus secularism. It should also be mentioned that we can find coalition on a state level, in

which nationalist’s or communities’ parties cooperate with pure secular parties. The state

level can also show the situation where the system of two main parties – bipartism with strong

bipolarism – can be found in state Gujarat in 2002.

48

(B) Minority veto – the main parties have been supported by the smaller ones, which are

usually based on the state level, but they also have their own ideology. Coalitions in India are

now mainly based on cleavage nationalism versus secularism. In the states, where the parties

cannot get majority of votes they have to depend on communities’ votes and their national

rhetoric against the minorities are not as culminated as in the system of two main parties. It

means that the smaller parties can successfully block the majority in ideal position, especially

INC depending on the votes of Indian minorities. (Kudláček 2006: 35) Party system with

dominancy of INC has also significant advantage for minorities. Congress was the party

represented in the structure of the population. There were also important positions of

minorities such as Muslims or Sikhs etc. According to Lijphart this cross population

membership structure of INC gave to minorities veto. However, the party system

development made changes in style of government. New nationalistic governments neglect

the right of minorities and minority veto is suppressed. (compare with Lijphart 1996)

In an ideal consociational system minority rights are entrenched, guaranteed and backed by a

minority veto. Unfortunately, in India the minority veto has been practically non-existent for

most religious minorities and, in the case of Muslims, has been frequently undermined by

‘compensatory’ concessions to the Hindu community. (Singh 2000: 46)

(C) Proportionality – The electoral system of the two chambers of Indian Parliament have a

combination of two voting system. It is a combination of plurality ('first past the post')

electoral system and proportionality system with Single Transferable Vote. The 'first past the

post' system in Lok Sabha is a heritage of British rule and their Westminster’s

parliamentarism. India with its federalism and wild spectrum of the population –

communities, minorities and castes system, generate a big spectrum of the electoral results –

especially in states with various structures of population and regional parties. The main

division is between BJP and INC. Where BJP and INC operate as the biggest and two

dominant parties the problem with religious violence seems to be worse (e.g. state Gujarat),

but where it is necessary, governing cooperation in coalition, the tension is weaker and parties

show more respect for the minorities. Parties as well as their candidates (especially the secular

one) try to respect the structure of the population. However, if we look also at the tables 2, 4,

6 (pages 23, 46 and 50) we can realise that there are not always success. The example can be

again state Gujarat (see table 2) where INC is not able to put number of Muslim candidates to

state assembly according to the proportion in Gujarati population. Moreover, the successes of

the minority candidates in election are not big, because the FPTP system does not help to

49

maintain the proportionality existing in the Indian political system. Godbole (2006: 203)

indicated that number of Muslims in Lok Sabha is low and have decreasing tendency. The 7 th

Lok Sabha had maximum Muslims among MPs – 41 (8.5 %), the 12 th Lok Sabha had only

4.99 %. The percentage of Muslims in Indian population is around 13 %. There is evidence of

under representation of this religious minority. The minorities incline to the parties with

secular politics. However, the secular parties follow the electoral strategy in Hindu majority

population. They prefer Hindu candidates who have bigger chance to be elected.

Proportionality of representation is problematic in FPTP system due to its relevant majority of

votes but also for the shaping of constituencies. Brass (2003: 149-199, 219-220) shows how

the demographic changes influence the electoral behaviour and shaping of constituencies. He

argues that where the demographic changes inside of consequences’ boundaries, there is are

more probability for communal riots. Therefore, the resultant communalization and

polarization in turn reduce the electoral prospects of parties and candidates who stand for

secular political practices, inter-communal cooperation, and class or caste mobilisation rather

than communal mobilisation. (Brass 2003: 220) The not existing proportionality in Indian

election and state as well as federal assembly produce potential conflict between religious or

other communities.

(D) Cultural autonomy – India has a secular democracy with many religions and other

minorities. Federalism helps to support the system, where the cultural autonomy can function,

which is based on languages. The problem is with Untouchables and religious minorities, but

the government tries to help to improve their position by positive discrimination in the public

governmental sector – Indian Civil Service. (Kudláček 2006: 35) Some success could be

found among scheduled tribes and scheduled caste, where exist reservation seats policy.

Regardless, the situation of these communities is not yet satisfying. Furthermore religious

minorities do not have the proportional representation in Indian Civil Service (Administration

Service) as is shown in table 5 and 6 (pages 49 and 50). Muslims do not have the proportioned

representation in governmental offices according to their number in Indian population. On the

other side, the Christians and Sikhs are “over representative” according to their average

percentage of inhabitants in India.

After fifty years of independence India maintains a constitutional commitment to secularism.

However, the practice of secularism in India is now increasingly under attack. In the quest for

electoral advantage, the once-dominant Congress Party, made a series of choices that

compromised India's secular ethos. These choices enabled the explicitly anti-secular BJP to

50

dramatically expand its political base through the pursuit of a blatantly anti-secular and

majoritarian political agenda. In recent years, as a direct consequence of the BJP's rhetoric

and policies, a range of religious minorities have been subjected to discrimination and

violence. The growing electoral strength of hitherto disenfranchised groups, the existence of

institutions committed to secularism and the continuing secular constitutional dispensation

offer some hope for sustaining the secular order in India. (Ganguly 2003)

Lijphart’s preferences for constitution of the political system show his affiliation to

proportional representation as shown mainly in chapter 2.2. and 4 and 5.2. India does not

have the proportional electoral results in spite of existing multipartism. Multipartism reflects

not only regional or linguistic cleavages but not the strong religious one. Electoral results in

India expose FPTP disadvantages and unsuitability for dividing societies according to

Lijphart’s (and as well as Horowitz’s) theories. This is valid for state as well as federal level

elections. The FPTP system cannot follow the Lijphart’s assumption of guidelines with PR.

The distance of FPTP to electorates reduces the possibilities for minorities’ representation in

India.

The Indian model of parliamentary government helps to set up the system of coalition and

collegial decision-making. This is valid for India in last two decades. There were some

deviations of this system when the India was governed by dominant congress party where the

main position had prime minister and the cabined played second role. (compare with Singh

and Saxena 2008: 159, 217-218 or Singh 2005 or Majere 2005)

Cabinet stability or disability in Indian last two decades context changed the relationship

between federal and state governments. The state governments lead by regional parties often

take advantage from cooperation on federal level and governmental support and try to

negotiate bigger power for their local state government. State level is for regional (recognized

state) parties the main source of voters and power. It is significant for federal as well as state

level of election. (compare with Singh and Saxena 2008: 158, 171-172, 217-218 or Singh

2005 or Majere 2005) The position and role of the institution in political system has changed.

As an example could be also mentioned the role of Rajya Sabha. With the transformation of

the party system by the 1990s, the upper house has emerged as a federal second chamber as it

reflects a different party configuration than that of the Lok Sabha. The differential

oppositional majority in the Rajya Sabha is attributable to a different party system

configuration in the States whose legislatures from the electoral college for the federal Second

Chamber. Thus, the governmental majority in the Lok Sabha now must make inter-house

51

legislative understanding with the Rajya Sabha to facilitate passage of legislations and

constitutional amendments. (Singh and Saxena 2008: 158) Regardless, the Rajya Sabha

reflects mostly only regional and linguistic cleavage and the religious cleavage is in

background. The problem with religious communities’ right of representation is not resolved.

Due to this we cannot also talk about power sharing beyond the cabinet and parliaments based

on religious group representation or quotas.

If we look on diagram 1 (p. 30), we can see that there is significant trend in increasing of

communal violence in India in last three or two decades. Thin inclination if also followed by

increasing of the number of parties and setting up of multipartism. However, Lijphart has the

explanation for this trend. He argues that India was the most consociational under Nehru’s

governments when INC has its own internal multi-ethnicity and its governments followed

crucial rules for power-sharing with minorities. Especially the minority veto and ethnicity

proportionality have been violated. (compare with Wilkinson 2004: 100-101)

Lijphart’s assumption for consensual democracy is not fluffily accomplished. All parties

agree with secularism and secular orientation of India. However, there are some significant

differences which neglected secularism and religious minorities. According to Lijphart’s

theory the reason could be in electoral system with lack of proportionality which does not

give full representation right to minorities. However, there is strong parliamentary and federal

system of government which has good assumption for power sharing. On the other hand the

FPTP system neglects minority representation. Moreover, the Muslim minority do not have

proportional representation in government offices. Their office holding is lower than their

percentage in population. Sharing of executive power and group autonomy of minorities is

lower. Especially Muslim minority participation of the representatives in political decision-

making almost does not exist. However, there are some differences according the parties. INC

governments usually give bigger chance to minorities because their votes are significant for

electoral success. BJP as the second biggest party does not depend on minorities votes. The

minority participation in their state or federal assemblies or governments is lower.

52

5. Analysis of the election results in regions with large and frequent religious

conflicts in Indian States in the context of Wilkinson

This chapter will analyse the election result and the party system in the context of riots

incidences in particular Indian states. For this analyse will be use Wilkinson’s hypothesis

about influence of the number of the parties in political system on number of the riots and

their intensity. For this analysis we will use the Wilkinson’s and Varshney’s data about

religious and communal violence in India. Their data analyse Indian communal violence from

1977 until the year 1995. Respectively, these data reflect communal violence by states. There

are also data gathered up by Varshney from 1950 till 1995 for all India. The next period is not

mapping in any official resources or statistical analysis. There are only fractioned reports

about communal violence collected by nongovernmental or international organisation such as

Human Right Watch. Wilkinson and Varshney had to deal with similar problem and their data

collection mostly based on the newspaper article survey (compare with Wilkinson 2004: 248-

249). Similar study of communal violence and riots will bring also this work. The new data

collection has been collected from biggest English newspapers in India “Times of India” from

its online database. The period, for which was data collected through this survey, is from the

year 2001 till August 200812.

Data collection based on Olzak’s definition of communal riots (Olzak 1992: 233-234). This

definition used also Wilkinson specification (Wilkinson 2004: 255). Olzak and Wilkinson

defined the communal riots:

1. There is violence.

2. Two or more communally identified groups confront each other / members of the

other group, at some point during the violence.

3. Additionally, there have to be also identified the groups and their members as a part of

religious communities.13

There is a selection of Indian state which have been analysed. The choice of states was based

on data resources availabilities. There is also selection based on causalities and examples of

party system. Gujarat is the state which has changed from non-violence state to one of the

12) Online Times of India database has been available from the year 2001.13) There is a strong Naxalite Movement in some Indian states. However, the communal violence among caste (Dalists, OBCs against landlords and upper castes), which is well reported by Indian police, is not able to marked as religious communal violence. Moreover, there is mostly socio-economical background of this violence. (compare with Deshpande 386-287, for further information also see Annual report of the Ministry of Home Affairs 2007, chapter II, Para no. 2.63)

53

most rioting states (according to the number of victims) in India. It is also the example of

domination of one party. The case study of Uttar Pradesh has been selected for the significant

party system with regional parties with federal level influence as well as for the structure of

population. Uttar Pradesh is an example of the state which has multiparty system and there

cases of communal violence are relatively frequent. Kerala has been selected as a case with

opposition of Gujarat party system. In Gujarat is strong BJP with Hindutva ideology and

Kerala is known for leftist coalition multiparty government. Kerala is only one state with

successful Muslim party which is given by the structure of population. It is also very peaceful

state according to number of religious riots. Orissa is another example, which analyse

moderate multiparty system with nationalist party in government. It is present example of

increasing communal violence in 2007 and 2008 against Christian’s minority. Orissa is a state

with coalition government and with multiparty system. In the past, it was also relatively

peaceful state also during the years of high number of riots in India. Analyse of present

violence in connection with present government can explain the changes in the intensity of

disorder it this state. Maharashtra was selected because it was in 1990s one of the first

example of electoral success of nationalist party with anti-secular and anti-muslim affiliation

and unprecedented brutal communal violence with participation of governmental security

forces. Rajasthan is example of pure bipartism with competition between nationalist and

secular parties, but on the other hand with lower number of religious disorders compare to

other cases. The number of victims in communal riots is similar to Kerala example. Bihar is

example of the state where the traditional federal parties have relatively low electoral success.

Most of the votes gain parties which have small influence on federal politics or government.

Multipartism is high as in Uttar Pradesh but there is Bihar’s main parties do not have as big

role as a state parties (BSP, SP) in Uttar Pradesh. Therefore, Bihar is good comparison to

Uttar Pradesh example.

All these states- Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala, Orissa, Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Bihar

were selected because together they make large scale of example which is possible to find in

India. These examples together complete the scale of potential example of party competition

in India.

Lijphart’s and Horowitz’s theoretical concepts will be also fractionally used in explanation of

case studies. However, there will be only focus on particular problems which are typical for

the selected case study. Most of the problems which generate communal violence in India

were described above and it means that they could be similar to them. As an example can be

54

mentioned FPTP electoral system. This method generates low minority representation and

lesser proportionality in whole India. Regardless there are some significant highlights and

specifics which could be described deeply by Lijphart’s or Horowitz’s theoretical

assumptions.

Diagram 3 shows the development of intensity of communal violence in whole India. There is

a number of riots comparisons as well as intensity of violence measured by number of deaths.

There is a trend which shows increasing of communal disorder when Congress lost its

dominancy in party system. Multipartism and competition between main rival – Congress and

BJP brought an increasing trend of violence and their victims in 1990s as well as in early

years of new millennium. The trend from this last two decades also opened the question of

viability of Indian secularism philosophy in the shape as chapter 4.1.1. has described. The

main electoral competition has been between secular Congress (UPA) and nationalist BJP

(NDA) in some states as well as in federal election. The other parties also operate within the

nationalist or secular party politics. Leftist parties as Indian communist parties operate inside

secular bloc. There are just few (mostly regional) parties which operate only within other

Indian cleavages.

55

Diagram 3 Communal Violence and Riots in 1950-1995 and 2001-200814

y = 1,0194x - 6,5488R2 = 0,1677

y = 0,2535x + 18,342R2 = 0,0262

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

1950 1953 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007

Year

Num

ber o

f Dea

ths

riots deaths trend (deaths) trend (riots)

Source: Varshney 2002: 95, Times of India and author

14) Gujarat (Ahmedabad) riots were the biggest riots in modern Indian history. However, there is not exact number of death people in this Ahmedabad riots. Maximum number of deaths is officially presented around 850. The international organization reported number of approximately 2000 victims (compare with Human Rights Watch 2004 or USCIFR 2008)

56

Table 8 Total Riots and Deaths by States and Effective Number of Parties

Effective no. of parties in federal electoral term

(year of election)

Incidents in particular electoral termNumber of

Deaths 1950-1995

Number of Communal Riots Number of Deaths

1999-2004 2004-2008 1999-2004 2004-2008 1999-2004 2004-2008Andhra Pradesh 1.95 (1999) 2.31 (2004) 2 2 1 300Bihar 4.64 (2000) 5.21 (2005) 1 1 890Delhi 1.61 (1998) 1.88 (2003) 1 100Gujarat 1.92 (2002) 1.93 (2007) 100* 9 966*** 36 1420Haryana 2.88 (2000) 1.73 (2004) 20Himachal Pradesh 2.37 (1998) 2.16 (2003) 2 -Kerala 3.93 (2001) 4.07 (2006) 1 1 25Karnataka 2.49 (1999) 3.54 (2004) 4 2 1 240Madhya Pradesh 2.31 (1998) 1.68 (2003) 1 1 330Maharashtra 4.83 (1999) 4.84 (2004) 4 5 1350Orissa 3.13 (2000) 3.43 (2004) 1 10** 3 27 90Rajasthan 1.63 (1998) 2.25 (2003) 90Tamil Nadu 2.81 (2001) 3.72 (2006) 30Uttar Pradesh 4.12 (2002) 2.94 (2007) 5 8 30 2 1250West Bengal 3.35 (2001) 2.59 (2006) 290* Gujarat court system has registered more than 1000 cases of communal violence during the riots in 2002** Orissa court system has registered more than 120 cases of communal violence in 2007 and 2008*** Gujarat official sources talk about 850 victims in the riots in 2002, Human Right Watch reported about 2000 deathss

Source: Varshney 2002: 98, Times of India, Election Commission of India and author

5.1. Gujarat case study

Who can actually gain from the communal and religious violence? The hypothesis is that the

main profit is on the side of nationalist parties such as BJP which can recruit new electoral in

the next election. These parties have proposed an easy way how to solve the religious problem

and proclaim support to majority (Hindu), which is the ‘moral and historical power’ in the

conflict. Parties as BJP have mostly core electorates from this majority. Diagram 2 shows the

growth in community riots which has started in 80s and this trend raised similarly with the

popularity of Hindutva and BJP. The case study shows also communal violence in Gujarat in

2002. There was the situation clearer than in other states, because the election fight was

focused on two big parties – BJP an INC. Gujarat has been also the most affected state by

religious disorder in India (compare with number of deaths in last two decades).

The Gujarat communal violence were the product of the long and sustained mobilization that

took place in the state long before Ahmedabad riots in 2002 happened. In effect, the stage for

the post Ahmedabad disorder had been set some time ago. BJP had systematically reached out

57

to Gujarati in order to disseminate the message of Hindutva. (Chandhoke 2004: 51-52) For

details see table 8 which shows intensity of violence by states.

Diagram 4 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Gujarat

y = 3,6808x + 41,526R2 = 0,0182

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

year

kille

d

Source: Varshney 2002: 99, Times of India reports, author

Gujarat witnessed several more riots since 1969, in 1981, in 1985, in 1990, in 1992-93 and

also the biggest in 2002 and several other riots in between. According to the "Times of India"

report, under Madhav Singh Solanki15 who was chief minister on three occasions, 276 people

died in 117 incidents of mob violence. Under Amarsingh Chaudhuri16, 582 persons died in

413 incidents of violence. And under Chimanbhai Patel17, who was chief minister twice, 563

persons died in 370 incidents of violence. (Engineer 2006) In comparison with these facts the

report written by Human Rights Watch said that during communal riots in 2002 as many as

15) Madhav Singh Solanki is an Indian politician from Indian National Congress party and a former External affairs minister of India and former Chief Minister of Gujarat.16) Amarsinh Chaudhary was an Indian politician from INC. He was the Chief Minister of Gujarat from 1985 to 1989. 17) Chimanbhai Patel is a former chief minister of Gujarat state in India from INC. He served in that office from 1973 to 1974 and from 1990 to 1994.

58

2,000 Muslims were left dead. The riots occurred after some Muslims allegedly attacked a

train carrying Hindu pilgrims and activists. One carriage caught fire and fifty-nine Hindus

were killed in the blaze. In retaliation, Hindu extremist mobs, often with police participation

and complicity, killed hundreds of Muslims and displaced thousands. The report also said that

the Gujarat state government, led by Chief Minister Narandra Modi of the Hindu nationalist

BJP, not only failed to take appropriate action to prevent the violence, but has since failed to

investigate properly the crimes committed as well. It has consistently sought to impede

successful prosecutions of those allegedly involved in the massacres, leading the Supreme

Court and National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to intervene on several occasions.

(Human Rights Watch 2004)

Table 9 Effective number of parties in Gujarat

Year 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 2002 2007

Effective numberof parties18 1.62 1.47 3.24 1.96 1.99 1.92 1.93

Source: Election Commission of India and author

The BJP, for many years in opposition against the erstwhile-ruling Congress Party, has

defined the terms in which this split public can be reconstituted. They have aligned their

national politics with the more communal campaigns at the local level, using power of the

religious image to bypass the gulf in language and literacy. Simultaneously, the inability of

their opponents to bridge this gap has been critical for their success. In the process, they have

come to dominate the rhetorical field of politics. In a poor country where Hindus are 80 per

cent of the population, arguments for state protection of minorities have been hard-pressed to

withstand Hindu chauvinism’s assault. Deliberately engineered riots against Muslims have

been an indispensable tool in this connection. Together with vicious rumour mongering,

which a state government is well placed to carry out unopposed, fear and suspicion resulting

from violence project a deeper divide than actually exists between the religious communities.

(Rajagopal 2006)

Comparison with table 8 and with diagram 2 shows that Wilkinson’s hypothesis is supported

by the Gujarat case, but there is some perturbation. On the contrary, the last period from the

year 2004 has shown also the decrease of violence intensity, but again the brutality of 18) Effective number of parties: N=1/Σsi

2, si proportion of seats of the parties in assembly. (Šedo 2006: 87)

59

communal riots (like Orissa) has taken intensity in 2008. Henceforth, there are still cases of

communal violence but without fatal cases compared to beginning of 21st century. There are

also cases of terrorist attacks from Muslim fundamentalist side which have been not counted

as regular communal violence according to definition of communal violence. These cases

would increase number of victims of religious cleavage noticeably. According to Times of

India records from 2001-2008, Gujarat has higher number of communal violence than is

average. In India in mentioned period (except the Orissa case in last two years where is higher

number of communal disorder than in Gujarat). Wilkinson’s supposition has been supported

in Gujarat case. Moreover, there should be enlargement of the hypothesis. Violence in Gujarat

was higher when federal government was more nationalistic oriented and the electoral did not

have core inside of religious minorities. The highest number of violence with victims

in Gujarat happened during BJP government on the state as well as federal level. It was from

the electoral term 1999-2004 and beginning of nineties when the new electoral behaviour and

party system formed and when the nationalist party was the most important part of federal

government.

In connection with Lijphart and Horowitz, there are some significant highlights which also

can explain why the communal violence is higher in Gujarat. Lijphart see the main success of

communal harmony in divided societies in proportional representation and electoral system.

The FPTP system cannot give this result in Gujarat. The constituencies are not also shaped

according to ethnic or religious base. There is low chance for minorities to be represented in

Gujarat Assembly. Majority representation of nationalistic party in government does not need

to ask for minority support and also does not need to create any great coalition or share the

seats with minorities. Seat-pooling with minorities does not exist. There is no chance for other

Lijphart’s assumption such as minority veto or segmental autonomy. Segmental autonomy for

religious minorities is given only by Indian understanding of secularism, but it is sometime

neglected by nationalistic government. Example could be found in Gujarat again where the

Christian community must to face violent conversion to Hinduism. (Times of India records)

Horowitz’s assumption also counts with minority office-holding, which is very low in

Gujarat. This state does not have any Muslim representation in State Assembly (see table 2, p.

23). The number of Muslim in governmental jobs is generally very low in whole India. Vote

pooling which can create interethnic appeals is not exist in FPTP environment and in BJP

domination in Gujarat.

60

Table 10 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 2007(total seats: 182)

Party Contestants Won % of votesCongress 173 59 38.00Bharatiya Janata Party 182 117 49.12Nationalist Congress Party 10 3 1.05Others 903 3 11.83

Source: Election Commission of India

Table 11 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 2002(total seats: 182)

Party Contestants Won % of votesCongress 180 51 39.28Bharatiya Janata Party 181 127 49.85Others 628 4 10.87Source: Election Commission of India

Table 12 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 1998 (total seats: 182)

Party Contestants Won % of votesCongress 179 53 34.85Bharatiya Janata Party 182 117 44.81Others 764 12 20.34Source: Election Commission of India

Table 13 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 1995 (total seats: 182)

Party Contestants Won % of votesCongress 181 45 32.86Bharatiya Janata Party 182 121 42.51Others 2 182 16 24.63Source: Election Commission of India

Table 14 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 1990 (total seats: 182)

Party Contestants Won % of votesCongress 181 33 30.74Bharatiya Janata Party 147 63 26.69Janata Dal 147 70 29.36

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Others 1 414 16 13.21Source: Election Commission of India

Table 15 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 1985 (total seats: 182)

Party Contestants Won % of votesCongress 182 149 55.55Bharatiya Janata Party 124 11 14.96Janata Dal 141 14 19.25Others 690 8 10.24Source: Election Commission of India

Table 16 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 1980(total seats: 182)

Party Contestants Won % of votesCongress (I) 182 141 51.04Bharatiya Janata Party 127 9 14.02Janata Dal (JP) 152 21 22.77Janata Dal (SC) 16 1 0.63Others 497 10 11.54Source: Election Commission of India

5.2. Orissa case study

Orissa is a state which could be diagnosed with low number of violence as well as with low

intensity. However, in past decade, there is some significant shift in electoral behaviour as

well as in minority approach from government. Orissa changed (see table 16) its party system

from dominant party system, to two party system, to moderate multipartism. However, this

multipartim is bipolar (there is marginal third leftist pole without big importance for

government composition). BJP and its coalition partner BJD (Biju Janata Dal) won last two

elections. BJD is a leading party in Orissa, which has regional focus as well as Hindu

(Hindutva) affiliation. There is also INC which has the main opponent to the nationalist

coalition. The electoral behaviour could be compared with the Gujarat example where there is

secularism of INC supported by minorities confronted with BJP nationalism. The intensity of

2007 and 2008 riots is strong. However, the number of death is minimized compare to Gujarat

case. In spite of it, there are increasing quantities of victims in Orissa from Christmas 2007.

The number of displaced is up to 20,000. (compared with USCIRF 2008) USCIRF Annual

62

Report 2008 said that “police reportedly look the other way or even appear to be complicit in

the attacks.”

Diagram 5 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Orissa

y = 0,0366x + 3,6917R2 = 0,0003

0

20

40

60

80

100

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

year

kille

d

Source: Varshney 2002: 101, Times of India reports, author

There is a similar situation in Gujarat where government security forces have been accused of

inactivity. Some reports also mentioned that incited mobs against Christians in India are

supported and frequently invoked by the Hindus nationalist and supported by nationalist

political groups and leaders. In Orissa it is mainly Sangh Parivar (National Commission for

Minorities (NCM) named this organisation in its reports) which has close link to BJD.

Table 17 Effective number of parties in Orissa

Year 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004

Effective numberof parties 1,52 1.41 2.5 3.13 3.43

63

Source: Election Commission of India and author

This situation only partly supported Wilkinson’s hypothesis. However, there are significant

attributes which increase the validity of hypothesis that government, which is not dependent

on minorities’ votes, does not protect minorities from majority aggressions. On the other side,

there is disagreement that the lower number of parties corresponded with higher number of

riots. The hypothesis could be modified. The bipolarism escalates intensity of community

disorder.

Coalition of nationalistic parties does not search for support from minorities. Bipolarism and

coalition nationalistic government cannot be consider as great coalition as Lijphart

understands it. There is also no chance for interethnic appeals through vote pooling or

constituency pooling as Horowitz described. Orissa’s last communal violence was carefully

observed by Christian community in India and also in abroad. (compare with USCIRF 2008)

The pressure of this Indian religious minority on federal government helps to decrease the

intensity of violence. Stress which put Horowitz or Lijphart on federalism can be

understandable also in this context. Secular and pro-minority federal government could

reduce negative consequences of majority nationalistic government in the state.

Table 18 Results of the 2004 Orissa Assembly Election(total seats: 147)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 63 32 17.11Biju Janata Dal 84 61 27.36Indian National Congress 133 38 34.82Communist Party of India 6 1 0.77Communist Party of India (M) 3 1 0.55Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 12 4 1.78Independents/Others 299 10 13.49Source: Election Commission of India

Table 19 Results of the 2000 Orissa Assembly Election(total seats: 147)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 63 38 18.20Biju Janata Dal 84 68 29.40

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Indian National Congress 145 26 33.78Communist Party of India 29 1 1.22Communist Party of India (M) 15 1 0.77Janata Dal (S) 24 1 0.84Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 21 3 2.14Independents 236 8 10.66Source: Election Commission of India

Table 20 Results of the 1995 Orissa Assembly Election(total seats: 147)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 144 9 7.88Indian National Congress 146 80 39.08Communist Party of India 21 1 1.71Janata Dal 146 46 35.41Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 16 4 1.94Jharkhand People's Party 4 1 0.17Independents 682 6 10.51Source: Election Commission of India

Table 21 Results of the 1990 Orissa Assembly Election(total seats: 147)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 63 2 3.56Indian National Congress 145 10 29.78Communist Party of India 9 5 2.98Communist Party of India (M) 3 1 0.84Janata Dal 139 123 53.69Independents 389 6 7.36Source: Election Commission of India

Table 22 Results of the 1985 Orissa Assembly Election(total seats: 147)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 67 1 2.60Indian National Congress 147 117 51.08

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Communist Party of India 27 1 3.31Janata Party 140 21 30.61Independents 374 7 10.50Source: Election Commission of India

5.3. Uttar Pradesh case study

North-Indian states in general and Uttar Pradesh in particular, are generally believed to be

worst-affected by communal violence. This is partly true because, in popular and scholarly

perceptions, the “worst” states are usually seen as those with the greatest total number of

incidents and deaths. Therefore the most populous states, even if they have a lower per capita

rate of deaths in communal riots, appear to be the most violent. Uttar Pradesh is however not

the worst state in number of communal riots and deaths and it is (with population of 175

million) the most populated state in India and fifth in the world. If we compare it with Gujarat

which has the highest per capita rate of deaths in communal incidents, at around 117 per

million of urban population – Uttar Pradesh has only 43 deaths per million (in the years 1950-

1995). Clearly, communalism is not primarily a northern Indian problem; it is a serious issue

for western India. Indeed, the western state of Gujarat not only has a greater per capita rate of

deaths and incidents but also a larger number of total deaths in riots than do Uttar Pradesh.

Although Gujarat has high levels of deaths in communal incidents, a look at the state level

data for Gujarat over time (diagram 4) in comparison with that for Uttar Pradesh (diagram 6)

suggests that there are significant qualitative differences in the levels of violence in Uttar

Pradesh that may, at one level, justify that popular perceptions of them as the most

communally violent state. (Varshney 2002: 96-98)

Increasing number of effective parties in UP Assembly and the decreasing trend of deaths in

riots in last decade shows that there is possible link between multipartism and minority

protection if the coalition partner or government as whole depends on minorities. UP

governments in 1990s and first decade of new millennium have depended on SCs/STs, OBCs

and religious minorities such as Muslims.

66

Diagram 6 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Uttar Pradesh

y = -3,097x + 81,754R2 = 0,1073

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

year

kille

d

Source: Varshney 2002: 102, Times of India, author

The growth of effective number of parties in UP had started in 1990s and continued till the

election in 2007, where was significant setback of this number. However, the result of 2007

election confirmed the increasing support of BSP and SP. These parties have base among

SCs/STs and OBCs. Moreover, the support also comes from Muslim part and other

minorities.

Table 23 Effective number of parties in Uttar Pradesh

Year 1980 1985 1989 1991 1993 1996 2002 2007

Effective numberof parties 1.81 2.24 3.15 2.87 3.61 3.70 4.12 2.94

Source: Election Commission of India and author

The main political party in Uttar Pradesh is BSP, SP and then BJP (tables 23 and 25). In the

past BSP made coalition with them or other smaller parties. Also SP were in coalition with

67

BJP. Congress can be characterised as a party in the middle of the political spectrum with

lower relevancy. Nationalists cannot be as radical as in Gujarat, because they depend on their

coalition partners and also the nationalist are not the main stream of UP party system. Also,

the secularism cannot be as strict as in Kerala, because of the same reason. It means that the

government tries to prevent the riots and communal violence, because of its dependence on

minorities – especially SP, BSP and also INC. In Uttar Pradesh effective multipartism with

multipolarised political environment has been in existence. A strong party with strong secular

programme does not exist, because the power and electoral potential of INC is divided

between BSP and SP. The real riots do not have a real impact on election result as we can see

in Gujarat, because any party cannot destroy their own coalition potential. (Kudláček 2006:

50-52)

Uttar Pradesh with its multipartism shows that FPTP electoral system does not produce only

bipartism or bipolar party system. The electoral competition is in some constituencies among

three or four big parties with different ideology which have good chance to win. However,

there is no real proportionality of votes, but in some approximate to it. Very tight competition

among all four main parties (BJP, BSP, INC, SP) shifts party behaviour and searches for the

electoral support also among minorities which are not typical voters for this party. This is

important in undecided constituencies. Parties follow the interethnic appeals in heterogenic

constituencies. Government also moderates their behaviour. The seat pooling was necessary

in last decades. However, the last election shows that one party (BSP) can also get majority of

seats and make one colour government.

Table 24 Results of the 2007 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election(total seats: 403)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 350 51 16.97Bahujan Samaj Party 403 206 30.43Indian National Congress 393 22 8.61Samajwadi Party 393 97 25.43Janata Dal (U) 16 1 0.42Rashtriya Lok Dal 254 10 3.70Independents/Others 3937 16 13.34Source: Election Commission of India

Table 25 Results of the 2002 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election(total seats: 403)

68

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 320 88 20.08Bahujan Samaj Party 401 91 23.06Communist Party of India (M) 6 2 0.13Indian National Congress 402 25 8.96Samajwadi Party 390 143 25.37Janata Dal (U) 16 2 0.58Janata Party 23 1 0.27Rashtriya Lok Dal 38 14 2.48Natural Law Party 130 1 0.71Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya) 21 1 0.24Independents/Others 3034 28 14.50Source: Election Commission of India

Table 26 Results of the 1996 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election(total seats: 424)

Party Contestants Won % of votesAll India Indira Congress (T) 37 4 1.33Bharatiya Janata Party 414 174 32.52Bahujan Samaj Party 296 67 19.64Communist Party of India (M) 11 4 0.77Indian National Congress 126 33 8.35Samajwadi Party 281 110 21.80Janata Dal 54 7 2.56Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya) 77 1 0.59Independents/Others 2093 24 9.43Source: Election Commission of India

69

Table 27 Results of the 1993 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election(total seats: 422)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 422 177 33.30

Bahujan Samaj Party 164 67 11.12

Communist Party of India (M) 17 1 0.47

Communist Party of India 37 3 0.64Indian National Congress 421 28 15.08Janata Dal 377 27 12.33Janata Party 298 1 0.52Samajwadi Party 256 109 17.94Independents/Others 7506 9 6.96Source: Election Commission of India

Table 28 Results of the 1991 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election(total seats: 419)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 415 221 31.45

Bahujan Samaj Party 386 12 9.44

Communist Party of India (M) 14 1 0.32

Communist Party of India 44 4 1.04Indian National Congress 413 46 17.32Janata Dal 374 92 18.84Janata Party 399 34 12.52Independents/Others 5652 9 8.53Source: Election Commission of India

Table 29 Results of the 1989 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election(total seats: 425)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 275 57 11.61

Bahujan Samaj Party 372 13 9.41

Communist Party of India (M) 8 2 0.37

Communist Party of India 68 6 1.56Indian National Congress 410 94 27.9Janata Dal 356 208 29.71Janata Party (JP) 119 1 0.74Lok Dal (B) 204 2 1.19Independents/Others 3748 42 15.82Source: Election Commission of India

70

Table 30 Results of the 1985 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election(total seats: 425)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 347 16 9.83

Communist Party of India (M) 25 2 0.68

Communist Party of India 161 6 3.04Indian National Congress 425 269 39.25Janata Party 311 20 5.60Lok Dal 385 84 21.43Indian Congress 169 5 2.27Independents/Others 3768 23 16.80Source: Election Commission of India

Table 31 Results of the 1980 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election(total seats: 425)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 400 11 10.76Communist Party of India 155 7 3.55Indian National Congress (I) 424 309 37.65Indian National Congress (U) 339 13 6.38Janata Party (JP) 339 4 2.89Janata Party (SC) 399 59 21.51Janata Party (SR) 302 4 4.17Independents/Others 2290 18 12.07Source: Election Commission of India

5.4. Kerela case study

Kerala is a state which has a different political situation from Gujarat. Both states have similar

religious community population structures. There are differences in structure of the

population in rural or urban area as well as the in literacy rate. Kerala has the highest literacy

rate in India around 91% and around 70% in Gujarat (Census of India 2001)). Kerala is a more

rural state compared to a more industrialised and urbanised Gujarat.

The election results show that Kerala is traditionally multipartism with coalition governments.

The dominance of some parties is not as strong as in Gujarat. Bipolarism does not exist, but

strong multipolarism exists. The strong alliances are divided into the three main stream –

71

socialist and communist blocks (leftist) led by CPI(M) and middle-left block led by Congress.

The third blocks are BJP and their partners and they are not as strong in Kerala as in Gujarat.

In Kerala the left orientation of the politics and strong secularism helps the preventing

communal violence and hindering the growth of nationalism and Hindutva ideology. The

comparison of the states Gujarat and Kerala helps support the hypothesis that the two- party

system and the low number of the effective parties are blamed for the riots and clashes among

majority and minority of the population. On the other hand, the multipartism help prevent

communal violence. Here we should also take into account other variables, such as the

literacy rate and the rural environment. The cities and higher concentration of the population

can increase the chances of community disorder. Moreover, Kerala is state traditionally with

secular parties’ dominancy. Muslims and Christians are also very strong minority which is

almost as big as Hindus majority. There is also concentration of voters. Some constituencies

are predominantly Muslim or Christian.

Party system in Kerala has developed from strong multipartism to present moderate

multipartism. The effective number of parties was the lowest after election in 2001 when was

reported 3.93 and in 2006 with 4.07.

Kerala party system is close to the outcomes which generate usually proportional (or list)

electoral system. Muslims as strong minority are represented by own party. Also other

affiliations are represented in society. The secular leftist parties have strong position in

Kerala’s political system. CPI(M) is one tradition leader in Kerala poltics. Other is secular

Congress. Both secular parties have their own offshoots or brother parties (leftist or congress

parties). The nationalist parties do not have big support in Kerala societies and they usually do

not gain any seats. The governments which are coalition of parties with secular affiliation

(and often supported by minorities’ votes or parties as Muslim league) do not have interest to

support riots and intensity of violence. Religious disorder will not bring gains for any main

parties in Kerala Assembly.

72

Diagram 7 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Kerala

y = 0,0109x + 0,3478R2 = 0,0012

0

20

40

60

80

100

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

year

kille

d

Source: Varshney 2002: 102, Times of India, author

Table 32 Effective number of parties in Kerala

Year 1980 1982 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006

Effective numberof parties 7.39 7.07 5.86 4.36 5.17 3.93 4.07

Source: Election Commission of India and author

Lijphart and Horowitz’ critique of FPTP system is not fully warranted in Kerala. The structure

of population and concentration of religious groups in the shaping of constituencies give to

the minorities the chance to get their own representation. Moreover, this specific situation

creates multipartism which generates moderate politics. Parties’ representation make great

coalition (seat pooling) and it create other Lijphart’s assumption as strong minority veto and

cultural autonomy for minorities. The parties which win the seats are mostly secular and

depend on minority votes. The structure of the population forces the parties for cooperation.

The secular electoral coalitions for their electoral success need to gain the votes in different

73

environment and religious groups. They need to cooperate and it creates strong support of

inter-ethnic appeals through vote pooling or constituency pooling. Kerala’s example is near to

Lijphart’s concept of consensual democracy.

Table 33 Results of the 2006 Kerala Assembly Election(total seats: 140)

Party Contestants Won % of votesUnited Democratic Front (UDF) 116 40 36.78Indian National Congress 77 24 24.09Muslim League 21 7 7.30Kerala Congress – Mani 11 7 3.26Janadhipatya Samrakshana Samithi 5 1 1.51Kerala Congress (B) 2 1 0.62Left Democratic Front  129 91 44.81Communist Party of India (M) 85 61 30.45Communist Party of India 24 17 8.09Janata Dal – Secular 8 5 2.44Kerala Congress 6 4 1.75Nationalist Congress Party 2 1 0.64Revolutionary Socialist Party 4 3 1.44Bharatiya Janata Party 136 0 4.75Independents / Others 398 9 11.98Source: Election Commission of India

Table 34 Results of the 2001 Kerala Assembly Election(total seats: 140)

Party Contestants Won % of votesUnited Democratic Front (UDF) 140 99 49.05Indian National Congress – Indira 88 63 31.40Indian Union Muslim League 23 16 8.00Kerala Congress – Mani 11 9 3.54Janadhipatya Samrakshana Samithi 5 4 1.78Revolutionary Socialist Party- Bolshevik 4 2 1.37

Kerala Congress- Jacob 4 2 1.32Communist Marxist Party 3 1 0.92Kerala Congress – Balakrishna Pillai 2 2 0.72Left Democratic Front  140 40 43.70

74

Communist Party of India (M) 74 24 23.85Communist Party of India 24 7 7.70Janata Dal – Secular 12 3 3.48Kerala Congress – Joseph 10 2 2.90Nationalist Congress Party 9 2 2.60Revolutionary Socialist Party 6 2 1.71Bharatiya Janata Party 123 0 5.02BJP Allies 7 0 0.06Independents 266 1 2.16Source: Election Commission of India

Table 35 Results of the 1996 Kerala Assembly Election(total seats: 140)

Party Contestants Won % of votesIndian National Congress 94 37 30.43Communist Party of India- Marxist 72 40 24.41Communist Party of India 22 18 7.88Muslim League 23 13 7.42Bharatiya Janata Party 128 0 5.48Janata Dal 13 4 4.12Kerala Congress- Mani 10 5 3.18Kerala Congress 10 6 3.10Indian Congress-Socialist 9 3 2.49Revolutionary Socialist Party 6 5 2.07Janadhipathya Samrakshna Samithi 5 1 1.54Kerala Congress-Jacob 4 2 1.14Kerala Congress -Balakrishna Pillai 2 1 0.64Independents 636 1 2.38Source: Election Commission of India

75

Table 36 Results of the 1991 Kerala Assembly Election(total seats: 140)

Party Contestants Won % of votesIndian National Congress 91 55 32.07Communist Party of India- Marxist 64 28 21.74Communist Party of India 24 12 8.26Muslim League 22 19 7.37Bharatiya Janata Party 137 0 4.76Janata Dal 13 3 4.04Kerala Congress- Mani 13 10 4.32Kerala Congress 11 1 3.37Indian Congress-Socialist 12 2 3.47Revolutionary Socialist Party 6 2 1.73Independents / Others 340 8 8.27Source: Election Commission of India

Table 37 Results of the 1987 Kerala Assembly Election(total seats: 140)

Party Contestants Won % of votesIndian National Congress 76 33 24.83Communist Party of India- Marxist 70 38 22.86Communist Party of India 25 16 8.08Muslim League 23 15 7.73Bharatiya Janata Party 116 0 5.56Janata Party 12 7 3.79Lok Dal 2 1 0.62Kerala Congress 14 5 3.54Indian Congress-Socialist 14 6 4.02Revolutionary Socialist Party 6 5 2.07Independents 896 14 16.92Source: Election Commission of India

76

Table 38 Results of the 1982 Kerala Assembly Election(total seats: 140)

Party Contestants Won % of votesIndian National Congress 36 20 11.90Communist Party of India- Marxist 51 26 18.80Communist Party of India 25 13 8.42Muslim League 18 14 6.17Bharatiya Janata Party 69 0 2.75Janata Party 13 4 4.04All India Muslim League 12 4 3.25Kerala Congress 17 6 5.86Indian Congress-Socialist 15 5 4.81Revolutionary Socialist Party 8 4 2.76Kerala Congress (I) 12 8 4.55National Democratic Party 5 2 1.67Independents 418 34 25.02Source: Election Commission of India

Table 39 Results of the 1980 Kerala Assembly Election(total seats: 140)

Party Contestants Won % of votesIndian National Congress (I) 53 17 17.03Indian National Congress (U) 31 21 11.28Communist Party of India- Marxist 50 35 19.35Communist Party of India 22 17 7.80Muslim League 21 14 7.18Janata Party 29 5 7.63All India Muslim League 11 5 3.51Kerala Congress 17 8 5.25Revolutionary Socialist Party 8 6 3.02Kerala Congress (I) 17 6 4.95Kerala Congress (Pillai Group) 2 1 0.80Independents 329 5 12.08Source: Election Commission of India

77

5.5. Rajasthan case study

Rajasthan is another example of competition between main two parties (BJP an INC) in the

system. The party system in this state could be called as bipartism (Sartori’s classification).

However, there have been not as many cases of communal disorder and murdered violence as

in selected period in Gujarat. How it could be explained? The BJP has not depended on

religious minority votes as well as there is no need of any coalition government due to FPTP

system and existing almost pure bipartism. Communal violence with victims was also

registered in electoral term when the highest numbers of effective parties were in Rajasthan

Assembly. The government also depended on minorities that time. All these differences from

Gujarat example go against Wilkinson’s hypothesis.

The explanation could be finding in historical conservancies in both Indian states. For some

scholars, the violence in Gujarat was not entirely unprecedented. In Gujarat itself, incidents of

mass violence have tended to be more intense in duration and scale than in other Indian states.

(Basu and Roy 2004: 321) Rajasthan is historically communal riots free state and also the

number of victims is comparatively very low in India.

Rajasthan had to cope with communal violence at the end of 1980s and beginning of 1990s.

That time the INC had power but the electoral behaviour was changing and the dominance of

INC broke and also bipartism originated. However, the number of death was comparatively

low as compared to causes in Bihar, Maharashatra and Gujarat in the same period.

78

Diagram 8 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Rajasthan

y = -0,001x + 3,2292R2 = 4E-07

0

20

40

60

80

100

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

year

kille

d

Source: Varshney 2002: 102, Times of India, author

The possible explanation could be the growing nationalism of BJP and its potential in state as

well as in federal election. However, the next election term after the strongest violence in

Rajasthan in 1993, the electoral success was on the side of BJP and INC lost its position in

this state.

Table 40 Effective number of parties in Rajasthan

Year 1980 1985 1993 1998 2003

Effective numberof parties 2.1 2.63 2.59 1.63 2.25

Source: Election Commission of India and author

There is an also important electoral swing between BJP and INC. Both parties are not able to

repeat their electoral success from previous election. Moreover, Rajasthan changes periods

79

with BJP or INC government on federal and state level. Both parties do not have coexistence

of their government on both levels in the same time. Lijphart and Horowitz put the stress on

federalism as the important factor for communal harmony and autonomy of minorities. There

is another reason than this for Rajasthan’s communal harmony, but federalism and changing

government could be one explanation for peaceful Rajasthan. However, the INC which

depends more on minority votes have significant interest to protect minorities. Orissa’s

example can support this assumption when federal government leading by INC threatened

intervention to nationalistic government in Orissa during the riots in 2008. Minority’s

pressure on federal level (or government) can help to prevent violence in Indian states which

they have own responsibility for communal harmony and security.

Table 41 Results of the 2003 Rajasthan Assembly Election(total seats: 200)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 197 120 39.20Indian National Congress 200 56 35.65Bahujan Samaj Party 124 2 3.97Communist Party of India (M) 18 1 0.77Indian National Lok Dal 50 4 2.58Janata Dal (U) 10 2 0.90Independents / Others 457 15 13.97Source: Election Commission of India

Table 42 Results of the 1998 Rajasthan Assembly Election(total seats: 200)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 196 33 33.23Indian National Congress 200 153 44.95Bahujan Samaj Party 108 2 2.17Communist Party of India (M) 14 1 0.81Janata Dal 69 3 1.97Independents / Others 622 8 14.69Source: Election Commission of India

80

Table 43 Results of the 1993 Rajasthan Assembly Election(total seats: 199)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 196 95 38.60Indian National Congress 199 76 38.27Communist Party of India (M) 12 1 0.98Janata Dal 146 6 6.93Independents 1506 21 12.90Source: Election Commission of India

Table 44 Results of the 1985 Rajasthan Assembly Election(total seats: 200)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 118 39 21.24Indian National Congress 199 113 46.57Communist Party of India 47 1 1.23Janata Party 31 10 5.88Lok Dal 60 27 11.86Independents 995 10 11.90Source: Election Commission of India

Table 45 Results of the 1980 Rajasthan Assembly Election(total seats: 200)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 123 32 18.60Indian National Congress (I) 199 133 42.96Indian National Congress (U) 69 6 5.59Communist Party of India 25 1 0.97Communist Party of India (M) 16 1 1.20Janata Party (JP) 76 8 7.34Janata Party (SC) 103 7 9.55Independents 750 12 13.08Source: Election Commission of India

81

5.6. Maharashtra case study

Maharashtra is the state where the relatively peaceful period is changed by violent time. The

communal violence has tradition in the state and especially Bombay has experience with

clashes between Muslims and Hindus. The riots are usually very bloody as we can see in

diagram 9. Riots in 1984 and in 1992/93 had many victims. Especially the disorder in the

early 1990s took many lives.

Wilkinson’s hypothesis is not as much valid in this case, because the Hindu-Muslim clashes

in 1992/93 have been signed up to Shiv Sena politics. This party was not the main power in

the state, but their nationalist politics and increasing electoral potency provoked riots in

Bombay in 1992. Also there was participation of official security forces on violence.

However, the government did not have situation under the control. But the Wilkinson’s

hypothesis could be verified if we look deeply on the structure of government and their

administration and security forces. The police as well as administration is under the control of

majority Hindus. Muslims and other minorities do not have proper proportion there.

Government was under the pressure of public and Muslims were that time marked as the

instigators of violence.

Lijphart and Horowitz put stress in their theory on office holding and power sharing in any

level. In Maharashtra the police forces were under the control of radical Hindus or sometimes

illegally directly under the control of Shiv Sena. There was no fast brake which was possible

for official use by minorities to stop the violence or pull out the state forces from participation

in. Absence of power sharing and office holding (which is common in whole India) or the

consciousness of importance of Muslims’ votes help to create massacre with state

participation in Bombay.

Stress on a Hindu identity and the use of Hindi in political sloganeering are indicative of a

major shift in the politics of in Western India. This turn to Hinduism is what seemed to lead to

the outbreak of violence in Bombay on a scale never before witnessed in the city. In winter of

1992-93, Bombay experienced the worst Hindu-Muslim conflagration the city has ever

known. It is shift in which once local, native party in Bombay, the Shiv Sena now finds itself

as the dominant political force in the state of Maharashtra, with a ready capacity to incite

widespread violence. (Katzenstein, Mehta and Thakkar 2006: 257-258)

82

Diagram 9 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Maharashtra

Source: Varshney 2002: 101, Times of India, author

The Shiv Sena conjures up images of Muslim treachery and betrayal. In inflammatory

language, the Shiv Sena depicts anti-national Muslims and destroyers of temples, as

murderers of the police, and as threats to the Indian state. (Katzenstein, Mehta and Thakkar

2006: 268)

Table 46 Effective number of parties in Maharashtra

Year 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 2004

Effective numberof parties 2.21 2.76 3.29 4.52 4.83 4.84

Source: Election Commission of India and author

The ancillary explanation can be found also in changing electoral as well as party behaviour

when the federal and state party system has changed from dominant party system

(respectively two party system) to multipartism and parties wanting to find the major support

83

y = -1,0683x + 61,895R2 = 0,0035

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

year

kille

d

of voters and find new electorates. The parties searched for their new political position and

profile. The secular parties could not know how to react on new situation and during the riots

they afraid of protecting minorities due to loosing votes from Hindu majority.

Table 47 Results of the 2004 Maharashtra Assembly Election(total seats: 288)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 111 54 13.67Indian National Congress 157 69 21.06Communist Party of India (M) 16 3 0.62Nationalist Congress Party 124 71 18.75Shivsena 163 62 19.97Jan Surajya Shakti 19 4 0.88Peasants And Workers Party 43 2 1.31Independents / Others 1213 23 16.36Source: Election Commission of India¨

Table 48 Results of the 1999 Maharashtra Assembly Election(total seats: 288)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 117 56 14.54Indian National Congress 249 75 27.20Communist Party of India (M) 23 2 0.64Nationalist Congress Party 223 58 22.60Shivsena 161 69 17.33Janata Dal (S) 25 2 1.51Samajwadi Party 15 2 0.69Republican Party of India 10 1 0.69Peasants And Workers Party 22 5 1.49Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha 34 3 1.85Independents / Others 859 15 10.1Source: Election Commission of India

84

Table 49 Results of the 1995 Maharashtra Assembly Election(total seats: 288)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 116 65 12.80Indian National Congress 286 80 31.00Communist Party of India (M) 18 3 1.00Shivsena 169 73 16.39Janata Dal 182 11 5.86Samajwadi Party 22 3 0.93Peasants and Workers Party 42 6 2.05Independents / Others 3199 47 27.74Source: Election Commission of India

Table 50 Results of the 1990 Maharashtra Assembly Election(total seats: 288)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 104 42 10.71Indian National Congress 276 141 38.17Communist Party of India 16 2 0.74Communist Party of India (M) 13 3 0.87Indian Congress (Socialist-Sarat Chandra Sinha) 71 1 0.98

Janata Dal 214 24 12.72Muslim League 9 1 0.51Shivsena 183 52 15.94Peasants and Workers Party 40 8 2.42Independents / Others 3004 14 14.90Source: Election Commission of India

85

Table 51 Results of the 1985 Maharashtra Assembly Election(total seats: 288)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 67 16 7.25Indian National Congress 287 161 43.41Communist Party of India 31 2 0.92Communist Party of India (M) 14 2 0.79Indian Congress (Socialist) 126 54 17.28Janata Party 61 20 7.38Peasants and Workers Party 29 13 3.77Independents 1506 20 17.49Source: Election Commission of India

Table 52 Results of the 1980 Maharashtra Assembly Election(total seats: 288)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 145 14 9.38Indian National Congress (I) 286 186 44.50Indian National Congress (U) 192 47 20.49Communist Party of India 17 2 1.31Communist Party of India (M) 10 2 0.93Janata Party (JP) 111 17 8.61Peasants and Workers Party 41 9 4.14Independents 654 11 9.39Source: Election Commission of India

5.7. Bihar case study

Bihar is an example of a state where the riots has happened in selected period during the

electoral term with higher number of effective parties in assembly. However, Bihar could be

called as a relatively peaceful state. When riots happened, they were more violent than in

other Indian states but less then in Gujarat, Maharashtra or Uttar Pradesh. Bihar’s

governments are coalition and could be describe as unstable.

86

Diagram 10 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Bihar

y = -1,5039x + 45,341R2 = 0,0154

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

year

kille

d

Source: Varshney 2002: 100, Times of India, author

The trend in Bihar is decreasing in last period when the effective number of parties in the

Bihar Assembly has increased. In the year 1989, when deaths quantity were really high, the

effective number of parties was 2.78. The number of parties has increased from that time and

with that also the violence has fallen down in Bihar.

Table 53 Effective number of parties in Bihar

Year 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Effective numberof parties 3.24 2.78 4.49 3.33 4.64 5.21

Source: Election Commission of India and author

According to this description Wilkinson’s hypothesis is confirmed. The most violent riots

happened in term with the lowest number of parties in Assembly. However, the assembly was

87

under dominancy of INC which has support from minorities. INC also is more secular than

other parties in Bihar assemby. The explanation of riots and high number of killed could be

described similarly as in the case of Maharashtra. The electoral behaviour and party system

had been under changing process and parties did not have experience with this new situation

and wanted to find their policy outlines and their electoral gains in majority. It was

malfunction of Indian version of secularism.

Bihar with its multipartism could generate consensus among minorities according to Lijphart

theory. It is true because the number of death in Bihar is very low in last decade. The

government in Bihar is not stable (it is very weak), therefore, the minority votes and voice is

stronger than in other states. The table 53 also shows that with increasing number of parties

and decreasing of stability, the number of death is decreasing. Also last communal violence in

September 2008 (Orissa) shows that government made strict action against rioters. In

connection to Horowitz durable governments are thought to be desirable as they promote

policy consistency and responsibility and may avoid the instability that can result during

interregna or from the creation of fragile, unpredictable coalitions. (Horowitz 2003a: 5-6)

Bihar is opposite example and the example of this state supports more Lijphart standpoint of

cabinet stability problem (cabinet instability does not automatically lead to regime instability).

Table 54 Results of the 2005 Bihar Assembly Election(total seats: 243)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 103 37 10.97Bahujan Samaj Party 238 2 4.41Indian National Congress 84 10 5.00Nationalist Congress Party 31 3 0.98Communist Party of India 17 3 1.58Communist Party of India (M) 12 1 0.64Janata Dal (U) 138 55 14.55Rashtriya Janata Dal 215 75 25.07Communist Party of India (ML)(L) 109 7 2.49Samajwadi Party 142 4 2.69Lok Jan Shakti Party 178 29 12.62Independents 1493 17 16.16Source: Election Commission of India

88

Table 55 Results of the 2000 Bihar Assembly Election(total seats: 324)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 168 67 14.64Bahujan Samaj Party 249 5 1.89Indian National Congress 324 23 11.06Communist Party of India 153 5 3.60Communist Party of India (M) 21 2 0.91Janata Dal (U) 87 21 6.47Rashtriya Janata Dal 293 124 28.34Communist Party of India (ML)(L) 107 6 2.50Samata Party 120 34 8.65United Goans Democratic Party 6 2 0.26Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 85 12 3.53Kosal Party 7 2 0.36Marxist Co-Ordination 9 1 0.28Independents 1482 20 11.37Source: Election Commission of India

Table 56 Results of the 1995 Bihar Assembly Election(total seats: 324)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 315 41 12.96Bahujan Samaj Party 161 2 1.34Indian National Congress 320 29 16.27Communist Party of India 61 26 4.76Communist Party of India (M) 31 6 1.44Janata Dal 264 167 27.98Jharkhand People’s Party 33 2 0.34Samajwadi Party 176 2 1.67Samata Party 310 7 7.06Communist Party of India (ML)(L) 89 6 2.36Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 63 10 2.32Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (M) 58 3 0.96Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (S) 22 6 1.26Marxist Co-Ordination 5 2 0.29Bhartiya Pragatisheel Party 259 1 3.04Independents / Others 5708 14 14.27Source: Election Commission of India

89

Table 57 Results of the 1990 Bihar Assembly Election(total seats: 324)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 237 39 11.61Indian National Congress 323 71 24.78Communist Party of India 109 23 6.59Communist Party of India (M) 31 6 1.33Janata Dal 277 122 25.61Janata Party (JP) 158 3 1.54Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 82 19 3.14Indian People’s Front 82 7 2.77Jharkhand Dal 28 1 2.77Marxist Co-Ordination 11 2 0.22Independents / Others 4377 31 18.76Source: Election Commission of India

Table 58 Results of the 1985 Bihar Assembly Election(total seats: 324)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 234 39 7.54Indian National Congress 323 196 39.30Communist Party of India 167 12 8.86Communist Party of India (M) 44 1 1.61Lok Dal 261 46 14.69Janata Party 229 13 7.21Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 57 9 1.82Indian Congress (Socialist) 59 1 0.66Independents / Others 2805 30 17.96Source: Election Commission of India

90

Table 59 Results of the 1980 Bihar Assembly Election(total seats: 324)

Party Contestants Won % of votesBharatiya Janata Party 246 21 8.41Indian National Congress (I) 311 169 34.20Indian National Congress (U) 185 14 7.34Communist Party of India 135 23 9.12Communist Party of India (M) 27 6 1.75Janata Party (JP) 240 13 7.21Janata Party (SC) 254 42 15.63Janata Party (SR) 153 1 1.61Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 31 11 1.69Independents / Others 1354 24 12.18Source: Election Commission of India

5.8. Wilkinson’s hypothesis and its modification and alternative explanation

Wilkinson’s hypothesis explains with small modification (see figure 3) the intensity of riots

and the high number of death in particular cases as in Gujarat 2002 and in Orissa 2007

respectively 2008. However, the hypothesis does not explain why the riots happen in a

particular state and period. Regardless, Wilkinson’s hypothesis also explains why the riots do

not happen very often and with low intensity in Kerala and in Orissa in the past and also in

Uttar Pradesh.

In spite of it, there are some cases of violence which had high intensity and many causes of

killing people, but the hypothesis is not strongly supported. One example is Bihar and

Maharashtra in late 1980s and early 1990s where bloody riots happened, although the

government was supposed to be secular and had some support in minorities. According to

Wilkinson’s hypothesis government should prevent the riots and their intensity as well as

protect minorities. There could be more explanation why there was opposite situation:

- changing electoral behaviour in late 1980s and early 1990s and due to this

party system changed, new shaping of major parties and their electoral (this supports

Wilkinson’s assumption, because government did not feel the importance of minority

votes);

91

- increasing potency of nationalist parties (like Shiv Sena in Maharastra) and its

effort to gain votes from growing nationalism;

- over votes and over seats gained by INC in Bihar and its elites felt that

minorities are not as much important for electoral success (this supports Wilkinson’s

assumption, because government did not feel the importance of minority votes);

- alternative economical, demographical and other explanations and theories.

Rajasthan’s example shows that for riots and their intensity must be also other prerequisite.

One should be also a historical background and experience. Gujarat has stronger tradition of

communal clashes than Rajasthan.

Figure 3 shows some modification of Wilkinson’s hypothesis and try it fixed more on present

Indian states. Especially this figure explains Orissa case of riots in 2007 and 2008.

Figure 3 The modified Wilkinson’s hypothesis of relationship between party competition and a state's response to anti-minority polarization and violence

92

Wilkinson’s hypothesis could be verified in some cases, but there should be also many other

expected or unexpected causalities which are out of it. There are some historical, economical,

demographical as well as other sources of causations which are difficult to describe and

attach. However, this hypothesis could be one main source of behaviour of parties and their

electorates during any riots. Moreover, Lijphart’s and Horowitz’s ideal model for divided

societies also gave some explanation as to why riots in India happened. Wilkinson’s

hypothesis does not count with federalism. Nevertheless, this could be one significant factor

which helps to explain relatively peaceful Rajasthan or some periods of violent Gujarat.

Gujarat riots 2002 happened in electoral term when BJP were in power in Gujarat as well as

in Indian Union. Rajasthan changes periods with BJP or INC government on federal and state

level. Both parties do not have coexistence of their government on both levels in the same

time for several electoral terms.

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Conclusion

This work focused on Lijphart and Horowitz’ theoretical concept of ideal model for divided

societies. Indian differences were studied through these two models. According to these two

scholars the main problem for Indian state is based on the Westminster electoral model –

FPTP and also in weak federalism (strong centre and weak states). No minority veto and also

lack of minorities’ representation as well as power sharing and office holding gave big power

the majority not to care about minorities’ needs. Wilkinson’s hypothesis of the impact of

number of the parties in the political system on India states government minorities’ policy

supports and follows up Lijphart and Horowitz. The work supported hypothesis that without

minority electorates’ requirement government do not protect these minorities against violence,

riots and aggression form majority. Wilkinson’s support Lijphart and Horowitz assumption of

office holding and proportional representation. Without that the riots and violence against

minorities would have bigger intensity as Maharashtra, Orissa and Gujarat example showed.

The need of minority support (as well as proportional representation) for government

increases fair behaviour and minority protection from government as the case of Kerala and

partly Uttar Pradesh and Bihar showed. The Wilkinson’s hypothesis does not include all

situation of electoral and party behaviour dependence. Chapter 5.8 enlarged the hypothesis

and the cases of moderate multipartism with bipolar spectrum which have been included in

Wilkinson’s assumption.

The answers to the questions from beginning were given by this work. First of all this thesis

has found the highlighted points of Lijphart and Horowitz theoretical approach of electoral

democracy in divided Indian society and finds which of these points have any practical

conservancies in India. The comparison of Indian real political system with the theoretical

approach of Lijphart and Horowitz shows how and where ethnic disorder is produced by the

system gaps which do not follow the Lijpahrt’s and Horowitz’s ideal model and

recommendation. There is a problem of electoral system which support majority and also a

lack of real federalisation as well as segmental or cultural autonomy and multicultural and

multiethnic veto. The power sharing and minority proportion of office holding is also weak.

There has been evaluation of the Willkinson’s hypothesis of the impact of number of the

parties in the political system on India states government minorities’ policy. Practical cases

show how strong is the influence of majoritarism election system on ethnic policy. The link

between number of parties in state level governments in India and number of ethnical disorder

exist. However, there is some assumption which has been upgraded. There is no necessity of

94

two party system, but there is also importance of existing polarisation in party system.

Bipolarism in multiparty system has also impact on intensity of communal violence. The

Willkinson’s model has been enlarged by the important role of polarisation of party system.

There is also significance of federal government which can back up the intensity of violence if

the state governments have similar political affiliation as the main parties on federal level.

95

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List of Tables

Table 1 Models of democracy for divided societies.................................................................11Table 2 Muslims in Gujarat Assembly elections (winners/candidates)....................................23Table 3 Election results for Lok Sabha in 1999........................................................................45Table 4 Election results for Lok Sabha in 2004........................................................................46Table 5 Indian Administrative Service from 1971 till 1980.....................................................49Table 6 Muslims in Indian Administrative Services since 1981..............................................50Table 7 Representation of OBCs/SCs/STs in the Service of the Central Government in 1979...................................................................................................................................................50Table 8 Total Riots and Deaths by States and Effective Number of Parties............................60Table 9 Effective number of parties in Gujarat........................................................................62Table 10 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 2007.......................................................64Table 11 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 2002.......................................................64Table 12 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 1998.......................................................64Table 13 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 1995.......................................................64Table 14 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 1990.......................................................65Table 15 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 1985.......................................................65Table 15 The Gujarat Assembly Election Results in 1980.......................................................65Table 17 Effective number of parties in Orissa........................................................................67Table 18 Results of the 2004 Orissa Assembly Election..........................................................67Table 19 Results of the 2000 Orissa Assembly Election..........................................................68Table 20 Results of the 1995 Orissa Assembly Election..........................................................68Table 21 Results of the 1990 Orissa Assembly Election..........................................................68Table 22 Results of the 1985 Orissa Assembly Election..........................................................69Table 23 Effective number of parties in Uttar Pradesh.............................................................70Table 24 Results of the 2007 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election..............................................71Table 25 Results of the 2002 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election..............................................72Table 26 Results of the 1996 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election..............................................72Table 27 Results of the 1993 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election..............................................73Table 28 Results of the 1991 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election..............................................73Table 29 Results of the 1989 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election..............................................73Table 30 Results of the 1985 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election..............................................74Table 31 Results of the 1980 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Election..............................................74Table 32 Effective number of parties in Kerala........................................................................76Table 33 Results of the 2006 Kerala Assembly Election.........................................................77Table 34 Results of the 2001 Kerala Assembly Election.........................................................77Table 35 Results of the 1996 Kerala Assembly Election.........................................................78Table 36 Results of the 1991 Kerala Assembly Election.........................................................79Table 37 Results of the 1987 Kerala Assembly Election.........................................................79Table 38 Results of the 1982 Kerala Assembly Election.........................................................80Table 39 Results of the 1980 Kerala Assembly Election.........................................................80Table 40 Effective number of parties in Rajasthan...................................................................82Table 41 Results of the 2003 Rajasthan Assembly Election....................................................83Table 42 Results of the 1998 Rajasthan Assembly Election....................................................83Table 43 Results of the 1993 Rajasthan Assembly Election....................................................84Table 44 Results of the 1985 Rajasthan Assembly Election....................................................84Table 45 Results of the 1980 Rajasthan Assembly Election....................................................84Table 46 Effective number of parties in Maharashtra..............................................................86Table 47 Results of the 2004 Maharashtra Assembly Election................................................87Table 48 Results of the 1999 Maharashtra Assembly Election................................................87

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Table 49 Results of the 1995 Maharashtra Assembly Election................................................88Table 50 Results of the 1990 Maharashtra Assembly Election................................................88Table 51 Results of the 1985 Maharashtra Assembly Election................................................89Table 52 Results of the 1980 Maharashtra Assembly Election................................................89Table 53 Effective number of parties in Bihar..........................................................................90Table 53 Results of the 2005 Bihar Assembly Election...........................................................91Table 55 Results of the 2000 Bihar Assembly Election...........................................................92Table 56 Results of the 1995 Bihar Assembly Election...........................................................92Table 57 Results of the 1990 Bihar Assembly Election...........................................................93Table 58 Results of the 1985 Bihar Assembly Election...........................................................93Table 59 Results of the 1980 Bihar Assembly Election...........................................................94

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List of Figures

Figure 1 The theoretical relationship between party competition and a state's response to antiminority polarization and violence.....................................................................................19Figure 2 Territorial election results for the Lok Sabha election in 2004..................................47Figure 3 The modified Wilkinson’s hypothesis of relationship between party competition and a state's response to antiminority polarization and violence.....................................................95

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List of Diagrams

Diagram 1 Support for main political parties in 1996 election according to religion.............30Diagram 2 Support for main political parties in 1998 election according to religion..............31Diagram 3 Communal Violence and Riots in 1950-1995 and 2001-2008................................59Diagram 4 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Gujarat............................................61Diagram 5 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Orissa..............................................66Diagram 6 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Uttar Pradesh..................................70Diagram 7 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Kerala..............................................75Diagram 8 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Rajasthan.........................................82Diagram 9 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Maharashtra....................................85Diagram 10 Total deaths per year in communal violence, Bihar.............................................90

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List of Abbreviation

AIMIM – All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimen

AV – alternative vote

BJD – Biju Janata Dal

BJP – Bharatiya Janata Party

BSP – Bahujan Samaj Party

CPI – Communist Party of India

CPI (M) – Communist Paty of India (M)

DMK – Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam

ENVP – effective number of parties

FPTP – first past the post electoral system

INC – Indian National Congress

JD(U) – Janata Dal (U)

LF – Left Front

LJNSP – Lok Jan Shakti Party

MP – Member of Parliament

N – Effective number of parties in assembly

NCM – National Commission for Minorities

NCP – Nationalist Congress Party

NDA – National Democratic Alliance

NHRC – National Human Rights Commission

OBCs – Other Backward Classes

PR – proportional representation

RJD – Rashtriya Janata Dal

SAD – Shiromani Akali Dal

SC – Schedule Caste

SHS – Shivsena

SP – Samajwadi Party

ST – Schedule Tribe

STV – single transferable vote

UPA – United Progressive Alliance

USA – United States of America

USCIRF – United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

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Appendix 1 – Political map of India – Union States and Territories

Source: Maps of India

105

Appendix 2 – Structure of Indian population

Percentage distribution of population by religious communities India - 1961 to 2001 Census (without excluding Assam and J&K)

Source: Census of India 2001

Decadal growth rates of religious communities, India – 1961 to 2001 Census (without excluding Assam and J&K)

Source: Census of India 2001

Percentage of population by religious communities and their residence, India - 2001

106

Source: Census of India 2001

Population by religious communities and residence, India - 2001

Source: Census of India 2001

Literacy rate (Persons) by religious communities and residence, India- 2001

Source: Census of India 2001

107