The Regular Army Before the Civil War

8/11/2019 The Regular Army Before the Civil War

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The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War

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CMH Pub 751

Cover: Detail from The Recall by Don Troiani(Historical Image Bank)


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byClayton R. Newell

Center o Military HistoryUnited States Army

Washington, D.C., 2014

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Introduction

Although over one hundred fify years have passed since thestart o the American Civil War, that titanic conflict continues tomatter. Te orces unleashed by that war were immensely destruc-tive because o the significant issues involved: the existence o the

Union, the end o slavery, and the very uture o the nation. Tewar remains our most contentious, and our bloodiest, with oversix hundred thousand killed in the course o the our-year struggle.

Most civil wars do not spring up overnight, and the AmericanCivil War was no exception. Te seeds o the conflict were sownin the earliest days o the republics ounding, primarily over theexistence o slavery and the slave trade. Although no conflict canbegin without the conscious decisions o those engaged in the

debates at that moment, in the end, there was simply no way topaper over the division o the country into two camps: one thatwas dominated by slavery and the other that sought first to limitits spread and then to abolish it. Our nation was indeed hal slaveand hal ree, and that could not stand.

Regardless o the actors tearing the nation asunder, thesoldiers on each side o the struggle went to war or personalreasons: looking or adventure, being caught up in the passions

and emotions o their peers, believing in the Union, avoringstates rights, or even justiying the simple schoolyard dynamico being convinced that they were worth three o the soldierson the other side. Nor can we overlook the actor that some wentto war to prove their manhood. Tis has been, and continuesto be, a key dynamic in understanding combat and the proes-sion o arms. Soldiers join or many reasons but ofen stay in thefight because o their comrades and because they do not want to

seem like cowards. Sometimes issues o national impact shrinkto nothing in the intensely personal world o cannon shell andmini ball.

Whatever the reasons, the struggle was long and costly andonly culminated with the conquest o the rebellious Conederacy,


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the preservation o the Union, and the end o slavery. Tesecampaign pamphlets on the American Civil War, prepared incommemoration o our national sacrifices, seek to rememberthat war and honor those in the United States Army who died topreserve the Union and ree the slaves as well as to tell the story othose American soldiers who ought or the Conederacy despitethe inherently flawed nature o their cause. Te Civil War was ourgreatest struggle and continues to deserve our deep study andcontemplation.

RICHARD W. SEWARChie Historian


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The Regular Army Beforethe Civil War, 18451860

Te fifeen years that preceded the outbreak o the AmericanCivil War were eventul ones or the U.S. Army. Afer invadingand deeating Mexico, the Army dispersed across the vast Western

rontier undertaking a myriad o duties. It subdued AmericanIndian tribes, explored and governed new territories, and generallyworked to maintain peace. At the same time, it supported nationaldevelopment through mapping and engineering projects, grew insize, and undertook important steps toward modernization. Whilethese activities did not ully prepare the Army or the cataclysmthat was to come, they did provide opportunities or officers tohone their leadership skills under trying conditions. Many o the

men who would become generals during the Civil War first tastedbattle as junior officers in Mexico and the American West.

he United States Army in 1845

Te United States Army in the early nineteenth century was amodest institution. Concerns over economy and the threat that a

large Army might pose to liberty led many Americans to regard theArmy as a necessary evil at best. Fortunately, the relative securityafforded by vast oceans and sparsely populated neighbors createda situation in which the United States could survive with a smallmilitary establishment. By 1845, the United States had about 7,300


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men under arms to protect a nation o nearly 20 million peopleand 1.8 million square miles o territory. In contrast, Belgiumsproximity to the great powers o Europe led that country o justover 4 million people and 12,000 square miles to maintain an armyo about 30,000 men. Even Mexico, a nation o 7 million peoplewith whom the United States would soon be at war, maintained aregular army o over 18,000 men with another 10,000 militia onactive duty. I Americans enjoyed relatively inexpensive securityin peacetime, a disorderly and costly rush to mobilize the nationsuntapped financial and human resources would be the inevitableprice or unpreparedness should the nation go to war. Such hadbeen the case when America went to war with Great Britain in

1812, and the upcoming war with Mexico would be no different.Subsumed under the Department o War headed by a

civilian secretary, the U.S. Army was divided into bureau-cratic and combat elements. Te bureaucratic side o the Armyconsisted o 259 staff officers, 17 military storekeepers, andabout 450 enlisted men organized into nine staff departments orbureaus. Heading these bureaus were the Adjutant General, theInspector General, the Paymaster General, the Quartermaster

General, the Commissary General o Subsistence, the SurgeonGeneral, the Chie o Ordnance, the Chie o Engineers, and theChie o opographical Engineers. Tese bureau chies oversawthe Armys logistical and administrative affairs in airly autono-mous ashion. Although they reported to the secretary o war,the bureau chies were jealous o their prerogatives, enjoyeddirect relationships with Congress, and tended thereore to bedifficult to control. Also reporting to the secretary o war was a

commanding general, whose exact role vis vis the bureau chieswas ambiguous and raught with tension. As or the Armyscombat orces, these consisted o ourteen regimentseightinantry, our artillery, and two dragoon. Underunded, under-manned, and dispersed among many small and ofen remoteoutposts, the soldiers o the line lived and worked hard or meagerpay. Few o the aging senior officers had a proessional militaryeducation, while 30 percent o the enlisted ranks were illiterate.

In a land bustling with economic opportunity, many Americanslooked down on soldiers as shifless individuals who donned theblue uniorm either because they could not or would not engagein the industrious pursuits o normal society. Nevertheless, therank and file were tough men, inured to the discipline and exacti-


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tudes o Army lie, and led by an increasingly proessional officercorps because o the efforts o the U.S. Military Academy at WestPoint, New York.

he Mexican War

I many Americans did not hold regulars in high esteem,they recognized their utility when war appeared on the horizonin 1846 (Map 1). ensions with Mexico started ten years earlier,in 1836, when Americans living in the Mexican state o exasrebelled and ormed an independent country, the Republic o

exas. Although the United States government did not intervenein the exas Revolution, it recognized exas independence andthe boundary it claimed with Mexico along the Rio Grande River,neither o which were accepted by the Mexican government.Reflecting national sentiment that it was Americas ManiestDestiny to expand across the North American continent,the United States government eventually moved to annex theRepublic o exas in 1845. When the exas legislature voted to

join the United States in July o that year, President James K. Polkordered Brig. Gen. Zachary aylor to advance into exas as ar as

The American Soldier, 1836, by H. Charles McBarron(U.S. Army Art Collection)


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the Nueces River where Mexico claimed its border with exas tobe. By October 1845, aylor had assembled 3,860 troopsabouthal o the entire Regular Armyat Corpus Christi, exas. Afernegotiations broke down to get Mexico to acknowledge the RioGrande as the proper boundary and to sell Caliornia to theUnited States, Secretary o War William L. Marcy ordered aylorto cross the Nueces in early 1846 and to establish an outpost,named Fort exas, on the Rio Grande River opposite the Mexicantown o Matamoros. aylor dutiully complied beore returningwith the majority o his men to Corpus Christi.

In late April and early May 1846, Mexican orces crossed theRio Grande River, ambushed an American patrol, and laid siege to

Fort exas. Marching to break the siege, aylor met the Mexicansat Palo Alto on 8 May 1846. His army consisted o elements o the3d, 4th, 5th, and 8th Inantry, a battalion rom the 2d Artilleryserving as inantry, two squadrons o dragoons, and three batterieso cannons. During this first major engagement o the war, U.S.Army artillery played an especially central role. Battery A, 2dArtillery, commanded by Capt. James Duncan, and Battery C, 3dArtillery, commanded by Maj. Samuel Ringgold, took up positions

in ront. From their advanced positions, Duncan and Ringgoldfired at the massed Mexican inantry, and because their gunsoutranged the Mexican artillery, the American artillery decidedthe battle. Artillery fire caused most o the Mexicans estimatedour hundred dead. In his report o the battle General aylorwrote: Our artillery, consisting o two 18-pounders and two lightbatteries (C, Tird, A, Second) was the arm chiefly engaged, and tothe excellent manner in which it was manoeuvred [sic] and served

is our success mainly due. American losses totaled six dead andorty wounded. Among the dead was the dashing Major Ringgold,soon to be replaced by another brilliant artilleryman and utureConederate general, Capt. Braxton Bragg.

Te day afer the battle aylor resumed his advance towardFort exas. At Resaca de la Palma, the Mexican Army blocked hisadvance once again, establishing a deensive line along a ravine.Te deenses extended or about a mile on each side o the road

with artillery in the center. Ulysses S. Grant, a lieutenant in the 4thInantry who would go on to lead the Union Army to victory in theCivil War, commanded a company during the battle and recalledhow the rounds fired by the Mexican artillery whistled menacinglyoverhead. When a company o U.S. dragoons overran but ailed to


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hold the Mexican cannon, aylor turned to Col. William Belknap,commander o the 8th Inantry, and shouted take those guns, andby God keep them! Te regiment, accompanied by elements othe 5th Inantry, charged headlong into the ravine. Afer fiercefighting, the American inantrymen captured nine guns whichthey used to fire on the Mexican Army, bringing the battle to asuccessul end.

When word reached Washington that fighting had broken outalong the Rio Grande, Congress moved to put the nation on a warooting. It appropriated $10 million to und the conflict; createda company o sappers, miners, and pontoniers; and strengthenedthe Regular Army by increasing company strength rom sixty-our

to one hundred privates. It also created a new regular unittheRegiment o Mounted Riflemento secure settlers moving west,although the administration would soon send this unit to Mexicoas well. Last but not least, Congress authorized the president tocall up fify thousand volunteers to supplement the Regular Army.Unlike the regular units, the new volunteer regiments were raised,organized, staffed, and equipped by the individual states beorebeing mustered into ederal service.

Ater several months o accumulating supplies and incor-porating some volunteer units into the Army, aylor, now abrevet major general or his victories at Palo Alto and Resacade la Palma, began marching toward Monterrey, Mexico, inAugust 1846. He reached the city the next month with aboutthree thousand regulars and three thousand volunteers. Wellortiied and deended by seven thousand Mexicans, the towno Monterrey posed a signiicant challenge. aylor sent attack

columns toward two sides o the city while artillery ired on theortiications. he Americans encountered tough resistance asthey pushed their way into the town. he Mexican commanderoered to surrender on 24 September provided aylor wouldpermit him to withdraw unmolested and grant an eight-weektruce. aylor, believing generosity would urther peace nego-tiations, agreed to the terms. However, when President Polkreceived the news, he terminated the armistice and directed

Maj. Gen. Winield Scott, commanding general o the Army,to conduct a campaign to capture Mexico City. aylor did notwelcome the news that most o his army, including virtually allo the regulars, would be reassigned to Scott in preparation orthe upcoming oensive.


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Te departure o the regulars in January 1847 lef Generalaylor with ewer than seven thousand men, all volunteers exceptor a ew companies o the 2d Dragoons and the cannon batteriesrom the 3d and 4th Artillery. Meanwhile, General Santa Anna,president o Mexico, assembled an army o some twenty thousandmen. aylor expected that Santa Anna would move against Scottwhen his army landed at Vera Cruz. However, when the Mexicangeneral learned that most o aylors orces had been transerredto Scott, he decided to make a bold strategic move. He turnednorth hoping to win a quick victory over aylors smaller army. By22 February 1847, the Mexican Army had fifeen thousand menarrayed against ewer than five thousand Americans near Buena

Vista. When the battle opened Santa Anna hit aylors lef hardcausing it to collapse. As the rantic American retreat threatenedto develop into a rout, Captain Bragg galloped onto the field at thehead o Battery C, 3d Artillery. According to aylors report o thebattle, the Mexicans were but a ew yards rom the muzzles o hispieces. Te first discharge o canister caused the enemy to hesitate,the second and third drove him back in disorder and saved the day.According to tradition, aylor said, A little more grape, Captain

Bragg. However the 3d Artillery regimental history points out thatin all probability the general really shouted Captain, give themhell, as the guns raced into position. In any case, Santa Anna,having lost between fifeen hundred and two thousand men killedand wounded, decided to withdraw. Although a near run thing,the American victory ended the fighting in northern Mexico.

Just about the time aylor began his march toward Monterreyin August 1846, the United States opened another ront in the

war. Col. Stephen W. Kearny, commander o the 1st Dragoons,lef Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, with eighteen hundred men desig-nated as the Army o the West. Kearnys mission was to captureSanta Fe, Mexico, and then move on to occupy Caliornia. Hehad five companies o dragoons, two companies o artillery, andtwo companies o inantry rom the Regular Army as well as ninecompanies o Missouri Volunteer cavalry. By 18 August Kearnyhad taken Santa Fe without a fight. Leaving the Missourians to

hold the town, he moved on to Caliornia with the dragoons.By early December, as Kearny neared San Diego he met a smallparty o U.S. marines sent by Commodore Robert F. Stockton whohad been directed to blockade Mexican ports and to assist Armyoperations in Caliornia.


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On 6 December, Kearny attacked a orce o Mexican lancers

at San Pascual with two companies o the 1st Dragoons andthe marines. Kearnys dragoons were mounted on mules tiredrom the long trek to Caliornia, and when the Mexican lancerscharged they inflicted severe losses on the Americans. Afer theirinitial charge, however, the lancers withdrew and Kearnys orcesoccupied San Diego. Moving north, the Americans engaged 350Mexicans just south o Los Angeles and quickly routed them, thusending urther resistance in Caliornia. In February 1847, the

Missouri Volunteers who had been lef in Santa Fe, along with acompany o the 1st Dragoons, deeated a orce o Mexicans southo El Paso. Tat action ended any urther threats to the Americanconquest o New Mexico and Caliornia.

American successes in the north and west notwithstanding,Mexico reused to accept Americas terms or peace. Realizing thatthe war would continue, in February 1847, Congress authorized therecruitment o ten new regiments or the Regular Army. Te orce

included the 3d Dragoons, eight inantry regiments numbered the9th through the 16th Inantry, and an unusual hybrid organizationgrandly designated the Regiment o Voltigeurs and Foot Riflemen.Te unit was to consist o highly trained skirmishersvoltiguersinFrenchwho would fight on oot but be transported by horses. Only

An Army train crossing the plains(Library of Congress)


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hal o the men in the regiment were to have horses. o acilitateshort, rapid movements the man on the ground would ride behindthe mounted soldier. In practice the concept ailed to materializeand the voltigeurs operated largely on oot, as did the Regiment oMounted Riflemen, which lost most o its horses in a storm whilecrossing the Gul o Mexico in ships. What truly distinguished thesetwo units rom the rest o the regular inantry in Mexico was thatthey were armed with model 1841 rifles, weapons that enjoyedgreater range and accuracy than the smoothbore muskets carriedby most inantrymen during the war. Congress provided additionalsupport in March when it increased the number o companies ineach artillery regiment rom ten to twelve.

While Congress initiated these measures in Washington,General Scott prepared his army or an amphibious landing at VeraCruz on Mexicos east coast. From there he planned to drive inlandto capture Mexico City. Scott set sail on 2 March with a orce omore than thirteen thousand men that included both regulars andvolunteers. On the evening o 9 March, he launched the Armysfirst major amphibious landing as more than ten thousand menwent ashore in waves using sixty-five heavy sur boats. Te troops

landed unopposed on a beach approximately three miles rom Vera

The American Soldier, 1847,by H. Charles McBarron(U.S. Army Art Collection)


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Cruz in about our hours. Pvt. George Ballantine, 1st Artillery,recalled the landings as exciting and imposing. As he watched thefirst wave orm up or the run to the beach, military bands romdifferent regiments stationed on the decks o steamers, transports,and men-o-war played . . . Yankee Doodle, Hail Columbia, andTe Star Spangled Banner. Te city quickly ell afer a brie siege.

Afer capturing Vera Cruz, Scott advanced on Mexico City. Hisarmy met little resistance initially, but in April, when the army reachedCerro Gordo, it encountered a strongly entrenched Mexican orceo about twelve thousand men holding positions in a rocky defilethat controlled the road leading to Mexico City. General Santa Annahad emplaced artillery batteries on mountain spurs on the lef o

his position. On the right, Mexican guns positioned on El elegraocommanded the high ground that overlooked the highway. On themorning o 12 April, Mexican gunners opened fire on the advanceelements o Scotts army while they were still out o range. Notwanting to assault the Mexican deenses directly, Scott sent his engi-neers to look or a route to outflank the position. Lt. Robert E. Lee,an engineer and uture Conederate general, discovered a ravine thatbypassed the main deenses. Tis route enabled Brig. Gen. David E.

wiggs to move his division o regulars into a position to attack theMexican rear. Private Ballantinerecalled his captain askingGeneral wiggs how ar theyshould charge, and receivingthe answer, charge them tohell! Te generals responsewas prophetic as the fighting

became a orm o hell with bothsides resorting to the bayonetin hand-to-hand combat. Pvt.Barna Upton in the 3d Inantrywitnessed a kind o fightingwhich I hope never to see again.It seemed like murder to seemen running bayonets into each

others breasts. wiggs flankingmovement succeeded in cuttingthe enemys escape route, andthe Mexicans surrendered indroves. Santa Anna lost between

Robert E. Lee in the Dress Uniformof a Lt. of Engineers by William

Edward West(Washington-Custis-Lee Collection,

Washington and Lee University,Lexington, Va.)


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one thousand and twelve hundred casualties and three thousandprisoners. American losses were 64 killed and 353 wounded.

By the end o May 1847, Scott reached Puebla with just 5,820effective enlisted men. Many soldiers had been hospitalized withwounds and sickness, and seven volunteer regiments whose enlist-ments had expired had departed or home with another 3,700 men.Te general had no choice but to halt and await the arrival o reshtroops rom the United States. Afer receiving reinorcements thatbrought his army to about ten thousand men, Scott resumed theadvance on 7 August. With Mexican guerrillas blocking his supplyline back to Vera Cruz, Scott needed to capture Mexico City beorehis supplies ran out. Afer three days o marching, the column

reached a high plateau about ourteen miles rom the capital.Although the Americans were close to their objective, Santa

Anna would not concede Mexico City without a fight. At theChurubusco River the Mexicans took advantage o the thick walls othe San Mateo Convent to conduct a determined deense that keptthe Americans at bay or several hours. Second Lt. Henry J. Hunt, 2dArtillery, rushed orward, unlimbered his cannons under fire, andunleashed what Maj. Gen. William J. Worth termed a fire o aston-

ishing rapidity at the ortifications. With the help o Hunts guns,the 3d Inantry orced its way through the deenses, causing theMexican garrison to surrender. Te report written by the Mexicancommander cited Capt. James M. Smith, a company commander inthe regiment, as having been the first to present himsel upon theparapet, providing an example o valor to many ollowing him.

Te Americans next met the Mexicans at Molino del Rey. Maj.George Wright, 8th Inantry, commanded the assault column. In his

report o the battle he recalled: At the distance o 200 yards the enemyopened on us with round and grape shot with considerable effect, theground being perectly level. I instantly ordered the double quickstep; the line advanced rapidly and immediately came within musketrange. Afer being hit by a musket ball and carried rom the battle-field, Wright later reported that the assaulting column continuedin combat . . . until the enemys positions were all carried and weremained in possession o the field; afer which there being but three

officers lef and the rank and file very much reduced. Te 5th Inantryconducted repeated charges against Casa Mata, a fiercely deendedstone structure located five hundred yards rom Molina del Rey. Te5th, along with the 6th and 8th Inantry met determined oppositionand attacked repeatedly beore finally driving the deenders rom


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the position. Te 5th Inantry paid a high price or its success. Teregiment started the battle with 13 officers and 342 enlisted soldiers.It lost 3 officers and 27 men killed, 4 officers and 107 men wounded,and 5 men missingsome 40 percent o its strength.

Te citadel o Chapultepec remained the final obstacleto capturing Mexico City. On 13 September, a storming partybegan the assault. Te 4th Inantry regimental history succinctlydescribes the action: Under a terrific storm o shot and shell theparty reached the ditch and main walls o the ortress, scalingladders were brought up and amid hand-to-hand fighting a lodge-ment [sic] was secured. Mexico City surrendered the ollowingday. As the 3d Inantry led the victorious American Army into the

Grand Plaza o the city, General Scott is reputed to have removedhis hat and told his staff to take off your hats to the Old Guard othe Army. Te 3d Inantry, which today serves as the presidentsofficial escort and guards the omb o the Unknown Soldier inArlington National Cemetery, Virginia, continues to be known asthe Old Guard.

On 2 February 1848, the reaty o Guadalupe Hidalgoofficially ended the war (Map 2). Te last American soldier lef

Mexico in August, and the national boundary between the twocountries became the Rio Grande. At the same time, Mexico cededthe territories o Caliornia and New Mexico, thereby addingapproximately 1.2 million square miles o territory to the UnitedStates. During the war the Army had demonstrated its toughnessand discipline, and Scott credited his victory in Mexico to hisbattle-hardened soldiers. Te nation mobilized about one hundredsixteen thousand men or the war, although the number in the

field at any one time was significantly smaller. Over orty-twothousand men served in the Regular Army, whose five-year termo enlistment meant that most o them were in uniorm or theentire war. Te service o the mobilized militia and U.S. Volunteersvaried more widely according to the terms o their enlistments.Some served or three months, others or twelve months, whilestill others stayed or the duration o the war. O the approximatelyseventy-our thousand men who entered volunteer service, only

about thirty thousand served in Mexico.Although the vast majority o men who ought in the MexicanWar were raw recruits, they benefited by the existence o the mostproessional officer corps since the creation o the U.S. Army. By1847, the U.S. Military Academy, ounded in 1802, had produced


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1,330 graduates, o whom 523 were in the Army when the war began.About another five hundred graduates returned to the Army romcivilian lie serving primarily with the U.S. Volunteers. Althoughnone o the Regular Army generals and ew o its field grade officers(major, lieutenant colonel, colonel) had been educated at WestPoint, academy graduates dominated the Regular Armys juniorofficer ranks, creating a proessional atmosphere at the unit level.Te situation was reversed or the volunteers. Unlike the regulars,the U.S. Volunteers had a large number o field grade officers whohad graduated rom West Point, lef the Army, and returned touniorm or the war. One o the most notable, Col. Jefferson Davis,who commanded the 1st Mississippi Rifles, went on to become a

U.S. senator, secretary o war, and eventually the president o theConederate States o America. However, the volunteers had ewcapable company grade officers (lieutenants and captains). Mosto them were either appointed by governors or political reasons orelected by the enlisted men they recruited and came to their postswith little or no military experience.

At the end o the Mexican War, Congress disbanded thevolunteers and reduced the Regular Army to an authorized

strength o 865 officers and 8,940 enlisted men. Te govern-ment eliminated the inantry regiments created during the war

but retained the Regiment oMounted Riflemen and thetwo companies added to eachartillery regiment. Whetherthey remained in service orreturned to civilian lie, many

o the men who had ought inthe Mexican WarLee, Grant,Bragg, Hunt, Henry Halleck,Joseph Hooker, George B.McClellan, George Sykes,William . Sherman, P. . G.Beauregard, A. P. Hill, TomasJ. Jackson, James Longstreet,

and George Pickett to name aewwould re-emerge on thenational stage to lead Unionand Conederate armies duringthe American Civil War.

Bvt. 2Lt. Ulysses S. Grant(James Bultema Collection)


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he Army Moves West

Te dramatic increase in the size o the United States thatresulted rom the reaty o Guadalupe Hidalgo, an 1846 treatywith Britain that added over 285,000 square miles in what is nowOregon and Washington, and an 1853 agreement with Mexico thatgained about another 30,000 square miles in southern Arizona andNew Mexico, required the Army to shif its resources west. Priorto the Mexican War, the Army had fify-six military posts in theUnited States, only twelve o which were west o the MississippiRiver. When thousands o settlers headed or Caliornia andOregon afer the Mexican War, the Army established new orts

to protect the migration. By 1860, the Army had seventy-six ortswest o the Mississippi River alone. Some remained in use or onlya ew years while others remained garrisoned or decades.

For administrative purposes, the Army divided the nationinto military departments. Tese changed over time but eventu-ally numbered seven by 1860. (See Map 3.) A brigadier generalor a colonel commanded each department. Because colonels whocommanded departments were also regimental commanders, such

individuals relied on a lieutenant colonel to run their regiment.By 1860 the Department o the East comprised all o the

country east o the Mississippi River. Te Department o the Weststretched rom the Mississippi River to the Rocky Mountains androm the Canadian border to the Rio Grande. Te departmenthad its headquarters in St. Louis, Missouri. Te northwest cornero the country constituted the Department o Oregon whichincluded Oregon and Washington erritory. Its headquarters was

at Fort Vancouver, Washington. Te Department o Caliorniaincluded the state o Caliornia as well as portions o Utah andNew Mexico erritories. Te Presidio o San Francisco servedas its headquarters. Te Departments o Utah and New Mexicolay east o Caliornia and consisted o the territories o the samenames except or those portions assigned to the Department oCaliornia. Te Department o New Mexico had its headquartersat Santa Fe, while Camp Floyd served as the headquarters o the

Department o Utah. Finally, the Department o exas embracedthe state o that name with its headquarters at San Antonio.Te reduction o the Army at the end o the war lef the military

establishment with fifeen regimentseight inantry, our artil-lery, and three mountedto garrison the seven departments. Te


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inantry and mounted regiments moved rom Mexico to westernposts while the artillery regiments deployed to ortifications alongthe Atlantic seaboard. Te 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Inantry initially wentto Louisiana, the 5th deployed to Arkansas and Indian erritory,while the 6th, 7th, and 8th Inantry traveled to Jefferson Barracks,Missouri. Te 1st and 2d Artillery went to Governors Island, NewYork, while the 3d and 4th assembled at Fort Monroe, Virginia. TeRegiment o Mounted Riflemen went to Fort Leavenworth and thetwo dragoon regiments remained in the southwest to patrol theMexican border along the Rio Grande. From these locations theregiments urther broke down and dispersed in small detachmentsto bring security to Americas long coast and expansive rontier.

Contrary to the Hollywood image, very ew o the so-calledorts in the American West were actually ortified. Western ortswere designed primarily as shelter or small communities oofficers, enlisted men, amily members, and civilian camp ollowers,rather than as deensive structures. Tey were usually built by thesoldiers who established and occupied them, and the constructionvaried widely, depending on the skills o the workmen and theavailability o building materials. Te soldier-builders preerred

lumber, but brick, stone, adobe, and in some cases brush, had tobe used depending on the location.

One o the oldest posts west o the Mississippi River was FortLeavenworth, initially established by Col. Henry Leavenworth, 3dInantry, in 1827. Its location near the start o both the Santa Fe

The second Fort Kearny in 1849(Nebraska State Historical Society)


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and Oregon trails made it the gateway to the West or thousandso settlers in the 1850s. Fort Leavenworth also served as a stagingarea or a number o expeditions including campaigns against theSioux in 1855 and the Cheyenne in 1857.

In June 1849, the Army purchased a privately owned tradingpost along the Laramie River that had been there since 1834. TeArmy acquired the property in response to a congressional mandatethat it establish military stations along the Oregon rail. Unlike mostorts in the West, the trading post had been ortified with walls.William Buffalo Bill Cody described the original structure as havingwalls twenty eet high and our eet thick, encompassing an area twohundred and fify eet long by two hundred wide. No military rontier

post in the United States was as beautiul as Fort Laramie, Buffalo Billwent on to write. It was an oasis in the desert. Its first garrison, twocompanies o the Regiment o Mounted Riflemen and a company othe 6th Inantry, lived in the existing buildings until new ones couldbe built outside the trading post walls in the tradition o the Armysother rontier orts. Fort Laramie became a popular stopping pointor travelers along the Oregon rail. Te post register recorded thatalmost ten thousand wagons passed through in 1850, and in 1852 an

estimated orty thousand people traveled by Fort Laramie. Te postalso played an important role as a staging area or expeditions againsthostile Native Americans in the Great Plains. (See Map 4.)

Further south, in New Mexico erritory, Lt. Col. EdwinV. Sumner, 1st Dragoons, established Fort Union in 1851 toprotect the Santa Fe rail and local settlements rom JicarillaApache and Ute Indians. he new ort soon became a mainstayo the southwestern deense system in New Mexico erritory,

providing both operational and logistical unctions. roopsbased at Fort Union conducted operations against AmericanIndian tribes, patrolled the Santa Fe rail, and escorted stage-coaches carrying mail.

In addition to providing protection along the major migra-tion routes, the Army built a series o orts in exas to protecttravelers along the road rom San Antonio to El Paso, to controlhostile Apache and Comanche Indians in the area, and to guard

the border. In 1854, Lt. Col. Washington Seawell, 8th Inantry,established Fort Davis, named or Jefferson Davis, the secretary owar at the time. Six companies o the 8th Inantry began buildingthe post, using local materials to construct what were known asjacal-type buildings in which cottonwood strips were tied together


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around a rame and filled with mud, clay and grass, providingrudimentary shelter rom the elements.

Te American West encompassed a huge expanse o land,and the Army was hard-pressed to maintain a presence every-where soldiers were needed. Most o the Armys rontier ortswere garrisoned by only one or two companies. Te 6th Inantrysexperience typified how the Army dispersed to cover the rontier.Te regiment assembled briefly at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri,afer returning rom Mexico in July 1848, but by 31 Decemberthe regimental headquarters had moved to St. Louis. Company Dremained at Jefferson Barracks, but Companies A, E, and K wereat Fort Snelling, Minnesota; B and F at Fort Craword, Wisconsin

erritory; C at Fort Atkinson, Kansas erritory; G and I at FortLeavenworth; and H at Fort Scott, Kansas.

Most o the Armys regiments spent considerable time in thefield, and companies moved requently to meet changing require-ments. According to its regimental history, the 2d Cavalry spentmost o its time under canvas, with a certainty o constant scoutingand a change o station at least once a year. Long marches werecommon. While campaigning in 1851, Company B, 1st Dragoons,

rode 2,240 miles across the central Great Plains. In 1856, the 3dInantry covered 500 miles in New Mexico erritory searching orGila and Mogollon Apaches. During three months in 1858, the6th Inantrymarched over one thousand miles rom Fort Bridger,Utah erritory, to Benicia Barracks, near San Francisco, Caliornia.Capt. Winfield Scott Hancock, a uture Civil War general whoparticipated in the march, observed that the men bore the atiguewell, and their general conduct is avorably represented by the

officers. wo years later, Battery B, 4th Artillery, traveled over twothousand miles across a barren and desert country to protectmail routes rom hostile Indians in Utah erritory.

he Army and Native Americans

Te Army had been interacting with American Indians

long beore the Mexican War. By the end o the War o 1812, theUnited States had conquered most o the tribes living east o theMississippi River. One important exception was Floridas SeminoleIndians. Prior to the Mexican War the United States had oughttwo costly wars in Florida that had resulted in the removal o the


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majority o Seminoles to Indian erritory west o the MississippiRiver. Several hundred had remained behind, however, and in1855 a third conflict with the Seminoles erupted. Te 4th Artilleryspent the years afer the Mexican War in Florida where, accordingto the regimental history, it was very actively engaged in huntingIndians . . . and suffered great hardships in some o its expedi-tions through the swamp. Te fighting in Florida finally ended in1858 when all but a handul o American Indians agreed to moveto Indian erritory. Te ew Seminoles who reused to relocatewithdrew into the Florida Everglades where they rerained romurther conrontations with the white population.

Indian-White conflict was rare east o the Mississippi afer

the Mexican War; however, the situation was different west o theriver. Here Indians resented and resisted the growing encroach-ment o white settlers on their lands, be they in the Great Plains,the mountains o the Pacific Northwest, or the Southwesterndeserts. Te Armys primary mission in the West was to protectAmerican civilians, particularly along the major migration routessuch as the Oregon and Santa Fe trails. In an effort to make theOregon rail saer, in the summer o 1851 the United States signed

a treaty at Fort Laramie that called or peace with the Indian tribesthat populated the northern Great Plains. Some ten thousandIndians representing the Cheyenne, Arapaho, Crow, Shoshone,Assiniboine, Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara assembled or thelargest council in recorded history. Under the terms the NativeAmericans agreed to allow roads and orts to be built in their terri-tories while the U.S. government promised to protect the Indiansrom hostile settlers and to provide an annual payment o $50,000

worth o goods or fify years. Although Congress later cut theannuity period to ten years, and some tribes received nothing, thetreaty did bring a brie period o respite along the Oregon rail.wo years later the government met with Comanche, Kiowa, andother tribes o the Southern Plains at Fort Atkinson, Kansas, tomake the Santa Fe rail saer. Te treaty that resulted resembledthe one signed at Fort Laramie and helped to keep the peace in theSouthwest or a ew years as well.

Te Armys relationship with individual tribes changed overtime. An example is the Armys relations with the Navajo in NewMexico erritory. In 1853, Col. Joseph K. F. Mansfield reportedthat at Fort Defiance the Indians are reely admitted in and aboutthe ort during the day and are riendly and bring peaches to sell.


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But as more settlers moved into the area, the Navajo grew resentul.In April 1860 some one thousand Navajo warriors attacked andbriefly occupied parts o the ort beore the garrison drove themout. Te attack marked one o the ew times Native Americans inthe West assaulted an Army ort.

Far more common than assaults on a major post were fightsin the open countryside. Most o these engagements were smallaffairs with ew casualties on either side. Nevertheless, a seem-ingly small incident could provoke a major fight. In August 1854,a settler on a westbound wagon train registered a complaint atFort Laramie that a Sioux Indian had butchered a lame ox. SecondLt. John L. Grattan, just one year out o West Point, led a orce o

thirty men rom Company G, 6th Inantry, along with two artillerypieces and their crews to apprehend the culprit. Although advisedto be cautious, the young lieutenant led his orce directly into anIndian camp about eight miles rom the ort and demanded thatthe guilty party surrender. A tense standoff ensued that soon ledto gunfire. While it is not clear who fired the first shot, Indian

31

Fort Defiance, New Mexico,by Seth Eastman(Architect of the Capitol)


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warriors quickly overwhelmed Grattan and his men. A singlewounded soldier made it back to Fort Laramie to report theincident beore he died o his wounds.

In August 1855 the Army launched a concerted effort to findthe Indians responsible or the Grattan Massacre. Col. WilliamS. Harney, commander o the 2d Dragoons, organized a orceo more than six hundred men that included companies rom aseveral different regiments. Intending to strike a decisive blowagainst any one o the hostile bands o Sioux, Harney arrivedon the North Platte River on 2 September. Six miles away aboutour hundred Brule Lakotas had established a village. About onehundred twenty o the Indians were o fighting age. Harney knew

that the village leader, Little Tunder, had been one o the menimplicated in the Grattan killings. Planning to attack quickly,he sent our mounted companies across the North Platte River,where they would be north o the village, to block a retreat bythe Brules. Te inantry moved into position to attack rom thesouth. When the mounted units heard gunfire they were to jointhe attack. As the inantry moved orward they encountered asmall party o Brules on horseback. Anticipating trouble, Little

Tunder ordered the villagers to strike their tepees and movenorth. He then rode to meet Harney under a flag o truce. Harneydemanded that Little Tunder turn over the men responsible orthe Grattan Massacre and other disturbances. Little Tunderreused. Harney ordered his troops to advance. As the Indianstried to flee they were caught between the inantry and themounted troops. Te toll amounted to eighty-six Brules killedand five wounded along with about seventy women and children

taken prisoner. Seven enlisted soldiers died and five werewounded. Little Tunder escaped. A search o what remained othe village revealed army clothing that presumably belonged toGrattans men and papers rom mail robberies.

One o the more active theaters in the decade beore theCivil War was the Pacific Northwest, where the Army attemptedto paciy the indigenous inhabitants and orce them onto reserva-tions. Conflict inevitably resulted. wo examples rom 1856 illus-

trate the nature o these fights. In March 1856, about one hundredYakima, Klickitat, and Chinook warriors surrounded a block-house manned by eight soldiers at Middle Cascades, Washingtonerritory. Upon learning o the siege, 2d Lt. Philip H. Sheridangathered about orty inantrymen rom the 4th Inantry at Fort


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Vancouver, loaded them aboard a steamboat, and headed up theColumbia River. At about the same time, Col. George Wright, 9thInantry, sent some two hundred fify soldiers down the river ontwo steamboats to join Sheridan. Te combined orce lifed thesiege, but the Yakimas and Klickitats escaped. Colonel Wrighttried nine Chinook tribal leaders at a military tribunal and hangedeight o them. Both Sheridan and Wright would become generalsa ew years later during the Civil War.

At about the same time as the siege, our companies romthe 4th Inantry, two rom the 3d Artillery, and one rom the1st Dragoons under Maj. Robert C. Buchanan set out in Oregonerritory to orce the American Indians o the Rogue River

area to move onto the Coast Reservation. Ater two months omarching through damp, cold mountains, Buchanan invited theIndians to a peace conerence in late May. he Indians promisedto surrender, but when a detachment o about eighty soldiersand a howitzer assembled at the designated meeting place at BigMeadows, Oregon erritory, a pair o Native women warnedthem that a Rogue Indian chie known as Old John plannedto attack them the next day. Ater sending a courier or rein-

orcements, the men dug in and with the help o the howitzerrepulsed Old John and his 200 warriors on 27 May 1856. Bythe ollowing day, however, the situation was desperate, with athird o the soldiers killed or wounded, their water gone, andtheir ammunition running low. he Native Americans weremassing or a inal assault when reinorcements in the guiseo a company o the 4th Inantry led by Capt. Christopher C.Auger suddenly appeared behind the Indians. he deenders

rallied and charged the warriors who retreated, taking theirdead and wounded with them. he ight at Big Meadow eec-tively ended the Rogue River War, with some twelve hundredIndians surrendering to reservations by the end o June. LikeSheridan and Wright, Buchanan and Augur were destined tobecome Union generals during the Civil War.

he Army and the Settlers

Although the Armys mission in the West centered onprotecting settlers rom American Indians, on occasion soldierswere called on to protect Indians rom whites, be they trespassers,unlawul settlers and prospectors, unscrupulous merchants, or


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hateul vigilantes. A number o Army officers had little regardor some o the civilians they encountered on the rontier. Teywere struck by the low regard rontiersmen had or human lie.Lt. Richard Johnson wrote rom Fort Davis that people areignorant, destitute o any refinement, and have no respect or thelaws. Another officer described exas as a country where little isknown o, less cared or, the laws o God and man. Most Armyofficers wanted to resolve problems between Native Americansand settlers without resorting to violence, a view ofen not sharedby white civilians living on the rontier. Capt. Tomas W. Sweeneyexpressed his opinion that all our Indian wars, with very ewexceptions, are brought on either by ourfrontier settlers. . . or the

traders in the Indian Country, who as a class, are an unmitigatedset o scoundrels (emphasis original).

rying to keep the peace between whites and AmericanIndians was a difficult and ofen thankless job, but soldiers werealso called on to keep the peace among whites themselves. On twooccasions, the government deployed substantial orces or such apurpose. Te first o these events occurred in Kansas, the secondin Utah.

In 1854, the question o whether slavery should be permittedto spread westward provoked civil disturbances in Kansas. TeMissouri Compromise o 1820 had prohibited slavery north o3630, but during its efforts to organize the Kansas-Nebraskaerritory, Congress passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act that repealedthe Missouri Compromise and lef the slavery question up to localauthorities to resolve. Te inevitable outcome o this decision was afierce and sometimes violent debate in Kansas between proslavery

and antislavery settlers. By 1855, two rival governments existedin the territory, one proslavery, the other antislavery. Te situa-tion came to a head in May 1856, when proslavery orces sackedLawrence, an antislavery, or ree-soil, town. Several days later thenoted abolitionist, John Brown, and six o his ollowers retaliatedby executing five proslavery men. Te two events ignited numerousencounters between armed bands rom both sides.

With lawlessness becoming endemic, the territorial governor,

Wilson E. Shannon, requested assistance rom the ederal govern-ment. Colonel Sumner, commander o the 1st Cavalry and FortLeavenworth, sent mounted troopers to patrol the roads betweenLawrence and the slave state o Missouri. Nevertheless, or the resto the summer chaos reigned in Kansas as ree-soil and proslavery


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Faced with the probability o armed conlict with theMormons and an unseasonable blizzard, Alexander retreated.In the meantime, the War Department ordered Col. Albert S.Johnston, commander o the 2d Cavalry and uture Conederategeneral, to take command o the altering expedition. Arrivingon the scene rom exas in November 1857, he led the wearytroops into winter quarters at Fort Bridger, Utah, and beganplanning or a spring campaign. Shortly thereater the newlyappointed territorial governor, Alred E. Cumming, arrived atFort Bridger. Johnston and Cumming believed that the situa-tion had to be settled by orce, but in June 1858, peace commis-sioners sent by President Buchanan arrived in Utah and negoti-

ated a settlement without bloodshed. he so-called MormonWar never happened. he Army occupied several orts in Utaherritory until 1861, when it sent the men East at the beginningo the Civil War.

Army Life on the Frontier

he years beore the Civil War ound the Army largely

isolated rom the rest o the nation. he small garrisons in theWest where most o the soldiers were stationed were lonelyoutposts. Oicers and noncommissioned oicers who wereassigned to the War Department in Washington, D.C., or to oneo the depots or arsenals in the East, as well the artillerymenwho garrisoned coastal ortiications, lived reasonably pleasantlives. heir ellow soldiers stationed on the rontier regularlyendured hardship, disease, poor rations, and less than desirable

living quarters.Soldiers in the nineteenth-century Army generally spenttheir entire military career in the same regiment, whether servingor a single enlistment or a lietime. Many who served on therontier prior to the Civil War were rom Northern cities. Teyincluded young boys and men seeking adventure, men escapingproblems at home, and European immigrants. As an exampleo the diversity in the ranks, when the 10th Inantry began

recruiting in 1855, o the first 500 men who enlisted in the newregiment, 66 were born in New England, 149 were rom the Westand Midwest, and 285 were oreign-born. Te regimental historynotes that 55 percent o the recruits deserted beore completingtheir enlistments.


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Other than the occasional encounter with hostile NativeAmericans, lie on the rontier could be tedious. Capt. John W.Phelps, a company commander serving at Camp Floyd, wrote in1859: I am suocating, physically, morally and intellectuallyin every way. I am airly gasping or resh outside air, and eelas an oicer said the other day, like begging to be taken out andhung or the sake o variety. Enlisted soldiers likewise oundgarrison lie dull. Eugene Bandel, a company irst sergeant inthe 6th Inantry, wrote to his parents in June 1859 that there isvery little to vary the monotony as the weeks go by. First Sgt.Percival Lowe with the 1st Dragoons in New Mexico, on theother hand, recalled how his unit battled boredom by orming

a thespian society that perormed weekly or the oicers andtheir wives.

Frontier orts varied in their amenities. In 1853 ColonelMansield toured New Mexico erritory and reported thatthe buildings at Fort Union were as good as at any post andthere seems to be enough o them to satisy the demands o theservice. At Fort Webster, however, he ound the constructionquite indierent and not suicient or the command, while

at Fort Conrad, he quarters o both oicers and soldiersare alling to pieces. he ollowing year he inspected posts inCaliornia and was once again largely unimpressed. He oundthe barracks at the Presidio o San Francisco to be miserableadobe buildings, while the living quarters at the Mission o SanDiego were worthless or the men and quite indierent andnot suitable or the oicers.

Despite shortcomings in their quarters, the occupants gener-

ally made the best o their situation. When eresa Griffin Viele,wie o Lt. Egbert L. Viele, 1st Inantry, got her first look at CampRinggold, exas, in 1851, she thought the buildings all remindedme o the house o the oolish man, who builds his oundationupon the sand, all being in the same plight. Tere were no signso vegetation around; not even a blade o grass. In spite o thatdismal first impression, she looked back on the year passed inthis isolated spot as one ull o pleasant recollections. Compared

with acing the elements when out in the field, Lt. Edward L. Hartzreflected that his quarters at Fort Davis were decidedly pleasantwhen returning agged out rom constant traveling, bivouackingand hard eeding. Tey offer you a comortable bed, a roo toshelter, and the enticements o a tolerably well spread table.


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Expansion and Modernization

Even as its soldiers engaged in their long-standing duties as arontier constabulary, the Army endeavored to modernize. When theMexican War had ended in 1848 the Army reverted to a peacetimestrength o ewer than ten thousand soldiers, essentially the samestrength it had been authorized in 1815 at the conclusion o the Waro 1812. However, as demands o rontier service increased, Congressraised the number o privates in each company stationed in the Westto 74, making the authorized strength o the Army 12,927 officersand men. Ten, in 1855, Secretary Davis persuaded Congress to addour regiments to the Army, two each o inantry and cavalry. Te 9th

Inantry ormed at Fort Monroe and the 10th Inantry assembled atCarlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, afer which both regiments movedto the Western rontier. Te 1st and 2d Cavalry organized at JeffersonBarracks. Te 1st Cavalry then moved to Fort Leavenworth while the2d went to exas. With the two new cavalry regiments, the Army nowhad three distinct kinds o mounted troopsdragoons, mountedriflemen, and cavalry. Each carried different weapons and wore

The American Soldier, 1855, by H. Charles McBarron(U.S. Army Art Collection)


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and pronounced it superior to the venerable smoothbore. Tenext year, the ederal armories at Springfield, Massachusetts, andHarpers Ferry, Virginia, began converting old smoothbores intorifles by adding rifling to the bores. Tey also began producing anew weapon, the Springfield Model 1855 rifle-musket, manuac-turing our thousand by the end o 1858.

Te Army also explored the possibility o developing a breech-loading firearm that could be reloaded more rapidly than a muzzle-loading weapon. In 1854, Congress appropriated $90,000 to test andpurchase a breechloader. A series o boards examined a variety oproposals over the next our years, but could not agree on a modelto replace the muzzleloaders or the inantry. Fielding a repeating

rifle offering even greater range, accuracy, and rate o fire thanany muzzleloader or breechloader also proved difficult. Te Coltrevolving rifle model 1855, issued in limited quantities on a trialbasis, requently burned soldiers hands when the paper cartridgesaccidentally ignited in the cylinder. George W. Morse corrected thatproblem in 1858 when he developed metallic cartridges to replacethe paper ones. wo years later he began converting muzzleloadersto breechloaders at the Harpers Ferry Arsenal. Tat project ended

in 1861 when Morse deected to the South and Conederate troopscaptured Harpers Ferry. Meanwhile, by 1860 Northern inventershad developed magazine-ed repeaterssuch as the Spencer andHenry rifles. Tereore, by the outbreak o the Civil War Americahad the technology to produce breechloaders and repeaters. Te U.S.Armys Ordnance Department, however, did not want to undulycomplicate the manuacture and distribution o rifles and ammuni-tion. Consequently, the muzzle-loading rifled musket remained the

standard inantry weapon or both sides during the Civil War, withbreechloaders and repeating rifles confined mostly to cavalry andspecialist units.

Te advent o rifled firearms prompted an interest in marks-manship training, something that had rarely been accomplishedpreviously. Brig. Gen. William S. Harney, commander o the1856 expedition against the Sioux, ordered daily target practiceto ensure his soldiers would be amiliar with their new weapons.

Sergeant Bandel o the 6th Inantry, part o Harneys command orthe campaign, recalled using seventy-five cartridges in one dayalone soon afer he received his rifled musket. In March 1856,the 10th Inantry also instituted marksmanship practice. argetsranged rom two hundred to seven hundred yards. According to


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the regimental history, All shots were recorded and the men classi-fied according to ability. Te 3d Artillery regimental history notedthat the superiority o the rifle was at once strikingly maniest. In1858 the Army codified these efforts by introducing a new targetpractice manual. Nevertheless, by the time the Civil War erupted,marksmanship training was still in its inancy, and in the rush toraise mass armies at the outbreak o the war, such training ofenell by the wayside.

Tere were also improvements in artillery between theMexican War and the Civil War. In 1857 the U.S. Army adoptedthe Napoleon gun-howitzer. Te weapon was named afer theFrench emperor Napoleon III who had introduced it to simpliy

his artillery by combining the unctions o a howitzer and a gun (orcannon) into the same weapon. Te smoothbore, bronze weapon,classified as a 12-pounder because it fired a solid shot projectileweighing twelve pounds, first demonstrated its effectiveness in theCrimean War o 18531856. Te versatile Napoleon gun-howitzercould fire solid shot, explosive shell, spherical caseshot (shrapnel),and canister. o simpliy the supply system, the ordnance depart-ment designed standardized ammunition chests that included a

variety o the types o projectiles the gun could fire.Te Army worked on other aspects o artillery weapons as well.

In the 1840s, 1st Lt. Tomas J. Rodman developed a method o castingiron guns that made them stronger during firing. In the mid-1850s, theArmy began to experiment with rifled artillery at Fort Monroe, and in

Artillerymen of Battery C, 3d U.S. Artillery, at drill on Fort Vancover,Washington Territory, 1860. (National Archives)


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1860 a board o artillery and ordnance officers recommended that atleast 50 percent o the Armys guns at orts and arsenals be convertedinto rifles. Te idea did not prove effective because adding the grovesto existing bronze cannons weakened the barrels. Iron proved to bethe answer. Rifled guns, made o cast iron, began to be manuacturedin a variety o calibers during the winter o 18601861. Capt. RobertP. Parrott o the 3d Artillery developed a method to add a reinorcinghoop on the breech to withstand the strain o firing. Te 10-pounderParrott initially had a 2.9-inch bore, but that increased to 3 inches inlater models to make them compatible with the ammunition used inthe 3-inch Ordnance Rifle introduced in 1861. Napoleons, Parrotts,and Ordnance Rifles would become standard equipment during the

Civil War. However, not all new weapons were equally successul.When Battery G, 4th Artillery, received mountain-howitzers inMay 1855, it ound that afer firing a ew rounds o ammunition atpractice, the materiel was so much injured by the cracking o axles,etc., that the scheme had to be abandoned.

Along with better weapons came a deeper interest in proes-sional literature. In 1846, 1st Lt. Henry W. Hallecks Elements of

Military Art and Science stimulated the study o military theory

Smoothbore Artillery Ammunition Cartridges and Projectiles; and Rifled Artilleryprojectiles (Dover Publications, Royalty Free Clip Art)


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in the United States. Halleck, a graduate o West Point known asOld Brains because o his academic achievements, would rise tothe rank o major general and command the Army or a short timeduring the Civil War.

Much o the new literature ocused on artillery. In 1849,Maj. Alred MordecaisArtillery for the United States Land Servicecodified the American system o artillery. Te manual containedcomplete drawings and descriptions o the different guns, howit-zers, and mortars and their carriages that were in the Armys inven-tory. Te artillery ranged in size rom 6-pounders to 42-poundersand rom 12-pounder Coehorn mortars weighing 164 pounds tothe 10-inch Columbiad weighing 15,260 pounds (unmounted). In

1851 the War Department issued new artillery drill regulations.General orders issued in 1859 established a systematic courseo practical and theoretical artillery instruction and authorizedinspectors to examine artillery units at least once a year. Althoughmany artillery companies were not equipped with guns in the1850s, these measures promoted uniormity in training. Finally,in the late 1850s the War Department ormed a panel to write anew artillery manual. Te resulting Instructions for Field Artillery,

published in 1861, would become the bible o Federal artillerymenduring the Civil War.

15-inch Model 1861(National Archives)


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Meanwhile, afer completing his work on artillery, Mordecaijoined Maj. Richard Delafield and Capt. George B. McClellan ina trip to Europe to study European military institutions and theCrimean War. Teir published findings, as well as those o otherofficers posted to Europe during the period, stimulated Americanstudy o the latest European methods, particularly those o theFrench. One piece o equipment that emerged rom these studieswas a saddle, designed by McClellan and adopted by the Armyin 1859. Te McClellan saddle would remain in service until theArmy disbanded its horse cavalry afer World War II. Less durable,but perhaps more consequential, legacies o this era were new drilland tactical orms inspired by French practice. One prominent

example was Hardees actics, published in 1855 by brevet Lt. Col.(and uture Conederate general) William J. Hardee.

Europe was not the only source o inspiration or Americansoldiers. Based on their usage in Arica and the Middle East, in 1843Capt. George H. Grossman proposed using camels or carryingsupplies in the deserts o the American Southwest. Nothing cameo the idea as he was unable to obtain unding. In 1851, JeffersonDavis, then a senator and chairman o the Senate Military Affairs

Committee, tried but ailed to get unds or the Army to buy thirtycamels. He finally met with success as the secretary o war when heconvinced Congress to appropriate $30,000 to purchase seventy-five camels and transport them rom North Arica to exas.

Camels in Texas,by Tom Lovell(commissioned by the Petroleum Museum in Midlands Texas)


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In April 1859, Lieutenant Hartz, acting quartermaster o the8th Inantry, conducted a trial in the desert country o southernexas along the Rio Grande comparing twenty-our camels andtwenty-our mules to determine the capabilities and useulness [ocamels] as a means o transportation or military purposes. FromMay to August Hartz led his expedition through rugged countryin intense heat with the camels demonstrating that they couldtravel twenty miles a day carrying up to five hundred pounds withlittle or no water. He reported that the superiority o the camelor military purposes in the badly watered sections o the countryseems to me to be established.

he camel experiment came to an end with the beginning

o the Civil War. As Regular Army troops moved east the camelswere sold or released into the wild to end or themselves inthe deserts o Caliornia, Nevada, Arizona, and exas. Somewere killed and eaten by Indians. Others were shot by huntersor rontiersmen. But a ew survived. A work crew or the SantaFe railroad reported seeing a camel in 1913 near Wickenburg,Arizona. Sightings o the animals were also reported near PalmSprings, Caliornia, in 1930

and Ajo, Arizona, in 1931.At about the time the

Army conducted its camelexperiment, another new ideatook root in exas. In 1854,Albert Myer joined the Armyas an assistant surgeon. Myerhad studied medicine at the

University o Buffalo wherehe had also worked or theNew York State elegraphCompany. By combining hismedical education with histelegraph experience he devel-oped a system or dea-mutesto communicate by tapping on

a persons hand or cheek. Whileserving at Fort Duncan, exas,he adapted this sign languageinto a signal system using asingle flag. Letters were trans-

Assistant Surgeon Albert Myer in1854 (U.S. Army Signal Center and

Fort Gordon)


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mitted by waving the flag back and orth in a set pattern or lettersand numbers. Te system became known as wigwag. In 1856,Myer offered his system to the War Department. Te Armys Chieo Engineers, Col. Joseph G. otten, supported the idea. SecretaryDavis did not. When John B. Floyd replaced Davis as secretaryin 1857, otten reintroduced the proposal. Floyd invited Myer toappear beore a board o examination in Washington. Te board,headed by Lt. Col. Robert E. Lee, met in March 1859 and recom-mended urther study o the proposed system.

Based on the boards recommendation, Myer, assisted byseveral other oicers including 2d Lt. Edward P. Alexander,an engineer oicer, began tests at Fort Monroe. he team

soon communicated at distances up to iteen miles. In lateNovember, Myer reported that the tests exceeded expectationsand suggested that the Army adopt the system and put him incharge o it. In February 1860, Myer and Alexander appearedbeore the Senate Committee on Military Aairs, chaired bySenator Davis, and the House Committee on Military Aairs.Based on Myers testimony Congress included $2,000 dollars inthe Armys 1861 budget and approved adding a signal oicer

with the rank o major to the orce structure. In June 1860,the War Department appointed Myer to the position. Within amonth o being appointed, Major Myer set out to New Mexicoerritory where he worked in the ield with Maj. Edward R. S.Canby o the 10th Inantry. he system proved eective duringoperations against the Navajos, prompting Canby to proposea corps o oicers who would specialize in signaling, an ideaMyer embraced. In May 1861, with war on the horizon, Myer

reported or duty at Fort Monroe where he established a schoolto train personnel in his signal system. his marked the birtho the Signal Corps.

he Army and Civil Works

A young nation like the United States could hardly afford to

confine its use o the talent embodied in its officer corps to purelymilitary unctions. From the first the government had relied onthe Army to explore new territories, and with the U.S. MilitaryAcademy offering the only courses in engineering in the UnitedStates until the 1830s, it had logically become a major source or


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skilled builders, designers, and cartographers. Prior to the warwith Mexico, Army engineers had helped plan roads, railroads,and canals. Afer the war, Army engineers continued to help buildthe nation.

Army topographical engineers had begun supervising theconstruction o lighthouses in 1834, and when the Federal govern-ment established a Lighthouse Board in 1852, three Army officersserved as members. Te board supervised lighthouse constructionand inspection. Army engineers also served in each o the twelvelighthouse districts and designed and built a variety o lighthouses.Seminole and Mexican War veteran George G. Meade excelled atthe task. As a lieutenant and captain in the 1850s Meade designed

and built several lighthouses in New Jersey including those atLong Beach Island, Atlantic City, and Cape May, and in Florida atJupiter, and in the Florida Keys. Meade would then go on to surveythe Great Lakes. Another Army engineer, Maj. Hartman Bache,borrowed a design rom British engineers to build the first screw-pile lighthouse in the United States at the mouth o the DelawareBay. wisting the screw piles into the bottom o the bay securedthe structure to the seafloor. Both Meade and Bache were destined

or general officer rank, with Meade rising to command the Armyo the Potomac during the Civil War.

In Washington, D.C., Army engineers built aqueducts,bridges, and public buildings. In 1853, Lt. Montgomery C. Meigs,

Topographical Engineers exploring the Colorado River near Chimney Peak(National Archives)


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uture Quartermaster General or the Union Army during theCivil War, received the mission o constructing a permanentwater supply or the city. Te project included an aqueduct withtwo bridges that later carried traffic as well as water pipes acrossthe Cabin John and Rock creeks. In the years leading up to theCivil War Meigs also supervised additions to the Capitol whichincluded the House and Senate Wings and the dome.

Prompted by the periodic floods that occurred along thelower Mississippi River, Congress appropriated $50,000 or atopographical and hydrographical survey o the Mississippi Deltain September 1850. Te survey included a study o how best todevelop a twenty-oot navigation channel at the mouth o the river.

Capt. Andrew A. Humphreys initiated the survey. In 1857, 2d Lt.Henry L. Abbot joined him. Four years later the two men coau-thored Report upon the Physics and Hydraulics o the MississippiRiver, a document that influenced the development o river engi-neering and the evolution o the Corps o Engineers or the nextsixty years. Both men would become generals in the Union Army.

West Pointers Bide heir ime

Te years between the end o the Mexican War and the starto the Civil War were ones o conflict, innovation, and industry,and those who ought, thought, and built received ew rewards.Promotion was slow in the antebellum Army, and a West Pointeducation did not make the process any aster. Between itsounding in 1802 and the beginning o the Civil War in 1861 the

U.S. Military Academy graduated 1,966 cadets, about hal o whomserved in the Mexican War. By 1861, 750 o the 1,063 graduatesstill living were on active service in the Army. Even though WestPoint had been producing officers or more than fify years andabout 75 percent o the Armys 1,098 officers in 1861 were gradu-ates, ew o them served in senior leadership positions. None othe Armys our general officers at the start o the Civil War wereWest Point graduates. Indeed, three o the our were veterans o

the War o 1812. O the nineteen regimental colonels, only six hadgraduated rom the U.S. Military Academy.Te promotion system had little or no room or flexibility. It

all depended on an officers date o rank. Officers were promotedwithin the regiment as openings became available, usually when


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an officer lef the Army or died. With no retirement program,officers tended to remain on active service as long as possible,regardless o age or physical infirmities. Officers spent manyyears as lieutenants and captains waiting or a vacancy to openup ahead o them. In the years beore the Civil War it took anaverage o orty-our years or an officer to reach the rank ocolonel in the artillery. Te inantry ared a bit better, taking anaverage o only thirty-seven years o service to attain that grade.In the mounted arms, it took just twenty-one years o serviceto be promoted to colonel, because when Congress added twocavalry regiments to the Regular Army in 1855, it created vacan-cies or field grade officers who were selected rom the three

existing mounted regiments in the Army, thereby lowering theaverage promotion time.

Officers could gain rank outside the rigid seniority systemby means o a brevet. Te brevet, usually awarded or gallantryin battle, entitled an officer to wear the insignia o a higher rank,although it did not authorize higher pay. In the Mexican War, manyofficers received brevet ranks that they continued to hold afer thewar while they waited to be

promoted to permanent rankswithin the regimental struc-ture. Lee, or example, a captainin the engineers, receivedthree brevets or distinguishedservice in Mexico, allowinghim to wear the rank o colonelor many years beore he was

ormally promoted to that rankin 1861. Although appointedsuperintendent o the U.S.Military Academy at West Pointin 1852, his permanent rankremained a captain o engineersuntil 1855 when SecretaryDavis appointed him the lieu-

tenant colonel o the newlyorganized 2d Cavalry. Six yearslater Lee received a promotionto colonel in the 1st Cavalry,

Major Joseph Hooker(Courtesy of William Schultz

Collection)


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but he resigned shortly thereafer to take command o the statemilitary orces o Virginia.

Not all West Point graduates opted or Army lie313o those still living in 1861 had resigned to try their hand atcivilian careers with mixed success. Some thrived as civilians;others altered. wo men who altered were Ulysses S. Grantand William . Sherman. Afer receiving brevet promotions tothe rank o captain during the Mexican War, Sherman resignedin September 1853 and Grant lef in July 1854. Sherman triedbanking and law beore becoming the superintendent o theLouisiana State Seminary o Learning and Military Academy inPineville, Louisiana. Grant tried arming, selling real estate, and

running or county engineer. He ended up a clerk in the amilyleather store in Galena, Illinois. Te two men met briefly on astreet in St. Louis in late 1857. Having not seen each other insixteen years they compared notes on their lack o success incivilian lie and agreed, as Sherman recalled, that West Point andthe Regular Army were not good schools or armers, bankers,merchants, and mechanics.

he Army on the Eve of War

By December 1860, the Armys authorized strength totaledabout 18,000 officers and men, but only 16,367 were on the rolls.O these, 1,108 were commissioned officers, our were generalofficers (one major general who served as the commandinggeneral and three brigadier generals), and the rest were either lineofficers assigned to the regiments or staff officers serving in the

War Department. Tere were 361 staff officers assigned to the ninebureaus and departments, all o which were headed by colonels,although several held staff brevets o brigadier general. Tebureau chies were men o long service, averaging sixty-our yearso age, with six over seventy. Te 743 line officers served in theregiments: 351 in the inantry, 210 in the artillery, and 182 in themounted units. As with the bureau chies in the War Department,the nineteen regimental colonels were mostly old men set in their

ways. Tey ranged in age rom orty-two to eighty, the averagebeing sixty-three.Te officers in each regimental headquarters consisted o

a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, two majors, an adjutant, and aquartermaster. Te adjutant and quartermaster were lieutenants


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detailed rom the line companies except in the mounted regimentswhich were authorized additional lieutenants or the headquar-ters. Te enlisted staff included a sergeant major, a quartermastersergeant, and a chie musician. Inantry and artillery regimentswere each authorized twenty musicians while mounted regimentshad two chie buglers. Because Congress in 1850 had authorizedunits in the West to receive more men than those in the East, regi-mental strength could vary significantly. Teoretically a regimentin the West could have as many as nine hundred soldiers, but noregiment ever reached that size. With recruitment and desertionbeing perennial problems, a typical regiment averaged 300 to 400enlisted men with 1 or 2 officers and 30 to 40 men in each company.

With ten inantry and five mounted regiments o ten compa-nies each (the 8th Inantry had only nine) and our artillery regi-ments o twelve companies each, there were a total o 197 line, orcombat, companies in the United States Army on the eve o theCivil War. O these, only eighteen, all artillery, were stationed easto the Mississippi River.

As Southern states started to secede rom the Union in thewinter o 18601861 ollowing Abraham Lincolns victory in the

presidential election, secessionists seized control o most Federalarsenals and orts in the South but allowed the officers and mento move north. One significant exception was the island bastiono Fort Sumter located in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina.President Lincolns reusal to surrender the ort and the subse-quent secessionist attack on it marked the ormal outbreak o theCivil War.

Te regular regiments responded well to the crisis. Tey

assembled their ar-flung detachments, marched east to join thefight, and, although miniscule in number compared with the morethan seventeen hundred state volunteer regiments that served inthe Union Army during the war, acquitted themselves well. Butwhile the enlisted ranks remained solidly loyal, the Regular Armyofficer corps was more ractured. Capt. Charles Mortons descrip-tion o the situation acing the officers in Regiment o MountedRiflemen in late 1860 typified the dilemma o the officer corps:

One-third o our people had plunged into secession believingit right, another third declaring coercion wrong, but the otherthird taking the stand that saved the Union. Some o the officersimbibed the epidemic political heresy o States Rights, and atno little sacrifice, cast their lot with the seceded States, breaking


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close, tender and cherished ties o comradeship, and severing

their connection with a service they revered and honored.Among those who cast their lot with the Conederacy were 168West Point graduates. O the other graduates in the Army, 556remained loyal to the Union while 26 took no active part in thewar. About 20 percent o the officer corps as a whole resignedrom active service in 1861 to join the Conederate orces. As orthose U.S. Military Academy graduates who had lef the Armylike Grant, Sherman, and Bragg, nearly 200 returned to don a

uniorm92 wore Conederate gray and 102 put on the blue othe Union Army.Regardless o which side they chose, Regular Army officers

o the antebellum Army would have a disproportionate effecton the war. By the end o the war, 217 o the 583 men who hadachieved general officer rank in the Federal Army were WestPoint graduates. One hundred orty-six o the Conederacys 425general officers were West Point graduates. But their impact went

beyond that. According to Civil War historian . Harry Williams,O the sixty biggest battles, West Point graduates commandedboth armies in fify-five, and in the remaining five a West Pointercommanded one o the opposing armies. Leavened on the rontierand in Mexico, the men o the antebellum officer corps would

Some Army installations, like Fort Moultrie, Charleston, South Carolina, werelocated in states that began seceding from the Union. (Accessible Archives)


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largely acquit themselves well in the greatest struggle the nationhad known up to that point.

Te Army o 1860, although woeully undermanned, wasa much more effective orce than the one that had marched intoMexico just fifeen years earlier. It had better weapons and a moreproessional officer corps. But like the Army o 1845, it would soonace a conflict or which it was unprepared. Afer the MexicanWar, during a decade and a hal o conducting small, independentoperations on the rontier, junior officers had gained consider-able experience in leading men in combat, but virtually none othe Armys senior leadership had ever ought a major battle. Menwho had commanded companies o one hundred or ewer soldiers

soon ound themselves leading brigades, divisions, and corps.Even more so than in the Mexican War, the Army was about toundergo a stunning transormation as the nation rushed pell-melltoward mobilizing what would eventually become a million-manorce o citizen soldiers who would fight to preserve the Union.


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Further Readings

Ball, Durwood.Army Regulars on the Western Frontier, 18481861.Norman: University o Oklahoma Press, 2001.

Eisenhower, John S. D. Agent of Destiny: Te Life and imes ofGeneral Winfield Scott. New York: Te Free Press, 1997.

McCaffrey, James M. Army of Manifest Destiny: Te AmericanSoldier in the Mexican War, 18461848. New York: New YorkUniversity Press, 1992.

Ness, George . Jr., Te Regular Army on the Eve of the Civil War.Baltimore, Md.: oomey Press, 1990.

Utley, Robert M. Frontiersmen in Blue: Te United States Armyand the Indian, 18481865. New York: Macmillan, 1967.Reprinted Lincoln: University o Nebraska Press, 1981.

For more inormation, please read other titles in the series Te

U.S. Army Campaigns o the Mexican War and Te U.S. ArmyCampaigns o the Civil War published by the U.S. Army Centero Military History (www.history.army.mil).


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The Regular Army Before the Civil War

Documents

Transcript of The Regular Army Before the Civil War